ExiMPimasiiBini
mini
Ull.tllCIIII
national
intelligence
estimate
Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Conflict5
VOtUME I
CIA HiSrORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
KEY JUDGMENTS ANDAS SANITIZED
SVUIKl'-'
THK TMHECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
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for intercontinental conflict5
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SOVIET FORCES FOR INTERCONTINENTAL CONFLICT5 Volume I
Key Judgments and Summary
THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.
THE.UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS, EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT, AS FOLLOWS:
Ine Jo/Wingonixol.ooi partkipalad in ihm pttpotauon ot
Ihe Cenliol IrtleOigence Agency, the intelligenceK. Deport-menu ol Stole, Deleree, Ihe Noliongl Security Agency, ond ihe Atomic inergy
CbiwhIiiIbi.
'
eputyel Centra. fMe&oeiKoihe Cer-rol beeKgence
The Director ol Intelligenceepawning inf Stole The Director. Detentegency The Director, Notional Securer Agent*
The Aitlttont General Manager lo. Nal^nol Security repr-tentlng >h. Atomic Energy CommUtlon
fimg:
Ine Speciol Aimioni lo ihe Secretory ol -he Treeiury repreirni.ngDeportment ol the Ireoiury
The An irector, Federal Bureau ol Imeilroollan
AISO pafmclpating:
Ihe AuhioAt ChW el Staff tor fatfeftgence. Depe-imem ol mm Array
Ihe Director ol Nrjrol Inlelbgence, Deportment of ihe Nary
'ho AiMIom Chief ol Sloll, Intelligence, Department of the Aw Forte
-ilf
VOLUME I
1
KEY JUDCMENTS 1
6
THE USSR'S CURRENT STRATEGIC 6
FACTORS INFLUENCING SOVIET STRATEGIC 7
THE QUESTION OF SOVIET STRATECIC 0
PRESENT FORCES FOR INTERCONTINENTAL ATTACK AND
PROSPECTS FOR THEIR IMPROVEMENT
A. INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILE
Statu* of Deployed
The Nr-
Wtuhead13
Prettat Deployment
Provpocti for Follow-on. 4
D. SUBMARINE LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILE14
Pitiol
C. FORCES FOR INTERCONTINENTAL AIR
SOVIET STRATEGIC DEFENSES AND PROSPECTS FOR THEIR
17
A DEFENSE ACAINST BALLISTIC17
Tho Moscow AntlbaMistic Muiile Syitero17
tile Research and1$
D. AIR.18
C DEFENSE ACAINST BALLISTIC MISSILE
D. ANTISATELLITE21
W CIVIL
FUTURE FORCES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS22
A. PROJECTIONS OF FUTURE
B QUANTITATIVE MEASURES OF OFFENSIVE25
C ICBM SILO SURVIVABILITY ..
MISSILE WARHEADS
FOR THE STRATECIC
SOVIET FORCES FOR INTERCONTINENTAL CONFLICT5
NOTE
This Estimate is concerned wiih the major elements of the USSR's intercontinental attack forces {ICBMs. SLBMs. and bombers) and strategic defense forces (interceptors, SAMs. ABMs. and anrisa'ellile and ASWther forces with some strategic and tacticalcapabilities are discussed in Estimates in the NIE34 series, inSoviet Military Posture and Policies in the Thirdnd in the forthcoming. "Soviei Naval Policies and Programs."
KEY JUDGMENTS
The Soviets ate pressing aheadroad range of programs for the near-lerm deployment of much improved offensive systems for intercontinental conflict, are gradually improving their deployeddefenses, and are vigorously pursuing the development oftechnology applicable to strategic forces.
In strategic offensive forces:
.Four new ICBMs are being tested. Three have MIRVs and aversion of tho other is probably being developed.
New silos which were started prior to the Interim Agreement are being completedrogram is under way toajor portion of the existing Soviet silos for the new missiles.
More ballistic missile submarines with long-range missiles are being constructed.
A new multipurpose bomber is being introduced into operational
new ICBMs and SLBMs are in the preflight stages of research and development.
Through these programs the Soviets will increase the number of their ICBM and SLBM warheads and improve the accuracy, survivability, and flexibility of their strategic offensive forces. The programs will add to Soviet capabilities for deterrence and for engaging in nuclear war.
In strategic defensive forces:
The Soviets are gradually improving the capabilities of forces currently deployed.
They areew antiballistic missile system which can be deployed much more rapidly than the one currentlypossiblyedge against abrogation of the ABM Treaty.
In antisubmarine warfare they are developing new sensors,and techniques, and are attempting to augment their skills in the use of aircraft, surface ships, and submarines in coordinated operations.
They are investigating the application of lasers to air defense. ABM. and antisatcUite uses.
We believe that the Soviet leaders are united on both the broad outlines of detente policy and the high value of strategic programs, although it is reasonable to assume that they differ on priorities. As the need to make new strategic decisions arises, more clear-cutwithin the leadership may become evident. For the short term, they appear lo haveorking consensus to move forward with major force improvements. The Soviet leaders probably hope through the SALT process to constrain future US strategic programs, or at least reduce the chances of major new US arms initiatives But theydo not expect detente or SALT to face them with pressuresto alter their near-term deployment plans in any major way. They evidently see no contradiction between their current strategicand their detente policies.
We doubt that the Soviets have firmly settled on acceptance of strategic parity or have decided lo seek dear-cut strategiche concept of superiority In Soviet military doctrine is III defined and is probably contested. In making the practical choices they confront, however, we believe that the Soviet leadership istrategic policy which is both prudent andpolicy aimed at assuring no less than comprehensive equality with the US and at the same time seeking toaigin of strategic advantage if US behavior permits.
Considering the hislory of Soviet strategic policy and forcewe believe that the motives underlying present Soviei strategic programs are to provide the USSR with:
Tt-t.ll lo. louGicnc. Ocpulmt erfxcTJiscc. Dc^nnw of Ohmil rrficn
of iW Aavfcr-tIh..helmmt
A counterbalance to the strategic strength of the US, plus Its allies, and China;
-
I-
A narrowing of the gap with the US in Important strategic weapon technologies;
Hedges against future US force improvements and possibleof US-Soviet relations;
Opportunities to gain strategic advantages should US behavior permit.
Inherent in present Soviet force improvement programs is ancapability to conduct selective or limited nuclear operations. In view of Soviet doctrinal aversion to limited nuclear warfare, however, it is unlikely that the USSR will adopt limited-use concepts at thelevel during.
Our best estimate of Soviet strategic force Improvements-over the next tenthat present SALT limitations continue and that US strategic programs develop as currently programedS-wouId provide to Ihe USSR:
ith the present newead over the US in most quantitative measures of offensive forces;
, with improved or follow-onotential capability toarge percentage of US Minuteman silos;
An appearance of overcoming the US lead in such qualitative aspects of Strategic forces as MIRV technology.
Despite expected improvements in Soviet forces, it is extremelythat during the next ten years the Soviets will conclude that they could launch an attack which would prevent devastating US retaliation.-
The Soviets will be uncertain about the outcome of an attack on US Minuteman silos and would probablyonsiderable number to survive.
Their ASW forces will be unable to locate and destroy the US ballistic missile submarine force at sea.
There will continue to be weaknesses in Soviet defenses against low-altitude bomber attack.
ABM defenses will be limited by treaty to insignificant levels.
Soviet civil defense will be unable to prevent massive casualties and breakdown of the economy.
We do not foresee technological advances which would sharply alter the strategic balance in the USSR's favor during the next ten years. Nevertheless, the scope and vigor of Soviet research and development, particularly in strategic defensive systems, bear especially closein the years ahead.
Although deterrence will be maintained and no overallobtained, the political impact of future Sovietreat extent on how they are perceived by the Soviets,and other nations. The question of whether the Sovietsa psychological edgeime of crisis, for example, willon the degree to which those involved focus on the basicrelationship or on appearances, and on how perceptions offorces affect views about the total capabilities and resolve of'
As Soviet forces for intercontinental conflict improve, acute problems of perceived strategic imbalances, threats to security, and distrust of motives are likely to arise.
Ideology and strategic doctrine make it difficult for the Soviets to embrace concepts of long-term strategic stability that take into account US security interests as well as their own.
Soviet strategic doctrineigh premium on war-fighting capabilities as the best deterrent and on counterforce operations as the best way to employ Soviet forces should deterrence fail.
The Soviets do not readily recognize that programs they deem important to their security can easily be read by the US asits strategic position.
The Soviets are likely to perceive countervailing US responses, as well as some features of present US programs, as deliberately threatening to them.
In the coming years, uncertainties faced by each side in assessing the capabilities of the others future forces, particularly theircharacteristics, will tend to magnify more fundamentaland fears about the other side's strategic objectives. Unlesstrategic environment is significantly changed by arms limitation agreements, it is likely that the Soviet leaders will continue to believe that the acquisition of more and better strategic armaments is their best course.
s
v 5*
SUMMARY
USSR'S CURRENT STRATEGIC SITUATION
I. The Soviets are pressing aheadroad range of programs for the near-term deployment ol much Improved offensivefor Intercontinental conflict In addition they are gradually Improving their deployed strategic defenses, and are vigorously pursuing the development ol advanced technologyto strategic forces.
In offensive forces, they are focusing on improving the accuracy, flexibility, and survivability of their ICBMs and SLBMs and on MIRVing (hair ICBMs. Four new ICBMs. throe with MIRV payfeads. are being flightobile version of one of the missiles probably is being developed. Hardened launch controlarc being constructed attandby airborne command post for the Strategic Rocket Forcesnow is operational New classes of nuclear-powered ballistic missilewith long-range missile systemsunder construction,ow multipurposetarting to beAdditional ICBMs and SLBMs are io the prcflight Stage* of research and development.
In defewief forces, the Soviet* arethe capability of forces already deployed and are developing newOlder fighter-interceptor* andmissile systems are being phased out gradually a* ImprovedIs Introduced. Current research and development activity Includes programs for antisubmarine warfare, an anfiballis-tic missile system which can be deployed much more rapidly than the one now operational, an endoatmospberiomissile Interceptor, and theof laser* to strategic defense.
hese developmentseries of large-scale deployment program* over the past ten year* which have provided the Sovietseliable deterrent and have brought about world recognition of the USSR's rtatusuperpower roughlyar with the US. Through these earlier programs, the USSR has largely eliminated previous USadvantages in strategic offensive forces.
In terms of commonly used static measure* of strategic offensivehe USSR now lead* the US in number* of ICBM and SLBM launchers andarge lead in missile throw weight. The USarge lead In total missile and bomber weapons, owing in part to the MIRVIngts JCBMs and SLBMs.
] In defensive forces, the USSR retains large numbers of SAM launchers andaircraft, whereas comparable US forces arc small and decliningummary view of quantitative trends over the past ten years,Figure I.
3 We believe that the Soviets view their strategic forces4redible deterrentowerful buttress to their international position,onsiderable potential for improvement under the terms of the Interim Agreemerst- They see the preterit US-Soviet strategic situation as one of mutualin which either side wouldassive retaliatory capability even if the other struck first. They arc aware, however, that the USarge numerical advantage In deliverable warheads andigrUfi-cant lead in many technologies applicable to strategic forces, and an ImpteiMvc capability to improve its forces further in the future. They believe that the better Soviet forces are prepared to light nuclear war success' lully. the more effective then deterrent will be. Thus, while having ample reason for sails-faction with their progress to date, the Soviet leaderseed for continued efforts to improve their strategic forces.
4 The Soviet leaders must be uncertain about future US strategic arms decisions. On the one hand, they perceive powerfulandlorces acting to constrain the US. On the other, they observe significant US force improvements currently under way and In prospect, and they display an abiding respect for the political and technological ability of the US to respond to strategicIn the face of these uncertain!ins. the Sonets teem convinced for now that their current force improvement programs areto their security and their political image, and that simultaneous pursuitay of enhancing theand technological strength ol the USSR
They evidently see no contradiction between
these elements of their policy.*
FACTORS INFLUENCING SOVIET' STRATEGIC POLICY
5 Decisions already made, and programsrogress,trongmomentum to Ihe present Soviet force modernization efforts. Tlte Soviets, however, will need to make new decisions at various stages with respect to thedecisions about the pace and ultimate size of ongoing programs and about the deployment of systems which have not yet reached the late stages of research and development. These decisions wdl be affectedariety ol factors which shape Soviet strategic policy. Among these are detente and SALT, economic and buieaucratic influences. Soviet threatSoviet military doctrine, and theof US strategic policies.
6believe the Soviet leaders are united in the conviction that powerful strategic forces ate essential to deter nuclear war. to wage nuclear war effectively shouldfail, and to project an image of national power. Beyond that, they appear united in the belief that strategic power is at once the
'See tuiienphea lae nor of the AnuuM Quel ofntell-jenee. Oepurrarm ol she Amy, ihr Director olIntelligence. Department nl ihe Ntvy, nnd the AiUeMnl Chief of SinIT,
Bi'ine. Dtruilmani ol the Alt Fwie.
enable* and guarantor of detente. Detenteiewed as the optimum presentfor maximizing the power, security, and economic strength of the USSR, anday of setting prudent limiti on strategic rivalry while allowing for greater Sovietpolicy maneuver. There is little evidence* that the leadership finds Ihe present burden of detente spending unacceptable, or that the USSR would forgo, for purely economicmilitary programs the leadeis consider Important Roth detente and SALT havegeneral support from the Soviet roili-tary, probably in part because of strongties between Brezhnev and Minister of Delense Crechko, and also because detente has thui lai gone hand in hand with ambitious military programs.
t present, the Soviets probably do not eapect detente or SALT to face them with pressures sufficient to alter their near-term deploylani 'n any major waj T'.ry continue to eiplote the extent to which SALT can be used to limit US programs while mini-miring limitations on their own. It Ii not likely that they will agree to meaningful limits on their forces unless they arc persuaded-that these will he matched by reciprocalon the US and that failure to reach agreement wilt lead to major new US arms initiatives. We do not know whether they would moderate their strategic arms programs if they came to the view that they cannot continue to have both substantially improving strategic capabilities and detente.
he Soviets must see the strategic threat to the USSR as dynamic and constantlyIn forecasting its future, theymake generous assumptions about US capabilities and determination Moreover.pressed Soviet concerns about US fotward-based systems, the forces of US allies, and ihe emerging strategic capabilities of China suggest that Soviet planners do not separate peripheral and intercontinental threats to the eatcnt that US strategy does. They have both military and political concerns about USstrike forces based on European and Asian territory and on carriers, about French and British SLBMs and Other strategic nuclear delivery forces, and about the likelihood that China's present broiled nuclear deterrent will be expanded to include potential threats to Moscow and oilier cities west of the Urals. This general outlook tends to weigh Soviet strategicboth medium range and Intercontinentalthe combined power of all potential enemies. It tends to drive Soviet interests toward large and flexible forces, no* governed solely by the US-Soviet balance
Soviet military doctrinesuperior military forces capableuclear war shouldThe relevance and nature ofvictoryuclear era, however,defined and probably contested.the doctrine which actively influenceposture decisions are probablyfor forces to be ployed Inthe Soviet leaden obtainstrategicinafter an enemy strike. Sovietit clear that, whether employedor inrincipalof Soviet strategic Strikes would bethe enemy's means of wagingcounteiloice capabilities have highin Soviet military thinking.
adoption carder this year ofide range of ofstions forof nuclearsmall-scale employmentcompel the Soviet leaders to considerof limited intercontinentalThill far, Ihe Soviets have generally re-
Jeered Ihe possibility that either the US or the USSR would be able (orestrain! once nuclear weapons had been employed. They consider (hat theater nuclear war could quickly escalate to intercontinrntal coalface. Soviet statements and doctrine reflect the view that If nuclear weapons were employed against Soviet territory, the inpnrue would be unlimited retaliation. There is, however, circumstantial evidence of Soviet planning forf nuclear weapon!entral European war. and it is conceivable that such use might eventually be embraced in Soviet planning lor intercontinental attack.Soviet doctrinal aversion to limitedconflict, however, we believe it unlikely that the Soviet) will adopt limited-useat the intercontinental level dunng, although the capabtht.rr. of Soviet forces to adjust loossibility are likely to improve steadily.
THE QUESTION OF SOVIET STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES
uring the long years when the USSR trailed far behind Ihe US in strategic power, the Soviet leaden could readily agree that Ihe country needed more and tatter strategic weapons. The present strategic lit nutiied picture Irom the Soviet point of view In these circumstances, wfo> the Soviet leaders clearly agree on both the broad outlines of detente policy and the high value ol strategic power, it is reasonable to suppose that they differ on priorities. They may dilfer as to whether restraint in future Soviet military programs is required inof detente goals, though there is title to suggest such difference* today. As the need to make new strategic policy decisions arises, more clear-cut divergences among the Soviet leadership may become evident.
or tho short term, we believe that the Soviet leadership hasorkingwhichommitment to move forward with major force improvementThe Soviets may well Justify tlseseas necessary to meet present and future deterrent and war-lighting requirements, to reduce or overcome the US had in strategic weapon technology, and to hedge againstabout US behavior and armsprospects. But these programs also raise Ihe question of whether the Soviet objective is some form of militarily or politically useful strategic superiority
We doubt that Moscow has firmlyon eitlier acceptance of parity or ato seek cUor cut strategic superiority, in part because these concepts are difficult to rebte to the practical choice* of policy on weapons systems, budgets, and negotianng tactics. Rather, we beheve Moscow isa strategic policy which bprudent aod opportunistic, aimed at assuring no less than the continued mainte-nanoc of comprehensive equably with the US, while at the same time seeking to attain some degree ol strategic advantage il US behavior permits.
Unless the future sees dramatic changes in either Soviet or US strategic policy,'It Is likely that this pragmatic opportunism will continue lo characterize Soviet strategicUnderlying it. however, are altitudes of deep-seated fear as to the capabUities and intentions of the US and other nations, coupled withand optimum that the process o! history will allow the global balance of forces to swing in the Soviets' favor.attitudes, at well as an entrenched body of strategic doctrine, make it diflicult for the Soviets to embrace concepts of long-termstability that tnkc into account USinterests as well as their own.
n -
he Assistant Chief of Staff forDepartment of the Army, the Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy, and the Assistant Chief of Staff.Department of the Air Force, believe that the Soviet leadenecisive shift of the strategic balance in their favor, and view the superiority they hope to achieve as an umbrella under which to pursue their conflict goals throughout the worldecreasing risk of interferencefrom the United States.
PRESENT FORCES FORATTACK AND PROSPECTS FOR THEIR IMPROVEMENT
A. INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC 'MISSILE FORCES
Status of Deployed Forces
4 the SovietstotalCBM launchersnumberfor five different systems andunder construction,conversion. It also Includesoftwhich are now consideredNot included are IS SS-9Tyuratam that are probably part of theforce.
Tho New Missiles
Soviets are continuing to testmissiles which incorporate majorover currently deployed systems:
The6mall. soUd-propellant missile probably being developed bothilo-based replacement for thendobile ICBM. It has about double the throw weight of thehe6 is tho only one of the new lCBMs which lias not been tested with
MIRVs. but it appears capable of cm-ploying MIRVs in the future.
7edium-sized liquid-propellant missile with inure than double the throw weight of the most capableodification. It is being developedeplacement for thelthough theas tested initiallyingle warhead, all recent tests have been with MIRVs.
s another medlum-sfced liquld-propellant missile with even greater throw weight than thehealled the "mam misslle" by Soviet leaders, is also being developedeplacement lor theTheas been tested only with MIRVs.
arge. Isquid-propeLlant ICBM with slightly greater throw weight than thehe missile It is beingto replace. Thes being tested io both MIRV and single-warhead versions.
The continued testing of each of the fout new Soviet ICBMs and the siloprograms for them indicate that one or more venions of all of them will be deployed. Deployment of the MIRVednd the slngle-RV version of theould begin by the end of this year. Deployment of then silos, the MIRVednd the MIRVed version of Iheould beginobile version of theould be ready forear or two later. Seeor characteristics of these and other Soviet ICBMs.
Deployment of the new missiles will give thearge Increase in the number of warheads available In their ICBM force. Tlsc combination of relatively high-yield war-
Improved accuracy, and1 improve the effectiveness of Ihe tore*ounterforee role. However. MIRVed Soviei ICBMs would rccjuirc better accuracies than we estimate tor the missiles now being tested loigh probability ofardened missile siloingle warhead..
ccuracy. Uncertainties^
Jj)do not permit conlident estimates ol the precise accuracies of the new Soviet ICBMs We believe that ia their present eonfipjrations these systems have theto achieve CKPsof5auuciJ mile
could1 lake an-other year or so of flight testing following initial deployment for the Soviets themselves to become conlident of the operationalol their new ICBMs. We do not believe that the Sovet, are capable of attammg CEPs on the order5 nm with the new lystems as presently configured They probably will be able to achieve such accuracies inith improved versions of the new systems or entirely new ICBMs.
arhead Yield. Another parameter greatly affecting hard-target capability,yield.lso highly uncertain for the new ICBMs q
Tintheir MIHV payloads. it appears that the Soviets havealance between hard-target capabilities and numbers of weapons, optimizing neither for the greatest yield per warhead nor for the maximum number ol RVs
The new andsilos are considerably harder andsurWvablc than any the Sovietsin the past In general, the new sibetter protected against high blastelectromagnetic effects, andground shock. Survivability of thewould be further enhanced shouldbe deployedobile
- Present Deployment Plans
Soviets evidently haveway to convert the bulk, but nottheir existing ICBM launchers to theJudging by eMdenceC^
he present Sovietcalls lor deployment olndost of these will be in convertediloi; aboutercent will be in new silos started before the SALT agreements were signed. We beheve that these new missiles wii be MIRVed. Scenewhat moreaunchers, however, have re-cenlly been modified to acosmmodata aof thehich carries MRV* rather than MIRVs. It is unlikely that further change is planned for these silos during.
2A. The picture with respect to heavy ICBMs Is lessew new silos for theere started at five of the si.ompletes before the SALT as-reemerirs. bul conversion of existingilos is under way at only three completesotal ofaunchers. The present Soviet plan (oreployment may thusittle more than hall ol the available heavy ICBM launchers. Barring further SALT limitations, however, it Is likely thatuch launchers will be converted and that the bulk of (he deployedSs will be MIRVed
n th* basis of past Soviet the conversion of operational launcher, eo the new mrtiile. in theretaak -hid) involves replacement of the entire rmisue system and major recoo-struction of thetake until the. In the interim, aboutercent of the operational ICBM force will be off line for conversion at any Riven time. During this same period, the Soviets may begin to deploy aversion of theresumably, they will alto be dismantlinglderndaunchers in erchaiige for newly constructed SLBM latirschers under the terms of the Interim Agreement.
Prospects" for Follow-on System**
here are indicationsigorousstrategic missile BAD effort beyond that associated with the four new systems no. being flight tested. The three major ICBM design bureaus have been expanded since fright testing of the four new ICBMs began, and we believe that all have new systems isrsdee way. This aettWty wflj probably result in the flight testing of several more new or improved systemse know little about these systems. It is likely, however, that future Soviet ICBMs will have accuracies on the order5 run CEP ineentry vehicles, better warheads, and impfoved components leading lo increased targeting flexibility and prolonged missile readiness. '
UBMARINE UUNCHED BAU1STIC MISSILE FORCES
she SovietsSLBM launchers onuclearwhich had reached operationalat leastaunchers onunder constructor onThere are alsounehers on older dieael units.
uring the past year the comfructxm program forass ended with the launch ofh unit. Construction oftasshave been launched tothere is evidenceengthened version wilh perhapsubes will be launched soon. We bdievc the Soviets are planning toodern SSBN force close lo Ihe limits ofubmarinesLBMs allowed under the Interim Agreement. Characteristics of the operational submarines and the missiles with which they are equipped are shown In Figure 3-
here is some evidence that the So-vleti are cjannlng to develop MIBVs for their SLDMs. L_
jjAJthough no flight testing has yet occuned. it is probable that the Soviets will be ready to start deploying MIRVs on their SLBMs by the.
Patrol Paiterns
he Soviets usuaUy keepmall portion of theit SLBM force atpolicy in line with iheu view that hostilities would come onlyeriod oftension. Normally, onlyf their Y-lass SSBNs are on patrol or in transit. Their patrol areas are shown in Figurelass units arc normally onwo off each coast of the US. Thus far. most patrolstass units nave been in the Barents Scaf"
of the range of theeployment in ihtl area provides coverage of virtually all of theiiphcrr.
eluding Ih* US. Europe, and Cbuu_ Aslass units become Ofsrrattonel. the Soviets will probably eapand iheu areas of opnalion.
e believe that ovet (he not tea yean the Sovicu will continue to deploy about the sameoercent) of iheir SSBN force as they have done in the put. Given the capability of the Ddass to fire its long-range missiles from home port, however, the proportion of the SSBN force withinrange of ilie US will increase substantially aslass units become operational.
C. FORCES FOR INTERCONTINENTAL AIR ATTACK _
he Soviets evidently intend lo retain an intercontinental bomber force to comple-ment their formidable ICBM and SLBM forces. The Long Range Aviation {LPA) bomber and tanker component of the Soviet intercontinental attack forces consistsears (TO of them equipped withangaroo ma sue and five confii-ured for reewwaissance) andisons (about SO fitted out as lankeis) The force has remained at about the present sire for the past decade.
heew twin engine, swing-wing aircraft,ultipurpose bomber whichensive capability for use in various types of iseriphernl missions in Eurasia and for naval missions over the open seas, and aboapability for inter eon tincnial attack. Its range and radlui at subsonic speeds arcto those of the Bison. It could cover virtually till of tho US on high-altitude,two-way missions, if staged from Arctic bases and refueled In flight. On one-wayBackfires could reach targets In the US from most of their home bases without refueling. If the Soviets intend lo use sizable numbers of Backfires on intercontinental two-way missions, we believe they wouldew tanker force There is some evidence
that the Soviets areompatible tanker variant of one of their heavy transports
e behave that the Backfire will be initially deployed In LRA for peripheral strike, closely followed by deployment In Soviet Naval Aviation in an antithip role, and that most Backfires will be assigned peripheral missions. The extern to which Backfires will be assigned misaiom against the continental United Slates remain! an open question in terms of evidence currently available1 The capabilities of tlte aircraft makeotential threat for attacks against the US, but we must await -evidence from basing, operational and. training patterns, and tanker development before we can confidently Judge whether the Soviets intend the Backfire for Intercontinental missions and. If so. to what eitent. .
e have no evidenceollow on long-range bomber, butofomber is within Soviet ca-pabiht.es- If the USSR decides toew long range bomber, weraped to become aware oftence four to five years before it reached operational status.
SOVIET STRATEGIC DEFENSES AND PROSPECTS FOR THEIR IMPROVEMENT
A. DEFENSE AGAINST BALLISTIC -MISSILES
The Moscow AntibollHlIc Missile System
he Moscow ABM system consists of Ihe Dog House and Chekhov battle manage-ment radars. Ihe Try Add engagement radars at each of the four completes aroundand Ihealosh missile launchcis dis-
Aishum Chief el
partment al the Air Forcei lubsequculr
rtun of the for IT oil! probeWy be Miirneii rrnuonl She eoMMeMai W
Top"
among these comploes. The tytttm achieves maximum erJwtivenesi only against missiles enleting the battle management radar coverage. While it would provide littlein (he facearge-scale rmssile attack, it couldredible defensemall attack and protect against an accidental or unauthorised launch. For ballistic missile early warning, acquisition, and slackingaround Moscow, see Figure 5.
of the primary limitations ofsystem Is that the radars cannotreentry vehicles hidden inThe system Is further limited bydirected Try Addradars, which cannot simultaneouslyspaced targets. Since there aretargct-tracking Try Add radars atthe system could be saturated by alight, coordinated attack.
Antlballistie Missile Research and Development
The Soviets are continuing theirand development efforts on ABMcomponents at the Sary Shagan testoal of one program observed there appears to be the developmentew type of ABM system which can be deployed much more rapidly than the one at Moscow. Inaunch areaew, conically shapedappears to have been completed. The conical missile Is probably designed for endoaunospherie intercepts and presumably will be includedystem to take advantage of atmospheric filtering ol chaff.
One ABM complex of the new type-consistingarget-tracking radar, two inter-eeptor-missile-tracking andradars, six launchers, and Supportbe deployed in less than six months as compared with about five years for one complex in the Moscow system. Addeployment program, however, would probably require several years to complete. The development of this ABM system now may be intendededge against theof (he ABM Treaty or for futureat Moscow.
Soviets have also completedconstruction of what is probably aat Sary Shagan, This identificationon observationarge opticalins slidingarge
activity at this complex may represent Soviet investigation of potential laser applications in both ABM and antisatellite programs.
B. AIR DEFENSE
strategic air defenses remainthe largest io the world. As of 1they includearlyground-controlled interceptadar sites,and0 SAMall types. These numbers reflect aof the gradual decline inwhich has been under way for theyears or so. However, because thehave towered the proportion ofand because the Soviets have anmodification program, theof the defense forces haveDespite these improvements thehave major weaknesses inagainst penetrating bombers andagainst the US short-rangeoviet surface-to-airat various altitudes ison6.
urreni Soviet research andon new systems include laser appliea-
BKTDOpy
Hon* (or air detente, newew low-altitude SAM,ewmayombinationAMantitactical ballistic missile system.neat decade the Soviett areof developing airborne orlaser weapons for use againstlaser weapons, however, would bein clear weather, would requiredata, and would have toin large numbers for areaof large numbers of mobileas theight partially offsetin the low-altitude SAM
here Is no evidence that the Soviet* are developing an airborne warning and control system capable of detecting and trackingat low altitudes over land or an effective took-down/ihoot-down system forevelopment program werewith high priority, such *ysterns could be initially deployed in the. Themay choose toook-down/ shoot-down system into existing fighters or to deploy itew interceptor, or both. Ifinto existingignificantcould occur
the prospects forIn existing air defense systems andof new systems, we think itthat the Soviets will be able to copelow-altitude attacks duringten years.
C. DEFENSE AGAINST BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES
ASW
Soviets do not havehe US SSBN force, but Soviet^
cupa
etermination to improve labilities. Wc expect the Soviets to increase their ASW force, introduce improved sensors and weapons, and augment their skills in the use of air. surface, and submarinein coordinated ASW operations.
he principal continuing weakness in Soviet ASW capabilities will be the lackystem which can detect submarines at long ranges within the broad eapaose of open oceans. We believe future Soviet systems for detecting submarines using fixed acousticwould be effective only In small areas near the Soviet Union or in narroweographic and technical considerations gen-erally militate against the useong-range acoustic system similar to SOSUS.
here ar? indications the Soviets believe that nonacoustic techniques have .potential for improving their capabilities in the open ocean. They have anrogram in nonacoustic detection, which primarilymobile sensors. Wc lack information on many aspect* of this program.
vailableoncerning nonacoustic detectionTrioleates that noneapability for detecting submarines at ranges comparable to that of SOSUS, although some could im-prove the potential of mobile units.
ver the next ten years, we expectu> Soviet ASW capabilities which may permit detection of US ballistic missile submarines during limited area searches of the open ocean or in confined areas the SSBN* must transit. We do not believe that advances in either acoustic or nonacoustic techniques will give the Soviets moreow probability of detecting US SSBNs on
patrol, although we do not rule out the pot. sibihty that they couldew andcould threaten some portion of the US SSBN force. Nevertheless, we estimate that Soviet capabdities will be irauffklent to prevent most submarines on station fiom launching their missiles.
D. ANTISATEIUTEhe Soviets nowystem which can conduct oonnudear orbital intercepts of satellites by using ground radars and maneu-vetable interceptor spacecraft. It could be employed against- satellites in low- and medium-altitude orbits. The Soviets have the technical capability to attack satellites inorbit by launching theirooster which has himerto been employed for other purposes, but they have not testedombined system The probable laser at Sary Shagan may havepower to disable low- and medium attitude satellites passing over the lest center when atsnospbezic conditions are favorable. We believe, however, that short of preparation for war or retaliation for what they believed to be prior US action against their mmif is unlikely that the Soviets would attack any US satelb'tes.
E. CIVIl DEFENSE
he Soviet civil defense organization Rained in importance2ow deputy minister of defense was named its chief. Civil defense is now represented in high-level military decision-making councils and Its new leadership has sought to teinvigorale the program Civil defense planning emphasizes shelters, evacuation of urban populations, and dispersal of industry.he Soviets have built Large bunkers at Moscow and ten other cities toadre ol government and reconstruction workersn addition to bunkers built near Moscow, evidently to protect the utional poetical aod military rom-mand authorities. Shelter space as available in major urban centers to house up to one-third of the urban population, but we do not know the extent to which such shelters ana stocked wilh supplies essential to survival. We believe the Soviets could evacuate up loercent ofrban populatJoneek under Ideal, but unlikely conditions.
aking into account the reorganization of the civil defense program and the progress that has been made in the last three years, we believe thai in the event of nuclear war the Soviets could capect that the program:
would be able to protect lop govem-mental authoritiesadre of key officieb;
wouldonsiderable number of hvea;
but would not be able to prevent massive casualises and the breakdown of thestructure.
FUTURE FORCES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS
A. PROJECTIONS OF FUTURE FORCES
SB. We can estimate the characteristics ol Soviet forces and project deployment levels for Ihe mid- toith someassuming that the political climate of detente and the current SALT limits continue During this period, unless restricted by further SALT agreements, we expect the Soviets to achieve:
Ihe deployment of MIRVs on most ICBMs and probably on some SLBMs.
73
tit Ir.rough equality wtlh lite US in Ihe number o( missile reentry vehicles;
a somewhat increased hard-targetthrough Improved missile accuracy;
i improved survivabilily and lleiibility for their missile systems.
he period05 is far more difficult to predict. There Is much lea evidence on the types of weapon systems which the Soviets could deploy. Moreover, the strategic plans, policies, and objectives of both the USSR and the US in Ibis period are far from clear We believe the Soviets will pot overall emphasis on qualitativeto add to tbe survivability and counter-force capabilities ol their missile (otce and to upgrade Iheir deterrent and war-lighting capabilities. In strategic oflensivn forces Ihe Soviets will tryinimum to maintain the image of parity with the US and lotheir capabilities against the US. its allies, and China In strategic defensive forces, the Soviets will seek advanced systems in an effort to overcome the major weaknesses in their capabilities against low altitude air Attack and against SSBNs. Their specific force structures and improvements in this period will depend on their advances in researchelrtljiiiliiil and on their perception of trends in tbe military and political situation.
o have constructed four projectiam to illustrate the variety ol forces which the Soviets could have. Some key aspects of these projections are summarized in thetable. All projections are consistent with currently observed activities and are within Soviet resource capabilities, but they are not considered equally likely envelopments:
ssumes that lite ABM Treaty and (lie eiisling limits on Soviet ICBM and SLUM launchers remain in effect through tha. Itikely Soviet force under conditions in which the current political environment is maintained and strategic competition continues but is not accelerated. This Force is our best estimate of thethe Soviets will achieve and the forces they would deploy within the present SALT constraint*.
epresents the lowest level of effort which we believe the Soviet* would consider. It also reflects our views of the lowest bkety level of Sovietachievement.
.igh level of effort within tho constraints of the Interim Agreement and ABM Treaty. It aitumes thai the Soviets successfully push Ihe limits of their technological capabilities Deployment of new systems is athigh rates.
ssumes that tbe Interimterminates7 and that the Soviets begin now to prepare for that contingency. The ABM Treaty isto remain in effect. Theaspect* and deployment rates Inrc ihe same as lahe offensive forces grew more because the SALT constraints of the Interim Agree-mcni lapse. This Fotee presume* anof increased hostility, in which the Soviets arc either strivingide margin of strategic advantage or are seeking to offset an expected upswing in the US strategic effort
e think it unlikely that tbe Soviets will achieve all of the technical successes and commit the resources implied bynd 4,
7i
Tcp-Secra
UANTITATIVE MEASURES Of OFFENSIVE FORCES
he projected Soviet forces (orattachre compared with tbe currently programed US forces in terms of commonly used italic measures in Figureption) for the US to expand or improve its tomes are not considered The Soviets retain greater numbers of delivery vehicles in allhey eaoeed the US In equivalent megatons tliroughout the period in all but the lowest prefect ion In missile throw weight therearge and growing asymmetry In the Soviet favor, whereas in missile Ihrow weight and bomber loadings combined, only the high Sovietare above the US total in. In warheads on operational missiles, llie US
J
n SALT the Soviets have often statedomparruxi of only US and Soviet in-tercontlncnul forces does not adequately measure the strategic offensive balance. They insist thai all forces capable of striking the Soviet Union, including NATO and Chinese systems, must be considered Abo, Sovietliterature and other evidence indicates thai the Soviets include their own forces capable of attacking only peripheral targets, such at Europe, although they continue to resist the inclusion of these forces in the SALT negotiation*ossible Soviet view in this corneal is presented in Figuresingrojections. (We have deliberately grouped Chinese and Western forces in thisalthough wc do not know whether the Soviets would dorom thii perspective opposing forces lead the Soviets in numbers ol on-line weapons In5 and
although the Soviets narrow the gap in the interim. The Sovietslight advantage over the combined other forces in numbers of delivery vehicles,rowing advantage in equivalent megatons. Other static measures, such as throw weight, which Is not plotted on ihe figure, would alsoarge Soviet lead.
5B. We have not attempted ino forecast specific Soviet views about the quantitative relationship) between Soviet and other strategic forces5 If tbe Sovietsontinuation ol previous trends, they would probably expect the relationships to remain about the same ati levels ilia easing somewhat. However, ihey would be quite uncertain about specificseriod SO far in advarsee.
C. ICBM SILO SURVIVABILITY
n the coolingby thend certainly in- both the US and the USSB arc likely to face large uncertainties about the ability of their sllo-baiad missile forces to survive attack. The US has good estimates of kt own silo hardness and its ICBM capabihtiei, but is relatively uncertain of Soviet ICBM capabilities against those tilos and of Soviet silo hardness. Theas the same problem in reverie. At present, because of the better accuracies of US missiles and the relatively softer Soviet silos, the Soviets are probably aware that Iheir force Is the more vulnerable. As more accurate ICBMs are introduced into the Soviet lorcc. and if US forces incorporate improvedach sides concern about silo survivabilitygrow.
stimates of silo kiU probabilities are subject to wide variations causedumber of factors. The most critical are the accuracies of llto attacking missiles and the question of
-yes ceooo3?m-
wiieSher more than one nuclear weapon can be detonated successfullyingle targethort period of time. Figure 9tlte sensitivity of US calculations to variations in tliese and othermall variations in accuracy will have large effects when CEPs are improved, and uncertainty about whether systems and Uctics can beto permit multiple targeting of silos will compound these effects. The entire range of uncertainty in theould be so large as to leave each side with little confidence in the outcome ofcounter force attacks against silos.
ssuming that ihe Soviets cantarget two ICBM HVs against each Minuteman silo, and using the accuraciesin all Forces butn. US Silo survivability will decline sharply during this period. As illustrated Inn attack by the Soviet forces projected inould reduce US silo survivors toheorces could reduce survivors to very low levels. Soviet silo survivability will improveif the US maintains its presently programed force. However. Soviel planners would piobably estimate ilsat improvements in US Minuteman forces, now underor in early stages of BAD. could reduce Soviet silo survivors lo low levels in. Thus, with US force options not firmly resolved, the Soviel planner today wouldconclude that the survivability of hissile force is not guaianteed by his present silo-hardening program
"The aiulyu'i in rnragrjciluliriucli OS and the airompjnyinn nspluciepresentfull netol Ihe interaction(tratei'lc forces on boihhich wtiukl requirelion ol nuny jdilitioiul factor..
ESIDUAL MISSILE WARHEADS
he importance of silo survivability, and of uncertainties about it, is mitigated by the probability that both sides would retain large numbers of weapons even after surprise attacks on silos by either side.he residual missile BVs available for immediate tatgeting on both side*ypothetical surprise attack by either side against the other's silos. If Soviet forcesas projected in Forceur bestthey could expect that even if they struck first, the US would retain several thou-sand missile RVs. largely the SLBMs at sea. for immediate targeting during most of the peiiod. After such an attack, the Soviets too would retain ample weapons for othering requirements. The Soviets could expect llveir own surviving missile RVs to climb through the period even If the US struck first, so long as US forces develop as presently programed. They would, however, bethat US deployment of improved ICBMs could considerably reduce the number of Soviet RVs expected toS Hat strike. Tbey could expect that inheir residual missile RVs available for im-mediate targeting would exceed those of Use US if the USSR struck first. Although the Soviets might viewrend asto them, they would also have to take into account the likelihood of many additional weapons in surviving US bombers. Thus, il appears thai both sides could expect to retain substantial second strike capabilities through-out the period.
E. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT
ne aspect of the slrategicwhich we believe can be predicted with confidence is that flic basis for mutualcc will conlinue to exist during the period
op-Se
r
L
of this Estimate. It it extremely unlikelynext ten yean the Soviets will con-
clude that they could launch an attack on US strategic forces which would preventdamage to themselves. The Soviets would have lo calculate that the US would bo able toevastating reply to any such attack. We believe the Soviets would hold the tame view of the outcomeS attack.
rincipal reason for thit iisdgmcfit is that we do not foresee during the neit ten years technological advancei which would sharply alter the strategic balance in thefavor. We have reexamined prospects for mayor advances in systems having important Strategic applications, particularly laserto air and missile defenses and systems for detecting and trailing US hallurvr missile submarines on patrol Wc do not believe that the USSR can acquire significant operational capabilities with such systems io the next ten years. Nevertheless, the scope and vigor of Soviet research and development, particularly in Strategic defensive systems, bear especially close watching In the years abend We believe that we wJI be able to identify newwith potential impact on the strategic balance several years prior to theirin operationally ilgnllicanl numbers.
lthough deterrence will lie maintained, the four alternative projectioni of Soviet forces in this Estimate would result ie.different capabilities- The politicalol each of them would abo be different. Their impact wouldreat deal on how ihey were perceived by the Soviets, by the US. and by other nations. The question of whether the Soviets oblaln aedgeime of crisis, (or example, wii! depend heavily on the degree lo which those involved focus on tbe basic strategic relationship or on appearances, and on the way in which perceptions of strategic forces affect views about the total capabilities and resolve of both sides.
2 represents an arsenal inimage of Soviet strategic powerand no significant increase into the survival of US offensivemateria lire s. This Force might beas meeting minimum Sovietstrategic parity and comparative forceagainst programed US forces.
3 andowever, wouldmore formidable to the US and itsthe, these Forces wouldcurrently programed US forces in allstatic measure* of strategicsome rneasuees they would beMoreover, they would pose aforce threat to Mmutesnan silos. Such forces would notSoviets with the capability toretaliation. If, however, thecould reach these force levelsUS couiitcrefforts greater thanby US programed forces, as notedcould be perceived aa giving thepower in crises or limited nuclearexceeding that of the US.
ur projection of theSoviet force under present politicaland SALT constraints. Is lessthanndlthough it isoverall capabilities to (hose forcesheoviet offensive andforces would give the USSR:
ith the present new Sovietead over the US in most quantitative measures of strategic offensive forces.
, wiih improved or follow-onapability to destroyour.terforcearge percentage of the US Minuteman silos
Top 6*
Top
appearance of overcoming the US lead in such qualitative aspects offorces as MIRV tecluwiogy.
espite these improvements, thewhich the Soviets would race if they contemplated using these forces to attack tho US will remain formidable.
Soviets will be uncertain about the outcome of an attack oo US Minuteman silos and would probablyon-siderable number to survive,
ASW forces will be unable to lo-cate and destroy the.US ballistic ijiissile submarine force at sea.
There will continue to be weaknesses in Soviet defenses .against low-altitude bomber attack.
ABM defenses will be lirnited by treaty to insignificant levels.
Soviet civil defense will be unable to prevent massive casualties andof the economy,
e have projectedt the most likely Soviet program largely on the basis of current evidence, past precedent, andSoviet technological progress. Thecouldrogram likesasis for sustaining roughparity or moving toward eventualover Iheomidering tho history
'The Annual Chief of Staff for InMliiente,of the Army. Ihe Director of Naval Inlelh (ence, Derd.ln.enl of the Navy, and the Assistant Chiel of Staff.epartment of the Air Force believeoe. not representlforl loUihee,nlyduring the time franc of thi. Estimate, toward straiegie lupenorlty.
of Soviet strategic policy and forceprograms, we believerogram likeould be intended by Soviet leaders toariety of purposes
counterbalance the strategic strength of the US, plus Its allies and Ouha.
narrow or close the gap between the US and (he USSR io important weapons technologies.
keep open the possibility of acquiring significant, if only partial, strategicshould US behavior permit,
As indicated above, wc thiol it likely that in the absence of further SAWwrutvaintr, the Soviets will proceedrogram like Forcehe Soviets do not readily recognize that programs tliey deem Important to their security, and their continuing penchant for concealment and deception, can easily be read by the US as threatening Its strategic position and therefore warranting countervailingBy the same token, the Soviets are likely lo perceive such USwell as certain features of present USas deliberately threatening rather thancountervailing.
In the coming years, uncertainties faced by each side in assessing the capabilities of the other's future forces, particularly their qualltative characteristics, will tend to mag. nify more fundamental uncertainties and fears about Ihe other side's strategic objectives. Unlesslrategic environment Ischanged by arms limitationit is likely that the Soviet leaders will continue to believe that the acquisition of more and belter strategic armaments Is their best course.
res mwatfw-
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