; i1 Survey ofilitary Developments in Indochina
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OF COMMUNIST
MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA'
I (This report covers iheanuary
The Key
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Nine:'new regular infiltration groups withroops were detected entering the pipeline during the past throe weeks. The rate is slower than previously projected in North Vietnamese plans.
Headquarters, Militarys moving from North Vietnam to Quang Tri Province, South Vietnam.
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The Communists have formed another infantry division in southern South
Vietnam, the third since the fall of last year
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The North Vietnamese have authorized surface-tc-air units to launch missiles ateconnaissance aircraft overflying North Vietnam.
Hanoi apparently will permanentlyIG regiment at Bai Thuong airfield1 in the North Vietnamese panhandle for the first_
Both Communist and ARVN ammunition expenditures surged during December, but thei Communists still are conserving theiretailed' report on the Communist use of their heavy field artillery inietnam4 is at Annex B. j.
report has been
jo ntly by the Central Intelligence Agency and
Department of Defense.
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This report summarizes evidence' received during the reporting periodI) Communist1 efforts to infiltrate new manpower and military supplies toward and into South Vietnam, (II) significant combat j; activity; and! (Ill) other developments affecting Communist military' capabilities in Indochina. j j I
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DETAILS
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Infiltration and Redeployment of North Vietnamese Personnel and Logistic Developments
Personnel Infiltration
ew regular infiltration groups withroopsetected entering the pipeline during the past three weeks. Of the nine, three arc cn route to southern South Vietnam, two to the western highlands, one to northern South Vietnam, and three to southern Laos. One of the latter groupsorthern Laos designator, but the continued southward movement of such groups strongly suggests that the entire series has been rerouted this season to southern Laos (see the report of.esult, two other groups detected in mid-Novcmbur, withroops, will now be included in the infiltration total for southern Laos shown in the table below.
The rate of infiltration to South Vietnam during the past five weeks has been slower than expected, and Hanoi's manpower commitment remains slightly below thatear ago. Earlier forecast messages indicated that Ihe North Vietnamese planned to step up the rate of infiltration in December ando one group perhich includedcrash" program (his
Comparative Slarti of Troops from North Viel
Total regular infiltration cyda,un 30
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regular Infiltration starts,
aag 'jj MRTrlThlen 1ront COSVN
Southern
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month. The actual number of regular; groups dispatched during December, however, averaged only onether day, and only two groups have been detected thus far in January. This slower rate suggests that the sending of replacement troops to the south currently! is not of 'the highest priority. In this connection,
two infiltration groups were diverted to work
inight, Bank. This occurred after their troops had completed trainingheir departure reportedly was imminent. The diversion is the first known instance of regular groups receiving such an assignment prior to infiltration.
he headquarters of Military Regions moving intoVietnam for the first time. Onear services unitKhc Sanh in Quang Tri Province! queried if the buildings forB! had beenoreover, on the following day, MRiwas located along the South Vietnam/Laos borderboutiles south of its normal area of operation inProvince, North Vietnam (see the transportationhe deploymentheadquarters will place it near, its transportation directorate. Groupand the headquarters of theth Air Defense Division,which moved into an area alongetween Cam Lo and Khc SanhTri Province during the past several
hese relocations have taken place at the'same time the North Vietnamese have been reorganizing their senior logistic authorities along more functional lines.
three of the five division-level groups
subordinate to,) will now have onlywhile the other two groups) will be taskedsupplies. Last year, these functions were performed by; separateeachgroup, and supplies were transferred fromroup to anothermoved south.|'X .
he: new organizational structure and location ofill provide; more efficient command and control plus's greater degree of flexibility for moving supplies to fighting units. Headquarters,ow will be able to oversee supply shipments as they arrive directly from North Vietnam. Supplies can then be movedsouth through Laos or western South Vietnam without administrative delays caused by entering another groupsf,nonstruction, of storage facilities, and repair, projects will be more easilynd coordinated under the new organization.
etected supply shipments during the past few weeks have been relatively light, possibly in part the result of the recent relocations and reorganization. In southern North Vietnam, onlyons of ordnance were referenced Q
as moving southward during December, even though anforecast indicated that -as muchonr of ordnance would be shipped during this period. At the same time, detected supply shipments through southern Laos and northern South Vietnam have been veryaucity of photographic coverage, however, precludes confirmation that there hasustained, sharp drop in supply1 shipments.
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Combat Activii!"
South Vietnam
j There, hasignifi ani increase in fighting innd 4
since
although the ovcra decreased.. j '
1 level of combat activity in South Vietnam has
i :In MRhe fall of Bo Due district town onanh Linh and Don Luan district towns onnd Song Be district town on Decemberrings the total number of district towns lost in the current campaign ton' addition, on Januaryhuoc Binh. the provincial capital of Phuoc Long Province, succumbedoordinated attack by Communist forces, eliminating South Vietnamese military presence in the province. This marks ihc first provincial capital lost to the Communists since3 ccasc-firc. Elsewhere; regional forces atop Ba Den Mountain northeast of Tay Ninh City came under heavy ground attack and were forced to evacuate their position becauseVN inability] to rcsupply. The evacuation of this dominant terrain feature gives Communist forces excellent observation of Tay Ninh City and the surrounding terrain. On. Januaryhe outskirts of Saigonocket attack. Ihe first such attack since the cease-fire. In Binh Tuy Province, the isolated district town of Hoai Due remains under heavy pressure. The garrison there has been reinforced by two battalions of theh Division. :!
ln MRlements of the ARVNt and ARVN 7th Divisions participatingegion-wide operation made contact with Communist forces in late December.'Moreommunists were reported killed, while ARVN suffered moderate casualties. On Januarylements of the ARVN 9th Division operating iij Kicn Giang Province received heavy casualties including three company!
commanders
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n MR I. light contacts were reported in the vicinity of Mo Tau and Bonghua Thicn Province, but neither side is attempting to expand itshe result of an earlier decision, the withdrawal of ARVN Airborne forces from the2 area southwest of Da Nang was completed on Januaryn southern MR I, two battalions of the ARVNivision were altrckcd and dispersed by Communist forces on JanuaryesultingRVN reported missing. In MRlements of theivision operating in the An Lao Valley made contact with Communist forces on Januaryeportedly resulting inommunists killed and the capture of various wiapons. includingm howitzer. On JanuaryVA forcesilled in an attack on elements
of the division, in the same area. j,
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HI. Other Developments Affecting Communist Military
Capabilities in Indochina Communist Force Structure Continues to Change
Communists are continuing to form new divisions in southernas partontinuing effort to improve their force structure forseason'snew NVA 3doperating in northern MRhich is composed of twoInfantrystnd some newlyThe division, along with elements of fie NVA 7th Infantry Division,responsible for the recent Communist successes in Plume Longthe receipt of additional evidence during the reporting periodthe existence of thed Division In easternnd8th Division in: northernsec the reports ofJ
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is unclear, however, whether each new division represents aforce organization for this campaign seasonermanent changestructures. The three new units, with estimated strengths of abouteach, raisehenfantry divisions now operating inarea (sec thehe addition of the new divisions, however, willchange the estimated strength of Communist combat forces inbecause they were largely formed from existing forces.
ccording to captured documents, the Northmay be forming another division in the area of Phong Pinh and Chuong Thicn Provinces of southern
Communist and South Vietnamese Regular Conibal Forces in South Vietnam
9th
7th ;
Regional Forcti
Slh 5th
MRhe division reportedly consists of.ndependent Infantry Regiments (the Utter two were formerly part of the NVA 1st Division which woj deactivated. There is as yet, however, insufficient evidence to confirm the division's existence.
y consolidating previously independent regiments into divisional structures, the Communists not only arc creating new threat areas but also arc Increasing the combat effectiveness ol" their regiments through better command and control. Tho major Improvement willetter capability to coordinate mutti-rcgimental attacks on selected targets.
RVNAF tooint General Staff Reserve
The South Vietnamese havelan tooint General Staff (JGS) reserve force in the Saigon area byew Marine brigade, an Airborne brigade,angerach consisting of three battalions. Two battalions of Marines and Pincers arc to be formed immediately and will be operational byhile the third Marine and Ranger battalions will be formed by May I. The formation of the reserve Airborne brigade originally was scheduledater date, but the military situation has prompted the JGS to begin immediately, and the brigade now is scheduled lo be operational by April f.
The Marines and Rangers were selected lo form new units because botl; have sufficient officers, NCOs. and recruits on hand to meet the requirement. The new Ranger battalions will be formed at the Ranger Training Center in Khanh Hoa Province, whererainees arc presently on hand. The new Marine battalions will be formed by taking one company from each existing Marine battalion. Manning spaces to permit the formation of the new units willreated by deactivating military police battalions and railroad guard units, whose personnel will also help fill out the new units.
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The Airborne Division, however, depicted by recent losses, will experience more difficulty meeting its manpower requirements for the new brigade.esult, the JGS has given the Airborne unit top priority to recruit in all Soulh Vietnamese training centers and schools.
The locktrategic reserve hoaajor' constraint for South Vietnam. If these units can be equipped and manned quickly and efficiently, they
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should help to limit Communist gains during the dry season by giving the JGS morend planning flexibility.
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ARVN and NVA Ammunition Expenditures During December
Communist and South Vietnamese ammunition expendituresDecember, reflecting the outbreak of widespread fighting in the southernSouth Vietnam. Communist expenditures of heavy weapons ammunitionveragedounds daily during they far therate in tlicse regions this past year.harp dropndommunist expenditures countrywide increasedbove November's level and one of the higher ratesyear. ARVN expenditures of artillery ammunition increased evenay countrywide during December. This figure ishigher than November's expenditures and the second highest monthlyonly hy August) recorded by
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high rate of expenditure of artillery ammunition byetback to South Vietnamese supplynitiated in response to military funding cutbacks in late summerbegun to show promising results in October and November, as illustratedtable below.
I)3fly ARVN and Communist Ammunition Expenditures In South4
espite the increase in combat in December, the share of artillery rounds among Communist heavy weapons expenditures remained low. Only aboutrtillery rounds" per day were fired during the month, equivalent "to about one artillery shell for everyeavy weapons rounds expended. This share hasairly constantontrastinguch higher rate ofxpenditure during2 oiT*nsive. This conservative use of artillery ammunition by Communist forces in Souiii Vietnam is discussed at length in Annex B.
hreat toverflights
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hange of policy, North Vietnamesenits have been authorized to launch missiles ateconnaissance aircraft overflying North Vietnam until further notice. Although shooting down ans highly unlikely, it is possible. The control and accuracy of theould be degraded by the speed, altitude, and flight operation of the00 feet at which theenerally flies, however, is withinfect maximum effective altitude that theaniving thehanceit.
MIG Regiment Deploys to North Vietnamese Panhandle
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North Vietnamese Air Force has begunIGo Bai Thuong airfield in the northern panhandle.from the regiment, formerly based at Kien An air base nearto Bai Thuong airfield betweennddditional MIGsto arrive at Bai Thuong beforeogistic, administrative,maintenance units are still in the process of shifting to Baithat the regiment's move probably Is permanent.
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North Vietnamese have never before permanently stationed
regf mental-si zed air force units south ofh parallel.ove willVietnam's capability to conduct air operations throughout the southernthe country. Farther south, the North Vietnamese have also beenrunways of the Vinh and Dong Hoi airfields,
that MIGs may also rcoccupy thcSe airfields"hr tlte* near luturc.
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October HES
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25. Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) reporting showed little overalln .the population control situation In; South Vietnam during October, despite increasing security problems In the Delta. This contrasts with earlier reports of
a more marked decline in security in the region during the month. As of the endOctober,f the country's popula'ion was living in government-controlledirtually the same proportiononth earlier.egistered very slight increases in government control during the period,eclined only marginally, andemained the same.
here were no dramatic shifts in the control situation at the provincial level during October. The greatest government: made in Quang Ngai, Phu Yen, and Tay Ninh Provinces, but the largest Of these was less than seven percentage points. On the negative side, the greatest decrease occurred in sparsely populated Quang Tin, where an upsurge in military activity occurred.
Possible Deactivation of theh Regiment in Laos
vidence suggests tbat theh Independent Infantrysouthern Laos may have been or is in the process of being deactivated.has been responsible for security alongnd in the MuongOf the four battalions originally subordinate to the regiment, oneSouth Vietnam last April, andecond battalion appears to havetoh Regiment of theth Infantry Division inThis is surmisedfrom
information provided by two recent ralliers fromh. if true, this would leave the regiment with only two battalions. Neither of these units, however, has been identified inear. They may have been disbanded and their personnel integrated into other unitsin the area, or they may have returned to North Vietnam.
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ANNEX A
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Number of Troop* Entertaj the Pipeline Dcttbwd for South Vietnam, ! t, and Cam bod ta
infiltrated south since theease-fire accord now totals. Most ofave started south since then, while the0 were already in the pipeline as of the date of the settlement. The table shows the number of North Vietnamese troops starting south, bysinceV.Ji'
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COMMUNIST CONSERVATION OF ARTILLERY AMMUNITION
One noteworthy aspect of Communist ammunition expenditures4 haseluctance on the part of the Communists to use their artillery. Even during the periodic hlghpoints and extended periods of heavy fighting in region-wide areas, firings of artillery ammunition have remained relatively low. This pattern of artillery fire haa distinct implications for Communist military capabilities and tactical plans in South Vietnam.
A comparison of Communist expenditures of heavy weapons ammunition4 with those during2 offensive demonstrates dramatically that the Communists have been conserving their artillery far rnore than their otherommunist forces In South Vietnam reportedly expended an averageounds of mortar, rocket, and recoilless rifle ammunition per day -only slightly fewer thanounds daily reportedly fired during the first six months (April through September) of2 offensive. In sharp contrast, the Communists fired only aboutrtilleryayhile during the Initial six months of2 offensive they reportedly expended an averagertillery rounds daily. The Communists therefore fired only about one artillery round ln everyeavy weapons roundshile2 about one in every three rounds was artillery.
The decline in the relative share of artillery ammunition In the mixCommunist heavy weapons expenditures is directly reflected In theof all types of ground ammunition fired by Communist forces.ammunition Is the heaviest In the Communists' Inventory, thethe tonnsges fired42 is much greater than the differencerounds.4 the Communists fired an estimated averageay, while in the period April through2 anll around ammunition were expended. The table below Illustratesrates of Communist expenditures4 and during the :; ;|
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Mortar.oiUtsi Rift* (Rend.)
(Round!)
385
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Total Hetvy Weapon, (Round. I
Artillery (Percent)
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Tula) Ammunition (Turn I
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The relatively low percentage of artillery expenditures4 did noi change during either the July-September or the December surge In combat activity. During the three months of July, August, and September, Communis! forces reportedly expended artillery ammunition at an overage rote ofay. while firing mortars, rockets, and recoilless rifles ai the ratetill equivalent to about one artillery round In everyounds of heavy weapons ammunition expended. This pattern again held true In December, when Communist force* fired in average ofrtilleryortar, rocket, and recoilless rifleay. In contrast, during the period July throughn which the peak three-month expenditures level was reported thathc Communists fired in averagertilleryortar, rocket, and recoilless rifleittle more than one artillery In every three heavy weapons rounds. The following table summarizes these expenditures.
DalyAmmunition Expenditure* In South Vietnam
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Mortar, Rocket. RecolUeai Rifle (Rounds)
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(Rounds)
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5400 25
Tot.il Heavy Weapon* (Round*)
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Artillery (Percent)
Communists' decision to keep their artillery guns under wraps apparently is basedombination of considerations. The overriding factor probably is that the Communists' limited military objectives4 required greater use of lighter and shorter range weapons. In addition, the conservation of artillery probably ia linked to the Communists' timetable for completion of training In the use of artillery and combined arms now being conducted in North Vietnam and In some of South Vietnam.
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More important is the obviousonsidering the Communists' massive ammunition stockpiles and their low rate of consumption of artilleryhat the North Vietnamese4 were conserving their artillery for useater date If the artillery is finally unleashedountrywide basis, the intensity of Communist shellings would be far greater than that observednd probably at least as Intense as the heavy barrages receivedhis intensive use of firepower could be critical, particularly considering the Communists' ability to exert heavy pressure on ARVN forees this past ycur without
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There are some recent indications tha* the Communists may now befrom their pattern of conservative use of artilley. ARVN defendersBinh ineported increasingly Intensive barrages of heavy-m artilleryuring the first weekThe usem artillery is the first reported ininceMoreover, the Communists reportedly firedoundsmthe district capital of Tuyen Nhon In Klen Tuongn Decemberhe first indication of Communlst'hisc of thisthe Delta.
Original document.
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