SEORKT
Soviet Leaders and Succession
Summary
This memorandum contains articles on the Soviet leadership that wereprepared to run seriallyaily publication. It beginsiscussion of the generational problem in the Politburo and endsook al the environment in which the Soviet leaders operate, with special attention to the bureaucratic and institutional pressures on them. The memorandum examines those leaders who seem tohance of succeeding to one of the top jobs, both in the near and longer terms.
At present, men in theirndccupy the key positions of power. Held togetheralance of power and self-interest, they haveorce for stabilization in leadership politics. They have restrained Brezhnev in his attempts at self-aggrandizement, but they have also inhibited challenges to him that might have threatened them all.
Kirilenko
No one among the younger leaderstrong claim to Brezhnev's job. Of the senior leaders, Kirilenko. who is the same age as Brezhnev, probably has the best chance of becoming General Secretary if Brezhnev were to leave the scene.owever, he could be no more than an interim choice for General Secretary, and his prospects for moving up to the top party post will diminish with each additional year lhat Brezhnev holds this position.uccessor to Brezhnev, Kirilenko would standairly orthodox Marxist-Leninist. At least initially, he would be more cautious about dealing with Ihe West, but his approach probably would not deviate sharply from the course that has been followed under Bre2hnev. Whatever his personal views on policy,ompromise candidate he could not move any further than his Politburo colleagues would allow. Any gradual shift in foreign policy would probably be to de-emphasize detente rather than to expand it.
Mazurov
Among the "younger" Soviet leaders. First Deputy Premier Mazurov alas the clcaresl chance of one dayop leadership post.5 he lias served as Premier Kosygin's top government assistant on industrial matters. His claim to the premiership, whenever Kosygin relinquishes it. was considerably enhanced a
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year ago by the demotion of the other first deputy premier, Polyansky, to minister of agriculture. Maztirov has gained Ihe reputation of being one of the more modern-minded members of the regime, while still hewing to traditional ideas on some aspects of domestic and foreign policy.
His avoidance of clear cut and controversial positions makes it difficult to giveolitical label, even in his principal area of responsibility as chief government overseer of industry. On some issues, his approach to economic questions appears designed to play both sides of the street. On the whole, however, he seems toood grasp of the complexity and interdependence of most economic matters, and he is receptive to innovative ideas. He has been ahead of other leaders inystems approach to various economic problems.
he Cautious Bureaucrat
As parly boss of the important Moscow city apparatus. Politburo member Vitor Grishin isood position to succeed ultimatelyop leadership posl in the CPSUi
rishineputationompetent if somewhat uninspiring performer in the traditional apparatchik mold. He probably could be expected to move along the center of the path on policy issues, avoiding controversy whenever possible. His personal views on foreign affairs ate difficult to identify because he rarely addresses these matters. Like Kirilenko, he would probably be cautious in dealing with the West.
Andropov. An Able Parly Veteran, Directs KGB
Yury Vladimirovich Andropov, who runs the KGB, is more than an expert in intelligence and internal security. He has, in fact, spent much of his long career in straight party wont, specializing in relations between the Soviet Communist Party and other ruling parties. He could in tho future return to full-time party work.
Andropovan of intellectual stature. Nevertheless, he has no better than an outs.de chance of ever succeeding to the top party post. The KGB portfolioevere handicap for anyone who aims for the top. His colleagues would hesitate over the dictatorial potential inherent in any direct jump from the KGB to party chief, and ihe Soviet Union's image at home and abroad would suffer from tooecret police aura around the country's top leader.
By temperament. Andropov has seemed better suited to an important behind-the-scenes influence lhan lo public political leadership. If he is still KGB Chairman when Brezhnev's successor is chosen. Andropov's support would be all but essential to Ihe winning candidate.
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Dmilty Polyansky was abruptly dropped from Jiu post as first deputy premier and named minister of agriculture inremlin politics, as well as ihc poor harvestas an important factor in his demotion. Tbe move seemed designed to deflect from Brezhnev criticism for the almost disastrous crop failure.
Until this setback. Polyansky was one of the most influential and promising of the junior members of the Politburo. His strength derived primarily from lus key position as first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, in which capacity he coordinated the work of numerous agencies dealing with agriculture. Polyansky'* penchant for politicking and his tendency lo generate rather than shun controversy undoubtedly contributed to his demotion.
Polyansky'* demotiononsiderable power vncuum that has still not been Riled. Fcdor Kulakov. who is party secretary for agriculture, seems now to be the ranking party man in agriculture. But Kulakov hasautious role, apparently unsure whether 1'olyansky's star has fallen permanently.
Shelepin
Aleksandi Shckpin. once strong enough tohreat to General Secretary Brezhnev, hat in recent years been dintingrecarious political existence Despite the marked decline in his status, Shelepin still bears watching.e is the youngest full member of the Politburo, and his aspirations seem undiminished.
Stickpin's ability to survive many reverses indicates that lie retains significant support built upareer as head of the Komsomol and of the KGB, and in other top party ami government posts. Sometime in thehelepin ran afoul of Brezhnev, unci over Ihe nexl few years Shelepin's offices and responsibilities were gradually peeled away.
Over the years Shelepin has demonstrated an abilityeadiness to shirt his policy views to advance his political ambitions. Since Brezhnev unveiled hisfor consumer welfare at home and peace abroad ath Party Congresshckpin has become one of his warmest supporters The shift to the Brezhnev bandwagon suggests lhat Shckpin calculates thai conspicuous support for the General Secretary offers the best hope for survival into the post-Brezhnev era.
ITiree Regional Leaden Likely to Move Up
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Of iheull and candidate members of Ihe ruling Politburo, seven represent regional or local inlcrcsts. By usage or geographic importance, some Soviet regional posts arc now more important than others, and the incumbents are thusood
position lo advance in the Soviet hierarchy. In Brezhnev's administration the top leaders in the Ukraine. Bclorussia. and the Russian Republic seem especially im-
portant.
Inladimir Shcherbitsky became the first secretary in the Ukraine, the largest of the non-Russian republics. Helose protege of Brezhnev. Both have political roots in the Dnepropetrovsk District of the Ukraine, and both maneuvered to bring down the previous Ukrainian first secretary, Petr Shelest. During this contest, Shcherbitsky adheredtrong centrist, Moscow-oriented stance. Once he (eels more secure in his position, however. Shcherbitsky may become more assertive with regard to Ukrainian inlerests.
Petr Masherov, first secretary of the party in Bclorussiaas been an effective champion of scientific and technological innovationeans of achieving economic and socral progress. He has, at the same time, consistently stressed the need for ideological purity. Under Masherov, whoandidate member of the Politburo. Bclorussia is enjoying an economic boom. Masherov probably has an important ally in Moscow in Politburo member Kirill Mazurov who, like Masherov.ative Bclorussian. Ma/urov. the odds-on favorite to succeed Premier Kosygin, isood position to advance Ihe interests of both Bclorussia and Masherov.
Inikhail Solomentsev was named premier of the Russianby lar the largest of the IS Soviet republics. His positionegional leader is somewhat anomalous. The post of premier of the Russian Republic, with its capital in Moscow, is in manyational office. On the other hand, because party affairs for the republic are run from the national Central Committee and its Secietariat, Solomentsev has no direct parlyhe area he supposedly rules.osition entitles him lo full membership on the Politburo, but he has been passed over several times. He may have high-level detractors or lack strongallics in the party hierarchy.
Younger Generation Skill in Economic Management
The Soviet leadership includes three men underears of age. All three began their cuieers in industry and later turned mostly to economic management. Their experience in this field may have an important influence on the future course or national policy.
Party secretary Konstantin Katushcv. whopent his formative years in the Gorky Oblasi of the Russian Republic. Under Katushcv's aegis in theew system of qualify conlrol was adopted by factories in Gorky. Experimentation with social development plans tn go along with production plans al enterprises was also begun during Katushcvenure in Corky.atushcv has been working on relations with ruling communist parlies abroad, an assignment he apparently owes largely to Brc/hncv. As the focus of Sooreign policy has shifted to the West and detente. Katusliev seems to have lost some of his prominence.
Crigory V. Romanov, who, is parly chief of the Leningrad Oblastandidate member of the Politburo. Leningrad has become the recognized leader in amalgamating enterprises and scientific institutes into integrated industrialcapable of dealing independently with many operational and planning matters normally handled by Moscow. Lastarty-government decree ordered the nationwide formation of production associations on the Leningrad model. Under Romanov. Leningrad officials have pushed for integrated economic and social planning at the regional level. In1 Brezhnevpecial trip to Leningrad to give his endorsement to its work in regional planning.
Vladimir I. Dolgikh became Central Committee secretary for heavy industry in2 after only three yearsegional party secretary. During his tenure as party boss of the sprawling Krasnoyarsk Kray in Western Siberia, Dolgikhen-year plan for the comprehensive development of the kray that was singled out for praise by Brezhnev. Rarlicr, Dolgikh had been director of one of the lirsl large enterprises to adopt the progressive economic reform system announcedS. Dolgikh believes that Siberian development has been hampered by the disjointed activities of central ministries, which fail to provide local services and social amenities along with new production facilities.
Collective Leadership
Soviet leaders workystem of power sharing lhatoice atpolicy-making level to all institutional and regional power centers. Theallowed parly boss Brezlinev lo emerge as the first among equals, but itrestraints upon his exercise of power. Brezhnev has been able to play off
one regional or bureaucratic faction against another, bul in so doing he has had to pay close heed lo the views of the most powerful interest groups in order to advance his own position. Anyone who hopes to succeed him will have lo do likewise.
The need lo reconcile the many different positions is probably greater in the piesenl Soviet regime than in previous ones. The resultautious, conservative leadership. The syslcm or commillcc rule "collective leadership" in Soviet parlance-lias in general inhibited sudden or radical shifts In policy and has fostered stability within the top ranks or the leadership.
Although the political standing of certain Politburo members has changed sharply, removalolitburo member apparently requires wide consensus. There has, therefore, been very little altrition in this key group.
Brezhnev mayreer hand than before in ihc mailer of ensuring lhat the man who follows him. or who succeeds another senior leader, willan of his own choosing who will conlinuc in broad outline Ins domestic and foreign policies. Unlike Khrushchev, who frelled aboul the succession question openly and endlessly.
Brezhnev lias nol seemed lo scl oul any clear line of succession. He may be cono put the matter orf or to leave it in the hands of the Politburo and the major interest groups.
The senior members of the Politburo arc getting on in years. Kosygin. Podgomy. Suslov. and Grcchko .ire all in their seventies, and Brezhnevone of them enjoys robust health, and the chance of all of them leaving the political scene in rapid succession increases with time. If this were to happen, it might be difficult to achieve un orderly transfer of power.
Meanwhile, the most dynamic and ouispokcn younger members of the post-Khrushchev groups-Shclcpin. Polyansky. and Shelcsl-have fallen victim topolitical ambitions. In the system of collective leadership, which requires caution and compromise, it is the more bureaucratic and self-effacing who flourish.
Soviet Leaders and Succession
GENERATIONS OF SOVIET LEADERS
nd over
Members. Politburo
Candidate members. Politburo
Age4
Members. Politburo
CandKlate membe's. Poiitbufo
Secretary
Age under 55
Candidate member. Politburo
Secretaries
SOVIET SUCCESSION AND GENERATIONAL POLITICS
The Soviet leadership headed by Leonid I. Brezhnev willecade old this year. The coalition of leaders who deposed Khrushchev in4 and redivided political power among themselves has remainedstable At Ihc same time, the Politburo has grown unusually large, and the average age of its members is greater than ever before. Although there arc no strong signs that the collective leadership is about to fall apart, its very longevity raises questions and creates problems concerning succession.
Past patterns of change in Soviet regimes suggest the rejuvenation of the top leadership may soon become an increasingly pressing matter. General Secretary Brezhnev ishe leadershipumber of younger officials who are in their late SOs or. but they hold offices of secondary importance (secime for them to have their turn at higher posts is beginning to run out. It was leaders in this age group who assumed powerhen Stalin died atnd4 when Khrushchev was ousted at
Brezhnev Regime Unique
The generational problem is made more acute by an importantbetween the composition of the Politburo today and thattalin and Khrushchev, in their drive for power, expelled from the leadership most public figures of their own generation. They tended to rely politically on younger leaders whom they helped promote and who,owed them some loyalty.
esult, under Stalin and Khrushchev the younger generation occupied more important posts andarger proportion of the Politburo than today. Thus younger leaders were already largely in place3nd succession involved, at least in the short term, little more than replacing the man at the top.
In the more collective atmosphere of the present regime, however, Brezhnev's contemporaries have held on to the lop posts and preserved their numerical strength on the Politburo. At present, men in theirndold the party's top positionwo unofficial party positions of "second" secretary (Suslov andhe premiershiphe presidencys well as lesser offices represented on the Politburo.
The Old Guard in) and) The next generation in waiting.) and Muherov
This clique of older men, held togetheralance of power and seir-intcrest, hasreat stabilizing factor in leadership politics. It has restrained Brezhnev in his attempts at self-aggrandizement, on the one hand, and, on the other, it has inhibited challenges to his position, which would threaten them all.
Although rivalry between Brezhnev and other senior leaders hasperiodically, the most serious challenge to his leadership came early in his tenure from one of the youthful leaders, Shelepin. Brezhnev relied heavily on senior leaders to deflect this threat. Brezhnev has advanced younger proteges like Shcherbitsky and Kunayev as chiefs of the Ukrainian and Kazakh parties, but they remain distant from the center of power. Moreover, Polyansky, another of Brezhnev's younger allies in the past, was demoted last year from his strategic post of first deputy premier to minister of agriculture. Among the officials promoted to the Politburo last year, Brezhnev's closest ally is Defense Minister Grechko,
In these circumstances, probable lines of succession are difficult to discern. It is true that Polyansky's demotion seems to clear the way for First Deputy Premier Mazurov eventually to succeed Kosygin, if he wishes. No one among the younger leaders, however,ery strong claim to
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Brezhnev's job. The mosl prominent contenders, such as Shelepin and Polyansky, must overcome the political setbacks they have received. Those with less controversial careers, such as Kulakov and Grishin. surfer from lack of public exposure or narrowness of responsibility.
Prospects
Prolonged immobility in the lop ranks increases the chunces that change, when it comes, will involve many leaders. The illness or deathenior leader, an ever-present possibility given their age and infirmities, could easily touchhain reaction.
Brezhnev is the youngesi member of the senior group of leaders. This faci, and his strong political position, may encourage him to hope that he canenerational turnover within the leadership. If he considersurnover highly likely in the near rutiire. he could build alliances with younger leaders and perhaps join them in an effort to case out some of his senior colleagues. In the process he might even be able io add to his own titles either Podgoruy's presidency or Kosyfiin'srequently rumored ambition. In other words, Brezhnev might belatedly try to do what Stalin and Khrushchev did much earliei in their careers. This course,would be risky and would go against Brezhnev's conservative nature and style. It also would require repairing some personal and organizational relationships with the younger group of leaders.
The other senior leaders seem generally to have little ambition beyond preserving their own status. Kirilenko, who is the same age as Brezhnev, is probably the only one who entertainslicker of hope of ever becoming General Secretary. This kind of defensive outlook on the pari of the senior leaders means that they probably arc not eager to break ranks and. in collaboration with junior colleagues, tohake-up that would rend the fabric of their generational hegemony. They are likely to be spurred lo such action onlyiscernible threat to their individual and collective positions.
The problem for the younger leaders of today is not. as it was for Brezhnev and companyombining together lo topple the party leader. Tlie best they can hope for in Ihe short run is simply to begin to pick away at the phalanx of aging superiors. Given Brezhnev's predominant position, the most realistic and logical course would be an alliance between Brezhnev and the younger officials against some of the older senior leaders. Indeed, such an alliance could be mutually beneficial Political divisions among Ihe younger leaders and various ties with the seniors, however, would be complicating factors.
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SF.tYRET
ANDREY KIRILENKO: THE MAN MOST LIKELY TO SUCCEED
Parly Secretary Andrey Kirilenko is the best bet lo succeed Brezhnev if the General Secretary leaves office in Ihc not-too-distant future. Kirilenko isears old. however, and the prospects of his moving up into the top party post will diminish wilh each additional year that Brezhnev,emains on the scene.
The sonussian artisan. Kirilenko was born in Ihe southwestern part of the Russian Republic near the Ukraine. Heuraltudiedrade school, and worked for four yearsitter and electrician. He graduated from an aircraft design institutend worked as an aircraft design engineer for two years. He switched to political workocal party secretary in the Ukrainehat same year, Brezhnev became party secretaryearby district and Khrushchev
assumed the parly leadership of the republic.
Kirilenko spent the first year of the warolitical officer on the southern front before moving to Moscow to supervise an aircraftHe resumed political work in the Ukraine infter its liberation, and succeeded Brezhnev as party boss of Dnepropetrovske transferredarty post in the Russian Republicained Centralnd became amember of the Politburo inirilenko's careeran unexpected setback1 when he lost his Politburo scit, but he bounced back six months later,ullmember and the number-two man In the Russian Republic's party organization.
ko is not known to have
played an active role in ouster in and his
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standing in Ihe newly oidered leadership was relatively low. His general administrative competence, the absence ofaiiy display of dangerous political ambitions, anil his past relationship with Brezhnev may haw contributed to an improvement in his political position. HePSU Secretary6 and since then has steadily increased his real power and authority in the leadership.
Kirilenko has considerable say in personnel appointments within the parly ,md has beenosition to build some personal political support. His record is relatively well-rounded, although focused more on industry than on agriculture In recent years he has hadit of experience in dealing with leaders of ruling and non-ruling foreign communist parties, but his contacts with other foreigners have been fairly limited
Kirilenko's chances lor succeeding Brezhnev depend primarily on his support among other members of the Politburo, particularly thewho served together under Khrushchev in the Ukrainian partyOne of these is President Nikolay Podgorny. who haspecial interest in preserving the "old-school" ties wilh Kirilenko and the rest of ihe group, and probably would support Kirilenko. Minister of Agriculture Dmitiy Polyansky, however, might withhold his support, particularly if Kirilenkoand in Polyansky's demotion from first deputyear ago.
Kirilenko probably would have the support of Ukrainian First Secretary Vladimir Shcherbitsky and Soviet Defense Minister Andrey Crcckho-lhe two Ukrainians added lo the Politburo since Khrushchev's ouster. Shchci-bilsky worked under Kirilenko during ihe, and their association has probablylose one. Grechko, whose tics with Brezhnev and Kirilenko date from the early days of the war, seems to have remained on good terms with both men.
Trade union chairman Aleksandr Shelepin seems to share Kirilenko's views on many policy problems. First Deputy Premier Kirill Mazurov has worked closely with Kirilenko5 in supervising industrialand Ihe two men appear to have similar views in this area as well as in foreign policy.
II seems likely that. Foreign Minister Andrey Crornyko and Kirilenko have,inimum, different perspectives and priorities at times-for example, in situationseighing of foreign policy equities against the stability of the Soviet political system. Nevertheless. GromyVo might prefer Kirilenko over other potential successors to Brezhnev, if onlyompromise candidate.
Premier Alekscy Kosygin, one of two "independents" on Ihe Politburo with sufficient seniority and prestige to avoid long-lived factionalin the internal power struggle, seems to have had little direct contact with Kirilenko. Kirilenko's responsibilities present the potential for friction with Kosygin, however, and he has differed with the premierumber ofexample, by emphasizing moral rather than materialin spurring labor productivity, and byore militant approach toward "imperialist" countries. The two men have, however, arrivedonsensus of sorts on industrial management policy andplanning. Boih have endorsed production associations, and Kirilenko has supported the creationusiness rnanagcmcnl school-the Institute of National-Economichich is another component of Kosygin's economic reform program.
Parly Secretary Mikhail Suslov, the senior secretary who serves as Brezhnev's unofficial deputy, is the otherith almostears of continuous service in Ihe Secretariat, Suslov has enormous prestige and considerable power. There is some evidence that he and Kirilenko have been competing for position and power, without necessarily opposing each other on policy matters In fact, Ihe two appear to be in general agreement on many domestic and foreign policy questions. Suslov, alreadyears old, probably would not putlaim for the top postuccession crisis, but he might use his influence lo block Kirilenko's bid, if only toRussian" al the head of Ihe party for the first time since Lenin.
Arvid Pelshe. Chairman of the Party Control Committee,inor roleuccession crisis because of his advanced age (he isow political seniority, and weak personal power. He was party boss in Latvia untild Party Congresshen he was given his present party post and co-opted into the Politburo, apparently because of his status as an Old Bolshevik andoken representative of the Baltic republics. His voteuccession crisis would probably reflect the altitude of Suslov, wilh whom he apparentlyommon outlook on many policy matters and to whom he reportedly is related by marriage.
Kazakhstan first secretary Dinmukhamed Kunayev, one of Brezhnev's most loyal boosters on the Politburo, seems to share Kirilenko's viewpoint on several issues and probably sees him as the most attractive candidate for Ihe top party post. Parly Secretary Fedor Kulakov. the regime's top-ranking agricultural expert since Polyansky's demotion, would probably prefermore sympathetic to the nation's farm lobby, but he might come to see Kirilenko as the least objectionable choice.
Among ihe Politburo's candidate members, possible Kirilenkoinclude the following: Parly Secretary Dmitryuasi-independent" who oversees defense-related industry; Russian Republic Premier Mikhail Solomentsev, Kirilenko's neighbor in the Urals during theellow supervisor of heavy industry; and Leningrad party boss Grigory Romanov, perhaps the regime's most enthusiastic booster of produclion associations.
uccessor lo Brezhnev. Kirilenko would siandairly orthodox Marxist-Leninist, and at least initially, he would be more cautious about dealing with the West. Kirilenko's public support of detente is infrequent and often conditional, and he has been in the forefront of those who champion the "Brezhnev Doctrine' of limiied sovereignty. He was widely reported to have urged the Soviel invasion of Czechoslovakia despite the doubts expressed by Suslov. among olhers.
In his public statements, Kirilenko has come as close as any other top Soviet leader to advocateynamic foreign policy. He has termed aid to the Viclnamesc and Arabs nolrevolutionaryutequirement of Soviel security. He has strongly criticized the Communist Chinese leadership and has defended ihe Soviet policy of attacking Peking's political and ideological positions, bul he has not shut the door on an
eventual reconciliation wilh China.
Kirilenko's relative militancy in foreign policy slatcments has itsin domestic policies, especially in the cultural and social spheres. On the question of improving labor productivity he puts greater emphasis onand persuasion than on material incentives. Kirilenko has revealed somethingragmatic attitude toward economic management His speeches on this theme have consistently promoted less dogmatic solutions to managerial problems.
Little is known about Kirilenko's real views on defense and strategic questions. His only public slatcmcnl on SALT to daletrictly pro forma assertion in0 that the talks can produce results "if Ihe United States makes an honest attempt lo solve the problem at hand and does nol try lo achieve one-sidedhis cautious remark was consistent wilh Kirilenko's generally wary atlitudc toward the US. Such reservations no doubt underlie Kirilenko's repeatedly expressed opiniondangerous" international situation makes it necessary to increase the USSR's defense capabilities.
Against this background, Kirilenko as General Secretary wouldbe somewhat more imaginative in the field of domestic affairs lhan
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Brezhnev has been. In foreign affairs. Ktrilcnko's regime probably would nol undertake any sliarp departures from the course that has been followed under Brezhnev. Whatever his personal views on policy,ompromise candidate, he could nol move any further than his Politburo colleagues would allow. Any gradual shift in foreign policy undei his leadership would probably be away from detente rather than toward it.tyle of leadership would probably be less colorful and exuberant than Brezhnev's. Knilenko gives the appearanceodest, efficient administrator,olitician who enjoys being on the hustings. The alteration in style would be in step with the regime's probable returnore collective style of leadershiphange at the top.
MAZUROV-HEIR APPARENT TO KOSYGIN
Among the relatively younger Soviet leaders. First Deputy Premier Mazurov atas the clearest chance of one dayop leadership post.azurov has served as Premier Kosygin's top government assistant on industrial matters. His claim to tfic premiership, whenever Kosygin relinquishes it, was considerablyear ago by the demotion of the other first deputy premier, Polyansky, to minister of agriculture.
Other recent signs also point to Mazurov's good standing. Ine delivered the Revolution Day speech for the second time in five years-putting him ahead of some peers who have never given il and of some senior leaders who have had the honor only once. Moreover, last July Mazurov read the main report on educationession of the Supreme Soviet, an unusual public platformolitburo member.
Mazurov's well-rounded background and political acumen contribute to his prospects. Before assuming his present government post in
he was for many years party chief in Belorussia. He has gained theof being one of the more modem-minded members of this regime while still hewing toideas on some aspects of domestic and foreign policy. In his public statements. Mazurov seems to try to avoid polemics with his colleagues and to suggestthat can accommodate many interests. He has managed to be his own man among the leadership, on friendly terms with some bulbeholdeno individual or faction.
unior member of theMazurov has not played an important role in the formulation of foreign policy. His speechesfollow uic current party line, and indications of his personal
views are scanty. In his most recent speech onazurov appropriately endorsed detente policies, pegging his support both to the prevention of nuclear war and lo the establishment of "constructive business links" with ihe US and oilier capitalist states. More than most 6thcr leaders who have spoken recently, however. Mazurov dwelt long and vigorously on the inadmissibility of ideological and political concessions to the West. He was notably specific in supporting the CPSU's current "broad ideological offensive "
Mazuiov has traveled widely outside the Soviet Union. In addition to Poland, Hungary. Czechoslovakia. Yugoslavia, and Mongolia, he has also visited the United Kingdom. Sweden, the UN Genera! Assembly in New York. Belgium. Indonesia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Egypt, and Finland.
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"burin, the Moscow summit ayMazurov recalled as "extremely interesting"day visit to New York1 to attend Ihc UNGA. He also remarked that he was in favor of more frequent informal visits lo the US by Politburo members, noting that since these men arc heavily involved in managing the Soviet economy, they would be interested in visiting American factories andindustrial management practices. The few Westerners who have met him have also found him easy to talk lo, wilh an attractive sense of humor.
A Systems Advocate
Mazurov's avoidance of extremes and simplification make it difficult lo giveolitical label even in his principal area of responsibility as chief government overseer of induslry. On some issues, his approach to economic questions appears designed lo play both sides of the street. On the whole, however, he seems to be actingenuine appreciation of the complexity and interdependence of most economic matters. Hen ahead of other leaders insystems approach" to various economic problems.
Mazurov's major task when he arrived in Moscow was to help Kosygin launch5 economic reorganization.rganizalion involved the re-establish11tent of central ministries, including more thanroduction ministries. At the same time, more emphasis was to be given to worker incentives and to enterprise initiative in management. As the lalleraspcct of the program was compromised over the years, Mazurov. along wilh Kosygin, continued to defend it but not in an overly narrow or bureaucratic manner. Indeed, his penchantomprehensive approach to problems suggests some rcserv.il ions about both the fragmentation of authority in specialized branch minislrics and the efficacy of purely economic mechanisms. In recent years, he has supported the amalgamation of enterprises into production
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associations and the creation of agroinduslrial complexes as ways to broaden the application of reform principles and to restructure management along more rational lines.
Although wedded to industry, and especially heavy industry, Mazurov has recognized the need for the "proportional development of thethat is.etter balance among heavy industry, light industry, and agriculture. In fact, his proposals over the years for developingproduction and foodstuffs reveal his comprehensive approach to problems.
During Mazurov's leadership of the Bclorussian party in the, the republic was in the forefront of an attempt to popularize-under the rubric NOT (scientific organization of labor) the concepteam approach to problem-solving in the economy. During those years, an effort was made in the republic to employ this approach in the development of rural areas. As originally conceived, population centers destined for future development were to be selected according to economic criteria. These centers were to be provided wilh the infrastructure and social amenities found in urban areas-all in addition to modernizing agricultural production per sc. The program never got fully under way. but echoes of it have reappeared in Mazurov's statements as first deputy premier.
Speaking in Leningrad inazurov became the first and, for many years, the only Politburo member publicly toimilar schcmc-thc Leningradcrs' social development plans in the industrial sphere. As he paraphrased their proposal, made at the party congress the year before, "each enterprise should, in addition to its production plan,nified complex plan for the comprehensive social development of thehese plans usually encompass such categories as job training, safety measures, housing, social amenities, and ideological education. The scheme attempts to break down the traditional barriers between segments of the economy. It also reflects, however, an orthodox belief in the efficacy of planning all things, evenocal level, and skepticism that "the unity of personal interests and the collective would be established spontaneously and automatically."
peech in Minsk inazurov also became the first Politburo member to use publicly the term "systemse cited the "inltr-branch approach lo management" (emphasis his)ost important advantage of socialism over capitalism. 'The systemse said, should be applied to "the problem of increasing agricultural production in our nationore rapidlaborating, he noted the complexity of agricultural production and its dependence on the "efforts of many other
branches of Ihe nationalazurov also advocated this approach "for the solution of the problem of supplying the public with an adequacy of consumer goods and cultural, household, and recreational goods."
Up from Belorussia
Mazurov was horneasant family on Apriln the Gomel Oblast of Bclorussia. There, in, he graduatedoad and motor vehicle technical school and workedighway agency. After serving in the army6azurov returned to Gomel to begin his party career in the youth organization. Komsomol. He saw combat duty in the army early in the war. was discharged after recovering from wounds, and then worked behind German linesomsomol official in the Bclorussian partisan movement.
Mazurov became first secretary of the Bclorussian Komsomol after the war, when Alcksandr Shelepin in Moscow was responsible for top-level Komsomol appointments. He served in the Bclorussian central committee apparatus and workedarty leader in Minsk, rising from city second secretary to oblast first secretary. He served as Bclorssian premier for the next three years.azurov became Bclorussian party chief, and he was made candidate member of the CPSU Politburo7 whenousted the "anti-partyis careernag, however, when he clashed wilh Khrushchev over the latter's decentralization of agricultural management, as well as other aspects of Khrushchev's agricultural policies. He attained full membership on the Politburo only when he transferred lo Moscow as first deputy premierive months after Khrushchev's ouster.
His Kremlin Colleagues
Mazurov was promoted5 over the head of Deputy Premier Polyansky. who had alreadyolitburo member for five years. Seven months elapsed before Polyansky also gained the statusirst deputy. Mazurov assumed responsibility for the industrial side of the economy, Polyansky for the agricultural side, and the two alternated in deputizing for Kosygin. Rivalry would seem to have been inevitable in their positions. Their public speeches have revealed differences of emphasis on important issues, bul Ihey have not obviously engaged in disputes with one another.
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Kosygin probably had an important say in bringing Mazurov towhere he oversaw the implementation of Kosygin's economic reforms. Until recently, Mazurov has been stingy wilh praise for Brezhnev. He does seem to share some common interests with Kirilenko and Shelepin. The
three have shown interest in several of the same innovations in economic management (production associations and social developmentazurov and Kirilenko share responsibility for the industrial economy in their respective government and party positions.
Keeping Options Open
Already well groomed for the premiership, Mazurov's lengthy party service makes him eligible, in the right circumstances, for party leadership At present, he is hampered by not being on the party Secretariat, as this leaves him only limited influence in the Central Committee apparatus. On the other hand, he probably still enjoys support in the Belorussian party organization. Mashcrov, Bclorussia's first secretaryandidate member of the Politburo, followed closely behind Mazurov in his rise through the Komsomol and party leadership in Bclorussia. This indication of political alliance is supplemented by evidence of social contacts with one another after Mazurov moved to Moscow.
Mazurov is the first ethnic Belorussian to attain full membership on the Politburo, and bis nationality could count against his chances of becoming party boss. Tlie Belorussians, however, arc the most Russianized of Ihe minority nationalities. Masherov enthusiastically supported Brezhnev's recent campaign against national individualism and sclf-intcrcst, whichto the downfall of Ukrainian first secietary Shelesl. The influence of Mazurov and Masherov, in fact, seems to have risen just as the unity of the "Ukrainian clique" in national politics has been dissolving.
There arc signs that Mazurov has tried lo maintain Ihc stature of aMazurov was widely rumored to have joined Shelepin in0 in some sort of challenge to the drift then evident inBesides advocating undefined modem measures in economicthey are allegedhave called for more partyeport circulating in Moscow in2 described ameeting al which, allegedly, Kirilenko, backed by Mazurovcalled for economic reform measures along with generallypolicies.
I" " ' azurov in the spring0 harshly
criticized inept handling ol preparations for the Lenin centennial in April. Mazurov has been the only leader to elaborate publicly on Brezhnev's theme of victory through contacts, set forth in3 at Alma Ata. Speaking last December, Mazurov urged propagandists to go from the defensive to Ihe offensive against the bourgeois ethic, and to do soanner calculated to develop "more sophisticated, more consistent, flexible, and effectiveIn sum, he appears to be trying to identify with issues outside his specially in politically advantageous ways
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If Mazurov aspires to party leadership, he will have lo overcome many hurdles and deficiencies in his political position. None is serious enough to rule it out, however, and he shows some signs of interest in the job. Perhaps the greatest element in his favor is that all other possible contenders for party leadership also labor under serious handicaps.
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GRISHIN, THE CAUTIOUS BUREAUCRAT
is in an enviable spot -vis ins peers.enjoys Ihe power and independence of other regional party leaders, and yet, as Moscow chiefe has had almost daily access to Ihe senior members on the Politburo.
Atrishineputationompetent if somewhat uninspiring performer in the traditional apparaichik mold. Grishin probably
can be expected to move along the center of the path on policy issues, avoiding controversy whenever possible.egional party leader, Grishin has notajor voice in foreign policy.
Although Grishin's recenthave coincided withtums in Brezhnev's political fortunes, he isrezhnev protege. Rather, Grishin emergesonsensus-oriented bureaucrat,to most other members of the political elite.egime that lias seemed in recent years to stress the virtue of collective leadership, these attributes makeood candidate to move up in the central party hierarchy.
Grishin has now returned to work. In fact, by January he waspublic almost as often as before, but thel "llias casl ahis
Grishm's Surprise Appointment
Afterears as trade union boss. Grishin was unexpectedlyas Moscow city first party secretary inhe appointment appears to have been the penultimate moveierce factional dispute between Brezhnev and the youthful challenger Aleksaiulr Shelepin.
Al an important Central Committee plenum Onhc then-Moscow party boss,cgorychcv, sharply criticized sonic aspect of llic I'ohiburo's handling of the six-day Arab-lsiaeli war. (His specific charges are Stillcgorychcv reportedly had support fiom Shelepin. Brezhnevlrong and apparently effective rebullal, and Ycgorychcv wasfrom Inseek alter the plenum Grishin replaced Yecoryehov as head of the Moscow party apparatus, and in what seemed lo be an act of calculated irony engineered by Brezhnev, Shelepin was given Grishin's old
ower Base
The disestablishment of Ihc Russian Republic parly bureau in Moscow6 hadower vacuum of sons, and Grishin,andidate member of the Politburo, moved lo fill it.
He first replaced the personal followers Ycgorychcv had left behind.1 three of the lop five secretaries on the Moscow city party bureau had been removed, and new chiefs had been installed inf Ihe bureau'separtments.
Alh Party Congress inrishin wasull member of Ihe Politburo. The congress also called for (he long-termof Moscowmodelrishin has used the mandate to plug for more funds and greater autonomy in directing Moscow"sdevelopnienl.
As leader of one of the largest industrial centers in the country, Grishin has had to address economic policy with increasing frequency, lie has always
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been careful, however, to avoid controversial or innovative ideas. For example, Grishin began to endorse "production associations" only after the concept had gained general acceptance in the leadership.
Relationship with Brezhnev. Others
When Grishin assumed control in Moscow he had no career ties with Brezhnev or any other important political leader, lt was not long, though, before he got his first opportunity to serve Brezhnev. In8 the leadership, faced with disturbing liberalizing trends in Czechoslovakia and growing student restiveness at home, decided to tighten ideological controls. Brezhnev iniroduced the "vigilance" campaignajor speech in8lenum of Grishin's Moscow City Party Committee.
Grishin's task was to spearhead the campaign to suppress orpersons in the Moscow intellectual community who hadprovocative stage productions or who had signed petitionsof jailed writers. He moved with vigor, and the protestsoon evaporated.has noted,
however, that under the circumstances trie actions taken by Grishin al the time were relatively moderate. More people could have been jailed, and the suppression could have been more severe.
There is little information on Grislun's relations with hisAmong the lesser lights in the central party hierarchy theresome antipathy toward him. Politburo candidate member Demichev,
for example, rose out of the post of Moscow City first secretary, but now has fallen behind Grishin in party rank. Party Secretary Kapitonov, in charge of party organizational work, was Grisliin's superior in the, when Grishin worked in the Moscow provincial committee. These men may resent Grishin's recent ascendency.
Foreign Policy Views
Grishin's personal views on foreign affairs are difficult to decipher because he rarely addresses an appropriate forum. Like Kirilenko, hewould be cautious in dealing with the West. He is certainly an ardent supporter of solidarity in the socialist camp, and his anti-Chinese credentials arc well established.
In some of his recent foreign assignments, Grishin hasotable lack of finesse.rip to Czechoslovakia one year after the invasion, his delegation was metarrage of rocks and jeersisit
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actory in Prague. Exceptne-day (riparsaw inrishin has not journeyed abroad since his trip to Rome.
Trouble Spots at Home
Although Grishin's career has not been marred by any clearlypolitical setbacks, there have been some danger signals. On party organizational matters, Grishin, in an uncharacteristic move, appears lo haveorward position on the controversial decision ath Party Congress1 lo hold an exchange of party cards. The exchange can serveay to remove dcadwood and revitalize the party ranks. Because of the high political slakes involved, most party leaders, including Brezhnev, have treated the matter with extreme caution, or have ignored it altogether in their public statements.
Early on, however, Grishin expressed his dissatisfaction with the slow pace of the exchange. In fact, he seems to have beenelatively large number of young people for party membership and responsible posts in the party. His position on this issue may bring him into conflict wilh some of his more conservative colleagues who continue to resist any large influx of new blood.
rishin, as chief of the Irade unions, was politicallyin the press debate that preceded the economic reform launched that year. One of the more controversial proposals being aired involved the use of "material incentives" (wages) to increase labor productivity. The concept was vigorously opposed by conservatives who preferred to rely on the conventional Soviet technique of "moral incentives'* (competitions, banners, and medals).
Tlie Irade union's newspaper, Trud, presumably reflecting Grishin's thinking on the matter, gave heavy coverageocal labor competition with high praise for Ihe winners, thereby signaling its support for "moralravda, at thai lime editedotable "liberal" in Soviet terms, promptly published an expose revealing thai the outcome of the competition had been rigged in advance and that Ttud knew about ihe deception. Grishin was obliged to issue an unprecedented, signed apology thai was published in Pravda.
Education and Early Career
Like mosi lop Soviet party and government leaders, Grishin received his only formal education in industrial technology.t the agee graduatedechnical school in Moscow, specializing in railroadFrom there Grishin went lo work in railroad administration in his home town of Serpukhov, near Moscow.0 he had risen to the top parly post in Serpukhov.
ANDROPOV: MORE THAN JUSTA KGB CHIEF
Yury VTadimirovichresent job. KGB Chairman, has templed many Western observers to view him simplypecialist in repression and espionage.year-old career party official also had substantial earlier regional party experience, however, and has servedears in other capacities in the Soviet leadership. Heood chance of reluming to other full-time party work.
Unlikely Party Boss
The top party post would seem at best an outside possibility for Andropov. Although his long party experience and apparently good working relationshipsroad range of leadership colleagues would work to Andropov's advantage in circumstancesompromise candidate, his handicaps probably weigh more heavily. The KGB portfolioevere obstacle to any contender for the lop party post. Leadershipwould be wary of thepotential inherent in any direct jump from the KGB to party chief even in the case of an Andropov, who has not beenambitious in Ihe manner of his predecessors. The Soviet Union's image at home and abroad would suffer, probably to andegree, from tooecret police aura around thetop leader.
Andropov's partyextensive, isin relations withcommunist parlies andmatters. He lacksexperience in suchas the economy. ByAndropov hasambitious for, andfor, importantinfluence than for
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political leadership. If Andropov is still KGB Chairman when Brezhnev's successor is chosen, his support would be all but essential to the candidate for party boss.
Likely Return to Party Foreign Affairs
It is quite possible, however, that Andropov will leave the KGBIn the next few years to return to work on foreign party relations atlevel.ull Politburo member, he could become aby reluming to the party secretariat that he leftJunior"for the KGB. At that time, Andropov had for the previous lenthe Central Committee's department for relations with rulingparties. Andropov appears to be one of the few intellectualsleaders, and might be chosen to combine supervision of ideologywith some aspect of foreign affairs. Suslov, the party'sand expert on international communism, is
/Andropov, who worked for Suslov4strong candidate to inherit at leas: some ofSaoftOtimtio
Policy VfeWI
lnformation on Andropov's policy views is fragmentary, but he has been seemingly consistent in defending Iwo priorities closely related to his successive areas of responsibility: CPSU leadership of the international communist movement and Soviet internal security. Andropov's most recent speech, in Estonia onredictablycathingof Western interference in internal Soviet affairs.
Nonetheless, he also endorsed Soviel detente policies as contributing to elimination of the threat of nuclear war and creating the best conditions for social and economic development of the USSR Additionally, Andropov has been more positive lhan any other full Politburo member who has recently spoken on the benefits achieved by Brezhnev's dclentc policies, saying thai "never before has Ihe foreign policy of the Soviet Union heen so effective or produced such splendid results within son sum, Andropov
seems likely lo support, detente so long as it docs not imperil internal security or Moscow's position in the socialist community.
Andropov seems loighly pragmatic manager who admiresand results. These personality factors on occasion seem to modify his policy views. The net resultomplex man whose opinions and actions arc not readily susceptible to neat classification as "hard-line" or "progressive."
One reflection of this complexity is Andropov's persistent reputationintellectual and even dissident circleselative progressive andhave argued in leadership councils against
political show trials, calling them senseless and counterproductive, and to have been one of the leaders behind the decision toafety valve of controlled Jewish emigration.
Under Andropov's leadership, however, the KGB,iscriminating mixture of threats and arrests, has all but routed the Soviet dissidents withoutndropov's willingness to step out of Ihc traditional KGB rut of uniformly crass repression, to employ subtler methods and shifting tactics, makesore formidable KGB Chairman, as wellore effective walker of tlie detente-vigilance tightrope.
Highly cultured and intelligent, Andropov is generally quiet andin manner. He seems comfortable with responsibility,killed administrator, and is as demanding of himself as of his subordinates.he knows some English. Although widely traveled in Eastern Europe and communist Asia, Andropov's only known travel to non-communist ureas was to Somalia in
Political Ties
Any CPSU party head must secure his position byoyal KGB Chairman.rezhnev chose Andropov, ousting Chairman Semichastny because of his greater loyally to Brezhnev's then principal rival, Shelepin.
Andropov also seems to have the kind of trust and broad support among other leaders lhat,ollective, is almost as essentialGB Chairman us the confidence of the party head. Suslov was probably Andropov's primary earlier patron. There is lillle information on their current relationship, but theie is no evidence lhat they do not still find basic common ground.
Andropov's acquaintance with Kirilenko, Brezhnev's unofficial party deputy and likeliest short-term successor, conceivably goes back lo the
. when both were in Rybinsk, although attending differentschools.
Andropov's promotion to full Politburo membership in the spring3 was tied to other considerations, including Brezhnev's desire to strengthen his foreign policy support and some other, still unclear, political tradeoffs. Andropov had outranked Gromyko and Grechko until last April when their promotions gave them equal status, and also indirectly advanced the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defensearty bureaucraticequal to that of the KGB.
Impact on the KGB
Tlie principal effect of Andropov's KGB has been closer party-KGB relations. The first KGB chairman since Beria to sit in leadership councils Andropov, unlike Beria, has the outlookarty administrator ratheroliceman. He has brought party controlarty leadership viewpoint directly to bear on KGB management. Several of the new KGB deputy chairmen appointed in recent years have been party, rather than KGB, officials. By the same token, Andropov probably also brings some degree of KGB perspective directly into the Politburo, with correspondingof the KGB's institutional influence in that body.
Budapest and Other Influences
Bom on June4 in the north Caucasus area, Andropova technical education in Rybinsk and thenomsomol organizer in Yaroslavl Oblast. His Komsomol work took himo the Karelo-Finnish Republic, where he headed the party youth organization During most of World War II he organized partisans behind the German lines, probably along the Finnish frontier in Ihc Munnansk area. His partisan experience is another common bond with Suslov. who directed this activity in the north Caucasus area, with Pclshend Mazurov and Masherov (Belorussia).
4, Andropov was again in formal party work in the Karelo-Finnish Republic, first as second secretary of the city ofand then of the whole republic.
ndropov went to Moscow and into the Central Committee apparatus. He simultaneously attended the Higher Party School.3 he was posted to Budapest, becoming ambassador there4 and remaining through the Hungarian Revolutionnformation on Andiopov's personal role in the Hungarian Revolution, however, is fragmentary and
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conflicting.7 he relumed lo Moscow as head of the Central Commit-tee Bloc Department (relations with rulinghere he served until going lo theecade later. He joined the leadershiparly secretary innhortly after moving to the KGB, he was transferred from the secretariat toandidatemember.
KGB Headquarters
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SKCVET
DMITRYOLITICAL PROFILE
On Februarymitry Polyansky was abruptly dropped from his post of first deputy premier and appointed minister of agriculture. Thisevere setback to his ambitions to succeed Kosygin as premier. Not only Kremlin politics, but also the previous year's poor harvest wereimportant factors in his demotion. His demotion seemed designed to deflect from Brezhnev criticism for the almost disastrous crop failure.
olyansky had been one of the most influential and promising of the junior members of the Politburo. His strength derived from his key position as first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers in which capacity he coordinated the work of the numerous agencies dealing with agriculture-and from his excellent and extensive political connections.
A Russified Ukrainian. Polyansky was oneroup of Soviet leaders, including Brezhnev, Kirilenko. Podgorny and Grechko. who got their start in the Ukraine under Khrushchev and who allied themselves with him during his rise to power in Moscow. Although they did not always agree among themselves on policy questions, they formed the core of Brezhnev's political support after Khruschcv's ouster.
Polyansky's penchant for politicking and his tendency to generate rather than shun controversy undoubtedly contributed to his difficulties. Whether Brezhnev engineered or merely acquiesced in Polyansky's demotion, the party boss ultimately benefited, and relations between the two men now appear to be somewhat strained. This year's excellent harvest clearly saved Polyansky his Politburo scat for the moment, but Brezhnev got the public credit.
The present arrangement regarding Polyansky is highly unstable with many loose ends. Polyansky long dominated the agriculturalleast behind the scenes-and his demotiononsiderable power vacuum that has not been filled. The position of first deputy premier that he lost is still vacant. Fedor Kulakov, the party secretary for agriculture and onceprotege, is now seemingly the ranking agriculturalist in theKulakov has made clear his allegiance to Brezhnev, but has otherwiseautious role, apparently unsure whether Polyansky's star is rising orovernment reorganization, rumored to be in the works, could resolve the issue.
The Man
Polyansky isaceless bureaucrat; he is one of the moreof tlieriving authoritarian politician, his ambitionby an open outgoingocking wit,endency tohe thinks. Foreigners who have met him have found him to be aand complex individual: '
Born Under the Right Star
Polyansky puts great stock in Ihe fact that he was born on the day of the Bolshevik revolution, Novembere grew up in the Ukraine and atlended an agricultural institute there in the. After graduating, he left the republic and though he kept in touch with many of his former Ukrainian associates, his subsequent career was primarily in Ihe Russian Republic and then at tlie national level.
He served as party boss in several key grain-growing districts, andhanks to his loyal support for Khrushchev against the anti-party group, he was named premier of Ihe Russian Republic andeat on the Politburo. Four years later he waseputy to Kosygin and in this capacity became the government's (op agricultural administrator.
. Polyansky's approach lo agricultural problems has always seemed basically pragmatic,oncern for economic considerationsealthy regard for political realities. He was, for example, an advocate of buying grain from abroad and was closely involved in the first big Soviet purchases
Yet, Polyansky had been as responsible as anyone for some of the ill-advised agricultural practices at that time, abetting Khrushchev in his determination to find cheap, short-cut remedies. Polyansky came close lo losing his jobesult. He participated in the coup against Khrushchev and expressed great bitterness in later years at the damage Khrushchev did lo the agricultural sector in the last years of his tenure as party boss.
Champion of Agricultral Interests
Polyansky was evidently the chief architect of the ambitiousprogram thai Brezhnev sponsored5 soon after Khrushchev's ouster. Through high investmentseform of planning and procurement mechanisms, the program sought io modernize agriculture and put itound financial footing-to undo the legacy from the Stalin years when the agricultural sector was milked to finance the development of heavy industry.
Polyanskytaunch and outspoken champion of this program. When other leaders, including Brezhnev, flagged in their support, Polyansky spoke oui publicly in its defense. In an all-but-unprccedented'move inhortlyecision had been taken to cut back on agricultural investments, Polyansky wrole an article in the leading Soviel theoretical journal, warning of the dangers of slighting that sector.
Polyansky's most serious and long-drawn-oui feud over agriculture appears to have been with Gemiady Voronov. who succeeded lumas premier of the Russian Republicmong other points of disagreement. Voronov heldadical reform in the organization of labor and in the system of wages on the farms would reduce the need for the highin agriculture that Polyansky proposed. As the argument wore on, both were driven to somewhat ridiculous extremes. Polyansky wasthe victor in (his controversy. Voronov was dismissed from Ihe premiership in1 and dropped from the Politburo inhe feud caused much badact that may not have helped Polyansky later when the harvesl failed.
Polyansky's friendly relations with Kirilenko and others like Demichev made it easy Tor him to smooth over policy differences wilh them, but this was not the case with Voronov. Polyansky seems lo have had nothing but
scorn for him and repeatedly dismissed his proposals as "nonsense."has expressed (he same outspoken intolerance towards others he has considered either wrong or of no consequence.
Polyansky Dabbles in the Arts
Polyansky's primary concern has been with the agricultural sector, but there have been persistent reports over Ihc years of his interest in cultural affairs. He may have had some official responsibilities for this area as part of his duties as deputy premier. In contrast to his generally pragmatic and flexible approach to economic matters, Polyansky is thoroughly conservative in his attitude toward the arts, perhaps because he recognizes thereonstituency holding such views. Furthermore, his name has been linked with the more reactionary Slavophile movements and with various anti-Semitic and Stalinist writers.
nd in Foreign Affairs?
This same message seemed implicit in Polyansky's appointment as minister of agriculture last spring. "Concentrate your able talents onand slay oul of theirhere were hints in the previous year that Polyansky may have flirted with those in the central committee who had reservations aboul Brezhnev's detente policies.
OLITICAL PORTRAIT
Aleksandr Shelepin. once in the running to become the regime's strong man. has in recent years been clingingrecarious political existence. Despite his reduced status. Shelepin still bears watching. His ambition and abilities seem unimpaired, ande is the youngest full member of the Politburo.
Shelepin's success in surviving many reverses indicates that he retains significant support built up during his career as head of the Komsomol, head of the KGB. and ultimately as holder of top party and government posts. His policy preferences seem to have had an important influence, even in recent years, on the direction of policy adopted by the leadership.
The high point in Shelepin's career came in4 following Khrushchev's ouster, when he attained membership on the Politburo. He was the only Politburo member to also hold important executive posls in both the party (Central Committee secretary) and the government (deputy premier).
Shelepin reportedly used his strong position to challenge Brezhnevleadership of ihe party sometime ut he was thwartedpolitical skill and, very likely, by the other leaders' fear ofOver the next few years, the layers of Shelepin's offices and
responsibilities were gradually peeled away. When inoscow party boss Yegorychcv, an ally of Shelepin, criticized the leadership's handling of the Arab-Israeli crisis, Shelepin was removed from the party Secretariat and made chief of the tradeosition that usually has not merited Politburo membership. Ath Party Congresshelepin was listed last (llth) among incumbentall from 7th place at6 Congress. The two leaders, Voronov and Shelest, who were ranked just ahead of Shelepin1 have since been forced out of the Politburo.
The Komsomol and KGB
Shelepin has demonstrated unusual ability and readiness to shape his policy to serve his political ambitions. The resultant shifts have frustrated attempts toolitical label on him, although he has (he reputation of advocaling modern, efficient management as well as traditional Sovietsuch as centralized control.
Shelepin was born in Voronezh, RSFSR,he sonailroad worker, lie is one of the few Soviet leadersackground in social sciences, having studied at the Moscow Institute of History, Philosophy, and Literature in the. He served in the army in the Russo-Fmnish Warolitical education instructorquadron commander. During World War II he began his career in the Komsomol in Moscow and reportedlyartisan group near Moscow.
Shelepin rose through the Komsomol hierarchy and2 became its firstosition he heldn this post he was able to develop tieshole generation of future leaders throughout the country. Shelepin still retained considerable influence over the Komsomol in thend, when the organization and its newspaper were open to new ideas and freer discussion of political and social questions. For example, the Komsomol undertook to popularize sociology and the use of questionnaires and polls.
helepin worked briefly in the Central Committee apparatus before being appointed chief of the KGB. This post contributed to his sinister image abroad. In fact, however, Shelepin took strenuous measures to bring the secret police under closer party and government supervision and to end its role as an instrument of political terror. Shelepin left the KGB infter being elected to the party Secretariat. The next year he was named deputy premier and chairman of the watchdog Party-State Control Com mil tee.
Tlie Voice of Neo-Stalinism
In his drive for power in the. Shelepineo-Stalinist program that in many ways suited the post-Khrushchev climate. He appeared to be in league with those who favored administrative fiat in directing the economy, cultural and ideological retrenchment,with China, and hostility toward the West. Brezhnev, however, took ihc wind oul of Shclepin's sails byonservative tack himself.
Brezhnev also moved lo erode Shelepin's organizational strength. Inhelepin was relieved of his post On the Council ofand dismissed as head of Ihc Party-State Control Committee, which was dismantled. In the Secretariat, Shelepin momentarily gained responsibility for ihe cadres sector, but was forced to turn this over to Kirilenko ine ended up with the relatively minor responsibility of overseeing the consumer goods industry.
Shelepin Changes His Colors Again
Following his demotionhelepin seemed to begin to moderate his conservative views, perhaps recognizing that he needed newand new issues. For example, inhelepin's trade union newspaperavorable reviewontroversial play, Bolsheviki. The play examined the Bolshevik leaders' decision, with its portentous meaning for Soviet history, to introduce the Red Terror after an attempt against Lenin's life. The play shocked and aroused Moscow audiences still deeply concerned about Stalin's crimes.
Shelepin was among those who opposed the
Soviel intervention in Czechoslovakia in the summers Irade union chief, Shelepin became active and effective in promoting closer lies with foreign trade unions, particularly those of Western Europe.
Shelepin continued to show interest in consumer welfare even afterresponsibility for il on the Secretariatlthoughopposed Ihe economic reformis economicto become somewhat more flexible by the end of the 0e joined such leaders as Mazurov,
Suslov, and Kirilenko in criticizing drift in economic policy and calling for more modern methods of management. He gave early support to Iheof production associations, which was decreed last year.
Shelepin Casts His Lo! With Brezhnev
Since Brezhnev unveiled his programs of consumer welfare at home and peace abroad ath Parly Congresshelepin has become, at least in public, one of the warmest supporters of the General Secretary and his policies. Speaking jusl after the Congress, Shelepin outdid olhcr leaders in praising ihe new deal for consumers. In3 he credited Brezhnev with successes in detente and became ihe first Politburo member, apart from Brezhnev's protege Kunayev, lo refer lo the General Secretary as head of the Politburo. During the leadership's round of speechmaking late last year, Shelepin heaped praise on Brezhnev and was more enthusiastic than even Brezhnev on many specific aspects of delcnle.
Shelepin's currcnl public views probably stem from his precarious positionudgment lhat ostentatious backing of an increasingly secure Brezhnev and his policies offers the best hope for survival. Yet, Shelepin docs seem tonack for anticipating the direction of policy. The change of heart he showed in theuggests that he may genuinely believe in Ihe new directions in policy.
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In recent years Shelepin's contacts with Westerners have been largely confined to trade union leaders. He makes widely varying impressions on foreigners he meets. He often comes across as heavy-handed in meetings with foreign communist party and communist trade union officials.
By contrast.met Shelepin in
Moscowhimood listenerriendly
personaliTyens?of humor. Shelepin avoided communist cliches and jargon andoke at the expense of the Chinese. He expressed regret and amazement over the assassination of Robert Kennedy, remarking that "these are the methods of Stalin."
who talked with Shelepin in Moscow
'h Novemberound him tougher on Middle East questions than in previous years. On the other hand. Shelepin said he believed US-Soviet detente was still strong. He praised President Nixon's policy toward the USSR and said he thought the President would complete his term.
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REGIONAL LEADERS IN THE POLITBURO
Of theull and candidate members on the ruling Politburo, seven represent regional or local interests. Their Politburo status exposes themertain extent to national policy concerns and issues.atter of practical politics, however, these regional leaders find themselves championing the interests of their own constituencies, especially with regard to the continuing scramble for development funds and resources.
Shcherbitsky in the Ukraine
Inladimir Shcherbitsky became first secretary of the Ukraine, bringing the largest of the non-Russian republics under the controllose protege of Brezhnev. Both men have political roots in the Dnepropetrovsk district of the Ukraine, where they had openly maneuvered against the previous first secretary, Petr Shelest. During this contest, Shelcsi sought to shore up his position in the republic by echoing some of the views of the more nationalistically minded clement in the Ukrainian party, while Brezhnev and Shcherbitsky moved steadilyougher, more centrist, Moscow-oriented stance.
At the same time, Shelest began Io challenge Brezhnev more openly on policy issues, such as detente with West and the domestic consumer program, presumably in hopes of attracting support from other quarters. He also began defending the interests of his republic constituency even moreAlh party congress in the springhelest criticized Moscow's policy of heavy investment in oil and gas projects in Siberia, claiming that the Ukrainian coal industry was stagnating.
It was at ihe party congress that Brezhnev moved decisively to weaken Shclest's position. Shcherbitsky, then Ukrainian premier, was promoted from candidate to full membership on the Politburo, lt is very unusual for both top posts in any republic to be held by full members of the Politburo, and it was apparent thai cither Shelest or Shcherbitsky would have to go.
The climax came at the Central Committee meeting on the eve of the Moscow summit inhe immediate cause for Shclest's transfer from the Ukraineeputy premiership in Moscow was probably his opposition to going through with the summit, although he had already laid himself open to charges of nationalism by his conspicuous defense of Ukrainian specialear later Shelest was ouslcd from the
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The campaign agains! Shelesi has colored Shcherbitsky's policies. He has supported detente and the consumer program. He publiclyShelest's criticism ofin Siberia. In the past year Shcherbitsky has quietly removed officials in the Ukraine closelywith Shelest and has acted to muffle manifestations ofin the republic Once he feels more secure in his position,he could become morein his views and pay more attention to Ukrainian interests.
Shcherbitsky, whotraveled abroad as muchother republic leaders, butone of the few to have visitedHe represented the Ukraine atsession of the UnitedGeneral Assembly in most Soviet leaders,received his only formal educationechnical school, ainstitute in the Dnepropetrovsk area, from which he graduated
Masherov in Itclorussia
The Kremlin is seeking to strengthen the country's economic base while maintaining close internal control. In its quest for these twin goals, it has an articulate and dynamic spokesman in Pctr Masherov, first party secretary of the Belorussian Republicandidate member of the Politburo.
Masherov has consistently championed scientific andeans to economic and social progress in Belorussia, but has also stressed the need for ideological purity. In particular, he has warned against the dangers ofoting that this tends to sap the party's elan and makelave to his material possessions.
Masherov hastrong centrist view on the nationality question,ore rapidintegration of the Sovietand the blurring of alland cultural distinctions. Masherov's frequent references to the "new Soviet man" reflect the regimes fundamental premise that, in time, the USSR's multinational population can be moldedomogeneous citizenry dedicated to advancing the interests of the whole Soviet state.
The absence of nationalist pressures in Belorussia and thepolitical rivalry between the Belorussian and Ukrainian party organizations are important reasons for Masherov's pro-centrist stand. His criticism in2 of the efforts of some local leaders to favor their own republics at the expense of the national interest was clearly directed against Shelest. It was one of the sharpest public attacks in the campaign against the former Ukrainian parly boss, and was even more sweeping than Brezhnev's in its condemnation of local nationalism.
Under Masherov, Belorussia is experiencing an economic boom, largely because Moscow is investing more in the republic, including constructionumber of large petrochemical complexes. In order to bolster hisfor more money while not laying himself open to the charge of nationalism, as did Shelest in Ihe Ukraine, Masherov has stressed Iheof these industrial complexes for the USSRhole. He has emphasized, moreover, thai labor is recruited from all Ihe Sovietand that construction funds and materials are drawn from all the republics.
Masherov's personal relationship wilh Brezhnev is not clear. He has enthusiastically supported some of Ihe General Secretary's programs, bul has been cool or even hostile to others.
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Masherov probably has an important ally in Moscow in Politburo member and First Deputy Premier Kirill Mazurov who. like Masherov, is an ethnic Belorussian. Masherov followed closely behind Mazurov in his rise through the Komsomol and party leadership in Belorussia. When Mazurov moved to Moscowasherov succeeded him as the republics first party secretary. It is true that Masherov. in his efforts to strengthen his personal control over the Belorussian party organization, has removed some of Mazurov's dose associates, thus creating the potential for some strain between the two. Nevertheless, Mazurov is the odds-on favorite to succeed Premier Kosygin, and isood position to advance Belorussian interests. The influence of both Mazurov and Masherov, in fact, seems to have been rising just as the unity of the "Ukrainian clique" in national politics has been dissolving.
Since he became Belorussian party chief, Masherov hasumber of European countries.eeachers' college in Belorussia in thendhort period before the war taught physics and mathematicsecondary school.
Solomentscv in the RSFSR
Inikhail Solomentscv was named premier of the Russian Republiche largest of the IS Soviet republics. He replaced one of Brezhnev's political adversaries, Gcnnady Voronov, who had quarreled with Brezhnev over agriculture investment policies. Solomentscv may have had early tics to Suslov and Shelepin, but he nows seems to beelatively independent role. The RSFSR premier is usually entitled to full membership in the Politburo.andidate mcmbeias missed several opportunities to be promoted. This may mean either that he has some high-level detractors or that he lacks strong allies in the party hierarchy.
Solomentsev has had broader experience than most of the otherleaders. He lias servedigh party post in another republicand for Ave years was responsible for heavy industry in the CPSU Secretariat. Westerners who have met with him say he exudes ruthless self-confidence.
Nevertheless. Solomentsev's positionregional" leader is somewhat anomalous. The post of RSFSR premier,cat in Moscow, is in manyalional office. The Russian Republic is twice the size of all the other
republics combined and contains over hair the population of the USSR. Solomentsev administers an RSFSR government bureaucracyas vast and complex asKosypn's USSR Council of Ministers.
On the other hand.has no direct party authority over the area he supposedly rules. Party affairs for the RSFSR are run from the CPSU Central Committee and its Secretariat. The absenceeparate party organization for the Russian Republic results in part from the central leadership's desire to avoid concentration of power in the hands of one man. For Solo-menlscv. it means that any number of central Politburo leaders can. and often do. meddle in the affairs of the RSFSR.
like Shelest and Shcherbitsky in the Ukraine, must deal
with nationalism in both its emotional and economic aspects. Russian national sentiment is an important clement in Moscow's intellectual life, and long-established regional rivalries must be taken into account. Solomentsev has. for example, promoted the development of Siberia in the eastern RSFSR. But he cannot do this too vigorously without antagonizingpolitical and economic interests in the heavily industrialized area of the western part of the republic.
Solomentsev, whoas begun to travel more frequently since being named KSFSK premier. Last December he went to Japan to open an exhibit devoted to Siberia. Solomentsev is of Russian descent. Heoly technical institute in Leningrad, graduating
THREE PROMINENT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE YOUNGER GENERATION
The Soviet leadership includes three members underears of age: parly secretaries Konstantinladimirndmember of the Politburo Grigoryhey represent the first contingenthird generation of leaders on the scene behind the top officials, aU of whom arend the middle-level officials, generally betweenroup, they cannot be considered Brezhnev's men, although he seems to haveand in the rapid rise each of them has experienced.
The three began their careers in industry and have devoted much of their later party careers to economic management problems. In this field they have been innovative and have pushed several of the organizational and management schemes now coming into vogue. This may say something about the shape of the leadership to come.
The present regimeegional organization of economic management5 in favortrictly centralized branch system. Yet, in promoting these three young regional leaders who have been successful in Ihe economic field, the regime has advanced advocates and practitioners of more regional control. These regional leaders have stressed the importance of improving local infrastructure and welfare in conjunction with thetasks that are the focus of central ministries, and they have also used sociological studies (traditionally suspect in the Sovicl Union) to bolster their programs.
Katushev
SinceS. Konstantin F. Katushev has been the Centralsecretary responsible for relations with ruling Communist parties abroad. His earlier career did little to prepare him for this assignment, which he apparently owes largely to Brezhnev.
Katushev was born and made his career in Gorky, RSFSR. He served in the army at the front late in World War II. In the, he began studies at the Gorky Polytcchnical Institute, where he majored intechnology.1 he went to work at the Gorky Automotive Plant, then the army's biggest supplier of tanks. He rose through various positionsesigner and party worker at the plant to become secretary of Ihe planfsparty bureau1 and first secretary of Gorky city
Inrezhnevll Gorky lo supervise Katu-ihev's promotion to first secretary of the oblast. Until then. Brezhnev had not appeared to be involved in Katushev's career, and this remains the only lime Brezhnev, as party leader, has presided over aat the oblast level. Although there were signs in the central press of opposition to Katushev's advancement, Brezhnev returned to Gorky in7 lo give the oblast the Order of Lenin and his praise.
Under Katushev's aegisrogressive systemcontrol andadopted by factories inprogram apparentlydefense-related electronicsbut was soon picked upindustries, including the Gorky Automotive Plant Al theatushev noted the success that5 economicmeeting inear later, however, he associated himself withlo establish in Gorky tight party control over the plantfunds instituted by the reform.
Katushev's support of the principle of parly control, however, was nol wholly orthodox.5 the Gorky city party committeeublic institute of sociological research to provide more scientific studies of economic and social problems. Gorky also early began experimenting wilh social development plans at enterprises lo accompany production plans. These plans usually encompass worker training, safely and health measures, housing, recreation facilities, and ideological education.
Katushev assumed his current responsibilities for bloc affairsime when Brezhnev was supervising this aspect of foreign relations more closely than others. Al the Central Committee meeting lhat promoted Katushev inrezhnev laid down an uncompromising ideological line in reaction to the liberal trends in Czechoslovakia. Katushev was heavilyin reasserting Soviet contiol in Czechoslovakia after the8 invasion. As the focus of Soviet foreign policy has shifted to the West and lo detente, Katushev has appeared to lose some of the piominentc he enjoyed in Ihe
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Romanov
After seven years as second secretary of Leningrad Oblast,omanov became the party chief there ineplacingolstikov who left as ambassador to Peking. Int theCenlral Committee meeting preceding Brezhnev's trips to Bonn and Washington, Romanov wasandidate member of the Politburo.
With these moves, Brezhnev apparently reached accommodationreviously rather hostile Leningrad party organization. Leningrad regained the representation on the Politburo that it enjoyed under Stalin, and also gained recognition and support from Brezhnev for some of its pet schemes in the field of economic management and party work. At the same time, Romanov departed from Tolstikov's silent treatment of Brezhnev and began giving the General Secretary generous praise.
Romanov's political roots arc in the party organization, whicheputation for being progressive on economic matters and reactionary on cultural and ideological questions. After serving in the army during World War II, he> worked as designer in the Leningrad ship-building industry and graduated from the Leningrad Ship-building Institute. He began full-time party work4 and moved up the city and oblasl party hierarchy unUI he became Tolstikov's deputy in
ran afoularticularly overpolicy, just when Brezhnev was taking his first steps in the direction of detente. In June, Leningrad authorities foiled an attempt by Jews to hijack anave of arrests of Jews around thefollowed, and the would-be hijackers were tried, with two receiving death sentences. This brought an outcry from the West. In December, presumablyesult of intervention of the leadership, the death sentences were commuted, and the next year saw the beginning of freer emigration of Jews.
Romanov's personalin these matters is unknown.
As Leningrad parly boss, he has maintained rigid culiural and socialbul apparently without complicating Brezhnev's foreign policy. Romanov, however, worked closely with Tolstikov in developing hisprograms and continues to be their champion,
Leningradcrs greatly resented the abolition of regional economic units5 and the rc-cslablishment of central production ministries. In the economic schemes they have advanced, Leningrad leaders have tried to improve their ability to integrate the activities of the central ministries in the region and to become better masters of iheir own house.
Leningrad has become the recognized leader in amalgamatingand scientific institutes into associations and in formulating social development plans at the factory, city, and oblasl level. At the party congressomanov stated that further development of associations would "sharply reduce the number of projects subject to control from" Moscow and would free central bodies from having to deal wilh many operational questions. Under Romanov. Leningrad officials have worked nol only lo achieve integrated comprehensive planning within the oblast, but also to extend their influence over economic affairs in the surrounding region of the country.
These efforts have been closely directed by the oblast party committee, which has developed several new organizational forms to enhance party supervision over the economy. At the party congress, Romanov mentioned their experience in creating unified parly organizations in productionenlarging patty committees in large enterprises, and granting such committees the rightsity ward committee. Sociologists have been enlisted by party organizations at all levels to aid in the formulation of social development plans. The Leningrad party committee hasouncil for economic and social development lo draft comprehensive city and oblasl plans.
Brezhnev incorporated many of these ideas in his report to the party congress ine particularly urged that production associations become the "basic..links of sociallis real effort to woo the Leningradcrs came in December of that year, when he traveled to Ihe city and gave official endorsement to Ihe work on regional planning. Leningrad had already received public support for many of ils programs from leaders such as Kirilenko, Mazurov, and Shelepin. Lastaity-governmcnt decree ordered Ihe nalionwidc formation of production associations.
Romanov has traveled widely abioad, most recently wilh Brezhnev to Cuba early this year. Last September, the US consul general in Leningrad
became the second non-communist headonsulate to be received by Romanov. At that meeting, Romanov said hetrong advocate of improved relations with the US androposal totwin" relationship between Leningrad and San Francisco,oviet consulate is located.
Dolgikh
Vladimir I. Dolgikh became Central Committee secretary for heavy industry in2 with only three years of experienceegional party secretary behind him. He brought to the leadership proven managerial abilityistory of strong advocacy of Siberian development.
Dolgikh served in the army in World War II and graduated from the Irkutsk Ore Mining and Smelling Institute in Siberiae worked as an engineer in Krasnoyarsk and8 joined the Norilsk Mining and Metallurgical Combine as chief engineer. He was director of this combine north of the Arctic Circle2hen it was growing rapidly.5 the combine was one of the first enterprises in the country to adopt the economic reform system, and Kosygin went to Norilsk in8 to inspect its accomplishments.
Dolgikh was promoted from plant director to first secretary of the sprawling Krasnoyarsk Kray inn that capacity, hea ten-year plan for thedevelopment of the kray and submitted it to Moscow. He said later that Brezhnevigh evaluation" of the plan and theCommitteeecree on il. In1 Brezhnev praised the Krasnoyarsk plan "as anfor Siberian development.
Dolgikh also publiclycase for Siberianspeeches, articles, and even inwith Westernof his themes has been therationale for such At the party congress in
olgikh emphasized the cheapness of Krasnoyarsk coal. He thus seemed to be vying with the Ukiainian coal industry, which Ukrainian party
THE KREMLIN POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT
Soviet leaders workystem of power-sharing that gives voice at the top policy-making level to all the most powerful institutions and regional interest groups. This voice is roughly proportionate to the political weight of these institutions and groups in the country. Conflicting regional andpressures are thus joined at the Politburo levelomplex interplay of power and policy considerations.
The need to heed and reconcile many different points of view hasautious and conservative leadership. The system of committee rulc-"coIIcctive leadership" in Soviet parlance has inhibited sudden or radical shifts in policy and hasigh degree of stability within the top ranks of the leadership. Although the political standing of certain Politburo members has at times changed sharply, removalolitburo member apparentlyear consensus among his colleagues. There has. therefore, been very little attrition in Ihe Politburo.
The system has allowed fot the emergence of party boss Brezhnev as the pre-eminent leader, but it does impose restraints upon hi* power Brezhnev has been able to play off one regional or bureaucratic faction against another and has been the main benenciary of the Kremlin's delicate balance of power. He has. however, been able to advance his own position only by paying close heed to the views of the most powerful interest groups. Anyone who hopes to succeed him will have to do likewise.
Collective leadership-Modus Operandi
Khrushchev in his time paid lip service to the Leninist principle of collective leadership in which members of the Politburo share, although not equally, in formulating policy, but he increasingly violated it toward the end of his tenure. In fact, his tendency to bypass his Politburo colleagues on controversial issuesajor factor in uniting them against him The group that ousted him innformally agreedumber of organizational and procedural safeguards that have become more and more institutionalized with the passage of time. One was the decision to keep the two top posts of party boss and premier in different hands-ccrtainly one ol the main obstacles to the re-emergence of one-man rule.
Collectivity has also been protectedertain extent by an elaborate system uf mutual checks that prevents any one institution from dominating the policy-making process, or any one individual from establishing ain more than one institution. Thaember of one fiction from moving against his rivals or htt boss. Thus, when Andropov was appointed to the government post of KGB head, he was immediately dropped from the party Secretarial. He was, however, compensatedosition on the Politburoandidate member, which gave him direct access to the policy-making circle.
The current composition of the Politburo closely reflects and isto the power relationships among the major interest groups in the country. In contrast to Khrushchev, who was constantly waging war against one bureaucratic element or another. Ihe present leaders appear to want to avoal offending any of the major interest groups.
The party apparatus. In* government, the military-industrial complex, the agricultural lobby, and important regional districts, all have someone on Ihe Politburo lo represent their interests.arty official likewho was given the top KGB post lo ensure the party's control over llic
security forces, finds it wise to represent the agency he was sent to supervise. His needower base and the KGB's need to be heard in policy-making circles are bound to makeutuality of interest.
The appointment of Defense Minister Grechko and Foreign Minister Gromyko to the Politburo last April and the elevation of Andropov to full membership continued the trend of giving broad representation on the Politburo to key interest groups. An overriding consideration in Grcchko's elevation, however, probably was the strong political support he hadfor Brezhnev personally and for his detente policy.
Alignments among theembers of the Politburo tend to be based on mutual and institutional associations, but cliques have nol turned out to be hard and fast. They tend to overlap and to shift from issue to issue. One question may pit the seniors-Brezhnev. Podgorny, Kosygin. and Suslov-againsi the junior members of the Politburo. Another may join party representatives against government officials.
The most durable, although now slowly dissolving, faction has been Brezhnev's "Ukrainiant is made up of the members of theUkrainians, some Russians- who, like Brezhnev, got their start in politics in the Ukraine. While they have not always agreed with Brezhnev or each other on policy issues, they once formed the core of his political support. Tlie group, which includes Podgorny, Kirilenko, Polyansky, and Grechko, now seems to be in the process of dissolution, and Brezhnev appears to be seeking new tics and new support elsewhere. He has, for instance, appeared of late to be more actively cultivating Russian interest groups than in the past.
There are no other groupings within the leadership comparable to the Ukrainians, although others mayense of solidarity by virlue of being ihe "outs."
Power Elites Who Counts foi What
The relative influence or the various institutional and regional groupings is best reflected in the composition of Ihe Party Central Committee's voting membershipurrent members makeoster of the power elite and are an important forum of opinion. Although ils role is primarily thaiubber stamp, it has been called upon in the past to resolve political and policy disputes within the Polilburo and could be called upon to do so again.
Full-lime parly officials still make up the bulk of the votingwith approximatelyercent of the scats. Tlie government executive branch comes next withercent, while the legislative branch hasercent. The representation of the military establishment has risen somewhat in the past decade and now accountsittleercent. Because of the relatively greater cohesion within the military establishment than in other institutions, its political influence is probably greater than its numbers would indicate. This probably holds true also for the security and judicial agencies whose representatives on the Central Committee account forerceni of the membership. Shclcpin's trade union organizations have lessercent of the seats. Intellectuals of any sort, particularly those who are associated with the creative arts or have liberal sympathies, arc woefully under-represented.
Breaking down the membership in terms of economic interests,ercent are associated with farm affairs andercent with industrial production. Of the latter,ercent are associated wilh the heavy industry and defense production andercent with consumer affairs.
'Ihe bloc of party officials is largely composed of regional parly leaders, while the representation of the executive branch is heavily weighted with officials from the central government apparatus in Moscow.
This would seem lo set the stage for party-state rivalry to take on the additional characteronflict between regional and central interests. For example, some aspects of past and ongoing debates over economicapparently pit the regional bias of the party officials against the Moscow orientation of the government workers.5 economic reform attempted to centralize economic decision making again by re-creating central ministries while at the Same time expanding Ihc nghls of the individual plant managers. The real losers were regional officials at the oblast and republic level. Local party officials, the most vocal spokesmen for that level of management, were quick lo make their discontent known.
Collectivity Versus Special Intcrsts
In recent years Brezhnev has given some recognition to the needs of local leaders He has backed the Lcningraders' scheme for putting regional planning under greater local control. He also lent his support to theplan to group small fauns into large associations, again under firm control of the republic party
SK
The leadership continues to wrestle, however, wilh the problem of reconciling the interests of regional officials with those of the Moscow government bureaucracy -and fitting these local experimentsoherent system or administration. There seems toeneral recognition that the entire system of economic management needs to be simplified and improved, but little agreement on how this is to be achieved. Brezhnev in December forcefully called for one integrated system of planning and management, but provided no details. Any reorganization, when it finally emerges, willcontain large, indigestible chunks of compromise.
The history of Brezhnev's detente policy provides another example of ihe way in which ihe system of collectivity has actedrake on new policyorkable consensus within the leadership in support of a
obtained only because Brezhnev made concessions in other areas of domestic policy and only at the cost, finally,upture in the leadership ranks and new strains within the Ukrainian group.
Ukrainian party boss Shelest was the most outspoken critic of detente within the leadership. He wasember of the Ukrainian clique in Moscow, but seemed to be close to two who were. Podgorny and Polyansky. None of the Ukrainian group, in fact, appeared lo be out in front in support of detente. Moreover, some of Shclest's reservations concerning detente were apparently shared by party ideologist Suslov and by Belorussian parly boss Masherov. In addition, there seemed lo be considerable opposition lo detente among regional party officials, perhaps because of their generally more insular outlook. Here again, the strength of this group on the Central Committee may well account for Shclest's success in holding out for so long.
Brezhnev was very slow to move against Shelest; he did so only after he had some successes to show lor detente. When Brezhnev did move, he was careful nol lo criticize Shelest for his stand on foreign policy. Instead, he chose safer ground Shclest's somewhat permissive attitude towardnationalism. On this issue Brezhnev could count on (he support of both Suslov and Masherov. for despite their reported sympathies with Shclest's views on detente, they both were even more Moscow-oriented in Iheir views on the matter of Soviet national minority relations than Brezhnev.
At the same time. Brezhnev sought to win over other conservative regional critics of detente by lending his name to some of their pel local schemes. This goal appears lo haveajor factor in Brezhnev's support of the industrial and agricultuial management experiments of the Leningrad
and Moldavian party leaders. The parly organizations in both regions tend toward rigid orthodoxy on ideological matters.
Shekel's position was seriously undermined by these tactics. Evenmight not have been ousted from his Ukrainian post had heover-reached himselfentral Committee meeting
by trying to reopen the question or the impending2 summitecision to go ahead had already been reached In the Politburo.
Shelesl's removal from theear later in3 and the other changes made in the membership of the Politburo at that time, such as the elevation of Grechko and Grorhyko, seem to have significantly strengthened Brezhnev's hand in the pursuit of detente.
The Matter of Succession
Brezhnev may also now betronger position to ensure that whoever eventually succeeds him will be of his own choosing and will continue the broad outlines of his domestic and foreign policy initiatives. Unlike Khrush chev. who fretted about it openly and endlessly. Brezhnev has given no outward signs of being concerned with succession. He may be content to procrastinate or to leave it in the hands of the Politburo and the major interest groups There are. however, dangers in this The senior members of the Politburo are getting on in yean. Kosygin, Podgomy. Suslov and Crechko are all in, and Brezhnevone of the top leaders enjoys robust health, and the chance of all of them leaving the political scene in rapid succession increases with time. If this were to happen, severe strains would be placed on any orderly transfer of power.
Meanwhile, the most dynamic and outspoken younger members of post-Khrushchev leadership-Shclepin, Polyansky and Shelcst-havc fallen victim of their own political ambitions. In Ihc system of collectivefavoring caulion and compromise as it does, it is the more bureaucratic and self-effacing who have flourished.
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Original document.
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