NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE
ESTIMATE
PROSPECTS FOR CAMBODIA THROUGH5
THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.
THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS, EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT, AS FOLLOWS:
I lie following inlelligence organizations participated in Ibe piepatalion of lhe esfimofe:
The Control Intelligence Agency, lhe Intelligence or go illations ol the Deportments of Stale, Defense, ond Treasury, ond tha National Security Agency.
Concurring.-
Ihe Deputy Director of Central Intelligence representing the Central Intelligence Agency
The Director of Inlelligence ond Research representing ihe Department ol State The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency The Director, National Security Agency
The Acting Deputy Assistant Administrator for National Security, Energy Research and Development Administration
lhe Speciol Aishlant lo lhe Secretary of the Treasury representing the Deportment of the Treasury
Abstaining.-
The Assistant Djecc. Federal Bureau ol Inrettigotion
Also Participating.-
Ih* Assistant Chief ol Start lor Intelligence, Deportment of the Army
The Director of No<al Intelligence. Department of the Nary
The Assistant Cruel of Staff, Inlelligence, Department of the Air Force
PROSPECTS FOR CAMBODIA THROUGH5
PRECIS
The military situation in Cambodia is critical.
Tbe Khmer Communists (KC) have embarked on an ambitious dry season campaign aimed at closing the Mekong River.
They have severely curtailed the flow of supplies reaching Phnom Penh via the Mekong. At this point, thereoay supply of critical munitions items in the Phnom Penh area.
In conjunction with this interdiction effort, the KC arepressure on Phnom Penh in an effort to prevent theArmy (FANK) from reinforcing the Mekong front
For the first time, the Cambodian Government's (GKR) faces the threat of collapse from economic factors because food stocks will cover consumption only through mid-March if convoys do not make it up the Mekong.
The KC will be unable lo interdict the Mekong continuously, but delays and shipping losses will continueuch that the "heavy" airlift nowtons perbe required to supply the CKR minimum ammunition needs for at least the next few weeks.
Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of State believe that this heavy airlift will be required until the rainy season widens the Mekong in July or August.
The Defense IntelUgence Agency and the intelligenceof the US Army, Navy and Air Force regard this judgment as overly pessimistic. They believe tliat the GKR will order extraordinary measures to regain security along theand that some essential convoys will get through. Thus, they believeeavy airlift need not be as prolonged as the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of State expect.1
In either case, the risks to aircraft and crews will besince Pochentong airport would become even moreriority target for the KC.
Aside from this immediate supply problem, the GKR's ability to get through the whole of the dry season ending in August depends on its receipt of supplemental US military and economic aid.
If no additional aid is forthcoming, the military situation will deteriorate rapidly, starting in late March or early April at the latest. The economic situation will also steadily worsen. Inituation, pressures against the GKRettlement, even on KC terms, could become overwhelming.
If the GKR receives additional aid in this fiscal year, it should be able to get through to the end of the dry season. But this situation would offer little prospect of the GKR regaining the overall initiative and would allow the KC to further consolidate their control over most of the country.
War-weariness is widespread in Cambodia and increasing numbers of Cambodians are coming to the belief that there is no relief in sight.
The chancesreakthrough on the negotiations front are poor. Although they currently lack the ability to bring Phnom Penh downrontal assault, the KC appear to have the incentive, tenacity, and external support to continue the war indefinitely.
Department of tlie Treasuiy believe* that (beot sufficiently cleariding the piospeett for dclivpry of economic aid supplies up the Mekonit in lhe event llw necesinry fundingprovided.
discussion
THE MILITARY DIMENSION
The Current Situation. The military situation in Cambodia is critical. The KC have severelytlie flow of supplies reaching Phtiotti Penh via the Mekong River. CKR stocks of ammunition, food, and fuel are fast approaching the point where, wllhout additional supplies, FANK's ability to resist the KC will further deteriorate. KC forcesthe Mekong are well-entrenched alone, thehoke-point areas, and the KC are rtnw using mines against eonvo>'s attempting to transit llie river. Unless FANK can clear the banks of the Mekong and cope with KC mines, it is doubtful thai supply convoys will be able to use the Mekong on more than an occasional basis.
ewhere. fighting aiound Phnom Penh is below the level of early January, but Ihe KC are clearly trying to Step up their pressure un tlie capital, including Pocbentong airport. Thus far. lighting around governmentheld peosincialIn- been limited, allowing FANK lo diveil units to the Mekong corridor and lo Phnom Penh. With major insurgenl units likewise concentrated along the Mekong and aiound the capital, military activity In the countryside has remained at moderate levels.
Tht KC Dry Season Offensive. Tlie KC onaunched the initial phase of their dryoffensive with widespread al tacks around Phnom Penh and along the lower Mekong Outotal KC force00 combat troops,0 insurgents participated in Ihe attacks aiound the capital and0 were committed tn the effoit against lhr Mekong. FANK on lhe whole reacted well to the teocwrd pressure on Phnom Penh and has contained lhe KC in most areas aiound diehe KC,maintain footholds near Phnom Penh, and the city proper as well as outlyingPocbentongtargets oi KC shellings. Both sides have suffered heavy casualties in the fighting; FANK lostroops duringand KC losses are believed to be nearly twice as high
The situation along the Mekong is more serious, and no rcsupply convoys have attempted to move up the river frum South Vietnam since early February. With the exception of thenavy base al Neak Luongew isolated beachheads along Ihe lower reaches irf lhe river, the KC now control virtually all key riverside terrainointiles soutbeasl of Phnom Penh to the South Vietaiamcse boiihi In addition lo concentrating their firepower along fhe river, Ihe KC have also mined the shipping channel south
of Neakesult, only Ihree smallconvoys have reached Phnom Penh since the beginning of the year, and they took heavy losses while deliveringwo-weeks' supply of rice and ammunition to theourth convoy attempted tlie run uprlver on Februaryut it turned back to South Vietnam after losing several craft, some toajor effort will be made toonvoy uprivcr later this month. Tlie increasing reluctance of civilian crews and ship owners to risk the voyage, coupled with thedeterioration of the ground situation along the river, make it extremely doubtful, however, that significant quantities of supplies will reach Phnom Penh via the Mekong before next month at tbe earliest.
KC Strategy and Capabilities. At this point in the dry season, Ihe primary KC objective is clearly to close the Mekong and thereby strangle the CKR. The largo-scale KC attacks against Phnom Penh's outer defenses and increased KC pressure against CKB provincial enclaves arc at the moment adjuncts to the Mekong effort and are designed to keep FANK fully occupied and unable totbe Mekong front. These attacks complement the pinch on the Mekong by forcing FANK to cut heavily into its dwindling ammunition stocks and. by generating additional refugees, further strain declining CKR economic resources.
In implementing the initial phase of theirthe KC haveignificantly improved ability to coordinate large-scale military action on widely separated fronts. This is largely the result of an increased number of KC headquartersabove the battalion level. In lhe process of strengthening their upper echelons, however, the KC have stretched thin their limited number of competent battlefield commanders. As the fighting wears on and again takes its toll of KC cadre, command and control problems arc likely tu crop up again, especially at the lower levek of the KC organization.
The KC military forces lack the heavyarmor, and logistics systemonventional army, but arc svcll-equippcd with small arms,
' Wc lark detailed information on the type or quantity ol mines now in KC hands, but those currently beinfialong the lower Mekong were probably obtained from North Vietnam or China and may be fairly sophisticated.
mortars, recoilless rifles, and rockets.'1 KC unitslear edge in aggressiveness and cross-country mobility and usually come out on top when pitted against thinly stretched FANK forces defending lengthy lines of communication or oudying territory. Tbe KC, however, have repeatedly come up short in large-scale attacks agaiust the perimeters of Phnom Penh and provincial centers where FANK can bring its superior firepower and Its naval and air assets to bear. FANK entered the new fighting seasonumerical edge over its opponent. FANK's use of Its US-supplied artillery, air. and naval assets also showed continued improvement.
nformation on the KCs external sources of supply is bmitcd. although thereteady flow of supplies from KC warehouses in the northeast to battlefronts elsewhere in tbe country. We do know that KC "defense minister" Khicu Samphan this spring signed an apparently open-endedaid agreement with Peking and that the KC this fall renewed an arrangement with HanoiNorth Vietnamese logistics units deliver materiel to northeastern Cambodia in exchange for KC rice. These developments are in line with Sihanouk's private and public claims that the Chinese provide the KC all their arms and lhat North Vietnam fulfills its responsibilities merely by transporting the munitions south.
ven if Iheir present stocks arcand the heavy insurgent ammunition expenditures during tho opening round of the dry season Indicate theyKC may begin encountering supply problems as the fighting wears on. Iaist year, KC forces In some areas had to economize theirduring late spring as the result of overly heavy expenditures during Ihe early months of the dry season.
he Next Fete Months. How hard the GKR tries to solve tbe Mekong problem will depend
'Over the years tlie KC bateumbermm howitzers from FANK. These have been iLicdhowever, and with little effect, the one exception being tbe artillery attacks against Phnom Penh last spring.mm rockets ore use mosl otcn-sivily used heavy weapons in the KC arsenal At for the KC logistics system, tracks provided by the KCs allies and river craft transport material Irom entty points In Use north-twit to areas near battlefronts in other parts of the country. Under combat conditions, however, KC troops carry tiieir ammunition with them and are resupplird by porters. Unlike FANK, which has made extensive use ofI3 armored personnel carrier, the KC have nu armor whatsoever.
4
SFCTFT
in part on its perception of US support. Our judgment is tliat tbe KC will be unable tothe Mekong continuously, but delays and shipping losses will continue to be sucheavy0 tons per day) will be required to supply the CKH's minimum ammunition needs, at least lor the next few weeks (seeeavier use of Pocbentong airport will complicate Khmer air force operations and require additional facilities, equipment, and personnel. Moreover. Pocbentong would become even moreriority target for tlie KC. The risks to aircraft and aircrews will be substantial.
CKR STOCKS AS OF5
Tons Day*
VOL
tons per day,
MEKONG DELIVERY CONVOYS
1January -
5
(metrictcm)
.
Ammunition
he Central Intelligence Agency and theof State believe that tbe FANK will be unable to reopen the Mekong for long enough periods toeduction inon per day airlift before the rainy season widens the Mekong in July or August. The Defense Intelligence Agency and the intelligence representatives of the US Army, Navy, and Air Force regard this judgment as overly pessimistic. They believe that the CKR will order extraordinary measures to regain security along the Mekong, The FANK has the capability to provide requisite convoy security, but it is problematical whether it will be effective In time for the next convoy. Beyond this, the odds are that the GKR will get some essential convoys through to Phnom Penh. The heavy airlift need not, therefore, be as prolonged as the CIA and Statend tho Services believe that FANK uetermmation can
Ammunition . better measured when (lie next convoy starts up tlie Mekongeek or io.*
he Aid Factor. Aside from the Immediate supply problem, any judgment that FANK will be able to continue resisting tlie KC through the whole of Ihis year's campaignthroughbe predicated on the CKR'sreceiptilitary aid.5 million in military aid allocated for5 has already been spent. Assuming an average ammunitionofhort tons per day,storks already in Cambodia and in the pipeline will only last until late March or early April at the latest- With the implementation ofconservation measures FANK could stretch available stocks, but its ability lo do so is dependenteduced level of combat which cannot now be assumed If the fighting continues at its present levels and the US is unable to provide supplemental military aid, FANK would probably find itself unable to contest the Mekong and be forcedast-ditch stand around Phnom Penh before6 funds become available. If, on thr other band, FANK receives sufficient aid to bridge the gap between April and the end ofl should be able to get through to the end of the dry season.
II. the economic dimension
1 The Department of lhe Treasury believes (Jul theis not sufficiently clear regarding the prospect* for delivery of economic aid supplies up the Mekong iu (lie went the necessary [undine Is provided.
he Impact of US Economic Aid Cuts. The GKR's economic fortunes continued iheirspiralovernmentremained far ahead of domestic revenues and an enormous trade deficit again had to be met almost entirety by foreign assistance- Aldiough imports were shifted heavily toward basicprimatily rue andproduction and wartime disruptions in the transportation syslem resulted In continuedshortages lioth in lluioin Penh and pnrt'incial enclaves. These shortages and the budget deficitercent Increase in the cost nf Using for the second oonsocutivsr year, svhich againmost severely on tho Increasingly large number of refugees generated by the fighting.
The situation can only get worse under tltc recently imposed ceiling on US financed imports into Cambodia during7 million limit1 is almostercent below the amount of US economic aid appropriated in4 and aboutercent less than what is cousideredto assure adequate midyear food stocks and to prevent further declines in Industrial production. Under these restrictions, rice stocks in August are likely to approach near recordif the Mekong remainsthis will comeime when US supplies for further deliveries are relatively scarce. For the next several weeks, the pressures on Phnom Penh food stocks will be somewhat less severe because local crops have matured and are now being marketedhis will provide scant relief, hosvever, should the Mekong remain closed for sustained periods; even at new lower rationing levels, there are only enough government-held stocks on band to meet food needs through mid-March. The situation could deteriorate even more rapidly with further large-scale refugee inflows* or an outbreak ofspeculation.
Oilier critical supplies have also beenby the aid cutback.esult of both the present ceiling and high world oil prices, petroleum deliveries areoercent below4 levels. So far, stiff domestic price increases, rationing, and widespread electrical blackouts have keptfuel consumptionimilar decline in imports of industrial raw materials andgoods, however, has caused numerous factories in Phnom Penh to close down and those remaining open have cut back production.to lay off employees have already prompted some demonstrations by workers, and labor unrest will almost certainly uicrease as more plants cease production.
CKR Options. Ihe CKR is limited in what it can do to cope with reduced US economicTo compensate for tin; sizable loss in GKR income whirh derives from the sale of aid goods, tbe CKR could either dampen public spending or circulate large amounts of new money. The latter would only fuel further inflation, however, while the former would mean reducing the salaries of already hard-pressed civil servants and military personnel. Hice consumption cannot be reduced significantly as most Cambodians arc now atlevels. The CKR can ask for increased aid from countries such as Thailand and Japan, but these donors are unlikely to provide aid on the scale necessary in liglit of US aid cutbacks.
fn sum. the CKR is facing the serious threat of collapse from economic factors. As stocks of essential commodities inevitably decline, the GKR will have to take drastic steps, uicluding frequent closings of government rice distribution centers, and further sharp cutbacks in petroleumSuch measures would stretch available aid, but they would bring on massive unemployment, skyrocketing prices, widespread hoarding, anddemonstrations against the government.
iii. the domestic political dimension
US advice and past levels of aid,bas been able to maintain enoughkeep matters from coming unstuck onpolitical front. Nonetheless, the warassociated hardslilps haveoll.is widespread and increasingCambodians are coming to the belief thatno relief in sight. Some senior GKR leadersappear to be losing confidence in theability to survive.ecentAmbassador Dean, for example, Sirikthe need to bring the war to an endciting tbe waning support in the USfor Indochina. If supplemental USnot forthcoming, the military and economicwill deteriorate rapidly. In this case,against the Lon Noi government willIncrease. Elements in Phnom Penh mightforce tbe departure of GKR figures high onlist of "traitors'* in hopes that this would open
the wayettlement short oi completeTlie KC. however, would probably only readtepign of imminent internal collapse and push even harder for total victory.
Receipt of enough supplemental aid to keep its head above water economically and militarily would enable the GKR to maintain the political equilibrium. The GKR's victory at lhe UN las! fall has increased Prime Minister Longtature, and he continues to enjoy good relations withIxm Nol. Tlie alliance between the two, Buret's strong US backing, and his improved relations with senior FANK generals have effectively torpedoed the efforts of Lon Nol's controversial brother Lon Non toosition of influence.ontinuation of cautious and accommodating policy toward student, teacher, and labor elements in Ihe capital should minimize the potential for public unrest so long as economic problems grow no worse.
Al the same time, prospects for anyimprovement in government performancedim, Despite constant prodding from the US Mission and Long Beret's genuine efforts at reform, Ihe CKR bureaucracy is still as mefficicnt asrime example is tlie CKR's Inability, despite available manpower, to fill combat units, many of which are atercent strength or less.
IV. SETTLEMENT PROSPECTS
The poor prospectsenuine compromise settlement reflect the fundamental weaknesses of Phnom Penh's positionrowing awareness among its opponents that the CKR probablysurvive an indefinite prolongation of the war. Although the CKR realizes that the Communists wouldtrong handegotiating process, it nevertheless appears to have come to thethat its interests lieolitical solution sooner rather than later. Lon Nol this Summerall for peace talks which for the first time posed no preconditions. In the wake of the UN General Assembly's endorsementegotiated settlement, the CKR has been actively encouraging foreign mediators to helpialogue.
The GKR's weaknesses and itsettlement, however, only reinforce the KCs tough position on negotiations. Thestill appear convinced that time is on their side, that the level of US assistance to the GKR will continue to decline, and that the morale and internal cohesion of the GKR will eventually reach thepoint. During the summer and fall the KC embarked on an extensive effort to improveconditions in theirtep the Chinese in particular appear to have encouraged strongly. To line up foreign support for these efforts, the Communists in October dispatched an "economic and financial"first of itsPeking, Hanoi, and Pyongyang. In short, the KC are conveying the clear impression lhat they arc prepared, if necessary, to sustain the insurgency over the longer haul, and will continue to strengthen their foices and political apparatus, whileotal GKR military collapse or. perhaps moreKR surrender under the guisenegotiated settlement."
Si/ionotik's interests, like those of the CKR, rest in an early political solution to the conflict. Because of his relative flexibility and accessibility he hasatural target for foreign peace initiatives- The Iiard-bne strategy of his nominal KC allies, hosvever, continues lo keep the Prince frustrated by his inability to dirccdy influence es-ents in Cambodia. As the svar has dragged on. Sihanouk, in fact, hasrogressive loss oftrend most recently dramatized by the formal transfer of most portfolios in liisto in-country KC figures. Sihanouk, on occasion, continues to go to Ihe media in aneffort to encourage foreign mediation and greater KC flexibility.ecent interview with Swedish newsmen, Ihe Prince for Ihe first time publicly expressed willingness to accept elements of Ihe present CKR within an "expandedSihanouk's comments amountedairly direct advocacyao-style coalition as lhe basis for aarrangement he could hope to dominate because of bis stature among the Khmer peasantry, his undeniable political skills, and his international backing. But the KCs distrust and animosity tosvard Sihanouk coupled with his diminishing influence among Ihe insurgents would pose serious obstacles to his gaining the upper hand in any coalition arrangement.
Peking and Hanoi, through their bankrolling of the insurgent military effort, possess the leverage
that could force or encourage Ihc KC to soften their position. Without Chinese and Northsupport, the KC would be forced totheir position. But to date, Peking and Hanoi probably have seen little to gain and far more to lose by applying or tbrealeniug to apply these ultimate sanctions.reat extent, longer-lerm Chinese and North Vietnamese interests inarc rootedutual but competitive desire to maximize their own influence within theCommunist movement. As long as the KC are determined to press for complete victory and have credible hope of achieving it. they willremain the beneficiary of this Sino-Vietnamcsc rivalry.
will be in Peking's interest toinfluence over the course of any possibleso as touture Soviet positionand to offset North VietnameseSilianouk couldseful agent inand Peking probably desires that heimportant roleost-settlementChinese, however, would not wish toKCime when insurgent militaryon the upswing. Peking thus has hedgedby strengthening its ties with tbe KClow-keyed support for Sihanouk. AsChinese equities appear Io be wellthe conflict is settled on the battlefieldthe negotiating table.
Hanoi, the Cambodian situationa more difficult problem, complicated byrelationship of events in Cambodiaobjectives in South Vietnam andrelatively direct but not alwayswith the KC. Short-term Northare not necessarily tied to atakeover in Cambodia. In fact, Hanoi
come to sec some merit in anao-style coalition in Phnom Penh that could be used to step up the pressure on Saigon toimilar arrangement in South Vietnam.
At present, however, we see no sign that Hanoi Ls uiteresteduick end to theimpasse or (hat it is now prepared toeading role in bringing about CambodianHanoi's most immediate objective probably continues to be to ensure that no regime in Phnom Penh is strong or aggressive enough to threaten Vietnamese Communist freedom of movement in eastern Cambodia. Given the friction and occasional open conflict between die Klimer and Vietnamese Communists, Hanoi probably continues to restwhen KC attention is focused on the military struggle with the GKR and KC dependence on materiel delivered by North Vietnam is most acutely fell. More fundamentally, the North Vietnamese probably see little reason to promote peaceime when they clearly sense growing US Congressional disenchantment with therole in Indochina. By keeping the pressure on in Cambodia as well as in South Vietnam, Hanoi may hope to encourage this trend, reasoning that it would leadrowing erosion in Saigon's political confidence and military effectiveness.
In sum, the chancesreakthrough on the negotiations front are poor. The KC appear to have sufficient incentive, tenacity and externalto push the war indefinitely. If USassistance is forthcoming, the most likely result will be the continued survival of the CKR in Phnom Penh and its provincial enclaves through this dry season. But this situation would offer little prospect of the GKR regaining the overall initiative and would allow the KC to further consolidate their control over most of the country.
8
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SttJfttsL
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