/IE MO RANDOM FOR: Congressional Support Officer, OCX
Director of Economic Research
Soviet and Chinese Aid to North Vietnam
attached blind memorandujo respondsLesay request to Mr. Colbyon Soviet and Chinese aid to Indochina fromthe present period. Both the text and data inare consistent with other aid series used inmaterials we have presented to Executivecomponents in the past.
bear in mind that North Vietnam also receives
a significant amount of economic assistance from Eastern Europe. Figures for this aid are not included because Congressman Aspin did not ask for them. '
h. Neither the response from DIA nor our raemorandui- cover Communist assistance to Indochinese countries other than North Vietnam. Even at the highest level of classification, there are only fragmentary data on aid passed through to Laos and Cambodia.' He would not be able to distinguish from available evidence what, if any, of the North Vietnamese receipts might be destined for these countries.
of Economic nesearch
Soviot and Chinese Aid to North Vietnam
8 the annual value of Soviot and Chinese military and economic aid to North Vietnam has ranged from0 million to0 million (see attachedlthough2 figure was the second highest of the period, nearly two-thirds of this figure represents military goods. With reconstruction underway and tho ports again open, economic aid should recover from2 low.
Fluctuations in aid levels generally have reflected the situation in Indochina and not shifts in the degree of support from Hanoi's allies. Economic aid from the USSR, for instance,0 million annually duringeconstruction period and could have been higher if North Vietnam's absorptive capacity were not so limited. Soviet aid fell sharplyowever,esult of the mining of North Vietnam's ports and the halt in reconstruction activity during2 bombing. Deliveries from China fell only moderately as Hanoi shiftedassive overland transportation effort in the latter part2 to maintain the flow of essential supplies such as foodstuffs and petroleum.
China's relative importanceource of economic aid exceeded that of the USSR3 for the first time since before the war. Soviet shipments recovered only partially as mine clearing nnd dredging operations did not fully restore
Haiphong's port capacity. Hanoi continued to rely heavily on overland transportation from China for essential imports.
Economic- assistance to North Vietnam should rise again4 and the USSR should regain its position as Hanoi's major supplier. North Vietnam's requirements for food, fertilizer, and petroleum remain high and the pace of reconstruction should pick up now that preliminary damage surveys have been completed and Hanoi has had time toomprehensive reconstruction program.
The military aid figures reflect the level and intensity of combat operations in Indochina. The high level8 resulted both from replacement requirements for ground forces equipment following8 Tet offensive and the delivery
of substantial amounts of Soviet air defense equipment before the bombing halt that year. Combat levels were lowor during the next two years and military aid declined. This trend was reversed1 when Hanoi began preparations for2 spring offensive. Military assistance jumped sharply againeflecting an upsurge in deliveries of ground forces equipment and air defense equipment. Shipments apparently turned down3 following the ceasefire agreement. Unless Hanoi plans another major offensive4 orilitary aid probably will fall again
Soviet, and Chinese Aid to North Vietnam
Million US DolTara