MEMORANDUM TO HOLDERS
NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE
ESTIMATE
Soviet and East European Attitudes Toward MBFR
4
N9
mis dcarnant bss been MDioved for release through tho?HISTORICAi. REVIEW fKCGRXM ot So Central InteiUqonca Ag^cy.
Date
BRP 2
MEMORANDUM TO HOLDERS OF3
SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARD MBFR
NO FOMIGN DISSEM
THIS MEMORANDUM TO HOLDERS OF3 IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.
THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS, EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT, AS FOLLOWS:
The following inlelligence organizations participated in the preparation of Ihe eifimofe:
iro4 liVplLgerK* Agency, rheomr-jiioii of themi o( State and Delenie. ond Ihr National Set wily Aoe-cy.
Concwffing;
Ihe Deputy Director of Cental Intelligence representing iSe Cenlrol Intelligence Agetrcy
Ihe Director ol Intelligence and Reseatch representing ih* DepartmentloleDirector, Defense Intelligence Agency Tlie Director, Notional Security Agency
Tho Spociol Assistant to tho Secretary of Ih* Treasury to pm sen lingDepartment of thc Tieasoty
Abstaining'
Theecior. Federol Ivoow o'nd mt Aswiom General Manage! lor National Securiry representing lhe Aleve Energy Coaunission. the subject being ovtirde ol their ;vr
AISO PARTICIPATING:
Ihe Assistant Chef of Staff for Inlelligence, Department of the Army
Iheof Novol Inlelligence, Department of iho No>y
The Assislant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Ait Farce
StJKET
SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARD MBFR
PRECIS
Thc basic judgmeuls set forth in NIEemain valid,tlie Soviets haveomewhat more active appioach to the negotiations than we had anticipated in that Estimate They moved quickly toraft treaty on Novembern the weeks prior to the recess in April, Soviet negotiators used the informal sessions of the conference to hint at areas of potential flexibility in their proposal.
Thc Soviets have shown particular concern about thc reduction of West European forces, notably those of thc PRC. Formally, theycommitted to the inclusion of these forces as well as ah and nuclear units in all stages of the reductions. We believe, however, they would settle for only token reductions in the first stage andoviet opposition to Western proposals that would involve substantial as>Tnmetries in reductions remains strong The USSRtake iu keeping up tlse momentum of the talks, but this subject remains of lower priority for Moscow than other areas of its detente policy.
J
NODISSEM
seJTet
discussion
Since3 was issued, tlie USSR huoT.pcebensive proposal for thc reduction of forces and armaments in central Europe and engaged In somo iix months of negotiations exploring many of the caudal aspects of the subject. This process lias shedight on the Soviettoward force reduction, but It has not altered the judgments in that Estimate about the premises and aims of Soviet detente policy and the pact force reduction plays In that policy. Those judgments were
The USSR considers an atmosphere of detente with Ihe West as the mostsetting lor avoiding war andits international position. Itsin the MBFR negotiations stems primarily from this broaderin detente.
Tbe USSR perceives the West andthe US as being under greaterto achieve (airly rapid results in thc negotiations and it hai no intentions ol seeing an attenuation of its authority in Eastern EuropeIt will, therefore prove
Atnc time. Ibe Soviel interest in sustaining the general process of detente will discourage Moscow from conduct that could leadtalemate or bicak-down of the talks
WesUm proposals involvingasymmetric rednclions will bereceived.
ne area of Soviet concern that came through more stiongly during the negotiations than was suggested in thc Estimate is thcinorce reduction agreement that %et* limits on West Euiopean military forces. The Soviets havearticular sensitivity alioot the present and potential strength of of West Cerman forces. They recognize lhat NATO's present nuclear capability is built largely on US supplied weaponry and they fearrecipitate withdrawal of those forces could leaduropean nuclear force that may ultimately he dominated by the West Germans. They are abo concerned about Bonn's abilily to increase rapidly the sire of the Bundcssvehr by drawing on its large pool ofen. Moscow is socking, thoielore. force reduction
FORmTGN DISSEM
SECRET
ni whi Ii would ultimately channel Wesl European military development* away (roan these contingencies
u also in lhe Soviel stance on fotce reduction at leas! the implication lhat the USSR would not like toapid and
large-scale unilateral withdrawal of US forces. Not only mightithdrawal givetu European defense cooperationbut the US would not bcby agreement from reintroducing troops it had withdrawn unilaterally
The Proposol of November 8
Iwo weeks of the opening of thc Substantive talks in Vienna, thc Soviets,i I: of the Warsaw Pact, proposed aplan for force reduction. Bythe plan early in theoscowliopcd io define lhe limits of thc negotiations and preseni the Westernultimately the public andof thea reductions pro-gram that could reasonably bc defended.
he Soviel proposal had three essential elements: reductions would apply to stationed and indigenous foices from the beginning, reductions would be of comparable units from each side and would involve air and nuclear-armed lorces iu addition to ground forces;would begin0 men from each stdc5 andercent from each side0 and anotherercentn addition, thc Soviet proposal called for the withdrawal of equipment associated with stationed lorces and the destruction of equipment associated with disbandedforcei It shower! little interest in the collateral constraints or non-circumvention measures of Inletest to the West. The draft treaty made no mention of verification, al-
though the chief Soviet negotiator said Init that national means of verification svould lie adequate.
6 'lhe implications of the various elements of Ihe Soviet proposal are clear. By applying reduction to both indigenous and stationed forces al all stages. Moscow would achieve major reductions in West Cerman forces, hinder tlie developmenturopean defense force, meet the desires of some of ils allies, and ease some of the pressure for thcof its own forces in Easterneduclioti ol like" units on each side isptiniarily toeduction ofPact units in returnhinning out but not removal of NATO units althoughi*-gotiations have said it would alsoverification. The proposal for equalami percentage reductions would preclude asymmetrical schemes, including tlie Western proposalommon-ceiling ground force manpower that would mean largerfor the Warsaw Pact. Additionally, equal percentage reductions applied to all forces in lhe area svould maintain existing force ratios between rhe Warsaw Pact and NATO and between the stationed andforces of the direct participants.tin- pioposal would set ceilings, on each national force and ils components. The emphasis on lhe reduction of air and nuclear forcei would have thc military advantage of getting al one ol lhc most important elements of NATO strength and the political advantage of fostering doubts about thc US commitment to ihe ileleiise of Western Europe.the Soviet proposal it the belief that the ratio of military forces that now eaists in Europe is satisfactory to them and ihould not be disrupted hy any force reductionThe consistent Soviet position al thc negotiations has been that lhe present overall ratio should be maintained, nlheitower level
3
Reoclion Io Western Proposals
7 Ai forecast io. Moscow has been (tally opposed to Ihe Weitefii proposal lhat first stage reductionsoviet tank army and its equipment in ictumS percent reduction of unspecified US ground foices. MOSCOW has also reacted negatively to the allied conceptommon ceiling applied to Warsaw Pact and NATO ground forcesecond i. of theti llBecause of thc way Eastern delegates have challenged Western data and categories of forces to bc reduced, however, wc believe that Eastern opposition to the common ceiling mighl foftefl if Ihc numbers and types of forces to be ie-duccd were redefineday tliat would make reductions about equal Wc Isebeve that the Western proposal for first phascas presently formulated svill continue to bc unacceptable lo Moscow. The common ceiling concept svould be acceptable only if Soviet conditions were met.
8 Thc Sonets are aware of at least the possibilitySapproved by NATO and not formally broached ina reduction of US tactical nuclear forces in addition to ground forces in return for the withdrawal of the Soviet tank army. The concept runs counter to Moscow's proposal for the reduction of similar units, but tlie SovK-ts might see an opportunity to negotiate reductions of US nucleai capable systems in lhe MBFR forum as svcll as in SALT. Pact officials thus far have not reacted formally, but as suggested in, Mos-cos- may be pit-pared tn bargain on ihisIn the meantime, knowledgeossible "nudear sweetener" lias probably strengthened their negative leattion to the original western proposal
Areas of Flexibility
oviet negotiators have shown almost no flexibility in any of their formal statements In plenary sessions since their ptoposaj was put forward. This hard-line position has been backed up by leadership and pi en statements critical of the Western stance and esrsccialty ol thc West Europeans for theireduction of Iheir forces.
astern negotiators have not. hosvevn, been entirely negative. Pact diplomatseties of informal meetings held between Fcbruaiynd thc recess in April to suggtrst modifications in Iheir proposal ofhat svould' bring It somesvhat more in line with Western preferences. Tactically, thb show of flexibility has allowed the Soviets lo probe Western positions and project an image of reasonableness anti sincerity about force reduction without formal commitments. To some extent these talks have brought the Western and Warsaw Pact positions closer and wo believe thereeasonable prospect that some ol the compromises offered by the Soviets in thc informal sessions will beformally when the talks resume
II. Sosicl flexibility has been most appotent in tlie variants they have suggested for the fust stage icdiKlion In plenary sessions, thc SovietsL! that each direct participant iu the talks musl reduce its force during Ihis stage. They continue io prefer reductions that svould be proportional to the number of troops each nation has in the reductions area- In kv formal sessions, however, the Soviets have suggested that each side could reach0 figure as it chose as long as all direct participants were involved. This would per nut token reductions in indigenous forces with llie bulk of the reduction coining from US and Soviel foices.
NO FORErfeb*TOlSSEM
SEOCET
0 figure Jot firsti- pi.ot sacrosanct. Onal occasions, Soviet negotiators havelhat first stage leduclloiisercent or Mi percent might he acceptable. (Using NATOercent reduction would mean0 mm peroviet negotiators have saidercent figure should apply to allandthe reductions lone
On occasion. Soviet negotiators have alluded to llie possibilityirst stage "freeze- on non. US or non-Soviet foices with all reductions taken from suiioned forces. This approach would go fat Iowa id meeting Western preferences fnr first stage reductions limited to US and Soviet forces although, of course. Soviel insistence that equal numbers and sinulai units make up tlie reductionleaves Ihe two sides fni apart on Ihese issues.
If thc Soviets were to seltleoken first stage reduction of non-Soviet and non-US forces orreeze on those forces, they would do so to establish the principle of- in force reduction and would, therefore, be especially interested Ina light link between first and second stage reductions when meaningful cuts would be made in the indigenous forces If they could be satisfied on this latler point, we believe tbey would accept very modest fust stage cuts In the Wesl Europeanimple first stage freeze on those forces is obviously less attraetisx. Il might be acceptable, however, if the Soviets were satisfied that movementecond stage ol negotiations svould be swift and certain, and il the West acquiesced in other aspects of the Soviet proposal such as thc inclusion of nuclear and air forces.
Since advancing this proposal, thchave shown similar flexibility on the inclusion of air forces and nuclear weapons
in llie first stage redm-iions Again, both token reductionsrccxrt ban- been suggested as acceptable compromises in thc first stage, and establishment ol Ihe principle that these forces should be included inlias been thc Soviet goal. As with the reduction of non-US and non-Soviet forces, we believe the Soviets would accept only token first stage reductions and mightreerr if they felt they were suffseientry compensated by otherof lhe negotiated package.
Moscow and its Allies
oresaw little difficulty for Moscow in managing ilv allies once tlietalks got under way and thai appears to have been borne oul over Ihc last six months. As expected. Homania has been the Soviets* most difficult problem Ia earlyBucharest reportedly wis ready toamendments to the Soviet proposal that would have broadened considerably its provisions on notification of troop movements and salification Tlie Romanians were said to have comebarrage of criticism" and have not formally prevented thc amendments. They have, however, spoken oul strongly against Ihe Informal sessions with lhe West from which thoy are excluded and have ex-prcssed Iheir displeasure with Warsaw Pact caucusing procedures The latter reportedly consist of monthly meetings which theattend, and weekly meetings of the Warsaw Pact directUSSR, Poland. East Cermany. andto which Hungary and Bulgaria areinvited, but from which Romania is excluded.
While noi all Ihe other Warsaw Pact allies sec eyc-to-eyc svith Moscow on every issue, there has been no sign of serious dif-feieiicc of opinion and llie other Pact nations
SECfcT
I'lWrsdBN
incarrying out their assignments to present aspects of Ihe Pact poiilion. For example. Polish and. to some extent. Czechoslovak spokesmen have taken the lead innuclear issues and the Poles have pressed for the ieduction of Indigenous foices.at Ihe informal negotiatingeach side Is limited to three directcaused only minor selection problems for Moscow.
Over Ihe longer Term
IS. The Soviets have not been reticent about expressing lhcir disapproval of theWestern proposal, but their overall treat-inentof force leductiou shows tliat they would like to see the negotiations succeed. Kven in one of his more |iessimistic public comments on the prospects for detente. Brezhnev said in Havana in late January that forcewas necessary to "ensure for the peoples of Europe concrete hints of detente" and he lumped forte reduction and thcEuropean Security Confeiencc together as "tsvo very important initialises "
cknoivledged that thelinkage betsvoeu Soviet engagement
in thc force reduction talks anil progress on CSCE seas important in getting the SovieU to Viennalso pointed to lhe gains Moscow might achieve from thc forcetalks themselves We believe .Moscow still considers those gains to be both important and achievable As long as Moscow sees force reductions as buttressing the climate ofin Europe, not weakening its hold on Eastern Europe or its military positionto the West, working against new West European defense arrangerneiiti. limiting or reducing West Cerman forces, and creating additional strains in NATO, it will haveincentives to continue the negotiations. We believe this svill be true even in the post-CSCE environment when that particularis lost to the Weat-
hese incentives do not make it urgent foi Moscow to reach an agreement and Soviet negotiators have not seemed to In- acting under tune pressures. Tbcy do have, however, anin sustaining the momentum of thc negotiations, and during tlie next session they wiT! actively probe Western positions in an effort to reach an agreement lhal meets the fundamental aims of their pioposal.
segAt noissem
DISSEMINATION NOTICE
document woi dniem looted by Iho Control Inlelligence Agency, thii(or Ihe information ond uie ot tho recipient ond of peiiem under Mi jurisdiction onboiii. Additional eitentlai dissemination moy be outhoriied by theoffkiolt within thoir roipecliY* departments:
of Inlelligence ond Research, for the Department of State
Oefense Inteltigonco Agency, for iho Office of Iho Secretory o(
Defeni* ond rho orgonnatVon oi the Joint Chiefi of Stoff
Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Deportmenl ot the Army, for the
Deportment of lhe Army
of Naral Inlelligence, for the Deportment of tho Novy
Chlel ol Staff. Inlelligence. USAf, for the Oopartmont of the Air
force
f. Aultfont General Asanager for National Security, tor tho Atomic Energy Commbiion
Direclor, rM, for iho Federal Bureau ot Investigation
ol NSA. lor Ihe Notional Security Agency
AMiitont ro lhe Secretory of tho Treasury, for ihe Department o*
the Treaiury
j. Tho DO'i Deputy for National Intelligence Offieeri, lorathor Depart-moot or Agency
Thi* document moy ba retained, or deilroyed by burning inh applicable leeurlryr returned to ihe Central Inlelligence Agency by arrangement with the DCri Deputy (or Notional Intelligence Offieon.
When ihii document ii disseminated overseas, the overseas recipionli moy retom iteriod notesi ol one year. At Ihe end ol Ihii period, the document ihould either be deilroyed. returned to lhe forwarding agency, or per-minion should be requested of the forwarding agency lo retain it in accordance with2 Juno
The Htle ol ihh document when used Mparotoly from Ihehould booaur DDtrtwr
SarfaT
Original document.
Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: