CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE AS SANITIZED
Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Attack
THIS ESTIMATE IS SUBMITTED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AND CONCURRED INHE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD.
Ihe following intelligence organizations participated in ihe preparation of the estimatei
the Centrol Intelligence Agency and tht .nteliigence argonliaiioni of ihooi State ond Defense,, ondAEC.
The Deputy Dprodor ototives
Ihe Director ot Intelligence ond Research,Slot*
Tho Director, Defame Intelligence Agency The Director, Notional Security Agency
The AsslUont General Monager for Notional Security, Atomic Energy Commotion Abstaining:
The Assistant Direclor, federal Bureau of Investigation, lhe Special Assistant lo lhe Secretary of the Treasury, Depaflrront of the Treasury, lhe subject being outside of their jurisdfctlon.
SVuiliInu tluliiu i
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
. .iATiru.ni |
SOVIET FORCES FOR INTERCONTINENTAL ATTACK
Proscnl Intercontinental Ballistic Mivttlc Forces
Target Sectors Infercontincnta! Ballistic Missile LVvelopment
New Silo Programs
Goals of thu Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Force Modernization Program
Submarine launched Ballistic Missile
Future Stibtna- ine- Launched Ballistic Missile Systems
Heavy Bombers and Tinkers
Implications (or Soviet Policy of the Present Strategic Effort
lllmtrativo Future Forces
Likely Soviet Courses of Action
Implications of the Future Forces
APPROVED FOR RELEASE CIA H! STORrCV1EW PRO GRAM
SOVIET FORCES FOR INTERCONTINENTAL ATTACK
The Soviets are now wellroad range of programs tomodernize, and improve their forces for intercontinentalhis round offollows hardarge-scale, sustained deployment effort that left the USSR considerably ahead of the US in numbers of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers and in process of taking the lead in submarine launched ballistic(SLBM )conceived long before the Interimwas signed innd most of the programs involved were already evident or foreseeable at that time. Nevertheless, theyreadth and concurrency of effort which is unprecedented, particularly in the field of ICBM development. Quesiions thus arise
'Thii Emma tit ij concerned with lhc mafo- elements of Soviet strategic attach forces cpceifiintended for iiitercorittiienulcertain SLBMs. and heavy hocihc.-i. The present sire and composition of these forces are summarued indf the Estimate. OtherSoviet Miliury Posture and Policies in lhc Thirdnd thueres dealing with Warsaw Pact forces lot operation! in tlnrnsia, discuSi other forces with some strategic Bin! tactical intcirontinciiul capabilities.
concerning Soviet willingness to accept additional limitations on their intercontfnental attack forces and thc potential effect on the strategic balance if such limitations are not Imposed.
Thc Soviets are presently testing fourollow-on to thcnd probably alsoobile missile, oneollow-on to thend two as replacements for thell four incorporate new guidance and reentry systems, and two ofew launchhree have been tested with multipletargctablc reentry vehicleshough two of these three have also been tested with single RVs. The othera post-boost vehicle (PBV) which could be used to dispense MIRVs, (ml all tests to date have been withingle reentry wrickf testing proceeds smoothly, all could be ready to begin deployment as early5 or soon thereafter.
Meanwhile, the Soviets have begunew version of the widely deployedith three nan-independently target-able reentry vehiclest three complexes in eastern Siberia and two in thc Ukraine. At the latter complexes, existingilos are now being converted, either for theariant or for one of the follow-on missiles. Conversion of existingilos to accommodate theollow-on has also begun at one complex.
Production oflnss submarine, withm missile, is continuing apace, with constructiontretched version large enough toubes now under way. In addition, the Soviets are well along with the developmentonger0 nm) missile with MRVs for thc widelylassand are preparing toollow-on to the larger missile carried bylass.
The new swing-wing strategic bomber we call Backfire is being introduced into Long Range Aviationll Agencies but Army mid Air Force believe it best suited lor peripheral missions,
urtliBt Oirf ef Staff. Itfc&feaoa, USAF, beiirwi Out tM mem matie ivWemi mow Drain Kitin* uW csU Uonch frchMqu* -iR be tkety tonitre cepebaXy See ho fooinole Id pirgpiphf lhe EiBnele tor furihn donmfon.
and CM and Navy believe it is primarily intended for this role. Army and Air Force believe that Backfire is suitableariety of missions including intercontinental attack, but that it would be prudent to await additional evidence beforeudgment on its primary role.
The present Soviet activity doubtless reflects in part internaland technological drives and the concernsountry which still sees itselfynamic strategic competition with the US and also has concerns about China and other potcnlial foes.the present Soviet effort involves more than can readily beas merely trying to keep up with the competition.
On the one hand:
Thc Soviets have longeed to catch up in MIRVs and other aspects of technology if they are to continue to be accepted as strategic equals of the US. They appear genuinely concerned about such US programs as, and SRAM.
Increased concern for survivability is reflected in development of harder silos and launch control facilities for tlie new Soviet ICBMs and probably figured in the apparent Soviet interest in land mobile ICBMs, in the desire to expand the SLBM force, and in introduction of thc long-range missile forlass submarini,
The Soviel emphasis on MIRVs and the apparent interest in greater targeting flexibility for ICBMs probably reflectrowing requirement to plan for variousincreasingly involving China and perhaps oilier peripheral targets as well as tho US.
In this connection, analysis completed within the last yearthat though all Soviet ICBMs can be directed against thc US.tandardlic last third of the force to bespecifically oriented so as also to provide full coverage of China or more extensiveof other peripheral areas. The broad targeting flexibility of lhehich makes this possible has been further cx-
tended with tho newariant now beingpresumably also with the new ICBMs.
On the other hand, Soviet actions almost certainlyope thai vigorous pursuit of their opportunities under the Interimand any subsequent accords that may be achieved will enable them to improve their relative positionis the US. Though they have probably not decided whether they could get away with it, their objectives probably include an opportunistic desire to press ahead andargin of superiority if they can. Thus:
The MIRVing of the largeollow-on, thend evident Soviet Interest in greater accuracy for ICBMs almost certainlyesire for improved ability to strike at US strategicfactor long stressed in Soviet strategic
The Soviets must recognize that extensive MIRVing of ihcir ICBMs would threaten to leave the US behind in independently targetable weapons, as well as in delivery vehicles.
Each of the new ICBMs has substantially more throw weight than the missile it is evidently designed to replace. Deployment of the new systems in large numbers would thus provide the USSR with an even greater advantage in missile throw weight than now exists.
In sum. the Soviets have been laying the groundwork for very substantial improvements in already large and formidableattack forces. This process is not yet irreversible, and the Soviets may prove willing to accept some curbs on it within the broader context of their detente policy. Nevertheless, they have shown little disposition to exercise voluntary restraint.
How far thc Soviets will go in carrying out current programs will depend fn the first instance on the outcome of SALT II and. inon how successful the US is in persuading them that they cannot have both substantially improving strategic capabilities and the benefits of detente, simultaneously and indefinitely; thatpursuit of present programs will provoke offsetting US
reactions which could jeopardize their competitive position; and that restraint on their part would be reciprocated.1
In absenceew agreement constraining the Soviet strategic buildup, thc Soviets will presumably continue most of the broad array of programs dow under way. Moreover, they arc continuing to expand their large research and development facilities. Earlyis probably already under way for new or improved follow-ons for the new missile systems now in flight test.
Our examination of various ways in whichuildup might proceed leads us Io believe that under no foreseeable circumstances in the nextears arc the Soviets likely to develop thc ability to reduce damage to themselves to acceptable levelsirst strike against US strategic forces. The Soviets would have to calculate lhat the US would be able toevastating reply to any Sovietattack.
Exceptinimal effort, however, tlie Sovicis, ifare likely by theo surpass programmed US forces in numbers of missile RVs and increase their considerable superiority in missile throw weight, while retaining their advantage in numbers of delivery vehicles. These static measures of strategic power would convey an imageargin of Soviet superiority to those who ascribe high sign:- : to these measures.
In addition, the Soviet strategic forces now beingwhatever their specificprobably have better counter-force capabilities than the present ones. How much betteratter of considerable uncertainty.
Unless Soviet ICBMs obtain better accuracies thanQ
^ they would have to assign more than one weapon to each target toarge portion of the US ICBM forces.
: "Sovtrl Sn.Mftci and LXkoU. Wh.l Aie TV,
UpturiOP SECRET. ALLu.uM.i Sovct iiraircii pobou indin the pirxnt ronltn ol SALT nffon*Ooni
However, we will probably be unable to determine the accuracies of the new Soviet ICBMs with confidence. And we willremain uncertain about both the feasibility of attacking targets wiih more than one weapon, which involves someproblems, and about Soviet willingness to rely onactic.
All In all. the strategic relationship over tlie next decade is likely to be much more sensitive to uncertainties Like these than to more readily measurable factors such as launcher or weapon numbers. More than ever, the strategic, and especially theimpact of the Soviet buildup will probablyreat deal on how it is perceived abroad, in the US and elsewhere.
Soviet! ar* now well iQto aof program! to augment,Improve their forcei (orThis new round olhardarge-scale, sustainedeffort which left the USSRahead of the US in numbers oft and io process of tailing theSLBMconceived longthc Interim Agreement wasnd most of the programsalready evident or foreseeable atNevcrtheiess. at least in the fielddevelopment, they represent aconcurrency of effort which isQuestions thus ariseSoviet willingness to accepton their mtercoatsncntaland the potential effect on theif such limitations aie not imposed.
Estimate discusses the makeupof currently deployed Sovietintercontinental attack, assesses tbcpotential o: new weapons under develop-
ment, and summ&rircs the factors probably infljencme present and future strategic amis policy. It concludes byet ofIllustrating different ways in which the makeup and capabilities of Sovietattack forces might ovolvo over the years to come.
PRESENT INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILE FORCES
t ofhe Sovietsperational ICDM launchers deployed in units atomplexes, includingoftaunchers which ereeduced state of readiness and probably arc in the process of beiutf deactivated. In addition, thereaunchers still under construction or undergoing rnoderntzation or conversion When the construction and conversionare completed, the Soviets willaunchers deployed excluding sixaunches* which are no longer consideredThere is also some cvtdence thatauncheri at Tyuratam lie maintainedart of the operational force.
of Soviet Imcrcontinental Ballistic Missile Lauuchers4 as of3
blrrvcMfilonv*sde Eleven ofhegreement The SovitU
believe ore liUcrided for command And control although Lhey appear
ie under coriitruetion lS# time of lh< Kgriirt# tOnair notion of lh* otherWJ,
which moy represent ih* bcxtontrw ofecaua* moal of them rotild
'Si* or iheie *r*i beic* convtMftd HI lhe ivcw'-iMv more,heie ftlo* hitused lo WAI lhe X
ith its combination of accuracy and yield, thc larges the only presently deployed Soviet ICBMignificantto attack hardotalaunchers have been deployed in tbe field.
"^Although severalami development) tests of thcook place this yearwo year hiatus, ihey did not demonstrate the increased flexibility necessary for an effective MIRV system. Oneroup at another complex is being converted for thc
he liquid-propellants the rough counterpart ol the US Minuteman and has beiwi deployed in comparable numbers. Its effective capability at intercontinental rangeimited to attacks on soft targets.
_JThe Modhich has three RVs (hat cannot be independently targeted, was probably initially intended to facilitateof antiballistic missile (AIJM)It also has greater targeting flexibilityreater payload than thc Modow-
ever, making it more effective against some soft targets.!
evelopment of another variant of the SS-irrihe Modhich was designed to counter ADM defenses, has evidently been cancelled.
he USSR's only operational solid-propellant ICBM, thes deployed inilosingle complex. It is less accurate than they our calculations can reach only the northern half of thc US, and generally appears to have been a disappointment.
ndounding out thc ICBM force are justnd SS-Ss,on soft sites or in clusters of three silos in the. These will have to beif thc Soviets wish to have all ofodem SLUM launchers permitted under thc Interim Agreement.quipment or fixed components atf1oft launchers have been removed or relocated, so as to suggest deactivation.is in process. One small complex with six launchers appears to have been completely taken overotorized rifle division within fhe hist year and is believed to be inoperative, although thc launch pads have not beenThe other sites, however, canull operational statushortas done in the case of one site. We think thc Soviets may have been experimenting in the ways to demonstrate that sites are being dismantled and will wait until there are agreed demanding procedures before completely phasing theseut.
OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS Target Sectors
ll operationally deployed Soviet ICBM silos arc sited to permit use against the US. and Uie bulk of them are probably Intended for that role. New analysis completed within the last year, however. Indicates thathird of thenits in the fieldf
I provide extendedof China and other peripheral areas as well. We believe that at least some ofand possiblytheir primaryin these areas
intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) launchers in the eastern USSH at about thc same time these alios were being completed, thes represent the only land-basedavailableime-urgent basis against strategic targets in China and elsewhere in the Far East.
ilos__Jprovide tlte first extensive coverage ofdle East and the Indian subcontinent as well as Europe and the US. Thereumber of reasons for believing that at least some of Ihem have primary targets in Europe. In
ine sail mc geting flexibility.^
hard targets such as the French IRBMheai even greater tar-
U- Although targets in northeast China could be attacked from somedosQ
J provide the first fullof China. With the deactivation of the 39
A*%'iiming that follow-on systems now under development have comparably broad taiget sectors. Soviet strategic planners should have considerable leeway In adapting their attack plans to various circumstances and
The new analysis reinforces our view thai thehc only other ICBM on which target sectors arc known, is targeted primarily against ICBM fields in the VS.f_
etargeting. We havo no directon how difficult and time-consuming it is to retarget Soviel ICBMs. We think it likely thai Soviet launch crews can direct changes In range and minor changes in
ajor changeazimuth for Ihend SS-7
cumbersome and time consuming process.
perational Readiness of the Force. All Indications jxitiilelatively low day-to-day level of readiness for the present Soviet ICBM force, in lino with Soviet expectations thai iiny hostilities would be precedederiod of international tensions in which readi-new could be increased as needed, f
ommand and Control. The Sovietcommand and control networks areto provide rapid, timely, and reliable dissemination nf commands to thc strategic forces. Steady improvements have been made over thc last decade in the ability of these networks to survive an enemy nuclear attack. In addition, the Soviets are continuing de-velopment of an airborne miliiary command and control system. It seems likely that the airborne posts will be given an operational command role.
INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS
ile Soviets arc presently testing fourollow-on lo thend probably alsoobile missile, oneollow-on to thend two asfor theH four Incorporate new guidance and reentry systems, and two ofew launch technique. Three of them have been tested with MIRVs and thc other alsoBVould be used to dispense thern. If testing proceeds smoothly, all of them could be ready to beginas early5 or soon thereafter.
olid-propellant missile which has been fired at least once fiom anilo and is an obvious candidate tolhat missile, lt is about the same size as thcut lacks the latler's range/payload limitations, in partesult of usinglight liber glass rather lhan metal motor cases. Mnst (and probably all) shots havea KBV that could be used to carry MIRVs. However, lhe Soviets have Ihu* far onlyingle RV. Total throw weightm range wouldounds.
he-hould be considerably more accurate lhan the
With four RVi. thceight
heaunch assist device which ejects it from the silo before the main engines ignite, so that no space is required within thc silo for venting exhaust gases.
here aie various indications lhal thc Soviets areobile as wellilo-based version of the
hc MIHV version of theill probably not be available"
ff thc Soviets elected toingle higT^ beta RV version of theest program of six monlhsear would be required.
that Iheystem can filtandardiloi which we believesable depth of abouteet.r*
Theiquid-propellantwhichodifiedilo and it one of two possible replacements for that missile Down range testing began in
All but tbc first five tests of theave Involved a
he largest of thc new ICBMs being tested by the USSR, thehrow weight
intendedollpw-on to the
. i. . . . S01 Kamchatka, the
'r8an ha*IRV pav-
his mwsileaunch assist Idata indicate that
to^propc!marries six RVs^
he first nine firings of the8 eachingle, blunt RV. The next fourin August, September, and Octobera PBV and probably five
then, the Soviets haveests with the single RV and une with MIRVs.
he test program for the single RVof thes well ahead of that for the MIRV version. We estimate that thequippedingle RV could befor deploymentnless thequicken tlir pace of MIRV testing, that version piobably will not be available uiitd the following year.
nother potential replacement for the SS.IL thenderwent^
^testing3APrii of lW3-Our knowledge ol its characteristics is scanty. We know that it does notaunch assist deviccf"
here is good evidence that theeeper silo than thehe silo used foi two sboit-rangc silo compitibility tests of the2ormerilo which had evidently been deepened. All flight tests to Kamchatka have come from new small silos which are deeper than weilos to bc.Q
NEW SILO PROGRAMS
our types of new silos or silocan be related to the new missilenow under way.
wo modifiedilos ut Tyuratam have been uwl for all firings of the7 They are equipped with hinged, plug-type doors in place of slidingchange
which makes them somewhat harder. Their inner diameter at the top is abouteet, as compared with abouteet forilos.
The other three types of silos areew. harder configuration on whichbegan in0 at Tyuratam and seven operational ICBM cornpleies. The walls of al* three type* are constructed by installingformed by heavy metal reinforcing rods attached to an inner steel liner and thenthe space between the liner and the silo core with concrete. The head works are formed from heavy steel components. They all have hinged, plug-type doors that fit flush with tbe surface.
The new tmall tilo (thc Type lll-Chas an internal diameter ofoact, and measurements of silo components lead us to believe that it has an overall depth ofeetsable depth ofonse five feet deepertandardour prototype silos of thisof them convertedtand CO are deployed in groups oft Dcrazhnya and Pervomaysk. three groups al each complex. These silos in the field are being initially equipped with theedli of whose test firings over the last two years were fromilos. Typeilos, however, have also been used for all downrange flight tests of theakingandidate to replace these Modhen development if completed.
ne group of standardilos at Derarhnya and one group at Pervomaysk are being convertedew configuration which uses headworki and doors of the type used inilos. It docs not appear, however, that
the heavy typeilo wall segments will ba installed and it is not yet clear whether these silos will be deepened. If they are not deepened, the converted silos couldthe SSodut not the
The new 'urge silo (Type 1II-F) has an interior diameter ofoeet whichto abouteet at the top. and ittosable depth ofeet Ten silos of this type, two ofilos, have been used for testing of thet Tyuratam. Twenty moie have been under construction in the field since lateat each of five SS-9Inroup of sixilos at the Dornbaronkiy complex beganconversion to the new configuration.
A second type of new large silo (Type III X) has the same inner diameter ns.oect. It also narrows tn abouteet at the top. It differs ftom the III-F. however. In that itircular rathe;ectangular door, appears to be onlyeet deep, and has associated construction not present with the MI-F.
e believe that theilo Istoaunch control capsule. In allingleilo has been collocatedroup ofrilos. The new small libs at Derarhnya and Peivomayik, all of which are now ettrrmilly complete have no other discernible launch control facilities.
^ large canistersp.nently related equipment have beennearnstallations al Tyuratam
af the two complexesllos aie collocated with the new muvQilos.
he useilo to home launchfacilities is the only reasonableof the appearance3ilo excavation adjacent to tlie launch controloff theriginal SS-tl launch groups at Dcrazhnya and Pervomaysk. It is highly unlikely that the Soviets, if they decided to breach the Interim Agreement's han on new fixed ICBM launchers, would do so in soashion. Although construction hat not progressed sufficiently for us to determine their eventual size and configuration, wethat these silos will turn out to be Ill-Xs ot variants thereon.
GOALS Of IHE INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILE FORCE MODERNIZATION PROGRAM
everal broad goals are discernible in tho current modernisation activities. Greater survivability and hence greater Sovietin the survivability of their strategicdeterrent will result from new siloprograms, from hardened andcommand and control, and from tbea mobile ICDM.guidance systems and tho introduction of MIRVs will provide improved fleaibdity and the capability toonsiderably larger number of targets. Tlie capabilily to attack large numbers of hard targets will also be possible although it if too early to judgrigh degree of confidence theor yield of RVs carried by fhe new systems. These improvements have beenby advances in propubaonew launch technique.
he new ICBM silos are considerably harder than any the Soviets have built in tbe
general, the new silos are betteragainst high blast overpressures,effects, and, perhaps, also from ground shock, than their predecessors.
he provisionIRV capability for all four systems under development will greatly Increase the number of targets that would be attacked if the USSR were to strike first, and thc potential coverage of those'ICBMs which would survive il thc US were to strike first. The new systems will also provide greater flexibility in targeting. We assume lhat all uuw systems will have broad target sectors like theodn addakm, u>ndre designed so thatf^
term it rapidfrom one point inTJvc US to another wiih only minima) degradation in accuracy.
he Soviets also appear to be seeking Impioved ICBM accuracy. In contrast to the blunt RVs typical of the past, RVs having ballistic coefficents greatersf have been tested with al) four new ICBMs, thereby reducing an important obstacle toof high ICBM accuracy, reentry
e have little evidence regarding the accuracy of any of the new ICBMs. It would be reasonable, liowever, to estimate that they are at least somewhat better than the best of the present svstcms-T
I wc estimate thata Die
new systems are capaBTe of achieving CEPs oft may takeyears of additional flight testing after IOC to reach that level of accuracy. We believe it is unlikely thai Ihc Soviets could achieve CEPs as low5 nm before the end of this decade or early in the neat. This would require considerably more component improvement or system modification than we think isin missiles currently being tested.
wo of the new missiles being tested, thend theselaunch assist device which ejects thc missile from the silo before the main engines ignite, so that no space is required within the silo for venting exhaust gases. This permits the use of silos of smaller diameter and, al least with theS. greater hardness, than would be possible with similar mistdes using the conventional hot launch technique. Thc new technique would also permit silos to be refurbished and reloaded more rapidly than In the caseot launch, since they would not be damaged by flames and hot gases. We do not believe, however, that the Soviets intend loefire capability for these or otber deployed silo based ICBM systems, as they have for older soft ICBM
SUBMARINE LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILE FORCES
s ofhe SovietsLUM-launchers onuclear submarines whleh have reached operational status, plus at least another ISO launchers on units still
of Stall, Intelligence. I '1
bcli've* thai the two new ni bilksunder test which us* lhe cold Uurch technique willeiveHitHe not**Sovietslongnpoasn on the mantle refire principle it evieVac* io iheir Mfl/IRBMt, thehe soli and hard launched Im thend the hardenedver Ihe vein Ihere have been eitem.ve fjir.fj of various types of ICBMi frocc openuonalfollowed hr relirtuhmeel asdi( el the uh> Aif tS- fourteenlriniii noted to dlle have been Iromi lo! using lhe new cold launchAnalyses
COTKlx" "ist uir lhe UuEck jJ*
would permit icfire houri.
nom oi tbe rm maeilei alio permitseasy fiaas-poriahcn Irommany milri Irom ihrii
I II lot.
At leastnJKjnl strategic advantages accrueo* capabJiry. ICBM 'trepowc*etTecrivelr mereaaed. wnde remaining within the limits of the SAi.it In addition llw SovieU could employ pari ol their ICIIM forcehird country coioijnitquickly men-iniuie that force for oevneot reiue capability against lha VS.
under construction, lifting out, or on tea trials-There are alioaunchers on older diesel
production of theubesubmarine probably endedlass units withubesup the bulk of thc SLBM force forto come.lass has thus farwith thoissile, which hastango ofewer Mod 2demonstrated range. Two versions, one with aand one carryingargetable RVs.en observed.
Twolass units, carrying the long-rangeissile, have now joined the fleet, and production of additional units, at an expected combined rate ofear, is continuing at both Severodvinsk and Korruomohli.
An important change in our evaluationlass capabilities has been necessitated by three of thc final developmental firings of then2 whichapabilitymrevioushad gone no furtherm.Agency differences persist as to the.of thoystem. Navy continues toystemfull range. All other Agencies believesystems accuracy is considerably poorer, on tho Order off"
in service antallisticbuilt82
of them diesel powered. Oneass nuclear-powered unit was used fortesting of thenelass unit has been convertedest bed for the SSntiship rnissiie, andis apparently intended (or testing athc size of the.
mall portion of the SLBM force is normally at sea. In line with readiness levels in other strategic components und tho Soviet view that hostilities would come onlyeriod ol international tension. Even allowing for anlass patrol off the US west coast which was added last August, onlylass units, two off each coait. areon station. Allowing for ships in transit, only five orlass units are at sea at any time as compared to aboutS balbstic missile submarines. This Imbalance is only slightly offset by continuation of some H-lass patrols. Although C-lass units continue to appear off the east coast of the US.ass units in the Pacific have been gradually movedew base on the Sea of Japan, and are probably now targeted against China and US bases in the Far East.
There is is yet no direct evidence on how the Soviets will employ tbe I) class. It is probably intended primarily for use against thelass units could cover most targets in tha US, and peripheral ones as well, with-out even leaving port but we think they will use patrol patterns promising betterThey might, for example, attempt tosanctuary areas which could he snemed off against hostile antisubmarine warfare (ASW) activities. Alternatively, they might take advantage of the't range by using broad ocean areas
FUTURE SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS
andisons in LRA equipped for aerial refueling.
To approach thc limitodem SLBM launchers onubmarines allowed under thc Interim Agreement will require in-Iroduclionubmarine with more than theubes oflass.f^
jThe lead unit of thiswille launched
here are continuing indications that the Soviets arc workingollow-onor
HEAVY BOMBERS AND TANKERS
he heavy bombers and tankers olLRAurboprop Bears,f them equipped withmangaroo missile and five configured forandurbojet Bisons, aboutitted out as tankers Thc force hasat about the present size for the past decade, in marked contrast to the growth of Soviet ICBM and SLBM forces. Soviet heavy bomber units continue to trainariety of missions, including attack of enemy naval forces and reconnaissance as well as fheone of intercontinental attack. The Bison tankers arc sometimes used to refuel Bears of Naval Aviation as well as theeajs
Testing of the new twin-engine swing-wing bomber that we call Backfire iscomplete, and series production has begun, probablyodified versionBackfire B, which was first identifiedll Backfires that we have seen so far have been equippedefueling probe.
An engineering analysis of theompleted3 calculates that itsun refueled radius wouldmound bomb load flying sub-sonically at high altitude with its wings fully extended;m flying subsonically at high altitude, then descending to low altitudem subsonic run into and out of thc target area. The study further calculates that thc maximum untefuclcd radius of thc earlier version of Backfire with the same bomb load andubsonic high-altitude pro-fde wouldm insteadm previously estimated. DIA, Army, and Air Force believe that this analysis should be accepted as the best avadable estimate ot Backfire performance based on existing data *
'The Assmam Chief of Staff. Intelligence. USAF bflicvi'i Out the Backfire has been subjected to the most extensive independent analyses ol any Soviet bomber in history. These analyses wcic conducted2
^All lupporlix-lution that the Bjclfiie') nng- is nearly comparable to that ofSoviet Bison heavy jet bomber. Also, tbe nu.iirrii.im unrefuelcd radius for the Backfire tn the reiereiiced study isercent greater than that ol thcartgci.ercent greater than that ur8 Ilmtlei.ercent granier than that Of the KB-1U.
On the other hand, another engineering analysis of thelso carried out3 results in range performance that is somewhat lower in both the subsonic speed missions lhan In the other study. The new study shows an unrefueled radius ofm for the subsonic, high-altitudeund unrefueled radius ofm for the case with the subsonic low altitude run in to the target area.
There has not been sufficient time during the preparation of Ihis Estimate for detailed evaluation of the differences between the two anih/ses- Neither of these analyses has been corroborated |
ith respect to the intended role ol the Backfire, Army and Air Force believe lhat it is suitableariety of missions including intercontinental attack, but thai it would be prudent lo awai* additional evidence beforeudgment on its primary role. All bui Army and Air Force, on the other hand, believe Backfire is best suited forian stnke options and CIA and Navy bdieve it is primarily intended for that role.
iih lis capability for sustained, high-sjieed. low-level penetration. Uackfireideally suited for use on two-way missions againit Europe and China, both areas ofconcern to the Soviets. Introduction
of Backfire, with the qualities noted above and its superior combat radius, will facilitate execution of the large-scale conventional bombing operations the Soviets apparently to carry out in the opening phase of war with NATO and provideange ofand nuclear operations against China. Backfire shouldignificantagainst naval task forces, and It Ls likely to appear in Naval Aviation units as well as in LRA units with anbship tasks. We thus expect significant numbers to beregardless of whether any are for use against thc OS.
n the view of all but Air Force, tbe case for use of Backfire in therole is less persuasive- Evenm maximum radius. Backfire would require both Arctic staging and aerialto achieve comprehensive coverage of the US using realistic two-way flight profiles. Such missions arcDM'* view some Backfires will probably be assigned In sucheven one-way missionsbe ruled out. All but Air Force believe II unlikely, however, that the Soviets, at this stage of their strategic buildup, would develop an aircraft for major employment in therole which had so tittle flexibilitychieving the requisite range In anyew tanker force would have to be created for Backfires lo be used on two-waymissions in sizable numbeis. Existing Bison tankers are presumably already committed, und conversion of Iheisons would be enough to supportimited Backfire force.
In Air Force view. Backfire'swould make it an excellent vehicle for intercontinental operations. Backfire, bke tbe Bison, would requite Arctic staging and in flight refueling to achieve comprehensive cov. erage of the US on two-way missions, but.the Bison, it could also carry out adash into and out of the target area.ange mission, with recovery in friendly or neutral countries to the south.ission profile couldm subsonic. low-allitude legoidash (Machigh-altitude leg over CONUS if refueled in flight and staged. Un-refueled, but staged. Backfire could reach northern South Americaigh altitude, subsonic profile. Air Force believes that the deploymenl of Backfire at about thc same titne that thendlass/re reaching initialoviet decision of theo equip each element of its strategic offensive forceseapon system capable of both peripheral and intercontinental operations
e have no evidenceew heavy bomber program is under way. If the Soviets do decide toeavy bomber, we would expect to become aware of ils existence four to five years prior to its reachingstatus.
IMPLICATIONS FOR SOVIET POLICY OF THE PRESENT STRATEGIC EFFORT
umber of factors have probablyin the decisions to press ahead with the broad array of strategic programs now under way. Despite their lead In launcher numbers, the SovieU have been behind tbe US in MIUVs. ICBM accuracies, nnd other aspects
of weapons technology. Civen iheir manifest concern with being accepted as at least the strategic equal of fhe US, they have had strong political Incentives to press on with improved weapon systems,
Increased concern for tho survivability ol Soviet strategic attack forces tl reflected in the development of harder silos and launch control facilities for the new Soviet ICBMs, and probably figured to some degree inSoviet interest in mobile ICBMs. in the desire to expand the SLBM force, and in the introduction of thc long-rangehe introduction of MIRVs with higher betas and potentially improved accuracy,for thelmost certainlyesire to improve Soviet hard target counter-force capabilities. Introductionumber of MIRV systems, together with apparentfor greater targeting flcxibiUty. probably also reflects an expectation ol growingrequirements against China as weltarge number of urban industrial targets throughout the free world.
A decision to press ahead simultaneouslytoad front probably furtheritself as the easiest way tocompeting drives within the parly leader ship and military and defense productionand to overcome reservations aboul arms control and detente held by principals within thoic groups.
Above all. the vigor of the presenteffortighly competitiveof Ihe USSR's strategic relationship with rhe US. even in tbe con teat of the policy of detente lo which Brezhnev bis increasingly committed himself. Despite tbe propagandists
of Soviet commentary on projectod new US weapon systems and the bargaining chip approach to SALT, there is probably genuine concern that the USSR could fall behindor lose some of its own bargaining leverage if it failed to fully hold up Us side of thc strategic competition. The Soviets almost certainly also hope, however, that vig oralis efforts to develop new strategic weapons will enable them to improve their relative strategic position. In sum, tbe Soviets aie almost certainlytrategic policy they regard as simultaneously prudent and opportunistic, aimed at assuring no less ihan the continued maintenance of comprehensive equably with the US while at the same time seeking the Attainment of some degree oladvantage if US behavior permits. The Soviel leaders have specificallyong period of detente as affording opportunity for them to improve their economic and military position.
xcept as limits are agreed to in SALT, the Soviets will piobably wish to continue strategic force development along the line* already stoked out. The institutionalbehind present programs is likely toas thc investment in RAD and In long lead tune items increases. In any event, they are dearly intent on driving as hard aas possible ih SALT and on taking full advantage of opportunities to build up their locoes in the meantime.
s for the longer term, the RADis strong and well-funded. Frommilitary requirements standpoint, the Soviets will probably not achieve all the qualitative Impinveinents they desireingle genera-
tion of newhangingthe growing Chinese strategic capabilities, an increasing threat to lllo-launchod ICBM systems from highly accurate US MIRVs. the effect of stringent ARM limits on damage limitingload to new goals and approaches. Finally,on thc competitive relationship with the US. the need to maintain the present level of economic commitment to strategic forces may appear less pressing in the future, when lhe problem will be less one of building up the USSR's strategic arsenal than of replacing existing weapons with more ccmplicaled and expensive cases,
ow far the Soviets will go in carrying out these lines of development will depend in the first instance on the SALT II negotia-
'Ihe Assistant Chief of Stall. Intelligence, USAf, believe* that In addition to the lour new Soviet ICBMi currently in test uitettiCence relativetoad spectrum of activities In the Soviet MD bnv* Indicates that as many as five new miuilet will probably bo tested inime pellod. Me believe* that there are alio (etiuou* indication!,
JU other follow-on irtterni could interthe.he Sonets havaat leastajor new offenilve"lyitrnu Into test. During this pettedpeodWlloa facilitie. bareaef over or* million square feet perMite-related RAD taaliues have doubled iathc same cone period TheieeoJiictasa center* aodoclxver ICO roci"arre number of htitMicalyand the exiHuec capacity of Sovietproduction facilities, be betievei lhat Ato fear can more than a
lijiit miitde system* or major mod Ifw at tout ihere to bejiB placed into test3 While Ihtiom-liilenl wiih the rate of Soviet de-eloptnenl during the pail decade. It does not addieat the implication!ear doublins in the Soviet minlte Hftl>ductioa base
lions. Al this point, however, we have no good way of forecasting what specific limitation! on Sovietermanent agreement, If achieved, would entail.
ILLUSTRATIVE FUTURE FORCES
To Illustrate various ways in which the Soviet buildup of iwetrxratinettal attack forces might proceedermanent agreement imposing further limits on strategic offensive arms is not achieved, we have developed font force projections which are laid out In some detail in the Supporting Analysis. In one case we assume abrogation of then the other three forcowe assume continuation of the Interim Agreement's constraints into
Since all of the forceommon developmental base, they have many features in common. However, they differ significantly in the number and characteristics of the weapons they provide and in the pace of lhe force buildups involved
forceforce is based on thethat the USSR abrogates the Interim Agreement5esult of failure of the US and USSR loermanentit presupposes an environment ofUS Soviel hostility in which thearc either strivingide margin of strategic advantage or are seeking to offset an anticipated sharp upswing in ihe US stra-
'Itoted lhalprojocuoni, which have boon developed pitlnanly for broad policy uie at the nitioiul level, are meant to represent different Utah of piogiami the Soviet! mijht cany out under vaiyjia circumitaneei rathe, than to jeovide aact of eltetnauve, Olherrpecifteally"Hillary planoinf in the Depaitment ateui the Defense Iniellrcerxe VtaMctNm feeee.ealyna
tcgic effort. Il assumes that the Sovietsall attractive options, successfully push the limits of thetr technology, and deploy at thc highest rates demonstrated In thc past As such, itind of limiting case. The development of2 isby:
A high rate of conversion to the new silo/missile systems and of introduction of other new weapons.
The addition ofew large silos for fheringing the total.
AchievementEP with the first generation ol new missiles and thc introduction9 of follow-on ICBMsEP of
Introductiontubeballistic missile submarine (SSBN) with an SI.BM whichIRVs.
Introductionew heavy bombe* in the Bear range/payload class.
Byould provideeliver, vehicles with moreeapons.2 thereelivery vehicles withany of them highly accurate ICBM RVs.ould have formidable counter-force capabilities as wellomforiable margin of strategic forces for handlingcontingencies In addition to target-ing requirements in the US.
Force2 assumes that theAgreement is extended into thend that fhe Soviels pursue all permitted by it laketind of limning casehat if assumes that tbc So-
victs successfully push the limits of thrircapabilities ami deploy new weapon systems at the highest rates demonstrated in the past. It differs fromn twono new ICBM si!os are constructed and expansion of sea-based systems ceases whenSBNs aadLBMs are deployed
2ould haveelivery vehiclesobile ICBMs. There would be0 weapons In the force,arge number ofMIBVs which would provide strong count erf orce capabilities. Overall, the strategic capabilities ofould be quiteto those of
nd3ttempt to bracket the kinds of force Improvements we judge the Soviets would be likely toif tho provisions of lhc Interimremained in effecthey are generally similar but differ in thc pace at which new weapons are deployed andimprovements such as higher accuracy are achieved. The deployment rates postulated for new ICBM systems inre comparable to the average rales offor thendystems during the mid- and. Forcsomewhat faster rates than the average rates demonstrated in the pail and forlightly slower rates.
'deployment of raoblbt ICBMt. wtiiU notetfically prohibited by the Interim Apeenwnt. Ml addreiied it SALTS unilateral rtatmat Out "tbe US would coeuider tbe debarment of open-basal UAoVeaoboc ICBM laaacben during UM period of the Interim AfieetneEt at lucent airntthe ohfeitivc ul chatoviet dccMlon lo proceed Iron de>elopinrnteployment of mobile ICHMi. ind the ion* and eitenl of nidi deployment, will piobably oVpentlarge eitrnt on (ho tint it (on at SALT.
3airly vigorouseffort, but with the Soviets notas far as inn making thethe technological opportunitiesthe Interim Agreements2 is characterized by:
A relatively high rate of conversion to the new silo/missile systems aad follow-oo SLBM systems.
AchievementEP with the tint generation of new missiles to beand lubseqent Improvements to
with follow-on versions
4empering of ihecompetition that resultsteadyintensive pattern of forcedevelopmcnl2 is characterised by:
A slower pace of conversion to the new silo/missile systems and follow-on SLBM systems lhan in Force 3.
Initial ICBM accuracies ofwith accuracies of3 not achieved until follow-on versions of tbc new misiiles are introduced
No deployment of mobile.
iven the launcher constraints of the Interim Agreement, both forces would end up with approVmatery the same number of de-bveryhey vary substantially,in the number of weapons they provide.ould haveeapons7 and increase to02ould haveeapons7y virtue of its relatively high number of weapons and the relatively high accuracy postulated lor them,ould have significantly greater hard-target potential than Force 4,
SOVIET COURSES OF ACTION
he foregoing projections illustrate that thereroad range of ways tn which thc Soviet strategic buildup might proceed in the absenceermanent SAL agreement. Given the investment which both sides have made in SALT and the general improvement in relations, thc odds are substantial against the emergence of the troubled circumstances postulated forven if the US and USSR fail to agree on permanent limitations on offensive armst is more likely that the parties would continue negotiations, al least until thc Interim Agreement ran outevertheless, we cannot rule outeadlock in SALT, coupled with growing US-Soviet antagonism on other issues, could producerastic result. In any event it is highly unlikely that thc Soviets would be completely successful in achieving all of the improvements postulated in Force 1.
8G. Similarly, wc believe that the Soviet strategic posture depicted by Forcehich assumes extension of thc Interim Agreement, is also an unlikely development. Like Force I,ssumes levels of activity considerably greater than the Soviets have consistentlyto date in terms of technologicaland weapons deployments.
arring an early breakdown of theAgreement we would expect thcof Soviet forces for intercontinental attack to proceed within the boundsyndsndc think ihe Soviets would be likely to pursue the more ambitious goals depicted in Forceowever, thereariety oftechnological, institutional andmight cause thc Soviet force io evolve more along lhe lines of Forcehus,and in which we
think Soviet intercontinental attack forces would be likely to develop if the Interim Agreement were extended.
IMPLICATIONS OF THE FUTURE FORCES
he illustrative future Soviet forces in this Estimate all depict impressiveprograms. Tlie pace at which newoffensive technology is developed andand the kinds of force mixes selected in these illustrative forces, however, produce substantially differing results. The strategic and political significance of these alternative Soviet postures would certainly also beIn the final analysis, their impact wouldreat deal on how they wereby other countries.
gainst currently programmed USoffensive forces, none of the illustrative Soviet force projections would provide theapability to reduce damage to itself to acceptable levelsirst strike against US strategic forces. The Soviets would have to calculate lhat the US could respond to an all-out surprise attack with devastating effect On Soviet urban-industrial and military targets. Similarly, any of the illustrative forces ascribed to thc USSR could retaliate effectivelyirvt strike by US programmed forces. Thus, :he basisutually deterrent strategic bal-ance i* likely to remain essentially intact.
DO. This balance notwithstanding, theillustrative Soviet forces presented in :his Estimate would clearly represent markedly different strategic environments. Illustrativeresents an arsenal in which thc image of Soviet strategic power grows modestly and no overriding threat lo the survival of US offensive force elements materializes. Viewedoviet perspective, this force might be
as meeting minimum standards of "strategic equality" and comparative forceagainst programmed US forces.
Forces, and evenowever, would appear far more formidable, in comparison, to the US and (ts allies. After thoould surpass programmed US forces in all conventional static measures of strategic power andould provide an edge in many of them. In some measures.,ould be markedly superior. These forces would,esult, provide the imageargin of Soviel strategicto those who ascribe high significance to these measures. If they could acquire those advantages without provoking US counterthe Soviets would probably attempt to exploit themavorable backdrop toand diplomatic endeavors.
Although Forcesould not impart lo thelear damage-limiting superiority against programmed US strategic forces, they could appear to other countries to give Ihe Soviet Union war-initiation options and incenlives, and. consequently, political staying power in crises exceeding that of the US. The USSR would appear inbetterto initiate limited attacks on US strategic forces without attacking cities, or to conduct a
strategic conflict that each side seeks toshort of massive exchanges (althoughstrategic doctrine apparently does not at present provide for limited strategic nuclearowever, the Soviets might still fed exposed to comparable threats of limited attacks by the US.
onsiderable uncertainty Is likely towith regard to the more criticalof thc Soviet strategic posture.be difficult to measure withaccuracy of Soviet MIRVed ICBMs.thc prclaunch survivability of USmissiles is most directly linked.if Soviet ICBM accuracies arethanwould
require an ability to attack eacTi target with more than one weapon to inflict severeon US ICBM forces. We shall probably re-main uncertain about Ihe feasibility of this tactic and of Soviet plans with respect to using it. In general, tn the absenceignificant change in intelligence capabilities therelationship over the neat decade is likely to be much more sensitive to uncertainties about force qualities, operations, andplans than to the more readilyquantitative factors null as launchers and overall weapon numbers
CENTRAL INTEUIGENCE AGENCY
I, Thii document -oi dlueminaMd br tha Central Intellg.nce Agency, thi* copy h, for lhoand ine of the recpi.rt and of p.noW hb jjrhdTctioneod-lo knowdditionaldinetNnahoe. rw,Wd byoftfcioJi witnio the*epartment,.
o. Dinette* ot Intelligence and RtMorch. (of th*ol Slats
Defeat* Intelligenceor >h*f the Secretory ol
D*feme ond iht orgonlratlon of th* Join Chief, ol Slolf
Oiitf of StaH forf lhe Army, fo. Iho
Deportment af rho Army
of Navalor lha Deportment of iho Nary
ChM of Staff. Intelligence, USAF, for ihoAfe
General Manage, for Notecurity, lor lhe Atomic Energy
U Director,fo- theou ufh. Direclor of NSA, for tho National Sacurlty Agenry
I Special Awlltont lo ih- Secretary of lhe Treatury, for Ihe Deportmenl of iho Trecuury
j Depoty fe* National In'.II9,neeIA. lor ony olher Department or Agency
he, doc-me* mayernd. oryeceedaec,opp.iable tecb-tfy <eg-*oho-n. or -etvteedfc*- Agencyh rhe Depvty lor Not.onol eteti.geni*A.
3 Whenocument It dluemlnoledruat recipient, may roroln Iteriod not Inaf one year. Al the end of thi* period, Iho document thould either be deit-oyad. returned to the foe-orefng agency, or pa--million ihould be requeued of the forwarding agency to retain i) hi accordance with2
* Ihe title of thra document wHe- .tedm tne tax iht*id b- ,lg, tWed-
Jap fnnrrtOriginal document.