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POSSIBLE SOVIET MILITARY INTERVENTIONYRIAN-ISRAELI WAR
THIS MEMORANDUM IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.
THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS, EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT, AS FOLLOWS:
Ihe following intelligence oiganiralions participated in Hie preparation ol Ihe estimates
Tha Central InteUigenee Agefny. the intelligence oraoniroiioru ol Ihe Deportf Slate and Defenie, ond ihe Nollonat Security Agency.
Concurring:
The Deputy Director of Central Infettjgence representing the Central Inielligenee Agency
The Director of InteOtgence ond ftetearth repietenting Ihe Deportme.nl of Stole The Director, Detente Inielligenee Agency The Duoclof. Noli ond Security Agency
The Acting Deputy Auittant AdmWiKalc* for Nallonol Security, tnergyDevelopment ..
raining:
The Speciol AitJilonf to the Secretory of the Treotury repreieotlng ihe Oeporimenl of the Treaitiry
The Auittant Director. Federol Bureau of Instigation A'to Participaling;
The Auittant Chief of Sloff for IntefBgence, Deportment of the Amy
The Director of Novel Inielligenee. Department of the Navy
The Aiilitani Chief of Staff, Intelligence. Deportment of the Air force
POSSIBLE SOVIET MILITARY INTERVENTIONYRIAN-ISRAELI WAR
THE PROBLEM
This paper estimates, in responsepecific request, thepace, forms, and consequences of possible Soviet militaryita Syrian-Israeli war should break out within tho next several months. The fighting is assumed to be confined to the Syrian fronts
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- Gccnrr -
CONCLUSIONS
The Soviets probably anticipateyrian-Israeli war would end quickly in an Israeli victory. Their capabilities for rapidof militarily effective forces to Syria axe seriously limited. Overt intervention would involve major political as well as militury risks.
We believe that the USSR would concentrate mainly on diplomatic efforts to save the Syrian Army, limiting its military support to such measures as the use of theegiment and the advisors already there. Through these measures, together with threats of more direct involvement, the Soviets would seek to get the fighting ended and toajor role in subsequent peace negotiations. The Soviets would also calculate that Syria, defeated once again, would become moreon them and that meanwhile the Soviet Union would reap major gainsonsequence of an oil embargo and its divisive effects on Western cohesion.
The Soviets might go further, and the Director of Navalestimates that they probably would. If they did, they mighton air defenseimited ground presence.
The first SAM regiment airlifted to Syria could go into operation two daysecision to send it. Within three days, an entire fighter division could fly in and some of its aircraft could be ready for combat. Fighters could be disassembled and shipped in by air, but this would take longer.
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ithinto two days and .division within four days. Airborne units could not stand up to Israel, armor, and the Soviet purpose in sending them would be to .ntensuy the crisis andeasefire by political
riticd factor"For geographic
and pohbcal reasons, the USSR would probably focus its pressures more on Turkey than on Yugoslavia or Iran.r
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' The AauSUoc Chief of Staff.Department of the Alt Fen* observes that the controlling sasumptloos of (hb tftlrrutc preclude adequate consideration of likely Soviet response* to in Israeli initiation o( hostilities and the braed rang* of political, propaganda, and military acUora which the Soviets could take. The Soviet* probably ccattider protection of their dieol-itile relatktnihip with Syria at betng of primary strategic importance, eapecially tn view of the leverage the Soviet! may believereUtiomhlp (within the Arab serocture) provides on Free World ccaeoane stability aod NATO's vfatatky. In the sent of Soviet action during3 war.elieved the Soviets would commit tbenud.es to the defense of Syria from the llrrt hour of hoilllilies and would not hesitate to luunedJately commit naval, air. ground, tactical rocket, andi defensend perhaps resort tn nocsear bladtrnill-He believes It would be dangerous lo underestimate Soviet resolve to thh regard not their belief lhat the US may be powerUu, to respond effectively.udden lowll Initiative campaign against Syria might seriously lestrlet Soviet taetknl options, Il is notertaio matwould be concluded ouicUy or that seriously disruptive counteraction! might no| occur.
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DISCUSSION .-
GENERAL SOVIET CALCULATIONS I. The Sovietsf*
Jtrudcnce requires Ihem to plan for tbe contingency ofshort and successful Israeli campaign. They must alio plan for theof little or no advance warning. Syria might provide some notice of its intentionttack, though probably not its exact timing, but in the case of Israeli attack or unintended escalation from skirmishes, the USSR would have to rely ontactical warning it could independently acquire.
n tbe eventar between Syria and Israel, the Soviets would see some advantages to themselves, both regionally and globally. It would wreck, at least temporarily, the diplomatic efforts monopolized by the US sincet would generate strong anti-US sentiment among the Arabs; and it would produce US-West European strains which, if magnifiedew oil embargo, would be seriouss against this,onsiderable stake inajor Syrian defeat, which would damage their
M&le form of another oilwill be ^nwdeied In detail tinforthcoming rnter-(fency stud)-.
position in the area, but they know that, coca the fighting starts, they have no sure way to preventefeat
he Soviets probably could accept serious Syrian reverses in the Colin Heights, but they could not be sure thai tbe Israelis would not fight on in pursuit of larger objectives, such asof th* Syrian armed forces.efeat would cause extensive, but not neocssaiilydamage to the USSR's prestige and interests in the area. To take pressure off Syria, Ihe Soviets would encourage other Arab nations, especially Egypt, to get involved and would offer to support them if they did. Moscow would bring diplomatic pressure on tlie US to get Israel to stop fighting and would use military signals to reinforce that pressure. But tha Soviets would also have very little time for calculation and diptomaHc maneuver. Thus they would also have tomust already have made some contingency planserven tioo by military force.
A. On theIn addition io the fac-
tors mentioneduccessfulne which slopped tbe Israelis andtbe existence of the Syrian regime, would:
gain the USSR credit among die Arabs and discredit Sadat if he failed toecond front;
gain il credit and subsequent influence in Syria, particularly if tho fighting endedisible Soviet military presence in the country.
ajor Soviet voice in subsequent negotiationi;
extend Soviet military presence in the Middle East.
n the nsgotioe Ode, the Soviets wouldthat the risks of military intervention, while manageable to some extent, cannot be fullyaod cootjooed.
They respect Israeli military capabilitios and. while they probably calculate that Israel would be reluctant to engage Soviet forces overtly, they cannot count on this.
Their capabilities for rapid intervention with forces capable of sustained combat are limited.
Their access to the area is doubtful forforms of intervention
They cannot be sure what Is the threshold of Soviet military involvement beyond which the US might intervene in force.
They rrrast be concerned about negativeto their larger interests, particularlywith the US.
n this last connection. Soviet judgments will involve Moscow's view of the value and prospects of detente at the time when the war begun. Our present view is thai this consideration wouldSoviet decisions but, by itself, would notthe Soviets from intervening in ways that were clearly designed only to defend Syria. In this regard, we have reviewed the evidence ofhen the Soviets had to weigh Egyptianfor intervention against, among other things, their concern for reUtions with the US. Thewhile not conclusive, indicates that thereood chance that. If the destruction of theforces had continued, the Soviets would have sent airborne units to Egypt, counting on this to beinguick end to the lighting.
II. SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR INTERVENTION
section considers militarythe Soviets could Initiate early in thea few days beforehand If they acquiredof hostilities. Civen the anctipatedof the war. warning could be anin enabling the Soviets effectively tosome of these operations.
Forces Already in Syria
the3 war the numbermilitary personnel in Syria has risen byhundredotal of aten.are mainly training Syrian pilots andground forces down to the battaliononly Soviet combat unit currentlyanegiment located near Damascus,forf the Soviet personnelcountry. This regiment consists of fiveof foureach,otal ofELs.
military equipment
j we believe that the excesses represent Syrian war reserves-videnceumber ofas many asSyria that
j are probably Intended for Syrian usepilots are trained. There are alsounassignedIt is
unlikely that the Soviets would plan to recover
this or othei military equipment from Syrian hands for their own use. but we cannot altogether dismiss
the possibility.
forces Thai Could be Soot from the USSR
ir Routes. There are three possible air routes for Soviet military intervention:
The Yugoslav route would be readilyfor transport overflights, but penrnssion to send combat units or to stage throughairfields is less certain. This routean over-water flightm to Syria.
The availability of the Turkish route isr-
Iran values its relations with the Arabs, bul does not need their oil and opposes Sovietio the region. For these reasons, the Shah is less likely than the Turks to allow moreew overfUghtsQ
Atr Dtftrue. SAM units arc air transportable, and the first new Soviet battery could arrive and go into operation within twoore potent force, such as an entire air defense regiment, would require several more days. Overflight rights for this intervention would probably notroblem.
The quickest way of Introducing Sovietair forcei into Syria would be to fly in opera-tional ucbcal air units directly from the USSR.
ove would be unprecedented, however, and the Yugoslav route would Involve long over-wafer flights with which Soviet pilots areThe Soviets couldombatugoslavia in about three days;ortion of this force could be ready for combat in Syria within this period. If lite Soviets chose to overfly Turkey from bases In the Trans -Caucasus, several squadrons could be readied for limited combat activityatter of hours. In either case, at least an additional week would be required for the entire air division to reach combat status.
As for ferrying routes, Belgrade woulddrag its feet on. and might even deny, afor staging rights. Iran would probablyoverflights by combat aircraft. Turkey might acquiesce,ontention that the fighters were being delivered to the Syrian Air Force.
Barring overflights by combat aircraft, the Soviets could fly disassembled fighters into Syria aboard transports, as ihey have done previously in Egypt. Allowing time to prepare the fighters foromplete Soviet air division ofighters could be transported from the USSR to Syria in three to fourew'aircraft might be available for limited combatay or so after delivery. Using this method of shipment, moreeek would subsequently be needed toall the aircraft and ready the entire unit for combat.
Airborneoviet airborne division is, by US standards, small, not highly ground mo-bile, and lightly armed. Soviet airborne forces alone could not Successfully defend against an IsraeliMore than one airborne division would not increase the effectiveness of the Soviet show of force. Usingirlift, the Soviets could deploy one airborne0 men) to Syria within one to two days and an entire0 men) within four days. As for air routes, Turkey and even Yugoslavia might refuse overflight rights for this
purpose, but the USSR might decide to proceed without permission
Vui.m/ infantry units, while small, could arrive fairly quickly toemocutrabon force or conduct port security. Tho Soviets can sealill the Black Sea naval infantry assault0 men)yrian port in five days- If the Soviets had any naval infantry afloat in the easternwhen the war began, it could reachay or two.
ank or motorized rifle division! would beii the Soviets wished toajor ground combat capability. If the Soviets pursued this course to the full extent. Ihey would have to carryonsiderable mobilisation and assemble much more shipping than is normally available in the Black Sea. The first sealiftcd Soviet division could not arriveyrian port in leas than two weeksecision to commit It would take atonth to load in the USSR, transport liy sea. and unload inoviet combined arms army0 men. Deploymentoviet force (two combined arms armies) of six tank divisions and four motorized rifle divisions, eight Sovietircraft) and air defenseminimum force which the Soviets might regardilitary match for the Israelis inrequire twohree mouths.
acal Forces. Tlie Soviets ordinarily maintainaval units in the Mediterranean.the3 war the Soviets doubled their major surface combatants fromondthe total number of shipsithout violating the Montreux Convention, the Soviets could deploy three major combatants, or nine small combatants (DEs) each day from their Black Sea Fleet, which contains aboutajor andmall surface combatants.
n3 war. Soviet naval units escorted some cargo vessels, supplied some protection for Syrian ports, tracked Israeli air and naval umU, and performed surveillance of the Sixth Fleet Inwar. the Soviets could do these functions and provide some SAM defense of the Syrian coast.
irlift Capabilities. Evenull use of available transport aircraft, the USSR cannotall its intervention possibilities simultaneously. For example, it would take at least eight days to deliver toorce comprising an airbornea fighter division,AM regiment Within four days, however, the USSR couldorce with considerable visibility and some ability toitself against Israeli air, an airborne division, twoalterics,egiment ofighters, if the fighters overflew Turkey.
ombat Effectiveness. The foregoingregarding Soviet capabilities for intervention have focused primarily on the USSR's ability to transport tactical forces and equipment into Syria. The initial combat effectiveness of these forcesideast war. however, would be severely eon-strainedariety of problems, such as language difficulties, unfamiliarity of the terrain, andon the Syrians for airspace control, combat and logistical support, and tactical intelligence. These prospective difficulties would, in our view, bo an important Inhibiting factor in any Soviet decision to send forces for combat rather than demonstrative purposes.
otential. Interdiction. The Soviets would have to consider possible lsraoli interdiction ofair or sea traffic en route to Syria. In previous Middle East wars. Soviet resuppty of the Arabs and US resupply of Israel have been inviolate, although3 the Israelis damaged some Soviet aircraft at Syrian fields andoviet supply ship in Latakia harbor.
inimum, the Soviets would have to assume that they would face such attacks.[_
III. SOME POSSI8LE SOVIET COURSES Of ACTION
T the wu broke out with little or no warning, the initial Soviet reaction would probably consist of diplomatic moves designed toeasefire. At the same time the Soviets would undertakemilitary preparations that would serve in partarning to Israel and the US and also as the first steps toward possible military intervention. The Soviets meanwhile would encourage the other Arab stales, especially Egypt, lo go to Syria's aid. The USSR's subsequent decisions about additionalwould be based on its calculationsthe course of events, but Moscow would be under intense time pressures. Its Immediate options would be:
Minimal military Involvement. The rationale wouldoviet calculation that there was not enough timeecisive intervention and that, in relation to Soviet Interests, the risks of military defeat at Israeli hands or eventual US military reactions were too high. Under this option, the USSR would limit itself to such measures as resupply of the Syrians andto combat of its advisors and Iheegiment already there, plus (he dispatch of additional advisors, and naval maneuvering and reinforcement to demonstrate support. Through these measures, together with threats of more direct involvement, the Soviets would seek to get Ihe fighting ended and toajor rolo in subsequent peace negotiations. The Soviets would also calculate that Syria, defeated once again, would become moreon them, and that meanwhile theUnion would reap major gains as aof an oil embargo and its divisive effects on Western cohesion.
Substantial air defense involvement. This would be aimed at showing strong support and bringing an early end to the fighting while avoiding the risks of ground involvement. It would entail the immediate airlift of SAM units and the dispatch of Soviet fighter units, by ferry flights if Turkish aijspacc were available for this purpose or, if not, by airlift.
Limited ground (nuotoement. This wouldmore military risksreaterof Soviet prestige, but hold more prospect ofeasefire; if successful, it would leave the USSR well positioned for the postwar negotiations. Under this course,forces would probably be preferred over naval infantry for reasons of size and speed. These forces would probably be deployed demonstratively in an effort to deter theand to generate intense international pressures on the US and Israeluick end to the fighting.
hese courses of action are necessarilyin their detaib. In general, however, wethat Soviet behavior would approximate that described above as minimal military incolorment. They might, however, go further and undertake some combination of tho actions described under substantial air defense involoemtnt and limited ground involvement. The Director of NavalDepartment of tho Navy, believes that the Soviets probably would go further, considering that the dispatch of some such forces (probablythe airborne units) would be taken under the facade of an influx of technicians and instructors. He feels that the Soviets would not acquiesce in the destruction of Syrian forces if Israeli military success so indicated. He calculates that the Soviets would wish lo establish themselves on Syrian territoiy to add impetus to efforts to oease hostilities.
t is possible that Ihe Syrian reaction to Initial defeats would be to save as many of their forces as they could, abandoning Damascus and retreating northward.^
^]ln these circumstances, we think that the chances of additional Soviet air defense itioolvrtnent would rise, bul nol those of limited (pound inooloe-
a
meni: while the military situation was fluid, thewould find the risks high; once il stabilized, the Syrians would have little incentive to receive Soviet troops.
ore far-reaching options for tubttumicl ground involvement are theoretically avails hie, should Moscow be convinced that its interestscommitting forces to overt combat outside the USSR's contiguous sphere of influence for the first rime.
By prearTangement with Damascus, thecould deploy divisions to Syria inof the fightingombined campaign with the announced aim of restoring Syria'soundaries. If the Soviets decided on such intervention, they would not be likely toiecemeal approach but would be prepared to introduce forces in sufficient strength to defeat the Israelis. This deployment seems to us highly unlikelyumber of reasons, including Syrian unwillingnessarge Soviet force, reactions in other Mideast stales and NATO, and USand military reactions.
Alternatively, the USSR could conceivably choose to commit substantial ground forces once the war had begun. This decision would be based on the possibilityong wax, in which the Syrians would retreat northward from Damascus. Moscow might calculate that, in these circumstances, even the delayedof Soviet divisions would halt further Israeli advances and leave the USSRtrong postwar position on the ground. The time required and the major military andrisks involved lead us lo regard this as an extremely unhkeiy Soviet course of action. Moscow could, however, proceed along thismovement of divisions toports, embarkation, and transit of theinaldepending on the developing military and diplomatic situation.l this process * would require considerable mobilization and generate great alarm In the US, in Turkey, and in NATO generally.
hiefly because of possible US reactions, the Soviets would not wish to inject the idea of possible use of nuclear or chemical weapons into the crisisyrian-Israeli war. even if the Syrians were being badly beaten.'
of the Ab Force believe,oviet nuclear and SaniesI Waretheefrgaewei Syrbn-Ismelirequire further
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