THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF ITALY: AN ANALYSIS AND SOME PREDICTIONS

Created: 6/1/1975

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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central intelligence agency

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE OFFICE Of PCHITiCAl RESEACCH

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THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF ITALY: AN ANALYSIS AND SOME PREDICTIONS

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Thii paper reflects Information available through mid-Junen its preparation Ihe author consulted other offices of the Central Intel licence Agency and (he Department of Slate as well as rrwopiiied academic authorities. Their and suggestions were appreciated bat no coordination was

wffl be wekoa-ed by the Office of Political Research

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IX PCI

A- towductioti

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I!i B. Chile and Portugal a* Factors la PCI Foreign

C PCI Policy onranecj D. The PCI and Pan-European nsutufions

INTRODUCTION

More than most communist parties the Communist Party of Italy (PCI) poses problems for analysts who try to categorize it. There are those who subscribe to the "Trojan Horse" theory that every major move of the PCI is dictated by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and that such differences as may appear are designed by the CPSU to push an overt imageemocratic world communist movement which, in fact, remains completely under CPSU control. At the other end of the spectrum is the belief that the PCI is totally independent and perhaps shouldn't even bearxist party. The Party is unique, but it's not enough to say that its uniqueness lies in the degree of itshe "Italianate" nature of its ideology, the sheer size and diversity of its membership, or any other single factor. The reasons are all of these and mote; the wholeis.greater than the sum of its parts.

It is not only the western analyst who has problems understanding the PCI; the CPSU; and the communist parties of Eastern Europe seem to be equallyn theiddlc-cchclon Soviet

asked about Soviet competence

in esse ling rrenasin WMferrrrnirope. He said that S' Wet expertise and understanding were increasingly sophisticated except on Italy, .which the Soviets found difficult to understand.he official

^rZPR (Polish Workers

Unitythat

major difficulty which the PZPH and the UPbU had In understanding the PCI stemmed from then his view, tbat the PCI wasn'tommunist party at all. He commented irritably that it was difficult to get on the same wave lengtharty whose qualifications for membership seem non-existent: "Membership In the PZPR or the CPSU something to be striven for. Thererobationary testing period before the applicant is accepted Into full Party status. How can you even find out the real significanceublished figure

Commatof China hu no- problem. For it, theourfoli. EtUblimmcnt. party. However, the Chln-ae abvtoualy welcome acboni by the PCI which came problema for ihe CPSU in the Intel national common tit movement or for the USSR In IU paid for greater Influence In wlem Europe.

millionillion members when the PCI will take In anyonea membership fee? This is not the sort of communist jjj: '. H'

This paper will try loeel for the PCI as an organization

which, particularly after the successes registered in the5 Italian regional elections, seems likely to play an ever more substantive role on the Italian'and European scenes over che next several years,*

principal conclusions

The Nature of the Party

An increasing number of non-PCI voters, politicians, industrialists, clergy, and even government ministers consider the PCI toorce for stability w'^ose collaboration is not only desirable but vital innf with the economic and social malaise which afflicts Italy In the mid-seventies.

. In Ideology, makeup, strategy and objectives the PCI differsfrom other communist parties. The Party is numerically strong and increasingly influential in regional and national government policy formulation; nevertheless, it faces problems in holding the allegiance of the conservative (or "orthodoxnd "new left" portions of its base. Its approach to these strains is flexible and non-doctrinaire and differs very much from that of the Frencharty

(PCF) to similar problems in the PCF.

The organizational and personnel changes made during tlie5 XlVth Pauy Congress were designed by Secretary-Generalto increase his personal control of the PCI. The downgrading of Armando Cossutta, long considered to be the CPSlTs strongest ally in the top PCI leadership. Is significant Berlinguer's pragmatism and other aspects of his personal management style will be increasingly j felt In the planning and implementation of major PCI policies.

The PCI ond the CPSU

deological and programmatic differences with tbe CPSU go backo tho twenties. PCI ideologyubstantive modificationarxism/Leninism which CPSU theoreticians have never been able to accept. The XIHh Congress of tlie PCI9 marked an official exposition of many of these differences which went beyond Togli-atti's earlier policy statements on the necessity for each national party to pursue its own road to socialism.

During the Allende regime the PCI and the CPSU differed sharply in their analyses of the dynamics of the Chilean situation.

The CPSU has suspended frontal attacks on PCI "heresies" in the interest ofegree of influence over the European

muni'vcrnenl and theft in general. Thispapersontinuing CPSU distrust of the

The PCI and Western

j Pan-European Institutions: The PCI has long had high-calibrein the European Parliament. It has favored Italian membership In the European Community (EC) and has itself had high-level contact with EC components. Although PCI control over the largest Italian trade union confederation (CCIL) is by no means total, it has pushed hard for CCIL entry into the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) in order to enhance PCI influence in European labor. The CCIL application was approvedarking the first entryommunist-dominated trade union into the ETUC.

Portugal: Long before the5 events in Lisbon, the PCIaundiced view of Cunhal, the Portuguese Communist Party

(PCP) leader, fearing that he would pusheftist authoritarian government on the east European model. In the developingsituation, Berlin iter's public criticism of the PCP and his favorable attitude toward the Portuguese Socialists may lead to an open rupture between the PCI and the PCP. Although the PCI would prefer to avoid this, it may well decidereak is necessary if this ihould bere-condition of the Party's acceptance by the Italian Socialists and the Italian DCartner in government

! Spain: The PCI is pleased that the CPSU is mending its fences with Carillo,avorite of the PCI because of his continuedofarsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, his willingness to be an interloculator for the PCI with Peking and his advocacyluralistic society in post-Franco Spain.

. 'France: Giscard's razor-thin victory in4 presidentialwas the ideal outcome for tlie PCI, which hadlose Mitterand victory and consequent inabilityeft coalitionto function in the faceostile French Parliament Such an eventuality would have adversely aftected the chances for any eventual PCI entry into government. The Communist/Socialist relationship in Italy is quite different from the relationship of dtesc parties in France. This, plus other basic differenceshe PCI and the PCF, militate against any close permanent rapport or common program and go far to explain why the French and Italian communists followinternal and foreign policies.

The PCI and the United Slates

The PCI's view of the United States is still dominated by itsthat Italian foreign and domestic policies arc largelyWashington and implemented through the DC, whoseand rightist factions are believed to be controlled throughAmbassador. It thinks that the US is committed tomeaningful PCI influence at the national level and is preparedthe CIA toightist coup if such is consideredleadership also believes, however, that there Is nowof views among the PCI, the Socialist Party, all of(and some of the center) factions of the DC, and largethe middle classes to make It impossible for any rightist coup

The PCI, aware that its earlier anti-NATO standasicto improved relations with potential coalitionew years ago decided that it would not oppose continuing Italian partfei-

; pation in NATO should the Party enter the government.olicyurope without Woes" it has subtly changedolicy of

'etween the US and the USSR, andthat tlie blocs will not disappear in the near future.

TCI gains in trie Juneeclmns means that Bcrlingucr's line will prevail' within the Party.arshly critical US posture toward the PCI might well force Berlinguer to change his position to avoid the formation of an anti-Bcrlinguer faction within' the

The PCI li Government

If the PCI entered the government tt wouldelatively mod-crate line on Internal domestic and social policy which. In many

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coses, would be to the right of Socialist Patty positions. It wouldard bargain with the DC to ensure that the Partyoice in the administration of the giant parastatal enterprises which are largely the preserve of the DC and whichominant feature In the economic life and the foreign policy of Italy. It would not advocate further nationalization. It would not push for radical social and economic refotrns unless it were convinced that it enjoyed the supportubstantial element of theood portion of the DC at all levels. Thoandpoints to the leadership's commitmentluralistic society and to the parliamentary system.

The PCI, in consonance with its overall "Eurocentrist" policy so criticized by the CPSU, would use its influence within theto try to strengthen the EC and the European Parliament. The objective would be the creationore unified Europe moreof American influence. Worried lestolicy might also lead to increased Soviet influence in Europe, the PCI leadership would find it easy to approve NATO demarches involving die USSR in cases suchoviet military interventionost-TitoIn cases where Italian national security interests might not be clearly involved (asoviet-inspired blockade ofhe PCI would probably not go alongough, retaliatory actionby the NATOit would probably find itself in the company of a' majority of the Italian Parliamentood portion of the DC in takingtand.

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DISCUSSION

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ORIGINS OF DIFFERENCES WITH THE CPSU

j< i'i, lAnionlo Cramsci :!

j Ait iintlcr-tnndlng of the nature of tho PCI hai In beginealization that its ideology represent* a; substantive modification oflnlim which CPSU thcor-flcinns have new bom able lo accept. Antonio Cramsci, the principal founder of the PCI in IMI. probably owed as much lo thehumanist philosopher. Benr^ktto Croce. as he did to Mara. Engcls, and Lenin. Grarmct wai the secretary ol the Italian Socialist Party in TurinIhe Bohhevik Revolution. Although Ihe Rev. olulion certainly inspired him. he wru primarily concerned withheory of socialism applicable to Italianell-readCranisd was aware of the extent Io which pre-war Caarist soclcly and the Russian tradition ofwere conditioning factors in CPSU Ideological formulation and its program for the world communlit revolution; he felt ll wouldistake lo transplant CPSU organizational methods and goals to ihe highly articulated.Italian society. Despite Ihe more revolutionary Leninism of some of Cramscii early rivak Italian communism of Iho twenties was Largely cast In theuldhen he had won control of the Party. Successive leading figures of Ihe PCI. some of whom were Cramsci's fellow students nl the University of Turin, by and large shared Cranuci's view of Ihe necessity for whnl Togliaili was Io cull the Italian Rood Io Socialism."

The history of the twenties is full of incidents showing Stalin't deep-seated distrust of this Italian Road- Within the Comintern, Togliattiem-be. of theUecutlve Cornrnittee) and the PCI wa. targe* of vitriol* attacks, occasion-any by Stalin lumself but more usually by spokes, men for his views: Thaelmann and Ulbricht of the German Communist Party. Kuusincn of tho Finnish Party, and Mnnulliky of the CPSU. Cramsci. who had been imprisoned when Ihe PCI was banned by Mussolinias kept informed of theseDespite the Stallnlsl pressures. Toglialfi and o'.her PCI lenders, even In the intlinidnlingof Stalinist Moscow, seem to haveeasure of ideological and organizational incV peneSence. This was not accomplished in anyof cordiality or sweet reasonableness.

Those concessions which the CPSU wrung from the PCI in Moscow appear t. have been mnrle by Togliatti or Tascn fa PCI representative In Mos-cow) only when It appenred that the PCI stood in danger of eviction Irom lite Inlcmatlon^ movement

"Tail anllaa rhawi heavily on dnciruloniWm> J. B- Vrhan. aalhor ofcrhapa Iho beat analyw. of Ihe perioda nrarareh In CTSU and PCIl.rvnmUm aad lha "CWnmO- of

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speech lo Ihe PCI Centra! CommitteeA in which he criticized nol only Ihe Comintc-tn'j as-fciimctii of Ihe world situation but Statin's do-mcilk economic policies as well. CPSU pressure forced the PCX Io expeland pubtidy tohis statements. Hut the PCI's batic line had nol changed. As Togllalti said at lhcthe Calilco tradition: If the Comintern says it feati right, we will no sonjer posit it (but) each of us will think these things and will no longer sneak of them."

Indeed, barring arguments I* revolutio-.aryin the fectory councils ol Turin in the early days of Ihe PCI or lhe brief period of militancy Inh* PCI has been consistently "reformist" rather lhanach time the CPSU policy line has moved to the "liberal" side, as during the PopuW Front period of Ihe mld-lhirtles and the war-time coalitions of tbe early forties, the PCI has been out in front. In other periods of crisis for the CPSU and the International communistwhen the CPSU hai rcaocrtrd its traditional, "orthodcu* ttogma,PSU has devoted special attention tn the PCI nnd hast* advocacy of "socialisthis drop-seated suipidon of the PCI continues and1 was forcefully statedovalev. the hard-line CPSUwho propounded tbe Brezhnev Doctrine at the time of lhe Green Invasion. Kovalev equaled

o*cr lhc CTtciit toommunltt party should ndvocnle sociallit pluralism and/or democraticexcepturely tactical move In thecslapidly de^-toping rituabnn where revolu-tioniry takeover nf powerMill the diorl-rancr-objcclfvo. The sulMtaitre at Ihe PCIwascntnmllc jpivmuni-nl In llnly woukl ai Stalm fr-jrerl. heinceturn of Fn*dMit. Tbgtialli Mlraditional type of demnerullc ptveiumentcct'iury in orderave lhe way for thelalilvdimcntrder, -duchin-eollil-'talitm ol hrjre elements of lUr iStSst-exmMM< ilKt llihan cndi'ty In theaffcnriTl within snd oiitudr the Comintern in Sfcueow em thh (ten cral nihjrct,of the PCI wound up by maklne.

proponents of socialist pluralism, with the Czech revisionists and attacked "certa'n frntcmal parties" for believing that opposition purties mightto exist under socialism, j

' This basic conflict hat had5 manifestations in the attitudes of the CPSU and the PCI on the developing Portuguese situation. Bcrlirrguetsspeech to the XlVth PCI Congress inomment Ing on the events in Lisbon of that month, stressed the PCI'i advocacyluralistic society and criticiird the Portugueseanning of the Portuguese DC More recenthave seen the intensification of the dispute. The Portuguese communists have publiclya forthright Stalinist position and the PCI is' publicly denouncing them. The CPSU has pri-vatolyIhe PCI and, using the French Communist Party as its mouthpiece, has rru.de this criticism

i'iTHE PCITHE !

Anoea "A" of Red fasoar and Frmpecu In ltd,.

"Cetting ahead in Italian' communism seems to require an earlyniversity education and bardha judgment, madeL is stillhe PCI leadership by tradition fa heavily intellectual and its origins middle or upper middle class; eg, Togliatti, Longo, Berlinguer, Napolicano. Ingrao. Bufalini and many others. Even wherelass origin has been tho peasantry or die industrial ', proletariat there is almostniversityCnmscl himself'.Is anchild of ^Sardinian peasants, he went through theofcholarship. (By contrast, the PCF leadership has usually borne from the working class, esajj, Wakleck-Roclx!tJ Marchali Thorcz.hroughout Iheir Party enrcers tho PCI's top leaders continue Io keep up to date on tho points of view of.other parties and groupings. National andleaders can be described as "broad gauge" as opposed to their more "provincial* French cotm-treports. Themselves open to the problems of all classes, they read widely In economic and political journals and in Ihe foreign press. Tho PCI Head-quarters, for example, gets ForfignThe New York Timet, the Home Dally American as well as the leading western ond eastern European Journals andthe Headquarters leadership reads tlicrn. At else kxnl level, surveys Indicate tliat thrro fourdii of tlse local PCI politicians read in ihc non-commuDfat press. (Only one-third of the local French communist official* do so.)*

PCToinciils slaTe Ihat IhellicJalol today is more sophisticated than his predecessor of the fifties. However, there Llingering intellectual contempt on the part of some PCI officials for the CPSU apparatchik, which, to some extent, is aofreatment by ihe CPSUhis often comes out in the form of statements lie "Ibe Russians don't understand Italy, don'twestern European trends, and therefore don't understandhere It another, leu publiclyreason for this PCI attitude: ihc PCI Icadcnhip fx aware thai detente gives theood excuse for culling tlse PCI out of discussions on global or'Europeanhere the PCI feels it can and should iriake substantiveInor example, there was an international conference In Brussels tc which the CPSUelegation, headed by Vadim Zagladin, Deputy Chief of the CPSU International Department. The PCI delegation included, among

"TVre have brea mrnk recantvorbca on the behavior aad tiutade* ef "CIF local officials. One af the beat Is an oapubluhru appraisal hr Professor StOnry

Ttrrow efiuOmiU

at lha Loral Level In fiafw andarrew'a work formi partntes of studies to be Incorpooledook scheduled for publication lo5 by Princeton VrwVenflr Preas.

iiorgio Anwndnh from (he Politburo,CI ^cimoiniii. Eugcnin Pctwu. Thel Home for Brussels early*

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A. Tha Leadership's Marrogemaril Style

Despite occasional appearances of disunity at the top, the PCI leadership is fairly wellarticular line has been laid down as policy by the Secretariat the leadership closes ranks and works to'get that line accepted ak'all Party levels. Soviet and east European communist analysts, as well' as weatnt nliaervt-s, often tend to construe Ihe occasional cjen divergence of .views ofPCI

jfillj ;

ihe3 XlVtfa PCIi*.was composedecretariatemberi,7 member Directorate andof SOS mrwibm. ADembersrneanbrri of the Politburo, all Politburo memberilha Directorate, ate. Tbt araeS SeerrtarSat has Hiand ta Soerria neat anatae. ThawaabaanrwuncedXIVthhad not met aa often aa the>oi prrhapt mora Important la trrma of betni theat which disparate *Mwa at re aired

and Ironed put to form the policy "line" ef the Party on a

given

{Jut

yvtnrrusually exemplary. If Is certainly immeasurably greater than can be found in any other Italian |pou'tfraJ party.

Toe leadership is able to maintain thitunity for three basic reasons: first, during more than fifty years the post of Secretary-General has been held by only four men aod transfer of power has always been accomplishedmooth and orderly fashion, ihus avoiding the sort of top-level Infighting which has occasionally troubled the PCF; second, Ihe basic philosophic and programmatic content of the PCI's "Italian Road Io Socialism" has been preserved virtually Intact overyears; finally, the PCI management style is chared crt red by great Oodbslity.

This fleifbility derives from the Wsvdershlp's awareness lhat Italy, despite moreundred years of formal unity. Isighly fragmented country. The PCI derided In the early forties to permit considerable autonomy to provincial and regional federation In following varied tactical

I, routes lo, dtctmas.

problems in the formulation or ciccu-tion of Headquarters policies arc often nipped in the bud by the constant travel between Home and the provinces by provincial and Headquarters(including Secretariat membersuch travei isorale builder in the sense that the local organiiationt are aware lhat thes local officials often refer to tlie Rome Headquarters, Ii open to their problems and views.

flrrffngr/erV phllr-'ophy and perianalstyle: For months before the XlVth PCIwell-founded rumors were circulating within PCI Headquarters that Berlinguer was "tooand put excessive reliance on gettingfrom various Party directing organs before making decisions. Berlinguer was aware of thehe was acquiring and. at tho Congress,out changes he had long wanted in order to achieve tighter personal management of the Party:

tu tlto leadership abort aspects of overall I'OI policy which msy beegative effect either locally orunctian.il jnrisdtction.

Seeraiary General ol the PC

he abolished lhe Politburo and made some key personnel shifts in the ruling; Secretariat. Thertion of the Politburo seems to have been motivated by Berlinguer's belief that it was tlterc that he had been Tiost often put under pressures by "old guard- conservatives such as Armando Cossutta and ClancarloThe new Secretariat is typified by cfficuL such as Renin Trivelli. whoistory of working effectively wilh non-communist parties on regional problems, has accompanied Berlinguer lo Moscow, and seems to shareesire to lay out realistic policies which can bein the Europe and Italy of today.

Berhnguer's removal ol Secretariatey man In the top levels of the Party and the only PCI leader for whom the Soviets haveind word In tlte past five years,old move and the rather brusque manner in which it was carried outicwly-found self-confidence on Berlinguer'ihisreceived another boost following the massive Iricrease in PCI votes in the recent elections and leads to the conclusion. that the Party leadership WSJ carryersonal stamp much mora

in (be future than it has in the past.

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Although Berlinguer Is described as "pragmatic" by PCI officials and by non-PCl officials who deal estensively wilh the Party, hells not without dear

philosophical or strategic cxmcerrts. His writings.

I'- Fokibwa which .uamnaajawParent Secchli owd ai th* foram for arsons pro-CFSU' docoiae lo tha Oayi af Teedbttt TW aaw Smrtartatath mkrr wnblbral eorrf to oW "old dayi- when tbe CHU had leiproponent! In theierarchy.

"DaplteinMUlol cmhhv it th*

nolle? he received tliat habrma; removed (torn the SocfMaitil. h*rutted Party eoDeaaw lhal "prnonal <wmtion* nra now clowd andp to Indtvldutli lo nippoet ih' policy of lhalgnlficant lhal Brrlfneucr ohvtoudp Milt nuardi Comilli'ihaalclilahlr to have rlnce Riven him the Important port ol Section Chkf liar Pnloiul andiin la the Party

, speeches, and private conversations aB point lo the sincerity of his goalluralistic, socialist, Italian society in which tho PCI willajor, but not necessarily even thoolitical force-To attain that objective; he believes that the PCI must persuade lhc DC (as Ihe ma|nr polillenl force In Italy) of the wisdom and necessityeftward shift In Ihe conservative policy of the current Fan fan! leadership so that these can he meaningful collaboration with the PCI at all levels; the Le, "conditioning* discussed in the neat chapter but formalized and carried much further to result in the "hbtorice thus rejects the concepthegemony of left lorces" or tho "union of the left" which forms the basic rationalo for IheProgram" of lhe PCF and the PSF in France.

CI's "CONDfTIONING">OLICY '

he PCI clearly jconslders Itsits parlismcntaiy strategy to bethe Party's impressive electoral recordof tu conditiaoing efforts onPolicies.ord roost oftenPCI^

and strategy of inesofgcn-rrnmenls toward adoption of policies favored by theo under, stand bow dns .condittotsmg works and the goa' it Is designed to achjesT. its worthwhile 'examining the manner io which the PCI. has operatedrl.arnentary party foruarter century.

A. lha PCIarSamanhary jPorty

j|j] PCI partJcipabon; in the parlia-

llmenlary system Is quite different from lhat ofCommunistCFJ the'onlymass communist party with a' long history of.actuationarliamentary democracy.'the'Fourth Republic and even! duringPopular Frontjlhe PCFin Hs parliamentary role; it wasparliament but not of it The PCI. oncontrary, has wottedmighttbe system and hasparliamentary gameannerabor party than of aThere seems ncehing nmotehr similar mear^ftrooe. Tbe ease. frftruevKr, smkI,mrimecy, of day-to-day contact betweenand other parties on >He businessjust don't exist in France. For theyears tor example, PCI members ofCommission ir. the Chamber ofbeen'ihown preliminary drafts of the bodgetof its formal parllameritajypfrawtfltionBudget Minister. Their commentsdiffonnces of opinion ironed oht beforeto ensure that the PCI wiD noti'.j.

aaVan'Oiisssssuasri Party wa. In Pa.li.meM for severalprior lo AKntdei overthrowi.Hne

" m ra

U Ihai al ih. PCF. Tl- Flanlih IWy V. ah*oo. htMoryerwotaUo-lhe rarraaWlirUlkmm aidut -Srhln iholy imoIBd conarrouveatcaJ. lo

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Ihe budget's passage In the Chamber.PCI deputies and other partyheld on jubstanUvc lliucs such as Italianin Africa. These conversations lakeonly in the various commissionsChamber but also inmi

-id of otherin the Chamber exchange views with, -nd get advice from, PCI deputiesariety of issues ranging from focal and labor policies to theion in Portugal

supplementaryexchanges, informal conditioning takes place di-

rectly with key yovrrnroent officials. T

Marxists; however, the long-established pattern of openness to collalioraticm and compromise seems lo haveecidedly diluting effect on their mlli-toncy. This possibility is something lhat bothers many of the PCI rank and lite, and is discussed below.

IV. WHO JOINS THE PARTY ANO WHY

Consistent wilh Togliattfi understanding that no radical transformation of Italian icseiety was pos-

A

tpercent ofIn thr regional elections ofarty4 percent of thet got in0 regional elections. Itfeats in the Chamberwo-thlrdi o! the number hcM,by thedan Democrat) and about as many fcs held byother partiesefore thotmost cases intheof theegions ofso-called "lied Belt" of Tuscany.f therovinces andpercent of all municipal councils. To"range of popular support it bos opened itspersons who never would have beenMarx, orbefoe Party membership in an advancedsociety. Only half of the PCIfrom lhe industrial working class for3 . ;ll.-

the forties and fifties Italian and other wesiern analysts of the PO tended to emphasize V'her poverty or alienation, as the [primo1 reason* why Italians joined ior voted for the aftJ;!leV

iruaeup ot id*electorate is not radicallyfrom that of the DC electorate. "Both run tbe gamut from low to high income, education and status. At times of economic upltirn and liscreascd prosperity.lhe |PCI voto has risenace nol substantially different from that shownlodi of economic recession. IT one applies' education and income factors there is an even move striking display of the Inapplicability of lhe old Lumpen-pfoletatial school of analysis of communist voting palterns. Reliable studies of the late sialics and early seventies sliow that Italian votersvc low Incomes and no education beyond elementary school tend to vote for the DC and parties of 0*

so many Italian Join the PCI?

Dalian nldien marchingemonstration In Milan5 in protest ogoinil "neo-Fosclst" terrorism and coup preparations. They are mosked lo ovoidThe banner readsou there it no lomorrowi We ore soldiers ond we sholl

i ]if; ijrj:-iyi!='

hen they wore in. their teens. Includingleader:Eorlcocniallys the fact that many non-PCI partisans wereades-ln-arms or were allied with'the PCI inegotiationsepublican structureofly. Silvio Leonardi (one of the PCI's top economists, member of the Budget Commission In Parliament and member of the PCI group Inuropean Paruamcnl) says tbat his high regarda Malfaerson and. as'a statesman

back,to the late thirties but was crystallisedie resistance. Tho reverse^ also seems

La Malfa and other non-PCI figures such asresident of tbe Chamber, Sandro PerOni. have an

apparently genuine esteemochvldual PCI

leadersroved anti-Fascist background.

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B, Fear of Fatciit| j

There is today Inidespread fear that nco-Fasciil elements arcoup withupport of right-wing memberi of the security services and the armed forces. Although the chancesuccessful right-wing coup are almostufficient number of coup preparations have been uncovered by security organs and public!red in the press toelief in the populationery real Ihreat exists. This belief was fueled when It wu found that the spatebings and terrorist attacks, which began Inthe far right more than the far felt. Glulio Andreotll was Minister of Defense In (he Humor government. and. as such, had ultimate Jurisdiction over tlse intelligence service of tlse armed forces (SID) and its counterespionage! arm. Arsdrcotti ptishcd an investigation of SID lorpigeonholing of evidence pointing to the eitreme right as the major instigator of Italy's wave of terrorism. The PCI, which had long been publicly advancing Just this theory, now poses as vindicated In Its initial judgments. An Increasing number ofl Italians givelus for 'a corresponding minus to those DCwho were so slow in coming to the same conclusion.

C Competence ond Dedication of PCI Officialsountry where corruptionUrnlelitmo are traditional and widespread, the PCI gets high marks among Italians for the honesty and efficiency with which Its officials carry out their tasks inpublic administration. The examples ol the Itologna municipal administration and the administration of other towns and regions under PCI-dominated councils are well-known. Indeed,ime of chaotic municipal administrations in many DC-dominated cities, the effectiveness of PCI localLs rarely challenged, as the5 election resultstudies on the attitudes of local PCI politidaru have concluded that Ihe PCI mayor or reglonol councilor sees the wull-bcing of his locality as rhe prime objective of his job.

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D. Responsiveness Io Ihe- Mood of the Couniry ! The TCI'i Image of modernity In the area,ocial motes and social legislation is piovingtractive to an Increasing nunilior of formerly'CI luliaiis who no longer buy all tliei iioctrines. The classic example ofhanged mood was1 tvferrndum onCC Sccrrtary Fanfani. against the wishes of innst of his advisors, as well as of manydttraU. chose to succumb to pressure from con-

mcnuVri of tlie ItaUan Councilishops and go to the couniryeferendum

itetJier Italy should continue to permitThelaw permitted divorce butrryrrrtrrrtiveioeighevices Misled lorferrndun: and therged iIk- DC to use (hem (fearing thend lntra-|iarty Uce-nlKnisampaign onanfani was adamant. Once the issue was joined, tbe PCI went all out and campaigned with

:thctd other lay parties In favor of divorce.

. Tho irfily ally of the DC was the nro-Fascist (MSI/

Party. Tim DC and the MSI tried to depict the PCI as "onli-famlly" and to tuin. the Issue

nrty-politlcal one. The result ofesounding victory for pro-divorcernentshattering defeat for Fanfaniand for the DCarty. Most analystsin the PCI) do not Interpretultsmassive vote of confidence In the PCIbutt'rather as aa: opportunityItalians took to get across the messagethe Church and 'he DC that Italianmove wilh the times. However. Ihe, PCIits positions on divorce, women'sigher percentage of women in Partyposts lhan any other maior party),of the voting age. and other socialtrandalc into more votes for the Party, orforce the. DC to move leftward In Itsprograms. |

Hitforcing the PCI'a image of modernity In the area of social mores is Its stand on theproblems nf housing, transportation, schools, hospitals, and bureaucratic and tax reform. Even respected Italian commentators known for their "distrust uf the PCIcknowledged lhatentlest PCI ptcsMiro hasajoror most of tbe progressive reforms of recent years.

Two powerful PCI officlolt of lha "Rednolo Zongheri (Mayor of Bologna) and Guido Fanti (PnaiWenl of the EmUHjJtomoana

The tax reform campaigns of the PCI find anaudience among lower and middle classes; the more topi'1st rcatcd in thb audience in-errosingh/ note that the PCI has done its homework when it proposes specific solutions lo this and other problems. The most effective nitty-gritty solutions advanced4 for making order out of chaos in the Italian postal system were those ol PCI parliamentarians and tlie PCI official organwere so recognised by many DCIn private and by some non-PCI journalists In the press. And.ime wh'n the issue ofreformront page Item abouteek In the naiional press, anoman who lives in Piacenza confided that she goesospital In Bologna "because, you know, even though it's mo by ewnmunlsts" "it has the best medical care; and it's so wdl administered."

E. The Law and Order Issue

In an era of Increasing crime In Italy, the relative freedom from crimei of violence In PCI-adinin-

tommrnlcdIn Jry nboul every day. Lust rtk 'robberies in Bologna

pa

Itorrl

year there, tvero Ba bank 'robberies In Bologna and-no Incidents of violencetreet demotutta-rionvl

prove

ifcuuiu, in iu jjiriK^nbis^te^ im-(lie Party's image of respcctabiUly among ons of (ho populalion' and the government 'h have traditltmoJIy feared "the Reds."

1V. THE PROBLEMS IN "THE 'WITH THE RANK AND FILE

Despite in impressive electoral ihowiog and its !influence within theto some eitent oecuujc of thesePCI leadership continues to have problems io getting the base of

: the Party to compreltcnd Its strategy and to endorsehe "historic compromise" Is simply notby many rank and file Partyor even by some local PCI leaders. Depending on their point of view, many members of the base feel It isellout to'me'bourgeois Estab- ;

: ushment; Ihc begfsoingeutralist policyis the'Soviet Union, oc proof that the Party has

tagnart bureaucracy indistinguishable

iltmmi_: -

i mmy wmn yiVHiwnw wi. IIS^ DJUO |WJUC pcnUBding

'potential'coalition partners of its "responsible*ureajor challenge to ihc flexibility and pragmatism .which characterise the Berlinguer leadership. Berlinguer wasware of this early on, At tho XIHth Congress of Uio PCI !in Marchrepared text to over one thousandfrom all of Italy, he outlined th- PCI's program for "an nlliancc of all peogiessive forces-communists, socialists andnchlcvc the transformation of Italiane paused far applause. It came, but onlyost per-lunclory mariner. Ilerood orator but without any particular. demagogic: stylo or flair, then Inserted "but It Is the PCI which must remain in tlie leadership of thisills is what Ihe delegates had come to hear and they were on their leet roaring approval. Another incident cf more recent vintage:5 meeting of ihc Trnstcvcrc Section of the PCI In Home, the local leaders tried to captain the Intricacies of thecompromise" lo members by way offor Ihe XlV'th Congress later in theoman in the audience listened patientlyime and Ihcn said,ord one almost never hear; any mom inhatever happened to ourucureflect the basic streets within the rank and file and the extent to which these strains affect leadership policy today.

A. Allegiance to the CPSU-Tho "Orthodox"

There arc no reliable statistics on Ihe number of PCI members who believe that Ihc PCI should be less liberal and more orOwdoa, but the usualo'oercent scerrts not far off ihc mark. One must distinguish between those who areIn terms of the internal policies to be followed by tbe PCI ia gamingthose whose orthodoxy is focused more on the jextent Io which Ihe PCI should bo moreinked to the CPSU in (Is foreign policy. Obviously therearge overlap; most of them probably agree, for example, that Derlinguer and the leadership should stop making public statements that the PCI would not advocate Italy's withdrawal from NATO even if it were to come to power al the national level. They are alto confused by such statements as Dial of Central Committee member Nllde JocU at tho5 Congress of the Vtasua PCI Federation that "the PCI favors the political unification ol Europe without American or SoofclEmphasis4 the PCI rank and file members have had drummed Into them the propagaraa that tbehe rnothcrland of communism, Ihat it supports democratic revolutions nil over ihc world and that it is in lire vanguard of popular forces aimed ntjtoppUig Americanfrom dominating Europe. It is veryfor them now to accept anymatter howthe CPSU on the part of their focal and national lenders. The nationalaware of this, has usually been careful to insert statrrrsents of gratitude for, and praise of, the CPSU in policy sutemenls enunciating the deter-

-

irthsaliori of (lie PCI to follow lis own path to socialism. The great majority of the base. Interested in the PartyV Betting Into national power to the point where It can better implement ill objectives, teems willing to buy its leadership!s to why tlie parliamentary and thehe only way this can come about- But there are some in the hard-core orthodox croup of the base wlio remain unconvinced, and theroubled as to bow to handle the problem except by continual and subtle cmphasii on the wisdom of Its policy In the peculiar con-dibon* of present-day Italy.)

ha New Loft

Although the PCI leadership publicly minimizesthreat of lhc "New Left' it has privatelyery disturbed by the problem and how! toith it. This'Is somewhat surprising given1 the fact jthal 'New Left" elements have not done well elec-:torally. gettingercent of,the vote in thehe leadership's concernor It axe worth examining because of

:the

'their Implications for future PCI strategy: In Italy and: Europe. |

y thr Ijejp'nning8 there were many in the PCI's elite who were already complaining that traditional PCI and traditional CPSUere not attuned to the wmrr.li of the sixtiesurope. The llunprian. East Ce*man, nnd Polishad led to con si limbic iotra-Party debate and dlscassion at all levels. Some Party figures were having problems with their teenage offspring, who felt the PCI and the CPSU were ideologically and organisationally sterileThe universities and high schools weretate of fermentind of populistwas Jn the air. With thisS saw three maior events which have left un Indelible mark on thehe "Prague Spring" of

rite of "Communismumanwas enthusiastically welcomed by moil of tho PCI leadership and base, nol always for the samehe "May (evolution" in Prance, culminating in lhc events at Nanlcrre and lesser revolts In Italian universities, appeared to many lonique alliance amongstudents and workers to begin to change "the system" Then came the PCF decision to back the French governments denunciation of the Nanlcrrehis action had ill weaker counterpart in the comment by Amendola of the PCI Politburo to Italian students tha: "the days of going lo tlte barricades arelie crusher svas tlie Warsaw Pact invasion of Chechoslovakia inArmy tanks In Prague and theof Dubcekeactionary regime which was manifestly the puppet of the USSR. Atheme In the Soviet response to the Crech sifalion war the CPSUs promulgation of theDoctrine, asserting tlte right of Sovietin socialist countries whenever there is dangercounter.revolution."

During and nfler this watershed yearS, there were continual intra-PCI debates which cub mlnalcd in9 Xllth PCIof lhc stormiest In I'CI history.terms of hierarchical position Politburo member Pietro Ingrao wasthe most influential adherent of the view that the totality o'8 events showed the necessity for rethinking the PCI's reformist policy. Both during and after the Congress ttroup of "Ingraoianf who were the most articulate criticsCI leadership which they felt had failed lo grasp the opportunity to channel the revolutionary sentiments in the European "New Left"ruly radical transforation of the trad it inn.tl Hate apparatus. Tl.it gronpj"

.verc also rursiiiy tjtjttcsi or sue isTemrsTr-rcvolutlonary" actions in Ciecho-

Slovakia.ong inner-Party trial they were expelled from the PCI. By all indications the Longo/ Berlinguer leadership dfd its utmost to avoid this drastici.ombination of the groups stubborn refusal to recant on any major Issuereat amount of CPSU pressure made expulsion unavoidable.

Sartre describes the PCF action ai "ravJna French capitalism." . '

20

Roue no fiouando.h* leaden ol In* Manila if a

! it

The group, which now callednd beganaily newspaper by thatonned an' orgaruxabon iand. an tofonnal gruop of tnesnbers In tho national Parliament.it ran an independent slate of candidates In the national electionshe intricate Italian electoral system pivfvented It fromits votes Into any parliamentary seats. Tlie group wu thus wiped out In terms of formall representation at the national level. However,continued to have on influence strong beyond Its numbers. Inhe Manifesto groupand merged with the Pnrty of Proletarian Unity toew party called tho Party of Proletarian Unity for Communiim which remains, howcter. tutcally Manifesto In orientation and eprteol*

jSrnjJlcnyi sale wa ihall me "th- Manllerto" In h> feerlniihti party, particularly since ihu It still the way bi whichfttri refermcl to In Italy, li'

Tlie oilier major eslraparlinmenlary leftist grotip Is known as Lottohe Continuingtdhirty-three year old funnrr PCI memlier. Adrirtno Sofri. It Is more tightly knit than tho Manifesto group and.he Manifesto, eschews violence. It conccntiates on prosclctyiing In the armed forces and In tlse prisons; In ihe prisons it has been rcspontiblc for significant detnoristra-tions with political overtones. The PCI regards Lorn eontinoanignly than II docs the Mntii-fata, and is optimistic thatmbcrs MS he brought back Into the Party.

Why has the top leadership been to worried about thexytto conrintaa? rust, because they speak to the PCI rnembership in terms which the membership understands. They ridicule PCI claims tovanguard" party nnd the Manifesto, particularly, duca so in articulate and unusually clear Mai Jt terminology. For the most partleaders are highly intelligent people with Impeccable records of service to the PCIhey and lx>tta continua have established contact withamentary groups in France. Portugal and olhcr countries- Second, they np^eal to the leftist youth of Italy. Third, the Manifestos paper. II hlanif.tto, is widely read, not only by the non-PCI Left but by PCIoreover.

rivate

aja raawayimuuaV lo the

- room of the PCXs Ciimxl Institute, belna paued from hand to hind. Similarly, at meetlnrn of local CCIL unlona copter, ire often. the

despite ill ideological and programmatic stanceleft of tho PCI, tbe Manifesto publiclycondemns Ihc terrorist use of violence"crsiies* in some of tbe far-left splinterLe, it has rateceasfxilly avoided being lumpedthese groupsunc when "law aod order"of major concern to the great majority of{Lottaof its inability to control

its left fringe. Is leu successful in thboncern of Ibe PCI for Uie threat posed byanifesto group is perhaps best illustrated by thefact dial It Manifestoi criticism of some of the PCI leadership for early support of theanfani for Presidentorced tbe Party's

leadership to dropen of Fanfani.

H ; . . - ]

ho Response to the Threats from the Left

The nature of the PCI response Io tliesegain shows the fundamental difference In tcrn-

anient and organizational philosophyhe PCI and die PCF. The latter has showncoiilliy toward organizations, such as Alainine's "Communisthich have gained

ndttle evidenceositive effort by the PCF to compromise with

.them and/or to beep in any sort of closeith.their elites. Tbe PCI, on'thc other hand. Is peonstandy mlriking of how it can win back Its

;iost sheep and. moreow it cantructure its programs to recoup die prestige it

Inst with tbe youth and tho momof its base. During the XJIIth Congress of the PCI

n Milan2 Banana Roisanda. ease of thedeputies to Parliament who had been expelled j. from tbe PCI because of her iosutersce that Itorno' trulyrequently met with

1 |MTp ;i: ;

ciple it seems clear that the PCI and the Manifesto will cooperate and collaborate on Items of common ccocern. Tbe PCI eventually fucceeded in getting Lotto continua support for PCI candidates in the5 elections. Further,nown that the PCI has not given up hope of "redcfectjng" most of Lotto continua and at least some of the more senior PCI apparat members who joined Manifesto.

Two aspects of the5 elections give the leadership cause for satisfaction: estraparllamcntary left groupings which ran candidates garneredercent of the voto, and, much more imperials! for the Part" fas lite long, run.oercent of the new-ly enfranchised youth (personsoho were voting for (he (list time) voted for the

pa.

ho Response lo lha "Orthodox-After the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia the PCI leadership decided to test the reaction cf its base? to die event and fennel.

igmficanl number IRiijs ubsc was sympathetic Io the invasion -because the USSR must have had Its reasons.'

IIK'IIVC

ousiy ine vrnc-ui ureof the CPSU by Magri, Ingrao. Rofsanda et al, coupled with pub-be evidence of extensive support by tbe Pa base for the Brezhnev Doctrine, would have put tho Party In complete disarray. As It was, the PCI leadership had to suffer tho loss of the Manifesto group on Its left; to have been forced" to deal at tho same time with an organized pro-CPSUamong its base In any conceited orfashion would have been beyond the capacity ofogliatti 1

Thus the PCI leadershipto avoid direct confrontation with tbc orthodox faction of Us

ti ani-iiuascsi iriPTmrrrpro -uiivamnncs or tho "Italian Road"ocietyar different from thoParty which therefore hai to oe different from the CPSU- At about the samehe leadership intensified itsto educate the base on the necessity ofthe PCI as esseutialrythe desirability of putting lis internatiocud emphasis on (ts rose in the west European labor movement, on improving the lot of Italians working In wesiern

; Europe, and in identifying with "progressive-and TKra-communist political and social movements in Europe. Ia other words, the leader-

. ship, well aware of the dangers of trying too quickly to persuade its base that two generations had been "misinformed" regarding the true state of affairs in

;ihe CPSU and the USSR, did not :criticUc the

iCPSU In lu propaganda directed toward Its base, but began to -trcsi much moro directly the unique

Interna! and external situations of Italy and Europe and the PCPi role therein. By4 the CPSU bad begun to attack this "Euroccotjtsm" with public

criticism patently aimed al the

The leadership has been only partJoIry successful in Its efforts to retainighti rational control ssrtthln the Party and the imageroad-based democratic parliamentary Patty1 meriting the trust of tbe movers and shekers In the ruling DC and other Italian parties. DC Minister De Mitt. In his comments cited earlier put the problemwhen he stressed that it was no longerogicalutrratber the PCPspolicy which kept It ouVof the;government. The PCI Is trying to cope withthis by Its policyon NATO and by increasing use Of the phrase "equldiitance (tquidlttanza) between the USSR and the USA" to describe its objectives for Italian foreign policy. The organizational problems with Ihe eoniervarive pro-CPSU faction of its base are quite another thing. The leadership probably will continue toraduahs* approach In hopes that the new generation of PCI members will not have Ihe vuccraJ affinity of some of Its elders for the CPSU ai the "guiding Party" of the Interna, tional communist movement..

E. The "Centrist" Policy of Berlinguer ond Its Difficulties

Berlinguer and his top-level associates hadproblems In drafting tlie lengthy policy itatcment read by Berlinguer to Ihe Central Com mitlee inho doctiment itsei. thowi (he problems created by tlieimul-Uneosuly presenting itselfarxist Party.

a Party adamantly opposed Io disturbing ia any way Italy's partJarncotary democratic system.

willing to move with Ihe currents of tbe New Left to avoid becoming an ovrsfy-bsireauentiied cxinwmnist party soch as the CPSU.olicy of 'equidistance" between the USSR and the USA. This document dearly tries to avoid antagonizing any particular faction within Ihe Party. It is directed toward appeasing those Italians who still fear "revolutionary" objectives of the Party, and it is also designed to tale advantage of the detente atmosphere In Europe by downgrading the Party's earlier antl-Americnnlim fn fnvorro-Europe policy which Is neltltcr anll-Soviet nor anti-American. Moreover, tlie Party5 isto take odvaBtav of further deterioration in Italyi economic situationad] should come forhelp In keeping (he country afloat Ioeo-Fascist takeover or total economic collapse. However, as discussed liter, it win come Into lh-goveTnmeot only when it Is convinced lhat the DC

repared to pay the pricerulyhare In power at the national level Its base,lexed. Is waiting. IJ

VI. SCHIZOPHRENIA IN THE CENTER. Why so Mony Influential Non-PCI Italians Think the PCIactor for Stability

A. The Attitudeho Builneiiman

On4 Ciovannl AgncUi. President ofan with great political clout in the Italian Eriabushmcnt,peech on theof his assumption of the/^airmanship of Coo-findusrria, the Italian equivalent of tho American National Association ofard look at the serlousoes- of Italy's economic crisis, which included an inflation raterobable year-end balance of payments deficit of close to |L3 billion,igurenemployed being swelled by lhc return

BliilflilP'

mi

of Italian, emigre workers frome and Ccrmaoy duo lo recessions there. He thenew "pact- along the lines of4 "Union for Salvation" to include die PSI, Ihe DC and the PCI. According to AgneCl Ihestability depended onoining of political forces.-

Shortly after ArmellfsDr. Glanluigi Cabetti, President of the Annelli family holding company) to7

ikjiiu urrto mean that Agnelli favored admission of the PCI lo the government Bather it was an attempt

ew months after AjmcUi't "pact" ipeeeh, aloan,of S3 bui ionreathlnff.ledhange In ArmcUi'i public attitude; athas not hinted acatn at the dcshabdllyialogue among Italy's three major political groupings regarding tho serious economic problems facing tho couniry. Cabcttl didhosyever, that "Ihcro Ls sentiment among some in Italian business circles" for PCI participationational government.

Although Cabetti was obviously tryinr toseems little reason

to doom ms n'rcmrm uf Agnelli's comments in the sense that Agnelli would bkc to seethewith the CCIL and the PCI on ways and means of maintaining employment while reducing inflation,fioof PCI entry intoHe and most other major Industrialists do not favor such PCI goals as increasing involvement of workers' councils in factorywhich would be easier to implement if the Partyormal say at the Cabinet level.

Italian businessmen who are similarly torn on the issue were not helped by the Initial PCI reactions to Agnelli's speech. Far from warmly welcoming his initiative, the first PCI reaction, by tlie outspoken Amendola of die Pohtburo, was "we're not patsies for the calls for help coming from mdustriabsts like Agnelli. Our Party is ready to assumeon condition that therehange in economicerlinguerew weeks later by saying that the PCI didn't Intend to commit suicide In order to pull DC chestnuts out of the fire.

Thus at top levels of Industrial and governmental economic policymaking there Is the desire tothe PCI contribution lo stability and to the solution of Italy's economic crisis, but to do so without relinquishing any significant control of the government al and paranatal apparatus, which is largely in the control of the DC and its adherents. The PCI. quite aware of this dilemma. Is upping the ante for the help It can give and repeatedly states lhat It won't come Into the government or evenpreferential relationship" with the DC al the national level unless it sees clear promiseajor policy change leflward on the part of the DC leadership.

Parallel to this public line of the PCI, thewith Agnelli goes quietly on. llidely known "secret" among PCI oflldals that Agnelli for years has had private sessions with topin the PCI-domtnaled trade union eonfedera-

I '

tit.

CCIL. It Is furl her known and evenmentioned in the non-I'Cl peas, thai Fiatributrs money to the PCI as well as to the OC and other part in at election time. How can this bo liavior be erplaincd? It's not enough to diimlsiith "that's the way things are doneven to say lhat it's typical of the Italiano hedge bets by contributing to both sides In an election campaign.

The ralJeeiale for Agnelli's wanting to Veep oo the good side of CCIL makes sense from the businessman's viewpoint. As an industrialist who Is competing In local and world markets he has to be able lo plan his labor, material and overhead costs In order to workricing policy which will make Fiatmany other big and smallto deal with the cordederauon (CCIL) which has jurisdiction over the gicatcst number of craft and trad- unions. Tlie intricate Italian process of negotia'Jng annual labor contracts is thus at least simplified to the estent of. dealing with on* labor confederation rather than with many unions or federations. Fitrthcr, the record of CCIL'i honoring of its contract agreementsood one and its current attitudoon wage Increases I* relatively responsible,*

gain-

O maairrg psugiCM-wiu. anion inxnrwTanwiing acceptancearty capable of restoring stabilityime when the government'i policies seem to them to be threatening their interests. Since tho early seventies ihe PCI leadenhip has been beefing up the so-called exitiddleection of PCI Headquarters. Thb Section, assisted by senior officials from the PCI hierarchy, is increasingly active in trying to build bridges to the middle classes and enlisting their electoral and other support. In addition to Intensification of routine propaganda programs to counter right-wing assertions that the PCI alms at further nationabaa-taoo of private industry, the PCI has Initiatedwith regional and national organisations of small businessmen. For example. In4 Luciano Boron, tbe PCPa lop economist who heads the Party's section on Reforms and Programming, met with Professor Selan, Pr-sldent of the National Confederal km of Small Industry, for discussions on how best to deal with the problems afflicting small'i t! il" ii"

f li

lilii NI

m Wm

'I'i I

small businessmen and officials of chambers of commerce tend to echo Fiat spokesmen in assuring Airierican interlocutors that they arc not taken in by the PCI. they admit that there Is much In PCI econondc policy which appeals to them, particularly the. PCI/Socialist quarrel, with tho government's high Interest, tight money policy-Most enterprises In Italy are still of small size with undermployees. Many1 of these firms. living as they do from year to year and with no capital reserves, have gone out of businessesult of a

.combination of domestic and international inflation 'and the sbrmking availability uf low-Interest money.

PCI's defense of this group's interest indebates, coupled with die sophistication

' of its economic arguments and the koowledgeabllity 'of its expertsignificantncreased acceptance of the Party as'a stabilizing influence

';whlch'defends the petite bourgeoisie caught In the

ijwage/prloe' "

oregoing indicates that traditionally anti-communist businessmen, whether they are major ,industrialists like Agnelli, Or small|or officials; of nationwide small budnessmen's organizations, arc mcteasuigly squeezed: by turn-'! ing to. or occepting overtures from, the PCI tohem out of their economic problems, they all know it they may be Wvancing the day when: the:rrives in the Cabinet and in positions ofower :Iq key Iparastatnl and privateheir prime' concern is not the prospect'ofllation of more of the privat-;sector. Stateion Intend evert control over, major Industriesomething ;new In! modem ItaUan leconomlc history/ Ihe" corporate state ofhear nationalization of the' electrical power!ry, the lailroads and other industries and the ^proliferation of parastatal Industries whereand public entitles share In financing andmcnt all provide recent

HE PCI AND THE CHURCH

TIw PCI hu conjlitently followed Togliitti's dictum: 'Never engagerontal confrontation wilh theignificant Item In thb contest, sometimes missed In tracking PCI policy over lhe years, is the inclusion of9 Lateran Treaty (between the Vatican and the Italian Government) as an Integral part of the Italian Constitutionhii would not have been possible without the support of the PCI. The Constitution contains therovisions on canon law, such as the compulsory teaching of the Catholic religion In public secondary schools, the necessity for aceremonyarriage hriCI with pretensions to Marsttm would have been expected to combat. TogliatU, In defending PCI support of the Lateran Treaty, recognized the extent to which Catholicism is part of the fabric of Italian society. For the PCI to adopt an adversary role would not only have been tactically unwise but would has'e beenwith the.PCr* goalluralistic society embracing communists, socialisti. and Catholics. What he played down in public statements was the obvious fact that many who voted for theand some who were members of tbepracticing Catholics. His philosophy on this issue formed the basic rationale for Berunguer's desire toeferendum onuarter centuryavoid intra-Party and ioter-party conflict on iisun Involving Ibe Church.

One of tbe more shadowy figures In the PCI with Influence on Berlinguer is Francoatholic, who is Berlinguer's principal adviser on PCI/Church relatfoni. Rodano was close to Togliatti ondriendship withdating from the forties when Berlinguer was bead of the PCI youth orgsmsration. Despite his excommunication by the Church8 "for having put the ecclesiastical hierarchyad light and for fomenting dissensions among the clergy" Rodano has always counseled the Party to maintain close and direct ties with the Italian Church and with the Vatican. Significant is his emphasis.4 article oo "The Peculiarities of the Italian Communisthat "lhe only requlrrirvntCI statutes place on membership In the Party Is that mem ben support the PCI political program, with no reference to personal religious or philo-

sophicallthough Hod .mo ondhave their differences, the evid-isce points

,oincidence of views on working with, and not against.'the Catholics to achieve PCI tactical and strategic objectives. The reporter on the Church

[ and the Vatican for TVnlta, Alccste Santlai, rarelyhurch stand on an issue; rather he plays up statements by individual "uncial" Catholic prelates which support PCIeaving to tho other lay parties (Socialists, Social Democrats, Republicans, and Liberals) head-On criticism o( the

; Church oa pohtieal/social

lthough it!is difficult to noil down precise details c'.Church and/or Vatican thinkingthe long-term status of relations with the PCI, it is'dear that the basic position'has undergone

j drastic modification'In the national elections of-that year the Pope and the Church portrayed the PCI as the anti-Christ; to vote for it would be cause for excommunication. Tlieaction arm of tlie Italian Council of Bishops, the so-called 'civicaw to it that this message got down tolallcst parish. Since that period, andince Vaticanombinationore liberal stance by tho Churdi hierarchy and the Vatican's OstpolUlk have made it Impossible for right-wing elements in the Church and the Vatican to launch any sort of comparable movement. The normalization of Vatican relations with Poland and Hungary, the use of PCI good offices inessage from the Pope to Ho Chi-Minh. DC/PCI joint efforts to get mcdicr' supplies to Vietnamhe disastrous results of4 divorce referendum for both the Church and the DC, and many other events have muted tlie voices of those In tho Church svho want to carryrontal assault on the PCI. Critldsm of tlie PCI fn the official Vatican paper VOssetvalore tomano and in Civilla catlolica is more and more

i limited to rerninding readers that theed to an international cotnmunltt rnoveroent led by tbe CPSU, which. Inedicated to the cn-crthrow of many traditional Italian (and Catholic) concepts of the family and^ cautioning Italians not to be mbled by PCI protestations thatust another Italian political party. .

h-onslflnor Ernesto Phoni, -ho shocked Cothollcby spookingeeting ol the Milanof the PO In

Tbe increasingly vocal criticism by some Italian clerics directed at the Chinch's failure to move more aggressively In achieving social justice in Italy has been paralleled, In tbe liberal wing of the Church, by clerics who openly proclaim their adherence to many of the slated goals ol tbe PCI such as drastic revision of tbe so-called "familyore and more, priests are willing to lend their names and presence to PCI-sponsoredwhich explicitly condemn DC local and p' ticmal policiesonservativetriVin^ example of how the PCI and "liberal" elements of the Church are working together Isddress by Moosignor Ernesto Pisonleeting of die Milan Federation of tho PCI. Pisonl stated thai he was speaking"rivate capcrity bat "through my personresentatholic world which has passedtrategy divide us on tbe Ideological plane but many things unite us. The great gulf is not between lay persons and Catholics but between the exploiters and iben effect hb ten-minute speech seemed to beatliolic blessing to theis remarks led to Pisoni's being reprimanded by th" Milan auxiliaryand by an article in the Vatican newspaper allegedly directly Inspired by Pope Paul Tbe furor stemmed not only from astonishmentatholic priest made such commentsCI Congress but from the fact thai in the past Pisoni had always voiced strong anti-Communist

A followup articleertiere deGa aero of filiate referred to an upcoming trip by Pisoni lo Moscow where lie was lo be received with honors normally accorded only high-tanking visitors. Tbe article stated that Pisonfj trip was planned by his good friend Armando Cossutta, of Ihe PCr* Secretarial, and concluded by saying that Pisonl was slated to play an Important role In implementation of the PCI't "historic compromise" line- Cossutta has acknowledged privately that the pressubstantially accurate and thatismayed by the leak; but he also feels tlutl It served toolitical victory! supportatholic Moosignor of PCI social programs.

What will be the future cosine ofhe eased situation of lhe Church In Poland

removal ol Uaroina rrxny; me eufiiinu iTion of frequent Soviet-Vatican contacts, and other Indications of give-and-take involving the Vatican's Ostpolitik and the USSR's detente policy, all point to continuedof PCI/Church rcLitiom. The PC? clearly Joes not hope for any official benediction from the Church;ontent to imply thaisuch as Monsignor Pisoni dooesess involvement of the Church in future electionno return to use of "civicessages from the pulpit, or other political action Instruments. The5 elections show that the PCI isin Its assessment that thisealistic

viil the "historic compromise" and the prospects for its success

ir* i' ' . '* i'i" A. The Concept and ih Orlgini

Boih Milton and outside the PCI there continues to be confusioo over the meaning of Berlinguers "historic compromise" formula. Indeed. Berlinguer may have deliberately kept the concept fuzzy to avoid being lockedigidich might have to be altered aa "ooditionj changed. He first publicfzed hb Ucnrsneries of articles written for tbe Party weekly, Rlnasctta, in the tallhat the sometimes obscure phraseology boiled down toonviction that the immobility of the Italian political situation required that the PCI and the DC, as the two major political forces, work more closely together to plan and implementpolir'-al and social policies required to cope with the country's problems. Changes In coalition partners of the DC over Ihe previousears had not been able to produce and execute the necessary "dynamic" programs because there haderpetual governing party (the DC)erpetual opposition party (thebewas becoming ungovernable In theseBerlinguer felt, and the time had come to rectify the situation.

Berlinguer and the PCI Secretariat are acutely aware of the problems of persuading the PCI base of the logic of the "historic com promise" withoutilitancy which will frighten DCaway from further collaboration. Careful preparation was undertaken at all levels of the Party before5 XlVth Congress to point out what tlse "historicot.aid Berlinguer and other Party leaden, an offer by the PCI to save the DC from past and present mistakes. It itove by the PCI to enter the government and occupy ministries Just to become part of the EstabUsJiracnt.ellout of ?C1 principles. Above all, any meaningful collaboration with the DC nt the national level will only occur when the DC has changed its conservative economic and social policies and lit current leadership. Berlinguer made thb last point most emphatically at the XlVth Congress when, to the dismay of many top PCI leaden, heersonal attack at DC Secretary Arruntore Fanfani for having used the Portuguese governrnent's banning of theDC as an excuse to pull out the DC observers who were altending the PCI Congress. Thoof tlie dissolution of the Portuguese DC. Fanfani's gleeful seizure of uVs proof tbat, once Lnommunist party will move to reduce all other parties to insignificance or worse, and the fact that the Italian DC now had an issue to work with In the upcoming5 regional elections, all combined to cause Berlinguer to lose his legendary cool

sposition of the "historic com pro-mbe* marks no real departure from the Cramsci ond Togliatti tradition of "working with Catholics, socialbU andhe tactical shift which bthe tactical change appears primarily motivated by PCI analysb of die events which led to the downfall of Allende In Chile.actics tn moving lo Increase the Parry's power at the national level bidather vague mixture of working with the PSI and with left factions of the DC while pitching their electoral and propaganda themesunion of the left" objective. TVs latter policy, sometimes known as "the fifty-ons percent"ad Clorgio Amendola as oneIb principal spokesmen.ased on the belief that, ifrouping could somehow get cohesive representation Inand In the COI. the PCI-wouId finally have access to the levers of power proportionate- to, if not greater than, its numerical strength. Although many PCI officials supported thb program, Ber-

k uuad that th* PCI ptj, is, Sod.loti and Irfl rleenenti af tha DC and lha Social DrmocriUajority of the electorate.

t' i

iI'll I

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has always seemedainin hb view, was (hat ultimate success ofrogram woulde {ado split within the DC and he has long felttroogssential to the stability of Italy for the indefinite furiro. Toplit would mcaiiajor chunk of the right wing of the DC, fauie de mieur, might well make common cause with the neo-Fascbts in the interest of survivaloU'lcal force. The fear of thb is very much in thef the top PCIwell as of center and left-of-center DC ofricials such as Prime Min-bter Moro.

L'ntll the5 Portuguese evenb the ground was being somewhat prepared for ultimate acceptance by the DC of formalized collaboration with the PCIcries of imnI<ompTomcrri, as the Italians called them, at the local level. In4 and5 there was evidenced onwillingness on tbc part of DC municipal

.adir.ini.-trat.in to enter into more formalizedwith ihe PCI in conununitics where the DC. on paper, controlled the admlnbti.In three major cases of thb sort (Venice, Awelino and Agrigen'.o) this eoUaboratton was undertaken with tlse realization that It was against the policy of Fan-

fard who bad expllcidy stated that the DCtolerate local or national power-sharingPCL Many of the DC local adrmnijtxatorsinto such relationships later citherpressure or were expelled by the'

: Although the National Council of the DC in5 gave what the DC' official organ II popolo described as "support byercent of the delegates" to Fonfanfj policy of no dcab with the PCI. the other side of thoerhaps more significant: that SO percent of the DC hierarchy publicly condemned Fanfanl's policy and that some key DC officials such as Prime Minister Moro were less than enthusiastic In their support. The DC Youth Organization was so explidtely and acidly critical of Fanfanfs stand that he was reduced to expelling several of its top officials.

B, Chiloactor in th 'Historic Compromise"

Tho publication of Berlingucr's Rlnascita articles coincidedetailed analysb of tho rise and

Crioco Da Mito. landereft-wing foclloa In the DC Party andinister in DC-dominated gov. ermxenis. He has disagreed wilh fanfonl's prohibition of DC/PCJ collaboration in local governments.

fall of Allertde'i Unidad Popular written by Renato Sandri, the.PCI's. Latin American expert, for the Party's theoreticalhis coincidence was not accidental. The Chilean Communist Party (PCCII) and the Cliilean Christian Democrat Party had just gone down tho drain with Allende. Sandri had some hard-hitting criticisms of the Chilean socialist leader. Altamirano. for chemanner in which ho had put ultra-leftist pressure on the PCCII leader, Corvalan. Sandri quoted, with obvious disapproval, the public letter frcm AJtunirano to Corvaian of3 wherein Altamirano urged Corvalan to rcsbt "any sort of temptation to reach agrccmcnj with petit bourgeob groups such as the Christianiven the srreat concern voiced by the Italian DCarty, and by the COI over tbe military coup

"See "Cile: analUI dll unartlfce marrlrie.a.,

11

had led io die banning ofPCCH and Ihc neurxalizaiioii of tho OilUnn Christian Democrat 1 Patty. the'PCI and some DC offrciah wereuct in their concern that "it eon happenne ij should not force tho analogy but tlieic arc some Striking parallels whichot Inst on the PCI and tha DC: Allendo and CorvaLao wereeft by the socialist Altamirano.ade-it Inircnsingly imposiible for Vnidad.Popular-to work with Frel and other Chriitlnn' Democrats. Similarly, in Italyhe powerful left-winghe Socialist Party (PSI) which makes what thePCI calls "irmpoosible" demands !for wagereases, price reduction, union'latioii of the police.

etc,ime when austerity andmeasures are colled for. The PCI and someDC polttjciara fearDC.

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itarya!Pinochet> I

r Tt.-'i'

! !me'rsco-Fascbts MSI/DN arid the lUberalare in touch with conservatives in the Italianand Security services toightist | "*

G The Impact oT.Por^lioii-

'i: The banning of the Portuguese D<

s; long '

calls tbe sbotsin the Italiandoubtful that:wUI stop for' long tha con-

i

[trend of

eal kreb of the sort desert!-tl above. Even jat ihoj top levels of -he DC there' does .tiuto be>'Corflplete agreement (Ii.it' a'mts should be read ai being appbcable to the

JIialvha* notChilean snvernrnent and ta not HMr to doInh.tReeoenittonr> aealoit therant DC and rOt would ikotihc Italian SaeSuau (whouchPome br Altamirano) Inheir rurtpnrl ta"liui to the t'jjl.l

relectSae af Becntneaceanl Ieanfaal as Secrrtarr pr the DC make* It probable thatn xuerVt race tliattf and Itallsnspattoraofficial mvpaee irnhSn thea freaneaal hat wan the pnpeet ar ISa fOnrnUeBr ttiera. The pm-rCl dailr fan* mathat- mnint'i olectkin "la franll* ilmpatlco to ua."* ; .;

of the|"hbtoric crjrnpTOrrb^^jaa-lorlg fas' F

Ilalinne> .casoM Involve both Internal DC power plays and lineere differences of opinion among the DC hierarchy.

Foreign Minister Mariano Humor was somewhat taken aback by Fanfonl's ostentatious withdrawal of DC observers to the XlVth PCI Congress. Humor, who he;ids the International Christian Democrat Movementmong Fanfani's rivab for power within Ihe DC, was almost certainly as well-informed as anyone within the DC about the nature of Portuguese devekopments. Hb "surpriie" at the speed ond severity of Fnntanls action may well have stemmedelief thai Fanfanfs attempts to link the PCI with the Portuguese communists as groupi.igs which ess notluralisticmight cause an Italian voter backlash. Many In the DCs top leadership must be mulling over tho fact that, despite Fanfaofs efforts totlie Portuguese situation for electoralin Italy, the PCI reached new heights in voting strength int would appear loo. lhat Berlin goer's openly friendly attitude toward Mario Soares. the Portuguese Socialist lender, ond the hardened position.of die PCI toward thenature of Cunhal's ideological andapproachihty to the PCI's consilient statements of the necessity for asociety.

Id, fathecoalition with the DC in an am:igeinent which giveshe Ministry of Posts nr the Merchant Marine Ministry and dial's all. We don't espect the Foreign AffairsOCIr.Irrior. Whafsve would want,inimum, would be seveml mtnistries -arlth responsibility and power In the economy nnd In sodal Icgblalkm, Including Labor, State Pnrlleipa-tieni, and one of the "money" ministriesrrstsury oeore lo the point, wo want appointments to the parastatol entities such as ihe

D. Prospects for Success of the.' Berlinguer and other Party spokesmen haveIndicated that then no rush to achieve more formalized and .more sulntaniive power nt llie national level.i.

;iiBiap!$i

. AjrwiKuatplocoWe oepoefM el ihe "historicend Secretory erf Hie OC vntJ5 when he wot rwx>yd ueeovse- e* lhe lottai svflared by tht DC In tha Juneregic-ialeoone of the influentialn DC

li^liiiiiill'

.Italian Hydroc&.bon Entity and Montedison.hen- effective power Is and that's whero the DC hu run Italy like, iu private property for thirty

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Ii the IX prepared to pay ihi, price? Obviously not now. Even thengh Deputy Prime Minister La Maifand aomc DC officials atale openly their conviction that the PCI5 Li not the same as the PCIhere ii nillicientof how the PCI would actoalition to make the DC unwilling to invito Itormal

SIS

He nig no Zoccegnini, newly, elected Secreiory ol lhe DC Party.

power-sharing role. Aside from this ideological lac-tor there is the hard political reality tint some DC rfficiah and voters would bolt Ihe DC ifove were made. And the PSI and Socialrcalirlng tint their Influence dwindlesif Ilie two giant parties are. de facto, running the country, would oppose it (Tills dcspile tlte facttrong minority within the PSI hierarchypromotes PCI entry into government)

If the "historic compromise" formula is not likely to result in PCI presenceoalition government wititln the next two years, is there going to be any real change In lhe way the PCI has gone about "conditioning" Italian policies over the years?]

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fiiulio Anclreotti, one ol tho moil Influarasol leodars of 'tho OC HV hoi bean buflefino btdges lo tr* Lett.lha PO,oma PCI leoderi horavoiced confidence In Mai ert someoneaorolk"!oppi(-Kh to workingPO-

In other v. jilS the ivi, rwognrzing mar mecompromise" at the top ti not possible In the short run, will try to create sufficient working examples of its efficacy at lower Icveli to lead the DC hienuxlry to accept thoof itsat the national level, j 't ;

IX. PCI FOREIGN POLICY

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A. Introduction

ItruUni In Italian politics that eventsItaly are reacted to by Italian political parties prima-'N' in the contest ol their impact on the parties' power position within Italy. The PCI is often not Included in thii contest, but it probcJiiy should- Its desire loaximum degree of independence from the CPSU consistent with retention nf membership in good standingoose "international communist movement" causes it to join with the Yugoslav! and the Romanians in asserting the right of national communistruling orpursue Iheir own paths to socialism. This stance tends to blunt charges that itPSU puppet. The Party applauds Dub-cek's "Prague Spring' and denounces the Warsaw Pact invasion. It cheers the overthrow of the Cao-tano regime in Portugal but vriticlie* tbe heavy-handed approach of the MFA and the statements of Cunhal on the abolition of "bourgeoisIt exploits the shock of the DC at theof Alirnde In order to make common cause with Ihe PSI and the DC In ensuring tha' Italy does not recognize the Pinochet regime. Where It can, it works with, rather than separately from, the DC In coordinated criticiirn of American policy in southeast AsiaLatin America. It has found It easier toialogue with the German Social Democrats (SPD) than with the Westcommunists or the PCF on commonto regional solutions to Europe's problems, and Is pleased to sec the extent to which this is noted In Cermany and Italy,

Aware of the fact that its tics to thecommunist movement" and to the CISU arc the prime obstacle to acceptance by the DCotential coalition partner, the PCI, in Its public and private italementi of poltcy, putsonesilty for the COl to formulate an Italian foreign policy which will be less subject to domination by Use US. The Party links this argument to an overall objective of an Italyurope which will not be under either Soviet or US hegemony. To implement these ihort end long-range strategies the PCI uies notoreign Stellar, wcll-itafled with area experts hut draws heavily en icnior oflteials and other experts m

appropriate for trips abroad oo geographic and functional. indication ofarty's flexibility and pragmatism. When, forthe Partyission to the Middle East ; ino get the facts on oi! pricing poUcdosit wasn't Foreign Section members who went but rather Giancarlo Pajeao, thePCI's senior Arabxpert, and the Partyj top economist, Luciano Barca- Ifixtion of examination of how the EC-is working, llerUngoer himself may talk to an . EC Commissioner, as be didhen hecgre went tor

. Significant hi any arulysis of PCIj foreign policy , is the fact that there Is regular, informal,f views with DC Party officials both within, the various government ministries and within tbe DC Party apparatus. It should noturprise 'to read DC Deputy Fracanzanfs5 blast at the Tclcarly imperialist logic"US foreign policy when it is known that Fracanzanis 'trips to NorthVietnam2 and to Lisbon laere 'discussed with tho PCI to advanced

j: Front >he.first days of tbe UniitWPopular (UP) 'the! FC1 was careful to emphasize the pluralistic ^tuituroihe UPthcriglit ofolitical groupings;to exist! and to propagatoiews. While PCI onalysts were' occarionauy crideal ijof Altamlrano and of the MIR;and other ultrasn thc'left, particularly after-the]Pinochet coup,hey also spoke 'favorably of Ihelmenncr iu whichI disagreements within UPhowedeals opposed to tacticalhat comj through In the CPSU analyses ofs the fact that Soviet theoreticians right up to the end of the Allnide regime were; talkinghe necesdty of commurdst domwatlon in anyition as being vftnl In the "transitioaar periodoute to true socialism. Tho PCI, on tho otherpproved the plaralistlc democracy which prevailed and objected primarily to the manner In which th'i

"Fraramanl Umember of die DC croup on the Fore'im Attain Oranurlan ot the Cburabn of Deputies.

left Socialist' were pushing for measures which could not fail to alienate the middle classes without whose support the UP government could not last.

When one cuts through the Marxist verbiage of CPSU and PCI wrapups on Chile written before tho Pinochet coup, it is this emphasis on theof middle class support for programs of radical social change and die desirability of genuine pluralism which marks the fundamental difference of approach in the analyses of the Soviets and the Italians. Since the coup, the CPSU has repeatedly and specifically endorsed the need to win middle class support for CP objectives but CPSU doctrine clearly views thisactical move in the overall strategy to gain communist control of the state apparatus. Both during and after the coup. PCI analysis stressed the desirability of non-communist support and collaboration as something necessary not only to any "transitional" phase but even after tbe eventual transformation of tbe society to one which Is structuredocialist basis. It can be argued thai thisinor nuance; for tbe PCI leadership and Uiwireticianj, however. It is aand fundamental point of departure withCPSU doctrine- Thi, difference Is con-sistcntlyhnjurdtout tho history of tbe PCI and Is especially marked in the mid-seventies is the PCI attempts to make oommon cause with the DC and other Italian parlies to capitalize on the Chilean experiment rind to neutralize theof Portugal'

Perfogol

Long before the Splnol* revolution of< the PCI hadndiecd view of Conhal, the Pjrtuguesc Communist (PCI leader. The early rCI fear that Cunhal. If heosition of power, would push for an authoritarian gennrrnrnerrt on the East European model has been amplyby the events since

The5 Italian election results notwith-standing. the PCI Ii being put Into an incrcariiigly difficult position, however. If It persists to Its and-PCP line and If the Portuguese Socialists ore banned, it may be forced to an open rupture with the PCP. The PCI certainly wiihes to ovoid this, hut if such option wereondition of Hi

liliiliB

k*Lr

Acceptance by the Italian Sccialistj and.the Italian DCartner In government It might well decidereak is Decenary.break* could take the form of an open broadside condemnation

. of the Pep's mtcrnal policies leaving It to the PCPondemnation would cause the

latter to break off party.'or-arty relations.

Wv cannot here go Into the Ir.fruac.es of CPSU actions and reactions to the dcvclopint; Portuguese situation.!

vsnori, nor ihe longhis exitlchm likely to 'cause the PCI leadership to change its mind. The Party will refuse to be lumped into the same rate-

' gory as the Portuguesef It recanted to please the CPSU and its ownt wo.il

vlolite its idoologieal doctrine and torpedo Us

| hopes of .entering the

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C. PCI Policy on Spoin, France, and Germany

': The PCI has always been close to the Communist Party of Spain (PCE) but relations became much 'warmerhen the split between1 Carillo .and Lister began to develop, the PCt'ihbwed Iu clear preference foepreference which was primarily based on the strong an ti-CPSU stand wlmh Carillo took from the beginning in reaction to the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia. Tlie continuing statements by Carillo on the neces* sity for each Party to follow Its own path toand Ihc degree of moderation shown by Carillo in his nena-dogrnatic approval of "socialist pluralism' ore right down the Una of PCI philosophy. The PCI also approves of another bold move of tho PCE: iu cor tacts wilh the Chinese Communist Party

A key aspect of the PCI'i judgmcnU on other PCs is the attitude those portlcs have toward the EC. It approves the PCE stand, taken2 in Bucharest hy Ihe Elahlh Congress of the PCE, that the PCE, while opposed to Spanish membership in the EC os long os Franco Is around, would change iu polkyost-Franco era and "look forward to cooperation with other .efUst forces tosocialist Europe'.*

However, even more significant for (he PCI was Carillos statement In Bucharest that the PCE would workocialist Spain where there would be "respect for the plurality of parties and theof any attempt to Impose any official

The CPSU. untilad been hostile to Carillo, branding bis callnd socialist Europe as "reeking wididowever, fences were purportedly mendedCE visit to Moscow where Carillo talks with Mikhail Suslov and Boris Ponono-morevommuniqiie wherein the CPSU tacitly gave up on Lister and promised to prornote an Improvement in relations with the PCE of Carillo "even when different points of view exist cn certainito PCI interprets these developmenU asealization on the part of the CPSUontinued hard stand against CarfJJo'sto Spain and Europe would only tend to further reduce tlie influence the CPSU hu w'ai European CP's and the'European Left in general.

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Relation! between the PCF and the PCI havo wormed up In recent yean but. for-te atom dlt*

1 tho PCI paperblWcslo Peilrujive-member PCE eEVf.uon hee.!ed br Cinllo. Sean,lr stated at the ttne lhat the Pdcd CanSe la lale acamdmo la TAlr* recrdimr the CCT. sedawervi la eetabahhcontacts la JW, with the rCt Alihcnarh Secra any. Cartlle brouahlo IIBaNlir fromhe TCI wa. emtrfol lor hi. oritureill probably continue to hold Ihii channelthe Romanian CP) In reserve If ond wheo Ihey deefcf- So maSe anothee bv at PCI/CCP contacts.

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'. cussed earlier in this paper, the parties are still quite dUTcrent fn their programs, styles andonditioning factor has obviously been tltepeculiar relationship between tho PCI and the DC in Italy which has no counterpart in any PCF/UDR contact. The French Socialists aro the moreforce In the'Common Program" of the French Socialists and the PCF; the reverse is true inhere the PCI is much stronger than! tho PSI.ntellectual arrogance of the PCI toward the PCF has [always been resented by the PCF, butituation has improved to the extent that then the PCI view, is becoming morel sophisticated In Its attitudes toward pan-European institutionsuch as the EC which it used to denounce but nowsomewhat grudginglycries ofev-Marchais, Brezhncv-Bcrlinguer anderlinguer meetings2 led tb apparent agree* ment to bury the hatchet and to worketter In1 the Interest of all parties. Differences i. nnd distrust between the PCI and the PCFoo deep,'however, toundamentalin the near future.:

These bate differences again surfacedhe XlVth Pa Congress with the PCFomplaining bitterly about the PCI's criticismhe Portuguese communists, calling itn the' affairs ofa "sovereign" party. To this t. Clancarlo Pajctta'of the PCI's Secretariat replied jlateSointed blast:ells usjVoii wrrc'wrongto mtcrfcrc in theBut; what Is Marchois himself doing to= .clarify jthli'position: If not interfering, and quitehat, fn the proceedings of bur! In tlte poliiical line ice cueEmphasis'J-ij

Tlio PCI was much worried fn the days before the Trench presidential elections4 lestCommon Program" of Use PCF/PSF be succcssfuLIt felt lhat if Mltterand were to win it would be by the narrowest of marginsovernment formed on the basis oflose result would be unable 'to carry out any positive programs In tbe face of a

hostile French Pwliament. The close victory of Clscard was the ideal outcome for the PCI. It was relieved at tho knowledge lhat it would not be handicapped by the example provided Italian votersCF presenceoalition which could never govern effectively. Al Ihe same time It couldon the election results by saying lo Ihe Italian electorale: "Twelve out of twenty-five frenchmen want the communists In tho government."

wmwsm

nated by the strains between tlse various European nationalismi on tho one handangerous combination of economic power in Ihe hands of multinational firms and US economic, military and polilical rscgemony on tbe oilier. The Party'i view isoro autonomous Europe must bo also morn open to expressions of popular will.

To this end tbe PCI fervently supportsMom's belief that dicre should beto the European Parliament. Tbequite sure that such elections would resultoverall European communist, socialist,DC presence in the Parliament than thereA corollary of the call for directthe desire to see the European Parliamentlegislative authority and InfluenceCouncil of Ministers and the EC. PCIotherIhc Italian DCChristian Democrat parties in theaimed at getting supportore united Europe as ato both American and Soviet power. Asput it inThe Partyagreement betwea all the popularforces In Italy and west Europethdr opinionseen and mayabout the origins and developments ofof blocs.-The PCI, -as the party whichupbc4der of the Interests and Ideals ofworking dan, ii the most attached toof Italy's safety, autonomy, and revivalframework of the revival and hence therote of the whole ef tcest Europe." i'

Tho European Porfjomonf The PCI has long hadalibreIn the European Parliament From tbe outset itood ndx of well-known senior officials such as Giorgia Amendola and highly qualified technocrats" such as the economlsU'Eugcnioand Silviohese PCI deputies do their homework on the gut problems of energy, exchange rates. EC/CEMA contacts, emigrant lalwr. the problems of the multinationals, etc. Over the years Ihey have earned the respect of the non-communist members of the European Parliament for this reaton, plus the non-polemical lono Oicy use In discussing these Issues In Ihe Parliament, and in Its working committees, and Leonard! has won

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election within the Parliament to the post of Vice-Carman of the Energy IThe PCF. by conbrast. has only recently begun to sendto tbe Parliament who have the breadth and vjpliist lea tion to bold! their own in any eiccpt polemical discussiorij. It will probably be some time before they achieve the stature of the PCI'j 5t ! ;

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! The European TVaoV Union Confederation

From the early seventies the PCI has worked to gain admission of the largest Italian trade union

' *In late IOT4 mditeuitiaa of the"EC,'iEC official Haled that "in EuropeanpoUoeat debates by lar the Vert prep*red. beltand reaaonableJ.lo Leonard! ofIlia vtewi andcfketlnameareheep knowlrdae of economics,aertouily by olhcrs from left Ie riiht tn thepollOcalj-.il,

i

confederation, llie PCI-domlnBted CCIL, Into tho ETUC. After nn Intricate scries of maneuvers tho CCIL was able to reduce tn "associate" status Its affiliation with the Sovict-dominnlcd World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) at tl* WFTU Congress In Bulgariaills action, plus lobbying within the ETUC by some alliestlie DC-domlnatcd Italian union grouping (CISL) resulted in CCIL acceptance by tbe ETUC infirst admissioncmmunist-domi. nated union into the ETUC. Although the French cominunist-domlnated confederationteems to want to enter tltc ETUC, the PCI docs not appear lo be pishing very hard to help out. The PCI has long felt lhat its WFTU membership has not advanced Ihc well-being of the Italian worker or the PCI objective cfajor role in western European labor. At the same time, it is aware tbat many western unionsim view of the presence of the CCIL within the ETUC and the PCI has admonished the CCIL to act "responsibly" In Its dealings wid. ETUC members.

Ine European Commi/nrfy .

The PCI has dcyotcd much study to the EC and the role it plays and can play in Europe. Since there are no PCI members at high levels of the EC bureaucracy, it works through non-communistIn the Italian government who are eitherhe EC bureaucracy or have dealings with it. There does not seem to be any effort to "subvert" the EC to communist ends, but rather to do what ispossible to "condition" EC decisions and to keep Italians and non-Italians who work in the ECarn of the "reasonable" nature of PCI positions, of continuing PCI interest to the well-being of the EC. and In the upgrading of Its effective European influence.

of the PCTi key points of conrtet within the EC It Alliens SplneUl. the EC CommUnoncr for Imlostrlet and Trehnolojlcl Poller. OrlnWally hi the PCI. SplneUl Hi the Party0 and joined tho PSI wheren advuor to Pletro NennL He has maintained good relation, wtth many PCI effletali. Including Betllnguer. Amendola and Leonardl. In4 fcHlnguer. Amendola and Segrr met with SplneUl In Brutarh and came away with Ihe feeling lhat he waa favorably dtapotrd lo the Pd'a obfecthe of retting non-PCI support for IU anal of ilfengthenlng EC

Inalihiuoni and the role of oommunfat> In

.^itlu'a uitfiUiJ uUiik LIE

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THE PCI, THE CPSU, ANDINTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT

ijn Increasingly prevalent view among wcslcm oJjsovctj of die CPSU and other communlit parties holds that the term 'international communistii not appropriate in tbe teTveatfiee. Analysts in thii group think the tern ii no longer applicable in In implication! of anything approaching anamut ion with lome *ort of fountalnhead oflive ciecullve power. Despite what has beenhroughout thii paper about tbe "Italian Road toociallim" and the ideologica] and programmaticiffcrencei between the PCI and the CPSU,s. nevertheless, an organizational Internalnvolved in the thinking of the PCI which Ismportant to the Party. Thii Internationalism still hai Hi focus in Moscow. Tbe PCI, after all,avothan any other Italianinealan miernatsoaa] and pan-European program. It it careful to keep ln formal amitouch with the CPSU, which remains the ruling Party of Ihe most powerful state in the communist world. On the many occasions forarty conclaves such as anniversaries of Individual j: communist partios or regional conferencei cfort or another, and through bilateral contacts, the '1 PCI Is able to keep In touch with tho variousof tlie "movement" It Is continuallyeading on the extent of resistance of thrto Soviet pressures la particular sectors of policy, lhe situation In Czechoslovakia, theange of "leftist" experimentationannd Asia, the CPSU maetioatc. 8 ' , i"

The attraction of the USSR and the CPSU forome of Ihe PCI's baseroblem In lerms of theI PCI's approach lo achievement of powertaly ai discussed earlier; at the same time it'source of strength for the Party In Ihe renteach member knows theofwith thea powerful ally ai intemlrd as tha PCI ia prevention of US hei;ernony in Europe The Intangible factor of morale cannot be lenored In this context: PCI members, whether in ihe base or hierarchy, feel more corrfortable knowing lhat they are part of an intei national fraternity which hat its family quarrels of varying inii mlty but which rarelyemlxr leave Ihe fraternity as the Yugoslavs were forced to do In Itf-W. The PCI leadership Ii convinced lhat "unity

ia diversity" is now the operating factor Incommuniiin. It refuses to be drawn Into any CPSU-iponiored cwidcmnaf Ion of tho Chinese Party fust ai It would havo preferred not to have had toritical stand on the Portuguese Party, lt sees the present European and world situation at marking an excellent opportunity to push ill own modifications of Marxism/Leninism (within and Outside Italy)anner which Ibe CPSU may oppose but can no longer afford lo condemn.

A. CPSU Attitudes Toward the PCI

As we have seen, the CPSU, from Ihe twenties, hasaundiced view of tho PCI'sof Mai xlsm/ Leninism. Although It no longerthe PCI the harsh and demeaningStalin gave it, the CPSU attitude remains one of decided distrust which Is not likely to diminish over the next servers! years. Those aspects of PCI policy which Ibe CPSU nowto accept (such as the right of each Party to abstain from particular Items of international commui.'st communiques with which it disagrees) arc accepted with much reluctance, and primarily because the CPSU feels that lo be stubborn would seriously diminish any continued Influence over the European Left In tha long run. lj ^Ivif jj- I

In recent years Soviet offidalil

tunteru overrvt piugiams anu'atti-tudes. They are' displeased about what Ihey term Berliaguer's "opportunism" and have seemedupset by the extent of PCI alliances with left DC elements and the Italian Socialist Party. These alliances are viewed as "sopping lhcspirit* The Sovieis also feci that Ihe

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his lost cooo-ol of tho yoothrwit acttvfty and has permitted Its control of the CGIL to weaken to the point where the Party faces the very real prospect of toss of effective iiifluence over the Italian labor movement. The PCI obfe tivo of entry into government is criticized by the Soviets been use of lha destabilizing factor this would represent: tbey leel thattrategy might provole US reaction and upset theequilibrium."

On personalities tliehave had

nothing but ctiBOseo for PCI leaders with 'beof Armando1 they doubted that Cossutta bad the makingsood Secretary-Ceneral lo succeed Luigi Longo but fell be wouldood number two man to offset

Berlinguer. In Ihe wordsnowledgeable east European oVfectcehe Soviets trust Cossutta as not being too Imaginative or forceful but someone who would be amenable to tbeir influence."

A curious nrpect of PCI analysis of the US and the USSR Is the leadership's conviction that the CPSU. for reasons of USSR state Interests, isPCI efforts on the Italian and European scene Whether It is CPSU anger at Berlinguer (or failing loeferendum on divorce (which rocks the Italian boat) or CPSU unwillingness to discuss European troop withdrawals with tbe PCI. the PCI leadership constantly runs up against what it views as indications dial the USSR and the US are so concerned with liability and detente In Europe that theerfectly cortlent to see Italy remain an American satellite for the Indefinite future. As one disgruntled PCI official put ItAmerican and Italian capilallam and the USSR formunhed front. AD want to preserve the Italian status quo.".

" Thencreasingly irritated by the steady drop ia PCI attendance at training schools operated by tho CPSU to the point where thii partii is now practically non-exi*tent.

out of the Conference of European Communist Parties scheduled for late this year. Theand Romanians are probably not as concerned as the PCI with developing ties to rtnn-ccmmurilit groupings In western Europe, but they nonetheless share Ihe PCI desire loaximum amount of independence for national communist parties. The CPSU Is fighting hard (with the EaM Gennan communtiti) to sec to it that tlie Conference comes up with an agendaommunique which will focus on the unity uf the!Interrullonal communist movement with the clear implication that this movement has its guiding party in the CPSU. The odds seem good, however, that thenUn/panish common front will be aagainst any conimimlcoci which smack of cm trained control of European communism by Moscow.

B. The PCI ond tho Yugoslavs

PCI rclati i- with the Yugoslav Communist Party (LYC) deserve special attention In the early seventies the Soviets were perturbed by the depth and frequency of TCI contacts with the LYC aod, if anything, the tempo of these bilateral contacts bar increased since then. The reason! for the close ties ate obvious: while they, differ on many things, the parties are united on the major theme of the mdependent roads to socialism and avoidance of loo dose an embrace by Moscow.

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DC. and said the Jugoslavs appreciated thela wrri'h the PCI had always done its best to dampen any irridmrut haliin claims for letrllory in the Trieste area occupiedo Yugoslavs after World War II.oteworthy development it tho visit of Berhnguer and Segre to Yugoslavia immediately after tho conclusion of the PCI Con-greis/ During their stay they spent several hours with Tito. Among lhe topics covered were the Middle East situation, about which Tito was very worried, detente (Tito told Berlinguer he believes that both tbe US and the USSR, albeit for different reasons, want to see Yugoslasia maintain its present. international poiitionj^aoslolhcr

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IDC OST.(h* PCI Wdcrsnip wishes toost-Tito Yugoslavia dominatedeak central authority which could foil prey to Soviet provocation or other actiom clesiscocd to bringnto the cast European satellite camp,eems -to have been somewhat rdassured on this point by Tito as well as other1 LYC leaden with whom he spoke. Tito frankly admitted thatereprcssiucs. uneven development. "Comln/ormtst" and pro-Chinese pressu*TS,ut Tito appeared confident that he and other Yugoslav leaders hod given tbatableone which the LYC

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