Survey of Communist Military Developments in Indochina
SURVEY OF COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA*
(This report covers (he period
The Key Points
Hanoi dispatched
more0 troops in the pastays.
The Northth Division has relocated from southern Laos to the central highlands in South Vietnam.
Delected supply shipments have been heavy during the past few weeks, in contrast In the relatively light activity reported dunng December.
Government control in South Vietnam dropped more sharply in November than during any other monthccording to Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) results.
A recent ClA/DIA review of Communisi and GVN combat forces in South Vietnam indicates that the strength of each side has declined during the past sixetailed report on Communist and South Vietnamese combat strengths is at Annex B.
This report has been prepared jointly by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense.
Preface
This report summarizes evidence received during the reporting periodommunist efforts to infiltrate new manpower and military supplies toward and into South Vietnam, (II) significant combat activity,ther developments affecting Communist military capabilities in Indochina.
1. Hanoi has accelerated the rate of infiltration during the pastays -
1 presumably to sustain heavier fifthting
some
in South Vietnam in the coming weeks.
roops were detected in the infiltration system during the reporting period.
ith the addition of the more0 troops tonfiltration totals, Hanoi's commitment of manpower to South Vietnam exceeds that of the comparableear ago by moreOO troops (sec the table below).r
Comparative Starts of Troops from North Vietnam
Total regularycle,un 30
Total regular infiltration starts,in 22
j/7s
0
Infiltration io southern South Vietnam and the central highlands (where0 infiltrators have been sent since mid-November, compared with less thanear ago) has been heavy. Such infiltrationiven area in the past hastep-up in combat acitivity. The current infiltration push to COSVN andront coincides with other evidence that Hanoi is preparing for an increase in military activity in these two areas.
3.
Exfiltralion
4.
Redeployments
he North Vietnamese have deployed an integral infantry divisionVietnam for the first time since the cease-fire. [
Ithcth Division has deployed from southern Laos into South
Vietnam's central highlands.
""SNajll
he redeployment ofihith an estimated strength ofnto the central highlands significanily increases the Communist threat to GVN population centers in the area.thhird Communist division to theh in Kontum andth in Pleiku -already in the highlands, giving the Communists the capability lowo-division assault on one of the government-con trolled provincial capitals. Prior to ihc unit's deployment, ihc military conflict in the highlands had been fairly closetandoff (see ihe Order of Battlen an initial response lo the added threat, the South Vietnamese inreanger group from the Saigon area, seni there less than three weeks ago for dutyeserve force for MR 3.
The major realignment and restructuring ofhich has been under way for the past few months is continuing
In contrast io the relatively light activity
- when there were unusually heavy rains
shipments
the past few weeks have been heavy. On Januaryajor rear services
and South Vietnamese Regular Combat Forces in South Vietnam
South Vietnam
Regular CombatI
VCINVA RVNAF
0
I. Include! VCj'NVA (WtkwimI In ground tombii, tOfnblt mpport, and Mr ietcaie unit* md locil tone comptatei md pi. RVNAF Ciound Ordci ot Bilfle. Indudeicnonncl lo aRVN/VNMC ground combil nd cumbil support uniB, and Rfpcmi) Foic* baiblloni.
MR 3
VCINVA0
VQNVA* RVNAF* %XW]n Q0
MR 4
VCINVA0 0
Oitig j
/CUM
Lhu
IR 4
Mttlty Piavnu Stand my
ollowing the same pattern or last dry season, supplies move from southern North Vietnam west alongn Quang Tri Province and then into the Laos Panhandle, where they are shipped south along the Communists' dual-lane road until they enter South Vietnam in the tri-border area (see the map).
] photography in early January showedruck
convoys
moving both north and south alongortheast of Saravane. Farther south, the coverage showed heavy traffic along, andeading into South Vietnam. Several hundred trucks were observed on these roads, cither on the road heading south or in truck parks. On the Communists' dual road in South Vietnam few trucks were actually observed from the tri-border area south to Parlac Province.
also indicated that the Communists are
10. The
continuing to expand their road networks in Laos and South Vietnam.
n other activity, the Khmer Communists (KC) are apparently continuing to receive logistical support from the North Vietnamese.
cargoes are probably lied to North Victnamcse-KC barter agreements made since4 involving arms in exchange for KC rice and foodstuffs.
Il The overall level of combat activity in South Vietnam remainedoderate level.
In MRovernment forces inflicted heavy casualties on the Communists as ARVN 1st Division elements recaptured Bonf Mountain. Farther south. ARVN forces conducting clearing operations in southeastern Quang Nam Province reported killingommunists on Januaryctivity increased ins ARVN forces conducted major operations north of Kontum nnd in the An Lao Vulley. In the operation north of Kontum. government units met stiff resistance in their attempts to push toward Voajor Communist supply area. In coastal Binh Dinh Province.ivision forces continued operations designed lo deny the An Lao Valley supply corridor to the Communists and reported moreommunists killed in this action. Onommunist sappers successfully penetrated the principle petroleum storage facility in Plciku Province,0 barrels of gasoline, diesel fuel, and JP-4.
In other activity in MRNAF air strikes also apparently caused considerable damage during the reporting period Onouth Vietnamese pilotsruck convoy moving through the tn-border area into Pleiku Province. The strikes reportedly destroyed moreehicles, along withmm antiaircraft guns. Four days later VNAF aircraft againarge Communist convoy in the same general area, reportedly destroying about half of ihe ISO trucks sighted.
In MRRVN forces successfully defended and then broke the seige of Hot!ey district town in Binh Tuy Province. In the battle for thai town, iwo Communist regimenis suffered heavy casualties and were forced to Withdraw. Supper and terrorist attacks increased in the environs of Saigon. Onommunist sappers attacked the main electric generating plant for the Saigon area, causing light damage and disrupting power lo the cityhort time. Elsewhere, activity consisted of almost daily attacks by fires against Tay Ninh and its surrounding area and sporadic rocket attacks on the Bien Hoa Airbase. In MRommunist-initiated incident, remainedelatively high level but were scattered throughout the region. The most significant combat occurred in Kten Tuong Province as elements of the ARVN 9th Division conducted operations aimed at halting the Communist 5th Division's move inio the Delta.
IH. Oilier Developments Affecting Communis! Military Capabilities in Indochina
NVA Artillery Regiments Subordinated to Divisions innd 2
ollowing ihe pattern observed inndeveral formerly independent artillery regiments in northern South Vietnam have been subordinated
to North Vieinamese infantry divisions
HES Residts
Government control in South Vietnam, according to Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) results, dropped more sharply in November than any other monthll four military regionsecline in government control, led byercentage points. During November, the number of people living in areas rated "A" or "B" declined by moreecrease ofercentage points from October's score of. Most of the people, however, did not come under direct Communist control, but are now considered in contested areas.
Countrywide, only threeuang Tin, Binh Thuan, and Longhowed increases of moreercentage points, whereasrovinces reponed losses of similar magnitude. Nine of these were in MRive of which -Kien Tuong, Vinh Long, Vinh Binh, Dinh Tuong, and Bacustained declines of at leasiercentage points, as the Communists began lo step up attacks against civilian installations and population centers in the Delia.
elatedew artillery/antiaircraft regiment has been formed in coastal Binh Dinh Province in northern MR 2.
ANNEX A
INFILTRATION OF NORTH VIETNAMESE PERSONNEL TO THE SOUTH
Number of Troops Entering Ihc Pipeline Destined for South Vietnam, Southern Laos, and Cambodia Since
The number of North Vietnamese combat troops and specialists who have infiltrated south since theease-fire accord now totals about
ost ofave started south since then, while the0 were already in the pipeline as of the date of the settlement. The table shows the number of North Vietnamese troops starting south, by destination, since January
10
ANNEX B
STATUS OF COMMUNIST AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE
COMBAT FORCES
A recent CIA/DIA review of Communist and South Vietnamese regular combat forces* in South Vietnam indicates thai the strength of each side has declined. The decline in GVN forces, however, in both relative and absolute terms, has been much greater than the Communists'. This imbalance occurred primarily because the decrease in South Vietnam's combaitemming from both the heavy casualties during lhe past few monthsonscious decision by Saigon loarge number of malcontents, disabled troops, and long-time reservists -has not been offset by recruitment. Nevertheless, the GVN docs have sufficient manpower to increase its forces to previous levels by increasing the draft. In this connection, recent reporting indicates that President Thieu has ordered his Defense Minister to bring GVN forces Hp to full strength.
The decline in the overall strength of Communist combat forces resulted from the heavy fighting that has taken place since late summer. To date, these losses have not been completely offset bylow of infiltrators to South Vietnam, many of whom arc slill moving through the system. Communist combat strength is now estimated, orelow the previous4 figure.
In contrast, the strength of the South Vietnamese regular combat forces declined by0 men between Mareh androm an assigned strength ofo aboulrop of.man decrease in South Vietnam's combat units was fairly evenly spread between the ARVN/VNMC and the territorial battalions. The ARVN and Marine unitsecline of. dropping fromroops in Marchovember strength ofen. The territorials fellromroops toen during the same period.
South Vietnamese regular combat loiCM consist of ARVN'snfaniiy divisions, the Marine Divinon. ISup*>mppo'Ong "mot and artillery units,egional Force battalioni.
Neuly recenvd information indicsKs thai ihe JTI.UOO-min csilimie ol South Vietmmew Mrenglhin Ihis4 understated the actual force level. This rciullcd Horn ibe useincomplete data in eitimating the ilrcngth of Reponal Foim riattnlmnt,in4 actually hadeicd rtrengih ofen instead ofeported
egional basis, Communist lossesecline in strength in each of the Military Regions, although the decrease inas recently more than offset by the arrival of thelh Infantry Division from southern Laos. The largest relative decline occurred in MRhere force levelsollowed byith morendimilar pattern occurred for friendly combat forces, as the largest relative decline also occurred in MRalling byince March. GVN combat forces in, whilendnits suffered dropsespectively. This order may change, however, when more complete data reflecting the high level of combat inuring the past six weeks are received.
Specifically, in MRosses suffered by North Vietnamese regular combat forces during the heavy fighting that occurred in the region between August and November lowered the overall force level there byroops. Hardest hit were theB Division in Thua Thicn Province andth Division in Quang Nam Province.esult, Communist combat forces in the region are estimated to have decreased00 troops.
South Vietnamese units ineclinedtrength ofen0 troops between March andubstantial portion of the drop can be attributed to heavy casualties suffered by the ARVN mainarticularly the Airborne, 1st, 2d, anduring the heavy combat of late summer and early fall. Regional forces (RF) also suffered heavyspecially in Quang Ngai Province. Many of these losses, however, were offset by the upgrading of some local and provincial forces into the RF battalion structure. If the draft is not increased, GVN combat strength inan be expected to drop further as personnel from the Airborne and Marine Divisions are withdrawn fromo establish new brigades in the Saigon area during the next several months.
In MRttrition reduced Communist force levels by anen. These losses were suffered primarily by the NVAth Divisions in Binh Dinh and Pleiku Provinces, respectively, over the past several months. In addition, the recent redeployment of theth Infantry Regiment from southerno Binh Tuy Province in easternurther reduced Communist combat strength byen. The move of theth Infantry Division wilhroops into MRowever, offset these reductions and caused the Communists' forces ino increase byroops,
The GVN strength inell byrom0 in March to0 in November. Most of this decline occurred within theivision in Binh Dinh Province and the regional force battalions defending key outposts and LOCs in the highlands and along the coast. Although South Vietnamese units inave performed fairly well in most encounters with the Communists since March, continued attrition of combat units will seriously impair their capability to effectively defend Pleiku and Kontum cities.
Inhe Communists incurred their heaviest losses in recent fighting in Phuoc Long. Binh Tuy, and Tay Ninh Provinces, causing the overall force level in the region to drop00 troops. In Phuoc Long, the newly formedivision bore the brunt of the fighting in capturing control of the province, while in Binh Tuy,d Division was responsible for the capture of Tan Linh district town. At the same time, thestth Independent Infantry Regiments sustained heavy losses in ihc fighting around Tay Ninh City and in the seizure of Ba Den Mountain.
Although complete results of the Communists' recent military campaigns Inre not yet reflected in GVN strengths, the latest available data indicate that South Vietnamese combat forces in the region have decreased by at0he decline reflects in part the intense combat in midsummer around Ben Cat and in northeastern Binh Duong Province, which involved extensive participation by all three ARVN divisions in MR 3
Inhe decline in Communist00 men -resulted primarily from actions in Kien Tuong Province where the NVA 5th Division suffered moderate casualties and in Chuong Thicn Province where NVA regiments have been engaging South Vietnamese forces in an attempt to expand Communist control in ihc area. Moreover, losses also have been incurred by the newly created NVA 8th Division in fighting in Dinh Tuong Province as well as by theegiment in actions along the border between the Vinh Long and Vinh Binh Provinces.
On the South Vietnamese side, combat strength declined by0 men in MRn March0 troops in November. The sharp drop in strength occurred primarily in the regional force Kit tal tons, accounting for more than three-fourths of the decrease. In contrast, the ARVN forces in the region suffered the lowest force reductions of any of the military regions.
*
Original document.
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