-Sewet-
national intelligence analytical memorandum
Soviet Policy Toward Selected Countries of Southern Europe
i HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM AS SANITIZED
-Seorot
5
389
THIS MEMORANDUM IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR Of CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.
THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS, EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT, AS FOLLOWS:
Tho following intelligence organ,laltont participated in lh< preparation ol th* estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the intelligence orgoniiotiont of the Department, of State and Defense, and ihe Nalional Security Aooncy.
Concurring;
The Deputy Director af Central InieOigeiKe representing the CentralAgency
The Director of Intelligence and feieoich representing the Department of State The Director. Defense Intelligence Agency The Director. National Security Agency
Abstaining:
The Special Anitlont to the Secretory of the Treoiury rcpteieniing the Deparimtnt of the Iieoiuiy
The Acting Deputy Aiiniam Adminiifrator far Nahoaal Security, Energy Research and Development Adminittrolion
The AuHlont Director, Federal Bureau af In-wtigeriion
Alto Participating!
The Aitiuont Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Oireetar of Naval Inleligence, Department ol the Navy
The Xwlwon. Chief af Staff, Indigence. Deportment of the Air Fare-
f
PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS
PROBLEM
I. INTRODUCTION
II. FACTORS UNDERLYING SOVIET
Soviet Opportunitfai
Complications and Limitation*
The Balance
POLICY IN INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES
Turkey
Ccwee
Ittly
Yugoslavia
Portugal
SOVIET POLICY
1:
SOVIET POLICY TOWARD SELECTED COUNTRIES OF SOUTHERN EUROPE
PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS
'i naeee Agency believes thfe Fituoate gtvc, loo much eoiphaiii lo tin reatxatats on Soviet polity and to tho cantta*will employ lalih dovdopenenu la wulbern Europe. US pobfyittm dtould not bt led to piece too natchiketkel (he USSR wfflnodcrate coune ta (be area out of lw of ioterfertnK "with lit carefully budt relation) with central Europe end with ther of prodpiiafln,!kitiuI* Toe explollaMoo of pro-CoaunuaM. pro-Soviet, and anti-US. anti-NATO tirade i= that area would be dlroctty ai line with pronary Soviet forrtfn poke*it. tuch trend) wouldmprove tbelr relative power potttlonii the reeii .and thetempo of the deletion tin* economic and political tlluaUon la toutacni Europe will eoccwrai* the Soviets to adopt itiunau pcaariea, even at aorae rkk ofhich, ta any caae, would be toco ht Mow. aa aultimatelyto pieaerve the present lyitero. The AnbUtl Chief of Staff, IntoHiftenee, Department ofAll I'*tMCe il.K' view.
A. The changes o( regimes In Portugal and Greece, the continuing gains of the Italian Communists, and the Cyprus situation haveboth opportunities and problems for the Soviet Union, Theperceive these changes as creating problems for the US position in Europe, and possibly the Middle East, and hence as relative gains for themselves. At the same time, southern Europe isrimary focus of Soviet policy, and Moscow does not want efforts to expand its influence there to interfere with its carefully built relations with central Europe and with the US.
of regional contradictions and their ownobjectives, the Soviets do not now have, nor are theydevelop, an integrated, all-embracing policy for this region.have fashioned (heir policyountry-by-couniry basis,on iheir strategic interests and giving current prioritygood relations with those in power.
supports the growth of Communist forces in thisand hopes to see them come to power ultimately. But it hasinclination to commend moderate policies to the indigenousparties. This line stems primarily from hard-headedabout risks, both in terms of stimulating localand jeopardizing Soviet policy in areas of greater interestEurope and the US.
Soviet Union's primary interest in Cyprus is toestablishment of any permanent Turkish or Creek base thatused by US or NATO forces. But the Soviets value theirboth Creecc and Turkey and will not allow Cyprus to becomeof their policy in the eastern Mediterranean. Whileto profit from the turmoil on the island and in NATO, there isthe Soviets could realistically do if Cyprus moves toward apartition.
is of considerable strategic importance to theof US use of Turkish territory and the value to theUnion of the Turkish Straits and the country's air space. Inopportunities and pressures generated by Cyprus.shown no sign of abandoning its patient cultivation of Ankara.this policy to continue.
political change in Greece hasain for theof the accompanying tensions in US-Creek relations andOn the negative side, they recognize that Karamanlis istoorkable Creek relationship with WesternSoviets have somewhat more long-term opportunity fornow that the Creek Communists can operate overtly. InMoscow will seek to strengthen its ties with theand to hold out the prospect of some support on Cyprus.
C. For the Soviets, the dynamic clement in the Italian situation is the prospect that the Italian Communists will directly participateovernment in fame, Moscow wants (his toslowly, lest the PCI fall victimharp rightist reaction, or excessive alarm be generaled among Italy's neighbors and allies. The USSR probably could not dissuade the PCI fromoalition if the party wereto do so.
Yugoj/auia, the USSR will continue to maintain theof correct relations with Belgrade while it does whattoapability to influence events after Tito goes.of direct Soviet force to bring Yugoslavia back into its campIf. however, Yugoslavia began to drift westward, andreakdown in central authorily, then the oddsalthough Ihey would still be against direct Soviet intervention.
Soviets are pleased with what has happened inthe key role being played by the PortugueseThey endorse the Portuguese Communist Party's effort toitselfesponsible force that denounces leftist extremismnot press the issue of Portugal's NATO membership andbase. Moscow is anxious about the possibilityightistwhich it would have no choice but to accept, and is likelycontinued caution in the pursuit of Communist power.
ew Middle East war. another Creek-Turkish crisis, andeconomic dislocation in southern Europe are three contingencies over the next year or so that might upset this prognosis. The first would probacy result in further strains between the US and the southern European countries, which would benefit the Soviet Union, butnot fundamentally alter its position in theustained Arab oil embargo wouldore far-reaching impact. The Soviets will use any new Creek-Turkish crisis to strengthen their positionin Ankara, but Moscow will continue toecondary role to the US. As for an economic depression, the Soviets are kltxilogically committed to welcoming this prospect and will extract what advantages they can from it. At the same time, they perceive political dangers in the situation, and for the immediate future their policy will probably not be designed to magnify economic instability Ineep and prolonged depression would lead the Soviets to recalculate.
PROBLEM: To assess Sov.et policy over the next year or so toward the changing situation in the region including Turkey Cyprus, Greece, Yugoslavia, Holy, and Portugal.
INTRODUCTION
umber of changes have taken place within iheear in southern Europe that have raised fresh questions concerning Soviet policy toward the region. The change of regimes in Portugal and Greece, the outbreak ol* hostilities on Cyprus, ami the increased strength and influence of the Italian Communist Party have all put additional pressure* on the NATO alliance and have contributedense ot malaise, and even incipient crisis, within the West. These events coincide with widespread economic dislocation and political change in the International conununlty. They also coincide wilh. and owe somethingidespread sense In Europe that the Soviet military threat has dimin-nhed and that indigenous Communist pearliesegitimate part of the political landscape
The Soviet Union has notator actor In events In southern Europe, and the area itself has notrune objective In Soviet foreign policy considers boos. The Soviets are deficient In 'ihe traditional levers of influence In ihe region. Up to now Soviet policy has been largely reactive, seeking lo use events to win new friends without losing old ones, to complicate US policy without milking serious commitments, and to play the rolereat power whose desires ought and must be taken into account.
oscow Is, however, aware of the intimate relationship between events in southern Europe and Its larger interests in the Middlo East and Europe, Disarray in the region and any diminution ol US influenceelative increase in the Influence of the Soviet Union there, llestrictlons on the use of bases in southern Europe by USto support Israel, for example, tend to weaken the US position in the Middle East and potentially strengthen the influence of the USSR. Over the longer haul, the Soviets hope to take advantage of any increased US or NATO weakness in southern Europeressew arrangement regarding the overall political balance in Europe.
he problem for Moscow Is that attempts to make gains in an area UVe southern Europe may be charged against its detente account. The Soviets do not want developments in southern Europe to compromise their carefully wrought policy of
fcT,
a political understanding in ooultal Europe, or add an additional burden to the itiil uncertain accommodation ol interests between the US and the USSR. Soviet policy io sou than Europe thus has an intrinsic ambivalence that tends to rob II of any driving imperative.
IL FACTORS UNDERLYING SOVIET POUCY Soviet Opportunities
n relating their policy In southern Europe to the changing environment in the region and to their general line the Soviets, as elsewhere, place strategic interests lint Soviet interests regarding the dissolution of NATO and the manipulation of the Middle East situation to diminish US influence ate manifest in Soviet relations with southern Europe. Their policyis Turkey, for example, is designed to reduce US influence and military presence there, at well as to protect Soviet rights in the Turkish Strafts end to be able to use Turkeyridge to Soviet-supported regime* in the Middleheir primary concern in Cyprus is to ensure that no US or NATO bases arethere. The Soviets would also see again if Crcecc. Portugal, and Italy restricted their roles in or pulled out of NATO, or limited the use of air and naval facilities by US forces. They might also hope that the fractiortaliiation of NATO on the soul hem flank would spread to tire rest of the alliance.
' Apprixirrutelyercent of Soviet inn rJeltveriesMiddle East. dVW (odps* after the Octobervt.of these ehxrrJtr
H overflew Yuf*UVia; the remsindej ovnTiew
fl. While Soviet policy is driven by strategic and securityhe Soviets also see broader political advantage to what is happening in tin-region.-The Soviets point, for example, to events in Portugal as evidence that their detente policy helps create conditions which are congenial to the development of "progressive" forces in the world. This has internal political benefiti for theof the current foreign policy line, as well as bringing advantages in the International Conv munist arena.
oscow has an interest in seeing leftist and Communistin Yugoslavia, more Soviet-orienteda position ofor power in the countries of southern Europe Although these forces might not act as Moscow's clients, they would be tougher on the US than elements of the center or the right. They would be more susceptible to penetration by those who are under Moscow's control or strong influence; they would be more likely to see eye to eye with Moscow oa the proper rcUtionship between their country and the Soviet Union than would dements of the center or right In short, leftist regimes would generally give the Soviets somewhat more latitude, more room for maneuver than they frequently have had.
Complications and Limitations
fl. This does not mean that the coming to power of leftist forces would be without problems for the Soviets. Various Communist parties, mostthe PCI in Italy, tend to be independent of Moscow and create difficulties for the Soviets within the world Communist movement Similar tendencies would almost certainly emerge among other Communist parties as they began to achieve positions of power within their own countries. Mm cover, the very fact of their being Communists or leftists would Impose burdens on Moscow thai do not exist when the Soviets are dealing withof the center or right Moscow might feel Itself under some obligation not to drive asargain on state-to-state matters as Otherwise For example, it woulderious embarrassmentoviet-supported regime to be ousted,if it were because of Soviet failure tn provide support
OSoviets would also have to weigh their support for a. leftward rnovement in this area
S
the potential damage it might cause to their policy elsewhere in Europe and in the US. The West would tend to resist and act against any significant development that seemed to favor Soviet interests- Any ol the followingCommunist government in Portugal, Communist participationoalition inro-Soviet swing in Belgrade, the appearance of Soviet Inroads inrevive latent fears about the Soviet threat to Europe, and might serve toarder line on the part of NATO states.
These drawbacks will not keep the Soviets from supporting leftist elements in the region ot from using their assets to promote Soviet interests. They will, however, tend to cool Soviet ardor and to reinforce Moscow's other reasons for going slow. Among the most important of these is thatand parties that are not antagonistic to theUnion are frequentlyeak and exposedLn Creece, Turkey andThe Soviets themselves openly acknowledge live dangerightist reaction in countries like Portugal, or even Italy; the Chilean precedent weighs heavily on Soviet thinking.
Despite Moscow's detente policy, and itsto appear as nothing moreriendly neighbor, the Soviet Union is Mill feared and looked on with suspicion by (lie Turks, Creeks, Yugoslavs, and many Italians. This limits Moscow's options, making it mote difficult for the Soviets to takeof the fissures in the relations hip of Creece, Turkey, and Italy to the US and to each other. More broadly, it tends to place limits onasic shift in Ihe orientation of those countries, to make for prudence in the conduct of Soviet policy toward tho regime.
n addition, the intrinsic politicalin this region make it particularly difficult for the Soviets tooherent policy. On Cyprus, ihe Soviets are trying toight-rope between the Creeks and the Turks, but have satisfied neither and cannot satisfy both. In the Balkans, an increase in Soviet influence in Creece would make themore nervous about the future and might cause Belgrade to look for some reassurances from the West Any major Soviet gains in Yugoslavia would almost certainly alarm the Creeks and Turks and drive them closer to theimilar kind ofwould probably be made In Italy, where tho PCl's domestic position would be complicated. In Creece, elements within the Army and the present government might be sufficiently aroused to move against the left, even at the expense of the new con sututjooal order.
The Balance
ecent changes In southern Europe havetlte Soviet positionew years ago, when Moscow had almost no capability tothe policy of countries of southern Europe. From the Soviet perspective, however, the balance in southern Europe still favors the US. Although NATO is in trouble In the area and Communist parties are making gains. NATO still provides the organizational framework for the areaorum In which the governing regimes can share problems and solutions with each oilier and with the US. Tho Soviets- have no similar base on which tooordinated area policy. Moreover, in viewtrong residue of anti-Soviet sentiment in the region, il is unlikely that Moscow can seriously entertain the substitution of its own organizational or. like the Asian security concept, notional idea of aarrangement for ihe area under discussion. Its proposaluclear-free Mediterranean has aroused scant interest in the area. It is still to tho US and the West that the peoples of this areaturn to meet their security and economic needs. Under these circumstances, the bias Inpolicy wdl be toward dealing with the countries on an individual basis.
III. SOVIET POLICY IN INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES
Cyprus
The Soviei Union'i primary inleteat in Cyprus is to forestall the establishment of any permanent Turkish or Creek base that could be used by US or NATO forces. For this reason. Moscow strongly supports the Makartos government and supports an irKicpcndent and nonaligned Cyprus For thisthe Soviets have been against roosu and nowederated solution that divides the islandeak central government. The Soviets fear thatederation would leade facto partition that might end upig-leaf version of double enorir, opening the possibility of new foreign bases on tho island.
These concerns arc not urgent The Soviets have had little trouble accomxnodating to theof British bases. Moreover. Soviet military forces, including naval forces in the Mediterranean, were used with restraint when Makwtos was ousted, and even when therehreat of war between Greece and Turkey. The events of4 also demonstrated that Moscow, despite itswith the Cypriot Communists, could not exert much direct leverage on the Cyprus situation.
Although Moscow has weighed in with both Athens and Ankara in supportnified andCyprus, the Soviets have not pressed their case. They do not want to jeopardise (lie possibility ofetter relationship with the new Greek government. More important, neither do they wish to compromise their long-term goal of mitigating the anti-Soviet character of Turkish policy.ot allowing Cyprus lo be the fulcrum of its pohcy in the eastern Mediterranean.
Moscow appreciates that turmoil on Cyprus makes problems for the US and NATO, and tlx?have, of course, tried to profit from theTheir propaganda has referred darkly to "NATO forces" as the instigators of the fall ofand they have warned the Arabs that Israel and its friends would attempt to use the island in support of another Middle East war. They have peddled misinformation about Turkish and Western intentions and have sought to lay the foundationuture Soviet role on the island, for example by offering to help reestahlish civil air traffic to Cyprus. Moscow has also consistently argued that new international guarantees for Cyprus arealong with new guarantors which implidtly would include the Soviet Union. TheN-sponsored conference on Cyprus and Ilichev's tour through the area In4 were designed to give the impression that thecould and should play an important role in determining the future of Cyprus.
ideal circumstances for the Soviets,solution will be found for Cyprusthe island is rulednifiedno foreign bases, and backstopped byincluding the Soviet Union. The Sovietsfor this outcome, but they will not putmuscle behind their effort. If theup partitioned, with Turkey and Greecesignificant roles in the Turkish and CreekMoscow will accept the setback andtry to dissuade either country frombases on the island.
Turkey
is the only country underthis paper thatxwder with theNot cotocidentally. itoreof conflict and rivalry with itsthan does Italy or Crtece or evenFor reasons of geography. Turkey is ofstrategic interest to the USSR: theare the Soviet Union's link to theTurkish air space bar been used bya bridge to its friendly regimes in theand the Soviets hope to expand theirof Turkish territory for ground access to Syria.
ince the. Moscow hasubstantial effort to better relations with Ankara. In pursuit of this policy, Moscow has given substantial economic aid, it has promoted increased trade and cultural ties; and it has pushed, uiuuccess-fuily thus far,riendship and ronaggression treaty. Turkey stilltrong commitment to NATO and still fears and dislikes the Russians. But Moscow has made some progress in smoothing out some of the rough edges in the relstionship. During7 Cyprus crisis Moscow gave strong support to the Turkish position. More recently, it wasdisposed to former Prime Minister Eeevit.bis tougher rhetoric about US installations and his commitment to state economic enterprises. It reaped some of the reward during the October Middle East war, when the Turks, with an eye to their standing with the Arabs, did not strenuously object to overflights by Soviet aircraft carryingsupplies.
Given these gains, Moscow has beento offend the Turks by openly opposing their actions on Cyprus. Although the Soviets are not pleased with the thrust of Turkish policy on Cyprus and have privately made it clear to Ankara that they arc opposede facto partition of Cyprus, they evidently have made no threats to cut off economic assistance or to take more eitrcmc measures.probably calculates that such threats would not work and that, besides, Washington would eventually be compelled to use its leverage to press Ankara to limit its objectives on the island
The Soviets* Cypriot policy has nevertheless lost them some points in Turkey, but the losses are cscarfy manageable, Moscow is not going toits objective of maintaining good relations with Ankara because of anything that happens on Cyprus or even by the prospect of major gains in Creece. Nor is an abrupt change likely to come from the Turkish side, but over time, if US aid is actually cut. an erosion of the US-Turkish relationship is likely. On the other hand, the Turks' commitment to NATO and to security arrangements with the US may be reinforced, if it looks as though theand indirectly Moscow, are making inroads elsewhere in the Mediterranean littocaL
Greece
Creece Is not as strategically important to Moscow as Turkey, and the implied pressures on it liavc been less strong. Nevertheless, the Soviets have sought toloser bilateral relationship, to attenuate Creek apprehension of the Soviet Union, and to woo the Creeks slowly from NATO and the US. Tliey have had little success in Athens, partly because the Greek military had been rigidly anti-Communijt and partly because the Creeks could afford to be less solicitous of the Soviets.
The circumstances that brought Karamanlis Into power created tensions in US-Creek relations and exacerbated divisions within the NATOthisain for the Soviets. But while the military government was difficult for Moscow to deal with, it unintentionally promoted one offurtlter Greece's estrangement from the West. Karamanlis is more acceptable to the West and will be better able toreece veilh restored dernocratic iristitutiora backloser relationship with (lie West.
oscow sees some new opportunities for the Creek Communist Party (KKE) now that, for the first time since the civil war. it can operate overtly in Creece. The Soviets heavily financed the electoral activity of the external (pro-Soviet) faction of the KKE, but the badly divided Communists did poorly in the voting. Moscow will urge tlie KKE to exercise restraint and to build for the future.
n the meantime. Moscow will seek to strengthen Its ties with the new government in Athens. The Soviets will urge Greece to withdraw completely from NATO and to cut back or even end the use of Creek territory by US forces. How-
ever, the Soviets ate unlikely to give Athens enough support on the Cyprus question to win anyimproved standing in Crcece. Thegovernment will not offend the Sovietsand If anti-US sentiment grows it may be under pressure to attempt to use the prospectoviet connection to gain some leverage with the US. If thb happens, tho Soviets will be cautiously responsive.
Italy
n the governmental level, Soviet policyItalyonventional mis of cultivatingties, seeking common diplomatic viewpoints, and developing economic relations. The dynamic element in the situation is the Italian Communist Party, whose increased strength and influence opens the prospect that the PCI will directly participateovernment inn the negative side, the Soviets fear that PCI participation, or aassertive role by the Communists, would leadight-wing reaction that would upsetassiduously built bilateral relations with Italy. The Soviets are also worried that such participation could harden altitudes toward the USSR elsewhere in Western Europe and complicate relations with the US. The impact would be greater if theCommunists appeared to be in the driver's seat in Lisbon.
On the plus side, Moscow would sec some political benefit in what would be widely perceivedetback to US policy in Europe, and would expect to find more common ground between Soviet and Italian foreign policy. The PCI Iswith Moscow applauding in thein against any increased use of Italian territory by the US or NATO. The party will almost certainly bo in the forefront of those arguing on economic grounds that Italy cannot afford to meet its NATO -obligations.
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Soviets are ambivalent about theand intra -Commuiuit rami Ileal ions ofIf the PCI acted with restraintsense of responsibility, its participationwould help bring respectabilityparties in Europe and elsewhere-argument that detente has provided aenvironment for the achievement ofCommunist parties Would obviously beOn the other hand, the Soviets maythat the maverick voice of the PCImore weight in internationalwhile Moscow's already weak InfluenceItalian Communist* would be further reduced.
its reservations, Moscow couldto be seen opposing the entry of thethe Italian government. Moreover, thenot dissuade the PCI from entering aif the party were determined to do so.
Yugoslovio
Moscow views Yugoslaviaerspective quite different from that which it applies to the Other countries discussed In this paper. Indeed, the Yugoslavnique In Soviet foreign policy,n part ideological, in part emotional,part geopolitical, and always intensely historical.he apostate to be shown the error of its ways and returned to theugoslavia that again embraced the USSR would realfirm, for the instruction of Communists everywhere, the correctness of Ihe Soviet view of the world.
To some extent Moscow (till viewssingular interpretation ofits obstinate independence of the Soviet Union, and its espousal of third-world nonalignmentontagion that threatens Soviet hegbmony in Eastern Europe. But to theears that have passed since Tito made his break, the Soviets have leamcd to Isolate the disease and to treat the symptoms while they searchrophylaxis. The abhorrence of thetill there, but thettenuated.
9
In addition lo the political consugoslavia realigned with the Warsaw Pact would strengthen that organization, and the Soviets would see military advantages in having guaranteed use of Yugoslavia airspace, airfields, and its Adriatic ports. Nonetheless, it is unlikely that Moscow would SO value Yugoslavia's realignment to pay the price in money, men, and damage to Soviet interest in the Third World, in Europe and in thean intervention by Soviet armed forces-'
The balance sheet would look differentost-Tito Yugoslavia seemed to be moving toward alignment with the West. This would poseproblems for the Soviets, would give them concern about possible reverberations to Romania, and might eventrategic spectrethe use of Yugoslav territory to threaten the USSR itself. If this westward drift coincidedreakdown in central authority in Yugoslavia, then the odds would shorten, although they would still be against direct Soviet intervemion.*
While military force is unlikely, Moscow will use other means to try to bring Yugoslavia into line after Tito gocs-P
T
l the same time, in their official relations the Soviets have been tryingeneration to gain their objectives in Yugoslavia withoutto heavy-handed pressure. There have been ups and downs In the relationship, but these have been due as much to Tito's sensitivities and to Ihe uprising In Hungary6 and the invasionof Czechoslovakias to Moscow's mal-adroitness and use of Stalinist tactics In Yugoslavia
' Seefter
itself. The trend has been running in favor of less antagonistic, although still not cordial, relations.
*}TJto has resumed his cautioustiml>er of high-level visits have taken place!"
^and Brezhnev may visit Belgrade shortly. Tito's purpose seems dear enough; he wants to minimize the risk of the Soviets doing anything rash after he leaves the scene byositive atmosphere between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union.
Soviets hope to bend these efforts lopurposes, and they will work bard toback into their orbit after Titoare not likely to be deterred by tlte facthere would complicate their prospectsIn the region. Their specifle actions willprimarily on the degree of internalYugoslavia and theI elimination of itskeep the Soviets at arms length. Otherthe balance of forces in Europe andof detente, will alsoole.
Portugal
happens inikely toinfluence well beyond the Iberianof tlx' role being played by thethere. Portugal It likely to be regarded asfor the communists in Europe, as welltest for Soviet policy. For example, thecould pointuccessfulin Portugal toid for athe action in Italy, or conversely, the PCI'scould gain new determination lo keepConuminists out of the govemmonl inIheir Portuguese comrades have actedor have made an extralegal bid formay also end upest of USof Washington's resourcefulness andin rruuntaining live Western alliance, and ofsinews under changing circurmtances.
The Soviets art clearly pleased wiih ihc turn of events in Portugal. Taken hy surprise, Moscow was nonetheless quick to sec the opportunities: in six weeks diplomatic relations were established wtth Lisbon,umber of routine bilateral agreements followed. For Moscow, thechanges imparted substance to its developing ideological line regarding the crisis of capitalism and the opportunities created by the USSR'sof tension policy. But, more important, an ascendant left would threaten Portugal's ties to NATO and could terminate US base rights in the Azores. Developments in Portugal could also have an impact on Spain, whicheadership change that could lead to internal conflicts which might tn turn present opportunities for the Soviets.'
The full potential of the Portuguese situation can be realized only if the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) becomes Indispensable or at least very influential In whatever government finally Cmarges in Lisbon. Thereood chance of thatThe PCPelatively large number of members and sympathizers centered in the capital It is better organized and apparently better led than any other party in Portugal It has sulntantiil influencenot controllabor group* nnd the media. Most important of all. it seems to have some influence within the ruling Armed Forces Movement.
Moscow can be encouraged by the fact that the PCP has been among its most loyal supporters in the international movement. Its leader. Alva CunhaL almosteceptive to advice, although perhaps not orders, from Moscow. In hb new situation, however, he may find that the Soviets need him mora and can do less for him than when hb party was underground.
Soviets have probably given moneyPortuguese Communbts, but they have taken
some care to remain relatively inconjpicuous in
r
Portugal. They have apparently urged the PCP to present itselfoderate force thatleftist extremism and does not press the issues of Portugal's NATO membership and the Azores bases at the present time. The Soviets seem totrong rightist reaction, similar to what happened in Chile. Io addition. Moscow wants to avoid creatingn its relations with Western Europe and the US. In tins vein. Cunhal's ministerial visit to Moscow in late October was handled with restraint. Theevidently turned down hb request for wheat, and Podgorny's reference lo the USSR doingan economically for Portugal "within ibsuggests that Moscow has no present in tentkm of underwriting the Portuguese economy. Moscow's beat bet soems to be to refrain from forcing the pace of events that seem to be run ning generally in its favor; it also wants to avoid too close an identification with what may end uposing cause.
IV. FUTURE SOVIET POLICY
Soviets will continue to seekio thii region. Mindful of theindigenous pro-Soviet elements, they will beto jeopardize their hard-won gainsregimes in power by strong, overt supporton the left. The Soviets will probablyhave it both
^Jlf the Comrmirusts in Portugal or Italy acquireda major share of formal power, the USSR's chief initial concern would be to see these gains consolidated, rather than exploitedigor whicheversal.
Soviets will be dbinclined toappearanceomino phenomenon inEurope, regardless of bow inapplicablemay be in this area. They will notin the area and outside, to perceivein these terras, lest individual gains for
cccncr
forces in one country arousereactions in another. Moscow probablythat long-run trends In llie area areto its cause, but that care is needed to manage the process. Otherwise, internal opposition forces might mobilize themselves and externalthe West Europeans and particularly thenot only intervene energetically in the area but draw negative conclusions about their own relations with the USSR.
The region will of course be affected by trends and events independent of Soviet actions, as will Soviet policy itself. In this connection, three foreseeable possibilities are another Arab-Israeli war, another Creek-Turkish crisis,eepening global economic crisis.
In the aftermath of the3 war, most of the countries of Western Europe have moved closer to the Arab side. Another round of lighting would give this process further Impetus, and US efforts to use European facilities to resupply Israel would meet with greater resistance thanhe ensuing strains would fray bilateral relations with the US; in the Yugoslav case, Del-grade's active involvement in the resupply of the Arabs wouldimilar result. The Arabs, with Soviet support, might reimposc an oil embargo which could have severe effects in Europe,icularly In Italy. These developments would not necessarily create opportunities for Soviet action, but they would damage US influence and thereby improve the USSR's relative position.
As in the past, Moscow would probably not welcome the complications inherentew Greek-Turkish crisis. If. however, there 'were renewed trouble over Cyprusevival of the Greek-Turkish dispute over offshore oil in the Aegean Sea, the Soviets would see some advantages toThey would expect further strains in NATO and in US relations with the two adversaries, which
L7" 3
in the case of Turkey might even affect USdeployed there against So-
viet targets. Tney probably would press again for broadened international consideration of theandirect role for the USSR. The Soviets might even cooperate with the US to that end. In the more likely event that the rncdiating burden fell to the US, Moscow would try to position itself to win points wilh whichever of the twofelt itself treated badly. Moscow's bias will continue to be with Turkey, and it would bealert to opportunities to drive wedgesWashington and Ankara. It would be less willing to take Ankara's side on the Aegean dispute if the Turks were dearly to be the aggressor. In the case of Cyprus, Moscow's prime aim would be to preserve the island's independence and neutrality.
The countries considered in this study are vulnerable in varying ways to the current economic decline Turkey, Creece, Yugoslavia, and Portugal, while protected to some extent by low levels of development, arc suffering from trade problems and the unwanted return of workers from WesternItaly's difficulties are more severe. Moscow views these problems as evidence of the superiority of the Communist economic system and Iscommitted to welcoming their appearance. But at the same rime it has emphasized the dangers, as well as the opportunities, that they create for the Soviet Union and Communist parties in Europe. Soviet officials are now recalling that the economic and social disruption of the Inter-war period led to fascism. They also argue that further economicwould cause the countries of Western Europe to be more, not less, dependent on die US.
Such fears find concrete expression incurrent advice to the Communist parties of Europe to work domestically to lessen, rather than aggravate, economic disruptions.eep and prolonged depression would lead the Soviets tofor the immediate future their policy will probably not be designed to magnify economicin Europe.
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h for Ih* Information ond IM ol the recipient ond of pcnom Under hh (uTBlficIbA on O
bow. Additional eueniiol diueminarion may be cwrhorjied by the follow-Ing officloJi within their mpnahtr department*:
o. Director of Intelligence ond Research, for the Department of State b. Director, Dof.m* Intelligence Agency, for the Office of ihe Secretary of Defame and tho organisation of the Joint Chief, of Staff
c Aueta* CMef of Stoff for lMell.gen<e. Department of the Amry, for the Department of the Army
4 Director of Navalor the Department of the Merry
Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, for the Deportment of the Air
Force
Administrator lor National Security, Energy RoMorcIi and Develop-
ment Admit
Director, FBI, for Ihe Federal Bureau of Investigation
of NSA. for the Notional Security Agency
L Special Assistant to Ihe Secretory of the Treasury, for ihe Department of the Treasury
he DO'i Deputy for Notional Intelligence Officers, for any otheror Agency
Thh document may be retained, or deitroyed by burning In accordance with applicable securityr returned fa the Central Intelligence Agency by arrangement wtrh ihe DO'i Deputy lor National intelligence Officer*.
When thortteminotcd overseas, the overMoa recipients nayeriod not la exceu of one year. At the end of thh period, the document ihouid either be destroyed, returned to the forwarding agency, orshould be requested of the forwarding agency ton oocordonce
The tMe of thh document when used mparatety from tho tot should bo das-ilfWi JOfl eWflCIAt-tJGC-OHW-
Original document.
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