THE CHINESE ASSESSMENT OF THE SOVIET MILITARY THREAT

Created: 4/1/1975

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

Research Study

The Chinese Assessment of the Soviet Military Threat

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CENTBfcL INTELLIGENCE IRECTORATE Of INTELLIGENCEOf POUTICAl REST ARCH

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THE CHINESE ASSESSMENT OF THE SOVIET MILITARY THREAT

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTORY

SUMMARY AND

THE DISCUSSION

L THE SOVIET ALLYILITARY

A nn* Chinese Perceptionoviet MlHtary3 3

R. Firsl Serious CoiisJoVriilion ol liclngI'ossllile Nuclear.oviet AlIaclcNc:

II. IMMINENT POSSIBILITYAJOR SOVIET9 8

9 g

etreat:0

III. THE ROAD BACK: DECREASING FEAR OF IMMINENT ATTACK:

II

IV. PEKING EXAGGERATES CONVENTIONAL. DOWNPLAYS

NUCLEAR.

V. CHINESE FEAR NATO FORCE

Tana* Is "To ifaoot China:3 . 15

Soviet-American War Iipril 10

US Nuclear Deterrent lor Europe is Unreliable:5 .t

VI. PROSPECTS

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INTRODUCTORY NOTE

This study Is of live Soviet military threat tohe Chinese seetcnris of both Soviet capabilities amintentions. Tlie st-tdy it corwerned with the Chinese view of:

tho pandafttyscnlnHnn of the Sino-Sovv.'t bordera conflict provoked origfnully by the Chliw jo themselves; nnd

tho possibilityovlM decision toassiveattackisarming nuclear struV foro dlsrmso of an inirarudgcntly hostilenipcrpcwrr.

Westernand outside the intelligencereached very different conclusions about tlw clumcesoviet military attack on China, whether growing out of Ihe border conflict or deriving from Soviet assessments ofoverall strategic situation. Wc have thought lliat the statement: and actions of the Chinese ilicmsclvei, as the most interested pari-j, might be

Tlw Cliincse have given to various audi ices at various times very different assessments of the prospects" Sovieta rnngo from alarmist tothat It <ias been necessary to evaluate these statements in the context of Chinese actions of the Kmc. Wc have reviewed all available CJifmsc statements on this matter, nnd wc have tried lo distinguish Iwtwccn statements that seemed to represent genuinewere consonant with Chinesethose lhat seemed to be madeariety of political purpose*.

Our analysis centers on the former: thessessment of the degree of dangeroviet attack at well-marked points In the evolution of the Sino-Sovict relationship. Wc attempt to reach sharper conclusions than the well-known and generally-accepted one that the Chinese for the past decade have foil threatened by the Soviet Union.

Tho effort horo is to track the genuine Chinese osscssrnent as it has changed at different times to determine:

whether tlic Chinese have over truly fearedoviel attack, however originating, might be imminent;

if so, what political and mUitcry measures they took at that time to reduce the prospect of on attack;

wrHrthcr their assessment of the prospect of attack, however originating, haveong-term pattern of change, arising or dedmfng curve;

and what their view of the Soviet military throat is today, nnd what they are doing about it.

The Chinese view of tho threat from tho borderis just one mlino-Sovict conflict across liveupon Peking's assessment as to whether it con keep alive MaoTse-tungs claims to Soviet border areas which have never been under Chinese COTununlst Jurisdiction, and to establish Chinese presence in these areas, without seriouslyarge-scale Soviet military attack. The central questions in the Chinese assessment of the prospectoviet strategic attack on Chinaholo ore whether the Chinese feel that the Russians are seriously tempted to make such an attack, ond. if so, whether the Chinese calculate that they can persuade Moscow that this could not be done at acceptable political and military cost.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In thoir patrolling of tho Sino-Sovlct bonier during the early and, Chinese leaders were not frightened by Soviet tin cats. It was notollowing the Chinese ambush of Soviet border guards, that the Chinese came to believeajor Soviet attack on China might be imminent.

The one ChineseAugust and Septemberpartly from localized Soviet military action but mainly from Soviet threats of larger actions which were credible to the Chinese, causing them to conclude that their policy of theasserting territorial claims by aggressive forward patrolling on themore dangerous than they had estimated. Mao backed off from ahe decided lo ovoid additional provocation by halting the patrols, and he agreed to resume negotiations with the Soviets.

The hard lino taken by the Chinese in the negotiations,refusing to make any concessions ami insistingithdrawal of Soviet forces from Chinese-ciaimed areas before substantivecouldthat fearoviet attack might be imminent dropped off sharply once the talks had begun.

Because the Chinese9 have avoided provoking the Soviets at the border, they have not needed to fecr an escalation as much. Tlie pa"ern seems toteadily declining curve.

Nevertheless, beyond the question of horder provocations, the Chinese have remained concerned about the continuing strategic military threat. Here too the pattern has been one ol decliningbut in the nature of the case the concern cannot be eliminated.

The Chinese have taken various measures, military and political, to reduce the dangerossible Soviet attack. They have continued to Improve their defenses kgafnst ground attack, and to develop their own nuclear forcesobering If modest deterrent. Also to serve the interest of deterrence, they have at times magnified und at timesSoviet military capabilities and intentions. This has put the Chinese in the somewhat absurd position of arguing, in one period, that China was greatly threatenedtcm pressure on Moscow tond, more lately, that China is not so threatened

but that tho West is (so that NATO forces should not be reduced) While tho arguments adducedough Western military posture toward the USSR have cliongcd, the results desired liavc not.

The aiinesc view today is short of fear, but also short ofThey are therefore continuing to develop their military strength ond totrong Western ftrntogie disposition against theNATO-Warsaw Pactwill reduce both the short-ccrm and the long-term tlircat to China.

After Mao's death, some Chinese leaders will prolnhly actively argue thot Peking shouldorder settlement on reasonable terms (which the Chinese have not done togain seeking to reduce both the shott-tcrm and the long-teim threat. In the meantime, even the Mao-dominated leadership will probably avoid direct physical provocation on tbe border.

Peking con be expected to maintain that China will retaliate if attacked, while emphasizing that China's military posture Is defensive (as itt the same time, the Chinese will prolwbly try to sustain and strengthen the Slno-American npprocliementtronger long-term deterrent to Soviet attack than China itself can provide. But because the Chinese intend to win Tatwin, they will seek to persuade the US that China does not need such rapprochement nt the costalt in US disengagement from Taipei. Should it comohoico, the value to Peking of rapprochement, ogainst the Soviet tlircat, would probably prove greater than that of early annexation of Taiwan.

In sum, the Chinese probably conclude that:

They can avoid an cscolotion of the border conflict simply by avoiding provocation;

fa the immediate post-Mao situation, the Soviets, rather than intervening militarily in China, are likely to wait for the post-Mao leadership to make or respond to initiatives for an improvement in relations; and

failing an early improvement, tlw Soviets wouldto choose tu accept the political and military costs ofattack on China, but would probably continue tothey could well afford tooping for better fromChinese leadership.

THE DISCUSSION

THE SOVIFT ALUILITARY OPPONENT)

Chineseof Iho Sovtoti at an enemy waa an hxn-menUla svldui oV^4cfjmcnt After |hu outbreak of the Siuo-Saviel dispute tnto public rmlcmtos in jfigO. il was (litre yean brforchinese leaders came to view Bag Iluxslunss potciilliu militaryry. Cliinckcn lite early lWOOi lind envisaged possible attacks from US-stipportcd Natimialbt forces In the cast (across the Taiwan Slrnlt) and lndbn form In (he tcuthwrst.had given HlUc attention lo Ihe povibof Soviet Initiatedon the northern and western borders untilor example, in tho (nil of lOOIt. when the Chlmsr begun totring of borderstations. northeast manned by Public Security troops. It wns primarily for the purpose-of pre venting refugees from crossing Into Soviet territory and secondarily for tlte prirpose of keeping Soviet agents out. Even when, in the spring1 the main minion of these troop* became that of disputing Sovirt-controHcxl territory (primarily Islands in iho two border rivers, tho Amur nnd theo iliootlng occtirrcd und the Clilncsc seemed to foci that tho only military confrontation they had to worry about wns pushlng-and-shovlng engagements at the border between border guard patrols. However, by the summeroth rides increased Ihe number of troops near the border.

A. first Chinese Perceptionoviet Milltery3

Khrushchev, annoyed by MuoV now policyto dispute Soviet-held border territory,first oblique and thcr direct warnings thatclaims by aggressive patrolling mightmajor Soviet military response. In lato JulyChinese actions

mfghtorm warr and by mkl-October Moscow was reported to have warned Pekingontinuation of holder probing might provoke from the USSHVclslvche Peking Profile't Dally rrrlcctrrl the CUnrse mxwikiiIrrlmu throat afclcd; far the firit* Parly paper complainedUS-Soviet nlUnncc iigaltistotwerii October unci DcmnhtT, several Chinese leaders rrfrrretl prlvtitely In tlie possibility that tlx; Soviets would iillack Cliiiui. However, ft is unlikely tlmt the Ciilm-v: had suddenly come to fearnojor Soviet iiltock. ccmvcnllonal or nuclear,mr-lerm powlbllily. Thr Sure-Soviet ngrmrMUt In start ImroYr tulles in4 <Ikl mt rcsntt frotn Soviet pKVHres; itWvcloprnent which the Chini'so had set In motion3 fie/orc iho Soviet* had made llsvfr threatening statements.

Khriuluhcv's position (hiring tbe negotiations was lo refuse to withdraw Sovietmhe Soviets well before Mao's rcgimr Isodu* to moke on exception of ccrtnln small Island' In tho Imrdcrao wanted, hyoviet politicallttlnrntlon that the treaties Itcfwecntsars nnd Impcrittl China hadeted the bit; river bland opr*coitccouM not bo mollified; he broke the secrecy of the talks hyublic statement onnd he taunted Khrushchev by dccliirlnB that ho would continue the Sinn-Soviet dispute withfrom lite danger of Soviet attack.

RrannlfaB on poprr. BVre arc no droit a* mum aWr harear forsndin sirfc" aML Wr an* prrpairtlhb war Anotherran. (Man twitmmit ofuly,in Tokjoi)

Khmvhchcv wis convinced by tins Chinese resort to public manein'er and by the course of the secret talks lhat It was useless to continue to negotiate wilh Mao, He withdrew the Soviet cldrgabcei onugust. In Ihe strongest public threat lo uic nucloar weapons against China ever made by

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1

lie waiint It tvonUIto enciunth on Soviet iNirclcrs "givenoii> of miiuliltNlam" hi tin- Soviet "Un.i! (sprvct. ofib poller was thus now to "roitle" niieknr weapon* lownrdn- IkhI titmr hi the pnxl lo many other niiinlrici.

However. Man and lib liculnumb werefdvva thh deuriy iimrkul pattern of KhntshdiiVs lidiuvlor. toluffil throat of lininliK-nt iltnek.vt-ptkiM of Ihe credibilityoviet limithlRhh/k-pei-denl. keyril to the |fcitttlntuin> of SovW form. KliruslKiiev had failed Id frighten theInto censing their border probes liet-auHO lie hud not made hb threat* sufficiently credible, I'ltlvr hy dcpkiying laeltenl mielearrn Irfat conventwwal builduprrpihr hirer* miranllrr.

By contrast, the rmst-Khnidicbcv Soviet leailer-ihlp avoided threatening ChinaiK-Wr 1Mb (imtilhe Soviet leaders were willing, however, lo make mows which were more costly In term* of commit tliiR mllilury manpower ami resource* to the border nren. Starting in tin- fullhey begsaa to send In regular army iinlls to provide more snlhlponlhle CaBBBBMlite Iwrdcr Rtiard units had provkkd. Inolitlmru dccKinn to slallou regular Soviet unit* in Mongolia was carried out, and the Chinese began to complain thut "rocket buses" had also hr-rn eslnhllslied In MotrKoIU. Tlie QrliN-Ri wife IwMr of the Sovfrt Imlkhip. and they seem lo liave lad an increased srwcar with Ihe USSR, kiehidimt the engagement nf major pound forces,eal posallilllly. This view was privately wprevwd by Clion En-tal in0 and by Tens Hdno-plng (among others) In mid-March. However, ihey Mill apparently did not perc-ive "ho threata|or war ashey spoke Only of an "eventual" or on "rnevilable" war with thertbrh-sa. ihe USSR 'n fact had becnene the PRCs prwinal enemy, nhlioiigli not yet In offieial statements and documents,

irst Serious Considarotion of Being o

Possible Not lea-6 CSou and Teng In earlyad been speak-ing nlxHit Soviet conventional forces, bat shortly

Ibenitfler. the Chinese for llsc first time seemed tu takeIhe posvlblKly that tlieould use noefc-ar weapons against lliem. whether in esealalkm ofnnarivr dlsaniilnx strike. Tlib new assraoneut was rriTcetedublic Interview given by former Foreign Mliilsler CJhii Yl. who declared tlmt:

Snvtrliny on- iluy fly fromVklinc. IViIih t,imin- iirarl.raeao-anUardUt.

ossibk tlwt thb new caknilallonSoviet Inlenllmis was ImshI on the speech ofarch madee Mongolian defense minister. llu warned' the Chinese thai hb forces now hut! "itiekeU"Ily the winteroviet Infers In Mougoha had short-range inn-lear-curvble Frog ruekct Uin>cbm; these- trapans arc not known In laavr been hi Mongolia) Tlie Chinese may liavr conddrrrd It prudent lo take thhiwiAly'

fTfirT

Mativ minister's statement tnho only known exeiiiti.ni to the Soviet polky of avoiding public threats of nuclear .slLnki on Chiiai5.

The Soviet* idiovmltlicy had in tlw summer ofVladismlok us Ihe city most vulnerable tn Chinese ground attack. It was In Vladivostok that Ilre/hnev made the remark that tin- SmW Furand "wlmsr every foot" Rlorifles the nmnigr of Rn-Man man (speech of. Po.lg.imy in KluUrovsk spokeune of Bar need to "guard" ami "if rkoiii*nry,eml" the USSR's Far Etist Irtfihri. Tlie Soviets tontiniicd to build up lln-lr regular army unlli along Iho fronlkr.

he Chinese deployed llirtr fintm)mlle bunctirr r. Ihr SU-mnnR MiHtary Region, north of Dairen. At nppnisimalrly tla* same time, the Soviets bonaa wliatour-year program lo deactivate llu-ir medltim-rniigc and Intermediute-rnnge mbslles In Ihe Far Ea*t. TIk- Soviet action was primarily related to the drrdoyirH-nt of flic more sophisticated and longer-rangeissile, with target sectors covering China. In the western USSR. It undbubt-

6

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wily was sl;pilfleimt, however, that llw newites were leu viilnembk' lo nlr or missile allaclc from the PUG

C Chinese Continue tooviet Atlock Not

Chinese action* In tlita period reflected an apparml lidlcf that any Soviet attack hi tho near future woukl he cooveiilicoal In nature. If it came at all, ami planning eoirtiiiunl lo lie for the ttiitont future. Although conslnictlun was begun on some nc* airfields, ami several curly-wnmiug radnr sites were established near tlie liorder, the Chinese did not siilistnut tally Iiktodsc llielr formoreover, military contact with Soviet troops waso border patrol encounters, and both sides adliered to uo-siwollng policies. Ami when, inie Chinese liegim constructionarge mounded defensive position near tho Shuang-clvetnOzii missile- tort cmtrr, It was along; aland-Invasion route lenillig from Mongolia. Peking kept the level of Its own actions down toordrr prunes. The Chinese continued lo bock up their claimi hy probing.

Ptolniig-and-shoving encoiinters on :hc Amnr and Ussuri riverncited by Red Ciurds and Chinese Imrdcr pal rob refecting Soviet border guard demand* lo cease patrolling and return to theortrdly were widespread in the winter7 during Mho's0 fighting wanml' which hud hern tense fo: at least Iwoot only didV'viels not rtillle their nuclear weapons ngnrnst the Cli.ncsv publicly, but also tlvcrc Is tj> evidence of privale minting* to tho Chinese in this period to desist on Ihe border oroviet nuclear attack.

At some lime between Fdmury andew land mobile nuclear mbsile system (Scalrboard) vna deployed al three point* along the Chhtr-cr border, providing Sovietactical weapon which could hit targets tipile* williin China. Abooscow was in Ihe Initial singes of deployinglle wheeled laellcal missile launchers (Scud) in the Soviet Par East. The Chinese may have detccled thesesing their COMINT capability, but, if lliey did. this information did not deter them fromolity of forward patrolling nt (bo tortkr. Moreover, tin fact that llrcy did not reposition tho bulk of fltclr forces northward suggests that they believed theirwould notoviet iitt.ck.

Tin- Soviet invasion9 sbocked the Chinese mil of iHrlr complacency, allliough they dxl not rcganl an nttack on thcimclres as any mure of nn imminentneptember tiicyote of pnit.it concerning what wan, Jn hot, an timinmlly lioovy CMKvntratlnc of Soviet overflights: around Ihe northeast border In August, of tniivflfniency tluinuch open disclosuroreak with the practice of delivering ancli notes privately./

I Utrce tluys later, Chan

En-Iaj stated publicly tlwl llie Hussiara wire trcat-Ing border tensions "by even more frvipicntly ScrxU Ing planes to violate China's airspace."

Esklencu lhat the Chinese judged an attack on China must lieontinuing possibility, altlwugh nut Imminent, is found in FurcignChen Viseptember statement to Crun-bodins Foreign Minister:

rliilin UmI Hk> USSIt will

Wr lit) itollitis. luvrhncvKa.to liemilitarily

faii-hum*iMom Iwiinh. Tlwy Knsv duupI riidit (llrlsioni of Soviet Iroont In Mann llanil hose installed rrKsWt>oiireo-(rjlion of moretrii on list Chinese Isvdrr.

Chen Yl's figure as to (lie total of Soviet troops was probably fairly accurate, although llinc were no more thandivisions in Mongolia. {In other words, the Chinese were not yet grossly exaggerating 'he Soviet threat, in term* of number* ofegarding lire matter of Chinauclear target, the Chinese asserted that "the USSR is engaged in settinguclear bases arotiTrd China to intensify nucLar threats ngalnstPeking Profile's Dolly article ofhe Chinese of course recognized thai their own actions provoked the buildup, but, ns

ciifo'l

observed in Peking* behavior, they wanted to Irovc things bothpcrsb* In disputing Soviet control of Cluncsu-claimcd territory btit nevertheless to stopuildup

It Is noccssary to reiterate that, despite this post-Crcd>os!ovukia ass-fssinent, the Chinese did not seem to feci that the dangernnjur Soviet attack was imminent Thus, liny sustained tltdr lorwart] patrolling along the border, disputing Soviet control of certain border areas, mainly the islands inmur and UsHiri rivers, undthat tho Soviets would not lie- provoked Into striking bockajor attack. When Chou En-lnipcocli onuptcmlior coumlulncd about overflights ami "massive troopoa the border, lie went on to say that"military threats and war blackmail" would have "no effect whatsoever."

!l. IMMINENT POSSIBILITYAJOR SOVIET9

Mao and his aides dearly believed themselves to be expert In assessing tho degree of tolerance In tlte policyilitary superpower confronting China. They hud been tnitngcd In one war {Korea) in which they naked the I'S use ol nuclear weapons and liad gone to tho brink of war twice (die two Taiwan Strait crises4 andhad emerged from each confrontation with athat they had had some leeway for probing to gauge US determination to defend friendlyTlicy seem to hnvo transferred theirthey were expert inuperior adversary! tolerance oftheir ccohor lotion with the Soviets.

A. Chinese ProvocolrortS!9

The Chinese leaden9 tested the degree of Soviet tolerance of provocation as Ihey carriedolicy of forward patrolling to contest Chinese-defined "disputed" areas, keeping Ihe probes down to small-scale encounters. Mao and his aidescalculated that they had leeway toin such encounters with conventional weapons withoutajor Soviet attack against China. They seem to have anticipated retaliation by small Soviet convent iotml-forco units only. They guessed right about 'ho level of Soviet retaliation.

arch and mid-August, every Soviet riposte to Cliincsti patrol proljcs was carried outouventloiuil ground weapons as artillery, tanks, nnrntfed personnel aurlcis, and nutomaUe rifles. No aircraft were used, -nor did dieexpand the conflict front the immediate arena of the skfrmfslies. Soviet corrvontlon.nl weapons, and the mobility supplied by their armored porsoniid carriers, were sufficient to defeat each of theborder units they were used against, However, tlte Chinese policy remained within 'ho confines of rational calculation, nnd despite Soviet dmrges of Chinesehere wo* method in It. The levd of Chinese provocatioii was nbc kept down by spreading Hie attacks out In time, by the use of small units, and by Chinese probingariety of poiuui

The Chinese ambushoviet bordernit on Clien Puo Islandarchefinite escalation. Moo and his aides appear to have chosen that particular Ussitri River Island which provided them with ilw strongest case of Chinese ownership: Chen Poo wns not only on the Chinese side of the main navigational channel In the Ussuri,o wasart of the Chinese bank. ThoSoviet border guard unit at least twice previously (In late January and "arly Feliniory; in the latter instance, rifle-butts were used by both sideslglit) had come out across the river ice to tho Chinese side onto Clien Pao to order Chinese forces to withdraw. Mao imdoubtedly had been angered by this bullying, nnd apparently wasto demonstrate to tho Soviet leadersragainst China would not 'nposc passivity onorces, border units included The ambush of Soviet forces at Chen Pao escalated die disputeajor shootingIn subsequent ingagcrnents at Chen Pao and other points along the iiordcr, Iho Soviets used their superior luopcnver to cirectfvely defeatunits entering Soviet-controlled territory.

Following tlte first battlo for Chen Pao. Maoto accept any Soviet military presence there, and he was unwilling tu retreat from the diallengc when tho Soviets sent armored personnel carrier* onto the island. His personal commitment wnsonarch, when,eeting ofat thehinese officer read nn "instruction from Chataman Mao" demanding that the Soviets stay off Chen Pao orew fire-

top*4arro^

ew firelight did occur onartli and,Wnese defeat by Soviet troops using armored personnel carriers, tanks, and artillery, Mao continued to context tho inland and othualong tho border.iasty shelUi pro-grain ivus initiated within China in tbo spring, and there was sonte evidence of tanks nnd artillery being (Hrpmod and revettedossible air attook, Mao'i actions on tbu border made It clear thnt ho was not Intimidated.*

Al tbey carried out thefr forsvurd patrolling onto disputed territory, and as their border guard units were defeated In almost every small-saile firelight, tho Chinese kept alert for signs that rhe Soviets might beuclear strlko against Chi-noso targets. What tbey seem to have rjcrccived were Soviet political signals intended to frighten them into dwbting on tho border.

Soviet envoys abroad (among other*) privately

that Moscow svosild toko any steps necessary to force tbo Chinese to stop birder probing. Thcso vague warnings conveyed in mid-March vruro not as explicit as tho threat to use nuck'ar weapons if necessary, which was made by the less officialinstrument, Moscow's Radio Peace and

.m wc afraid c{ Moo Tue-tuiin and lih patvm, who awbsulay ot mudrt. Thuorid inovo thai iliu insliifoKo of Ihc Sovfcr armedo rocket tniitt- (Broadcast of IS Munti IOtJO.1

Peking laterune) complained about this threatening language and shosred some conceni, bat Hk> Chinese calculated correctly that tholeodt's would continue to avoid striking narkajor attack.

In addition to trying to frighten the Chinese lenders, the Soviets deckled to pursueolitical solution to tbo border dispute bythe Chinese to resume Hie negotiations broken offosvever, these Soviet political moves seem to have worked agefiuf Moscow's effort to

tla-lr Wont Inhe ChBwse siLbnpWHUy retained lo Choi Pan, shutiheir (ones, owl nrnialu tratre'lehed lo llili day. Thu Soviets apiHireiitlylmlhir view of CfatMi* rucbta to thh partksibr Island aad dhl noi conllnuu Id tonlcil IL frighten the ChiiMM, Tlie Chinese lenders perceived tlio urgency of Moscow's desire to Wo thorn up In border talks. The Soviets,ute ofpril, urged tlw Chinese to iiniw in Moscow svitldo fouror torundttttions. This hint of anxiety exposed the Soviet lendersaunt, very characteristic of Mao, which was delivered derisively j

Tlie Soviets then proposed, ns on Interim measure, tlmt Pekingelegation to Khabarovsk totbe Jointsbn niectiiigB on hrnxler river navigation which had nothe Chinese accepted these lossvr-lovd talks onay but suggested that tbey be held one month later, tho Intention being to disclose ip fenr by sveinlng too anxious to begin. Tln-sccl talks began onune, teniporniily rcditciugAt the same time, the Chinese pjhiscd loalks about tbo cntln. border dispute; tbey continued to probe at various points on the border.

Even lifter the Soviets began to float lilacsossible inujor attack, tlie Cliincse persisted. They refected higher-level talks (Cliincse government statement nlhey seem to havethat they need only monitor Soviet intentions while deterring the Soviets by publktldop; Soviet threats, talking at Khabarovsk, and keeping their probes down to small fi*cfiglits spread out In space and time. Thofvay statement contained nn open complaint thnt Moscow bad Twawlfalicdweapons atune, an NCNA report listed Soviet ituclcar threats, chiming that Moscow was threatening to launch "all-out destruc-tlve nuclear counterattacks" from balSitlc mtaile units stationed at tlie lower fjike Baykal area and along the Sine-Mongolian border; onune, another NCNA report complained about tlie Soviet use of private statements hinting of the possibilityajor attack.

In July. however, the Cbimsc started taking soundings among diplomats in Moscow about the USSR's real intemioiu. Tills was an curly sign that Cliincse concern wai starting ro increase nnd that their monitoringoviet Intentions wouldbo mote ictcixo.

li. Chlnoio Alarm and Refrooli9

Tlie Soviets were confronted with the Insk nf convincing the Chinese that tlie alternative tu nc-pilbtitnna (or attack uu China, crmvtntional or nuclear, nnd tlmt Moscow would not permit lire Chinese to Weed Iho Huularu etallcsslyeries of srn&IVscoV skirmishes. Tho Soviets set nhoiit raising Chinese emicernevel of anxiety suffi-vtcnt to Lnnd Muo and lib aides firully lo desist and agree to netpitlatiinw.

For example, the Chinese P

Further, the Soviets in curly Angus! |treatry av temtfied their cnrlkr hinUossible mojnr at-tack by ground lorces. Privately only, they hiiiltdossible preemptive strike against China's nuclear foeiUtlcr.

Wbllc the Cluncsc can fully iiranttorrd thbn late as IE August they clearly had not yet got Iho messnge; that is, ihey WON stillSoviet territory. Forhinese unit crossed tho border in Sinklang near the Dziuv gnrinn Gate, and was decisively beaten by Sovkrt forces onugust. There were two signs ofChinese concern in the next week. Clitneac forward patrolling In contested territory (both in Sinktanr and hi the Northeast) apparently ceased, and on iu August the Chinese charge In Moscoworeign diplomat lhat Peking wasover signs that the USSR was preparing forajor military engagement" with China in the near future. He reportedly displayed less eon-ficWnce lhan previously in China's ability looviet attack and claimed that Peking wns always readv to negotiate wilh Moscow. The possibilityoviet "surprise attack" on Clilna was under-scoredanking provincial broadcast ofhb pi irate wns used In theugust Decree on Combat Readiness issued with particular reference lo border-area commanders, reflecting

'Between AugustOctober.rovincial unmit-omSs (or Iho Pit Km referred to rhe USSR oh'i "pctnvtinlffk-iftBy tlhpbdna ibr ITS In drat rot.

In partntention of Peking tosow of aitkm-wide pnpnrrdnew bi order tons slblc nllnck.econdaryho war piep--iirorMgaivdn probablyil lttd been during tho Taiwan Strait crisis InJustify continuation ol liitcrnnl mtstcrlty by pointing tu tlie external tlircat to the lutton's security.)

If anytlilng further was needed lo persuade Iho Chinee la ilcdst, it wm proliubly sunplkd hythat Western IntduspTtcc services,Iho American Intelligence conimunity. hnd become iiltumcd about tlie possllillily uf il Soviel strike.Chinese inxloulifcdly were nwarc, from Pnrb nnd Tokyo accounts,8 August Wrish-Ingfon Potl article attributing to Ainerieiin intelll-gencc the view lhat tbe Soviets might launch an air strike againstiilim's nuclear facilities in the northwest. FurilKiinore, tlie article noted lhal "one key off kill" In Washington "whoonth eorUcr had rated the clmneesajor Chinese-Soviet figlit atiitreent recently sakl that Use chances now are only slighlry lesslso in late .ugiiit, the Chinese proliaMy hadnformed by their charge In Paris thai some Frctich officials also bdk-vedoviet air strike could ik)iscounted.

It Is likely that Mao and hb aides placed coa-ttdcrablr CTcdVixx in estimates mode in theIntelligence community (as reflected Inmltinaon Port article) as well as In official French views of Soviet Intentkmi. Mao retreated furtheronfrontation in the week itflerrefectionoviet offerhou-kCosysln meeting In Hanoi at Ho Chi Mink'sekingenewed Soviet bid. resultinghou-Kosygtn meeting at the Pekingieeversal by Mao of his policy of refining Icader-to-leader contacts with the Russians, the last such having been the Tcng-Brezlinev meeting In Bucharest inore than four yean before. Altliough Mao and his aides may have beenas lo whether the Soviet threats were to bo taken at face value, the Chinese leaders un-doubtedly found it prudent toajor Soviet attack to be an imminent posn7>l'ffy.

Nothing slicit ofodgment could have Impelled Mao to desist in mid-August from sending out patrols and to agree in eoriy September to n

kadcrslilp-lcvrl moethur, with thr Soviets. This mcnl wui lo lie, reflected hi sevond additional net torn.

Ihe PKC Government Stnluwntnvloher.which the Chinese fonmdlyie-goilntioiu, contained the mostl ol-rrfieit public refenw IVklirgver made to the possibility lh.it the Snvlrts might Man-to raid aiim'i strategic stlra";

the Chinese made ll tlx- first artier ofdsen Ixxiler .tiwrtlutloni started In Peking mictolx-r, to nskreliminary ngrrcmnit in winch Ixifhwere lo rnxiunce uityto commit aggression againstcr. wllh convenlloiuil ur nuclear svestpons;

tliehe name limeajor rcpo^tirsnimt of iheir ground forces ass-ay from the previous soullx-ast coastal orientation aixl tirsrard the Ixwlrr In Die north, lx-gliming thh operation only after the CWKeisyj-in mret-tngkm tlx- heat ool of the borderdelay mainly Intrndnl lo nvniil nhwming tho Sovirts to the point where lliey might Iiavcreemptive strike.

The Chinese informed the French nmlrvuidor onctober that Ihey had agreed to Isrgln negoHn-lions became they Imd bran pressured by threat* of surprise atlnclr, by fear of the Sovietkxial-svra pons copulilllty. and liy tbrcali ofborder troubles Soviet diplomats In Peking privately cotKcdcd In October, despite hlgli-lcvel Soviet leadership denial* ih.it Moscow hadhreat campaign against lacking, that they felt the main Chinese motive in accepting ncKotlntkiii* was nnslcty over Soviet military intentions.

III. THE ROAD BACK. DECREASING FEAR OF IMMINENThe Chinese seemed to have calculated that the Chosi-Kosygin agrcernorW 'C cease forward patrol-ling on both sides and to begin negotialksns in Peking drastically reduced the ctianccajor Soviet attack They settled down to the task ofpoh-icnl losses on die Soviets while keeping them engaged hi tho lalks. Tlie Chinese publkly professed to being under threat from the Soviets and, hoping for international condemnation ofiomplafitcd lluil they could not nrgrMintr nx-imlngfuHy so Inng us Ike Soviets rrfiised In nil-vancr In wllhdraw llkrt' form fromerrltiwy. Aetiudiy. Hie fcVrvlH direat was fell Id Iwve ermtklcmbly subsided idler iicgntlnlkm*Miltshleil in the |xilnl wlx-re PefcdiK rami nuike no nmeessJixB hi Die ncgfrtUilicmi. Imlrnl, Ihe opening Chlm-scat tlx- sterrt lalks sens very hard; nsmiely. lhat the Soviets withdraw theirromre suliHati. Ihe Issiies eoold Ik-Imti Kn-Ul him-self Inhl Chinese cadres hi November that aldxmgb Mnscosv Imdup its mlfilnry pressure lo get China loxwtlrr ngrcciix-iit. Chirm wtaM not Ik- hit militated.

Tlie slart of tbe Ixirder negotiationsossible attack and enabledtn rxtiiislvelytheir forcesnlamuag the .Soviets.

|Hy tlsc cnrlhese and other major pni-auTioctsnsaible Sovietl Isren gerxTalty completed: four improvements sine-then base consisted largely of rilling out existing imltk-0he Soviets bad considerably reihieeil tbe pace of their on buildup liking the border, nnd the Cliincse rserception of lids nesv phenomenon uiulouhledly reinforectl Iheir calculationoviet attack was now unlikely. Evkleiice fiHheates .hat lire9 rccmH-

IW bretntimKUrr

MM UV Sorirts kasr Chine

oVxsaa.lt dast Mokdw MldtK Hs Imps from tbe tmoVfaofYmmri tamymTlx- Sovln. km- kratlfirdo ares-pi tWKryto pall backa-wintmi In uriiottale nbtnrt. Mumrm,osr xidstrd that their ratOM do ool "ihrealeir China,

"See tbe rxrelknl resrardi paprri China's MllarViiiixiax AjDxnir Sorlrt Marl the artUrVrnm.lmHJ.w.nalyitt frOP SECflET.

drive In Ihr lieh<Hlve ,is ever. dihI the ilrmiihluV.illmi Hint dlulmij'c nf PIinwinl In Hh- following months Mai plm-i- In Urn slund.id mimiirr mid In Ihr usual mmtafa,

Chinese coiieeniossible "smprhe nl-lark" wineduced'cllii)-'* effort In improve Ihell loning of rWrra and elvll MrMn iiMitlmmLilli was In asotd prmmlloti al ibe Imdrr.mpeaking lo cadres In Mayl-mltherilck"as wellpnalrmtcd" war, vliessrd China's defensive poMmc.euling forust Ih- pal lent"

IV. PEKING EXAGGERATES CONVENTIONAL,

DOWNPLAYS NUCLEAR,

In orilrr to generate thlnl-eooiiliy pressure In kr.Ti lire Soviets restrained nod t" Imttmr politicaln Moscow for "Imfiyiiig- China, fimnhr emphasis of Chloric ttatcmctilihe Soviet thieiil was shifted ntvay from ilegiMlins! kfw dangerich-ar attack mid Mussel instead Ihe strcnglli oT Soviet amiwHamii force* ncor Ihe Imnler. The Chinese ww In fad more vulnerable to miek-iir than coim-tiliimalthrnit ofas surely regarded as more ercdiblc

to tin- foreignChinese wunled In reaHi.

To lake this line.to include InU.fi.mcc of Sovht convent miniPeking nrRuinc llial Ostiu couldajor grmmd attack ami WKrnfuUy liRhl hack despite lovs ofwas more useful for, Urairvc inorc niiMili to, die Chinese domestic midlrncc also.

The SoWels wen' highly sensitive lo litis Chinese complaint of bullying, and tin- Chlm-sr.Ihls, hammered my nva harder ul the sin- of the conventional threat. Tlie Chinese lenders began0 to put IIm- fienrr ofroops near the Ixmler at slio.it one million Tliis was theu En-Ul used in Ihe fall0 In awith an Asian official ami In0alk with Edgar Snow. Also Inbntsadorris-atc conversation pot tlie figureillion.

Actually, according to Amtiicnn estimates, Soviet forces In the China border area nt live lime totaled only bjlmtll TaWI. Musi of Ihe Sovbt dhKl.im WW iiiHlr-riiiairueil,il II nil ihr dhlsloiri mid llf-ir Mip|Niil mills weiril,rtMlfl sJrrnglli IIIainleriild lint havebmi THMKn 'IVhe Chin.srH.i.mpco lour limes the actual number Muff.

ilnese

immiengeilary' nrganl/iitltni. mid maiming practices riniLesven Mime tmllLcly lh.il the discrepancy eniild In- nl-

ms. ii.llallon of

IhrllirChliHM idinosl oilalnK ssnsllierate, liiteiirird primssrily to "prove" Ih il thetld.nl.-onl (JkllU, ami seeumLailly. aise of thi- linr In1 .Mslrrlty.

natler r'.ttack, ihr Chl-nesen (Ik-fshiilmiing Ihr rslreat fnwm inilnr cadres Ihnl warIonshoiu-term" imiller ami llmlwas nhrady (Uilially Itteiuriil If svar wrre lo sl.nl "ink."

Tin-id nn| remain romplcli-ty slh-nlJr Susiel nudntl. svh.ti Ihcv did irfrr to il. Ihey usually|osiVI sursisvtrike seidi Ibnr "war pr.-isara-IhHis"artml-lritl (Mora- .sfUsal in Kwopr aWrdin1r-grmind UilltIn trimfd cnaWelots imluslriiil liases and pojmlatkm io thr eceiit nfielrarmu Kn-lal himself told ii correspondent mi fl1 thai China's svs-leni of iimlergrmiiiil shelli-rs svmdd he efh-etlve afciiosl unclear atLuk:

Wr- an- it* alrahl al sssss* IssssV

ptrpc-"IUVI. alu.k. .ehm-

baa ak k.

ingniyliiiih-rgRNinilhigredienl In PeVings higli-]mofile suniv-

m^MttnuU -wilri- mi liii-imliiiil Iii Im In NnvM iIhiiIriK*

vWn li nlIn* Itiixxhetx,ilm-vr Irulrlx :nU.nlUl "

Inla liuhr- ttfw Ihilr*i ii iMttmuil vL.inl.limniliilhr irslrnUlJr irjxnuUmI Mm-Jt.ivirlx mlf.lil ullitrk.iM-rlnl nlril

Alieii I'lslmi'ltlmv

In nun ml 'Innilrd In ilrlrel

Inulhri CIiIik'm-rrm.MiillliiiiHcmi.illitl'. ii sitl ill drxpnatluii. IVliinj nisi. Miner jhd Ihr hut lh.il. fur (imiimajor atl.ul nn Chlu.i.nvlH Ir.idrrs nt Ihr lime nlll-oiled

rflMlled Miniairs for *

ii.nlli niiy Irailrr ihry wrir willful-oscow. TV Indict, .rx iVud from thrmr nil rmi* ihai my. nil hmtiV

Kvhlr-nrr lhaleamr -milLd* Indiraltil lluliiiuv UXJI. -it iImI limr lo ml xlwiply thr piolnilfciniliUiy afeindln Jow IV linilnHna of airVJds. iVHm MM.f .wnlul airrrdl hado llu-lr ofIn TO mum ft pr* inm-lli. MMR MS, il dro-mid In an imMTd-nit Ti per nionlh. I'lmlmlUni nf Ihr MICI7 noil thrloppixl ixiii.pliirly.lV iwiiilhly mrtpul uf ihr Tl'-lfl miilhim

botolK'l "iinhan I. and the

onllw-k* in till' pn-dmUnii nl iiaial xhipi and lund nnuaimiib wrrr also made, nlthmiuh llii'v were iii'irhcfi'. llu- eon. vlrurlii.ii nf airfield* had aho rix.ii dramatically

UtMriu I'lfl'l millnn xl.trlx

i. Ahlmurli

In Hi-aWtkrl .lr,u.Mnn raflnthlHd nwp-lllrwxxklx llm.-xucir-xix m. ntMr llul nWuji^

.lll.il l mx.- I

In Itr fall awl xvi,-lri%nlSmHNi la- rx-rn tml|Hi lljaj.h-ivi

Wtixihrrrllu.ixl

nra Iii laavr1 iIh'

liilllvVLltir! .il ll.rl',rx|.

llIxr I'lhiir

ilruilirr.hal ihr'-lii. laiil limn mi lulon- |i.ill li lewdly irhtliim hadiMJor I'.it tile power.v,l'xiiiu lou.flltMh inllulux tintslimiRi-xl nnvrihrl miIn- anyIMhrniiilHT I'nVI. InAm.iiejn ul.nl >n

uckl mm nf/rrh.1l.

vliiihSnrirlx micM hy InJin (liru. lliixj inline frar on Ihr part ol alIrnlrtVx intmvuux

ee llirMid jixxi-xX ihr iuleulfuiv of the in Dhiurxe Ir.ulrtdiip. tatliertm.iii. rnl Invnhedmtraitrd ami ptnlialily liMlivlxlve war with China.

IteiMiilfiie llu-ovxllilr diluteKn-lalNovniilur

r SmM ranaM al-mr .tlu-

iUpwI mm, lit Ort-aWl i-lr- ,4

ll- mtfiVxr I'N

I" An-llr

Iitx. NATtlu.lr(iWvflvuri-r.

llul Snxh-t Uii. .mtcll nCiHnt OlHu

llul tto.tn-rtiktm ikmi.ill nr nrhrrnr-ipraf xhliliUtv iiUrlilor WaMW la mh-jdW.

luliiu-xr wrrc pniuarllymirt anonr lliruxlmrlhrsxt ainl north China.- Al llrn lime, anjlrV.il

c*

innimiVitllw KonlimiiImIlrlv UmI thin'iii ii nmvdlii.ilili' huh mill of ilkiimlnn In Chimi alum! ihr tatll Aliirti' In lulm .iiwlml Muilr! iiiusntlhiiuil Ihhi-s. 1Irillvihi-nal.lillnd for thi' hi mill nu'iluiil/ralnucs. (til ihiIikntl. Ihr SmW*Mim* tin*imit (In-lllihan ihirc limnl hint*.huellu-ly siipi-ilnr ashr Chlitrw*lft-il. in Munh unit. iIn-lrhinhiiitliteep. metot ioiillim.il to Insist llulealel.

llf Lilt-riin.l. In wht.lihlaesr aimiVs had Ih-.iiirrrnl.il .intl hinlh.-iit nillll.uyth.ir ImI hrm Im-illi ml iluiiifi-i. In thr"Hit iit nl mainiltslisivr siles in-.irinn; piwsiblr int-aslniii.nl Is-imnlt-il onlymien' liiqunviil and Imi.Ivii.'I .Inline.n>ilThrlri Mvniilyl hy- nod platihvlrirl millsI In* IiomIit hImi |hi;.hi lo hi*miI.hi inter units iiHWliiimslMlTI) miles had from ihr horilrr. these oMViisivcmd milpmhninsv.itd rnsiiiiu; forte lor Impmlaut jhmsn slim* andny Soviet inimnchowed lhatim*sr were pu'p.iKil In put up liusrasinch' sjilflisj attentionglsiit In Ihrinsrlh ami nmUnseat of I'.-Hnc. uheic slcfciisivr |lm)llims in-tr rstahhvlHiI in liHUedmill's Ifnni ihr lainh't. Chinesei'i'niiil lo In' In ronei-dr leiritnry in Slnliam* and in the nuithrm: Military It remit, wfirre Irrciinnil Ifll'llcal cnnshhtatHnis svmildtaiu1 near ihe huntere,<sfhlr.

The Clilnese view olowthlr nnelenr tillatk In this period was that iIh* Smlrls would not me iiii.li.il weapon-Rreatly jsmsnknl.alsnlaliil lliat the* wmild Ik* unscjlliinr, lo tale triineiidoiss politienl kisses 11

lisl .leal sliilrsia-nl nsnde hy an impm.nul Chlmu' olli. lai slitniillylla* ihamrmli'lin nmih* hy tliluo Kuan* lo Ai.ifelwaVais Invi-|iunriil wnnldlrindi-inalimiilallla*Infld me iii'.iilosllaim pidnlnl .mlt had Into tinnyshr I'S iiU'd an alum lawiih.lhai llu* Sntlels ssi-te simllaily nliiHnnt lit Ih- <iHnleninril li.tniMlliin.iIly.

NVv.-illn'leis. iIh'o ih'srlup ihi-lr ihiiIi-hi missilellw.t^slhllllyhinese ss'.it hrim; fnoithl with miilrar tsr.ipons. lullimiii-i<ivhl mirleai sir lie. Il.thiil. Ihr ei.iihrfll ilrjiliiyinrlil nf tlf-lr iihihiim*l Itiiiiin-ilfali-iNa ilialri'.yino lite ilrli'iinrtpuluV mn.hi in ihrlr ownnl iiiiilrms, ami. Inrnl llul lii-lriii'iHe lalls. la IiiIIhI unilr1iih tin-it small liner. (Smitri-Utiles.is it, imihl iwly hen theaterhirrnlinns. In siiilrfir/ifn China.)

Tims, inlilwse enilnwy nffieinl

3

Chit..

1 missHra Inr Soviein hiliiti'l hut did not ji'l haeepahilily of'SSItann rati* assnsninit. In Jnm- I'fiS. an SCNA iJltiial In llnnii staled |wls*alelj* thai China hadreparations Inr war. es-.ties-saryim-lear war. and dial, althmudi China vraild oot use imeh-ar sveapons first. i| ssnuld osr them in di-frnse.

V. CHINESE FEAR NATO FORCE

The prospective European security eonferener ami forse-iediKtioti talisew tnnei'rn for tin- Cliincse; any astrrcmciil on In-op fednc-th-ns in NATO forces ssmild strenRtlirii Smiet-WrSleni cklenle ami dins prnside ihe Sosiet*rrer Ivsnd lo confront Chinese forces. Tlieliase tried to esUhlish the sicw tlut Europs'an (CovrrnfiK'nts diotild not trust (lie Soviets, and have

i tnmlfillrim <rl ihrfc irwn smirny

CIkiii KnUi InInil

u-'i" *iHi I"mhr mmii-in ntirn.lt lurwitl ,n. lli.ill. W7

Man InWlf ll. JulylMlil.llrivm MuTlrd"ll In ihr llhliirxr litN.Irr;4 mi In xnim..il wrylym- cji-.ii .mill (or llir xlilllh-lmlrrll.-Iiri|ih< aH.ni iva< llul.lyrrrth thr I'SSlIr-up-rlrr

i-tri.tr.

: waxhr xtarl nfllxmirnran vmrlly tmilW-rmrnnlirr VPZ It, January VOX Chm.

nllirr Chlnrxr ollMah ximmllim-

lli.il Un- mimliy .Wrr.iNV mlthlaimf MiiitHVi llul IVllnc. rnlhrr lhan hivorliii; hit; mthaehi An hi Iran furmairnpr. nnw niiii-ul/iil llu* mill fur .in American mirtcir drier-

mil mil ilmi NATO was i ikn-nmry airtl

xhimld remain iiiiikiwfl anv imild .IrlVmlrn' rrlla.

lrJlH-M' JWl'M UlltM-flllClltlv .

mi NATO.

A. The Threat is To- Not Chino,3

nniwllne lhalmMyhfrxlrxl D|an ami liiiid.ilangr ihrami In iirtlxt Ihrir.tlnl ul thr UVif. Thr WMMJr in ll.ii ihimtti-ATOlul IheyHaflhwrrr nihittimu- and. Minmlirlly. tn ihr US. llulhmddthai China don. nn) nml rapprnrlHiiirnt ui drx|irratrlyIn Ih- ludiflrrnilirtual lull in AmericanKi-nn-nl (rom Taipei.*

b-.nn.ltirv* iiiujhIV ttm Ana-tkan riLWimiiip npU-ily. (nllknh buyli" k. awlIi litmxa'Surr

hr I'SSlI

ivrrvill.m.vmr-yliiR thr vlrwvlir dm Chin.-w

iiMrvrh hv il..-

iihiivily

rlmr- In thmr rvlinNit.il hy Ihr Wnt InI.'him wax mini: imrivl hr.mm hi mdrrllu-imi|m.

>viiv ihr piiiumy luittrt. Chnu wtiil un In my Dial SmiH iiiilllmy |iirsviiri- niMiinl China win nmlii-lahi.il |iiliiMiily K. lilr.hl.-ii Ihr Chlw-vri.'Imhil tIn.lhndrn wiir millk-vinr. Hut Ihr USHIl um.ldmilll.il' Inii-liIlu.lal.ilLlrmKlni

In hK Amriiii I'JTlinuT. PartyjimiISireirl vlralt-Ry waxilua (llmr Hit

IVh.xxai.: ml

ttf. a.rxl

n.,i|ii lilm

iii-i, ami Im ftmn

ii liUr ml.l pil'-'lll. IV

i-xlu.in.il. -trfljnjfrAf.i.u- in Ihr iK|Vli

kinl'itl-iait ll-lf rllMlixllM. hi lVlUHmi.jii

WViiHv' .iralml. ami

lfltl,

Oiiiim; Knudi Pr.-xkbulto rVlini: inakl Ihry arrrr uinti.ilihr poxnliihly

nxirl ntlait mi CMh ami. al thr xjinr liir-'.

axlml why Kimipram wrrrtl--tir in mm

^

oviet llite..l. Clnm hliim-lf staled llmt lie (relieved Ihr SncicU Inlendril In make miil Chin* Inir hihirr.icmb <w

awaywlirihrr lite Clilnr-sc Weir

RllllTfl* or merely |Mnfitslng fear hi orilrr lo fnllm ttKTwrimienl ngulml ihr Sovlrh. Thr liillrr seems ihr inotr pilana! loo.

n rvidmer llml ihrern-llfimm hi inlllUiyiler In thr "'iniirr ol*such aslmNing nr .llnni.hli.j; Willi Smrctigi.li.N, wiilLin,

1W_niiiio.il io br lo

Achrul Irnrear Irnn SovH iiltuck win notl In CIioh's icuuirk* lo I'rlmr MlmMrr Tm-ilrini nl Curtail- In mhUKlubrr. Chim mild llml iniprr|Miiihtru nn |Im- |wrl id ihc Chinese would hvltr Soviet military lie'Ion agau.sl China hul llml In- win mil worried (Until thr nrasprd of an attack.

A*Ihr liftaw or main focus of thr Snvlrl lhe_t. rt.i. llr to br "in Ihr eswl* Odin would lie Ihr hut majoro In- hll. Cl-ai rem tried Inm-lRii Minislcr Oliil- In rally Januaryhaiilo liar cast would he dinil.ilS first. Japan nrtl. nnd Ihrn anna. Tin-awnrr lhat ihHr ton-frmilallon with thr Soviets over fimr Mmr.lt was noiime military nalurr -is Ihc Chinese confrontation at ihc Imnht wiih dm Himlans, apparently dp) not vtrw Oimii ttrej.iltir.iliter Ol an eastwardmit hie.itirnce lhai Omki cnaaigrd thelew in Tokyo thai Pilingrd rap-pnK-ltemeirl with ihr US mid enotl relations with Japan Immr of its dispolc with Momhsv.

ovlot-American War is "Inovlloblo'i4

Tin- Chinese Mi at tlelenlr from anolher tingle when thry Inrd lo dcmmislratc to Kurnpram llulotilil not sithai war wasmi lhat then-forr lliey would he insoh-tl Inolution.rcnrtl. lorcr rtilmltunt would git-ally soflen llieoviet -Hack. CIkmi and other Chim-M-owever,redibilityn trying lo ctmsincc European leatlersoviet-American war wasn. Chon angrily hammered away al litis lineiscussion wiih

AinlibY- Foretell Mh-ttrr Klrrlrw1ib.cr.-r. vrhe-loenlly iiltuellur- drlente .mil Iie-UiltiR tlml notovM WW Willi (he US. hul nhaiir tvllh Kuiope. was "Inevitable."

Chon formall/nl die Idea In Ills hi January MB re|mrl lo llie himlli Nalional PuiplcsNKO. luihlhiK lhai Soviel.Amcleai, rivalry "Is houndIi .id tu woritl war somel liar saone llnie.iu-iir.radrd die linr.gr nfvM threal In China. .muTtlng loan his rc-wi theit rrlerrmeurprhe attack, "par-tli-idarly- from the Mrl Union ug-hiviaie mid ntiiilc in reimrliug to ihc Parly Cum-revs Inie nn>dn hislslnl. as hehr Partyhm1 hihat llie Ihreiil Is loesi.

C. Tho US Nocloor Dolorronl for Europo il Unrohoblm5

Thriasv aho aiRiinl thai ihe USvml liis.dsiiorolam-jiean star with its noeharTills line li-mh lo tutiliadiel Ihr line ml aniiN-ricai.leaily the fearum.ilsemrily tinifernm-h-IiImi nt thr level olHmg.lhil Ihe Chinese ton cslractiMiit pleading.

Doriiig talks in ntrlv- ba-siljUliiy of warlait wiih rtaairia'fciaaai itttssfssMmirls wmM mrfoefc-ar wvip-mv. themausenedrd u> .ouipier and mcupyhed thai the Us'wimld mil risk ils own siirsival by improving lis nmlear miipmrtuvicl aguiessiou hi Kmnpr. llie Chinese concludedtnmg NATO was essentiallmtleiiciiluvict attack. Iml tl.al io die tmigniKht.-hiintig anand ereslililr nmbai Itanrts iiwn."

Tlie aunest-ed their menu 'aniel attackihia prol-ably wimW In- eon-veiilional rather lh.menmbat Ihe view among Kiinipean leaders thai Ihe US nuclear de-It-nrenl wtniltl pretenl any Siwiet attack. |mividc security for NATO, ami thus permit NATO emm.ot- their (meet. They have gone mi to

omtriidmerican war might well Ik-fought riillrelym-eulloiNiti>il tlml Kiiropeim sillies wi uikl mini large uiuvciilliiiml

ftHti.%

Tin' nmivni nf Mno almiit drtride mid -hhsIIiIc Western, finer nihietlnns (iiimI IIh* InipllentHNH nltrnrly Iuls Inijvetled lilm in Mum rNWNiul fnv.tr in Kiiriiprtm -mllileal flgiircs.im- ih-trnlc- Soviets _ii.il advocate strong Wi-Mfni deft-mes. Tims In- ha* -frnuliil personaltwo .midi iimmi. loimrr lVlnii' Minister Ilculh of the UK iiimIrlnisr Minlxler Slrum* ol Wnl Ctvnwiiy. Mao has ilom- this despite llr furl tlml they are pnlllliiilol ihr cm mil heads of gusummiil In Ian-don and Homi.

VI. PROSPECTS

The Chinesef Ifae Smhl mllltnry llwral today I* slmil of fear, ImI fiImi short of mmplairiiro. A* lim. Imiii win, Ihry icnigiilir llml Ihr .Suvli-tn limy Ih-tn! loer mil ol liivinlJUy aftrr Man's,iir.-mim.ihly. lhat sume Snvlcl lenders .night mlvoralerig mill-larlly hi Ihr hope llml tlisidf tiled groups in China wmihl oveilhrow Ihrdcishipim unite against Ihe invader, or in sitppoil ol some our grmip ol lenders wh.nn ihey lielirvril ur ho|hil to he iKo-Sosiel. Mori-over. Ihe Chinese vim-Is (onglcrm. Ihey mi- the slrat.ir.H- threal Irom die niHlh as prislsliiiK lor many years. Tliey seem also to In* wonieil fil-ml Ihe prospect ofis. .limit the rxitatision ol Soviet in-flueiiee in India. Ihe Smirt-lmliari Itealy. ami Ihe prcM-ner of Sovirl nasal noils in thr Indian Oeiaii, in tin- Sea of Japan, mid even In Ihe Taiwan Strait.

Tlie tniifiiml.il inn at ihe bolder,esult of Mini's desire lo contest leiritoty svhieli he had lefl uncoiitesliilecade alter ihe (minding of Ihe NIC. will probably extend al least lo tlx- time of Mao'slter Mao dies, Ihe nuiltcr of whether he really acted in China's natiomil mtcri-st or from reasons ol persinul alfnmt or cnitlcmpl idinnsl certainly will In- discussed withinuhr-ship, ami it is piolwhle thai some leaders will ar-lively nrgticol letting of tin- hard Chinese teniisement. The diiralimi of ihe border coidrmitalum al that future lime willdepend on like mi'urculer ship, as no one single lender will Im able to Imposr. hls jm-rMHiil poHey mi Ihe Part" In Ihe way lhat Midi Imlv. While Mao lives, liowever, lliere Is noi likelynivelling of Chlltrsi!,

f Hvlnj* wllh the Iwirdcr cuiifriHibi-llmiituation Inin* Chluesir me dniiinitieally Inferior mil only In nu-eliw weapons bat hi cihrvcntli.mil nrnuonetit. will probtilily cniilimir loide niiirgii* nt safely liyggressive action on ihr Isonhr. Tluil is. Iliere wMI be nulrolliim nml no shouting nlrder guards or river-iiasHgnlii.il seoikrrs.

An lni|mrtaiit aspect nl this pulley ofnvjci at luck Is lo kivp Ihe Sin-Iel lendersIhey seem to have been "Iter negotla-Itom starlet'mi sllll seemChinas mlliliiry |iusliire is defensive, us in fuel It Is. The Chine-so (iroliably will eoulinm* Id do this In several ways hi tin* mar fnlme.

Tims llies- ran hr cvpecfed loIn ns-oid deploylm; abciall In rruHinii lo Soviei border re-cnimaissaihithose- tracked svilhln Chim-m- airspace I

eaimoiis |hdky mayeillie Cliincse hatemd di-|iloy.il up-todate SAMs. Iiiasnmeli asrall military inlrriotily will remain. Th- Chinese pniluhly svill U- more rarclid lhan Ihe Smii-ts have Inmii Iheir own Inwder retimnalssamv lllgliis svlildn their own Icniloty.

Tln-j- iimlonbleilly will maintain Iheir publichia svill mil Ik- the lirsl lo .nltiK'kp.hieiil (wiih imrlear or eoiiveolioiialmIuk If iillaek.il fleavinc ll nnitiigiioos ss-lielher Ihe cmmlerattaikiilirely with consiitlii-iMl weap-iirs nr uImi with nuclearOn occasion, they may stale privately Iheir ii-.teiiHon In strike hack with whatever nuclear missiles they have deployed If Ihe Soviets sIkhiM iitlack Cliina Willi nuclear weapons. Ihisvcrcr. tin* main thnist of their piivate shilcroents proltahly will coutimu* to lie tliat theyossible future Sirviet attack will U- with convnilimid weapons, mamly arimw. Tliey probably also

mn Untie tii my tlntt Ihey tl" nut nnliclp.Hr any Soviet all.uk In tin- near future.

hey willIhrk rffnrl In eim-vlmv ftlRMMU lentlris MlmhlM NATO's cm.vi iiIIihuIln-iif-tli. (Iwlr apjieal prnlutlJy will have, little rllril.t- lurk In NATO will In-hrniemU-r* Ihrnnrlvn, a- will he ihr case In liny fiifn* rrdiutiinii TN' dtiw pace nfKiinijicnn ifrurlly cmih-rmer nn wrll tH niiiliml ImIiiihiiInn in'l,iirrp Ihr Chinese, on

it ice. MlUfkil Hint Mirjim will nolkit Iil lu (k'lll with lluAtly

dale.

Finally, ihrill pn.Uilily try lo vmUln

IIIkIN i'ii; iim.-ni.ni (uppin ll iu a IniiiMirii: llefniMit til SllVlrl iiltatk

linn Ctiiiw HsHf mil prm-hlr. Al IIm- uinm lliur. Prkluu will continue tu rniouriiee WmliinHliin In Iwrnt diplmnnlic lie* wilh Taiwan. Till* policyppi'kiih iii will emitiuitr In limit ihr drj-rre nf pt-miih*lhlr Chinese crilklMu uf llu* US. fllvine Ihls vr ilk-Ion lis HurcatncsaatlaMl Id tin- uiimiUftatrd poliimml atuoh mi ihr USSH, an nvouilt ili.ii liinTmililedly will continue nl Iravl until Man ihe*uliud<i Id uf Taiwan mtr way or amallirf. II ranprrlcd lu try In pmiMdr thr US tliat China firm ml nrrd ruppmclicuirut ill Uh- cmtill lu US d'liiiijcrnn'ul frtan TaipH. Should II emm-unce, however, ihrn IVkiio* nf lappruilir-mcnl with the US uRnlm! ihehreat wnuld protuldyhan tin- vakir nf early minrxaHmi of Taiwan, which could not much hrlpl.in/ ll;.

Chi new an- swan- fromi in thr lander rnnfruhtalMiu lhat tin- Itimlam. are not

ar wilh Chliui. drspllr llie USSM's ir'rrwlm-liuluK inilil.i) niprrkirlly. Thry mr itlvt nwhir (Im! llirrr will Ih* no milltunlmilmt ovrrwhrniiiiiAny willrrluinrd fur imuiyu nmir. Whilr they Imvr In CinrwW Ihr pmtlliiliiy thai Ihr StrvirH will IN milii- ittl'Mnloiv' iii uiakinK an nltai'k in ihr period Ilium dliili-ly IiiIIiiwIiiu Mnn'x dralh ur in wiinrthin- iif puuihr- rriUi, ihry ran enh i'ililh nmir cmi(hltiirr Hint tin' rents mm hi pnihahly hr regarded Ivy any Stivlrt Irnilrrship in prohiUllvrly jural. Tin!oviet attackla- iiinrli nmrr Hkrly li: rcinon-pliirlliii: latrnt pmSm-irl (ur, nlmicillalo-y) lurcri lu China than tu allract Imer"rMrr tn impute ii pni-SiMrlup nnd wnuhlnrkl opinion nvcrwhrlmlnuly nxaknnlirrrin-ii. llw- war nnild pintmhly not really he Him. as Sin-irl snp.-imnly in nuitrrl<'l nimld In- murtlnl hynaiipuwcr mid lie-Irnnliialliiii. ami China nuiM imt (nullkr Qarcla-mkw.iLU)ueli-arBIrs, Thran luttlhT (iid(jr that tin- ctmiinmiwiiM' Ihlni* lur Mmttnv to ilu is to wail, lo aura thr iltape ami Intel it nn ii of tin- pom-Mmi ir.idmhlp, to make inillalivev fur an iiiipiovcmrut in rrl.ii if iher lo wait fmmn tlmtmir wrinvirumiip. 1'nikinun |iii|Hiimurut wniiuyy pnliliriil ami rtoiHmilc im-anx.

InIhr Cli imappi-ar lu lwllnvIiir Imlh In Soviet caltutnllmis and llu'ir amno avutd iwirrirt iiiiht.irya|m- attack it utililrly, in either Ihr %lnui trim or thr ImiK Iriiu.

Original document.

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