Created: 8/1/1975

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A The Ukrainian Nation

B Thr Ukraine's Statu* Viia-vii lhc Union


Brezhnev Years:nitary Slate

and Demographic Trends



A.and Socioreakdown II. Grievances of the Disaffected

Intclliffciilua and Nationalism

with Eastern Europe und the West

E< Relations with Russion. Jewish, and Christian Dissent


A. Factionalism and Nationalism

B The Case ofassal Who Loved His Fief

C TV Case of Shcherbitsky As Royalist as the Kins.


Source CiUfiuns



Ukianuan Rcprcscntalmn in the Ukrainian Communist(chart)

'll hart.





Inihn Uwdy. ihe Offke ot PoMtKOi Vcwo'chr otfxei

ot "he CentralAoenty'he Deportment o' State. The-end wggei'iom wereond mod. bill no oMtmpt olcoordination wot undcilohen. Furlhet <ommenii will be wekomed by the oirihor



11k- Sirs setulli national stale ui an of Ol fht three grealirop< .in lunii empires pf (hi- nineteenthTurkish, andlhc Russian is still intact. Although the viu) signs of the Soviet i'in|iiic* itiniunny of Its national minorinumberundred, and make up jliiknl half ot ihe Sovietlo resist Iti ism licit ion |iicssurcs. and some nf them Ml becoming more ratlnr than lev* assertivethe nationalitiesne ol Ihe most I* iind vexing domestic problem* tuiifrimt-ing Soviet authorities today.

Some Western students of Soviet society,by Mat iii! and in part by liberal mocln of thought, as well as by the dominaiiiT of Russians in the lirst generation of American academicbase been *los* to recognize the staying power of Soviet minority nationalism Predisposed In believe In an historical trend toward increasing isiltiiral uniformity and political in tlie of social engineering loold loyalties, they long regarded nationalism ,i> an atavism, an obsolete ami even embarrassing throwback to an earlier eta. Mot* recently, as many mnfliet* in Soviet society ion tinned to be i'tlmii rather than (lass conflicts. Ihe academic pendulum kit vssnng in the olhri direction. Scholar* areto nuke up for their tardiness inthe import ol theies problem wilh tionalities question is also germane to the debate concerning tli- nature of the Sovitt system and the direction in which it may evolve in thewhether toward increasedin the political, economic, and cultural spheres, orore federal, diversified and pluralistic system Thus far. lo Ihe citetil thai Soviet traders havea long-range goal in nationality policy, Ihey have engagrd tnn the. at tempi to transform the old multi-national Russian empireoviet "nation" whose citizens, regardless of nationality, osse their primary loyally lo Ihe Sovitt unto. In many respects the dilemma of thr Soviethat of the imperial statesman of all htiit-and all placet. To require complete culturalas weltand economic ccnlt alira-tton across the board, may stir op unrest among nationalities which could be mollified by moreattention to their Individual needs, but to yield too much to local interests may encourage partlcularisi attitudes which likewise threaten the stability of the (tale.

Thus, the history of centra) podo towaid the nat.unal minorities has not been one of unrelieved repression, butlend of coercive mid con-eiliatory measures. The fluctuations of Sovietpolky probably do not reflect any change in basicill merely the use ol more Or lev* Mibtle means to achieve tlie same end. Il islhat il imperatives continue lo weaken, the regime might become nsore mpomise to llie desire* id tmtaHi key national minoritiesetain Iheir rlhnic and idenlity. and in gain Mime measure of economic and political autonomy

nationalities potentially prendretudy of lhc


them and most minority.stimate*lvni to which centrifugal and destabilising forces

rxist in the Ukraine and evaluates MokOw'j efforts lo contain thrm The Ukrainians possesswhich, taken together, givenique position among Soviet minorities Some of thesetire and cohcsirrneu ol Ihe Ukrain-un population, the economic Significance of iheir urea, Ihe historical longevity of the Ukraine as aethnic community conscious ot un independent cultural heritage, and the Ukrainians historiclo Western culturalseem toit the ability of the Ukrainians toRussifkalion pressures. Yet otherthe considerable affinity (linguistic, ethnic, cultural) among Russians andworkie opposite diiectiOn. Soviet authorities tend to accept Ukrainians, fellow Slavs, on an almost equal footing with Russians in eliteand under Khrushchev and Brezhnev the Ukrainian Communist Party has enjoyed aposition Yet the similarity betweenand Russians may also make centralthat Ihe Ukrainian* (ire more easily assimilable than many otherto accord Ukrainians rightsroup.

This piper appraises Ukrainian nationalism nn several knrlt First, the character of ihr Ukrainian nationality and Ihe question of how fully thepeople and the Ukrainian Party have lieenmln ihr Soviet system is considered. See-

tionalist dissent among Ukrainian intellectuals, and nf nationalist manifestations within the Ukrainian Communis! Party. Suggests the eitent and nature of resistance to central control


A. The Ukrainian Nation

Snviet Ukraine is more lhan an administrative sulidivision Theillion Ukrainians in the Soviet Union lorm tin- largest national minority iu ihe country and account forercent of itsTlie I'lijiiH- Itself containsullumrvii I" percent of the Soviet poputatiofi I. of whichnlhm ate ethnic Ukrainians In tics >iih1li'iu tin Ukraine is almut iho >iif uf France Its people possess all the attributesiHil-ulou language, ethnic distinctness, geographic and economic cohesion, nnd consciousnesshaitd heritage. The vitality ofliunalism and the-ability of the Ukrainians to resist assimilationnn the strength of those qualities.

tuny. It serves liutbranaryajor mineral producer ol Ibe Soviet Union. Aiming Us mineral resources, the piimary raw materials tor heavy metallurgy arc most important. Scarcely anywhere else, in the Soviet Union are coal, iron, anillouudsuch proximity as in the East Ukraine. In addition to the rich coal deposits in the Donets Basin, nr DonbaS, another coalfield has lx-rn discovered in Ihe Lvov region. Krivoy Bog in (heegion produces iron oreigh quality, ami manganese is found in the middle Dnepr area. Tbe Don has* hast anddeposits. Vicsl iialural gasve bun discovered in East Ukraine Petroleum fields lie in several eastern regions, in the Crimea, and In the foothills of the Carpathians, where potash is also found. In addition, the Ukraine produces about one quarter of ibe Soviel Union's grain, as well as sugai beetsariety of other crops.

The Ukraine welldeveloped and divctsiliisl industries Inlie Ukraine produced mure pig-iruii lhan any European coiiutiv. mine *leel thin the United Kingdom or France, and wasnull lo tin- United Kingdom in coal mining. The Ukraine leads tbe world in per capitu pioductiou of iron, steel, and iron ore. Its chemical industry has ev-oaii'ledince il is the majoriacin He cunstiiictioil center ol tbe Soviet Union. The Ukraine also produces some nhnmnmn. aboul two-thirds of the country's sugarball it* salt.

The part played by the Ukraine in tin- Soviet economy is considerable. On balance, it contrilmto mure to the Soviet exchequer than it receives from it, although the costs of administration and dcfi'mt borne byI-union government tend to even the score Although the Ukiaine's light industry i>

underdevelo|ied. and it imports cloth.

some Other products from other pint* nl the Soviet Union, the Ukraine has escaped the narrow regional

specialization which has buen forced on sumc union republics. Confined forenturylosed economy and unable to reach foreign markets directly, the Ukraine ha* becomeertain degree wi-lded economically tot her ngiom uf theUnion, but its economy is relatively balanced and has Income less reliant un the traditionalof, iron and steel, and grain If cut loose frum the all-union economy, the economy of the Ukrainc cuold probably stay afloat.

While tbe economic importance of (heir areasheif weight of their numbers give theSoviet nationalities lack,i4 Ukrainians to Hussions dniil>tlc-ssauthorities some ground* for liupc thatmay ultimately solve the UkialuiauLittle Russianshiteand Creat Hussions ni.ike upbranches of the Eavl Slav family Theof the Ukrainian! may lie morehe alnoiplmn of tbe Baltices

lu assessing tlie ability ul tlie Ukrainian! Ii>rutuxul identity in the face of RussifyingisIoistinction

between East Ukrainians and West Ukrainians. In modern times thi' Ukraine has never formed an in dependent politkal state (except timing the brief and confused peiiod following the Bobhevikand its terrminrs fuse often been divided among several states. Only with thi' ac-(position, of World War II were allltunes consolidated in one Soviet republic East Ukraine, un al ot which has lirkmged lo the RussianSosN-t.e during must of the uiodi-tn period, is closer In iIk- Creat Russians in historical traditions and in enltuial and religious background than is Wi-st Ukraine, which was annend only during World Wai 11

kraine, encompassing tbernvincrsv Hie Soviet Union9 amiy vftlUl'ls bolder luc.ition ,ui'l histoiy has long hi-ii more Westernuiienled than tbe (astern pail of tbe rc-public. Five of the weslern nbl.isls. iiiwhich make up Easti-rnsov. Ivano Kr.inkostk. and Ternopol ublasts) and part ol Voly-nia fV'olynij and Rovnu ohlusts) were under Aus-Iriau ut I'olish rule lot centuries, although the

Volynian areas had been under Russian rule from the eighteenth century until World Warcquired by the Soviets from Chechoslovakia, was under Hungarian conlrol until World War I. Chernovtsy, formerly called Northern Bukovlna, belonged to Romania until World War II.

While East Ukraine contains no sizeable minority except for the Russians. West Ukraine hosts twomfnnrilkS. Most uf the Pole* in Easternere deportetl lo Poland after the war. bul Hungarians constituteercent of (he population of Trantcarpalhia. while Romanians and ihe cluscly-rilateil MuliUvUns make upervent ofAt llx' same time. Czixhirsluv.ikia andcontain small but vocal Ukrainian minorities This intei mingling of nationalities create* atroublenune situation in lho Soviet Ukraine. Nationalist movements in Eastern Europe couldnnions in Ihe Ukraine retell, asdiiimg tliehoslovak crisis.

Wesl Ukraine's religion has also helped to set it apart Irom the ml of Ukraine. Must of the Chriv lians in West Ukraine, except for Vuh/maL, rnovtsy, are Uniates, Creek Catholics who adliere lo the Ortbudux rite buluthority while the great mass ol East Ukrainian lulieveii arc Oithotlox. The Uniate church has traditionallyearer ul Ukiainian feeling Tbe church's miimate connection with the Uluaiman mdepend rncc movement during World War II provided the pretest lot ils official ibvvolutiun byinationalist Ukrainian Autocephiilonv Ortho-dov Church did exist and svas intermitti ntly active in East Ukraine) until its final siippresnimWurld War II. but ifomsii sup poll as tlie Uniates in Wet Ukraine The off icially sanctioned Russian Orthodox Churrh is subservient to the state, which has relied on it in the struggle with tlie "national" churches in Ihe East as well as tlie West.

In ihe East Ukraine.ti" feelingseenonger in tbe niirlh.III the north west em ii'gums (Khilielnil.vky. Vinnitsa. Zhitomir, Kiev. Cherkassy,art nl this northwestern 1stiilnry was actiuued liy Km-via only in thr late eighteenth century The south, which iins most ofge lilies, was sdfltxl



much Liter,s histoiicallyess UkrainianYethole Ihc East Ukraine shares iniicli ut ils long history with the Great Russians

Because ol its cloier physical proximity andties to Europe, hosvever, even whilerule tho East Ukraine has played arule in the development of (he Russiana cons-cyor ol Western influences. Peterfor example, relied heavily on Ukrainianand ideas in his effort to Westernizethe eighteenth century. The Ukraine isRussian history for another related reason.nineteenth centuryRussianearly history of the Ukrainethe quest lor freedom and the defianceautocratic state. This conception of

Uki aine's historical role can be seen in (he intei-pret.iliim of two events, both of which have sparked fierce disputes between contemporary Sovii-tand Ukrainian historians At issue is notry. acalemic inatler, but the identityeople.

The firstoncerns the dctlructioti ul tin first "Russian- slate,iev in the Dnepr River Valley in lhc early mKldW ages Western in (Kiltinik and in lis political syslitn, Ihc Kievan state prospered until the Tatar invasion of the thirteenth cenluty For theears much o( thr old Kicvan trmtories svere nibiecfrd to the Tatar yoke, but parts of Ukraine (Calico and Volynia) were absorbed by Poland and Lithuaniaew state lo the north, Mnsoovy, ruse to drive unt the Tatar intruders and "gather the Russiant differed fmni its Kiev an pmlrecisor substantially, in its base, in ils political system,ts ithnic make-up Russian historians havi sfirsml the continuity lietween the Kicvan and Muscovite periods, and view much ul Russian foreignhe centuries In comeuntinuing effort to reclaim the Ukrainian Irtritoricsegitimate pari of the Russian state. Ukrainian historians, on the contrary, have scm Ihe Tatar invasion asharp break and are inclined to regardsiiilual annexation of ibe East Ukraine as nof one separate people by another, ratheramily reunion

Anotlier cherished Ukrainianf the periodissacfc freedom Tin* Cossacks were bands of free-wheel lug tmppcis ami ineivmarics who lived in several areas nut yet htooglil him hi tha* sway of Ihc- rx|nmlmg Muscovite stall Thus* in the nu-aian's land akmg IhcIhv of tl" Dnepr formedough democracyvinaanctuary for runaway serfs and others who wantedcape gnvcrnmenlal oppression While the Ukrainians idealize Ihe Zaporoafuan Gnsacks as free Spirits who defied the Tvin. Soviet historians attempt In uncover evidence of class conflict in the egalilnrian Cossack society, and legaid the(ni subiugation) of Ihe Cnssatk Intuit with the Tsarist statelessing for the Ukraine

The Ukrainians have ronianticizrd thrtr history vmsewhal. yet Ihe "myth" nf the Ukrainians of oldnmd and freedom-loving people Ins suis-ivcd to provide Ukrainians today with national heroes,ational Ideal,unciption of national cliurac-trr. Years of Soviet education, sshich subtlythe superiority ofussian have taken their toll Ixit have nol etimpk-trly c-he Uknini.itis apprit-ialimi and knmvleilffie ol tlieiiulriireis1nr>.

B. The Ukraine's StatusiiUnion

Undu Khrushchev ami Bri-rhncs. tin Ukrainians liovc achieved ihe stains offolicy of "lecriiiliiu; local cadres" In govern (heirsts pari of the elfort olt" oras been rcviwd The Ukrainian Party.f thev- nwlieynniis Imt nlia-flHsri appaiatchlks. hasu Ihe position ul Ihe Russian Party's jimim paitner. Al the same lime, Ukrainians appealirtually equal vocational opportunities, as the central regmico strengthen tin- bonds of interest among, elites of different nationalities anduhbK among1 groups within theesult of thesenliveellli governs the Ukraine, the Ukraine tnd.iv is nnolonial outpost nm by Cn-at

Since World War II (he Ukrainian Party liasalrrxrtt completely UkrauiiZ'sJ Beginning wilh (he Khrushchev era and enntinuingtn-

Figura ?

Utiaimanse.camaga o* Ukrmnan oOkom Fust


Partya remarkableof giowth. although its membership Is still disprupur lion.ili'ly Inn' loinpaied svifh the nil-union average. Duringperiod of gruss'th. many local tadere recTiuted. ami today imhaetmnie Ukrainian Party is higher than in most union republics. Tin- Ukrainian representation in the Ukrainian Party rose fromercent9 toercents high as the Ukrainian share of the population of Ukraine. During this period the Russian element in the Party fell fromeicent toerceni. although ihe Russian share of Ihe population ol tlieas growing.1 itin"mate the upper echelons as well at the rank and file of the Ukrainian Parly. While in almost all other unaai republns Russians serve as second secretaries, important posts because ol their control over cadres,1 holh the first jini rln- wciitdf the- Ukrainian Party hasc been ethnic Ukrainians Of Ihc eleven fullhe |ncsent Ukrainian Politburo, only one is Russianhe twenty-four lust secretaries ul Ukrainianrovince) Patty committee* luhkouis uhusc nationality ran be asenlamcd. twi nty are ethnic Ukrainians (there are twenty-five committeest Moreover, many of the Russians in Inch po*il<om ui the Ukrainian appant are natives

Thereeneral tendency In

appoint East Ukialnlans. piesumably1 imporlant pints inlso eomidtrultls' luwer in one ul the seven western oblasts

patklil IIIo tbewhich has It also ivflects minis!lor reasons mt, it is not tluit uf ihchas captured il the iiRiias-uns tuleadership no

have1 as miiny as huty Party members per one thousand people. All but two of the eighteen east-em oblasts hassj at least forty Party members per our ihousandhe higher iiercenlngr of Kimiaru residing In the easte-in ohli*t*esp mi 1lor Ihis dillercncc.

The high level of natr Ukrainian Party isL advancement nf increased the size ol the un Ihe glowing acceptance of by part ul Ihe- Ukrainian el uf conviction urkrainian elite has captun ian Party, but that the Ukra the alle-gitinct"kiuimi iiijj tendency to give rcspoui tans also indicates that tlx

longer distrusts the Ukrainian Tartyival power center, as Stalin did. but regard* ihe Ukrainian Communists as rchatik- parlnris


1 i" tintslilies ul the Ukrainia

mt Muse


retaiy nrtsts i

also occups 'aity and govei nmcni illy tin histuncal aeii lie Ci-iiler's pidicy lo v.ormer Firstaturally filledvifhHues and

Imin lhe Ukrainian Party. Hiexhnev. nm* ol |Im-u; Khrushchev pinlcges. ennliuucd this practicein. .scak'. Four ol tin- fillecn lull mcmlicrs at theKirilenko,tlx ir early careers in Party. Shchrihitsly. First Secretary ot the Ukrainian Parly, isull member, and another, (ajethkii. is an tllmtc Ukrainian

Of Pnlnbun. menilms Irum the Ukrainian ap-parai. Brc/imev and Kirilenko are ethnic Russian v. afthough Brezhnev was born in the Ukraine and Kirilenko. uliokrainian name, in an RSFSR oblast bordering it Tlir nalumabty ol theon the Politburo is not very significant In any case. They all belongussified, or at leastapparat. During the early years of the Khiushehev era these Politburo members at times seemed toolitical iirnupjngommon polity orientation, but at leastvitb theof Kirlcheuko from the Politburo, the so-called "Ukrainian clique" began to break up and thereafter showed little cohesion on issues. After KhrnsUhcv's removal, the rivalry between Brezhnev and rodgunry. and later. Ihe demotions of Poly jr.-sky and Shelest. further demonstrated that the "Ukrainians" on the Puhihuio did notnited group. After long years away from theirpmver base, most of them bad developed new cnnslitofiieiCs ami allies

Today tin- "old scliool tie" of the "Ukrainians" operates largely on the social level, wilh littleinto politics. In fait, reliance un differing power bases in the Ukrainian Party often has created frictions rather than political compatibility among the "Ukrainians'" The livalry betweenand Brezhnev, anil tint between Brezhnev and Shelest had iti roots in earlier factionalin ihe Ukraine, so thatl the center has sometimes appeared toontinuation of Ukrainian power politicsagnified scale

Thenitially owing their positions not tn any quota system institutionalizing Ukrainian representation on ihe Poliliboro but to theirties to Khiushehev or Bre/hnev. do not appear

to leprcsenl ihe Interrsls of the Ukraine.except in the mailer of patronage, the fact ol heavy Ukrainian representation on Ihe Politburo docs not imply special treatment or advantages for Ihe Ukraine. More significant is the fact that Ihe First Secretary of the Ukrainian Party, who docs represent Ukrainian interests and answerskrainian constituency, has an ex officio place on the Politburo.3 the Party boss of tin-Ukraine has always sat on the Politburo. Al present One other union republic first secretaryull member of the Politburo, bul only the UkraineIscen regularly represented al llial level on what appears to be intendedermanent basis.

The Ukraine is somewhat under-represented in the CPSU Central Commit tec, makingof the members and candidate members elected at the Twenty-fourth Party Congresshile the population of the Ukraine makesl the total Soviet population. Memltcrship elected at the three previous congresses, spanning the period6adradual increase in representation for the Ukrainian Party, which reached its [teak at the Twenty-thirdal which the Ukraine providedicrcent of the membership. The fall in Ukrainianmay reflect in pari the troubles of Petr Shelest, ousted as First Secretary of the Ukraineut file discrimination at throrth Congress appearedystematic. While only twelve of ihe twenty-five obkom first secretaries of Ihe Ukraine were elected In the Cent nil Gimmiltee. all bul two of Ihe sisty-five firs! secretaries of the Russian Republic (RSFSR) obkoms andrepublics (ASSHs) were given seats.ol Ukrainian ohla.its appeared In he based on population or on the size of the oblast Partywhile RSFSR ohen* represented regardless of the size ol Iheir pnpnlahimv. Wilh ihe single cxceplion of Ivano-Frankovsk, whose first secretary at the time was from Dncprndzcrzhinsk. Brezhnev's hometown, all Ukiaiman oblasts with lessillion people were deniedThose oblasts with betweenillion inhabitants svere represented by candidate mem-licrs. and those wilhillion by fullYet forty-two of the RSFSR ublasts and ASSHs represented on the Central Committee svere "rotten* oblasts, that is. they had populations smaller thanillion seemingly required for Ukrainian iililaitv. In addition, whether measuredopnla-



lion standard oi liy the si/cof regional fatlyht- Ukraine's rt,Mrtentation lagged behind lhat of most other non-Russian republics. Still, in absolute terms ihe Ukraine, has not donearger percentage of Ukrainian oblasLs wereby (nil members on the Central Commillce

lhan those of any other republic except fur the RSFSR* And the greater representation for RSFSR

oblasts may be due to the lacknion republic

party organization (or the RSFSR rather than to

nationality ennsiderations.

Although the Ukrainian union republic is under-represented on the Central Committee,vst-represented Ethnicmadeercent of lhc Centralmembership, but9 percent of the Soviet population1 This is because, liesidc* the Ukrainians serving in Party and govenimenl posts al the centerin Ihcimbcr of Ukrainians have ailamcd positions in other regions svhich merit Central Committee membership Ukrainians, like Bnuurri are employed in key managerial andpositions throughout the Sovietthat they are nol discriminated against.6 Kuvvians ami Ukrainians were the only two nut tonalities to hold obkoin first secretaryships (heir own republics* Today al least eight ohkom firsl secretaries in the RSFSR and two in Kazakhstan are Ukrainians* Ukrainians appear to be uved interchangeably with Russians lo bolster central control in Central Asia According to one Suvut MMMiitatut. "in ihe eyes ot the Kazakh, the Tulur. the Kitghiz. the Turkman, or the Uzbek, (lie Ukrainian or (he rseloruvuan are lo an equal degreeAn except ton lo Ihis genet al lack of foimit disttimination ate the prelereulialquotas of all-union universities. Tncse quotas favor Asian nationalities over Ukrainians and oiher Kiwnrxv-an* eicept of course, for tin- Russians.

Wiihin (heir oivn republic Ukrainians are under-repti-wnled in several Otsupattonal Hite*5 for example, Ukrainians made- up onlyercenttin- condiment in Ukrainiannd inuhIii hall ol the scientists in ihe Ukiaine boldtng doelnial

Party,1 fourteen nut of sixteen bishops were native Ukrainians."

oubtful lhai the heavy representation o( Russians in key elites in the Ukraine is ihe result of dclihcralc polity as much as ileflection of lhc employment and eduiational opportunities en-Joyed by all urban residents. The Russians, largrly concentrated in the major cities of the Ukraine, reap these advantages to the fullest. At the same time, in some cases ihe regime docs disperse Ukrainian chics throughout the USSR, wilh the avowed intent(iislering theirboul one-fourth of all Ukrainian professionals work outside thekrainians living outside Ihe Ukraine, who comprise one-eighth of the total Ukrainian population of the Soviet Union, may aceoont for lhc bulk of those working outside the Ukraine. Totent lhat the center docs engageonst lose, policy of eross-pmling, this has the effect olincreasing ihe opportunities which Ihecity dweller in the Ukraine would enjoy evenee market" conditions.

I 1fad (hat Ukrainians have taken control of tin Ukrainian Party does not menu (hat IheSSR has gained any significant degree ofautnnorny. As long as Moscow controlsand ilemolmns within the Ukrainian Parly, Iheitserving elile ratheruling elite As long as policy (or lhc Ukraine is made by (he Soviet Poblbiiro. whatever the career opportunities lorUkrainians,ollective ihey willwer!ess Yet Ibe existence o( ihe union republic government should not Ik* written off tompJetety Like the ninctecnlh-eentiiry zemstto* it eouldihe nucleus around which an opposition to the central grrsemmenl could (orm.1"


A. The Brezhnev Yrrors-nitary Stale



occurred. regional paily busses moved Io maximize their authorityime when central vigilance was related slightly As the Leadership headed by Brezhnev eomolktatrd its pustthxi al the center, however, it moved loentral hegemony over thr hinterland*.'" By thehe erosion ol discipline was arrested, and signslhat structural changes to reduce the powers ot union republics further were undertion. Dumg Brezhnev's tenure the Ihemes ol eoonornic ccntrah/anoii. ihe amalgamation of nationalities, and "Sovui patriotism" have beennd given point by the riVcision lo drawonomic plan lot Ihr period6

Brezhnev's mapir vtatcmcnl un nationalities policy was delivered at the2 celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the Soviet Union'sIn this speech Ik- eapsulated his policy tndogmas, not all of them new but all given new-ami .mllimitative emphasis; lhat Ihe Soviet economynified, organic whole, lhat regionalpolity has licrn actus-ved. that the "drawinc tugishcr" uf rialimialiiics hasading Icwl-ency. Uomnicntoiy by nthei ufflelal spokesmen on these Issues registers some disagreement, but shows an overall trendentralizing.iry

Bie/hnev fnrniiilaled the economic ic-lalionshipof Ihe .Soviet republics as follows;

Thr rvnanmy ij ihr Sovirt (Jmmml jIntil

el thr nirwui ol ite mtniihul rrpiWiii Jnd ngftW Il tintr mi'jniun.

foniHil nn ihr htiut 'itintm cvhh-iiIi sim*i ivtliifo ami niitinnxlihr*

The ctKullary of economic interdependence is re-gional spectBy advancing tins iliemc. Bie/hniserved nolicc to union republic leaders thai elfurts lo achieve regional economic autarky would not be tolerated

Brezhnev'si also seemed lu signal an end to preferential treatment for lioclward rcgiunv Them of regional economic dcvckipincnl had long !na staled goal nf Soviet ecmomic policy. Although in practice this objective had iJtiii yielded to the of maximizing national economic growth, il had never been abandoned altogether. Tlius, the eighth and ninth Five-Year Plans, spanning6avored some ul thetral Am in republics at the espmie of the moteWestern repubbes.ypical year in this rospeet. the RSFSR, Ukraine, Kstonia. and Latvia all retained less thanercent ol thefrom Ihe turnover las collected wilhin theirSeveral iihs before tbe filliethan authoritative article written by hsdgarny appeared which indicated thai new criteiia would henceforth govern resource allocations, that Iheeconomic needs of individual republics would 1st subordinated lu all-union interests."

At the fiftieth anniversary cvkbfalmti Brezhnevthis view He announced that *tnre "the pnihlem uf levelling ihe tt-nnniiiK dcvclopnu-nf ul the national republics had on the whole been rehe government was now "able to approach economic questions, first and loreinnst. from the point of view nf the interi-sis of the stalehole, from Hie standpoint of raising ihe elln lency of the entiie national connmy nl ibeenin bad always maintained thai economic inequities were the nmt nf the Soviet nationalities prrihlciu Byforth ihe fiction lhat rcgMwial parity had now been attained..ietinlim that ihe nationality problem had been solve.r. He was also attempting In cmtail Ihe broker-

eflieiency as the main criterion for futuremight havr Iwen cvpeetcd lo redound lo the benefit of the Ukraine. andhe productivity of labor and capital input* has gruwn most rapidly. Instead, more capitalIwiug pumped into the Eastern RSFSR. Highcontinues to be given lo tbe dcsefciposi-nt of

theil HHliulry, lo thr neglect ofttil in-.ln-.ri> and in4 aprogram In di'Vi-liip (hi- nun-black-sod land ol (he HSFSIt was ini ii' il This may reflect, inlanner's preference (or exploiting the vast iiatural mnim' base Mi the tost ol uiil.aily high investment allocations, ratherolicy of deliberate discriminationlic Ukraine and other regions

nified economy may beseith yet another announevmcnl Hrezhnevthe dial!esv const id it ion. long in the seorks bot rarely mentioned sincesvoold be made public before Ihe next Party Congress, scheduled forn Ihe scholarlyconcerning possible eunstiluliiinal changes which followed Ilie/hiK-v'i disclosure. proposals were id* for attiring adminislralive bouiHiaries In match economic rathei lhan nationalityebate whichnlaced [H'liodieally sinceuggestion lo Ihis effect wus set forth most explicitly in articles liy Gosplan official ViktorAn authoritative article3 written by Eduardeading theoretician on nationality mallei> and deputy chief editor ot KommunM was more caiitinus but agreed lhal 'naturally, in some cases, as has been ihc case in the past because of, above all.ume changes may be mnde in Ihebetwirn union republics' Me ss-enl on toIn- nailers ibal Marxists mustsc their udiuns entirely and exclusively on tlie 'nalKMiul-lerritoilarrticles in various*uggested that units based on ethnic lines weir hecuming u'no'-ie of, iIi.iim livesV advocated constitutkmal changes lo inakc-iiiihui republic laws eimfuriu mure closely In all-iniliin legislation (mist PC. Semenov called for the ciKuphti alio|itiini of union republic 'autonomy.'

IS-miulaix changes vihirh ignore iiiiumi ii-piihlk. hutsthreaten ibe power of local leaders. US mil as olleud ualiunalecu-Irali/cd Party aduillustrative urgaiii/atmus that wire evIaMkhecleas, such as the Asian lliucaii and the Trans-Caucasian lUueuu. whichialed in (lie early lUfHK ran up uuaimt local vc-slnl infi-rcsts Tlie-d<TshipMii:ull any suchs,*tIt tiiiilum

Definite actum has been taken, howevet, lo(he jurisdiction of regional governments. All-union and union-republic ministries have increased in numbermpetence. while ihe trend has beena reduction of republicu llu- past, the complexity ol Soviet administrativeonfused web of overlapping jurisdictions, had given skillful local leaden some room for mi-nuevre. The elimination of republic mirustnes. which are freer from central interference than union-rcjiublicould clarify the subordinale position of local authorities

Formulas concerning the evolution of lhchave also been manipulated to reinloree the centralizing trend In recent yeais. In lhcera the premise was propagated (hat aof "drawing together" was taking place, which would leadmerger" of all mtmnulilics Alter Khrushchev ihe concept ofvas consignedistant future afler ihe worldwide victory of mxsm and emphasis was placeduall 'llosvering' and 'drawinghich delicately balanced tin concept ol assimilation and increasing uniformity with lhal of the freeof each nationality

These two piucesses had generally been treated as <oequ.ilhether nationalities "flower"rawing logelber" or "draw together" through 'flowering" hod never been clarified But several articles2 seemed to argue lhattogether" had become ihe primary tendency.andidate member of ihe l'olitbuio and head of then led ihisfurther than anyone, by reviving the notion thai "merging" was six-ads taking place. Content)-iiig lhat it was inclinedssume dial "merging" could take place onlyengthy stage of de-veloprnenl. he staled thai (he tendency towardchad atuotrcd full scope, particularly inonornic sphere **

More moderate voices were hcaid asraula article by Hagramov. svhile noting lhat

drawing together" was "increasingly acquiring fundamentalernted "certain authors who artturry to throw the national clement overboard as somcthinjt that, Irom their standpoint, ismeh more critical articleSSR.en loinriticized those authors who "esaggrratr the process of thesocial and drawingnd declared the theory that thr "drawing together of tho peoples it beginning to play Ihr decisive role" to In-ne-sidedoncludingroadside at "some writers" who "feel that thefederal structure has outlived itsHcrstobitm informedthai "it is wrong to nndcrcslimale the significance of national

At the fiftieth anniversary celebration itself, Brezhnev steered clear of any talk ol "merger" but he clearly regarded "drawing tngelhor" as thetendency:

Thr I'd lli" ibswliiB bn& dm ol tlir nilmns jti.l

ui eountry

i" ObleCllveB.

> artificially, thric ii

it.ileil by tlie iMih'rc

ante time, tlir Parly

ifit* In re*Irjlithr


ICn create

I . iill I ii

Ill Il.'llllll.l

Brezhnev also paid great atlention to the lhemenew historical community of people, the Sovietad emerged, nnd implied (he primacy of this community over its constituent parts.

Since the fiftieth anmvtrsaiy most writers have followed Brezhnevs linetressing "drawingwhile making no claim ufagramov. for eiample. rrfcrred lo "ihe ever closer drawing together ofut hastened tothat the view of those who "displayed theto make the merger among nations and the withering away of national differences part of the present" had "nothing in commoncientificladimir Zevin. deputy director of theof Mamsrn-Leninism, wroteniiuthnt socialism would "tremendouslythe coming together nf nations" was coming In pass."

In hue with the subordination uf "Howeiinc" to "coming together" is the excessive praise of the Great Russians, so prominent in speeches in. In the mid-oOs "mutual help" of allreplaced the "older brother" theme as stock terminology, but this has changed.hrowback to the Stalinist elevation of the Russians to "mentor" status, official spokesmen have indulged in paeans to the Russians' charity in providing spiritualeconomic aid, and cultural enrichment to their presumably inferior "youngerl the Twenly-foiuth Congress Brezhnev lauded the On-al Russians in terms reminiscent of Stalin's Inast to ihe Russian people at Ibe World War II victoryand regional leaders picked up this theme

There are even indications that neo-Slavophile ideals may he condoned by .some Soviet leaders Sinceradiliunal Russian nationalism has evidently attracted Lirge numhers of Russianvvho have used both samizdat publicalinus such as Vladimir OsipOv's journal V'cc'iC and the legitimate press, particularly Stolodtitja Cvardiya. as outlets for iheir views. Ironically, ol Sovielit iskrainian by nationality, who is reputedly most syrripathelic to conservativenationalism.0 he is reported to have instructedfltsiija ta publish fl favor-able reviewovel by one of the more extreme nationalist authors. Pravda respondedostile review of the same work, and Polyansky's conduct was reportedly nilirizedolitburolthough no other Soviet leaders of such stature have known connection* with Russian patrioticseveral reports have suggested Ihe existence ofighliM iiilion.ilist societyor ihexisting within ihe Party and consisting (if branches throughout the"

B. linguistic and Demographic Trends

One way uf measuring tlie impact of Sovietpolicy on the Ukraine, and of evaluating Brezhnev's- claim2 that ihe national"has been settled completely, finally, ami lor good" is to siuvey linguistic and ethnic" the* composition of the Ukraine's population

The preservationational language is mil essential for the persistence of nationalism (witness the ease of Ihe Irish without Gaelic, oi of Suviii

Jews, must of whuni speaknd ihe irm.jJ ofrn language owes more to thr similarity lirtsvecn Russian .lnrJ Ukrainian, and (he .r'at.v,llki.iini.inussian, at well a*x-dH-TKy.ouIkmu)iinte Ukrainian dissident* havv made the use nla tyiiibolkrainianeut of rrmioi. of the language is on* indicator of theliusilisalion

Al least in llie majm cWa of East Ukraine.ian iv replacing Ukruinian in public ctiminuiilrii-lion. Party ami military activities. business tulmln-istiatiiin and civic alfairv arc routine ted in Travclt-is to llic Ukraine report that inkrainian cities Ukrainian is simply not spoken in public anil that -xii-ik-ls useark of smial inferiority Them- Ukrainian. Am.ric.lii hisloiian and tourist, though cvingeialnl. is nut atypical:


rlrsra -lasi tn IWarr uiker .

aw 1cm*->

tommu in theImcuarr - YraV klr.

TV imisl dramatic triumph for linguistic Rmsi-ficutlon in leceiil years has been in the aiea ol OnV ealion, nol surprisingly In view of llu- nmicrted ilhirf. inis field Since5 Soviet school law gising pirenis the choke of sending their children either to Russianlanguage schools or lo Ukrainian-language schools, matriculation at Russian language schools has increases] substantially Moreovsr. svhile Ukrainianan elective subject in Russian vchuoK. Russian isn all Ukrainian schools and inwh of Ihe instructionin fact.n Russian.

In general, the higher tile level ol education, ami Ihc more urban Ihe area, the gicalci tbe use of Illusionedium of instriKtion. Unulfkialhulk-ate thaiew Russian stionghulds of (he East Ukraine, notably Donetsk and Dnepiope-Irnvsk, Ukrainian school* have eiiluallyAs fur theonetskprofessor svho Irfl the Soviet Union3 asserted lhat al his university "all cmiises were taught invov Unitersltv is iei*nrlcdlv following Ihis eastern trend."

Even assuming that parentst for Ukrainian schnoh are not subfected to official prnaltits ort is not difficult to accouiil Inr |Ih-m-lknent al Russian sc-hoots. The primacy of Rus. sian al the universities, its svidespieasl use lorsity admission eiatus. and ibeational oppoitunitiesussian-speaking child all pni-vide incentives. It is simply more convenient lo atchool, and in some titles Ukrainian schools appear to be so few in number that mi real choice exists. And yd. the acquiescence nfin tins mailer, so crucial to Ihe fate of the indigenous language, li-slilicsrowing nccepl-

Russian Language Use ie ihe3

as a

nl ooowUI-on o'siWa-w

SijOems eRaiaur kKooM


siaog Ox* stas oUi-a's-Jd ei IVussw


.in of ihv privileged stains ol Russian at the "high" languajticita frawu uf all Sovietith I'li.iuiuiih-gated to the statuslow" vcrnuculai. Many city dweller* look down upon the Ukrainian languageulgar peasant dialect.0

A trend Imvards literature in Ukrainian haa also becoiiie apparent in recent years Library holdings evidently consist overwhelmingly of Russian-language publications. Russian has also made inruads in other media.

i it- signilkant than the status ol then public aatvnunkatioiis arr census bcuics ivhich indicate which language aof tlie Ukraine designates as his "nativeThe choice between Ukrainian nnd Russian for censihesignation which must be viewed largely as an alfkmalion of nationalisore acciuatr gauge of ethme idtntilK.itmi than is infurinatkun concerning the usage of Ukrainian or Russian.

krainians represented the largest share in absolute numbers of mm-Russians iu the Soviet Union who gave Russian as their mother lungiand ranked second ininn-panson uf9 ami0kiw> that the Ukrainian share of tbe pupulalum nlkraine has declined byercentage juuiitsS prrn-nt9. and tlie Russian element in the Ukraine has risen in iIk- same prupurtinn (frontt inhere has ahxihe prrcenlage of ethnic Ukrainians who claim Ukrainian as their nahve languagei cent4ussian, and hngiuslically Russified Ukrainians thus constitutepiiir-tcr uf the total population of the Ukrainian SSR. If triesc trends are projected. Russians and Unguis-tic-ally Russified Ukrainians lit the Ukraine ss-uuld constitutehird ot the populationv> and would giow to almost half of die pnputatiou within the nest fifty years. The bnth rate ofand Russians r> about the same.nte ssgnifkantfy alfrcting thisMuch willon Ihe iate of Russian migialmu into the Ukraine.ver ime-llnnl of the Ukiaiu-luns who claim Ukiainianatlsv tongue also speak Russian fluentlyecond language.


ic HussilicMtiimn ul the Ukraine is broken (ms, and urban-rural divi-is mme eMensivc in citiev ami is hem in

mong young

Russians in the Ukraine havein lhecities,ercent ol

the Ukraine's urban population is Russian,lofl percent uf ihr rural pu|<ulatnHi Of orlian Ukrainians IN prtuml claim Russian a> their naliwumcMteil loU eounliy su'e. and half of the remainder speak fhu-nl Itus-siau. compand toinal UkraineThe population is growing rapidly, both inand icdnlise terms, from 4fi percent of theof Ukraine9ercent0 The divisiihi of thr Ukraine into llu.ii.iii

citk^rewunably willinassimilation.

Mti fael thr'ki.iimow, sbice Ihr census ilrliniininli>

I in

Tlie census shows thai the West Ukraine is much less susceptible lo Russian influence than the East

Jjiii ii i

only- dn Russians make upercent of the Western popuUtion; thr Ukrainian popuUtionmall proportionale Increase in the inler-tcnsal period, and the percentage of Ukrainians in the area rlaiming Ukrainian as their native tongue rose slightly (fromercent to overercent).

Subtracting the population of the moreWestern provinces, we find that the remaining population in the Ukrainearger Russianercent of the population of East Ukraine) Further, the percentage of ethnicwho claim Ukrainian as the native tongue also dropsast Ukrainehile roughlyercent of the remaining ethnic Ukrainians in Hast Ukraine speak Russian fluently.

IVrhaps more portentous for the future is the tendency of young iwople to speak Russian more widely than their parents.0 as many asercent of ethnic Ukrainians overO in ihe Ukraine spoke Ukrainian as their native langn-ine. compared toercent ol those underet thiselatively small decrease compared to that ol so mi- nationalities

If the thice areas of hrjslcsturban areas, and easternconsidered together, the degree of linguistic Riissificationsignificant, especially ovet the long haul2 percent of ethnic Ukrainians residing in urban arias of the East Ukraine recotdetl Russian as their native language; for young people Ihcwas doubtlessn addition, the Russian presence in the urban arras ol Fast Ukraine is greater lhan in other areas of the union republic Ethnic Russian* constituteercent of the urban popul-ilimi of Ihe Fast Ukraine In ihe urban ateas of (he Rail Ukraine, then, the number of linguix-tsrally Russified Ukrainians and ethnic Russians combined loughly equals the ruiuihrr of unnsviml-Liled Ukrainians (here.

"'Ifce net- Knai|i> are ifis-en tmlv Uh tlir I'Limic usss-tui>

Assimilation ol Ukrainians cannot entirely ,ir count for llic increase in Ihe nunilicrs ofn Ihe Ukraine The Russian population uf ihe ItSKSR increased byercent9 and 1'fTO. the Russian tin- Ukraineby more lhan twice lhal percentage Part of the increaseesult of Russian migiatlon Into the Ukiamc. The fact ol Russian migration is nol in doubt, but its dimensions cannot be preciselysince statistics on migration are generally compiled by union lepoblics rather than by niilion-

According lo thr census,80eople moved from (he RSFSR lo the Ukraine,rom the Ukraine to the RSFSR. Almost hall of the RSFSR migrants settled in lhc heavily Russilied Donelsk-Dnepropelrovsk area Almost certainly, the rrujonty nf thesefrom Ihc nSFSR wen1 Russian Statistics available lor the city of Kiev, for example, indicate (haiercent ol those moving to Kiev from the RSFSR mere Russian, sshileerceni ol those moving from Kiev lo the RSFSR were Ukrainian According to one Soviet statistician, one million Russians moved into ihe Ukraine during the inier-censal period. At the somekrainianattested to "an annual planned voluntary resettlement of families and individuals from the densely populated Ukrainian regions to olherof the USSR According lo one unofficial report over tsso million Ukrainians were resettled in this way7S. but (his figure may he high. Although most of the movement out nf ihe Ukraine is probably due more to socio economic factors than lo nationality policy, it has the etfeel ol increasing the Russian |Mesence in the Ukraine* -

Another index of assimilation is ihe degiee of inter marriage ktwriii Russians anil Ukrainians svitbm the Ukraine One Soviet puhhcaltun indicates lhat over one-fourth ol allkrainian cities arehifther percentage lhan in any republic exceptvia According toerceni ol Ukrainian families in urbanerceni in rural areas, ate mixed, and tlie number of mixed marriages in the



Ukraine his quadrupled in less thanhat scant published data concerning housingexist do not indicate that Ukrainians and Russians in Ukrainian cities live in segregatedIwrrios '"

C. Modernization and Russification

Tu the extent that Russification ol the Ukrainian population has taken place, this process probably owes more to long-range forcesocialthan In the more direct efforts of Sovietto combat nationalism. Urbanization,ion, and standardized education are centripetal forces in the Soviet Union, as elsewhere. They tend to foster increased mobility and contacts between different nationalities, and the adoption of uniform cultural, economic, and political lorrns. In an era of improved communications, the use of Russianodern-day Latin, though not its adoption as alanguage, is dictated by practical necessity. And the resident of Kiev, be he Russian orhas more in common wilh other urban dwellers regardless of nationality than he does with thefarm peasant.

The impact of modernization, however, cuts both ways. The integration demanded by modernmay In lornearningeturnore distinctive, independent, and narrowJust as fumiliarity may breed contempt, nationalism can become more polent when twolive in close proximity, each regarding the otherhreat. Thus, while urbanization may ultimately undercut Ukrainian nationalism bynational differences, it mayoreeffect of aggravating ethnic conflict by sharpening awareness of those differences. TheUkrainian dissident is an urban intellectual of peasant stock, the person best placed to observe the kullurkami>f. The protests of Ukrainian nationalists in the cities aTe in part provoked by the very success of Russification, by the gradual assimilation of Ukrainians, (he demeaning of the indigenousand the competition for |Obs between Russians and Ukrainians. Il is no accident thai the major cities of the Ukraine. Ihe spearheads of Russian penetration, are also centers of Ukrainian

Like urbanization, mass education hasUkrainian nationalism by stirring mlo action classes which formerlyassive pari in political hfr. and by augmenting the sir* of the intellectual elite. Ihe only group capable ofnationalismoherent ideology andleadershipalionalul movement Thus far. nationalist dissent has remained largelylo Ihe "huinanistic" or "literary" intelligentsia, and continued ascendancy of the scientific-technical intelligentsia may spell more rapid Ruwilication The existence of (he union republic govern men I. however, has provided administrative experienceative clile. and the economic modeml/alion of (he Ukraine7 has giveniversified social structure with the potential for self-rule and self-sufficiency.


Twice in this century nationalist Ukrainians have taken advantage ol Russia's Involvementvinld war to try lo break away fawn Russian domination bach time il wax (heir inishrrlunc lhal circsinxstances led Ihem. however reluctantly, to turn tn thestate for succorfter (he Bolshevikhort lived lnelcprndcnt gosernmc"t. the Kada. was set up In the Ukraine, but thiserman-backed independence movement failed to win widespread popular

any Ukrainians welcomed Ihe German invasion. believing thut evenule evnutil Iv less oppressive than thai ol Stalin, and Impelul that llillei would ultimately |veimll the creation of an independent Ukrainian slate Allhuiigh mine Ukrainians continued to collaborate svlih Ihe Nazis until (he end. the brutality ol Ihe Nazi uccupation disillusioned the greal Inilk of ihc population, many nf whom came looth youl houses approachaf-tnty nf those in the West Ukrainian area ssmild hive ptefeiied the-establishrnenlovereign Ukrainian goveriunent to either the Russian or the German occupation. The organized Ukrainian resistance, which included both the open military like formations of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) and secret mrmhers of (he Ukrainian underground or Organization ofNationalistseached an estimated peak .strengthn addition partisan



guerrillas (uniK'cJ in the countryside to fight both Kovsian* .nn! Germans. After tlie war armedoiitiiiiieda0 or later

Ukrainian nationalism today is far removed from that of World War II. No organized national group

J mass following ha* csisUd since the

routing ol the UPA and OUN. During thrndunher of secessionist groups apy in Westut they seem to have represented tin* dying gasp of the wartime resistance ratherew nationalist movement Ahhougli tluse tiny kinds of militants drewid virtually nulhmg iu the wayn ii to implement their oblcctives before being rounded up. tried, and sstit to labor camps.

In lheissent seems tu have takennesv character. Dissidents since then has-eorganized and more fragmented, lessand more open, less single-minded infoi national sovereignty and moreinllilanl but peihaps more giiographically i hlS 1 ill

hr . . National UMK


Wu-at FrontBMi

Wot Ukraine.

* lAinmiali. Uafaa lit


ddixmslr at suits, and petitions, as well as in the less risky outlet of filet attire and history writing Most uf the pruti-sts appear to have taken place largely without planning Dissident journalist Vyacheslav dwiniuvil contended that thr inapirity olin-iit the time of the Moscow trial of the witters Audio Sinyavsky and Vuly Daniel, "si en- nut acquainted with one another and were not iu any wayissidents have, however, collabotaled in Such enterptists as prtitiun campaigns for tin- release of political prisoners Leading* In major Ukrainian cities do maintain some common ication, especially between Kiev and Lvov.'- but to dwell on these fleetiitfiis tu create the misVading network with cells in various locales.

In addition to the fesv inlellcctiials ssho base cast their lot svith open dissent there are large numbers of establishment" intellectuals who sympathize with nationalist views in varying degrees Since the limits of tlie permissible expand andccordance with the changing political situation, the line separating these quasi-dissidents from the open dissidents is hard to draw

A. Geographical and Sociological Breakdown

Westhe furefruot, makes up the geographic homeland ol UkrainianThe nationalist movement olI was centered in Calicia. All but one of the nationalistin thrverr confuted lo West Ukraine, and many of Ihe dissidentshere in the Ukraine, particularly those- in Kiev, are nl West Ukrainian origin oi have spent some time there The most recent flare-up of talso occurred In West Ukraine, where23 scores ol university Rodents and leacbc-rs are repotted to base been jricnted or subjected to other reprisals in Ls-ov,and Ternopol. Over the last rivcnly years known arrests lu West Ukraine 'or dissident activi ties ot views oulnumberhe much more heavilysl Ukraineatio of at least three tu one" In Ihe twills, hosvevcr, the na* tinnjl "uiovctneiu" appeared tn revive in the KaU Ukraine, mainly in Kiev andities, but also in Dnepropetrovsk and otherhe south. Dissidents in the Eastenerallyess virulent form of nationalismby the writings of Ivan Dzyuba. literary critic and author< rna/iCHsa'inn or fu.*it/<cution'. thanie seceastiitiist variety spawned in West Ukraine.

i io logical bnl t>

reveals, noteavy prepmideiaikre of wntits. linguists, historians, journalists,teachers, anal lawyers Although most ul the more sisiblebelong to this literary or "humanistic"their dominance, is probably not as great as is tin case wilh dissent in Mossi.t. Amongdissidents air many member* uf lhe scientific technical intel hgei its ia. whose opposition is more troublesome for Soviet authorities. MciiiIhts uf the

scientific-technical Intelligentsia cumprise aboutourth of known arrests during tlie last twenty yean.

Perhaps even more aUrmlng lor the regime are sign* of nationalism among lower strata of theA great fear of the central authorities may be that, at some period of great strain for the gov-eminent. such as military attack by China or ael niggle among top Soviet leaders,Intellectual dissidents cooldeservoir ol latent mass discontent. The Ukrainian dissidentsotential weapon thru Russian counter-parts do not, since in ihe Ukraine the normalgrievances of the population may beby popular resentment of Russian domination.

Il ii difficult to know whether the peasantry would rallyuture Ukrainian nationalistin time of crisis in Moscow. The peasantsere nol willing to fight for ihe' Ukrainian Rada. but this may have been because the new gos-ernrneni did notrogressive land reform. Duringthnic conflict between Ukrainians and Russians was at times reinforced by class conflict The peasantry of East Ukraine suffered greatly during collectivization, and many Ukrainians fell, righlly or svrongly. lhat collectivization wai directed against themationality as much asarticular class. During Work) War II Ibe peasants of Wesl Ukraine gave their support lo the activities of separatist groups (here In East Ukraine, however, all hough the Ukrainian underground attracted large numbers of the inlellcetual elite, they were leaders in search of an army The peasants remained uriconunittcd. although many leaders were sons uf puigcd Luliik* Tlie sticngth ol active Ukrainian nationalism today lo Ik in lite cities.

Workers compriseourth of thosefor nationalist activities in the last twothisroportion mainly because they played an important role in ihe more militant nalionalitt organizai-ora ofndoreew reports have sulfated of mass protests even In Eastern Ukrainian cities, involving svorkers and others oulside the- narrnev confines of tbe intelligentsia The largest suchwo-day notationalist coin-piealou, tool place in Dncprodiceizhinsk in June

ew moilIhv lalcr in the same nblast. uiajor strike is reported to have broken out On both occasions the police retorted lo gunlire lo disperse crowds ofside from these presumablysoilsew occasions workers have engaged inprotests wilh political as well as eennnnur objectives.

There areew instances nf inriiihcrs of Ihe intelligentsia acting in conjunction evtlh the workcrs. thus breaking through class barrier* to achieve ibr elusive "union with the people" ever sought by the estranged intelligentsia in prc-revo-lutioiiary days. Some of these occasions have been relatively innocuous affairs, involving such things as pubhc readings of Ukrainian poetry Others have been more serious, particularly the annual commemoration of the Iransfer of the body of Taras Sheveheoko, the Ukraine's great nineteenth century poet, from Russia to the Ukraine. These dem-onslralions have takenievnd ins-olve hundreds of people. With theof an8 petitionkrainians, which contained Ihe signatures oforkers have not participated in petitionprotest log arrests and trial* nf dissident* Generally speaking, nationalismonsensu ideology is confined to tlir intelhgrnttia

B. Grievances of the Disaffected Inlflli-ctual dissidenls in the Ukraine do not divide neatly into distinct groupsere are Iwu basic currents nf llu-nelies! rep resented until his recantation1 byuba.ew generation ul nationalists, who are not anti-Soviet but merely anti-Russian or. as dissident philologist Mykhaylo Horyn put it. "not anti-Sosirt. but pro-Ukrainian" Some of ibe Ukrainians of this stupe sutn as

*IIb il.iiiM, 'Ii a< 'pul>-

> Hiflnnital umlairi with

ill-siilint IiIiijIiiii- Ihr "V. iin . nii-uy-fOi

lawyer Lev Lukvanniko andykhaylo Osadehy. are former Communist Party members, and most of themarxist orientation.ule. Ihey embrace Communism, not as miliodicd in lhe current regime, but in an ideal form which tiny associate, correctly or incorrectly, ss-ith Leninroup of Dnepropetrovsk petitioners9 prutnlcd tin' persecution ofil<-vutedi lo the cause? of thr construction of! ami Chornovilom labor camp lhatave always firmly adhered to theot socialism and continue lo dnn (anuaryIn opening issue of lhe Ukrainian Herald. tbe Ukrainian counterpart of lhe Russian ianuzdat* [uiunal KhrimiUa. annoimeed Ils policy of; any documents it deemed "jnti-Coiiiiminist" or "anti-Sovier (defined in ils original sense as "opposition to democratically-elected

Like the wing of Russian dissent represented by Roy Mcdvedev, these Ukrainian dissidentsto use Lenin against the regime, tothe authorities for failing to follow their own prophets Also like Mcdvedev. many of them claim to believe that the present system is redeemable and can reform itself from within. For this reason, their criticisms may be more Insidious andcertainly they make the authorities' time-honorrd propaganda line against nationalism look dated. To lhe authorities contention thatare. by definition, "lackeys ofhe dissidents counter that those who are being tried as "bourgeoistoday are not survivals from the botugeois past but "young people who grew- up under the Soviel regime, were educated in Soslet schooh.universilics and in theeople who do not remember lhe bourgeois system."'*

While defending thr uhnlrtict right of the Ukraine to secede from Ibe Soviet Union, these dissidents make dear that they do not advocate lhe etercise of this right. Most of the dissidents were bom in, too lute to Ik- involved in the violent nationalism of World War II days. Dissociating themselves from the OUN. they keep their protest within legal boundaries and purportedly aim merely at the restoration of the Ukraine's legal rights under the Soviel constitution. Trying to legitimize hisDryuha insisted thnt "nobody in the Ukraine advances (lie slogan of 'independence' today "M

As is often ihe case wilh Soviel dissidents who criticize (laws in then own systemocialist standpoint, many Ukrainians claim to abhor Ihe efforts of Westerners tu utilize Iheir criticisms for "Cold War" purposes Literary critic Veshen Sser-Slyuk. regretting that his name was "shrrsvdly picked up by bourgeois propaganda in thesplainrd his quandary al his trial.

t find myself htlwrrn two firu. ami imti-ait of uihIiii< alpaeily In IhrIh* ipirilual

liil>ii-rri ul our Wrtrly, I hrlplnili lniUiiii- of thr -taw

Such prutt ii ms are uf dubious sincetilv. butlhe tendency in recent years has been for

Ukrainian dissidcnii In lay stress un ihr limited and patriotic nature of their aims.

Because of the bad connotations of the word "oaany dissidents have tried to turn the tables by arguing thaiot Ihey. but thewho are nationalists They protest that they are no motr nationalistic than was la-nin. who at times advocated national equably as ihe only basis for true internationalism, and blamed Russian chauvinism for stimulating minority nationalism. "If there is noissident literature teacher Mykhaylo Masyutko stated, 'there is noi: Chomovil, loath lo accept the nationalist label, argued al his trial that one need notationalist to protest illegality:

I did nnt dwell on tlie national lintirstion in mylone nil Tlie conclusionalhwiailil) has been drawn solely on the ham oi trie factrolr aboutl legality committed in thr Ukraine. Aadived Mami - soane-

tm-; uUt. what kind ot naHonalnl WaiU I far

Tansbosian amr***

imilar vein, Dryuha maintained lhat he had no quarrel with sincere internationalism, butthe "internationalism" which servesover for Rust If ication and exploitation.

he TiaUaruJaoi" o(

thr reMwf who has wlird ctieare moenkdos aunt

want SO hand thm. back hrah to the

he victim what aandt backwardnrvaOntc "minr" andowowrue los* fix another people or peopleshnt wr want lint people to he Itirlf anil nol similar to in. wv want to ire it independent and equal ouliHSF and brudr ourvrhevart ol

Dzyuba and those of his persuasion, matchingwith tactical moderation, have been inclined lo Concentrate their activity in literary and scholarly fields, generally refraining fiom overt actions to provoke the authorities M

a more traditional current of nationalism, long concentrated in the West Ukraine, lends toward more radical and explicitly political actions directed toward the ciealmn of an indrpendrnt Ukrainian state.omewhat toned down version of this trend of nationalist thought can lie found in the writings of historian Valcntynolto he Marxist, Morn/ comes closeondeni-

Voltniyn Moroi. the Ukraine's most celebrated political prisoner

nation of the Soviet system in toto lie discusses lhe allcgcd campaign lo obliterate Ukrainian identity in terms of the Stale compulsion allegedly pervading all areas of Soviet life, and stifling all stirrings ol individuality ami nonconformity. Moro/ recognises the value ul pragmatic dissidents who "make idium official speeches" in order to aid the cause bytheir positions and "boring fromut hehe leaders of the dissidents shuuldigher road When Dzyuha partially recanted hisv9 in order lo avoid official persecution. Moroi chart md him for actingapitulatorM Moruz's long and nearly suicidal prison hunger strike indicates the huglhs to which he himself would go beforeoniprnmisini: statement.

Even those dissidents who have openly favor it! the establishment ofsovereign Ukrainian state base not sanctioned the use of violence. Those tried in the so called "case nf the jiinvts"o secesslonisl agitation but stated thatmethods were neither used nor contemplated

During the sixtlcx lhc inure moderate- Marxist nationalismohe isccndancs, Theof ihe Brezhnev period, however, ma> have bnmghleturn to the moreand radical variety. Rcecnt leaflets report-edly circulating in the Ukraine in protest of MoKrl'l imprisonment call for an independent Ukraine which "may well remainut 'must not remain Soviet, for that is mena synonym for absorptiiin into Russia- The disorients circulating these leaflets rqiortcdly stated their intention of forming "an action-orientedeall tbe same lime, the Ukrainian Herald, sup pressed tor over twoas reappeared under new and moreditors who haveallstniggle for national"

Their ideological and laclical differences havekrainian nalionaliMs from cooper atuiihn much the same manner lhal Sakliarov and Sol/henllsyn minimized their dil Icreiiees in ibe faceommon enemy.0 Dzyuba appeared at Moroz's Irial to leslily In his behalf, shortlyuruz had subjectedverly "realistic" approach to scathing criticism Nor ilo the dnvidenlsule appeal to shun eon-laclx svilh lonner UPAany of whom weie released from labor camps inccording In unee general altitude of the dissidents is lo 'embrace' these peuple in iheue-annown lo have behieui'etl one such former leader, and Dzyuba lepoitedly planned to assist Ihe education ul annihers son Only one prominentenowned literary critic and translator Svyatoslav Karavansky. was active in the World War II armed nsivtancv. has (unctisitics have not prevented Chornovil ami iiI'm'Is fioin coming lo his defense, even while they are careful to point usit (hat (hey do not excuse lu> pasl

Wlnle Ihe dissidents disagree un ladies ami on lung-rangeumliei of grievances an- voiced regularly hy dissidents of both camps

"P ll. It III I'm

mm hMBN ol thrllrrwU oIm-tsfti


ill il ll.-> I'l.lllUll lllllli it Mpill lllsl llll>.llillll. ill).I

milium tit'At iitllnlliiii. LSi-ti il >ii<hlli.ii iiiti-nlliiii.



tearing down ol Ukrainian historical monuments, and the "accidental" burning uf old churches and Libraries, rich In historical docuinents. as well as the distortion of Ukrainian history in scholarly works, and the ban on publicatkon of the works of many Ukrainian nineteenth-century historians

Economic exploitation of the Ukrninc liy the HS Kb It, and eneessive centralization oldecision-making.

Poor living conditions and wages (or workers and peasants. While economic grievances arc central tn lhe most recent strikes and disorders among workers. Ihey receive scant attention in the writings of the intelligentsiailled for an end lo passportwhich restrict the movement of collective farm peasants Vasylormer Party member connectedmall dissident group, the Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants' Union, criticized Ihe oppression of the peasants, "whose position did not differ at all from the position of theissident Anton Koval9 called for increased wages and consumer goods for the lower-paid, and Horyn looked forward to the day when the economic fate of the peasants would be "in the hands of the collective iarm peasants themselves."Such demands ate surprisingly few. despite the lower class origin of the bulk of the intellectual dissidents and must make their brand of nationalism less attractive to the masses

(S) Tlie lackkrainian national militia

Implicit In nil these demands are tsvo more general desires: the desire for greater Individual freedom, and Ihe desirereater decentraliia lion of authority in alland cultural.

C. "Estoblishment" Intelligenlsia ond Nationalism

The importance of these desires ol the dissidents is enhanced by Ihe fact that large numbers of "establishmenr intHirctuals in the Ukraine share them, in greater i* lesser degree, and oiler Ihe active dissidentsmuch support as ihey consider possible without endangering iheir own careers. The most notable group nf these liberal intellectuals are the so-rullod iheMytl'tyainuky ui men ol theroup of Western-oriented, humanistic, .md sometimes nationalist poets who werein bringing about an "awakening" ofculture in the sixties Included in this group were some, such as Dzyuba and Svitlychny. who eventually went beyond the pale Mi their crrtienim of tin regime to become outright dissident* The greatest ol them. Vasyl Sym on.achieved such popularity that after his early deathhose not to anathematize his work, but tried instead In neutralize its eflect by playing duwn it* nationalist content. Today Ivan Diuch is perhaps the best example of those in the croup who, like Yevtushcnko in Russia, temper Iheir criticism ami choose "safe" themes in order to keep out ol trouble Many others have avoided arrest but have lieen sulv rcctrd In other reprisals and hase had difficult! getting their ssorks published

Although the me^?aeayiU'u/fcy were attacked in the press2 on, their influence remained strong among Ukrainian intellectuals. Some from this group were arrestedut atkrainian Writers' Congress theirduttiinated the proceedings, making open pleasotalization of Ukrainian culturalestoration nf national dignity, and aof the Ukrainian language, affirming that "while we are internationalists we always remain Ukrainians

New rationalist trends alsotk in another medium, the writing ofew historians, among them Fedor Shcvchcnko, long time editor of the Ukrainian Historical lournul. dared to emphasize the unique fealuret of Ukraine's past, and argued thai Communist culture* need not be "boring, despondently uniform, lackingethnographical and other varieties andBrought into question were sanctified canons of Soviet historiography, such as lhe "friend ship of peoples" theory, according lo which ihr Cossack bet man Bogdan4 treaty wilh the Russian state is seen as havingolunUiy union of the Ukraine and Russia, and lhe national hi poet Taras Shevchenko is portrayed as an admiring "younger brother" of Russian radicals like Nlkolny Chcrnyshcvsky.



Ot the rash of monographs and novelsthe orthodox Soviet interpretation of lheKiev an period and the later Cossack period, srseral were written bystablished writers Death In Kiev by Pavloember ol (he Ukrainian Writers' Union hoard, portrayed the lifeedieval Kievan princeavorableovel by Oles Honchar. Chairman of theWriters' Utnon. breame the targetajor IdioItMtKal campaignS The noseL SofW ur Ca'hedrat. bewailed the fate of an old cathedral slated fin destruction in the name ol "progress"arly official The. cathedral was clearly symbolic of rural ami traditional values, and reviewers iilenli-ficd Ihretallurgical town on the Dnepr, asenins* if nation in then lhe subsequentumber of

Honchars supporters were expelled from Ihe Party or dismissed from their jobs, but Honchar himself commanded enough support in tbe Writers' Union and in the Party to retain the chairmanship until tbe Congress ofl which he continued to express regret that many readers were losing contact wilh Ihe Ukrainian language, "thaifragrant language whose beauty and wealth evokes the admiration of the Russian and all other fraternal peoplesThe annulment of hb re-election reportedly evoked an outcry from the assembled writers.

Even after the Honchar case, worksimilar message continued to be published, sometimes by people with important official positions2 N'ikolayormer ideology secretary in Zaporoibr oblast.istory of theian Cossacks svhieh allegedly glamorized Cossack leaders who fought the Russians, and even used the term "foreign rabble" lo refer to the latter3 Ivan Bilikovel in which he stressed the antiquity and Western roots of the culture and ethnic makeup of ibe medieval Ukrainian stale of Kiev Rus.iographyossack hctmart written by Volodymyroung writer from Dnepropetrovsk, allegedly embellishedhistoryike manner

Another instance of fnmcnt amongintellectuals was the case of Vilalyon ol Parly Secretary Petr Shelest. and deputy director of the Institute of Theoretical Physics in Kiev,0 heiscussion on Ihe state of scientific research in the Soviet Union Evidently injoyins widespread backing in the scientifiche advocated increased funding for basic research ami exchange ptograms designed Iocontact wilh Western scientists Vitaly She-lesl's proposals were crilicired in the Ukrainian press, and he stopped publicly propagatingews1 With his fathers ouster, hr lost his position

D. Contacts with Eoitern Europe ond the West

Ukrainian dissident* base several other sources of potential supportesson from the Jews. In recent years they have increased their


to bring external pressure to Inn Soviet authorities. In the course oi the recent campaign to obtain the release of Moroi from prison, for example, several appeals were made to international organisations. Ukrainian dissidents commandlike the widespread attention in the West enjoyed by Soviet Jews, but the government of Canada, whicharge and influential Ukrainian population, has interceded on occasion on behalf of beleaguered Ukrainian intellectuals. Johnanadian Communist of Ukrainian extraction who lived in Ihe Ukraine35 wrote an expose of conditions there which prompted the Canadian Communist Party to send an officialto the Ukraine7 to examine KoLasky's allegations The delegationamning report of Ms own the following

More important are the nearby populations of Eastern Europe, always sympathetic to minority strivings against Russian hegemony. Il was the sense of commoo subsection to the Russian yoke lhat impelled Karavansky toS appeal to Constnforming him of the persecution of Ukrainian intellectuals, und urging fraternalbetween the Ukraine and East European countries The Ukraine has maintained close cultural relations wilh Poland and more especially with Czechoslovakia. The fact that many Westspeak Polish or al least understand it facilitates communication. The Polish strikes0 arelo have been widely discussed by workers in Lvov.

The Ukrainian population of Czechoslovakia is concentrated in the Presov region of East Slovakia The presenceearby group of Ukrainians with relatively more cultural freedom has made Soviet authorities uneasy, as can be seen by the fact lhat authorities have forbidden Soviet Ukrainians from subscribing io Ukrainian publications from Poland or Czechoslovakia, although Czech or Slovakhas been permitted. This prohibitum proved an ineffective barrier to communications between the Ukraine and Czechoslovakia Ukrainian broadcasts from Radio Presot' were beamed into lire Soviet Union even before Iand Presov Ukrainian loumals and newspapers were routinely smuggled across the border. Shclest's son is reported lo have regularly received Duklfa. one such publication. The Presov publications provided an outlet forUkrainian writers lo publish articles which they could not print in the Ukraine. Some Ukrainian intellectuals, notably Rostislav Bratun. editor ol Zhovten, (he organ of Ihe Lvov Writers" Union, had long advocated closer ties with Ukrainian writers in Slovakia. Bratun seems lo have had backing from Oles Honchar. After the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovak is the editorial board of ZhoiAen came under attack ,w

During Ihe Do beck liberalization in tlie spring and summero. when Ukrainians within Czechoslovakia were striving to achieve increased autonomy. Ukrainian clliiijls evidenced increased nervousness about ideologicaln late8 "Ukrainian Diiys" were held in Slovakia The Ukrainian Parly could hardly avmdelegation, which the Slovaks arc rennetrd lo have received almost as if Ihey were emissaries from an independent state The Sosiel press generally toned duwu Czechoslovak statements about the celebration, but an article Intaitui. entitled "Friendship anil Brotherhooduoted from Czechoslovak pres. releases covering theof Ibeollowingravda article in July, written by Aleksiindr Botvin. first secretary of Kiev city Party committeeenounced "decadent pettybout Ihe necessitytion' and Hberalizxlion" oftain) that "tlie efforts of some writers and artisls lo de fend exposed loti-Soviets" had been "angrilyand tinted that measures had been taken in Kiev to "screen" and "segregate" lhe cadre" Dnrln; this period the campaign against Honchar Suitor was taking place in Di* propel rovsk. and Botvins article alsohut at Honchar

Ukrainian First Secretary Shelest sins an ardent Pnlitburo advocate of invasion nf Czechnskitakra Heding rule in theprim lo the invasion, he was the only Sosnt except fur Bier.hnev who attended all live of the key Soviet -East Euiopeilii meetings iu the spring and summer

that Shelby icu me imunilC IncHoH within the Politburo, reportedly the fear that the Czech disease might infect Soviet Ukraineactor


fog 'lailTi

in hUccording to Czech leader Sin tk civ iiy Shelest wit particularly upset with Czech leaders lor allowing literature urging (heof Transcarpalhia to Czechoslovakia to cross the bordii iutu the Ukraine.'1 Many reports also indicate that other members of the old "Ukrainian clique" on theBreihru v. Podgorny. krrileiiku. amicams- down on the side uf invasion. Their lainiliarity with Ukrainian conditions und fearomino-effect may have made theni ini-re aggressive.

Speakers at theft plenum uf (he CPSU Central Committer included not only Shelest. bult her Ukrainian PartyDrglyan-v, First Secretary of Donetsk obkom, and Yiny Ihutsky. Firsl Secretary of Trailseaipalhia ubkum Ihiilsky was notember of thc CPSU Cenlral CommilUe; las poution as party Innsuiall. rclaliielv unimpurtant oblavi! nut normally have entitkd bun lo any significant rule in the deliberations Presumably he svas in-eluded as an official from the region svheiefrom lhe Czech liberalization were be-ing left most keenly, to boKlrr the case luiut iky soon emergedajor advocate ofe wrote articles89 attacking lhe nostalgiahe Weil" os'er "lhe pseudo-democracy of both Masaryk andnd noting thai "under the conditions of our borderl is especially important futto propagate ideas ol proletarian international-ism" since "this oblast is vulnerable to foteign radio and TV.""

When live invasion came, one rcpoil indic-ateilosiit military truck was land on before iTusung lhe Ukrainian Underhuslosakia One ol lhe first acts oftcring Soviet army reportedly the closing of lhe Presnv radio station ', Very fesv prominent Ukrainian inlcllce-tuals could lie enliciddorse the invasion puMtcry

E. Relations with Russian, Jewish, and Christian Dissent

In Ihe past Russian and Ukrainian dissuknts liave nut siNCeeikd very well in raciM-str aling thru crttkunu uf iIm- regime. Cooperation between theioupt has beiu impeded by the liaditional refusal uf Russian liberals In lake Ukrainianseriously. Russian dissidents, many of themo regard the Ukrainianseparate nationality, have typically shown reluctance lu sanctum thehl lo sell-dc-tcrmination, arguing instead that Ihe general allcs-iatiuu of government repression would eliminate thefre of Ukrainian nationalism. Ukrainianfor their part, have olten defined their crusade fur Ukrainian rights narmwly. taking little interest iu lhe all union struggle fur civil liberties In recent years altitudes on both sides base chaiigid sonic-what, but some distrust remains

One mujur wing ol Russian dissent, thatSlavophile" orientation, tends to exclude the Ukraine from any nght to secede from the Soviet Union Vladimir Oupov. for example, has said that the nun-Russian parts uf th* USSR should be given up, but indicated thai these did not include thelovoaimztliil manifesto of the extreme Russian Right, complained olruly dis-proportional strengthening of the mightiest of Ihe regiunj] gioupings. Ihet the expense uf the Russians, and called for the annexation of large portions uf East Ukraine by the RSFSR" Although Sol/lienitsyn has drlended the Uktainians on occasion, his reported lack of enthusiasm about Ukrainian separatism has been exploited by the Ukrainian press. InileraUnna Vkitiina distort nl his views by -suiting thatan "glorified" by Ukrainian nationalists, turned out lo be "an autocrat who regards 'Little Russian ravings' about self-determination from the same positions as Katkov and

Igorissident mathematician close to Sulzhenilsyn. resents the tendency of some Ukrainian dissidents tu reduce the national problemncle formula of "colonial exploitation" by the Russians According to Shafarevieh:

The bask (Valori'i u' ruliunal III* in lhe puxluct- nl Hie leiipiiim socialnl ideology Thnwry nation,i it nJ luinu<>iiiiMl hmnaa prmrolKy In thitimtknan tnnpudil. riptmt onepmfir. but Hi fon>iMnr*(al trnd ineyihr maximum ilntruction ol all nilirm* In nn way ilo thr fiimim. Miller Iroinata thaniiukri. In fact il win. Ihry who reccKecl ill" first him* fioni lliii fen*

'Kirx'trintli-rriiturt' Buwijin riafvmnllit*

Shafarevich maintains (hat in dealing with the nationalities question II is essential to go beyond the assumption "thai the creationoveieign stale for each people would provide an automatic solution to all lhal people's

Tlie tin rents of thought grouped together for the sate of convenience under (he "Slavophile" or "Russian nationalist" label are actually quite diverse, however The emphasis sonsr "Slavophiles" place on traditional and rural values couldmale them sympathetichose Ukrainian dissidents who defineational identity in similar terms.

Most other Russian dissident groups, when pressed, recognize the Ukrainians' right to national self-dctermination, even if only as an abstract principle. Roy Medvedev, for example,onstitutional reform settingracticalbyepiihlic couldeferendum and exercise its forma) righ( lo secede from the Soviet Union. "Oure insists, "mustompletely voluntary union of nations" At the same lime, he asserts (hat he "would resolutely oppose the departure of any of the republics from Iheainly on economic grounds**

The Ukrainian! complain tha( few Russianhave any real desireee concessions made to (he nationalist* The Vkiolnkin Herald. "without denying the importance of Khrontka' (Ihe mnior organ of Soviet dissent In (heomplainedeneral neglect of Ihe plight of the minorities:

lui iiilhrr unilaterally sndii(ho it iteripranaUOoaliniimal, whxn thr prodad of

fi (ind possibly in pail. utiles. .

The tpaisc .nineripmi ham' trhry tmr HippimimUrr Id

the lirsauptnifl al in Rus. *


Writing about Russian tivil nglits' gioops. the Ckrair.ien Herald lamented lhat:

None nfonaniulmni hxl worked out alor lolvlng lhclin Ihe I'SSHunic had ilatn) inon on naliunal do-itunds. TTic iriiprttiuen uhUmrd if that the pfli-IKip.ints in these gicipi. while uniing at vrry radiial ihangri in manyof uim.iIe arfpre orprrtrrti* thr status quo no (hr natmiul question "

In addition, relalions between Ukrainian anddissidents were reportedly strained by3 trial of Russian dissident Petr Yakir. Yakir. who talked rather freely during his interrogation, reportedly gave the KGB information almut his contacts with Ukrainians, which helped the antlmr-iliesase against Chornovil."

In general, however, dissidents of all stripes have tended to close ranks and act in concert in recent years. The Ukrainians have some mnlacts with dissidents in Moscow, particularly with Sakharov. whoriend of Ivankrainian literary critic and leading dissident Sakharov's Human Rights Committee haseveral appeals on behalf of beleaguered Ukrainian dissidents, most recently in defense of Moroz Svitlichny and another Ukrainian al tended the trial of Hussian dissident Pave) Lilvinovnd on at least one occasion Sakharov. at the request of Svitlichny travelled to Kiev lo attend Ihe trialkrainian nationalist.*1

The major concern of the dissidents ineen lo draw Ukrainian nationalists into the broader human rights movement For example, (he Program of the Democratic Movement of the Soviet Union, signed9 by anonymous "Democrats of Russia, the Ukraine, and the Baltic, while"national liberation oftressed (hai this "should be linked in the closest svay to the common democraticumber of Ukrainians have addressed themselves almostto the broader movement lor human rights, and arc not closely associated with Ukrainian matters as such. These include mathematician Leonid Plyushch and retired Genera! Cngorenko; writer Yuly Daniel is half Ukrainian. Those chiefly concerned with Ukrainian interests have paidattention to violations of legality elsewhere. The8 Appealkrainians*1the trial of Russian writer Alcksandr Gins-burg, as well as the more general "suppression of civic activity and socialhe signatories included people like Svillichny and Sverstyuk associated primarily with (he specifically Ukrainian interest, as well as others with records ofin the broader struggle for civil rights. The Ukrainians have also stressed the community of interest between Ihemselvcs and other minorily

nationalities Crigorenko has made lhe defense of thr Crimeanuuu ceiebre. and6 Pclition to ihr Soviel of Nationalitiesevoted less attention to the problems of lhe Ukrainians than to those of some other minorilies. Ukrainian dissidents are also careful to distinguish between the Russian government and the Russian people, toward whom tliey haveore generous attitude Dzyuba has est ended an olive branch lo Russian dissidents by referring to the Russian nation as "one of the greatest and most Vilorious in lhe world."

Mutuals also pirvcntcd an allianceJews and Ukrainian nationalists in the past, in spile of their common concern for minority rights-Historically Ihe Ukraine has been regarded as one of lhe most anti-Semitic areas of the world. Many Ukrainian nationalists of the revolutionary period distrusted the Jews because of the heavy Jewish ir prevent at ion in Russian socialist parties If the Jews were not regarded as Bolsheviks, Ihey were often seen as allies uf the Russians Today, as in the past, vety few Jews in the Ukraine speak Ukrainian When they assimilate, ihey assimilate into Russian culture

Today anti-Semitism in the Ukraine may beincekrainian dissidents have shown interest in cooperating with Jewishpartly for idealistic and partly forreasons. Compared to the futile efforts of other Soviet minorities to have their grievances redressed. Ihe Jews have had some success In approaching iheii objective of Iree emigration. The Jewish exodus has lieen particularly visible in the Ukraine.8 percent ot Jewish emigrantsum lheonsiderably highei percentage lhan from any otherisproportionate number of Jewish emigrants from the Ukraine evidently come from lhe western regions, where Ukrainian nationalism is strongestith the Jewish suceosv su clearly before them, the Ukrainians doubtlesshe advantage of associating thru own cause svilh thai ol the Jews. Most Ukrainianlike Other libcnil-riundcd dissidents In the

"A. Ur ISCJ. j -hie.-le. rM

mtlmehrd utrruairrl'kraiuiin

Soviet Union, sinceiely support the right of the Jews lo emigrate, but they do not want the(or Jewish rights to obscure the more general lack of civil liberties in the Soviet Union They point out, as Moro/ puts it, thai today "the pale is legalized, and not as formerly just for Jews, but for everybody' In6 commemorative speech at Babi Yar, the scene of the Nazi massacre of Kievan Jewszyuba also related the plight of the Jews lo that of all victims of state repression.

Ukrainian dissidents have charged the regime with actively working to frustrate Ukrainianlo the Jews. John Kolasky believed thates in Moscow were responsible for the publication in the Ukraine of an anti-Semitic tracthich allegedly made many Jews wary of expressing support for Ukrainianecent issue of the new Ukrainian Herald accuses Ihe KCB of trying to set Jews and Ukrainians against each other by organizing pogroms, and by spreading rumors that thr Jews wanted toewish state oul of the Ukraine. According to the Herald, "the chauvinistsoiled toedge between Jews and Ukrainians'"

The advantages to the Jews of identifying their particular causearger one are less dear. While Jewish leaders do nol question the motives of Ukrainian intellectual dissidents, they remain dubious lhat Ukrainian nationalism al the popular level is truly purged ofewish emigre from the Ukraine explained their skepticism:

villi ihr Ueriaw ian*u-

In) ' our

nliu-vls. Yet theirr.preail dirpttiiunperspti tlie* this inmi'iiirnt. Fiim thru riperJrvn kii.iv> llul any kind ull1- the form mufc


Relations between Jewish and Ukrainian dissidents are grosving friendlier and then: have been cases of cooperation for limited objectives, bul it isthat tbe Jews will rally wilh entbuviasm lo Ihe banner of Ukrainian nationalism.

Christian dissent abo reinforces nationalistespecially in lhe West Ukraine where the Uniate Church rrpuledly had some four million adherents at the time of its liquidation. There are indicationseligious revival faking place since

thai ihey are necessarily devoid of any emotional attachment lu their native region In fact, few Ukrainian officiab are so rigidly loyal lo ihe center as to place the interests of the all-union Party always above those of tbe Ukraine, or soas lo be totally insensitive to Ihe ntrsls and desires of the people among whom they live. In varying degrees they are responsive to those desires, al limes because of the practical difficulties encountered in administering unpopular central policies, at times because popular desires sometimes coincide with lhc Communist official's desire lo win economic concessions for "his"xml official may also lake pride in the achievement* of his region and seek recognition for these, if only because such recognition reflects credit on him To thisocal leader mayocal loyally which is scarcely distinguishable (rumalthough its roots arc different.

egional leader may uMenipl Ui manipulate natiunalismever fur increasing his political clout in Moscow Dependent on central favor for his rise in the Party, basing risen he may become bolder and try ro build an nittcpcntlrnt power baseocal constituencyis own. This is particularly true in an area ivherr nationalist sentiments are not confined lo an isolated segment of the population, but have infillroted the Party itself. In spite of its natural appeal for an ambitious regional loader,ourse is risky in the extreme. Hy condoning Ihc milder forms ofantl relaxing the strictures againstdeviations in literature and scholarship, the regional leader may unintentionally unleash forces which he cannot easily conlrol. In addition, if In goes too far. be will offend centraliucutl. tolerationeasure of freedom of cxpn-stion (ur "establishment" Inlellectuabationalist orientation is not incompatible svilh repressive measure* against more open and radical dissent.

A. Factionalism and Nationalism

In Ihe IBfiOthe altitude nf aofficial toward nationalismnfVucncrd by his factionalut all factions urihtn the Ukrainian Partyrs-cn equal support In the centralizing initiatives of the Brezhnev yeais

. OutingS Piague Spring in Czechoslovakia some Ukrainians in Slovakia agita-tedeturn to the Uniale Churchevival of thr link with Rome. The increased attention Riven to anti-religious propaganda by the Soviet Ukrainian press since then Indicates lhat former Untalrs in the West Ukraine may have become restive alto Most of those Uniates arrested have been in the West Ukraine, but the most xealous Christian sect in tbe USSR, the Initsialivnik) Baptists, appear to be active in the East Ukraine as well They also appear lo be attracting more young people than do the more traditional churches.

In recent years the cause of the Uniates has been taken up by Ukrainian nationalists, first by the Ukrainian Herald, and then by Mora. In line with ihe attitudes of mote traditional Ukrainian nationalists. Moroz believe* ihe Uniale religion and Ukrainian nationalism are inseparable.ight against the Churchight against thee maintains. In any ease, he argues, religious believers should be defended, if for no other reason, merely tiecause they are persecuted- "When religion was dominant and socialism wasecent person did notord againsthe writes, and contends thai now the roles urc reversedMoroz has been particularly outspoken in his praise of theountain people living in Ihe East Carpathian region, who preserve old Ukrainian customs and the Uniale religion Moroi's defense has emboldened them,n ssith more general Ukrainian causes


As much as any elile group in the Ukraine. Ukrainian Party officiabetted interesl in the maintenance of the political system as il exists, indeed, ihey are part of lhalanking Party apparatchik has been conditioned by years uf servicearty imbued with hostility In minority nationalism. He has peilorce propagated its line, he owes his station and his prestige not lo tbe consent of the gos-erned. butarty in which power flows from ihe center outward

And yet. senile Ukrainian Communis! leaders owe their primary loyalty to Ihe Party, they are nol one men. Il is unreasonable to assume i

Tin' (action centered iu the eastern, uiban. and

KliSslllC-d oblasl m! Dmpropelruvsk hat through

-ui thedecade consistently been much mure hostile toward Ukrainian nationalist dissent, and has generally championed economic centralization as well. The subservience of this group to Moscow owesi tu the fact that its patrons (here wield great power, and can bestow great rewards on thru clients Brezhnev servedirst secretary inith ol Dnepropetrovsk and of neighboring Zaporo/hc Kirilenkoormer Hist secretarynepropetrovsk and also worked in the Party in Zaporozlse. and Shcherbitskyormer first secretary of Dnepropetrovsk

The taction ceiiteicd tu another cistern,oblast. Donetsk, hasoreand ambiguous lole The Donetsk Party's iikvinbership grew rapidly throughout, and it Insame the largest Party organization in tbe Ukraine Because of tin- sire uf this faction and the economic importance ol its geographic base, lew Ukrainian leaders in recent years have been svilling or able to ignore its inierests altogether. Khrushchev reined to act aa Donetsk's patron, but his tail did nut allect the fortunes ul the faction adversely Shelest may hawted to win the support ulashko and his Donetsk followers by defending Donetsk economic interests. Inashkii and Ins cohorts may have given Shelest limited backing, bul ihey kept Iheir options open According to Ukrainian sawiuiet the Firsl Secretary ul Donetsk obkom. Valdimir Drglyarev. was one of only three obkom first secretaries in the Ukraine who was openly hostile to Shelest during his lime of troubles inince Shclest's demise lhe- Donetsk faction's numerical represents-liun in central Party and guvemment institutions has imuMMcl. and Donetsk men continue Id be well placid in key oblists. For the last five years tlie firsl secretaries of Kiev and Zaprau/hc ubkoms base beiii IXmetsfc piotcgei uf Lyasbku. Vet the seeming intluenei- of the Donetsk faction has apully nut reaped them the same economic con

under Shcheibitsky as they received under

Shelesl Tlie attitude ol Ibis group towardi crackcluwu sponsored by Bn/htsev and

i tnsuppoitcri has been passive and xpiiioeal Dnnctvfc is so Rossi lied that tbe Parly there may see no need lo crack the whip on this issue. Only on economic issues have they spoken out. bitterly opposing central policies which sbght Ihe development of lhe Donbas coal industry.

The Kharkov faction's pusver was eclipsedhen its patron Podgorny unsuccessfully vied with Brezhnev for the succession Brezhnev's victory over Podgorny was accompanied by an assault un (he Kharkov Party organization Its membership was cut back and ils5 the Kharkov faction hasSome of Podgorny's proteges in lhe Ukraine, notably Nikolay Sobol. removed asSecond Secretary in IMS and from lhePolitburo1 suffered demotions. Other Kharkov leaders, notably Gregory Vashchenko. who became First Secretary ol Kharkov obkom only after Pndgurny's departure from lhe Ukraine and had no clear lies to Podgorny. have fared better. While some Kharkovians. perhaps Including Podgorny himself, may have favored lenient treatment ol liberal writers,8 Vashchenko joined Alrksey Vatchenko. Scherbilsky's man in Dnepropetrovsk, to atiack dissident writers,

lhe Kiev Party's importance increased during the tenure of Petr Shelesl. Party boss of thr Ukraine32 Shelest began his Party career in Kharkov and may hase owed his elevation lo IheSecretaryship to Podcorny* lavur Av Fust Secretary of Kiev obkom7e placed old Kharkov associates in several key positions. Under Shcherbitsky the political power nf the Kiev organization has been drastically

B. The Cose ofossol Who loved His Fief

The case of Petr Shelesl, First Secretaty ol the Ukrainian Party3 untilro-sides an exampleeudal vassal who became so attached lo his fief lhal he incurred the wrath of his lords In2 Shelest was dismissed as Firsl Seeri'laryhe Ukrainian Party andii Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council ofessear later he was dismissed from this position and retired from the CPSU Central Committee Politburo on pension. Shelest's*Trt'

Petr Shelesl, oustedecretory of the Uk'oinion Common id Poity

removal from the Politburo was preceded by heavy criticism of hit alleged nationalist deviations. Some Western students,isplay of Kremlirsological dexterity, have argued that since nationalism was the only public charge levelled against Shelest. it eould not have been the real reason for his removal Vet an examination of the evidence suggests that, while no single-factor explanation is satisfactory, Shclest's identification with and toleration of Ukrainian national sentiment played anot the main paving the way for his ouster

Shelest's fall could plausibly be explained in terms of power politics, pure and simple Sbcherbit->ky. Shclest's replacement as Ukrainian Party boss, belonged to the close-knit (action of "Dncpropet*e had old and fast ties to Brezhnev,ong-standing rivalry with Shelest. According to this thesis, for many years Brezhnev had been "gunning' for Shelest. and hoping to replace him with his client Shcherbitsky. Conversely, Shclest's opposition to Brezhnev's policies may have heen rooted in power considerations rather than in genuine policy differences. Certainly Shelesta conspicuous lack of deference toward Brezhnev, and played down the Secretary's personal contriliutiom This argument, based on (he usepatron client" model of political mobility, is probably true as far as it goes Its weakness is thai it cannot adequately account lor the decision of other Politburo members to go along svith the sacking of Shelest. To gain their approval, Brezhnev probably needed an issue with which tn fault Shelest. Thus, while Brezhnev may have regarded policy "mistakes" by Shelest merely as an excuse for moving against him, policy difference* may have constituted the real reason that other Politburo members concurred in this action.

At the lime nf Shclest's departure It was widely speculated in the West that he was removedof his opposition to detente in general and to President Nixon's2 visit to the Soviel Union in particular. The timing of his removal as First Secictaiv does suggest lhat this was the immediate cause for the showdown Tlie decision ta remove him came betweenay of his decision to mine Haiphong harbor and Nixon's arrival in Moscow onhclest's opposition to this visit was In line with his long-standing advocacy of heavy defenseand his generally bellicose attitude toward the West.ime when Brezhnev was committing the Soviet Unionetente policy andimited SALT agreement.1 speech Shelest had berated "the policy of US imperialism, which presents Ibe greatest threat to universalnd called for an increase in the defensive might of the Soviethelest is said to have advocated all-oul attack on the US fleet after Nixon's decision, and to have argued vehemently at the Central Committee plenum uf2 in favor of revoking Nixon'sisit to Kievcheduled part of N'unn'v itinerary, and Shelest is rumored to have declared that if Nn on came he would find "the gates of Kiev shut beforehelesl's behaviortate banquet for the Nixon entourage, when he declined to drink the toast in the SALT agreement, until per-

"Shclrrt irniainxt on lhe Polithuxi until Ti April |GT1

Jjlji lll'll

suadcd by Shelepin. seemed lo confirm his negative attitude toward the visit**

Opposition to (he visit may have triggered lhe ilecision io sack Shelest. but il alone does notis an explanation for his departure, saner there svere signs lhat Brezhnev had already laid the groundwork for pushing him out In1 Ihree of Brezhnevli supporters were added lo lhe Politburo. The addition of Shcherbitsky, Premier ol live Ukraine, created the highly unusual and nminous circumstance ol two representatives of ihe Ukrainian apparat sitting as full members of the Politburo Al the same time. Shelest was losing bis gnp over his own baiuwtck The moil glaring sign lhat he might no longer be master of his house was the appointmeni in0ew KCB chief for the Ukraine. Vxaly Kcdorchuk.over Shclest's strong protest According to rumor. Shelest was completely taken aback by Fedorchuk's appointment and refused esxn to shake hands with him when he arrived in

Shelest had been out of step on foreign policy issues other lhan detente with tbe USsvilh Ukraine's World War II memories, he had questioned lhe wisdom of rapprochement wilh West Germany9 speecheremony in Kiev markingh anniversary of lheof the Ukraine from Nazi occupation. Shelest let Out all stops in con(unrig up tnemoties ofV atrocities in the Ukraine Hemiuding hislhat "imperallsts have long cast envious glances on the Ukraine'snd thai "in this trnluiy alone they twice pounced on (liee noted lhat "Ihe present international situation demands thai the lessons ol the past br taken intoince "international imperial ism is striving loesv worldot content with such generalities, he explicitly tried lo discredit Brandt's Osipohftk

Thedrri mluiaiiw thrur mm

pains- line thr policy of bitiU'r; In',.< Hovrvri.

Ihr era* of the nutternot iaIn thr

l-it Wnl (ion.oiiftlut KHil'l on mliseil-

niK Hie unity <rfnl .'mlUnr. on km in* >Jiihil pane fmni lheu-n But

plans oferawn revanxhnu

F'tifla't uruon of this vpeich omittrd ibese rrf-erctKCS lu impel ialist design* Stu-lcst later changed sails and in his1oh Ukrainian Congress, on the eve ofh CPSU Congress, he endorsed the new treaty with West Germany. But it is douhlful thai his views had changed completely.1 speech in Kiev he again tccalhd past German Cupidity,that "we have no right to forget, musl nol forget" lhe evcnls of World War

It is doubtful that Shclest's hawkish behavior during lhe Czech crisis significantlyis position, although this stoiy seems lo have been put out by Soviet leaders After Shclest'sentral Committee letter, which was reporiedly circulated to local Party committees throughout the USSR and sent to Czech Secretary Husak, tried to saddle Shelesl with lhe blame for the invasion The letter reportedly accused him of giving the Politburo misleading information, on the basis of which the leadership decided no solution other than invasion wasimilarShelest had tricked Brezhnev intoleaked to an Associated Press newsman in2 Other reports indicate that2 Brezhnev gavtimilar explanation foi lhe invasion It is unlikely that Ihe Politburo would have relied so completely on Shelest for information inrucial matter More likely these "leaks" were self-serving disinformation prompted by Brezhnev's desire locapegoat lo bear the onus offor the invasion

Other factors no doubt contributed to Shelesl's demise his evident footdragging on Brezhnev's promotion of consumer welfare, biv alleged abuse of tin privileges ufoffice and "offenses against socialistarticularly iu catering lo the whims of his wile, his failure to Iwsdlc his son. who had promoted closer scholarly lies lo theossible disagreement withover the issuance of new Party cards, perhaps because Brezhnev wanted lhe Ukrainian Party to reduce the size of its rapidly growing membership


Some combination ol fiwiign policy differences and personal failings might suffice lo explain She lesl's dismissal Yet none of his "mistakes" in these areas set*msenough lo account for theof the public criticism which accompanied his demise. In lhe end. Shclest's "nationalism" must

be figured into the equation Perhaps most ob-noxioushn daring defense of Ukrainianinterests

Ukrainian administrators. like those of otherepublics, have sought toalarvcrd economy and hive complained ol discrimination in central investment policies. The competition between the Eastern RSFSR and the Ukraine has been intense. Inonouiists led an unsuccessful fight for building hydroelectric power nations on the Dnepr rather than In Siberia, charged that the Ukrainian chemical industry was being sacrificed to the rush to develop Siberia at all costs, and complained that the Ukrainianindustry was farced to import products from other republics, although the basis for theof Mich products existed in the UkraineA Political Diary article5 noted the s'chemenee with which Ukrainian administrators insisted that the Ukraine was economicallyby Russia, and declared "openly that they are being

During the last few years, when priority has been given to the development of oil and gas industry in Siberia, ihe coal "lobby" of Donetsk ha* been particularly vocal in charging unfair treatment by central authorities.1 Shclesl added his voice to their protests. Ath Ukrainian I'artyin1 he lamented that in the past five years only two new mines were constructed in the Donhas. and regretted thai "unfortunately.nd the USSR Ministry of the Coaldo not give sufficient attention lo llu-se mailers" Ath CPSU Congress he praised Ihe work of the Ukrainian coal Industry, noted its importinl contribution to the Sovieted that ihe increase in the industry'shad been carried out al an exceedingly slnw pace, and added:

Some imiplr try tu assrrl lhal llu- part pissed hy Uiil in iht fowlnd ihrn-.

(fr il ii un) thai thr itfrotion |Onl n> di-vrbspsnil ihr

i ojIt b** hrlaor ihliwiuns

Donetsk First Secretary Degtyarev. doubtlessfor Shilest'i support,milarat tlie Congress, and stated tha! "wo hilly share" Shclesl's concerns in ihis mailer After tlie

Congress, presumably in an effort toPSU Central Committee decree announced sharply increased inscstmcuts in new mines in the Donhas In2 DegtyarevIbal seven new mints were scheduled lo be opened in ihe Don has5 After Shrlcsts removal these investments may have been tut back again2 article Degtyarevthai "Ihc miners of Ihe Donhas hasxr tbe right to expect moressistance from tin USSR Ministry of Coal2 Supreme Soviet session Donetsk leaders Lyashko anil Alekscy Titarrnko complained that the Ukrainian coal industry was suffering from the poslponcmenl of the scheduled opening of new mines and the modernlMilinn of old ones

Shelest's "nationalism" went beyond economic matters, lie also appeared reluctant to throw his full weight behind campaigns tu repmt nationalist dissent. This altitude appeared in all three of the major crackdowns duringnd2 During the witchhunthile Shdcst dutifullyrials of uW dents in ihe Ukraine, he is reportid to have gianttsl an interview to Ihe wife of one of the accused promising an open and fair inalater,italy Nikitehenko. ibe then chiti of the Ukrainian KGB. probably with Shelest's approval is reported lo have refused an order de liveredfficial senl fiooi Moscow to arrest Dzyuba. allegedly because be believed such an ndion would Inelle new

While Shelesl lushed out al Ukrainian separatism and "bourgeois" nationalism, possibly in an effort to prove his ideological purity, he simultaneously permitted ami even encouraged literary expnssinns of national pride. Al ihe Fifth Ukrainian Writers' Union Congressotttl fur ibe openness u( its procerdingv heribute lo llie effort* of writers to preserve ihe Ukrainian language.

ondii'ai lotnlour nnn arc flnimshm.

Mlin to Urat Har om

braulilu Itliamiar.itharepcilnr U'.isiitratehiih oiuu

amilu-Partsirttil ami lUar* willin tutnir yinir effort In this dun turn

Tht lone of Ids speed) contrasted diarply wilheading lluuiflei onard of the Writers' Union.

Evidentlyolicy of limitedShelesl took eoncrete sups5 tothe use of the Ukrainian language inIn August of that year lhe UkrainianHighei Education. Yury Dadenkov, called inof higher educational establishmentsthem in writing lo give lecturesin Ukrainian.'* This instruction,have bten sanctioned by lhe Firstreportedly eounlermandcd by ientr.ilafter an orchestrated Ictier-wrilmgaggricsed parents who did not want (heir"denied" the opportunityussianAgain8 Shelest reportedly ordercollege lextbooks be published "first ofthe Ukrainian language" The delegationCommunists who suited theba maimainid that Shelesl, Insome other high officials in lhe Ukrainetlie Ukrainian language.A*

lale avpeech lo the Ukrainian Writers' Union Congress. Shelest slaird that "We Oiouldhe practice of littering nurhrase invariably usedefer lo tbe influx of Russian words into tbe Ukrainian

Slielcsl >eemed to oppose other forms of Russi fnation us svell. In bis report lod Congress of Ihe Ukrainianarly ink- eumlemned both "bourgeois nationalism" and "great-power chauviniiOL" In Soviit parlance tlie furinet is sytionstnous with minority naltouakun and lhe latter svith Russian nationalism While op|Hisitioii to "bourgeois nationalism" is andle riguevt. placing "great-power chauvinism" on lhe same plane had Iwcome strictly jmmc by

Sheleslresludfling of the Ukraine's8 had lhe effect of pulling nun more lenient tuvvaiil national hi dissent in keyu8 Andreynifier, was. !ideulogv siirctary liy anedur Osch.iretiko Follosvtug Ovdiarenko'slhe le .nl of lhe Dipartmenl uf ScienceCulture of ihe Ukrainian Central Commit lev, and the chief editor of Kommunui ULrainy were removed Tlie new editor olrainy svas belu-ved by some observers to favor greater local political autonomy

Although Ovcharenko named against the danger of alien ideologies imported from abroad, like Shelest he seems lo have done what he could behind the scenesefend UkrainianAccording9 report he fold sometime dissident Ztna Franko lhat he was louking aftst her welfare, but that he could do nothing lo help Dzyuba and Svitlychny because if he died to.ould lose my head"was reportedly summoned in lhe summer0 to Moscosv. where Suslov upbraided him for failing In control nalionalisin in the Ukraine. Ovcharenko allegedly responded that il was first necessary to eliminate Russian chauvinism *

Another Shehsl protege. Ukrainian CinemaChairman Svyatoslav Ivanov svas removedloud in2 for having allowed lhe release of an "ideologically harmfulhelest himself is reported to base quashed the release1ropaganda film "exposing" the atrocities of tliea Ukrainian separatist group active during World War II. and during Ids tenure Ihe Ukrainian media reportedly received explicit instructions to play up Ukrainian economic achieve-mem* and lo downgrade all-union

Shelest clearly bucked central authority inOles Honchar. InSSol tor, which had earlier receivedand also

hi Literalurnaya Oazela,under lire Irom the Dnrpropctiovsk Party organization, wilh thesupport of Writers' Union officials Koza-chenko and Mykola Shamota. Hostile reviews of tlie novel were confined lo Dnc propel rnvsk ami /aporoihe local papers until late April, when thev spread to republic-level papers In "une Ihey were followed up in the cenlral press with an article in Soeef.laiyo KvUura Irs Anatoly Ulanov. Firsl Secretaiy of Dnepropetrovsk goikom.""

In spile of lhe fact thai Brezhnev and other high authorities probably approved of the campaign

*Ona Sovwl ilrlxloilnlhaientoi relation*

-rih Sl affff IOT1.i" il

n-lairvril in oilier itullnr ShrleUi tmiirr

against Hornhm. his position in the Writers' Unionnly gradually weakenedS he was forced to share his airfhotily with Koza-chenko. it wai arinounced (hat the (wo men would decide all questions Jointly. In Uss than two monlhs. however. Mondial was again drvatcd lo he soke chairman and Ko/achcnkoo (me ofdeputy chairmen. In1 theblow came; Honchar was retired from Ihe chairmanship, but with full honors. He was replaced nut by Kozachenko, but by Yury Smolich, who had publicly neutral in [hi- SorW controversy'. Not until3 after the removal of Shelest dtd Kouchcnko reap the full reward of victory and ascend to lhc chairmanship

Obviously, tn order for Honchar to have clung

post for so long under suchwilh power must have been lookinghim. Clandestine reporting, circumstantialand logic all indicate that Shelest wasHonchar, according to one report,to Sholest. and sometimes wrote speechesCertainly Honchar went out of his wayShelest's favor, praising hb book, hisin Ul rami an literature, and hishelp to support all thai iss for Shelest. only in onedid he come closeeprecatinghe must have been under intenseto do so. According Iexample, in Ihe spring ol IU7U.oray into Ihe Ukraine, wherelhc Party for failing lo laketo quell nationalist dissent A( theParty Congresshelest"not only young butnwriters" produced "politicallyHe repeated this veiled leliule atUnion Congress which retired Honchar."'*

Shelest's protective hand can also be seen in Ihe strange history of Kan Dzyubayiiba, who alreadyeputationpiritedof Ukrainian culture.reportedly re quested by high Ukrainian Party officials totudy of Party nationality policy.hen he completed his study, which turned out toowerful enliquc of Russifying policies, he sent

Shelcsl. who reportedly circulated theto Ukrainian Party secretaries' fur their cum men is and consideration.ocument ov-viouslyontroversy, and Andrey Skaha. ihen Ukrainian klrcslogy secretary, reportedlyto Shelest during this period lhal Dryulu should Ik- arrested. Shelest allegedly responded ssith Ihe remark that "he was not KagAnovich and these were not lhc limes ofuha was detained for questioning by llu- police in connection with the trials. he was soon released Tlie unauthorized publicationyuba's study in (he Wcs(s fnfrrnotmna/isrn orowever, provided his opponents grounds for assailing himollaborator of Ukrainian emigre "hourgeoa nationalistsDuring the course of the campaign against him.9 Dzyuba was expelled from the local Kiev branch of the Ukrainian Writers' Union, but was rssnslalml by Ihe republic Writers' Union after hearefully worded statement denying lhat helthough he continued to pen pro-tcsl articles, he seemed immune from more serious forms of persecutionhen Shelest's own position had deteriorated Alter being briefly arrested ine was ript lied from ihe Ukrainian Writers' Union in March, re-arrested in April, tried andive-year prison sentence inhen permitted or pressured Into writing an "apology" infter which he was pardoned and released.1"

Perhaps the hesl evidence of Shelest's nationalist sympathies surfaced when,ekraine. Our Sovtet Latul. which betrayed an unseemly national pride Although (he Imok al lint received laudatory rvssews. it containedwhich could be and later svere used as am-imjnilion against Shelest In particular. Shelest con-trlhuled to ihe growing "Cossack cull" in (he Ukraine. He trealed the Zaporozhlan Sich svith sympathy, referring to ils "democratic stmeture" in whleh "all Cossacks had equaluoting from Marx's complimentary description of (hecommunity, charging lhat Polish and Russian historians had "grossly falsified" (he history of ihe Sich. and aibnonishing Ukrainian hniorvins lo pay more attention lo the "great progressive role" plated by the Cossacks He also had harsh stoids fur the Russian Tears, whose "cruel"ini's hail

stroycd tin- Irci-dom of the Ukrainianrid fastened serfdom on the Ukrainian

Although the book wis printedarge editionopies, these soon sold out. Since it was not reprinted, andear was reportedly being removed from libraries,2 excerpts of the book began to circulate in lamizdat. According lo claiicsVstiiie reporting, the book was discussedolitburo meetingresumably when the Ltfoiindwork fnr Shclest's removal was being laid. After quoting some damaging sections, either Brezhnev or Suslov pronounced lhat "this is where nationalism"

Only iufter Shelest had already|Hisiliiin in the Ukraine,evastatinglhe book appear as ihr coup dc grace andhi* from theon the back pages of Kommunis!

he review laid bare Miclests sins in shockingly blunt language Never beforeolitburo member been subjected lo such blatant puhhc criticism from any organ below ibe Central Committee or its esocutive organs. One by one the book's "serious shortcomings" were ticked ofl The author devoted too much space to the prc-October hislurv ol the Ukraine, particularly to lhe Cossacks, and hi- "says nothing about the class stratification uf thee is said to view Ukrainian historyertain degree in isolation" fiom lhat of the ussrhole, thus fading lo elucidate the "IrietKkhip of nations' which cements thelugcthet. On speaking of the reunification of the Uki.une wilh Russia, he "never mentioned lhat. thanks lo this historic act. the Ukrainian people were sasrd from foreign enslavement" llrfailed to reveal "the beneficial infhicrter id Russian culture" on the Ukrainian arts WhileItKpienl on the economic achievements of lhe Ukrainian SSR. lie somehow neglected loam thai these were Ihe "result nol only of the bar oh labor of tin* workers of the Ukraine, bul also nf all pcimlcs of theinally, horrible tltctu, "eleini'uls of economic uumrky me obvious in thehe following iwie nln article written by Shchvrisittky.Miin-suir in tlie Ukraine, which faulted un-named Ukrainianr "national iniiieil and ii.iilownmidi-ilness "

in Ihr Ukrainianounayor assault on Ukrainian rutiorumst dissent, and givenupport to Brezhnevs policies. Although he has not groveled in the manner of some Central Allan leaders, he has offered the requisite amount ol public praise for his chief, and has gone out of his way to emphasize that the Ukrainian Party looks to Moscow for its marching orders.

Soon afler taking charge in Ihe Ukraine inheherbilsky evidently moved to curtail the gruwth of the Ukrainian Party, whose membership had Increasedpeed which may have alarmed Brezhnev.62 the Ukrainian Party grewaster rate than the all-union Party.2 Its membership dropped byercent, while lhe membership of the all-union Party roseercent.,rt

Sheherbilsky has also taken steps to consolidate Iks position in central Ukrainian institutions. During Shcberliilsky't tenure three new full members and four new candidate members have been added lu the Ukrainian Politburo. On the enlarged Politburo Shcher bit sky's Party Secretariat has morethan the government, which had not been the cose with Shclest's Politburo, when Shcherbitsky svas Pie inter,

At least in terms ot numerical supeiknity in ruling institutions, thr Donetskow tncrndancyashko. head ol ll*roup. Idled the post Sheherbilsky vacated a* Chairman of the Council of Ministers Hn faction is ripfescnlede Politburo by lour fullVladimir Drgtyarev. Aleksey Titai enko, ami Vilalytwo candiihlrTsybulko ami Ynkuv Ptvon the Secretariat by Tllurcnko and Pogrebnyak. On the Ukrainian Central Committee olocted1 the Donetsk Party organization was represented byull members (out)

The Dnepropetrovsk faction is represented on tlie Politburo by Shcherbitsky. Aleksey Valchenko. ond prol-ibry Ivan Crushetsky. Vashchenko. thr Khar kuv man who has actedrezhnev ally, was transferred from First Secretary ofirsl Deputy Chairman uf the Ukrainian Council of Ministers, retaining hi* full membership rai the Pol.tlHim Of lhe candidate members Vitaly Fed orchuk and Valcniyn Matanchnl arr Brezhnev allies, and Malanchuk also sits with Sheherbilsky on lhe Secretarial. On the Ukrainian Central Committee electednepropetiovsk nnd Xnpnrnzhr providedull members.


HIS ENKO. Niknby MikhaykwkhEV, Vladimir ltuKmch


: '


silt iii KhllSKY. Vladimir VaulyevKti

VilalyITARENKO. Ak-fcwy Antonovich VASHCHENKO. Chfiory Iv.oovich

VATCHENKO. Aleksey Fedusejevith


-FEDOHCHUK. Vitaly VasilytwichVakmtvn Yeftmovtcri

-Yakov PetrovirhIvan ZaUsarovicfcVW-iu, MikK>yLi-Kti

Othct foutions Snrrt.iry. CPUs Cento] Committer First secretary. Doretik Oblast Part*W* Chairman. PrrsMSnim. UkSSR SUprrme So-let first Deputy Chairman. UiSSfi Coonril ol MaMttrei

Secretary. CKTk Central Committer UkSSRf


brr. Politburo. CPSU Central Committer Chairman. UkSSR Council of Trade Urtont Secretary. CPUk Central Committee First Deputy Chairman. UkSSR Council of


I'uit Secretary. Dnepropetrovsk Oblait Parly Conimitlre

Onim rosiriovo Chairman, UkSSR KCB Secrelaiy, CPUk Central Committee Secretary. CPUk Crotral Committer First Srcrrtary. Kharkov Oblait Party Commit Im Fust Secretary. In Obkut Part*


The lointrr strongholds ol Podgorny anil Shelest have deteriorated.! Kharkov and Kiev wen cut back to six lull members each on theCentral Committee. Nikifor Kalchenko is the only holdover from Podgorny's "old guard" remain -itig on the Politburo: he is probably little mureigurehead today The only presumed Shelest ally remaining on the Politburo is Ivan Lutak. who served with Shelest in, then as his deputy in the central Ukrainian secretariat. Unlike Lyashku, he has no strung geographic base of support, but he occupies the important post of Second Secretary of the Ukrainian Party.would probably be happy to br rid of him The composition of Party leadership on the oblast level has also been in flue Since Shcherbitsky's takeovetf thekrainian obkums havechanges of first secretaries. Most of these were removed during Shcherbitsky's firstalf in oflice. and several were charged within work In addition, many oblasts lost other secretaries. Kherson. Poltava, andobkoms, as well as Kiev gorkom. appear to have been subletted to full-scaleuv, Chernovtsy, and Odessa bass* also been hard hit Many of those deposed had Ins to Shelest ur Pudgoniy.

Shchci bitsky hat also taken ileps tocontrol uvet the Party organiiatiun of IheHe Isas been tritrcal ol the pcriorrrunrc olParty, and since2 alluf Kiev guikom except for FirstAleksandr Birtvin have been replacedsame time, in5 ShcherbitskyKiev guikom Parly organization from iheand placed it undei the directol the Ukrainian Ontndity Party split off. the remainingaving losl over hall olihe size of the oblast Partythat uf al least six other Ukrainianstatus ot Kiev city will now be similar lo lhatVi> cily organization, winch is largerMoscow ublasl Party and iiu! sulmrdinalcd tuarrangement augurs ill fur the politicalol Vladimir Tsybulko. First Secretaryobkoauyaihko.

political position ol llotvin is alwi shaky Allhungli llotvin could piobably nut In- nciusctl ul ideological lasily, having earlier played an aetive ri-le in preventingrend of the Czeche has career ties to Shelest Botvio. like Shelest. rose in the Kharkov Party organization, and served under Shelest in Kiev obkoiu.

At least six of Ihe departing obkum first secretaries were replaced not through promotions from within their own oblasts. ihe policy generally followed duringe dines years, but by men Imiugbt in from outside. Nol surprisingly, many of these appointees either belonged to the Dnepropetrovsk faction or came our of Shcherbitsky's Centralapparatus Fcdor Morgun. the newFust Secretary, wasrezhnev protege, who was educated in Dnepropetrovsk, and worked svith Brezhnev in Kazakhstan. Viktor Dobrik, who took over In Lvov,ur met Firs! Secrelary.h.orkomrezhnevof many years

Several uf the new appointees had beenactive in campaigns against naiionalist Dobnk had been sent lu Ivano Fr.iukutskioul Jciboolcre now went tu Lvov in the wake of anti Rinnan demons! rat torn there. Both linn Mnzgovoy. sent Io Khmon. and Vladimu Dikusarov, dispatched to Ihe Western oblast of Chernovtsy, had served a* deputies olirsI Secretary llnitsky. Ilnitsky had been shot into prominence during the Czech crisis by his relentlessagainst dissent

Of obkom first secretatics loday. only two appear lo have been proteges of Shelest. Their posls arc in the relatively unimportant oblasts of Khmelnitsky and Kirovograd.

The central Ukrainian rdcokogieal apparat has undergone an evenorough houser leaning The key step was taken In2 when Ovcharrnko was replaced by Malanclmk. who as an ideology secretaiy In Lvov hadareerirulent crusader against dissent-s Deputy Minister of Education he had reinforced Ihis reputationuisifier in numerous Iracts extolling ihe virtues of the "friendship ofMalanchuk and Shcherbitsky have re-staffed cultural and ideological departments of the Ukrainian Central Committee. Other culturaland organs, at well as several institute* of the Ukrainian Academy of Science were also caught up in the purge.


Head of Central Committer Prttpaaanda Drpaitmcnt Head of Central Committer iVpirtrnenl for SesentifV

lutalioiud Initttiilloiii Head of Central Committee IVruilm-iil of

Oonal Paily Work Head of OtiUa! Convrunrr CulturalOat*oaaam-urlChief Editor. Lateral urna flraina Chief Editor. Sovirt Wrlien' Publisliiott Hoiisb Chairman, Slale Committee for Cinematography MiDiitn o( Higher and Sprcialiwu Secondary

Chairman of Writers' Umon

Fintf Kormomo! Reetoi of Higher Party School

The KCB had been taken out of Shclesl's hands in lhc summer0 when the centraltionghold of Brezhnev, had imposed Fedorchuk no Shelest Vitalyharkov man. had haadetl ihe Ukrainian KCB since Its formation4 The length of ha tmure suggest* thatrofessional who remained aloof Initn politi-cal infighling or cn(uyitl poileetiuniiglm leader like Podgorny. He was reportedly inclined toward leniency ui handlingilorchuk. by contrast, came from oulside the Ukrainian ap paral. alihough he is an ethniceteran ofecunly apparatus, he appears to be close lo Brezhnev's clients in ihe ccnhalnd may wield some authority In dependent uf Shcherbitsky. Fediirehnk clearly Clime lu the Ukraineandate to rout nalmualtsl dissident i

Sbcherbttsky has rallied this revitalizedarur crusade against dissent An intensive cflnrt has been made lo step up tbeueatiini of yuurig peii|ile. and oblasl

"" whipped the i'llr- v ill!-. :

Lvirv has been (he- chief target In lhi>sensational Hulls ol tourists, accused olsent intoI'kf.uiii by emigreui inalionallsis. bass- lieeiiAuest* and dismissals base kept theol Lvov in turmoil The regime haspersuading several swell knownyuba and 2inagranddaughter ol the celebratedKaneadingyl Ukramiuii cultuie'" Many otherhave been driven undetgruuncl Thegone su far thai on one occasionn portcdly deterredommission sent throofjb wilh a

plamud tnal iu

Shcherbitsky has also trumpeted Bre-zJinev'i pit economicn ies the piimacy erf lhe Party's role in economic administration, lhe high priority ofthe "il and gas industry, lhe push tu develop Siberia. Inheherhitsky svas not su docile. On at least two occasions he openh look lu lask policies of all-union administrators Today Shcherbitsky has curbed his parochial appetite. In an elfort to sell the policy ol developing the eastern HSFSR. Shcherbitsky has repeat cell) reminded his audience lhat the Ukraineaige debt to the Russians for its economic dcvelop-menl. N'ow, he argues, it is the lurn ol Siberia.'"

Sheherbilsky has paid homage to the

"immense historical tole" of the Cirrat Russians Typicalfcroiny article denouncing the nationalist emigre "riff-raff" fur mahgning the "high spiritual dignity of Russiane svrole of the virtues of "Russian man" in rhapsodic fashion, concluding thai "whoeverthe Russian people oflends all Soviet people "

Shcherbitskya|or article on nationality relations for the4 issue of Komrrmriiir This article contained no sharp departures from Ihe policy Brezhnev outlined at lhe fiftiethcelebration, but in the process of enlarging on some of Brezhnev's pronouncements it toned them down somewhat, andense of reassurance tn lhe nationalities.

It is possible lhat Shcherbitsky is trying to broaden the base of his personal popularity by backing oil somewhat from his harsh stand on national aspirations Wilh his chief ailing,is stepping forthcomer" in thewriting frequently on economic questions as well as on Ihe nationalities problem, but there are no signs of any divergence between Brezhnev ami Shcherbitsky. The more soothing tone of Sheher-bitsky's article may reflec* Brezhnevs desire to dee derail: his RussilicatMMit her lhan any move by Shcherbitsky to dissociate himself from Brezhnev's policy.

f ShcheilMliky were so inclined, it should pruhably be politically disadvantageous for him loenient attitude loward the grievances of

lhc rationalities. Shchcrbi; sky's greatest habdityBrezhnev's mantle it probably his

close association with the Ukraine. If angling far the succession, lve would probably lean owtto prove his loyalty to Brezhnev and bis ideological purity on the issue of nationality rights.


In an effort to evaluate the strength offorces in the Ukraine, sve have broken the Ukrainian problem down Into its component parts. First, we have seen that the Ukrainians possess most of the ingredients necessary for political self-sufficiencyeople who hasr not enjoyed independent statehood in rnodern times, they have an unusually rich cultural heritage andegree of pride that they are more "European" than the Creat Russian* Theyelatively balanced economy, and over the last half century they have been transformedeasant peopleationiversified class structure.

Yet our survey of linguistic and demographic Ireiiib Minerstsi" nny I- on llu' Mile nf the forces of assimilation, at least in the East Ukraine Linguistic Russification is proceedingin the urban areas of East Ukraine.most Ukrainians there continue to think of themselves as Ukrainians, and continue to claim Ukrainian as their native tongue, the Russianis replacing Ukrainian in official and public communications. The use of Russian in public may be largely due to official pressure, but many Ukrainians ibemsclves have come to feel lhat speaking Ukrainian is "nekuhumyi" orThe process is slow, but ihe Russian elcmciii in ihe Fust Ukraine is growing, particularly In the cities, through assimilation of Ukrainians andof Russians.

In West Ukraine the statisticsomewhat different slury West Ukraine has more than held its own against Russian encroachments. This fact points to another dimension of the UkrainianThe history, culture, and religion of East Ukraine hatereat degree been intertwined wilh the Russians but the Soviet annnalion of West Ukraine introduced into the Soviet system an alien and generally hostile population which can be Russified, if al all. onlyassive and prolonged effort.

While assimilation is gradually taking place in East Ukraine, this does not preclude the possibility that Ukrainian opposition to Russian rule may he incrcasing, partly because of the West Ukrainian infection The two tendencies would nol necessarily be incompatible. The very forces of urbanization, social mobilization, And mass education which work to efface national differences in Ihe long run may simultaneously heighten conscious nets of those differences in the short run. In fact. Ukrainian nationalism does appear to be growing, or al least becoming more vocal. During tlie last several decades Ukrainian dissent has undergone anthe armed resistance of World War II. to ihe formation of conspiratorial groups in, to ihe flourishing of open protest in. Overt dissent probably reached Its peak in the period8n the wake of the invasion of Czechoslovakia and during the period when Shelest was permitting dissidenteasure of latitude. Shcherbitskysfor idnological conformity has put theon tint defensive, but they have not been completely silenced and the reintroduction of more draconian measures may have radicalized them (See page

A geographic and sociological breakdown ofreveals tiul dissent is not completelylo the intelligentsia, or to one section of the Ukraine. Although nationalism has always hern stronger in West Ukraine, particularly in Galicia. in recent years dissent seems tu have been on the rise in ihe cities ol East Ukraine as well And although the bulk of Ukrainian dissidents ate intellectuals. Ukrainian nationalism probablyreater popular base lhan Russian liberal dissentew recent occasions workers have engaged in strikes wilh nationalist overtones, but coopera-lion between workers and intellectuals is doubtless impeded by the general failure nf ihe nationalist intellig.nlo articulate lower class grievances concerning living standards and material welfare Overt nationalism seems lo remain an urban phenomenon; if nationalist disturbances involving the peasantry have occurred in recent years, we do nol know them. Larger portions of the

: Mlltli- ll< .' : Hi

Mil timehb period witnessed the emergenceew type ol nationalist distent, avowedly Marxist in orientation, which appealed lo new Soviet elite* for whom Iraditional Ukrainian nationalism seemed outdated

The ease of the Ukrainian dissidents issomewhat by support from other dissident elements in Soviet society. Recent years haveradual convergence between tbe aims and tactics of the Ukrainians and other dissident groups,iminishing of old hostilities. The Ukrainians have received some cautious support from the Jews, and Soviet propagandists have taken to charging collusion betweenndore important. Russian liberal dissidents, in the past lukewarm or hostile toward Ukrainian separatist sentiments, have shownsympathy for Ukrainian aspirations, and Christian dissent, particularly that of the Umates, continues iu reinforce Ukrainian nationalism

Another variable is the degree of externalfor Ukrainian nationalism As the regimes detente policies make it increasingly vulnerable to criticism from "tlie othernd open upol communication between the Soviel Union and the West, organized protest of Ukrainian emigres in the United States and Cinadaotiniial shield fist Ukrainian dissidents, and could perliaps encourage them to engage In Imlder acts of dissent The Ukraine is even moreto East European Influence, due to theassociation of West Ukraine with bordering East European countries, and tbe poly plot character of the affected populations If discontent in the Ukraine mounted sufficiently lo createevolt in Eastern Europe couldatalytic effect Evidence that this level of discontent has not been reaefsrd is found In the evenlyS, when what was probablyvyinpathy for the Czechoslovaks created enough unrest in the Ukraine to make Party officials jittery, but lo our knowledge did notny violent incidentseriousuccessful revolution in Czechoslovakia mightore kilting effect on the Ukraine, bul to speculate almut rhis is to call in the unforeseen to account lor lhe ttmute.

The fear that lu lhe event of war with China the Ukraine might try to break away has been voiced by Russian dissident Andrey Amalrik and is evidently shared by some high Soviet Party officials.,J* In recent years Ihe PRC has stepped up its efforts to exploit the Ukrainian nationality problem by producing propaganda about Russian repression and by making contacts with Ukrainian emigreong drawn out and debilitating military encounter wilh ihe Chinese might well stimulate Ukrainian fractionalism yet it is unlikely lhat Ukrainian nationalists would side wilh the Chinese. Ukrainian dissidents dislike the Chinese regime more than (he Soviet one. the onlylo Maoism in Ukrainian tomizdnJ areones. Nationalism in the Ukraine appears lo be waxing rather than waning,erious separatist effort is not in sigh I.

Even if the Ukrainians resented Russianas greatly as do the East Europeans, ai least Iwoir factors make the Ukrainian situation different from that of Poland or Czechoslovakia. First of all. the Ukraine has no national military unils of its own. The various Soviet nationalities are thoroughly and dehberatery integrated in the Sovietroops stationed in tlie Ukraine probably do notigher lhan proportionate percentage of Ukrainians. Secondly, although the Ukrainian Party and government are in the hands of native Ukrainians, il put lo the test they would probably by-and-large east iheir lol with the regime. The lenders of the Ukrainian Parly are moreintegrated into lhe Soviet system than were their counterparts in Czechoslovakia, and thehas been good to them The central regime has accorded Ukrainian Party apparatchiks career advantaRes perhaps sufficient to prevent them from nurturing significant grievances.

Yet Ihr Ukrainian Party has not been completely free of nationalist tendencies These most frequently lake the form of economic localism. Rut unless the case of Shelest lie regarded as anil is unlikely thai he would have taken the stands he did without the support of important segments of the Ukrainiantendencies may continue to be manifested in other attitude* These may include support lor scfseroci of political de-eentiatiration. relative leniency toward dissident

writers,eneral unwillingness to accede to the claim of Russian superiority in allt-li'ndcs towaid nationalism seem to be depeiident in pnrt on factional alignments, with (hefaction traditionally taking the lead in Russifying campaigns On the basis of slimsupported by common sense, we may pre some that Party officials !rom the West Ukraine are more amenable to compromise with nationalist elements, although there are exceptions to this rule Malanchuk. who bails from Lvov, andative of Tianscarpathta, are both fiery champions of Russification. Finally, the policies pursued by Ukrainian leaders are complicated by the presence of powerful patrons at the center who originally came out of the Ukrainian Party organization, and continue to meddle in Ukrainian affaiis.

At present Shcherbitsky seems to have the Ukrainian Party in hand. He has purged those who dragged their feet in the ideological crackdown, and most of (hose who had obvious connections with Shelest. Yet Lyashko. Shcherbitsky's strongest rival, has long been identifiedritic of Brezhnev's economic policies, and his Donetsk faction is strongly represented in central Ukrainian Party and government institutions. Evenhas not alwaysatsyes-man in his dealings with central authoritiesHe is so closely identified with Brezhnev that it would he difficult for him toolte-face on nationalities policy while Brezhnev remains in office, but if the political climate changesuccession he might find II expedient lo seek accommodation with nationalist elements in the Ukraine

Under Brezhnev, the readership hasard line against all forms of Ukrainian nationalism The lenders have cracked down on nationalist dissent and pronounced dogmas which appear to give official blessing to intcnsitied Russilicatiun. They have also resisted proposals lo decentralizeadministration, changes which might reorganize administrative nnrts on eeononiic rather lhan on rut venality lines, and fired an independent-minded Ukrainian Party host svho stielched his authority anil svho seemed sympathetic tn some forms of national "deviation" Bui campaigns lo root out nationalism are hard lo sus lain for long periods, since they run the danger of exacerbating Ibe problem (hey sveie intended to. solve. And the vice of "knalism" can la*o rear its headegional Partyhatever hu nalmnuhty. rs responsible for tin economic performance nf his union lepoblic He naturally lobbies for its Interests in the allocatmn nl resources.

Both afler Stalin's death and alter Khriisruhcv's ouster, thet fin ion uf authonty maiiIuiIelaxation of Russilicatiun eft Oct*rowth in assertiveness of union republicimilar relaxation may well follow Brezhnev's demise, but will probably be as short-lived as previous" On the whole, central autboriljes can be expected tomuddle through"policy, to continue alternating spasms ofwilh periods of malign neglect, in ad fine eliorts Inagging problem under conlrol without aggravating it. They may hope lhal long-rangi lories of economic modernization and Social integration will do what out and-out repressionnationalism by graduallythe national diMerences which he at its base

If particularistic attitude* ill the Ukraine and in other border regions persist, and cotni lo be per ceivrdortal threathe centrals conceivableiflerent ap-proach might be adopted. The prepimdetancc- al ihe Creal Rinnan nationality would make itenuinely federal system,his were desired,l as the prepondeiance uf Piussia made federalism in imperial Cennany unwoik-able. Consequently, if concession* came, they would probably take the form of granting greater dc /ecu autonomyew key nationalities, in an effort to buy (heir support for (he .system. By such an action nineteenth-century Austrian* gave thea slake in (he preservation of (he llabsbiirg Empire and (hus pacified (hem. Czechoslovakia provide*exampleunn! state in whichi minoritiesegree uf autortoni).

Ycl ihe impulse toward Russian domination and the ctculionnitary stale is strong This urge has Ideological as svell as historical mots While classical Marxism was as hostile to Russian national ism as to minority natioriahsm. the mam thrust of Soviet Marxist ideology has been toward centralized political and economic decision-making, and uni-

(otm cultural forms. Political irntralizalionasai where onr nationality is larger lhan all the others: combined, us well as being (heir historic master, inevitably result* in domination byonality. Fcorsoroic efficiency is enhanced if plannei*it- to treat the entire Soviet Unioningle economic entity, placing industries and assigninghere most profitable or strategi tally useful. wiiImhi! regard for local desires. II culture and language are lo be "internationalized* or standardized throughout thenion,i language and culture is the logical sehicle lor this purpose. This process ofy which Russian language and culture become uni-seisahzid to verve the needsoational em-pitr for communication and integration, can be defended on pragmatic and even ideological gniunds In practice, however. "Ruvuanization" has led to "Russifr the process by which tbe regime attempts to transform the minoritiesand psychologically into Russians Hereof realpohtik are probably paramount. Soviet Russian leaders doubtless have the usual prejudicesominant ethnic group, but they are not Ureal Russian chauvinists consumed wilh an emotional desire to convert alien populations, there is little indication of this sort of zeal in theRather, it is the desire lor mote political control os-er the minorities which leads the central authorities to sltive for the eradication of national tliffi'iencev, and has been among the main factors tausing ihern to shy ass-ay from schemes ofor economic dteentraliiation. Finally, lhe sheer weight of nn old imperial tradition argues against systemic changes to relax central control oser the provinces

Il is even possible that Soviet leaders might move in lhe other direction,adicalol authorily lor the union republics,resultuig in the formal abolition of the Soviet Federation, and open association of the Communist regime with traditional Russian nationalism. Some Soviet leaders today flirt wilh Russian nationalism because of its possible usesolitical tool, in the same way that the Tsars, not Pan-Slavspromoted Pan-Slav ideas for great-power purposes During World War II Stalin discarded Marxist slogans in favor of nationalist ones with greater emotional appeal. With the waningorce capable of motivating people and legitimizing the regime, some leaders may beaboulubstitute "integrative myth" for the regime

After the Russian Republic itself,o area ot the Soviet empire more important to Moscow than the Ukraine. Neither the center nor theare easy in their present relationship and in one way or anothri this is bound to change in coiiiini; years. This change may be gradual and evolutionary, but it may also resultecision in Moscow that special measures are required. If so. ihe direction of change will more likely be toward greater centralization, ralhet than aof power.




Ktmimunui4atar. T. P. McNnH. "The Comm.-nut Party oi (he Sovietembershipadio Libeny Research,9in Deputesowfo SSSfl. Moscow.

ohn ArirnlrdiE made thi, observation in The Sonet -WawMWA Cut $ludUfrV. The trend appean,ontinued

4 From appropriate volumeskiam-itoy flSfi

u jle uhbuuii uwval. im Centralnd Central AiidlruiKlected byh CPSU Radio Liberty Research. CRDnd "An Analyst, of Ihe Currentof the Soviet Central Partyo

ukowska-Hanralnne. "Ellinic- Politicthe USSR Mem, of Com.-iimum.. 5.

PeterThe CPSU Otter* Firslah humtl of Pohlkol..

Bated on DepuUnv,m "Appamt Tsenlralnogo Komilelaadio Liberty.4

. Kh.K,lt,nna!ne SSSfl..

trtraWy Vm,vfr. VI. March feunrni 8.

VnlnJto.. 91

H. Boc.urkiw. The Ortbocloi ChurchSoviet Regime in lhea/im. XIV. November

ohn KoU-ly.n Sow! Okialnv (Toronto

his line ol (lWUKlu pm.ued byi in "'Scilsiiitf- thc Naiionaliiy froblein"p .

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o. 5.

rtlX'ki;. LKUIM. ntmian'; In.

piMinm. Mminian Quantify.XIV No.

amdnoeoi'uuuJyo.o.ument5 Waiyl Very ba, "Status of National Lanssub-c* in Sovietkrainian Qu*ittftv.XVII. No, fsarprfnor obroroiome.


Kadi" LibertyResearch anil Prograi'i Evnb ujtion DivMun. "Note* on the Huuifkalion of theackground Repori74


his Ii the contention of liau Diyuha, foi eaample,

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