parliamentary govcnimenl which made it unique among its Latin American neighbors, it was seenodel for modernization andepresentative democracy. The Allende vears broadened interest in Chile. Europeanand Socialist parties followed closely the formation of AUende's coalition, its rise to power, and its struggle to socialize the country. Chile alsoero of non-aligned countries. It was viewedscourge" of multinational corpora-tkms,horn in the side of the "yankeeAHeode's formidable internationalspanned the Communist, Western, and Third Worlds.
llende's ousler and death and tbe repression that followed provided fertile ground for ancampaign designed to discredit the military government and embarrass the US. The USSR snd Cuba continue to lead the propaganda initiative. International meetings convened to condemn the "crimes of the fascist junta" attract participantsarge number of countries. To many, Chile has replaced Vietnamcause celebre."of CIA involvement in Chile have increased support for "solidarity" movements. Muchand misinformation about Chile have been disseminated by Soviet and Cuban media and by" Chilean exiles. All this has helped make Chile some-thing of an international pariaheavy cost to its international, political and economic interests. Western European hostility to the Chilean junta -has complicated the problem of renegotiating Chile's foreign debt.
he military government abo bears heavy responsibility for Chile's poor international image. Because of their Initial preoccupation with internal security. Chile's leaders failed to appreciate the damage that mass arrests, summary executions, and the incarceration of leading officials of the Allende regime would inflict on their country's interests. More recently, there hasrowing awareness that with its large economic and military needs. Chile iseavy priceesult of its poor international reputation.
A stable internal situation has enabled the government to relax its security controls and to deny credibly any capitulation to foreign pressure. The prospect now is for further progress on freedom for political prisoners. The return of guarantees of due process for individuals, however, willengthy affair.
The prisoner release and exile programlast year was slow to get off the ground, but has begun to acceleratehe prune beneficiaries thus far have been those detained but not formally charged. The program has beento include persons tried and convicted, mostly for violations of the arms control law. The total number ofaboutshould shrink substantially this year, although some persons considered too dangerous even for release into exile may be detained indefinitely. Seventeen of therominent figures of the Allende regime originally imprisoned on Dawson Island remain in custody. Guidelines on lhe treatment of prisoners have been laid down and some pumshmenU have been dealt out to violators. There are also new rules calling for prompt notification to tbe families of detainees and requiring that within five days of arrest prisoners be charged, released, or officially detained without charge under the state of.siege.
* As ofenom hod been tried indby military tribunal* fotoficmes including arrru cotnol law violation! and actac wrvinger ton* were tnrudtciel proce*iing. and TOO detainee* win being held without charge under the itate of taiga,otal of"political" prisoners. The number* in each category areto constantome people ne releaird, other* detained, andtben convicted- Althoughant incornatirxy in the government prtaoecr ttatiitiea.theat figure* are roughly accurate.
Wp at) unit* the ouimum number of pertoraitody Bt any one time lince3 lo ba
his is not to say tha the total eradicationf-abuses is likejysoon. The uthorities inemain sensitive To the need for maintaining tight control over possible threats-from elements ef the Chilean left, and the junta itself cannot fully police or control the actions of the security agencies. Tbe military firmly believe that they foiled plans by extremists to massacre the officer corps and other
opponents ol Allendc and that groups like Ihe MIR would still do so if given the chance- In the final analysis, dissidents will continue to be handledanner commensurate with the threat they are thought to pose, aod security considerations will take precedence over concern with Chile's inter-national image.
prisoner releases have helpedimprove Chile's international standing andlikely to be some further progress asthe military takeover fade and internalare gradually relaxed. But Chile'sprobably overestimating how far this canBecause of Chile's poor image, theiu critics will easily be sustained by theof occasional abuses. Moreover, theinternational concern with Chile is shiftingto the restoration of due processrights, areas in which the junta isdisposed to move in the near term. Thecontinued criticism and harassmentsources, but it will continue toand frustrated over the failure ofopinion to be satisfied. Chileantheir critics will never be satisfied couldon civil rights.
Peru and Other Neighbors
loMrafencv memorandum eitanatn that hostilities between Peru tnd Chileunl.lralytheull diicuHion. Mtl DCIVNIOeru aad Chut: ReawumtTU of tha Potential for
Chile's chief foreign policy goals are toome its international isolation, gain respectabilityand acceptance, and secure moral and material. support. Its principal foreign policy problem is its concern over the threat believed posed by Pew, with its rapidly improving miliury capabilibes-This concern underlies much of what Chile is doing to improve its international position and itsrelations.
Chilean mililary men are convinced that their Peruvian counterparts plan to avenge Peru'sat tbe hands of Chile in the War of tbehey abo believe that Cuba and the Soviet Union, for reasons of their own, arcPeru to do so. Chile doe* not expect Peru to be ready to translate its rcvanchist dreams intountil late this year. In the meantime, Chile will continue to reinforce its northern ttoopmake further defensive preparations in the border area, and desperately seek arms to defend itself from the threat posed by Peru's new Soviet tanks and other modern military equipment.
the Chilean perspective, Brazila counterweight to neighboringource of support against Peru.is an ideological ally on manyodel ofilitarycan achieve. Brazil did little to concealover the end of Marxist rule init has not become the large source ofeconomic aid that Chile had hoped for.Brazilian sympathy and support are
continues efforts to wooaway from iu traditional alignmentby exploiting La Paz's obsession withaccess to theyear break inwas endedeeting betweenPinochet and Banzer in February. Chileto be considering plans to impart someinternational status to the northern portArica. The purpose is to accommodateto give Bolivia and othertake In deterring Peruvianwill object strenuously tochemeinvolves territory that once belonged tomight threaten to block it by force,of9 treaty between Peru andtreaty prohibits either side from cedingarea territory dealt with in the treatythe other's advance consent. Tho US wasparty to that treaty but did help arrangeand never objected to inclusion ofthat disputes over its interpretation.resolved by Peru and Chile, would bethe President of the United States. Becausethe US could be drawn into the dispute.Original document.