-Tot-Sceret-
Interagency Intelligence Report
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM JtBJEASEASSANlTIZED
A Soviet Land-Mobile ICBM: Evidence of Development and Considerationsecision on Deployment
4
A SOVIET LAND-MOBILE ICBM: EVIDENCE OF DEVELOPMENT AND CONSIDERATIONSECISION ON DEPLOYMENT
CONTENTS
P-g*
CANDIDATES FOR LAND-MOBILE ICBM DEVELOPMENT
LIGHT TEST
EVIDENCEOBILE VERSION OF THE6
Planned Production
Development of Equipmentobile ICBM
Activity at
Heav> Investment in tbe
SALT 17
POSSIBLE DEPLOYMENT
Road-Mobde and Olf-Road Mobile... 19
Shelter-Based and Rail-Mobile19
FACTORS AFFECTING THE SOVIET DECISION TO DEPLOY A
LAND-MOBILE ICBM
Incentives lor Deployment22
' terations Militating Against 22
POSSIBLE SIZE OF THE
ANNEX
ANNEX D:
C:ACTORS AFFECTING DEPLOYMENT
OF LAND-MOBILE ICBM
FIGURES
Page
I. Map ol USSR: Test Centers. Assembly Facility andaunch
2light Test
lesetsk: Map ol Launch Sites Related to6
5 PWelsk: Unusualailcari
^JL Artiit'i Concept of Mobile ICBM Unit
^TT USSR: Population Density and30
SSR Areas Suitable for OW-Road Deployment ol Land-Mobile
ICBMs 30
A SOVIET LAND-MOBILE ICBM: EVIDENCE OF DEVELOPMENT AND CONSIDERATIONSECISION ON DEPLOYMENT
PREFACE
This Interagency Intdhgence Report was prepared by trie Central Intelligence Agency withf the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the intelligenceof the Departments of Slate. Air Force. Navy, and Army.
The report was prepared at the request of the National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs. The analytical and draftingwere carried out by an interagency working group under theof CIA.
The study presents and analyzes the evidence that points to the developmentoviet land-mobile ICBM. and examines thethat seem likely toecision on deployment ofystem. The report is based on information available as of October
SUMMARY
We believe that the Soviets areew land-mobile ICBM and thai the best candidate is the solid-propellanthisis based on the following major areas of evidence:
Planned production of largo numbers ofCBMs.
Development of equipment for theimilar to lhat used by previous land-mobile systems.
Association of haunch sites at Plesetsk. previously used withsystems, wilh therogramround support equipment (CSE) (est program at Plesetsk that employsconcealment.
Expenditure of considerable resources toew missileseemingly illogical commitment if ihe missile were just to replace theissiles in theorce.
Development of the mobile version of theas beenan unprecedented concealment effort at the Plesetsk missile
"]of Iheo ICBM rangeobile launch platform may HOI Vrl have occurred, although testing of associated ground support equipment appears to be under way. If testingobile version begins in the near future, the Soviets probably would have their first mobilenits ready for deployment
The Soviets may have decided toersion of iheobile ICBM to have ready for deploymenthen the Interim Agreement expires. Whether the Sovietsobile ICBM probably hinges on the negc<iauons at SALT and on theof (he missile program
Assuming the Soviets do decide toobile version of thehey could easily deploy about :W> launcheis7 andn ihe fieldore threatening strategicthey might beginear earlier,ith aboutaunchers and could build up the force loaunchers by
2
ttmt*
A land-mobileould be deployed in any of several possible modes, bul ihe acliviiy at the test range suggests (lie Soviets arelx>th road- and off-road-mobile concepts for dmobile units could be rotated among various prcsurveyed fixed-field sites or unprepared positions, perhaps as far asilesupport base. Existing Strategic Rocket Force or possibly Ground Forcecould be used as support leases.
The Soviets probably sec developmentobile ICBMedgeossible lapse of the Interim Agreement,otentialchip for future agreements, andrudent moveffset the effect of the increased accuracy of US missiles. Deploymentobile ICBM would Increase the survivability of the Soviel ICBM force.
INTRODUCTION
The Soviets hive been interests! in bod-mobiie strategic ballistic missiles since, but they have yet to deployhe four land-mobile missiles tested, only theactical short-range Liquid-pro-pellant missile received wide deployment. TheBBM was deployed in smaller num-bori, and programs for two longer-rangeIheHBM and thended in0 prior to deployment.
During tbe, when thendere under development, the Soviets made numerous references In their military press to land-mobile missiles, frequently hinting that mobile medium- and inter continental-range ballistic missiles were already deployed with the Strategic Rocket Foiceslie press articles consistently emphasized lhat Soviet Und-mobile missiles
would be:
fueled by solid propellants, which would give them quick reaction time;
comparatively small; and
practically invulnerable, because they would be highly maneuver able, would
change position frequently, and could be easily camouflaged.
6 and againarshal N. I. Krylov, then commander in chief of the SRF. said that the attention of Soviet science was being concentrated on the development of mobile missiles. In8 statement, Krylov also said that tb* Soviets had solved thisIn general, statements made by SRF officers tended to suggest that mobile missilesbeing deployed, while statements made by non-SRF ollicers tended to emphasize the development of mobile missiles.
In other articles, the Soviets wrotehree-stage, solid-propcilant ICBMthehat could be fired both from silos and from mobile launch platforms-Soch statements declined in frequencylthough as recently1 General S. S. Maryakhin, then chief of Rear Services for the Soviet Armed Forces, claimed that the SRF was becoming increasingly mobile and invulnerable.
judgment is that the Sovietsa new land mobile ICBM under
lap 6ef
FOR IAND-MOBILE ICUM DEVELOPMENT
here is, al present, one good candidatehis missilehree-stage ICBM, one version of which almost certainly iv intended to replace the SSCBM force, which is deployed inilos at the YoshUrOIa ICBM oomple. (seeor map of pUcehes undergoing flight testing al the Plesetsk missile and space center. It uses solid propcllants andeat-boost vehicle suitable lor dispensing MIRVs. To date Iheas been tested onlyngle RV.
he Soviets alto have underanother solid-propellant missileQ
"Jsug-
gests that it is an IHBM and not an TCBM. Its intended deployment mode and maximum are unknown.
LIGHT TEST PROGRAM
ince Ihe first launch from Plesetsk inheas been test flownimes,imes successfully (seehe last ten launches were conducted at night, suggesting that the Soviets wanted to prevent the US from observing launch activity. After only four tesl Mights2 there was an
irii-ri
l. Test Centers. Assembly Facility andaunch Complex
art
OfmHf Figurelight Tesl Program
month hiutus in the program/^
^indicates
the Soviets modified the missile oaring this period Moreover
Revealed significantcontrol problems
>
a sing
he missile was flight tested only sir timeshe pace of theest program has acceleratedithaunches as of
LA silo based version of Iheingle RV could be ready
e have no firm evidence that theas been launchedobileWe believe that the majority ofaunches have come fromilos.l"
^we cannot rule out the possibility that some of theests were for lhe mobile mode option
e wouldull series ofperhaps foi one to twocheck out the mobile otttiin) before the system could be
lirst seven ivits of the
CItiiiii.
OBILE VERSION OF THE6
vidence to support the existenceobile option in tberogram falls into four major areas:
Planned production of large numbers ofCBMs.
Figurelesetsk: Launch. Sites Related torogram
Development of equipment for theimilar to that used by previous mobile systems.
Association of launch sitesreviously' used with mobileherogramround support equipment (CSE) test program at Plesetsk that employs extensive
Expenditure of considerable resources toew misuse developmentseemingly illogical commitment il the missile weiu just to replace theorce.
^wc believe lhat the bulk of evidence indicates that production beyond that needed to replace theas destinedoliie- version of the system.
r
Production
jL
7
top-fa
Figurelesetsk: Launch Sites Related torogram
Development of equipment for theimilar to that used by previous mobile systems.
Association of launch sites at Plesetsk. previously used with mobile systems, wilh tlierogramround
TOP SECRET BUf-F
believe lhat the bulk olindjcftTcs (hat production beyond that needed to replace theas destinedobile version ol the.
-
support equipment (GSE) test program at llcsetsk that employs extensive con-
cealment.
Istpeudituie of considerable resources loew missile developmentseemingly illogical commitment il the missile were gust tu replace rhcorce.
Planned Production
I3J
L
Development of Equipmentobile ICBM
The same types of equipment associated with the mobileRBM are abowith thef theere intended only lo replace theuch of this equipment would not be needed. The Soviets haveiberglassolly to move the canister,ad flafcar to transport it
A launch canister probably would be needed to fiie thoobileTheanister is similai in size to the canister for theeen during its test
Thes assembledlant near Votkinskf
he Soviets constructed an additional missile assembly building in thef the plant. The increasedGcapacity indicates that spaceorce larger than that needed to replace theas planned and is available if they choose lo go ahead with mobile deployment.
Soviets*-have erected permanent shelters overeet of railroad track at the Votkinsk missile assembly facility (see Figure
C
y^The container^
probably will be used lor both transporting and launching the missile. Since therobably does notaunch canister when installed in theilo, we believe that the canister was designed to permit launchingobile platform.
ey componentobile system is the dolly, which is needed to move the missile from the road transporter to the transporter-elector-launcherr theas available in limited numbers in2 and was still being modified as late ashortly thereafter, inSE testing at Plesctsk was intensified.
r i
mobile missile systcmf
artists concepteployed ile ICBM unit appears in Figure 6-
radcars (see Figurelalcatanister have been seen al thessembly and checkout area at Plesetsk. Flat cars were used as one method of transporting thehe rallcars for theight be used to transport the mobile version of lhe missile and its ground support equipment.
he key dementobile launch unit that lias not yet been positively identified at Plesetsk is the TEL for the
The TEL weald he the most Important piece of CSE being tested there.
Activity ot Plesetsk
ctivity at Plesetsk strongly suggestsovert program is under way toa land-mobile ICBM. The observedsuggests that the Soviets are checking out ground support equipment associatedobile version of the
he initial phase of cheeking out ground support equipmentobile system al rfesclsk probably occurred during
3
lie nest phase of the programstarted in the spring3 andinvolved the testing and evaluation of launcher-relatedand re-supplysecondary loadsl^*
"HNoiic ol this activity would be required for Tnc developmentilo-based version of theG. It
would, however, lie consistent with a
to conceal ground suppuit equipment lor
10
lo replace theith an improvedit would seem less expensive to install one of the other new ICBMs currently under development, rather than toeparate HAD program.
SALT STATEMENTS
hroughout the SAL negotiations, the Soviets consistently have opposed US attempts to ban deployment of land-mobile strategic systems.0 Vladimir Semcnov. head of the Soviet SALT delegation, stated:
Land-based ICBM launchers include both fixed and mobilend must be included in the overall aggregate level of strategic offensive armaments on an equal basts with fixed launchers.of any kind of additionalorshese launchers areariety of mobile systems which includeand nuclear-capable aircraft.of land-mobile ICBMould obviously not be any more difficult than. say. verification of submarines and their ballistic missile launchers.
Therefore, justificationan on land-mobile ICBM launchers on the grounds of difficulties of verification by national means appears artificial to the Soviet side.
j
A change in policy indeed seemed poi-siblc at the Moscow Summit. Duringdiscussions at Hie final negotiations that ended with the signing of the Interim Agreement InPSU GeneralBrezhnev reversed tlie position taken by the Soviel SALT delegation and agreed to ban mobile ICBMs. Shortly thereafter, however, the Soviets retracted Brezlincvsagreement on this issue. Whether Brezhnev was ill-informed about the Soviet position and simply had made an error, or whether the Soviet military refusedromising program cannot be determined.
ailing to limit land-mobile missiles in the negotiations, the US unilaterally stated that if
ould consider the deployment of operational land-mobile ICBM Launchers during the period of the Interimas inconsistent with the objectives-of that Agreement.
**T" tt ait Mi
Sop
Inlter months ofa preliminary agreement was signed stating that
acilities remaining at (deactivated) ICBM launch sites shall not be used for storage, support, or launch of ICBMs but may, at tlie discretion of the parties, be used for purposes not inconsistent with Ihe provisions of the Interim Agreement 3nd the Protocol thereto.
r
L
liatcvcr the relationship betweenpublic statements and reality, tlie record shows that Soviet military leaders have long been aware of the contribution that anland-mobile missile force could make to ihe survivability of their strategic deterrent The exaggerated quality of their statements duringuggests that the Soviets also may have expected lo reap polilicalfrom possesion ofarginally effet-live mobile missile force. They frequentlyhat only they hadeapon,
lhat developmentobile missileechnological "first- foi the Soviet Union.
n this connection, the Soviets implied in public statements made duringhat theas intendedobile role. Although there is no Supportingthe statements suggest that amayobile ICBMobile MB/iItBM.
t SALT, Soviet unwillingness toa ban strongly suggests that they are keeping open an option to develop and deploy mobile ICBMs. This may have been atofor an arms agreement.
I the Soviets havehat would not preclude the use of deactivated ICBM sites as support bases for mobile MR/IRBMs. Furthermore, theagreement docs not coverSovietndR/IRBM sites. These sites, which have as many supportasrCBM sites and which, in any case, have presurvcyed, fixed field sites, could be used toobile ICBM. Some MR/IRBM complexes are being used to support the mobilecaleboard. aballistic missile, which is deployed at isolated field sites.
POSSIBLE DEPLOYMENT MODES
and-mobile ICBM could be deployed in various modes including road-mobile,mobile, shelter-based, and rail-mobile. There is evidence that suggests the Soviets are comidering both the road-mobile and ofl-road mobile coricepts but no clear evidence to suggest lhat sheller-based or rail-mobile systems are under development.
c believe lhat the Soviets would elect to use existing SRF installations as support
liasesobile version ol (liefi. Tor example, ill-activatedndites. ICBM complex support facilities, and SBF regional storage faculties, all ol which are rail-served, coo Id be used. There ate numerous arras around SRF installations which arcfor mobile ICBM deploymentupport bases used by tactical mobile missiles also might be employed.
Rood-Mobile and Off-Rood Mobile Concepts
be evidence at Pleselak indicates that the Soviets are Investigating both of theseconceptsobile ICBM. One deployment mode probably underb the use of presurveyed. fixed-launch sitesain support base. Any SRFw.th adequate support facilities could serveupport baseobile system. Tlie use of siteformeroftat Plesetskupport area suggests this possibility. Missile units could be rotated among various presurveyed fixed field rites, perhaps as fir as SO miles from the support base. The revetments near sitet Plesetsk suggest that the Soviets are considering the use ol fixed-field sites for the mobile version of thesee.
nother deployment possibility is the use of any unprepared, presurveyed area, suchoad intersection,aunch point. There are miny unimproved road networks, especially in the forest regions of the Soviet Union. Some of theseail-served, and supporl bases could be established (here.
3
The Suvicis have used holh lucparcd andea* as launch points foi the
SS-I2 Scalcboard. Initially theere used on concrete pads within the permanent facilities Later operations shifted lo isolated, field pui.tions and now the permanent sites apparently are heing utilized as support bases, rather than primary launch areas
Shelter-Based and Rail-Mobilo Concepts
Hie US hashell er-based mobile system, but there is no clear evidence to indicate Soviet interest inystem. This concept involves the use of hundreds of -hellers amongmaller number of mobile ICBMs would be constantly rotated. The "shellpproach is intended to enhance the survivabilityobile ICBM force.
here also is no dear evidence lothat the Soviets areail-mobile concept.)
3
FACTORS AFFECTING THE SOVIET DECISION TOAND-MOBIIE ICBM
he deploymentobile ICBM would tx consistent wilh live USSR's efloit toits strategic missile force and to make it leu vulnerable to attack. Suchwould complicate US targeting and inomtnrmg programs The Soviets probably mmIi'i-obile (CUM force ol
*op-6e
hundred launchers would nol significantly alter the strategic balance; however, they would vieworce as adding to their deterrent capabilities.
if the mobile ICBMis successful, there aie otherSoviets would consider before makingon deployment. They certainlythe benefits against theoperational, technical and economic.
Incenlives for Deployment
The principal incentive, fortrategic missile systemobile mode is to increase its survivability.obile system can move to and occupy any launch position within its radius of operationandom fashion, its location at any given time would be difficult for an Opponent to predict forng purposes. Extensiveimc satellite reconnaissance coverage would help to monitor the movementsobile missile force, but surreptitious movement could be accomplished at night, under cloud cover, or by the use of camouflage. In view of USin improving its capabilities against hardened targets, deploymentobile ICBM might be attractive to the Sovietsupplement to other measures to increase the survivability of their ICBM force.
The Soviets may also view deploymentobile ICBMedge against thelapse of the Interim Agreementhe developmentobile system would provide themurvivable forcefor deployment in the event of lapse oi abrogation of Ihe agreement.
Institutional momentum may haveto the development of theobile version and may also ntililate for in deployment. The missile was underseveral years prior to the signing ol the Interim Agreement and its advanced stage
of development undoubtedly was ain the Soviet refusal to ban mobile ICBMs. Institutional considerations mightthe Soviet decision on deploymentobile ICBM, especially the momentum gen-eraled in Ihe military and in various ministries responsible for developing and producing the missile.
the Soviets may see thedeploymentobile ICBM as achip in SAL negotiations to breakover issues they deem crucial.
Considerations Militating Agoinsl Deployment
key negative consideration indeliberations seems clear:and-mobile ICBM affectagreements and dctenle? BecauseOffensive Agreement wasa freeze in the number of fixedICBM launchers in thelie Soviets mighttoobile system beforerisk US withdrawal from theAs noted earlier, onUSnilateral statementICBM deployment. Thebelieve that this statement isalthough publicity that thebeobile ICBMthe Soviets to question the firmnessUS position.
SB. Tlie prospect of technical problems and operationalOny also might workecision tuobile ICBM system Reliability and accuracy are more difficult lo achieveobile missilethan in one that is fixed. Ato. bileG would be effective only against soft targets.
ortionobile missile force would be available for launch at any
11
given time, except during periods of crisis, because pan uf the force would liemaintenance or moving to new positions.
Mobile systems require morethan fixed systems because movement, vibration, and exposure to the elements cause more frequent equipment failures. Logistic support mightroblem because of tbe distances involved and dispersion of support units.
Because of their size and weight,ICBMs could present other operational problems in moving about the countryside. The solid-propcllantor example, is in theetric ton weight class (notthe TCI. or resupplyheweight limitation for vehicles on Soviet road networkshole is six metric tons per single axle. The tactical Scalrboard-launcher, which has four axles and an estimated grosstheofetric tons, exceeds this limit by aboutercent. On roadscapital' surface (such as cement or asphalt concrete) the single-axle limit isetric tons, but these roads arc located in areas of high population density and areissile unit would want lo avoidon unimproved roads would be limited by the load capacity of the bridges Most of tbe bridges on Soviet country roads have load limits ofetric tons. Snow and rain on unimproved roads arid launchalso could present formidable obstacles for movement to assigned launch position? (tee
hyucal security is more difficult to maintain with mobile missile units than with fixed-based deployment. Countering thisrequires additional personnel for security purposes anil places additional demand* on npci-itiug crews.
trategic Bucket Forces command anil control procedures emphasize positiveto prevent accidental or unauthorized use of nuefcir weapons whileapability for quick strikes. Deployment ofohil' missile poses special command and control problems not experienced with fixed missile systems. It is difficult, for example, lo make mobile communications systems as reliable, secure, and redundant as fixedand to ensure uninterrupted control of mobile launchers by higher echelons ofAbove all. the command and control system must guard against the possible loss of contact with any portion of the mobile forceritical moment. Mobile missiles must rely on dispersal andhardness or quicksurvivability. Thus, mating warheads to mobile launchcan be (and normally is) delayedinal decision lo employ them has been made, without degrading their capability to retali ale.
inally, if the Soviets were facedhoice between large numbers of mobile or fixed ICBMs, they would have to consider the comparative costs of the systems.costsobilecost of tbe missile, launcher set, and relatednot be much higher dian those lot the fired-deployment mode. Operating costsobile system, however, would probably he three to four times thoseiled -ivslem. The higher operating cost stems primarily Irom the need for incieated main-tcnassea on both the missile and launcbeiand tlie greater personnel requirements. Other itemi contributing to the higher cost arc increased requirements loron. loiniii.iud and control, training, security, and
Mipplllt
POSSIBLE SIZE OF THE FORCE
obile version of theould attain initial operational capabilityI the Soviets maximized their development efforts, however, they could deploy their first mobilenitshey probably would hasten tbe program only if theyore threatening strategic environment and
little chanceollow-on to tho Interim Offensive Agreement.
ssuming the Soviets do decide toa mobile version of thee believe lhat they would deploy aboutaunchers7 and haven the field0 If the Soviets were to maximize their efforts, they might deploy aboutaunchers6 and have
74
ANNEX C
GEOGRAPHIC FACTORS AFFECTING DEPLOYMENT OF LAND-MOBILE ICBM SYSTEMS
one-fourlli of the USSR, orillion square miles, is considered suitable for deployment of land-mobile ICBMs. Most Soviet railways and all-weather roads are located in this area, which comprises the European USSR, the North Caucasus, the Ural Mountains, western Siberia, and(see. Also concentrated in this area are most MR/IRBM and ICBM complexes and regional nuclear storagethat are dependent on the transportation network.
Deployment along main roads andhowever, has some drawbacks; the agricultural regions of the southwestern USSH and Soviet Central Asia, arcecurity problem. Thenetwork tapers off toward thepart of the USSR and becomesarrow band along the Trans-Siberianin eastern Siberia.
In addition to the principal all-weather roads there are many fair-weather country roads, especially in agricultural and logging areas, that couldand-mobile system. These roads and even good trails arc suitable for movement of land-mobile systems if the terrain is fairly level. Wherever these roads intersect streams, however, the weightof bridges mightestrictive factor. Moreover. Soviet country roads ore usually little more than graded earth and
become viilually impassable during periods of rain, snow or thaw. The agricultural regions in the Ukraine, in Belorussia, in the Baltic slates and south of Moscow, with theirof main and secondary roads, would be suitable for on-road or roadside mobile
Off-road mobile ICBM units also could be deployed away from the mainnetwork (see Figureorepending on terrain, areas for off-road deployment areas either good-lo-fair orn good-to-fair areas, cross-country movement up lo SO nautical miles (nm) from the mainnetwork is considered feasible. If these areas also contain an SRF facility, they are considered well suited for mobile deployment. The total area in the good-to-fair category covers about one million square miles. In areas ratedobile missile unit probably would not movem from thenetwork or from an SRF facility.
Much of the remaining portion of the USSR is considered entirely unsuitable for
1 Good-lo-ladire those, wilh fairly levelsparse forests,ini mum of streams, lavinet. swamps and loose sand. Areas rated poor in llic western USSH aie centrally dissected by streams and raviises, and characterised by patches of dense forest and necnsional stsamps. Travel in "poor" arm of Soviet Central Ailsbe restricted by loose si nd and dunes.
7v
cross-counlry movement ol mobilerge low areas around ibe Valday Hills, west and north of Moscow, and in the western Ukraine are swampy. Oliver formidableobstacles include loose sand and dunes in Sonet Central Asia; mountains in the south-em Ukraine, in the Caucasus, in easternand along the southern border with China and Afghanistan; and the dense forest (taiga) stretching along the entire northern part of the country. Even In these areas, however, deployment off but near the main roads would be possible in places. In addition, deep snow and permafrost make most of eastern Siberia
and the northwestern USSIl unsuitable for deployment of mobile ICllMs. In the Spring and summer Ihis areauagmire when the surface layers thaw ami thepermafrost prevents drainage. Much of (his area also has snow accumulating over one foot deep and lasting three to sii months of the year.
espite the limitations of climate and terrain, theith its estimated range0 nm (see, could reach most of the US ami all of China from its potential launch sites.
Original document.
Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: