la the months prior to India'say nuclear test, the intelligencefailed to warn US decision makers thatest was being planned. This failure denied tho US Government the option of considering diplomatic or other initiatives to try to prevent this significant step in nuclear proliferation.
Tbe Intelligence community had long known that India was capable of producing anduclear device. It had also estimated as tar back5 that India would 'In the next few yean"uclear device. Its inability to predict tho actual event was due essentially to two factors: inadequate priority against an admittedly difficult target, and lack of adequate communications among those elements of the community, both collectors and produceis, whose combined talents were essential to resolving the problem.
The proper collection strategy against the nuclear proliferation target will necessarily carter from one nth country to another. It can be determined only by Integrated analysis conducted by representatives of all collection modes and by both technical and political analysts. Once determined, it must be reviewed and reinforced by continuing close coininuiiicatioris among all concerned.
Most Importantly, success against the nth country Intelligence problem will require that the community accordigher priority than it has received
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