SOVIET DETENTE POLICY (NIAM 11-9-74)

Created: 5/23/1974

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ANALYTICAL MEMORANDUM

Soviet Detente Policy

34

N!

SOVIET DETENTE POLICY

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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS, EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT, AS FOLLOWS:

The (olWing intelligence organizations participated In the preparation of the aitimatei

The Central Intelligence Agency, ihe intelligence orgonUatioitt ol th* Dr-portmenU ol itotc. I' w. Treowry. ond the Not-onol Security Agony

Concurring:

Ihe Deputy Director olientlng the Control Intelligence Agency

Theof Intelligence ond biearcH representing the Deportment ol Stole Ihe Director. Defem* InteUrgonce Agency The Director. NotionalAgnney

The Awiitant Generol Atanogor lor National Security repwMwiIng the Atomic Energy Commhiion

The Special AurUonf to the Secretory ol ihe Troowry repreienling the Otportmenl ol the Treowry

Abstaining:

The Atviuant Director, Federal Burooo ol In.eUipation, the wbjetf being outbid*

Ol hit (VllictkxX.

mso PARTICIPATING;

Tlie Aiiinunl Chiel of Stall lor Intelligence, Department ol the Army

The Duecto. ol Novo! Intelligence. Oeportmeni ol the Navy

tont CW< of Stoll, WeBgeocc.ol ihe Air Force

E6REF

contents

Page

NOTE

PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS

DISCUSSION

OSCOW'S

Problems and

It MOSCOWS CURRENT DETENTE BALANCE

BEARINC ON THE FUTURE OF

The Leadership 9

The Question of 9

China 9

Economics

The Third World In Cencral11

The Middle East In Particular B

Europe and japan12

The US13

SOVIET14

SCCKC!

SOVIET DETENTE POLICY

NOTE

This National Intelligence Analytical Memorandum addresses the Soviet conception of detente, the factors whichetente approach to the Soviet leaders, the dangers they sec in it forand its durabilityeneral framework for Sovietbehavior. It discusses the relationship between detente and the USSR's major foreign policies, but does notetailed analysis of each of these individual policies.

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principal conclusions'

ussr sees in detente the international atmosphereto maximizing the powerecurity ol the soviet stateinfluence abroad. soviet hinders neither expect nor intendprogram" to end rivalry with (he outside world, but ratherprudent limits on that rivalry in the nuclear age and allowsoviet policy maneuver.

the soviets, detente is at least aseed as amajor contributing factors include; the necessity to avoidand, by extension, to manage local crises with great care;of coping with chinese hostility.eed for westerntechnology: opportunities to nave the ussr's superpowerand to consolidate its hegemony in eastern europe,chance to inhibit western military programs withoutlimits on those of the ussr.

of detente also raises problems for the soviets atabroad: the problem of maintaining internal discipline in ainternational atmosphere; possible erosion of sovieteastern europe: and complications in relations with clientwithin the international communist movement. thesenot appear critical al the moment.

1 the director ofintelligenceie aiiuuiil chief of sufi. intcltieencc ail force, believe lint ihilltole. don, not umi lulftcicndy soviet ib* of detenteool of etterrut policy designed to anjmnd soviet power and influence in the workl

D- Brezhnev and (he delente approach seem well enlrenched, but both mustefensible record of accomplishment. Foreign [Kolicy setbacksagnitude to bring the overall detente approach into question wouldhallenge to Brezhnev's position. He would probably be able to head offhallenge by initiating some policy shifts. But if these setbacks were to coincide with serious domestic difficulties, he might not be able to carry offaneuver.

hile Soviet leadership changes are likely over the next few years, successors will face much the same set of opportunities and imperatives. After some hiatus for domestic political consolidation, they will probably be predisposed by Soviet national interests to look favorablyetente approach.

F. The most durable elements of the Soviet detente approach arc the drive for expanded economic relations and the avoidance of threat and challenge in relations with the highly developed countries.adical change in Sino-Soviet relations, which we think unlikely, the rivalry with China will also serve to keep Moscow on this track. But some casing of this conflict, perhaps after Mao's passing, could reduce Soviet incentives to pursue detente.

G- In the Middle East, the USSR is concerned to regain lost ground and hopes to do so at the more difficult later stages of Arab-Israeli negotiations. In any crisis within the next year or so, if Moscow were forced tolear choice between detente and its regionalLhe chances are better than even that, within the requirement ofonfrontation with the US. the USSRilling, toetback to detente.

relations with the US are central to die future ofarms control negotiations are central to those relations.policy does not allowollapse of MBFR and SALT,still appears to be searching hard for advantage in dicscwould like to believe that this behavior docs not threateninterests bound up in detente.

the meantime, the USSR continues to pursue ambitiousprograms. These extend beyond its vigorous ICBMto embrace many other weapon systems as well.

J. While (he Soviet balance sheet on detente is becoming more complicated, the leaders will prefer to deal with various problems in pragmatic fashion, and to keep detentehole from coming into question. Even if only partial gains arc realized, Moscow will not choose deliberately to abandon detente unless forced to do so by critical repercussions at home or in Eastern Europe.

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discussion

For the Soviet leaden, the function of detente is loetting which best enables them to benefit doai the USSR's strengths and to compensate for its weaknesses as they see them. They mean it to facilitate pursuit of their time-honored objectives:of the power and security of the Soviet slale and of its influence abroad. In seeking detente in relations with the West, and the US in particular, they proceed fiom the belief that in present circumstances such an easing of tensionsore expedient way of promoting Soviet policy objectiveslimate of hostility and confrontation. The Soviel leaders neither expect nor intend theit "peace program" nor the particular policies it now encompasses to bring an end to the rivalry with the outside world, especially the highly industrialized countries Instead, the detcnie approach is meant to set prudent limit* on that rivalry in the nuclear age imd toSoviet policy with greater room forHut the Soviet leaders also recognize that detente isreatatter of mutual inceptions of the other side'sand that this places certain constraint* on their own policies.

in the Soviet view, thususher in an era of East-Westof conflict Negotiation andare. to Moscow, not ends innecessary adaptations to conditions.view most issues on which theywith the outside world inlenns, and this adversarycalculations of unilateralofinveterate aspect ofbehavior in international affairs.telling in this respect are themodernization programs nowwhich the USSR must realize couldarouse US anxieties.

I. MOSCOW'S MOTIVATION

pursuit of detente was not newadvent of thehe flowering of Brandts Ott-

r the Soviet-US summitry. Detente has been an important element of Soviet policy at least since Stalin's death, though unevenly pursued because of contrary international developments and the ebullient, sometimes adventuresomeof Khrushchev. The immediateof embryonic posl Stalin peace!it!

eiistcncc woe to end ihe USSR's isolation in international affairs ind coned oVtmestit-ills caused by the dead dictator's rigid and autarkic pohcies

n the promt stage, detente has been elevated to become ihe USSR's "general line" becauseariety of factors, some ol which attract Moscow to this couise, others of which impel it in the same direction. These factors include;

Ihe destnictivcness of nuclear weapons, which makes il imperative lo avoidwar and, by extension, lo manage local crises with great cate.

the implacable ami active hostility of China, wlucli aigues strongly for an avoidance of major tensions, andultivation ol useful relations, with Ihe US and Europe-

the need to draw on Western resources, particularly technology and know-how but occasionally grain as wen, to boost productivity, primarily in the civilian sector but in military industry as well

the opportunity lo obtain recognition of superpower statusevel with the US. This is due largely lo the USSR's advances in strategic strength, but its acknowledgencreases the USSR's sense of securily and the weight of its diplomacy.

the chance lo consolidate recognition of Ihe USSR's postwar gains in Eastern Europe and prepare ihe ground for gains in Western Europe.

the opportunity to reduce the senseoviet tin.at in the West and Japan, in the hope that this canowering of military expenditures and an erosion of Western alliance cohesion even while Ihc USSK continues to seek relative mih-lary advantage.

Problems and limitation*

The pursuit ol detente raises specific problems for the Soviet regime In the leaders'rucial one is that ol maintaining di5-opline and control within Ihe Sovietelaxed international atmosphere and greater eiposure to the outside world inevitablythose forces wiihin the Soviet Union drfiring lelaiatlon of the stnngencies of the Soviet regime, especially of the Party's heavy-handed interference In eveiy sector of society. These forces include the small but vociferous dissident group, which Is able lo appealympathetic world forum. They also Include otherwise loyalist segments of society, such as those wiUiin ihe scientific and creative intelligentsia, die ranks ofcrceu rives, and some second-echelon party and goveinmeni officials. Fearingreactions fiom this increased exposure, t'c regime has intensified its ideological and vigilance campaigns simultaneously with Ihe pursuit of detente abroad. Nevertheless, the regime's methods for containing restiveforces remain moderate by traditional Soviet standards, among other reasons because of the Soviet leaders' stake in detente and theU consequent vulnerability to international pressure.

The Soviet Union faces similar andlated problems In Eastern Europe. The maintenance of communist systems andin Eastern Europe is seen as critical not only for security reasons, bul also because instability Ihere feeds back into the Sovietariety of Institutionallus the dependence of these local cotmnurnst regimes on Soviet power, tend to keep this pioblcm within manageable limits.the attractive pull of Western Europe increases with detenle and threatens toSoviet influence In the area.

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this connection, and despite the image of confidence, which (he Soviets arc at painv to project, several notable ferns lie al Ihe heart of Moscow's policy ma king. Attuned as they are to revolutionary potentialities and to the turbulence of Russian history, the leaders scum tnoie coitc'riicd about the stability of their regime than many Westerners would think justified As for their immediatethey are aware of the persistent force ol nationalism in Eastern Europe and. looking westward, find it difficult to assurethat the German people are permanently reconciled to then division into two nations To the east, they perceive Peking as not only hostile but incalculable, they appear to feel more insecureis China than mostcalculations of relative strength would suggest as reasonable.

ess critical but nonethelesslevel, the cultivationetente atmosphere sometimes severely complicates Soviet relations with client states. Theof2 Soviet-US summit in the face of US mining ol Haiphong cost Moscow in its relations with North Vietnam. In the same vein, Soviet cultivation of relations with the US contributed to the alienation of Egypt, which feared that larger Soviet concerns would take precedence over Arab interests. In addition to such instances, Moscow faces chronic problems in the in!em*bona! Cornmu nist moven>ent in squaring the Marxistinheritance with its newly moderate line toward the capitalist stales.

II. MOSCOW'S CURRENT DETENTE BALANCE SHEET

Soviet leaders must currentlyresults of their detente policy as awith both successes andhooding the list ofthi' difficulties Unit have arisen inwith Iho US. Failure to obtainadditional government-guaranteed credits and MFN treatment represents at least asetback for Moscow's long-range plans for US assistance in development ol the USSR's economy and natural resources. Fur-tlicrmorc, Soviet concessions on largelyissues, especially the key one of Jewish emigration, have only raised demands forconcessions. The USSR has'run into much the sansc problem at the Conference onand Cooperation in Europehich has been prolonged because ofover measures such as freer East-West exchange of people and ideas. The USSR's bilateral prospects in Europe havebeen thrown in some doubt by changes of government in France and particularly West Germany. In the Middle East, Moscow has been deeply concerned to find itself nowa secondary diplomatic role andotable reduction ol influence in the area despite its heavy prestige and materialin the Arab cause.'

espite these disappointments, theleadership probably derives muchfrom the results of detente to date and continues to look to the future withMoscow's stature in international affairs has risen to unprecedented heights, its status as one of the world's two superpowers has been universally recognized, and its military capabilities continue to improve, The Soviet

'The Director ol Naval Intelligence and Assist-urit Chief ol Stall. Intelligence. USAF, disagree with tlielluil tho Soviets areotableol influence in tlio area. They believe that, villi ilio cu.cplMin ol Egypt, the Soviets continue to lijvi' considerable influence in those countries with which it bat alignedyria and Iraq, as well n< increased involvement with the fedayeen movement.lto poi-it Out that Soviet sctbaekt In Ivcypl nnd in the current disenzafiemcnt talks maywellUaository phenomena.

leaders cm bo sure thai any future strategic arms Agreement, or any other accord in the disaim.iinent'security held, will be concludedasis granting the USSR no less than full nquality with the US. Conclusion of the CSCE would give all-European blessing to the status quo there and in the short run at leastSoviet prospects in Europe. Mean-while, significant differences have surfaced among the West Europeans themselves, and those with the United States have increased. While riot primarily responsible for theseSoviet cultivation of detente has helped toolitical atmosphere in which such differences flourish.

LI. With regard to the economic aspect, the picture is generally satisfactory for the short term. Last year's volume of US-Sovietillion, with grain sales accounting for over half the total) and growing Soviet access to US technology and expertise, while still not large in international trade terms, must be gratifying to Moscow. The same positivepicture prevails with respect to Europe. The Soviets feci they have some reason to hope that opposition in the USuantum jump in bilateral economic relations willbe overcome; in any case, the issue is not now critical.

enerally favorable detente balance sheet from the Soviet point of view, Soviet leaders differ from time to time Over the specificose reading of Politburo speeches over the last six months suggests as much. Further, it is natural tothat leaders may even occasionally have misgivings about the larger aspects ofomprehensive undertaking. There isconcern al various levels thai detente might leadeakening of the USSR'sposture and internal security. There arc unquestionably also among professional ideologists andand within the lower partywho find it liard to reconcile themselves in generalofter line toward old capitalist enemies. And there are signsebate among Soviet commentators over whetherwar can beopic with possible future implications for force planning and arms control negotiations.*

In these circumstances, both Brezhuev and the detente approach will have toefensible record of accomplishments. Policy setbacksagnitude to bring the utility of detente into question would at the same timehallenge to the Ceneralposition. Brezhnevood record of political savvy, and he would probably be able to head offliallengc by himselfolicy shift His personal role in detente,ow so visible that, If these foreign setbacks coincided with serious domestic difficulties, he might not be able to carry offaneuver.

We do not see signs tlul such aol troubles now exists. The evidence pointsairly solid consensus behind detente at the top political level, and there is considerable evidence attesting to the strength of Brezhnev's position of leadership. Inhe has been careful to assure himself of military support, and while the military arcautious force in the framing of arms control positions, they have every reason to be satisfied with the trend of allocations to defense under Brezhnev's regime. Defense Minister Cicchko in particular hasup-poiter of Brezhnev in foreign policy matters.

'The Assistant Chief ol Stall. iMetligencc,vc* tlt.it Hilt tentcner doc* no* reflectature <it ili^itliinSoviet Union. The debate t> limi'.cd to (heealm of "militaryiwl lui iai affected Soviet doctrine, whichfo> victory uclearihuuld one oceur.

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in Ihe present situation Brezhnev needs to insure dial (he tnomcn(um of dc(cntc is not lost, but at the same time to plan his stepsay which guards him against furtherBalancing these rcquirenwnls confronts him with one of the trickiest problems of policy and political management he has faced during his leadership.

III. FACTORS BEARING ON IHE FUTURE OF OETENTE

IIS. The Soviet leaders havetrong public commitment to detente, and there Is abundant evidence that they do not regard itransitory clement in their policy. This is implicit in their eagerness to engage Western corporations in long-term developmentaland their willingacss, at least ino negotiate limits on strategic arms. Thisdoes not mean that, come what may, theill adhere to detente, but it doesan expectation that this will be tlic most advantageous general course for the USSR for some years to come.

The Leadership

f only for actuarial reasons, there will probably be important changes in diein the Soviet Union in the next few years,enerational turnover. Our meager information about the younger members of the present leadership docs not reveal any clear divergence from present foreign policyuccessor regime's first priority willo consolidate its position and establish its authority in domestic and East European affairs. This might initially mean retrenchment or at least lack of innovation in foreign affairs. The new leaders, however, will he faced with the same realities andas the present ones: the need tothe Soviet economy, the same set ofand security problems on the USSR'sandrontiers, and the need for exorcise of restaint whileuperpower role in the nuclear age. As they settle in, it seems likely that the requirements of Soviet national interests will predispose tlirtn toa policy along the lines of that of the Hrexlinrv regime. This predisposition could be altered, however, by external events beyond their control. Furthermore, being leaswith the detente line as it has developed, they might be quicker and more severe in judging Its utility in the face of ernes or setbacks.

Ihe Question of Discipline

he most serious problems that detente is likely to raise for Moscow are precisely in those ainas which take priority over foreign policy considerations: stability at home and security in Eastern Europe. While the Soviet regime can absorb slight and gradual changes on these two fronts, it would probably react forcefully lo abrupt and far-leaching ones. Dotneslicaliy. the question of how muchactivity to tolerate for the sake at internal esprit and Western sensibilities will remain under constant review, and the leaders will not hesitate to react to serious danger signs on the home front. In Eastern Europe, it is easy lorompt and decisive Soviet reaction In. foromanian attempt to bolt Ihe Warsaw Pact In such cjreum-stanrei at these the Soviets would notrenounce detente. Indeed, they wouldloublc their verbal adherence to it, hoping to limit the extent and duration ofat lion and to resume beneficial dealings with ihe West as soon as poiuble.

China

lo One major result of ihe Sioo-Soviethas been lo impel Moscow to mrmaluc and develop ilc telations with the West. The China factor will proltably continue lo have lliis effect, even allowing for the possibility of

some improvement in (he present si rained state of Slno-Sovict relations. As for Chinawhile the USSR will exploit tacticalthrough political action orbasic Soviet strategy appears to be basedesire to avoid any further deterioration of relations while waiting and hopingore responsive leadership to follow Mao. To the extent that this hope was realized,would feel less concerned to pursueengagements out of fear of isolation.the Soviets might come to believeilitary solution lo (heir China problem was necessary and feasible; in this case they would hardly expect to he able to preserve detente as well. While border skirmishes might well occur, wc continue to estimate that the oddsremeditated Soviet attack on China leading lo wai archigherenuine and durable rap-prochcmcnl between the two is highly

Economics

he economic incentive is probably one of the most durable elements in the USSR's approach to detente. Basically, this Is because

Possible Chance, in the Siivj-SuvH'latedcontinues to differentiate between (be possibilityarge-Hale Soviet jiwuionisarming Strike, and would rate die likelihoodisarm inj strike at miit>edl| greater than that of an invasion.

Assistant Chief of Staff,SAF. believe* thai while die oddsi no-Soviet war over the long term arc law, ihe nearperiod duiiniiuccwion lo Mao will piobably take place and the Chinese deploy theirwill lie erilieal lor Sino-Sovtet icIalSmu, and die potit-bilily Olhostilities occurring in tint period will Ik* tenuioiarily higher.

The Direi-inr ol Intelligence and Bercarch.ol Suie. believes that Uie coniinuinj; oeteiiora-lion o! Sino.Soviet relation* since the publication ol NIGomcwlut higher catting of the odd*major conflict than only one chance in ten.

the USSR remains far behind the USumber of key areas, especially In capital and labor productivity. The Soviet leaders realize lhat Ihe rale of growth, which has slowed in recent years, cannot be pushed upward again simply by bringing ikwand under cultivation, by Introducing new plants and equipment, and by expanding the labor force. Because of lower birth rates, the labor force will eventually increaselower rale, while the growth of plant and equipment is becoming harder to sustain in the face of competing demands for consumer goods. Meanwhile, the desired increase inis not being obtained, among otherbecauseag in introducing the necessary improvements in technology, and the technological gap between the West and live USSR has persisted in almost every sector.

oscow believes that trade with the industrialized countries of the West will speed up the rale uf technological progress and provide pioduction capacityuch shorter time and at less expense than it would take lo develop the technology al home. II has resorted to this policy in past periods, and current Soviet efforts to obtain Western good* and technology have again resulted in anin trade with the West The developed Wests shaie in Soviet foreign trado rose fromercent5 toercent'Con-tinuing Soviet efforts to obtain Westerntechnology, and now large sums of capital arc leading the USSR lo move toward greater dependence on the West. The USSR, for example, is committing itself to long-term deliveriesears) to Western trading partners, and is aclnowledging the need for fuller participation in ihedivision ol labor."

n financing more imports, the USSR'* ability toarger debt or to pay cash

will be significantly enhanced byii>ctcaves in Soviet export earnings whidi are expected during thetwo or three years. Major priceor gold and for traditional Soviet raw material eipocts. along with ex panded deliveries of natural gas. could push total Soviet eaporU to the developed West to perhapsdhon4 andiHioii infrom less thanillionhe USSR will thus have substantial export surpluses- in sharp contrast to past deficits.esult, debt service5 should be no greater than3 and perliaps even less, depending on price trends. The outlook for the longer term Is less favorable, largely because of the expected leveling off and eventual decline in the volume of crude oil exported to Ihe Wrsi.

ith regard to the military aspect,economic relations have increased the Opportunities for transfer of important military-related technology to the USSR from Western Europe, Japan, and the US. Soviet initiatives to US aircraft, computer, electronic, and metallurgical companies are ol special interest in this connection. The Soviets dearly hope that the climate of dclcnte will leadurther loosening of allied controls on the export of strategic goods.

ven should its efforts fader on other fronts, the USSR is likely In the near lerm to persist an its attempts lo acquire Western technology and capital, bargaining andamong alternative suppliers as necessary. Ultimately, however, the USSR may discover that it has exaggerated what importedthe absence of structuralcan do for the Soviet economy. Even so, the Soviets would almost certainly not give up altogether in trying to expand economic tics with the West. But they wnuhl place lessremium on these lies, and ihe economic factor in detente would accordingly diminish.

The Third World In General

In the Third World, oontradictorywill affect Soviet behavior. On the one hand, most regions in this category arc of lower priority in Soviet calculations lhan ihe highly industrialized countries, and Moscow will not wish to compromise its relations with die latter by an overly aggressive pursuit, of opportunities in thon the other hand, the Soviets remain ambitious and view their present strength as entitling themull measure of influence In those areas of Ihe world previously beyond their reach. Their competition with China propels them in the same direction. In general, the product of these factors will probablyoviet policy of seeking an exponsloo of influence, temperedober appraisal of local difficultiesoncern lo avoid confrontations with the US.

In latin America and most of Africa, the Soviets for some time have been limiting their expectations and their commitments. Their aims in Southeast Asia, which is less accessible to them than to China or the US, are also likely to remain modest. The Indian subcrmbnent is of much greater interest to them, and while their position there is subject to periodic straiiis, they probably expect to remain the prindpa] external influence in India for some time to come. In all these areas, they will regard their global detente approadi as assisting tlidr traditional diplomatic and economic activity and their continuing search for military relationships.

"The Director of Naval IntaJkfeoce aad the Axsttt-im duel of Staff. iBtfOia-aa. USAF.it tbt* xaaBMnt >uj koto weightthe Soviet cal-cobtiecs The Soviet Union aHatilwell be wftnfrisk OMeproanue of Hi rolattou wiib the highly itpjmtruiaed eounuiei by anpermit olin the Thinl World.

SE6RS

Middle East Inhis itmote ciitieal aroa for Soviet policy because both tlia East-West stakes and the instability of the region arc high. In the past few yean, Moscow has maintained Its tiadihonal policy of seeking to maximizeinfluence among (he Arabs withand military support, hoping that the detente it was developingarger world scale would not interfere with this course. The summits23 revealed the contiadictioni inherent In this approach, and when the October war broke out, Sovietwas essentially governed byhaving little to do withof the Arabs up to the limit set by the need In avoid military confrontation with the US. When disaster threatened their clients, the Soviets found it useful to resort to themechanisms developed in the practice of detente for crisis management, and indeed cook the line that the new Soviet-USwas the key element in resolving the crisis. In fact, however, they wereiplomatic salvage operation. In thenegotiations, they have been severely discomfited by their relegation to thesidelines and by the readiness of the Arabs, particularly Egypt, to disregard their advice and interests.

t is likely that this brought homo to Moscow, more dearly than ever before, the inherent conflict between (he twin Soviet alms of cultivating East-Westandtrong Soviet position in the Middle East. Despite this discord Inpurposes, we believe that live Soviets rate both detente and the Middle East too highly to forsake either voluntarily. Instead, wethem to try to keep the contradictions within manageable limits and, in any new Arab-Israeli crisis within the neat year or so. to 'iy to balance and even advance both aims. Inrisis, however, eventsay that forced (lie Soviets to choose between detente and their interests In the Middle East. If the Soviets found them selves thus compelled to choose, we think the chances arc better than even that, within the requirement ofonfrontation with the US. they would be willing toetback to detente with the US for the sake of their critical Middle Easternn Syria, Iraq and Egypt.

turope and Japan

evelopments in Western Europeapan are likely to Justify to the Soviets the wisdometente approach. By continuing their current mode of behavior, they expect toradual erosion of anti-Soviet alliances and to give freer play to conflicts of interest among their rivals. Over the ncit few years, the USSR will not be able to bring these nations under Hi dominant influence, and indeed current Soviet tliought seems to put this objective offairly distant future. In the meantime, Moscow sees virtueontinuing US presence because this serves to block more dangerous possibilities: in theore strongly united Europe led by West (Germany, and in tlioose Sino-Japaaese collaboration.

n these circums lances, the Soviets will probably continue to regard Western Europe and Japan as sources of economicnot only In their own right but as al-Irnialives forarenas of long-run political competition best prosecuted by the techniques of detente. They see noin making concisions of their own on such issues as mutual force reductions in Europe or Japanese demands for the return nl the four small islands off Hokkaido. But they will also see little profiteversionore demanding or threatening posture unless they come to fed themselves faced with dangers to their own security, as in any move-

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uropean nuclear force, aof Cerman or Japanese militarism, or an erosion of their position in Eastern Europc.

The US

oviet American leUhons pose the vital problem of Soviet detente policy. Despite (lie rise of multipolanty. the USSR still views the US as its primary nval and encounters it as an obstacle wherever it seeks to expand its influence It is the US which provides the underlying security permitting Westernindependence of the USSR. It is the US which compotes with Soviet influence in the Middle East It is the US which Is capable of developing withelationshipdangerous to the USSR. And beyond this, the US standsajor source of leeh-nological assistance, tin- only serious threat to Soviet security, and the necessary partner for arms control negotiations.

ne Soviet appioach to this probtctn is toondominium arrangement with the US in which the two superpoweis make the crucial decisions and pressure the rest of the world to accept diem. Theto the Soviet Union of such anare obvious since ihe US. as thewith the more far-flung interests and alliance systems, has more to deliver than the USSR, and more to lose in terms of frictions with friends and allies.esser degree, the USSR's external engagements, bothand political, subject Moscow to similar vulrtcrabililics. Nevertheless. Moscowpecial relationship with the US not only as central lo pursuitetente policy, butas improving Soviet opportunities to Euiope and with the major powers of the Far East. China, and Japan.

oscow has qualms, however, about iheetente partner. In the Middle East, for example, il has lieen unable to use the superpower relationship in support of ils posit inn. Furthermore, the Sovietsariety of anli-detcnte forces in lire US, including Jewish leaden, intellectuals upsci over trcatmcnl of their counterparts in the USSR, ideological util(communists, and others who question ihe priority attachedelations wtdi the Soviet Union as opposed to those with Western Europe. in addition, they are clearly concerned about US long-rangein lite bilateral strategic balance of power. Despite the magnitude of their own strategic weapons development program, which they rationalizeustifiable attempt to redress specific imbalances with the US. they are genuinely worried aboutnd Trident; they probably also perceive the tecenl elaboration of US strategic targeting doctrine as pajtolilicalwhich runs counter to detenle.

n addition to all those problemsat Oiis stage of the Soviet-Americanew and important factor is Soviet uncertainly about Ihe Implications for Ihe USSR of the domestic position of the US Administration. The Soviet leaders almosthave been considering whether tothe President's difficulties or to be ac-crjmmodating. On the one hand, they suspect that his critics primarily seek to sabotage his policy toward the USSR. On the other, they recognize that the Administration has-aability lo deliver on agreements they deemEN. Their problem is underlined by other recent developments, whichmi up lo diemreat deal of ihe substance ol their relation* with the West has been developed by personalities who have now deparlml Ihe scene, likeand Drnndl. Because ol Brezhnevsassociation with detente policy and his relationship with the President, he wishes lo apif-at inori- nrcommndaling, is witnessed by Soviet willingness lo publicize the foriiicom-

mg summit Hut we clou lit that tKii lactor, in itsdl, will strongly- Influence the positions the Soviets tale on major substantive issues; it may serve tourther poation of caution to Soviet policy and perhaps slow the pace of ongoing negotiations while Moscow waits for uncertainties on the US side to be resolved.

IV. LIKELY SOVIET BEHAVIOR

nlobal role under the rubric of detente, the USSR encounters particular opportunities and problems

The leadership is able tolobal policy virtually Independent of domestic public opinion.

In this process success can be used to gain further success, in the senseoviet reputation of respect ability and coristructiveness enhances Moscow'sfor new advances.

the same time. Jtowcver, otliers will hold the USSR to account for behavior which Is inconsistent with their definition of detente.

may on occasion require moreconcessions, or more restraint, than the leadership originally envisaged.

s for specific areas, the billowing arc likely to be the most stable element* of Soviet

policy:

respect to China, continuedagainst Chinese ideological andattacks, continued improvement of regional military capabilities, and an effort to avoid further deterioration of relations while awaiting political change in China.

respect to Western Europe and. continued cultivation of Improved stall-to state relations, not only for the sake of Soviet economic requirements but also to expand Soviet political

Withconomic relations,efforts to attract Westernin the oVveioprncnt of Soviet re sources and in the provision of advanced technology to boosl productivity in bolh civil and military sectors.

The second and third of these elements seem particularly stable, since the Soviets probably see little prospect of gain in reverting toautarkytance of politicalthreat in their relations with their highly developed neighbors. Policy toward China would change only if the Chinese were toalter their owneither direction. If there were moverncnt toward acccAirnodatMo, the Soviet calculus favoring iletente with the West would be weakened If Chinese aggressivcncsi uk-icased and the So viets decidedilitary solution wasthough continued detente with the West would be all the more in their interest, they would be prepared to risk its collapse

3ft In the Arab-Israeli conflict, we do not expect the Soviets to accept passively the present trend against their interests there. The USSR isritical public attitudethe US-sponsored disengagement inilin live and may be playing an obstructive role I'-liiml the scenes Moscow probably liopcs that negations will founder at some pouit over such issues as Jerusalem and Palestine, and that the Arabs will then welcome, andrice for, renewed Soviet support. In any case, the Soviets can be expected totheir efforts to strengthen their position in Syria and Iraq, PDRY. and Somalia while working to undermine Sadat and Egypt nr. influence.

The oil resource* of the Fenian Gulf provide an atlractive target lor Soviet ainbi-lions 'Ihe USSR has been probing more actively in this region in recent years, and it-.

occncr

naval and air capabilities areits options. While wc expect continuing efforts to expand Soviet influence in the Gulf, these efforts will be tempered by severalNot only are the local governments likely to remain resistant, but the USSR is aware that any major effort to establish Soviet control there would threaten the vital interests of the neighboring states, especially Iran and Saudi Arabia, and the major oil-consuming countries as well. While inclined to seize upon any opportunities that present themselves, Moscow will recognize that reactions from these quarters could jeopardize the prospects for detente and might involve military risks as well- Accordingly, we believe that theUnion, while not abandoning its longer range hopes, will move cautiously in this region over the next few years.*

In pOst-Txlo Yugoslavia, the USSR will use political, economic and subversive means to try to bring Yugoslavia back closer to the socialist bloc. It is possible that Moscow would put sufficient priority on this objective to pursue it aggressively, even to the extent of jeopardizing detente prospects in Europe and with the US. We think it more likely, however, that detente considerations, along with local risks and the chance of associated troubles elsewhere in Eastern Europe, will deter the USSR from the use of forceerious threat of it.

The Soviet leaders will try to give an overall shape to detente which makes the

'TheChkf of Staff, Intelligence,d Ihe Director of Naval Intelligence believe that ihit estimate overstate* the effect of detente onactiontheCull- Soviet continued advocacy of the use of oilolitical weapon Woioit .ceeaiof Moscow's lonc-tom stratcgi.:ol brtneinc the Oil producing state, under .IS mflueT.ce orcontrol. fundamental to the iraluu-tion ofwalthe ability to influence, control, deny, or diwupiandawrjsr resource* ol tl* Pc.sian Cull.

relationships among specific issues work to tlicir advantage, nowhere more so than in the field of arms control Soviet political andleaders believeiversified and highly modernized military machine is anfoundation for any foreign policy,one conducted in detente terms. Obviously, they will attempt to reserve to Ihemsclvcs to the fullest extent possible the right to judge whether their arms programs square with detente or not. Meanwhile they are maintaining an intensive research and development program in military weaponry, the Soviet Navy has expanded rapidly, and tlie ground and tactical air forces have undergone continual mooemization. At the same time, Moscow no doubt realizes that in areas such as Europe, the potential advantages of detenteelter chance of being realized If the menace of Soviet military power is removed from the forefront of Soviet policy. Soviet leaders, political and military, now also talk about the need to go beyond political detente to military detente. Such an attitude serves propaganda purposes, but it also suggests that some of them would foresee economic and military disadvantages to the USSR inarms competition with the West.

ith regard to specific ongoing arms control negotiations, the USSR is committed to continuing momentum and some periodic results in both MllFR and SALT; its detente calculations do not allowollapse in these talks, particularly SALT. But Moscow considers its negotiating partners to be under the same pressure to at least an equal degree. Regarding MBFR. wc believe that Soviet movement toward Western terms will be slow and partial and will require limits on non-US as well as USn SALT, we doubt that

'Moreivi on the outlook for Soviet behavior in MflFP. talk, are contained into Holder! ofSoviet and Eastttitude. Toward MB

lite Soviet leaders will come lo accept USf stability and security a* negotiating criteria Instead, they will continue to explore how much dicy can limit US programs and how little limitation on their own programs they must accept in return. They evidently believe that thb year's negotiatmg target can be satisfied with some sort of partialTlictcafter. they can derive someIn both bargaining and security terms, from the (act that their current developmental programs are scheduled to bear fruit before those of the US.

f the Soviets behave in this fashion, it means that ihey would like to believe that they need not yetard choreeontinuing strutegic arms buildup and detente, but can simultaneously pursue both. Tlieirprograms seem toope that, by vigorous pursuit ol their opportunities under the Interim Agreement and anyaccoiik, they can improve theirpositionis the US. Though they have probably not decided whether they could get away with it. their objectives probablyan opportunistic desire to press ahead andargin of superiority if they can

n (his connection, the Soviets are bying the groundwork for very substantialin already large and formidable ICBMigorous testing program is aimed at extensive MIRVIng, at improving accuracy, and at increasing throw weight. Thelass ballistic missile submarine has joined the fleet At the same time, the USSR isthe developmentwing-wing supersonic bomber and the modernization of its naval, tactical air, and ground forces.

4.I. While they carry on these programs, the Soviets hope thai hard arms-controlon their part will not damage the other elements of detente. To this end, Ihey willlo resist relating SALT and MB PR to other Kast-West issues. In the CSCEand in their relations with the Westover the past year, the Soviets have been discomfited by such linkages.

and Other compbeations havellie USSR to renounce detente, nor dothat Ihey will. The Soviet leaders will

prefer to deal with various issues in pragmatic fashion and to set asldo ihose which they lind not ripe for solution on acceptable lerms. When Ihey find tbenuclves unable to advance on ooc front, tbey will try lo move forward clscwtierc and will seek lo discourage others from putting detentehole in question.

tootring ofdisappcarilraents could eventuallydetente altogether in Moscow.wr have indicated earlier, thiss al least aseed as athe USSR. Economic needs and theposed by China are perhaps theasjunstardthe board in foreign policy. Onlydevelopments closer to the heart ofcoo cans, suchhreat todiscipline or to Soviet controlwould be likely to cause Moscowto abandon detente Short ofcontingencies, they will seek todevelop the climalo of detente, whilewith specific issues as much asti'ims of their particular relation tointerest,

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