TABLE OF CONTENTS
I INTRODUCTION
II. THE PI.ACE OF THE UKRAINE IN THE SOVIET SYSTEM
A IV Ukrainian Nation
B Thr Ukraine's Status Viii-vtS thr Union
III RUSSIFICATION AND ITS FRUITS
Brezhnev Years:nitary State
and Demographic Trends
andn
IV. NATIONALIST DISSENT IN THE UKRAINE
A. Ceographica! and Socio logBreakdown II. Cilevancei of thc Duaflccted
Intelligentand Nationalism
with Eastern Europe und thc West
wiih Bunion. Jewish, and Christian Dissent
V. THE POLITICS OF NATIONALISM IN THE UKRAINE
A. Factionalism and Nationalism
B Thr Cat ofaual Who Loved Hk Fief
C TV Case of ShcherMttky Royalutthr King
VI THE UKRAINE IN THE YEARS AHEAD
Source CiUliuns
FIGURES
Ukrainian SSR. {map)
Ukiaiiuan RrprncnUfmn in Ihr Ukrainian Communis Party (chart)
. 'll hart.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY DIRECTORATE Of INTJUlOENCI OfFICE OF POLITICAL RtSIARCM
5
NATIONALISM IN SOVIET UKRAINE
by
tnihn Uwdy.Office otr oHkn
ot Ir* Cenlrol lnMtio*>K* Ao*nt, ond 'he Deportment.
wggei'iom wereond mod. bmotmmenii will be welcomed by the oirihor
DISCUSSION
INTRODUCTION
ulti national slate in an of MiiiKni.ill.il. Ol (he three greatiropi .in lunii empires of (hi- nineteenthAus-Turkish, andiheill intact. Although ihc vilal signs nfniunmany of Ils national minonwhich numberundred, and make up jliiknl half ot the Sosieflo
iicssuics. and some nf them Ml
ln'coming more ratlier than lev* assertivethe iut tonalitiesn* ol Ihr most I* ii ill ciii and vning domestic problem* cunfnmt-uiK Sovietoday.
Somr Western students of Soviet society, influ*arsist and in part by liberalf (bought. a* well as hy the dominance of Hessians in the fust generation of American academichast been dow to recognize the staying power of Soviet minority nationalism Predisposed In believe In an liistoiii.il trend toward in* rt-ash tultur.il umfnrmity jimI politicalt ton.faith in the power of social engineering loold luyaltics, they long regarded nationalism ,i> an atavism, an obsolete ami even embarrassing throwbacl tit an earlier era. Mot* recently, asnflicf* in Soviet .i-ontinued to be ethnic cither ;li.in doss conflicts, the academic pendulumunng in the olhei direction. Scholars are al-limpting In male up for their tardiness in recog-ni/iug the import ol the nationalities problem with
tioti.ilities question is also germane to the debate concerning Ihe nature of the Soviet system and the diicction in which It may evolve in thewhether toward increasedin the political, economic, and cultural spheres, or towardmore federal, diversified and pluralistic system Thus for. to Ihe extent lhat Soviel leaders havea long-range goal in nationality policy, Ihey have engaged tnin the attempt to transform the old multi-national Hiissian empireoviet "nation" whose citizens, regardless of nationality, owe their primary loyally lo Ihe Soviet ktt-to. lu many respect* the dilemma of the Soviet leader is thul of thefll placet. To require complete culturalas weltand eennomicnlr alir*-tlon ucruss tbe board, may stir up unrest among nationalities which could be mollified by moreattention to their individual needs, but to yield too much to local interests may encourage partloiilarisi attitudes which likewise threaten tbe stability of the stale.
Thus. Iheentra) polio towaid the nat.unal minorities has not been one of unrelieved repression, butlend of coercive midmeasures. The fluctuations of Sovietpolicy probably do not reflect any change in basic objectives, bill merely the use ol more orubtle means to achieve tin- same end. Il islhat. il ideoloKU.il imperative* continue to weaken, the regime might become moreo tin* deslie* iJ cenlaiu Ley njlton.il muiorKie*etain iheir ethnic and cultural idenlity. and in gain some me;isure of economic and politicautonomy
Soviet nationalities potentiallyretudy of ihe na-
s
the Ukr;iiniaiis--the Logest .mdtion.il minority. I( estimates (he extent to which centrifugal and destabilising fo.ces
TotL^aetci
exist in thc Ukraine unci evaluates Moscow's efforts lo contain thrm The Ukrainians posses*which, taken together, givenique (lowtion among Soviet minotitiei Some ofnd eohesis-eness ol the Ukrain-ian population, the economic significance of their area, the historical longevity of the Ukraine as aethnic cnmmiinily conscious ol un mile-pendent cultural heritage, and the Ukrainian's historicto Western culturalseem to ini ii .it the ability of the Ukrainians toRussifkalion pressures. Yet otherthe considerable affinity (linguists, ethnic, cultural) among Russians andsvorke opposite direction. Soviet authorities tend to accept Ukrainians, fellow Slavs, on an almost equal (exiting with Russians in eliteand under Khntshchev and Brezhnev lhe Ukrainian Communist Party has enjoyed aposition Yet the similarity betweenand Russian* may also make centralthat Ihe Ukrainians are more easily assimilable than many otherto accord Ukrainians rightsroup.
This paper sp praises Ukrainian nationalism on several levels First, the character ol lhe Ukrainian nationality and Ihe question of hosv fully thcpeople and the Ukrainian Party have lieenmln lhe Suvlet svsieni is considered.
tionalist dissent among Ukrainian Intellectuals, and id nationalist manifests lions within the Ukrainian Communist Party. Suggests the eitent and nature of resistance- to central control
II. THE PLACE Of THE UKRAINE IN THE SOVIET SYSTEM
A. The Ukrainian Nation
Snvlct Ukraine is more than an admin 1st rati ve iulubvision Theillion Ukrainians in lhe Soviet Union loriu the largest national minority iu the country and account forercent of itsThe Ukraine itself runt aimillion pcoplc (iim I" percent of the Soviet populatroti i. ofilbiri) are* ethnic Ukrainians. In ana amitin ULi.urvc is almnt tin-fts
people possess all the attribute*mu. moil language, ethnic distinctness,nd economic cohesion, nnd consciousncsshaied heritage. The vitality of Ukrainian nationalism and the ability of the Ukrainians to resist assimilationno the strength of these qualities.
tuny. It siivcs bothranaryajur mineral producer ol the Soviel Union Aiming its mineral resources,nary raw materials tor heavy metallurgy are most important. Scarcely anywhere else in the Soviet Union arc coal, imn, anilloiind in such proximity as in the East Ukraine. In addition to the rich coal deposits in the Donets Basin, nr DurtbaS, another coalfield has Ixsn discovered in lhe Lvov region Krivoy Bog in (he One-pro pet rovsky region produces iron ore ofhigh quality, anil manganese is found in the middle Duepr area. Tbe IJonba* has extensive salt and met-cury deposits. Vast natural gas resources have been discovered in East Ukraine Petroleum fields lie in several eastern regions, in the Crimea, and In the foothills of flic Carpathians, where potash is also found. In addition, thc Ukraine produces about one quarter of the Soviet Union's grain, ns well as sug.liariety of other crops.
The Ukraine has ivclI developed and dtvetsiliid industries Inhe Ukraine produced more pig. mod (ban any Km opt-an tuunCiy. mine Uirl lli.ui the United Kingdom or France, and wasuuU lo tin- Uniled Kingdom in coal mining. The Ukraine lends the world in per capita production of iron, steel, and iron ore. Its chemical industry hasr.ipidlv since lhe 1MSIK .uid it isjuiiaclnne construction eeitter of the Soviet Union. The Ukraine also produces some nhnuinmn. .iboul two-thirds of the country's sugar and hall its suit.
The part played by the Ukraine iu the Soviet economy is consideiahle. On balance, it coittiilmlc> murethc Soviet exchequer than it receives from it, although the costs of administration and defense borne by thc all-union government tend to even the score Although the Ukmine's light industry i>
anil it imports clolli.
some other products Irom otherl the Soviet Union, the Ukraim- has escaped tlwegional
specialization which has buen forced un sumc union republics. Confined forenturylosed economy and unable to reach foreign markets directly, the Ukraine hai becomeertain dejyee wi-lded economically to thriom nl theUnion, but its economy is relatively balancedhas lnnniie less reliant un the traditional sin pluses of co.il, iron and steel, and grain If cut loose Irom the all-union economy, tbe economy erf the Ukraine cutdd probably slay afloat.
While the <tunomk' importance of their ureasheer sveight of tlicii number* give theSoviet-li.tnnam to Russians dotilille-vsauthorities souseiupc thatmay ultimately solve thc UkialuiauLittle lluinaiwhiteand Creat Russians make upbrandies of the Eavl Slav familykrainiam may lie mote feasible,tliui the alnoiplmn of the Baltices
In .iswsiiik the ability ol (lie Ukrainians li>natn-ul identity in ihc (ace ol Russifyinghowever, ll is necessary to make aEast Ukrainians and West Ukrainians.times the Ukraine bus never formeditolitkal state (except during theconfused period folktwing the BoKhesiLami its teirilonrs base often beenuioug several states. Only svith the lerrilorialof Wuild War II were .ill Ukrainianconsul iihi ted in one Snviet republicneat ol sshkhtohr modern period,
is closer In thc Great Russians in hisIiKK.il traditionsnltuial and religions background than is Wist Ukraine, which was annelid only during World War 11
kraine, eneotispasung therovincesv Hie Soviet Union9 amiy viitue of its bolder location ,ui'l history has loi'U linn more Wcsiirnuiicnled lhan the cislmi Ikul nf the republic. Fist ol the western oblasts. iiiwhich make up Easternsos. Is-ano Frankovel. and Tenropol oblasts) and part olfV'olyiiia and Rovno oblasts) were underih Polish rule Inr centuries, nllhough the
Volynian areas had been under Russian rule Irom the eithlrenth century until World Warrans carpalcquired hy the Soviets from Chechoslovakia, was under Hungarian control until World War I, Chernovtsy, formerly called Northern Bukovlna, belonged to Romania until World War II.
While East Ukiaine containsiilt minoiily escvpt for thr Russians. West Ukraine hosts two sig-nilk-anl mfnnrilkS. Must of thc Poles In Easternere deported lo Poland after the svar. but Hungarians constituteercent of the population of Transcar|Mlhia. sshile Romanians and the closely-rclatcd MoliUsiam make upenenl ofAtame turn'. Canhusluvakia andcontain small but voc.tl Ukrainian minorities This intermingling ol nationalities crculestruiiblesouic situation in the- Soviet Ukraine. Nationalist movements in Eastern Europe could spark lemrciissiora in the Ukraine itself, asiningehoslovak crisis8 {wet.
Wesl Ukraine's religion has also ln-Ip.il to set it apart Irtsm the rest of Ukraiite. Most of thein West Ukraine, except for Vetrynw and Chet-nostsy, ire Uniates, Creek Catholics who adliere lo the Orthodox rite bul recugnizc* Home's authority, while thc Rieat mass ol Fait Ukrainian Iselieveii arc Oifli.wlox. The Uniate church has traditionallyearer ol Ukrainian nation.il feeling Tbe church's miimate connection with lhe Ukrainian irtdtpend iiKivemeiit during World Wai II pnrstdcd the pretestts official ihssoliitinn by MomXiwationalist Ukrainian Auloccphiiloii* Ortho-dos Church did exist and svas intermittently active in East Ukraine) until its final: World War II.its muchi sup put as lire nin Wc-st Ukraine The irflK.-inlly sanctioned Russian Orthodox Church is subservient to lhe stale, which has relied on it in the struggle with the "national" churches in the East as well as the West.
In tbe East Ukraine. Ukrainian national let-lings baseeen stronger in rite iiortb.III the northsvestern legions (Kbiuelnitvky. Vinnitsa. Zhitomir, Kiev. Cherkassy,art ul this northwvsJcrti Isfiilury wassyonly in the latecrntory lhe south, sshicb iins most ul the laige citK*s. was scllli-d
much Liter, and has hisloncallyess UkrainianYethole IhcUkraine shares much nf ils long history with (he Creal Russians
Because ol its clnier physical proximity andties In Europe, however, even whilerule the East Ukraine has played arole in the development of the Russiana conveyor ol Western inllucnces. Peterfor example, relied heavily nn Ukrainianand ideas in his effort to Westernizethe righieenth century. The Ukraine isRussian history for another related reason.nineteenth centuryRussianearly history of the UkraineIhe quest for freedom and the defianceautnaralic state. This conception of
Uki ante's historical role can be seen in ihr intei-pretaliiin of two events, both of which have sparked fierce disputes between contemporary Soviit RBS-sian and Ukrainian historians At issue is notry.n inatler. bill the identityeople.
The firct event concerns the destruction of the firs! "Russian" slate, centered on Kiev in th* Dnepr Riverhe early middle *firs Wr*ti in inand in lis political system, ihc Kievan date prospered until the Tatar invasion of the thirteenth century For theears much o( Ihe old Kicvan territories were subjected to the Tatar yoke, hut parts nf Ukraine (Calico and Volynta) were absorbed by Poland and Lithuaniaew state lo the north, Muscovy, ruse to drive uut the Tatar intruders and "gather the Russiant difffird fmni its Kntsan predecessor substantially. in ils tenitori.il have, fn ils pnhiical system, even ui its ethnic make-up Russian historians have stic**cO the continuity lietween the Kicvan and Muscovite periods, and view much ol Russian foreignhe centuries In comenntinuins; effort to reclaim the Ukrainian leiritoriesegitimate pari of the Russian state. Ukrainian historians, on the contrary, have sciii the Tatar invasion asharp break and arc inclined to regardventual annexation of the East UkraineOD* quest of one separate people by another, ratheramily reunion
Anotlirr cherishrd Ukrainianl the period of Cossack freedom Tlu* Cossacks were
bands of free-wheeling (mppciN :ind iiMiv-iiarie* wlsu lived in several area* nut yet Iikhii'IiItha* sway of tht-Mu*cn*ilc state Thin* in Ihe rut-man's land along the Inwcr readies of tin Diu-pi fnrmeslough democracyvinaanctuary lor nmaway serfs and nthi'rs who wanted to escape gnveinmenlal oppression While the Ukrainians idealize Ihe Zaporoahian Gnsacfc* as tree spfrtts who defied the Tvin.ivtmian* atlempt tn uncover evidence of class conflict in the egalitarian Cossack society, and jeganl (lie(ni subjugation) of Ihe Cossack land* with the TsarM statelessing for Ihe Ukraine
The Ukrainians have ronunticirrd their history somewhat, yet the "myth" of the Ukrainian* nl oh! asnmd and freedom-loving people has suiviii-il to provide Ukrainians luday with national heroes, national Ideal,onception nf national cliarac ter. Years of Soviet education, which subtlythe superiorily ofussian have Mien their toll but have not enmpkh cV-stroyiil itn-Ukr.tini.im apprecialimi and ktMnvlcilffc nf tlieii nwii national cnlfnre and hi*1nr>.
B. The Ukraine's Status Vis-cV-vis tbe Union
Undu khinshchcv ami Briihncs. the Ukrainians have achieved Ihe status off Sovietolicy of "recruiting local cadres" lo govern the Ukiaine. firsts part of the effort olt" oras been revived Th* Ukrainian Party, enmpoard nlmheynn-is lint nbaflii-irias beenIn ibe po-aluni nl ihe Russian Party's junior partner Al the same lime, Ukrainian* appeal tojjijntetl virtually equal vocational opportunities, a* the centralme attempts to *trcngthen Ihe lionds of interest among elites of different nationalities andmong dilfeicnl social croups within theesult of theseative Com-munist ellie governs the Ukraine, the Ukraine tndav is noolonial oiitpust tun by Great Hni. sians.
Since World War II the Ukrainian Party kw lie-come alm-rtt completely.inning with
the Khrushchev era ami cntitiniiint;ive
Ukrainian Representation in the Ukrainian Communis! Parly EthniCUkrainianae Ol populationkraine
EUwiicwiee^tage ol Uh/amian PoMbu-o
etet-nuge oi Uknur**ri oDkom Fust Sec/Warn
PERCENTAGE
Partyemarkable spurt of ginwth. although if* membership Is still disprupor tionilcly hiw compared with the all-union average. During this period of growth, many local MtllH were recruited, ami today imhaetmnie Ukrainian Party is highern most union republics. Tin- Ukrainian representation in the Ukrainian Party rose fromercent8 toercents high as the Ukrainian share of the population of Ukraine. During this period the Hussion element in the Party fell fromeicent toerceni. although the Russian share of the population ol the lit unc was growing,1
ranks ol
,'ki'ai
mt Muse
Ukiaimam dumiuale the upper echelons as well as rhe rank and file nf the Ukrainian Parly. While in almost all other union republics Russians serve as second secretaries, important posts because ot their control over cadres,3 both tho first Jinl rln- vctitd secretaries of tin- Ukrainian Party base been ethnic Ukrainians Of Ihe eleven full members of the |ncsent Ukrainian Politburo, only one is Russianhe twenty-four lust secretaries of Ukrainianrovince) Patty committee* lutikmiisj whose naliouatily can be ascertained, twi my are ethnic Ukrainians (there ure twenty-fiveutoreover, many of the Russians in high poMl-im ui the Ukrainian appant are nativi-s
p.itmu ino the sotio-ne. which has It also idled* iiunist regime (Cf lor reason* e. it is not tliat of thehas captured it the incnav ons toleadership no
Thereowever,eneral tendency tn appoint East Ukiainians. piesumahly more trust-worthy. to fill important pints in Westartylso comiocrably luner in the weslrrn oblasts None uf the seven western oblast* have as many as lurty Party members pei one thousand [seople. All but two of tbe eighteen east-em oblasts base at least forty Party members per one thousandhe highei |ierccnlsigc of Russians residing in the eastern ohli*t*l 1lot Ihis dillrtcnce.
The high level ol ii.att* Ukrainian Party is -urtly ci economic advanceinenl nf increased the swe ol the nn Ihe glowing acceptaivce of by part uf the Ukrainian c! ol conviction orkrainian elite has captun tan Party, bus that the Ukra the allegiancekuinii mg tendency to give rcspoui tans also indicates that tb
longer distrusts the Ukrainian Partyival pcmvi center, as Stalin did. but regards the Ukrainian Communists as reliable partneis
nniaii
retaiy nosts i
M;
appuial also oexups 'aity and government illy an historical acei he center's policy toormer Firstaturally filledith old en Hues and
tliciils hi'in Ihc Ukrainian Pmty. tin-zhnev. uilc ol (Ihjm; Khrushchev nmlcges. continued this practicein. .scale. Four ol tin- fifteenl ihrv, Kirilenko, Podgorny, indtlx ir early careers in fhe Ukrainian Puts Sli.n*-'v. First Secretary o( the Ukrainian Paity. is alviull member, and another.is jm itlmK' ULi.iiiu.iii
O* Pohilmnt mcmlieis Irom the Ukrainian ap-parat. Bre/imev and Kirilcnkii are ethnic Russian v. although Brezhnev was born in the Ukraine and Kirilenko. wliokrainian name, in an RSFSR oblast bordering it "Ilir nationality ol tlieon the Politburo is not very significant In any case. They all belong to it Russified, or at leastappnrat. During llic early years ul the Khiushehev era these Politburo members at times seemed toolitical groupingommon policy orientation, but at leastvith theof Kirlcheukn (mm the Politburo, the so-called "Ukrainian clique" begin to break up and thereafter snowed little cohrSkin on issues After KhrucUhev's removal, ihc rivalry between Brezhnev and Podguniy. and Uter, lhe demotions of Poly jr.-sky and Shelest. lurther denx-nitratcd that the "Ukrainians" on the Politburo did notnited group. Alter long years away (rum theirpower base, most ul them bad developed new cunstitiHiieies ami allies
Today llu- "oldie" of (he "Ukrainians" operates largely on lhe social level, with littleinto politics. In (aet. reliance, un differing power bases in lhe Ukrainian Party often has created frictions rather than political compatibility among the "Ukrainians'" The livatry betweenand Brezhnev, anil tint between Brezhnev and Shelest had itiarlier factionalin the Ukraine, so that polities al lhe center has sometimes appeared loonrinuatksn of Ukrainian power politicsagnified scale
ThenitiaTly owing their positions not tn any qirola system institutionalizing Ukrainian representation on the Poliliburo but to theirt.es to Khiushehev or Bre/hnev. do not appear
to lepresenl tbe Interests of the Ukraine.except in Ihc matter of patronage, the fad ol heavy Ukrainian representation on the Politburo
does not imply special treatment or advantages for Ihe Ukraine. More significant is the fad lhat the First Secretary of the Ukrainian Party, who docs represent Ukrainian interests and answerskrainian constituency, has an ex officio place on the Politburo.3 the Party boss of tin-Ukraine has always sat on the Politburo. Al present One other union republic first secretaryull member of thc Politburo, but only the Ukraineeen regularly represented al lhat level on "bat appears to be intendedermanent basis.
The Ukraine is somewhat under-represented in the CPSU Central Committee, makingof the member* and candidate members elected at the Tsventy-fourth Party Congresshile lhe population of the Ukraine makesf lhe tolal Soviet population. Membership elected at fhe three previous congresses, spanning the period6adradual increase in representation for the Ukrainian Party, which reached its [teak at the 'fsventy-thirdal which the Ukraine providedicrccnt of thc membership. The fall in Ukrainianmay reflect in part the troubles of Pelr Shelest, ousted as Pint Secretary of tbe Ukraineut the discrimination ut thr Twenty-fmirlh Congress appeared to Ik systematic. While only tsvi'lse of lhi* twenty-five obkom firs! secretaries of the Ukraine were elided In the Cent nil Committee, all butof the sisty-flvc first secretaries of the Russian Rcpuhlic (BSFSB) obkoms andrepublics (ASSRs) were given seats.of Ukrainian ohla.sts appeared In be based on population or on the size of the oblast Partywhile RSFSR oblasts seen- represented regardless of thel their pirpulaliiim. Wiih the single exception of Ivano-Frankovsk, svhosc first secretary at tbe time was from Dncprod/crdiinsk. Brezhnev's hometown, all Ukiaiman oblasts with lessillion people were deniedThose oblasts withillion inhabitants svere represented by candidate mem-licrs. and those willsillion by fullYet forty-two of Ihe RSFSR oblasts and ASSRs represented on lhe Central Committee were "rotten" oblasts, that is. they had populations smaller thanillion seemingly required for Ukrainian oblasts. In addition,easured byopul.i.
6
lion standard oi liy the size of regional fattyhe Ukraine's re^ireierMation lagged In-hind that nl mcnt other non-Russian republics. Still, in absolute terms the Ukraine has not donearger percentage of Ukrainian obbu.li wereby full members on the Central Committee
than those of any other republic, except for the RSFSR* And the greater representation for RSFSR
oblasts may be due to the lacknion republic
party organization for the RSFSR rather than to
nationality considerations.
Mthough tin- Ukrainian union republic is under-rcprmnud on the Central Commitlcc.wntid Ethnicrn-idiercent of ihc Centralmembership, but9 percent of the Soviet population1 Thh is because, liesidcs the Ukrainians serving in Party ami government posts al the centerin theimbcr of Ukrainians have attained positions in other regions which merit Central Committee membership Ukrainians, like Russians arcey rnaiiagersal andositions throughout the Soviet Ithat ihey are not discriminated against.6 Russians ami Ukrainians were the only two nationalities to hold obkoin first secretaryships out-sule their own rr publics" Today al least eight ohknm first secretaries In the RSFSR and two in Kazakhstan are Ukrainians* Ukrainians appear to be mad interchangeably with Russians to bolster centra! control in Central Asia According to one SovuS ccwranc utatut. "in the eyes of the Kazakh, the Tiilur. the Kirghiz, the Turkman, or Ihe Uzbek, the Ukrainian or there lo an espial degreen except ton to ihis general lack of foim.il disttlmjnatlon are the prclerculialquotas of all-union universities. Theseviu Asian nationalities over Ukrainians and other Kuropc-ans ricvpl of course, for the Russians.
Wilhin their own republic Ukrainians arein several Oicupal tonal elites. Inexample, Ukrainians mack* uphe cmiiUlrnent in UkrainianihIci hall ol tha- scientists in thedoctoral
Party,1 fourteen nut of sixteen bishops were native Ukrainians."
oubtful lhal the heavy representation of Russians In key elites in the Ukraine is ihe result of dclihcialc polity as much as ileflection of the employment and edu< ition.il opportunities en-toyed by all urban residents. The Russians, largely concentrated in Ihe major cities of the Ukraine, reap these advantages to the fullest. Al the same time, in some cases the regime docs disperse Ukrainian elites throughout the USSR, wilh the avowed intent nf fostering theirbout one-fourth ol all Ukrainian professionab work out sule thekrainians living outside the Ukraine, who comprise one-eighth of the total Ukrainian population of the Soviet Union, may account for ihc hulk of those working outside the Ukraine Totent that the center does engageonscious policy of cross-prisling, this has the effect ofincreasing ihe opportunities which thecity dweller in the Ukraine would enjoy even under "free market" conditions.
I 1fact that Ukrainians have taken control of tin Ukrainian Party does not mean that theSSR has gained any significant degree ofautnnofny- As long as Moscow controlsand ilemolmns within the Ukrainian Parly, theitserving elite ratheruling elite As long as policy for the Ukraine is made by (he Soviet Politburo, whatever the career opportunities lorUkrainians,ollective they will lieet Ihr existence of the union republic government should not Ik* written off completely Like the nineteenth -century zemstto* it euuldthe nucleus around which an opposition to the central government could form.1"
III. RUSSIFICATION AND ITS fRUITS
A. The Brezhnev Voorstnitary Slate
C-UltC
lmi-
occurred. Scvti.il regional paily busses moved Io maximize ihcir authorityime when central vigilance was related slightly As thc leadership beaded by Btczhnrvusittoai al lhe center,oved! lo re-establish central hegemony over lhe hinterlands.'" By thche erosion ol discipline was arrested, and signsthai stfictur.it changes to reduce thc powers nt union republics further were under considi ration. Dumg Brezhnev's tenure thr- themes of eoonomicnon, the amalgamation ofies, and "Sovui patriotism" have beennd given point by the decision lo drawong-term economic plan foi Ihr period6
Brezhnev's major vtutcmcnl un nationalities policy xvas delivered at Ihc2 celebration of Ihe fiftieth anniversary of Ihe Soviet Union'sn this speech Ik- rapv dated his polKy tndogmas, not all of tbem new but all given new and authoritativehai the Soviet economynified, organic whole, that regionalpaiity has liern aerus-ved. that the "drawing tugithcr" of nationalities haseading lewl-incy. lainuneTitaiy by other official spokesmen onuei registers some disagreement, but shows an overall trendentraliring. Russifying pnliry
Bie/hnev fnrimilaled the economic rc-lalionshipof Ihe Soviet republics as follows;
Thr rrtw*iy nj ihrl jlol.il el throl rhr mln>ihul ItftMtmaIMUtttM ll tsu koiff sinceimml mi'jniun. finnml on ihel llu- omnium resmnntk sum ami Ii4iti-.li of allmliire. ami nutinnalihrs
The eiKiillary of eeononiic inti[dependence is re* gional speciali/attoti By advancing tinsie/hmserved notice to union republic leaders that elforts lo achieve regional economic autarky would not be Tolerated
*ll rt line lhai aiinrin ri iwilnnii ilrn-iilr.di'a-
lion Kjw jho torn priiiitttril Railt HfwMthr
ierf nimmii minaarmrot mum with mrnlirallieiimal iDoipelrinr, havli.unwr tmvore titan oiw unwin rrpuHli. in.-iy
iiiiilmul ihr sutheirHf ul rrrwhlu
b rases Khrushehrs-'s mIiomI trfftn*
.-Fad ikn efTect.Hstan
bone, ollii.jlb ui>ilnnpHJ.in Itic
direction
lso usincd lo signal anpreferential trentnM-nt for luck ward regionvof rvgairul ecsasomic dcveii|Mnettlstated goal of Soviet economic policy.
Although in practice this objective had ofteno lhe goal ofixing national economic growth, it had never been abandoned altogether. Thus, the eiglidi and ninth Five-Year Plans, spanning6avored some- ul thetial Am in republics at the eeprnee erf the mote (fsftus-Iriahred Western republics.ypical year in this rospeet. the RSFSR,tonia. and Latvia all retainedanercent ol thefrom Ihe lurnover las collected within Iheireveral iihs before lhe filliethan oilhnritalive article wiitlen by ftMigorny appealed which indicalisl thai new criteria would henceforth govern resource allocations, thai Ihcccoiiomic needs of individual republicsubordinated lu all-union interests .'"
Al Ihe fiftieth anniversary celebrationthis view He announced that since1cm of levelling the iciiihiiiik; developmentnational republics bad on the whole beenIhe government was now "able toquestions, first and foremost, fromof view nf the interi-sts of thc state a* afin- standpoint of raising thc eflKiency ofnational economy ul lheeninmaintained thai economic inequitiesrout of tlic Soviet natmnnhties problem Byforth ihc fiction thai regional parity hadattained. Brerhncv seas reinforcing his tb.it the had been
e was also attempting In cmlail lhe broker-
efficiency as (lie main crilrrlon for future invest-menl might haveetted lo redound to trie benefit uf the Ukraine. Bekmr.ua. and Georgiai ihe productivity of labor and capital mputi has griiwn most rapidly. Instead, more capital is ln-iiii' pumped into Ihc Eastern RSFSR. Highcontinues to he given to 'lie rlcs clnpmmt
l theWl. hnwevn.IKiiioil into csuactivr iiiiluslrin. whlili iliit litllr In nfiiinntr
theil HHliutry, lo ihr neglect of tiutil iie.ln.ri> and inajoi program In develop the nun-black-sod land of (hi* HSFSIt was ini ii' il This may reflect, Inlanner's preference for exploiting the vast natural resource base in ihe eastern regions, even at the toJ ofigh investment allocations, ratherolicy of deliberate discrimination against the Ukraine and other regions
nified economy may bewith yet another announcementthe draltew constitution, longworks but rarely mentioned sinceinaclc public before Ihe nest Partylorn ihe scholarlyconcerning poxsiblvn liond disclcisure. |irut>Osals
w-stc made for alts-ring adminutialive bmiKiarics lo match economic iaider lhan nationality hnev thusebate which has surlucccl [sriiodicallv sinceuggestion to this effect was set forth most explicitly in articles liy Cosplan official ViktotAn authoritative article3 written by Eduanleading theocctician on nationality malleis and deputy chic) editor ol KammunM. was more cautious but agreed th.il 'naturally, in some cases, as has been the- case in the past, because of, aboveume changes may be mode in Ihebctwun iminn republics' Me went on toIns reailrrs lhal "Marxists must not bisc their act tuns entirely and exclusively on tile iiatKMiul-lerrltoil.iriilielev in variousuggested that territorial units bused on ethnicere becoming ulssok-ti- or. ilieina lisvfy. uticonstitutional changes to makc imioii republic laws eimfonu mure closely In all-iiiilun legislation (wist PC. Sum nov railed for the cmnphte .iliolitiim of union repulilic "antononiy"
IVonuilaiy changes ninth igliuien Ij-lines nould threaten ihe power of local leaders. US well1 nationalice lout ecu-Irak/id Party adiimust rat ive in gamut tons that were evlablikbnl to control regionaluch as Ihe .hurtentral Asian lluic.iu and the Traits* Caucasian IWui-au. which Khnulcil in the. ran up ugaimt local vs-slnl mtercvt* TIw cnrrnit fc-aderslup svunld .qif.Mo.iili any such ih.mges stith tiuitioli
Definite actum has been taken, howevei, to re-strut the jurisdiction of regional governments. All-umon and union-republic minrstriei have iricreased in number and competence, while the trend has beeneduction of republicn tlti- past, the complexity of Soviet administrativeonfused web of overlapping jurisdictions, had given skillful local leaders some room forci The elimination of republic ministries, which are beer from central interference than union-republicvould clarify the subordinate position of local authorities
Formulas concerning the evolution of thehave also been manipulated to reinloree the centralizing trend In recent years. In theera the premise was propagated that aof "drawing together" was taking place, which would leadmerger" of all intmnulilis* Alter Khrushchev the concept of "merger" svus consignedistant future afler ihe worldwide victory of MXulrsm and emphasis was placedualsowering* and "drawinghich delicately balanced the concept ol assimilation and increasing uniformity with that of the freeol each nationality
These two prucetses had generally been treated as coequalhetherrawing together" or "draw together" through "flowering" had never been clarified But several articles2 seemed to argue thattogether" had become the primary tendencyandidate member of ihc l'olitbuio and head of the Belurussi tut Party, cankcl ibisfurther than anyone, by reviving the notion that "merging" was already taking place.that it was incorrect to assume that "merging" could take place onlyengthy stage ol de-velopmenl. he staled thai the tendency toward "merging" had acsjntrcd full scope, particularly in the ceorsoink- sphere "*
Moreioice* were heard asraula article by Hagramov. svhile noting lhat
n-iMbUM.il- UiO, In llie ii imldh .ohI il-1 -Sll ill nf Xliiilidis.
I,,- l.. 'mini.
"drawing together" was "iiicmislngly acquiring fundamentalerated "certain anlhors who arnurry Io lluow ihc national clement twerbuard as something that, Item theti standpoint, isneh more critical article inbcrstohttov criticl/cd those authors who "exaggerate the process of thesocial and eullnr.il drawingnd declared the theory that the "drawing together of thes beginning to play the decisiveI0 bene-sidedoncludingroadside al "some writers" who "leel that thefederal stnicturr has outlived itsherstobitnv informed them that "it is wrong to underestimate the significance of national
Al Ihc fiftieth anniversary celebration itself, Brezhnev steered clear of any talk ol "merger" but he clearly regarded "drawing together" as thetendency:
The I'd lli"t in bn&l the nilmm jri.l
country
in ubli'itivi'rtificially, thricnitnlira nnic lime, thr Parly
ipli In nMrjtiit thr
.lit...
in oimiiiitlalc iiilitiua
IC iiiilitii. int - il i il
Brezhnev also paid great attention lo lhe lhemenew historical community of people, the Sovietad emerged, nml implied the primacy of Ibis community over its constituent purls.
Since the fiftieth anniveisaiy most writers have followed Bre/hnevs linetressing "drawingwhile making no claim nf imminentagramov. for example, referred to "ihe ever closer thawing together ofut hastened tothat thc view of those who "displayed thelo make lhe merger among nations and the withering away of national differences part of the present" had "nothing in commoncientificladimir Zevln. deputy director of theof Marxism Leninism, wrote that la-nin'sthat socialism would "tremendouslythe coming together ofas coming lo pass."
In hue svith the subordination of "flowering" to "coming together" is the excessive praise of the Great Russians, so prominent in speeches in. In themutual help" of allreplaced the "older brother" theme as stock terminology, but this has changed.hrowbackhe Stalinist elevation of tbe Russians to "mentor" status, official spokesmen have indulged in paeans to the Russians' charily in providing spiritualeconomic aid. and cultural enrichment to then presumably interior "youngert the Twenty-fourth Congress Brezhnev lauded ihe Gre-.il Russians in terms reminiscent nf Slatms Inasi to the Russian people at the World Warictoryand regional leaders picked up this theme
There are even indications that neo-Shwophile ideals may he condoned by .some Soviet leaders Sincerudiliunal Russian nationalism has evidently attracted Large numhers of Russiansvho have used both samiztlat publiculimis such as Vladimir OsipOv's journal VVc'ic and tbe legitimate press, particularly Molorlmja Cvardiya. as outlets for their views. Ironically, ol Sovielit iskrainian by nationality, who is reputedly most syrripatheliC to conservativenationalism.0 he is reported to have instructed SovifCtikaifii Bfltsiija toavor-able reviewovel by one of the more extreme nationalist authors. Pravda respondedostile review of the same work, and Polyamky's conduct was reportedly nilirisedolitburo meeting.J* Although no other Soviet leaders of such stature have knosvn connections with Russian patrioticseveral reports have suggested the existenceightist nitionilist sncielyUxliim ffor the motlii-rlamri. existing within lhe l'aitv und corisisHrig of branches throughout the"
B. linguistic and Demographic Trends
One svay uf measuring the impact of Sovietpolicy on thend of evaluating Brezhnev's claim2 that the national"has lieen settled completely, finally, ami Inr good" is to suiVey linguistic und ethnic changes iu the cnnpositiim of the Ukraine's population
Tin- preservationational language is not essential for the persistence of nationalism (witness the ease of Ihe Irish without Gaelic, oi of Soviet
Jews. Ml ol whom speaknd ihrI uf Ihc Russian language owes mofe lo the similarity lirtwrcnd Ukrainian, and ihe relativeillkrainian can master Russian, atlo mnsde-ratiuns ofn inhangesiyaltics II.since Ukrainian dissident* haw made the use ofa .yinbol af Ukrainian llHl II, Ihe rateut -rf erosion of the language one mdicaln. ol ihc cvt.-iit nl Riissilieatinn
Al leant in ihe majni cities ol East Ukraine. Rus-slan iv replacing Ukruinian in public cuminmilcii-tion. Purty and military activities.ndairsiiiIikn Russian TraeckvPI tn Ihc Ukraine report that in sum. EmM Ukrainian title* Ukrainian is simply mil spoken inid thatls usearksocial inferiority The- Ukrainian. American lusloiiaii and tourist, though cviggeiutnl. is nut atypical:
i
rtrsra iliyi tne U>
e.rurptfe. -
Warheas-pinpa-in the
i-- m VnrV lhar. k'K- a.
TV must dramatic triumph for linguistic Hussi-ficution in rtCClM years has been in the aiea ol odtt-cation, nut surprisingly in view ofnrtrdin Ihis field Since5 Soviet sclioul law giving parents the choke of sending their children
cither to Riissiait-language schools or to Ukrainian-language sehnols. malricnlalion at Russian language schools has increased substantially Moreover, svhile Ukrainian r> an elective subnet in It its* tan tehools Kutsian is required in alliaiK and much of Ihe instruction is. in fart, comlurtid In Russian.
In general, the higher the Igwrf of education, ami the- more urban the area, ihe gicalci the use of Illusionedium of instruction. Unofficial if |KHls indicate thatew Russian stionghulds of the East Ukraine, notably Donetsk and Dnepiope-Irovsk, Ukrainian schools have virtually divap.s for theonetsk Uniw-*ity professor who lcll the Soviet3 asserted that at his university "all emirsc* were taught invov Universltv is reportedly following this easleni trend."
Even assuming that parentst for Ukrainian schools are not subjectedfki.il penalties ort is not difficult to account Inr tin-rc'lkiient al Russian schools. The primacy of Rus. sian at the universities, its widespread use lor um-versify admission exams, and the greater vocational oppoitunitiesussian-speaking child all pni-vide incentives. It is simply more convenient to atchool, and in smne cities Ukrainian schools appear to be so few in number that nn real choice exists. And yet. the acquiescence- ofin tins matter, so crucial to the fate of the indigenous language, tcslll'ic*rowing accept-
Russian Languagehe Uhramo3
as a
nl oocwUIOO olUera*-
SijeSnsis eaeaiutt^KooM
tguaga at rtaow- otRusso* tanjuaga Ox* stes ruaa-aits-dUuhi
"ERCfcNl
f
uf llic pi ivik-gtd status ol Russian at Um- "high"he hacua frawu ufirlith Ukiauuan being relegated to the statuslow" vrrnnciil.ti. Many cily dwellers look down upon the Ukrainian languageulgar peasant dialed.0
A Irrml Imvardless literature in Ukrainian has aim bt-coaite apparent in recent yeais Library holdings evidently oonsisl overwhelmingly of Ru-is inn-language, publications. Russian has also made inroads in other media
ore signilkant than the stains ol the Ukrainian language inainvnunkratioits are censusvhich indicale which language aof tlie Ukraine cSrsignates as his "nativeThe choice between Ukrainian nnd Russian for censu.esignation which must be viewed largely as an alfirmalion of nationalisore acciuate gauge of ethmt-iihiitiln.it.-ni than isincrrnmg the-ittu.il usage of Ukrainian or Russian.
krainians represented the largest share in absolute numbcis of non-Russians in the Soviet Union who gave Russian OS iheir mother longiand ranked second inmi iiaiisonnilIkiwk
that tin Ukrainian share oful,iiiun id ihe Ukraine has nn I hy Iss'u pi to ml age puintsS percent9ercent. and the Itosstau element in the Ukraine has risen in about th. same proportion (from9 percent toercent) There has alsomalln the percentage of ethnic Ukrainians who claim Ukrainian as their nalive language5 pri-ct nl4ussians and hngiuslically Russified I'kramuuis thus constitute aboul aof the total population of the Ukrainian SSR If these trends are projected. Russians and Unguis-tic-ally Russified Ukrainians in the Ukraine*uld constitutehird ol the population) -snd ivoold giow to almost half of theithin ihe nest fifty years. The birth rate ofand Russians rs about the same, therefore no" sttjulfk-aiitry alfrctmg thisMuch willon Ihe iate of Russian unguium into tin Ukraine. Inver one-third of the L'kiaiu-ians who claim Ukrainianative tongue alsoRussian fluentlyecoiul language.
Tl,
iCss ib cm I" ui luxomes in ul tin* Ukraine is broken ons, and urban-iiiral divi-is more cMensis'e in citiess somewli.il hem in
.inn uii an long yniuig
mi rthnk and linguistic- nllitiatmn" imciI vvlllt tautumhiiniWiW liaer u'clutft) Ihe valuethe rrmuiesBW.sr in*
beenin Ihn UuJv Otviull 0 ivmnses
I"iht lirarea af UenU. isviwlit-anll uilna reMlt-Bfs aura fSrcUircl's
ut jp-ieliii (turnittvrr il clilld's -
as slalril ui his paisrHiil al nci' It) unisl mln'cli- with tint of .it Irnal -iw pjirnl. faMnrtuenlly, a
-viaiM pcmwiaht) hr rr tut tin I iti.iiirr his
i-jiamalils Inorpuipines, W I i
K.iin hn trial
ih'ti rsira4knerson'treinuni-i.l his luitiorulity andin- batf-uts* as> telMiM -Im>ml his I'li'inim jmoliy. Inwil. (In muit* milussifUd Ukrainian ;i. u
I'Vi.unian il Innnslralnid In continui- leu-sinraman. andusskin il hp the nOn-r naml. ihr im
usitMi! I'll JUKI" as ihr lani-uBgr iJRun-fin*
l/kijunans. *nnr leiisus-tjlrrs askeium's "nalisc
rtiislielh theit- ij ime's iifllor ililv.-in Im Im li
saw "
Historically Russians in the Ukraine havein thecities, and IndusO*nl ol
the Ukraine's urban population is Russian,to fl percent of the rural prqsulatxHi OfIN perci-nl Haim Russian as theironnnaicd toU count.ui'. half ol the remainder' Miii-nlcompared louial Ukrainepopulation is growing rapidly, liolb inand lelnliserom 4fi perceni of theof Ukraine intoercentivision of the Ukraine mtu and 1rn*rsisls fam-
unably willin-creased assimilation.
Tlie census shows that the West Ukraine is much less susceptible lo Russian influence than the East
fuel thees Inr iirtinn I'ki.inii ani low, .slnivucis ilefiniUnnuiImii" Is iiiilleil
JjiiiTT
Jjih ii i
only- du Russians make unercent of the Western population; the Ukrainian populationmall proportionate Increase in the inter-ccnsal period, and the percentage ol Ukrainians in the area claiming Ukrainian as ihcir native tongue rose slightly (fromercent to overercent).
Subtracting the population of the moreWestern provinces, we find that the remaining population in thc Ukrainearger Russianercent of the population of East Ukraine) Further, the percentage of ethnicwho claim Ukrainian as the native tongue also drops slightly in East Ukrainehile roughlyercent of the remaining ethnic Ukrainians in East Ukraine speak Russian fluently.
I'ethaps more portentous lor thc future is thc tendency of young iicople to speak Russian more widely than iheir parents0 as many asercent of ethnic Ukrainians overO III lhe Ukraine spoke Ukrainian as their native language, compared toercent of those underet thiselatively small decrease compared to that of some- nationalities
If the thice areas of hraslcsturban areas, anil easternconsidered together, the degree of linguistic Russifrcationsignificant, especially ovet the long haul2 percent of ethnic Ukrainians residing in urban arras of the East Ukraine it-corded Russian as their unlive language; for young people Ihcwas doubtlessn addition, the Russian piesence in the urban arras ol East Ukraine is greater than in other areas of the union republic Ethnic Russian* constituteercent of the urban population of the East Ukraine lu the DrbstD aieas of (he Eusl Ukraine, then, the number ufRussified Ukrainian* and ethnic Russians combined umghly equals the number of unassiml-Liled Ukrainian* there.
Assimilation nl Ukrainians cannot entirely ar count for iIk* increase in the nunilrcs of "Russians" in the Ukrainem peculation of tbe IISFSlt3 percent9 andtin- Russian population ol llu- Ukraine- in-
io- Kiiai|i> an' icivrn imlv Uh tin-
creased by more than twice that percentage Part of the increaseesult of Russian migration into the Ukraine. The fact of Russian migration is not in doubt, but its dimensions cannot be preciselysince statistics on migration are generally compiled by union republics rather than byines
According to the census,80eople moved from the RSFSR to the Ukraine,rom the Ukraine to the RSFSR. Almost hall of the RSFSR migrants settled in thc heavily Russified Donetsk-Dnepropetrovsk area Almost certainly, the rriaiority rsl thesefrom thc RSFSR were Russian Statistics available for the city of Kiev, for example, indicate thatercent of those moving to Kiev Irom the RSFSR were Russian, whileen rut of those moving from Kiev to the RSFSR were Ukrainian According to one Soviet statistician, one million Russians moved into the Ukraine during the inter-censal period. At the somekrainianattested to "an annual planned voluntary resettlement of famihe* and individual* f'om ihe densely populated Ukrainian regions to otherof thc USSR According to one unofficial report over two million Ukrainians were resettled in this way7ut this figure may he high. Although most of Ihe movement out of the Ukraine is probably due more to socio economic factors than to nationality policy it has the clfcci of increasing the Russian iwcsence in the
Another index of assimilation is the degieelietwren Russians andthe Ukraine One Soviet publicationover one-fourth of all marriage's inarehigher percentage than incscrptvia According tocrcenl of Ukrainianurbannelrural areas, ale
mixed, and the number of mixed mariiages in lhe
13
IjlH
has quadrupled in less thanhat scant published data concerning housingexist do not indicate that Ukrainians and Russians in Ukrainian cities live in segregatedbarrios '"
C. Modernization and Russifieation
Tu the extent that Russifieation ol thc Ukrainian population has taken place, this process probably owes more to long-range forces of social mobdiza-tiou than to the moie direct efforts of Sovietto combat nationalism. Urbanization,ion, and standardized education arc centripetal forces in the Soviel Union, as elsewhere. They tend to foster increased mobility and contacts between different nationalities, and the adoption of unifonn cultural, economic, and political forms. In an era of improved communications, the use of Russianodern-day Latin, though not its adoption as alanguage, is dictated by practical necessity. And thc resident of Kiev, be he Russian orhas more in common with other urban dwellers regardless of nationality than he does with thefarm peasant.
The impact of modernization, however, cuts both ways. Thc integration demanded by modernmay in turnearningeturnore distinctive, independent, and narrowJust as fumiliaiify may breed contempt, nationalism can become more potent when twolive in close proximity, each regarding ihc otherhreat. Thus, while urbanization may ultimately undercut Ukrainian nationalism bynational differences, it mayoreeffect of aggravating ethnic conflict by sharpening awareness of those differences. TheUkrainian dissident is an urban intellectual of peasant stock, the person best placed to observe thc kullurkami>f. The protests of Ukrainian nationalists in thc cities aTe in part provoked by the very success of Russification, by the gradual assimilation of Ukrainians, the demeaning of the indigenousand the competition for |Obs between Russians and Ukrainians. Il is no accident that the major cities of the Ukraine. Ihe spearheads of Russian penetration, are also centers of Ukrainian
Like urbanization, mass education hasUkrainian nationalism liy stirring into action classes which formerlyassive part in political life, and by augmenting the sir* of the intellectual elite, the only group capable ofnationalismoherent ideology andleadershipationalist movement Thus far. nationilist dissent has remained largelylo the "buinanislle" or "literary- intelligentsia, and continued ascendancy of the scientific-technical intelligentsia may spell more rapid Rirwilicarion The existence of thc union republic government, however, has provided administrative experienceative elite, and lhe economic modemi/ation of the Ukraine7 has giveniversified social structure with the potential for self-rule and sclf-suffieiency.
IV. NATIONAUST DISSENT IN THE UKRAINE
Twice in this ceiiliiry nationalist Ukrainians have taken advantage ol Russia's Involvementin Id war to try lo break away from Russian domination bach time il was their tnishwlunc lhat circumstances led them, however reluctantly, to turn hi thestate tor succorfter lhe Bolshevikhort-lived lndcpendcnl gosfrnmcnf. the Rada. was set up In the Ukraine, but this university-inspired. German-backed independence movement failed to win widespread popular
any Ukrainians welcomed lhe German invasion, believing Ihul evenule svnutil lie less oppressive than thai ol Stalin, and hopelul that llitlei would ultimately |veimll the creation of an independent Ukrainian slate Although sonic Ukrainians continued to collaborate with Ihe Nazis until the end. the brutality ol live Nazi occupation disillusioned the greal trollhe population, many of whom tame lolague on-bufJi-your-huuses approachasonry nfhe West Ukrainian area would hive pictciicd thc establishrnenlovereign Ukrainian goveriinvcnt lo either the Russian or Ihe Cerman occupation. Thc organized Ukrainian resistance, which included both the open military-like formations of lhe Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UFA) and secret mrmhers nf the Ukrainian underground or Organization ofNationalistseached an estimated peak strength0 In addition, partisan bands ol
14
TjftJeeffT*
guerrillas formed in llu- countryside to light both Russian*Germans. After (lie war armed re-
jliljni i (tMllilllUxJ mi a small III I 0 oc
later.
Ukrainian notional Km today is far removed from that of World War II. No. organized national groupun following ha* existed since the routing ol the- UPA and OUN. During thend eailyumlier of Mscssinnist groups ap pcurcd lii'ielly in Westint tliey seem to have represented the* dying gasp of the wartimeratherew nationalist movement Ahhough tliise tiny kinds of militants drewid virtually nothing in the way ofaction to implement their oblcctlves before being rounded up. tried, andto labor camps.
In theissent seems tu have takenesv character. Dissidents since then have been leu organized and more fragmented, lessand more open, less single- minded in their quest foi national sovereignty and more variegated, less militant but peiliaps more giographicarly Dissent his bevu iiauilestcil )ti ,eu Hesitations, and pet it torn, as well as in lhe- less risky outlet of literature and history suiting Most of the protests appear to have taken place largely without planning Dissident journalist Vyacheslav Clioniuvil contended that the inapirity ol.in-ilt lhe time of the Moscow trial ol the wi iters Audio Stnyavsky and Vuly Daniel, "sure not acquainted with one another anil were not in any wayissidents have, huwess-r. collaborated in Such enterprise* as petition campaigns for tin- release of political pil-ainrrj Leading dissidents In major Ukrainian cities do maintain some communication, especially between Kiev andut to dwell on these fleeting con. tacts is lu create the misleading impressioiiiiispnatiiii.il network with cells in various locales.
aufassVili
III Umf-rr> tar thr lahnjim ul tV Ulnmr mOI'VI' .
Ih* Vliaiinao Workers1 ami'lium, in Lvov,
he fawitiittce m sJNK
n Lvsw.
W tH.atp.-n Ps.lu-al Front UM ISIBT). im
lanhw,
iSI Ttm Ueinmi.iti. Vmkm ml.
In udditioii to the fesv uilelleciuals ss'ho base cast their lot svith open dissent then- are large number* of "establishment- intellectuals who sympathize with nationalist vicsvs in varying degress Since the limits of tlie permissible expand andccordanee with the changing political situation, the line separating these quasi-dissidents Irom the open dissident* is hard to draw
A. Geographical and Sociological Breakdown
West Ukraine, with Lvos- in lhe- lorefruut, makes up the geographic homeland ol UkrainianThe natioitallxl movement olI was centered in Calicia. All but one of the nationalist or-gani/at ions in theverr cunftmd to West Ukraine, and many ofnside sit* else where in the Ukraine, particularly those in Kiev, are ol West Ukrainian origin oi have spent some time there The mosl recent ire up of universlly-centerrd rutionaliuu also occurred in West Ukraine, where23 scores of university students and teachers are repoited tornsstisl ur subjected to other reprisals in Ls-ov, Ivano-Fran-kuvsk. and Ternopol. Over Ihe last Isvcnly years known arrests iu West Ukraine 'or dissident aclivi lies or views oulnumberbe much more heavilysl Ukraineatio of at least three tu one" InUOS, however, the"movement" appear eel In revive in the Fast Ukraine, mainly in Kiev andities, lml also inand other cities in the south. Dissidents in the East Ukraineenerallyess virulent form of nationalismby the writings of [van Dzyuba. literary critic and author of frtrerrHVicuu'lnri orJie--i'. than tbe svceaslimnit sanely spawned in West Ukraine.
'in IO logical bl'll.' I,
re veals, noteavy pripoudeiance of writers, linguists, hiitori ins. journalists.t)nd lawyers Although inost ul the more visiblebelong tu Ibis literary ur "humanistic"their dominanceprobably not as great as is the case with dissent in Russia. Ausong Ukiam-im dissulcsits are man>he scientific technical intelligentsia, whose opposition is mors troublesome for Soviet authorities. Mcinlms of lhe
scientific-technical Intelligentsia comprise aboutourth of Mio'm arrests during tlic last twenty years.
Perhaps even more alarming lor the regime are sign*ationalism among lower strata of theA great fear uf the central authorities may be that, at some period of great strain for the gov-crninent. such as military attack by China or ael niggle among top Soviet leaders.intellectual dissidents couldescrvuii ol latent mass discontent. Tbe Ukrainian dissidentsotential weapon their Russiando not, since in ihe Ukraine the normalgrievances of the population mayy popular resentment of Russian domination.
Il is difficultnow whether the peasantry would rallyuture Ukrainian nationalistin time ol crisis in Moscow. The peasantsere not willing to light for ihe' Ukrainian Rada but this may have been because the new gosernrnent did notrogressive land reform. Duringthnic conflict between Ukrainians and Russians was at times reinforced by class conflict The peasantry of East Ukraine suffered greatly during collect it ir.it>ou. and many Ukrainians felt, rightly or svrongly. lhat1 On svai directnl against them asnationality as much asarticular class. During World War II Ihe peasants of Wesl Ukraine gave their support lo the activities of separatist groups there In East Ukraine, however, although the Ukrainian underground attracted large numbers of the intellectual rlite. they were leaders in search of an army The peasants remained urxornmitted. although many leaders were sous ofV1ITlie strength ol active Ukrainian nationalism todayppeais lo Ik in tlie cities.
Workers compriseourth of thosefor nationalist activities in the last twothisroportion mainly because they played an important role in ihe more militant nationalist organiiaiwns ofndoreew reports have surfaced of mass protests even in Eastern Ukrainian cities, involving tvurkrrs ami others outside the narrow confines of the intelligentsiaM The largest suchwo-day notationalist com-plealou, tool place in Dncprotlxcrzhimk in June
ew months later in the same nblast. inajor strike is reported to have broken out On both occasions the police resorted to gunfire lo disperse crowds ofssde from these presumably spontaneous revolts,ew occasions workers have engagid inprotests with political as esell ns ecsinnnue objectives.
There areew instances ol inrmhrrs of tbe intelligentsia acting in coniunction evtlh thr svorkers. thus breaking through class barrierschieve the elusive "union with the people" ever sought by the estrangedrc-rcvo-lutionary days. Some of these occasions have been relatively innocuous affairs, ins-olving such things as public readings of Ukrainian poetry Othen have been more serious, particularly tbe annual commemoration of tlie transfer of the body of Tans Shevchcnkii. the Ukraine's great nineteenth century poet, from Russia to the Ukraine. Thesehave takenievnd involve hundreds of people. With theof an8 petitionkrainians, which contained Ihe signatures oforkers have not participated inunprotesting arrests and trial* nf iliseulenls. Generally speaking, nationalismorescicms nle-ology is confined to tlie intcDigrnteia
B. Grievances of tbo Disaffected
Intellittual dissidents in the Ukraine do not divide neatly into distinct groups but there are two basic ciwrcuts nf ihr "inoseincnl OneIh vl rrprcscntid until his1 byuba.ew generation ol nationalists, who are not anti-Soviet but merely anti-Russian or, as dissident philologist Mykhayloet it, "notsbut pro-Ukrainian" Somr of the Ukrainians of this stripe such as
ruloit un>>ii.ilh iliis-eleil
.11 . on
.nswvkm' mmo) organ-frd inriuLU'l
1 priaaanbsnet rOMlmoat. tm cksl a
n-srM the pel'lm persnn fr> , Moscow. Th* st-iiakm nportrdl. MrtSkrd Irom Iheli meeting svilh lauinrrsall poster in Ini -in ui-.. ilililtnii;i
lniMnrjit
Wot Oryubo. diltido-st author ol Inletnotk>"ol>im or
lawyer Lev Luksanciiko and (Oumarist Mykhaylo Osadehy. art formci Communist Party members, and most of themarxist orientation.ule. they embrace Communism, nothudicd in lire furri-nt regime,n ideal form which tiny associate, ourrrctly or incorrectly, with Leninroup of Dnepropetrovsk petitioners iurotected tin- persecution ot "honestih-ssjttsl lo ihecsuseof lite construct ion! ami Chornovi! wrntr Irom labor camp lhatave always firmly adhered to lhe prin-eiples ol sueialism and continue lo don0 opening issue of the lar-alnian fferald. tlw Ukrainian counterpart of the Russian immtxaol* |oiunal Khrvnika, announced lis polity of notmill mi; any tsocurns titv itami Communist"
I.-iiiil.iiiM.'Ii *tI'll HifliinilliIiijIiiii- Ihr Ull Iron v> nimlyi'tK
or "anti-Soviel* (defined in its original sense as "opposition to densocratrcally-esected councils.in
Like Ihc wing of Russian dissent represented by Roy Medvedev, these Ukrainian dissidentsto use Lenin against the regime, lothe aulliorities for failing to follow their own prophets Also like Medvedev, many of them claim to believe that the present system is redeemable and can reform itself from within. For this reason, their criticisms may be more insidious andcertainly they make the authorities' time-Isonored propaganda line against nationalism look dated. To Ihc authorities lontention thatare. by definition, "lackeys of the Interna-tiouathe dissidents counter that those who are being tried as "bourgeoistoday are not survivals from the boiugcuis past but "young people who grew up under the Soviel regime, were educated in Sos id scbooh.universities and in theeople who do not remember thc bourgeois system."'*
While defending the ahslraet right of the Ukraine lo secede from the Soviet Union, these dusidents make dear lhat they do not adsocate the exercise of this right. Most of lhe dissidents were bom in, too late to Ik- involved in the violent nationalism of World War II days. Dissociating themselves from the OUN. they keep their protest svithin legal boundaries and purportedly aim merely at the restoration of the Ukraine's legal rights under the Soviet constitution. Trying to legitimize hisDryuha insisted lhat "nobody in the Ukraine advances (lie slogan of 'independence' today "M
As is of ten Ihe case wiih Soviet dissidents who criticize (laws in then own systemocialist standpoint, many Ukrainians claim lo abhor thc efforts of Westerners tu utilize their criticisms for "Cold War" purposes Library critic Yevhciityuk. regretting tliat his name was "shresvdly picked up by bourgeois propaganda in thexplained his quandarv at his trial.
l myself IMlweriiliru. and imti-.u!hxiii< illpiinlv In Ihr cphric if lite >pirilu,illiif>ti-ri'i uf out-r|plrs>l> Imaine rhr
ol thriimb
Such prutj ares sincinlv. butthe tciidc-nc-y- in rccenl years has been for
Ukrainian dissident! In lay stress un the limited ami patriotic nature of their aims.
Because ol the bad connotations of thc word "naany dissidents have tried lo turn the tables by arguing that it is not Ihey. but lhe Rus siam. who are nationalists They- protest lhat they are no more nationalistic than was la-nin. who al times advocated national equahly a< llu- only basis for true internationalism, and blamed Russian chauvinism for stimulating minority nationalism. "If there is noissident literature teacher Mykhaylo Masyulko stated, 'there is no: Chornovil. loath to accept the nationalist label, argued al his trial that one need notationalist to protest illegality:
I did not dwell on list national It lei tHiestiunmyThehaiallofiallsl) has bernsolily on thr hatM. of lhe factroir 4bout violations olmrnllted in theMami - tom*-
in. ii mhal kind ol .Lv -' I far
TansbosuB oan*-*
imilar vein, Dzyuha maintained lhat he had nu quarrel with sincere internationalism, butthe "internationalism" which servesovet for Itusslficatiun and exploitation.
TV-c hr -ol
the rohtrarf who has tntrdof want to kuvd tsrt>.Inalrad. hrib ta the' ul tt* victim
Iaratc "mine" andowowun1 lose fix another people orunt thnt wr wait) ilia) people to be ilirll and not similar. wv want toIt tndeprn-Jenl and equal an Hid* and brndrail ol oursel-res.*'
Dzyuba and those of his persiiasion. matchingwith tactical moderation, have been inclined to Concentrate their activity in literary and scholarly fields, generally refraining from overt actions to provoke the authorities v'
A more traditional current of nationalism, long concentrated in lhe West Ukraine, lends toward rnore radical and nplkitry political actions directed tosvard the nealmn of an independent Ukrainian stale.omewhat toned-down version ofid of nationalist thought can lie found in the writings of hisiori.ui Valcntynotto he Marxist, Mom/ coirics closeondem*
Voltntyn Moroz. ihfl Ukraine's most celebrated political prisoner
nation of ths1 Soviet system in toto lie discusses the allcgcd campaign lo obliterate Ukrainian identity in terms of lhe Stale compulsion allegedly pervading all areas ul Soviet life, and stilling all stirrings ol individuality ami rsoncooformity. Motor recognizes the value ul pragmatic dissidents >vho "make idtum official sptwhes" in order to aid the cause bytheir positions and "boring fromut hehe leaders of lhe dissidents shouldigher road When Dzyuha partially recanted hisvx9 in order lo avoid official persecution. Moroi chastised him for actingapitulatotM Moior's long and nearly suicidal prison hunger strike indicates thi' lengths to which he himself would go beforeompromising statement.
Even those dissidents who have openly favored the establishmentovereign Ukrainian state have not sanctioned the usere. Thane tried in the so called "case of the junvts"o secessionist agitation but stated lhatmethods were neither used nor contemplated.
During ilit- siKtlex Ihc more mock-iate' Marxist
o bf III (he 11 - Thc
f ihe Bredine* period however. rru> have broughteturn to the morend radical variety. Recent leaflet! rrpoit-edly circulating in the Ukraine in protest ofmprisonment call for an independent Ukraine which "may well remainut "must not remain Soviet, for that is menvnonyrn for absoriHiim into Russia- The dissidents circulating Ihese leaflets rqiortcdly stated their intention of lurming "an action-orfentedeall Ihe same lime, the UJruirUnn Herald, sup pressed for over two years, has reappeared under new and more aggressive editors who haveallstruggle for national
Their ideological and tactical diflerervces haveress-uted Ukrainian nationalists from cooper at inttfher. in much Ihe same manner that Sakharov and Sol/henitsyn minimized their dil lercnces in the faceommon enemy.zyuba appeared atrial to testily In his behalf, shortlyoroz had subjected Dzyulioimsly "realistic" approach to scathing criticism Nor ilo the dissidentsule appear to shun con-locts svilh foiiner UPA memlieni. many ol whom were released fioin labor camps inccording to one report, "the general attitude of the ihsvidents is lo 'embrace' Ihese peuple ui theirvan Ssitliehny is known to have bcfru-iidcsl one such former leader, and Dzyuba icpoitedly planned to assist Ihe education ul another's son Only one prominent dissident, renowned literary crKk and translator Svyatoslav Karavansky. was active in the World War II armed nsixlancc. his funnel activities have not prevented Chornovil and Others fioin coming loefense, even svhile they are careful to point nut that they do not excuse bis pasl
Wlnle Ihe dissidents disagree sm tactics and on lung-rangeunliei ol grievances an- ii iiegularly by dissidents ol lioth camps
IV*- lt-nl-.l- vf
laBBSS ol ttir UllHn,1 mJili-ls thai bom IhV ditMitmli Ssiaitd admit opriill
ii.iai1 liiparallsl iiriMiiiialiiui. thut
milium Ktilliliiiii.l >ii<hllii-it iiiti-tillnii.
Aside fram the controversial issue of political in-de|iendrncc for the Ukraine, the most common grievances, in order ul the attention given them by petitions and tamiafaJ writings are
olicies orumotmg the linguistic Rusiilka-tion of the Ukraine. These draw the heavu-st cnlicisiu. seemingly mil ol proportiun to tbeimportance ol Ihcighof dissidents are philologists and students id Ukrainian literature, ssho have made Ibe use id Ihr nativeadge of Ukrainian uh-nlityational state which could be glorilied as the carrier of the Ukrainian ethos dues not exist, Ukrainian nationalists look to theirto perform this functiuii.
it) Cultural and political oppression mil related lo purely Ukralman matter* illegal indicia! proceedings (this because many of the ps-titions are protesting arrests and (rialshe general lack ol civil liberties, the stand ardi/atlmi and unifomilty allegedly imposed on all areas of Soviet life, the pervasiseness of 'Stalinist" modes of brhas-lor in tbe bureaucracy. Ihe vacuity of intellectual life. Moru/ writes derisively of the "empire ofhwriHisiloe fromorrowing the titleine-teeiilli>centuiy Russian novel ridiculing theof critical or independent thought, and Sversytuk ol Ihe "sensuous, physiological mate-nalism" which makes Ihe "routine fulfillment of Ihe monthly and annual production plans" the end-all of human existence, and of the dulling nl ihe intellect by "the soothing talk about wirier, ballet, and outer space"1"
he lack ol minority rights, especially the lack of Ukrainian-language schools, tor iheof Ukrainians living outside the Ukrainian SSR.
(A) The transfer ot Ukrainians, especially those with scientific knowledge or technical skills, to Siberia, Kazakhstan and other parts of the USSR, ami the settlement of Russians in the Ukraine ltil.it.il to Ibis grievance is the complaint that Ukrainiansmlern vanoux oc-coiKitional elites within thrii own union republic
epression ol Ukrainian culture. Thisphysical acts of destruction, such as the
n)t"
tearing down ol Ukrainian historical monuments, and the "accidental" burning ul old churches and libraries, rich In hislorKal documents, as well as the distortion of Ukrainian history in scholarly works, and the ban on publication of thc works of many Ukrainian niisttccnth-century historians
Economic exploitation of thc Ukraine liy thc IISFSH, and cuccssivc ccntrali/ation oldecision-making.
Poor living conditions and wages (or workers and peasants. While economic grievances arc central In thc most recent strikes and disorders among workers, ihey receive scant attention in the writings ol tbe intelligentsia. Severalhave tailed lor an end to passportwhich restrict the movement o( collective farm peasants Vasylormer Party member connectedmall dissident group, the Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants' Union, criticized Ihe oppression of the peasants, "whose position did not differ at all from the position of theissident Anton Koval9 called for increased wages and consumer goods for the lower-paid, and Horyn looked forward to the day when tbe economic fate of the peasants would be "in the hands of the collective iarm peasantsuch demands are surprisingly few, despite the lower class origin of thc bulk of Ihe intellectual dissidents and mutt make their brand of nationalism less attractivehe masses
(S) 'Die lackkrainian national militia
Implied In all these demands are tsvo more-general desires: the desire for greater individual freedom, and Ihe desireion of aulhority in alland cultural.
C. "Establishment" Intelligentsia ond Nationalism
The importance of these desires ol the dissidents is enhanced by the fact that large numbers of "establisbrnr-til" inti-ll-ctual' in the Ukraine share them, in greater u* lesser degree, and oiler Ihe active dissidentsmuch support as ihey consider possible without endangering iheir own careers. Tbe most notable group of these liberal intellectuals
are lheihrMytlelyatnyky ur men ol tberoup of Western-oriented,nil sometimes nationalist poets who werein bringing about an "awakening" of Ukraui ian culture in Ihe sixties Included in this group svere some, such as Diyuba and Svitlychny. who eventually went laeyond lhe pale Mi their criticisms of tin regime lo hcc-ixne outright dissi-dcntx The greatest ol them. Vasyl Symchieved such popularity that after his earlyhose not to anathematize his svork. hot tried instead tn neutralize ils effect by playing dmvn it* nationalist content. Today Ivan Diuch is perhaps the best example of those in the group who, like Yevtushcnko in Russia, temper their criticism and choose "safe" themes in order to keep out of trouble Many others have avoided arrest but have lieen sub iected In other reprisals and hase hail difficulli getting their ssorks published
Although the ih&ydetyaini/ky were attacked in lhe press2 on, their influence remained strong among Ukrainian intellecluaU. Some from this group were arrestedut atkrainian Writers' Congress their sup-poiters dominated the proceedings, making open pleasesitalization of Ukrainian culturalestoration uf national dignity, and aof the Ukrainian language, affirming that "while we are interrxationslists we always remain Ukrainians*"
New rationalist trends also appeared inn another medium, thc scriting ofew historians, among (hem Fedor Shcvchenko, long time editor of the Ukrainian Historical journal, dared to emphasize Ihe unique features of Ukraine's past, and argued that Communist culture need not be "boring, despondently uniform, lackingethnographical and other varieties andBtought into question were sarsetified canons of Sovyrt historiography, such as Ihe "friend ship of peoples" theory, according lo which lhe Cossack bet man Bogdan4 lieaty with lhe Russian slate is seen as havingoluntary union of the Ukraine and Russia, and lhe nationalist [met Taras Shcvchenko is porltayed as an admiring "younger brother" of Russian radicals like Nlkolny Chcrnyshcvsky.
Jjll
OUn Horvchor. Chairman ol Ihe IHiralnian Writers' Union Under Shahm
Ot ihe rash ol monographs and novelsIhe orthodox Soviet interpretation ol theKicvan period and ihe later Cossacl period, several were written by well-established writers Death In Kiev by Pavloember ol (he Ukrainian Writers' Union hoard, portrayed the lifeedieval Kievan princeavorableovel by Oles Honehar. Chairman of theWriters' Union, became the targeta km ideological campaign8 The novel. Sohor or Cathedral. Iiewailed the fate ol an old cathedral vlalcdestruction in the name ol "progress"arty official The cathedral was clearly symbolic of rural and traditionalnd reviewers MSenti-fied Ihretallurgical town on theenter ol Russlocation in then Ihe subsequentumber of
Honchar's supporters were expelled from Ihe Party or dismissed from theirbul Honchar himself commanded enough support in the Writers' Unioo and in the Party to retain the chairmanship until ihe Congress ofi which he continued to express regret that many readers were losing contact wilh Ihe Ukrainian language, "lhalfragrant language whose beauty and wealth evokes the admiration of the Russian and all other fraternalhe annulment of hisreportedly evoked an outcry from Ihe assembled writers.
Even alter the Honchar case, worksimilar message continued to be published, sometimes by people with un por! ant official positions2 Nikolayormer ideology secretary in Zaporoihc oblast.istory of theian Cossacks which allegedly glamorized Cossack leaders who fought the Russians, and even used the term -foreign rubble" lo refer to the latter3 Ivan Bilikovel in which he stressed the antiquity and Western roots of the culture and ethnic make-up of ibe medieval Ukrainian stale of Kiev Rus.iographyossack hctman written by Volodymyroung writer from Dnepropetrovsk, allegedly embellishes!historyike manner "
Another instance of friment amongintellectuals was the case of Vitaly Shelest" Son ol Party Secretary Pelr Shelest. and deputy director of the Institute of Theoretical Physics in Kiev,0 heiscussion on Ihe state of scientific research in the Sovietjoying vt idesprcad backing in the scientiliche advocated increased funding lor basic research ami exchange programs designed Iocontact with WnWm scientists Vitaly She-lesl's proposals were rrilicirrd in the Ukrainian press, and he stopped publicly propagating his views1 With his fathers ouster, hr lost his povilinn
D. Contacts with Eoitern Europe ond the Wosl
Ukrainian dissidents have several other sources of potential supportesson from the Jews. In recent years tbey have incivascd their
UTT
to bring external pressure to bi.ii on Soviet authorities. In the course oi the recent campaign to obtain the release of Moroz from prison, for example, several appeals were made to international organ! fat ions. Ukrainian dissidents commandlike the widespread attention in the West enjoyed hy Soviet Jews, but the government of Canada, whicharge and influential Ukrainian population, has interceded on occasion on behalf of beleaguered Ukrainian intellectuals. Johnanadian Communist of Ukrainian extraction who lived in Ihe Ukraine35 wrote an expose of conditions there which prompted the Canadian Communist Party to send an officialto the Ukraine7 to examine Kolasky's allegations The delegationamning report of Ms own the following
More important are the nearby populations of Eastern Europe, always sympathetic to minority strivings against Russian hegemony. Il was the sense of common subjection to the Russian yoke that impelled Karavansky to5 appeal tonforming him of the persecution of Ukrainian intellectuals, and urging fraternalbetween lhe Ukraine and East Euiopean countries The Ukraine has maintained close cultural relations with Poland and more especially with Czechoslovakia The fact lhat many Westspeak Polish or at least understand il facilitates communication. The Polish strikes0 areIn have been widely discussed by workers in Lvov.
Thc Ukrainian population of Czechoslovakia is concentrated in the Prcsov region of East Slovakia The presenceearby group of Ukrainians with relatively more cultural freedom has made Soviet authorities uneasy, as can be seen by Ihe fact lhat authorities have forbidden Soviet Ukrainians from subscribing to Ukrainian publications from Poland or Czechoslovakia, although Czech or Slovakhas been permitted. This prohibition proved an ineffective barrier to communications lielvvecn the Ukraine and Czechoslovakia Ukrainian broadcasts from Radio Presov were beamed into tin* Soviet Union evenS, and Presov Ukrainian loumals und newspapers were routinely smuggled across Ihe border.on is reported lo have
regularly received Duklt/a. one such publication. Thc Presov publications provided an outlet forUkrainian writers lo publish articles which they could not print in ihc Ukraine. Some Ukrainian intellectuals, notably Rosiislav Bratun. editor of Hhovltn, the organ of the Lvov Writers" Union, had long advocated closer ties with Ukrainian writers in Slovakia. Bratun secma lo have had backing fromone liar. After Ihe Soviet invasion of Czecboilovakia tbe editorial board of Znenten came under attack."
During Ihe Dubcek liberalization in tlie spring and summer. when Ukrainians within Czechoslovakia were striving to achieve increases! autonomy. Ukrainian officials evidenced increased nervousness about ideologicaln late8 "Ukrainian Dityx" were held In Slovakia The Ukrainian Parly could hardly avoidelegation, which the Slovaks arc reported In haw received almost as if they were emissaries from an independent state' The Sosiet press generally toned duwn Czechoslovak statements about the celebration, bul an article Inraina. entitled "Friendship and Brotherhooduoted from Czrchoalosak press releases covering the slot of theollowingravda article in July, written by Aleksandr Botvin. lirsl secretary of Kiev city Party committeeenounced "decadent pettybout Ihe necessitytion' and libera Ural ton' oftated that "tlie efforts of tome writers and artists toexpousl anti-Soviets" had Ihs.-ii "angrilyand iirneel that measures had been taken in Kiev lo "screen" and "segregate" lhe cadre" Dunn; this period the campaign against HonchaTs SoVmw was taking placeproper!rrivik. ami Botvins article alsohot at Hnnrhai
Ukrainian Firs! Secretary Shelest was an anient Pnlitbiiro advocate of invasion nf Czechnskivakra Heding ml. inulialions prior to the invasion, he was the only Soswt except lot Biczhnev who attended all live of the key Soviet -East European meetings in the spring and summer
thatcu me imunilC Ifltnofl Within the Politburo, reportedly the fear lhat the Czech disease might infect Soviet Ukraineactor
tag iTi
in hisccording Io Czech leader Srnrkovsky. Shelestparticularly upset with Czech leaders Ice allowing literature urging (heuf Transcarpalhia to Czechoslovakia tu cross the border iutu the Ukraine.'1 Matty reports also indicate that other members ol tbe old "Ukrainian clique" ou ihePudgorny. kuileiiko. amicame- down on the-side o( invasion. Their lamUiartty with Ukrainian conditions and (earlcct may have madeore aggressive.
Speakers at the8 plenum ul the CPSU Ce-ntral C'oinmittee included not only Shelest. but Iwo other Ukrainian PartyDeglyairv. Kiisl Seerctiiry o( Donetsk obkom, and Vuiy lluitsky. Kirsl Secretary of Trauvempathia obkiuti Iluilsky was notember uft' Central Commiltce; his position as party lassmall. rilalitdv ummpurtanl oblast would not normally have entitled bun to am significant role in the deliberation- Presumably be was in-eluded us an official from the region wherefrom ihe Czech liberalisation were being (eh most keenly, to buKtrr the case lot invasion. Ilnrtsky seam emergedajor advocate ofe wrote articles89 attacking the nostalgia id "somebody in the West" over "the pseudo-democracy of both Masaryk andnd noting thai "under the condition* of our burdert is especially important furo propagate ideas of proletarian international -ism" since "this oblast is vulnerable to foreign radio and TV.""
When lhc invasion came, one ri-poil indicatedo*tit miliiary truck was lirsd on before ennsmg tlic Ukrainian bordershusluvakia One ol the lirst acts of the entering Soviet army wase closing of tlie Prevnv radioery fesv prominent Ukrainian inlrlloc-IimIs coultl lie enticed to emdorsc the invasion jbiIiIkIv
E. Relations with Pulsion, Jewish, and Christian Dissenl
In tlie past Russian and Ukrainian dissiilvntv have not siNCeedcd vxey well in orchestral nig their iiilxisms of ihe rcglntr. Cooperation hriween the two groups has been impelled by tbe liaditional
relusal ul Russian liberals to lake Ukrainianseriously. Russian dissidents, many of them loath to regard ihe Ukrainianseparate nationality, have typically shown relnctancv tu sanctum thehl to sell-deter mi nation, arguing instead that the1 general alleviation ol government repression would eliminate thefrr of Ukrainian nationalism. Ukrainian(or their part, have olten defined their ciusade for Ukrainian rights nurnnvly. taking little intcrrsl in ihe all-umua struggle fur civil liberties In recent years altitudes on both sides have changidbut some distrust remains
One major wing ol Russian dissent, thatSlavophile" orientation, lends Io exclude the Ukraine from any nght to secede from ibe Soviet Union Vladimir Osipos. for example, has said lhat the non-Russian parts ol the USSR should be given up, but indicated thai these did not include thelovoiniziltit manifesto of the extreme Russian Rigid, complained olruly dis-proportional strengthening of Ihe mightiest of the' gioupings. thet the rxpcnsr of Ihe Russians, and called lor the annexation of large pcations uf East Ukraine by the RSFSR" Although Sol/henitsyn has drlendcd the Ukialniait* on occasion, his reported lack of enthusiasm about Ukrainian separatism has been exploited by the Ukrainian press. In4 LileraUnna Vkitiina disturtid his views bysuiting thatan "glorified" by Ukiairuaii nationalists, turned oul to be "an autocrat who legards 'Little Russian ravings' about self determination from the same positions as Katkov and
Igorissident mathematician close to Solzhenitsyn. resents the tendency of some Ukrainian dixsisicrrt* lo reduce ihe national problemingle formula of "colonial exploitation" by Ihe Russians According to Shafarevich:
Tile- basicl luliunal life in lb* USSR ais-
inevliable puxluct- Ills- leilpiiiill SOCialiO ideology
Thn ale<ilt>|ry is hostile "wry nation, ml a> II i>. eseiy traloruibl Heloua personalityhe
hIi of ats Rtrnfliwaa tnupm^nls riplmtntkei prs-ptr. but lis (ur-ia.trnd
inty is ihr maximum ilnt ruction ol all mlimis In im wmj do in* fvuwiam Miller fromhan oOir, peoplrs. Inl win ihry ss-lio recpisnlirst bins* fiom litis [ore*.
i(iiri'milvm.itiit*
7i*
Shafarevich maintains that in dealing wilh the nationalities question il is essential to go beyond Ibe assumption "that tbe creationovereign state for each people would provide nn automatic solution to all that peoples
Tlie currents of thought grouped together for the sate of convenience under the "Slavophile" or "Russian nationalist" label are actually quite diverse, however The emphasis some "Slavophiles" place on traditional and rural values couldmale them sympathetic to those Ukrainian dissidents who define thru national identity in similar terms.
Most other Russian dissident groups, when pressed, recognize the Ukrainians' right to national self-determination, even if only as an abstract principle. Roy Medvedev, for example,onstitutional reform settingracticalbyepuhlic couldeferendum and exercise lis forma) right to secede from the Soviet Union. "Oure insists, "mustompletely voluntary union of nations" At the same time, he asserts lhat he "would resolutely oppose Ihe departure of any of the republics from theainly on economic grounds**
The Ukiatnlam complain that few Russianhave any real desireee cxmcesskstis made to ihe nationalists The Vkiolntan Herald, "without denying the impoilance of Knronifca" (the major organ of Soviet dissent In theomplainedenornl neglect of the plight ol the minorities:
lui niihrr unilaterally andiiil* sr.inc?upranational or ill-union |ii<|fiul. whent is the peidoct of Hi;'sari (and possiblyari.
Tr.e i si r. nitI npnii ham the republics
are marked mthoufh fhrysupplraanCarr Id
rhe Qilf's as Vi-sto-
Wriling about Russian civil nglils' groups, the t'trciuicn Herald lamented lhat;
Nonehrsr oraaniMlmni had worked oul alor solving IhcciIion in Ihr I'SSH and none had ililrd its pmiUon on ruilional de-rnands.ll [minion uhtamrcl is that thein llveut gioopi. wlille aiming al very radical (haiiRrt In manyof usm.iI III*.one oVpwln- status quo no Ihr natmrul ijveitttn
In addition, relations between Ukrainian anddissidents were reportedly strained by3 trial of Russian dissident Petr Yakir. Yakir. who talked rattier freely during bis interrogation, reportedly gave the KGB information aliout his contacts with Ukrainians, which helped the author-ities buildca.se against Chornovil."
In general, however, dissidents of all stripes have tended to close ranks and act in concertyears. Tbe Ukrainians have some mnlacts with dissidents in Moscow, particularly with Sakharov. whoriend of Ivankrainian literary critic and leading dissident. Sakhiirov's Human Rights Committee has issued several appeals on behalf ol beleaguered Ukrainian dissidents, most recently in defense of Moroz Svitlichny and another Ukrainian al tended the trial of Hussian dissident Pave) Lilvinovnd on at least one occasion Sakharov. at the request of Svitlichny travelled to Kiev to attend the trialkrainian nationalist.*1
The major concern of the dissidents in Moscow has been lo draw Ukrainian nationalists into the broader human rights movement. For example, the Program ofmocratic Movement of the Soviet Union, signed9 by anonymous "Democrats of Russia, the Ukraine, and thehile"national liberation oftressed that this "should be linked in the closest svay to the common democraticumber of Ukrainians have addressed themselves almostto the broader movement lor human rights, and are not closely associated with Ukrainian matters as such. These include mathematician Leonid Plyushch and retired Genera! Cngorenko; writer Yuly Daniel is half Ukrainian. Those chiefly concerned with Ukrainian interests have paidattention to violations of legality elsewhere. The8 Appealkrainians*1the trial of Russian writer Alcksandras well as the more general "suppression of civic activity and socialhe signatories included people like Svitlichny and Sverstyuk associated primarily with (he specifically Ukrainian interest, as well as others with records ofin the broader struggle for civil rights. The Ukrainians have also stressed the community of interest between Ihemselvcs and other minority
nationalities Crigorenko hat made the defense of the Crimeanau> crUbf. and6 Petitionhr Soviel of Nationalitiesdevoted less attention lo the problems of tbe Ukrainians than to those of some other minorities. Ukrainian dissidents are also careful to distinguish between the Russian government and the Russian people, toward whom tliey haveore generous attitude Dzyuba hasnded an olive branch lo Russian dissidents by referring to the Russian nation as "one of the grealest and most glorious in the world."
Mutual dnl'usl Las also (Su-vi-nted an alliance be-Iwi-en Jews and Ukrainian nationalists in the past, in spile of their common concern for minority rights. Historically Ihe Ukraine has been regarded as on* of the most anti-Semitic areas of tbe world Many Ukrainian nationalists of ihe revolutionary period distrusted the Jews because of thc heavy Jewish rrpri-sentation in Russian socialist parties. If the Jews were not regarded as Bolsheviks, Ihey were often seen ns allies uf the Russians Today, as in the past, very few Jews in Ihe Ukraine speak Ukrainianthey assimilate, ibey assimilate into Russian culture
Today anti-Semitism in the Ukraine may beincekrainian dissiclents have shown interest in cooperating with Jewishpartly for idealistic and partly forreasons. Compared lo lhe futile efforts of other Soviet mirsorilirsave ihcir grievances redressed, the Jews have had some success in approaching theii ob|ectivc of bee emigration. The Jewish exodus has lie-en particularly visible in the Ukraine.8 percent of Jewish emigrants came Irom lheonsiderably higher percentage than from any otherisproportionate number of Jewish emigrants from the Ukraine evidently come from the western regions, where Ukrainian nationalism is strongestith the Jewish success so dearly before them, lhe Ukrainians doubtlesshe advantage of associating then own cause svith lhat ol lhe Jews. Most Ukrainianlike other liberal-minded dissidents In the
"A. Ur ISJT1. J em*
ril Uli <ruairtl'xuiiiiiiiew "*
Soviet Union, sincerely support the right of the Jews lo emigrate, but they do not want thefor Jewish rights to obscure the more general lack of civil liberties in the Soviet Union They point out, as Motor puts it, that today "the pale is legalized, and not as formerly just for Jews, but forn6 ccsmnsrrnorative speech at Babi Yar, the scene of the Nazi massacre of Kievan Jewszyuba also related the plight of the Jews to that of all victims of state repression.
Ukrainian dissidents have charged the regime with actively working to frustrate Ukrainianto the Jews. John Kolasky believed that authorities in Moscow were responsible for the publication in the Ukraine of sn anti-Semitic tracthich allegedly made many Jews wary of expressing support for Ukrainianecent issue of lhe new Ukrainian Herald accuses the KCB of trying to sel Jews and Ukrainians againsl each other by organizing pogroms, and by spreading rumors that lhe Jews wanted loewish state out of the Ukraine. According to thc Herald, "the chauvinistsoiled loedge between Jews and Ukrainians'"
The advantages lo the Jews of identifying their parheular causearger one are less dear. While Jewish leaders do not question Ihe motives of Ukrainian intellectual dissidents, ihey remain dubious lhai Ukrainian nationalism at the popular level is truly purgrri ofewish emigre from the Ukraine explained their skepticism:
Sli"ivilli iKr cllin
In) ' our
nliuvls. Yn their wasunperx|Xi Use* ol thi. nimeiitrnt. Fiiiniknow llul .mv- kind ullihr (arm nuh
Relations between Jewish and Ukrainian dissidents are growing friendlier and then: have been cases of cooperation for limiteds. but il islhat tbe Jews will rally with enthusiasm to the banner of Ukrainian nationalism.
Christian dissent also reinforces nationalistespecially in the West Ukraine where the Uniale Church reputedly had some four million adherents at the lime of its liquidation. There are indicationseligious revival taking place since
that they are necessarily devoid ol any emotional attachment to their native region In fact, few Ukrainian officiab arc SO rigidly loyal lo lhe center as to plaice the interests of the all-union Party alwaysose of the Ukraine, or soas lo be -totally insensitive Io Ihe in-nli and desires ol lhe people among whom they live. In varying degrees Ihey are responsive to those desires, al times because of Ihc practical difficulties encountered in administering unpopular central policies, al times because popular detiret sometimes coincide with lhe Communist official's desire to win economic corst-essiont for "hit"x-al official may also lake pride in Ihe achievements ol hit region and seek recognition for these, if only because such recognition reflects credit on him To thisocal leader mayocal loyally which is scarcely distinguishable from na-liunalism. although its routs are diffrrent.
egional leader may ultempl to manipulate natiunalismever foi increasing his political clout in Moscow Dependent on central favor for Ins rise in the Party, having risen he may become bolder and try to build an imkps-nelerit power baseocal constituencyis ownarticularly true in an area where nationalist sentiments are not confined lo an isolated segment of the population, but have infiltrated tbe Party itself. In spite of its natural appeal for an ambitious regional loader,ourse is risky in lhe extreme. Hy condoning Use milder forms ofand relaxing the strictures againsldeviations in literature and scholarship, the regional leader may unintentionally unleash force's which he cannot easily control. In addition, if hi goes too far. he will oftend central authruitirs Consequently, tolerationeasure of frceckim of expression fur "establishment" intellecluabationalist nrirnlalion is no! incompatible wiih repressive measures against more open and radical dissent.
A. Factionalism and Nationalism
he altitudekrain-
ian csffrcial toward nationalism ha* Isrrn inffcrcotrd by his (actionalol all factions within Ihe Ukrainian Party have given equal support In the centralizing initiatives of the Brezhnev ycais
. OutingSrtng in Czechoslovakiaih.io ineturn to the Unlal* Churchevivai of the link with Rome The Increased attention given to anti-religious propaganda by the Soviet Ukrainian press since then indicates lhatates in thc West Ukraine may have become restive alto Most of those Uniates arrested have been in lhe West Ukraine, but the most zealous Christian sect in the USSR, thc Initsiativnik) Baptisu, appear to be active in the East Ukraine at well They also appear to be attracting more young people than do the more traditional churches.
In recent years the cause of the Uniates has been taken up by Ukrainian nationalists, first by the Ukrainian Herald, and then by Moroi. In line ssiih the attitudes of more traditional Ukrainian nationalists. Moroz believer the Unial* religion and Ukrainian nationalism are inseparable.ight against the- Churchight against thee maintains. In any ease, he argues, religious believers should be defended, if for no other reason, merely because tbey are persecuted "When religion svas dominant and socialism svasecent person did notord againste writes, and contends that now the roles areoroz has been particularly outspoken in his praise of theountain people living in the East Carpathian region, who preserve old Ukrainian customs and thc Uniale religion Motor's defense hatthem, andthem with more general Ukrainian causes
V. THE POLITICS OF NATIONALISM IN THE UKRAINE
As much as any elite group in the Ukraine. Ukrainian Party officialsested interest in the maintenance of the political system as il exists, indeed, they are part ol thatanking Party apparatchik has been conditioned by years uf servicearty imbued with hostility In minority nationalism. He has pertorce propagated its line, he owes his station and his prestige not lo the consent of the governed, butarty in svhich power flows fromter outward
And yet. while Ukrainian Communist leaders owe their primary loyalty to the Party, they are not nne-dimenslonal men. ll is unreasonable to assume i
Tin- (action centered inastern, iiih.iu. and Hum lied oblast m! Dmpropetrus-sk hat-ui thedecade con listen* ly been much mun-hostile toward Ukrainian nationalist dissent, and has generally championed economic centralization as well The subservience of this group to Moscow owesi tu the (act that its patrons there wield great puwxr. and can bestow great rewards on their clients Brezhnev servedirst secretary iwrlh ul Dnepropetrovsk and of neighboring Zaporozlie Kirilenkoormer Hist secretary of Dnepropetrovsk and also worked in the Party in Zaporozlie. and Shcherbitskyormer first secretaryepropetrovsk
The- faction centeied in unother eastern,oblast. Donetsk, hasoreand ambiguous role The Donetsk Party's membership grew rapidly throughout, and it Ins-ame ths- largest Party organizatioii in the Ukraine Because of tin- size uf this faction and tin- economic importance ol its geogiaphicew Uknimian leaders in recent years have been svilling or able to ignore its interests altogether. Khrushchevto act as Donetsk's patron, but Ins fall did not all.et the fortunes uf the faction adversely Shelest may have attem|ited to win the support ulashko and his Donetsk followers hy defending Donetsk economic interests. Inoshku and Ins cohorts may have given Shelest limited backing, but tbey kept then options open According lo Ukrainian somiiWeii the First Secretary ul Donetsk nbkom. Valdimir Deglyarev. was one ol only three nbkom first secretaries in the Ukraine who was openly hostile to Shelest duriii" his time of troubles inince Shc-lests demise the-et urn's numerical represents-turn in initial Party ami gnvemment institutions bus increased, and Donetsk men continue to be well placid in key oblasts. Fur the last live years the first seen lanes of Kiev and Zapoiu/hc obkonis bass-onetsk pioteges of Lyasbko. Vet the sinning intluenei- of the Donetsk faction has ap paiciitly nut reaped (him the same ccminmic it in
under Slichcrhifsky as they received under
Shelest Tlie attitude ol thii group toward the ii crackihiwii sponsored by Bn/hnev and Insii passive- and xpiisocal Diuielsfc is so It ossified that tbe Parly
there may see no need to crock the whip un this issue. Only on economic issues have they spoken out. bitterly opposing central policies which slight the development of the Donbas coal industry.
The Kharkov faction's pusver was eclipsedhen its patron Podgorny unsuccessfully vied with Brezhnev for the succession Brezhnev's victory over Podgorny was accompanied by an assault un the Kharkov Party organization Its membership was cut back and its5 the Kharkov faction liasSome of Podgorny's proteges in the Ukraine', notably Nikolay Sobol. removed asSecond Secretary3 and from thePolitburouffered demotions Other Kharkov leaders, notably Gregory Vashchcnko. who became First Secretary ol Kharkov obkom only after Puclgurny's departure from the Ukraine and had no clear ties to Podgomy. have fared better. While some Kharknvians. perhaps Including Podgorny himself, may have favored lenient treatment nf liberal writers,8 Vashchcnko foined Alrkscy Vatchenko. Scherbitsky's man in Dnepropetrovsk, tu attack dissident writers.
Ihe Kiev Party's importance increased during the tenure of Petr Shelest. Party boss of the Ukraine32 Shelest began his Party career in Kharkov and may base owed his elevation to theecretaryship to Podgorny's lasyr As Fust Secretary of Kiev obkom7e placed old Kharkov associates in several ley positions. Under Shcherbitsky the political power of the Kiev organization has been drastically
B. The Cose ofossol Who loved His Fief
The case of Petr Shelest, First Secretaiy ol the Ukrainian Party3 untilro-tides an eeampleeudal vassal who became so attaches) to his fief lhal he incurred the wrath of his lords In2 Shelest was dismissed as First Secretary uf the Ukrainian Party anda Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, lessear later be was dismissed from thee position and retired from tbe CPSU Central Committee Politburo on pension. Shelest's
Igis.li*fre'
Pair Shelest, misled2lrsl Secretory of the Uk'oinion Communid Poity
remova) from ihe Politburo wa* preceded by heavy criticism of hit alleged nationalist deviations. Some Western students,isplay of Kremlirvological dexterity, have argued that since rationalism was the only public charge levelled against Shelest. it could not have been the real reason for his removal Vet an examination of the evidence suggests that, while no single-factor explanation is satisfactory, Shelests identification with and toleration of Ukrainian national sentiment played anot the main paving the way for his ouster
Shelests fall could plausibly be explained in terms ol power politics, pure and simple Shcherttlt->ky.eplacement as Ukrainian Party boss, belonged to the close-knit (actinn ofe had old and fast tics to Brezhnev,ong-standing rivalry with Shelest. According to this thesis, for many years Brezhnev had been "gunning' for Shelest. and hoping to replace him with his client Shcherbitsky. Consersely, Shelests opposition to Brezhnev's policies may have been
rooted in power considerations rather than in genuine policy differences. Certainly Shelesta conspicuous lack of deference toward Brezhnev, und played down the General Secretary's personal rontrilmtiom This argument, based on (he usepatron client" model of politicals probably true as far as it goes Its weakness is that it cannot adequately account lor the decision of other Politburo members to go along with the sacking of Shelest. To gain their approval, Brezhnev probably needed an issue with which to fault Shelest. Thus, while Brezhnev may have regarded policy "mistakes" by Shelest merely as an cieuse for moving against him. policy differences may have constituted the real reason that other Politburo members concurred in this action.
At the time n( Shclcst's departure It was widely speculated in the West that he was removedof his opposition to detente in general and to President Nixon's2 visit to the Soviet Union in particular. The timing of his removal as First Secretary does suggest that this was the immediate cause for the showdown Tlie decision to remove him came betweenay of his decision to mine Haiphong harbor and Nixon's arrival in Moscow onhclcst's opposition to this visit was In line with his long-standing advocacy of heavy defenseand his generally bellicose attitude toward the West.ime when Brezhnev was committing the Soviet Unionetente policy andimited SALT agreement.1 speech Shelest had berated "the policy of US imperialism, which presents the greatest threat to universalnd called lor an incrcare in the defensive might ol the Soviethelest is said tn have adsxx-aled all-out attack on the US fleet after Nixon's decision, and to have argued vehemently at the Central Committee plenum ulavor of revoking Nixon'sisit to Kievcheduled part of Niton's itinerary, and Shelest is rumored to have declared that if Nixon came he would find "the gates of Kiev shut before him" Shelests behaviorlate banquet for the Nixon entourage, when he declined to drink the toavl lo the SALT agreement, until per-
irm.iiont on ihe Polithum unlit Ti1
Jjlji "I'll
Jap tfffet
by Shelepin. seemed lo confirm his negative attitudethe visit'*
Opposition to the visit may have triggered theto sack Shelest. but it alone does notas an explanation for his departure, since thete were signs that Brezhnev had already laid the groundwork for pushing him out In1 three of Brezhnev's supporters were added to lhe Politburo. The addition of Shcherbltsky, Premier ol lite Ukraine, created the highly unusual and nminous diesumtance ol two repcesemativct of ihe Ukrainian apparal sitting us full members of the Politburo At the tame Hum'. Shclcsl was losing bit gnp over his own baikwick The most glaring sign lhat he might no longer be master of his hoove was the appointineni inew KCB chief for the Ukraine. Vttaly Kcdorchuk. rc-poitcdty over Slick-si's strong protest According to rumor. Shelest was completely taken aback by Fedorchuki appointment and refusedo shake bands with him when he arrived in
Shelest had been out of tlep on foreign policy issues other lhan iletcotr with the US Conslslisst svith Ukraine's World Waremories, he had questioned tlie wisdom of rapprochement with West Germany9 tpeecherrrnony in Kiev markingh anutvcrsaiy of thetion of the Ukraine from Nazi occupation, Shelest let out all stops in coo(unr>s; up meiisories of Nan war atrocities in the Ukraine Reminding hislhat "impcralistt have long cast envious glances on lhe Ukraine'snd that "in this crnluiy alone Ihey twice pounces! on (liee noted that "the present international situation demands lhat the lessons ol the past he taken intoince "international imperial ism is striving toew worldot content with such generalities, he explicitly tried lo discredit Brandl't Ostpolttik
The Wevl Crinun leaden inluianw thru lu'rixn
lulnv lira* ihr pnlny oi bitiU'r;mi ill rhe iHMn r. out idbut In ihr
ili.il Wnl liipn.iii rultnii links muni on snhicil-
iiiK Hien till ths*
* thil jwsv fmm |hr nxulnl Bui
planihvm>hntv nr>rrleuliTs "*
F'tifla't hj.hui of this speech onutlrd these ref-erences lu ini|ie-rialisl de-signs Slielest later changed
satis and in his1uh Ukrainian Congress, on the eve ofh CPSU Congress, he endorsed lhe new treaty wiih West Ccrmany. But it is doubtful thai his views had changed completely.1 speech in Kiev he again lecalksl past German cupidity,lhat "we have no right to forget, must not forget" the events of World War II.IW
It it doubtful lhat Sttrlest't hawkish behav-ior during the Czech crisis significantly wcakenul his position, although this story seems lo have been put out by Soviet leaders After Shelest'sentral Committee Irlirr. which was reportedly circulated to local Parly committees throughout the USSR and sent to Czech Secretary Ilutak, tried to saddle Shelest with the blame for the invasion The letter reporledly accused him of giving the Politburo misleading information, on the basis of which lhe leadership decided no solution other than invasion wasimilarShelest had tricked Brezhnev intoleaked to an Associated Press newsman in2 Other reports indicate that2 Brezhnes-gavtimilar explanation lot lhe invasion Il is unlikely that the Politburo would have relied so completely on Shelest ior information inrucial matter More likely these "leaks" were self-serving disinformation prompted by Brezhnev's desire locapegoat lo bear lhe onus of re-spctrrubdity for thr irtvaiion
Oilier factors no doubt contributed todeinise his evident tootdragging on Brezhnev's promotion of consumer welfare, bis alleged abuse of lluie office and "offenses againsl socialistarticularly in catering lo the exlr.ivag.mt whims of his wile, his failure to Iwsdlc hit son. who had pronnsird closer scholarly ties lo theossible disagreement viithover the issuance of new Party cards, perhaps because Brezhnev wanted tin- Ukrainian Party to reduce the size of lis rapidly grosving membershipurge
Some combination ol foriign policy differences and personal failings might suffice to explain She lesl's dismissal Yet none of hit "mistakes" iu these areas terms serious enough to accoemt for theof the public criticism which accompanied his demise. In lhe end. Shelest's "nationalism" must
be figured into the equation Perhaps mostwas his daring defense of Ukrainianinterests
Ukrainian administrators. like those of other union republics, have sought toalanced economy and have complained ol discrimination in central investment policies. The competition between the Eastern RSFSR and the Ukraine has been intense. Inkrainian econoiiiists led an unsuccessful fight for building hydroelectric power stations on the Dnepr rather than In Siberia, charged that the Ukrainian chemical industry was being sacrificed to the rush to develop Siberia at all costs, and complained that the Ukrainianindustry was forced to import products from other republics, although the basis for theof such products existed in the UkraineA Political Diary article5 noted the vehemence with which Ukrainian administrators insisted that the Ukraine was economicallyby Russia, and declared "openly that they are lieing
During the last few years, when priority has beeno the development of oil and gas industry in Siberia, the coal "lobby" of Dnnetsk has been particularly vocal in charging unfair treatment by central authorities.1 Shelest added his voice to Iheir protests. Ath Ukrainian PartyIn1 he lamented that in the past five years only two new mines were constructed in the Donhas. and regretted that "unfortunately.nd the USSR Ministry of the Coaldo not give sufficient attention lo tliesc mailers" Ath CPSU Congress he praised the work ol the Ukrainian coal industry noted its important contribution lo the Soviel ecotsocny.that the increase in the industry'shad been carried out at an exceedingly slow pace, and added:
rsiprr try ui osscrl lhal llw part played hy bis and ml in lk* lud balance isc andit is iah) lhal ihr atrrnt'in iuid n> drvrlnpmnjI Uhhmtly ran b* reduced.teles* ihli
Donetsk First Secretary Degtyarev. doubtlessfor Shtlesis support,imilarat tlie Congress, and stated tliat "we fully share" Shcli-sl'i concerns in this matter After tlie
Congress, presumably infoil toPSU Central Committee decree announced sharply increased investments in new mines in the Donhas In2 Degtyarevthat seven new mines were scheduled In be opened in the Donbai5 After Shelestemoval these investments may have been cut back again2 article Degtyarevthat "Ihc miners of Ihe Donhas base the right to expect more effective assivtance from tin USSR Ministry ol Coal2 Supreme Soviet session Donetsk leaders Lyashko anil Alekscy Titarrnko complained that the Ukrainian coal industry was suffering from the postponemenl of the scheduled opening of new mines and the modernlMilinn of old ones
Shelest's "nationalism" went beyond economic matters, lie also appealed reluctant to throw his full weight behind campaigns tu reprise nationalise dissent. This attitude appeared in all three of the major crackdowns diningnd2 During ihe wilchhunt. while Shelest dutllully stagid trials of dissi. dents in ihe Ukraine, he is reported to have giantcd an interview to the wife of one of the accused promising an open and fair Inal for heratter,italy Ntkitcnenko. ihe then chief of the Ukrainian KGB. probably with Shelest's approval is reported to have refused an order de' tiveredGB official sent from Moscow lo arrest Dzyuba. allegedly because he believed such an nctinn would incite new
While Shelcs! Iisheil out at Ukrainian separatism and "bourgeois" nationalism, possibly in an effort, to prove his iiicofogical purity, he simultaneously permitted ami even encouraged literary expressions of national prutc. At the Fifth Ukrainiannion Congressoteel fur tbe npeiioess ol its proceedings. In-ribute to tin- effort* of writers to preserve the Ukrainian language-.
L'nsSrr londaamjl<(. iif
ourn arc flwwishmKtis* to urat one beautiful Ukrainian lanru'V*xrat le-spcstiraid prat trswv seliiih nmu mpeilnt andlic Conmninisi Parts always haaami llssay* swill sopiKHtuliirr your effort In this ibrritnm
Tht lone ol Itls speech contrasted diarply wllh (hatVastlyading Rutsifier onijiil of ihe Writers' Union.
' sillyolicy of limited Ukraini-zation. Shelest loot concrete sups3 toIhe use ol thc Ukrainian language inIn August of that yeai Ihe Ukrainian Minister of Highei Education. Yury Dadenkov, called in the rectors' of higher educational establishments and uistnicted them in writing lo gist- lectuiesinhis instruction, which must have been sanctioned by the Kirs! Secretary, was reportedly cuunlermanelcd by central author Hies afler an orchestrated Utter-writing campaign of aggrieved parents who did not want (heir"denied" thc opportunityR Shelest reportedly ordcrrd that college textbooks be published "first of all, in the Ukrainian language- The delegation of Canadian Communists who visited the Ukraine in7 also maintained that Shelest, in contrast to some other high officials in the Ukraine favored lheof tlie Ukrainian* late .iv Maypeech lo lhe Ukrainian Writers' Union Congress,st staled that "We should oppose he practice nf lillenng uurhrase Invariably used to refer to llu-influx of Russian words into the Ukrainian
Shelestto oppose other forms olas well. In his report lod Congress of Ihe Ukrainian Communut Parly in6 Ik- conileniiKsl both "bourgeois nationalism" and 'great-powern Snviit parlance llu-furiner is sy tvons moos with minority nalMaiaksm and the latter with Russian nationalism While opposition ro "bourgeois nationaksm" is and WH de ripieur,reat-pow-cr chauvinism" on lhe snme plane had Isotonic strictlyby
eshuffling of the Ukraine's idi-okigu.ilinhad the tiled of putting nun mute lenient tuvvaid nationalist dissent in keyitious. luS Audreyeputed Russiller. wass ideiHogv visrclary liy anfdor Osch.ireiiko Following Uveliarenko's ap-iHimtmtsil ihe- li-.nl ofarlnsenl of Serenes-and Cullure of the Ukrainian Central Committee,
and the chief editor of Kommunui Vl'Oinu were removed Tlie new editor of Kommtrnut Ukratmj was belu-ved by some observers to favor greater local political autonomy
Although Ovcharenko warned againsl lhe danger of alien ideologies imported from abroad, like Shelest he seems lo have done what he could behind the scenes lo defend UkrainianAccording9 report he fold sometime dissident Zina Franko lhat he was looking aflsr her welfare, but thai he could do nothing lu help Dzyuha and Svillychny because if he Hied to,ould lose my head"vcharenko was reportedly summoned in the summer0 lo Moscow, where Suslov upbraided him for failing In control tsafionalism in theharenko allegedly responded thai il was first weessary lo elunmale Russian chauvinism *
Another Shek-st protege. Ukrainian CinemaChairman Svyatoslav Ivanov svas removedloud in2 for having allowed th.-release of an "ideologically harmfulhelest himself is reported to have quashed the release1ropaganda libn "exposing" the atrocities ofkrainian separatist group active during Work! War II. and during Ids tcniue the Ukrainian media reportedly received explicit instructions to play up Ukrainian economic achieve-mr-nls and to downgrade all-union
Shelest clearly bucked central authority in de-fending Oles Honchar. In8 Honchars novelwhich had earlier received favorable reviews in Dnepropetrovsk newspaper* and also in Literal urnayane under fire Irom the Dnrpropctiovsk Parly organization, with thesupport of Writers' Union officials Koza-chenko and Mykola Shamola. Hostile reviews of tlie novel were confined lo Dnepropetrovsk anil /apesrozhc local papers until late April, when ihev spiead to republic-level papers In 'line Ihey were followed up in the- central press svith an article in Sot^.kayo Kullura Ir. Anatoly Ulanov. First Secretajy ofkom.":
In spile of the fact lhat Brezhnev and other high authorities probably approved of the campaign
'Or.le'n Umllul OsirlilV-s
-rib.!inril in oIIicf t'ullnR SdrlW'i tenure
against llonehar, his position in (he Writers'only gradually weakened In ISreembcrwas forced lo share his airlhoiilyit was! that the two menall questions jointly In less than twoHo rich si was again Hrs-atcd lo heand Ko/achenLo demoted to one ofdeputy chairmen. In1 the Km;;blow came; Honchar was retired Irombut with full honors. He wasby Kozachenko, but by Yury Smolich, whopublicly neutral in (he Solroruntil3 after the removal olKey*the full reward of victory
and ascend to the chairmanship
Obviously, tn order for Honchar to havehis post lor so long under suchwith power must have been lookinghim. Clandestine reporting, circumstantialand logic all indicate that Shelest wasHonchar, according to one report,to Shelest. and sometimes svrote speechesCertainly Honchar went out of his wayShelest's favor, praising hb book, hisui Ukrainian literature, and hiihelp to support all that iss for Shelest. only in one-did he come close to deprecatinghe must have been under inleiiseto do so. According I
for example, in Ihe springU. Pwiomarev and Suslovoray into the Ukraine, where they uphraidrd ihe Party for failing lo lake adequate measures to quell nationalist dissenl Ath Ukrainian Party Congresshelest staled that "not only young but sornetirnes eeen well-known writers" produced "politically Immature" works He repeated this veiled lelmke at the Writers' Union Congress which retired Mondial."*
Shelest's protective hand can also be seen in Ihc strange history ol Ivan Dzyubaubi. who alreadyeputationpiritedol Ukrainian culture, wae reportedly re quested by high Ukrainian Party olficiari totudy of Party nationality policy.5 when he completed his dudy. which lurncd oul toowerful crtitque of Russifying policies, he sent it to Shelesl. who leporledly circulated the manu-
script to Ukrainian Party secretaries fur (heir com men is and consideration.ocument ov-siously arouicd controversy, and Andrey Skaha. then Ukrainian kleology secretary, reportedlyto Shelest during this period thai Dzyulu should be arrested. Shelest allegedly responded ssith the remark that "he was not Kaganovich and Ihese wen not the limes oluha was detained for questioning by Ihc police in connect ion with the trialse was soon released The unauthorized publication of Dzyuba's study in the Wests Infrrnnrinrwiisni orowever, provided his opponents grounds for assailing himollaborator of Ukrainian emigre "boxirgeos nationalists" During the course of Ihe campaign against him.S Dzyuba was expelled from the local Kiev branch of the Ukrainian Writers' Union, but was reinstated by the republic Writers' Union alter hearefully worded statement denying lhal helthough he continued to penarticles, he seemed immune from more serious forms of persecutionhen Shelest's own position had deteriorated Alter hnng briefly arrested ine was expelled from the Ukrainian Writers' Union in Match, re-arrested in April, tried andise-year prison sentence inhen permitted or pressured into writing an "apology" inlter which he was pardoned and released."1
Perhaps the hest evidence of Shelest'v nationalist sympathies surfaced when,ekraine, Our Sovtet (Land, which betrayed an unseemly national pride Although the Imok al tarsi received laudatory reviews, it containedwhich could be and later were used asagainst Shelest In particular. Shelestto the growing "Cossack cult" in the Ukraine. He treated the Zapororhlan Sich svith sympathy, referring to its "democratic structure" in which "all Cossacks had equaluoting from Marx's complimentary description ol thecommunity, charging that Polish and Russian historians had "grossly falsified the history ol ihend atrrnonishing Ukrainian historians to pay more attention to the "great progrcssise role" played by tlie Cossacks He also hod harsh words for the Russian Tsars, whose "cruel" |Kilicies hail "de-
stroycd tin- in loom of tlw Ukrainianicucd serfdom on the Ukrainian peasant
Alfhocigb the book was printedarge edit.onopies, these soon sold out. Since tt was not reprinted, andear was reportedly being removed from libraries,2 eaccrpts of tbe book began to emulate in lamizdat. According lo tiaitdestinc reponing. the book was discussedolitburo mn-tingresumably when the groundwork fmemoval was bring laid. After quoting some damaging sections, either Brezhnev or Suslov pconoursced lhat "this is where uatmnalisin"
Only infter Shelest lead already lost bis |Hisiliiin in the Ukraine,cvaslating review ul the book appear as the coup de grace and signal Inr bis finalov.il from (he Politburo Tucked away on lhe back pages of Kommunisthe review laid bare Shelest* sins in sltmkiogly hlunt language Never beforeolitburo member been subjected lo such blatant public entiosm from any organ below the Central Committee or its esoculive organs One by one llic book's "serious shortcomings" were ticked ofl The author devoted too much space lo the prc-October hislorv ol the Ukraine, particularly to the Cossacks, and he "says nothing about Ihe class stratification of tbee is said to view Ukrainian historycilatii degree in isolation" from thai of the USSRhole, thus fading to elucidate the "IrusKlship of nations" which crrneiils thctogether. On speaking of lhe reunification of the Uki.iiue with Russia, he "nevet mentioned lhat. thanks lo this historic ad, the Ukrainian (Srople were sased from foreign enslavement" liefailed to reveal "the beneficial influence id Itiissian culture" on the Ukrainian arts While waving eloquent on tbe economic achievements of lhe Ukrainian SSR. lie somehow neglected loron lhai these were the "result not only ol Ihc'-ii of thc wniters of the Ukraine, but also ol all pcimlcs of Iheinally, horrible tltctu, 'i-lemonIs of economic ucitarky .ne obvious in ihehe- following iwie oln utis Ir svritteii by Slwherisitsky.uuvessnr in llic Ukraine, which laulledi.iiiiiatl suiter* Im "ualional emu oil and
The latest issues of the Ukrainian Heralil, only esterpts of which are thus far available lo us. ire repotted lo explain Sbelest's removal in terms of his "nationalismAccording to this account Shelesl intervened to save Vastly Kutsevol. First Secretary of Lvov ohkom. svhom Suslov wanted to oust for errors in "internal iooalist and atheistic education of Ihe masses" This action afforded his enemies. Fedorchuk. Valentyn Malanchuk and Sheherbitsky lhe opportunity to complain lo Moscow about Shelest, and ultimately Shelest was summoned to Moscow, where he was put in the "penal chair"olitburo meeting and charged withiim and national narrow-mindedness" The Ukrainian Herald claimed that Shelest had thc support of most of the obkom first secretaries in lhe Ukraine, and also of several non-Russian Party leaders in other republics. Perhaps for this reason. Shelesl was not permitted to return to Kiev lo attend trip Ukrainian plenum which ousted
Shelcst's "nationalism" may have gone no deeper lhan Ihe desire of an trsdVpeiidenl-mindedeader to strengthen bis power base Hi* opposition lo Bie/hnev's personal ascendancy may have bi*eti partly dueelief thaiegional leader he would have more powerollectiveleadership than under one-man rule Whether Shelest sincerely sympathized with some forms of Ukrainian national sentiment, or whether he turned lu nationalist elements only in an effort lo drum up supportersonal vendetta with Brezhnev, we cannot know Of greater concern here lhan Shelest's personal motivation is the fact thai he did act In ways which associated himegree with Ukrainian national feeling. There is nu reason lo doubt lhat nationalism in (he broadestmanifested inook, his protection of some dissident writers, his championing of lhe Ukrainian language, his advocacy of economic decention, his defense of Oonbas coal interests, even perhaps in his suspicion of Westayor part of the case against him
C. The Cose of Shelter bilskyi As Royalist as Ihrj King
Thus far. First Secretary Shctierbirsky has done to blemish his reputation as "Brezhnev'shee has purged trouble spots
in Ihr Ukrainianounarc assault on Ukrainian nationalut dissent, and givenupport to Brezhnevs poheses. Allhough he has not groveled in the manner of some Central AsUn leaders, he has offered the requisite amount of public praise lor hu chief, and has gone out of his way to emphasize that the Ukrainian Party looks to Moscow for its marching orders.
Soon afler taking charge in fhe Ukraine inhcherbitsky evidently moved to curtail the growth of the Ukrainian Party, whose membership had Increasedpeed which may have alarmed Brezhnev.62 the Ukrainian Party grewaster rate than the all-union Party.2 Its membership dropped byercent, while Ihe membership of Ihe all-union Party roseerceni."*
Shcherbilsky has also taken steps to consolidate Ins position in central Ukrainianm.During Shcberliilsky't tenure three new full members and four new candidate members have been added to the Ukrainian Politburo. On the enlarged Politburo Shcherbilsky's Party Secretariat has morethan Ibe government, which had not been the cose with Shelest's Politburo, when Shcherbitsky was Pie inter,
At least in terms ot numerical superiority in ruling institutions, the Donetskashko. head ol ll*roup, lilted the post Shcherbitsky vacated as Chairman of the Crwcrl of Monsters Hm faction is riprescnled on ihc Politburo by lour fullVladimir Degtyarev. Aleksev Titai enko, ami Vitalyand two candidateTsybulko ami Ynkuv IVun tbe Secretariat by Tilurenko and Pogrebnyak. On the Ukrainian Central Committee eluded1 the Donetsk Party organidation was represented byull members (out)
The Dnepropetrovsk faction is represented on tlie Pulitburo by Shchcibitsky. Alekicy Vatchenko. and probably Ivan Crushetsky. Vashchenko. the Khar kov man who has actedrezhnev ally, was transferred from First Secretary of Kharkov In First Deputy Chairman of the Ukrainian Council of Ministers, retaining his full membership imt the Politlmm Of the candidate memlseis Vitaly Fed orchuk and Valcniyn Matanchnk are Brezhnev allies, and Malanchuk also sits wilh Shcherbitsky on the Secretarial. On the Ukrainian Central CommitternepropetrovskZitpnnizhr providedull members.
IMIin .i| Mil UKllAIM- POLITBURO
IS ENKO. Nikolay Mikkaylovieh DKCTVAREV. Vladimir
'CRUSH ETSKY. KanatorS
l.TASIIKO.V-rick silt iii
Vitaly AlrlrsryevicJi MTABENKO. Ateksry Antonovich VASHCHFNKO. Crifioty Ivaoovlch
VATCHENKO. Alekvey Fedoseyesich
Candida it memuihi
Vitaly ViniTywichValcotyn Yeftmovkh POCREBNYAK. Yakov PrtroviehKm ZaUsamichVla-dima Mikkiykj-sch
Othsti rewrios* laoatary. CPt'k Centra]irst Secretary. Donetsk Otslast Parr.Chairman,kSSft Supreme So-trtDvtWT OuUman. UkSSR Council ol MassSBtei
SecondKTk Cex-cral
castar-san. UkSSKd of
First s. CPUk Central Commiliw. atSB>
bri. MBSSSPS, CPSU General Comm.inr Chairman. UkSSR Council ol Trad* clrtoni secretary. CPUk Central Committer First Daputy Chmonan. UkSSR Council ol
Minister*
Fun Secrrtaiy. Dnepropetrouli Oblait Party Conim ittre
Omm positions Chairman. UkSSR KCB Srcrttary, CPUk Central Comniittr* Secretary. CPUk Central Committer First Secretary. Kharkov ObUn Parly Committer Fum Svcretaiy. Kiev ObUit Partv
1
The hunter strongholds ol Podgorny and Shelest have deteriorates!! Kharkov and Kiev wen* cut back to six full nvmorn each on th*Centra) Gwwnittee. Nlkifor Kalchcnko is the only holdover from Podgorny* "old guard"on the Politburo: he is probably little moreigurehead today The only presumed Shelest ally remaining on the Politburo is Ivan Laitak. who served with Shelest in, then as his deputy in the central Ukrainian secretariat. Unlike Lyashku. he has no strung geographic base of support, but he occupies Ihe important post of Second Secretary of the Ukrainian Party.would probably be happy to be rid of him The composition of Party leadership on the oblast level has also been in flux Since Sbcherbitsky's takeoverf thekrainian obkoms havechanges of lint secretaries. Most of Ihese were removed during Shcherbitsky's firstalf in oflice. and several were charged within work In add tt ion many oblasts lost other secretaries. Kberson. Poltava, andobkoms, as well as Kiev geirkom. appear to have been subjected to lull scaleov, Otnnoxfty, and Odessa bass* also been hard hit Many uf those deposed had lies lo Shehsl or Podgoniy.
Shchci bitsky lias also taken ileps to incicontrol over the Party organization of IheHe lias been critical ol. olParty, and since2 allul Kiev goikom except for FirstAlcksandr Botvin have been replacedsame time, in5 ShcherbitskyKiev goikom Parly organization from theand placed it undei the directol the Ukrainian Ontrulily Party Split oil. the remainingaving lost user hall olthe size of Ihe oblast Partythat of al least six other Ukrainianstatus of Kiev city will now be similar lo lhatMoscow cily organization, winch is largerMoscow ubl.isl Party and nut sulmrdinalid toarrangement auguis ill lur tbe polltie.ilol Vladimir Tsybulko. First Secretarynlikmii ami aUyaihkn.
oMW.il position ol llotvin is also shaky Although llotvin could piobably not lie- accused ol
ideological laxity, having earlier played an adixe-role in preventing the spread of the Cnxhe has career ties to Shelest Botvin. like Shelest. rose in the Kharkov Party organization, and served under Shelest in Kiev obkom.
At least six ol the departing obkom first secretaries were replaced not through promotions from within Iheir own oblasts, ihe policy generally follerwedthe Brezhnev- years, but by men brought in from outside. Not .iiuprisiiigly, many of these appointees cither belonged to the Dnepropetrovsk faction or came out of Sbcherbitsky's Central Com rnittce apparatus Fidor Morgun. the new Puhava Fust Secretary, wasrezhnev protege, who was educated in Dnepropetrovsk, and worked svtth Brezhnev in Kazakhstan. Viktor Dobrik, who took over in Lvov,nrmer First Secretaryli.r tornrezhnev syco-phanl of many years
Several of the new appointees had bce-nactive in campaigns against nationalist
Toj^JstrfTpr'*
dissent Uobnk had been sent Iu Ivano FtaukusskroulJcs hootere now went lo Lvov in Ihr wake of anli-Roman dcmcsnU rat tons there. Both lvnn Mnzgovoy. sent lo Kherson, and Vladimu Dikusaruv, dispatched to thc Western oblast of Chciiiuvlxy. had served as deputies of Transcar-palhia First Secretary llnitsky. Ilnitsky had been shot into prominence during thc Czech crisis by his relentless struggle against dtssent
Of obkom first secretatics today, only tsvo appear to have been proteges of Shelest. Their posls ai. in the relatively unimportant oblasts of Khmelnitsky and Kirovograd.
The central Ukrainian rdcologtcal apparat has undergone an evenorough house-cleaning The key step was taken in2 when Ovchurrnko was replaced by Malanchnk. who as an ideology secretaiy in Lvov hadareerirulent crusader againsl dissent-7 as Deputy Minister of Education he had reinforced this reputationuisifier in nurnerous tracts extolling lhe virtues of the "friendship ofMalanchnk and Shcherbitsky have re-staffed cultural and ideolngieal departments of the Ukrainian Central Committee. Other culturaland organs, as well as ses-eral institutes of the Ukrainian Academy of Science were also caught up in the purge.
MAJ OH UKRAINIAN CULTURAL AND IDEOLOGICAL POSITIONS RESTAFFKD SINCE ISTl
Head ol Central Committee Propaganda Derailment Head ol Central Commitirr IVpirunent for Sesentlfh-
and I'lucInitllutloiii Head of Central Committee IVjuitm-iit of Onranira-
ttooal Party Work Head of CiBtnsI Comm.nee Cultural Deputnrnt ChiefChief Editor. Ulrtetunw flrnina Chid Editor. Soviet Writers' Publishing House Chairman, Slate Committee for Cinema loam phy Minister o( MiRlscr and Spreialieed Sessmdaiy
Chairman ol Writers' Union First Secretary ol Koimonxi! Rector ol Higher Parly School
The KCB had been laken out ofands in the summer0 when lhe central KCB, a
Viloly Fedorchuk, hood oiUfcromion KGB
stionghold ul Brezhnev, had imposed Ftdoichuk on Shelest Vitalyharkov man. hadt lhe Ukrainian KCB since its formationrie length of ha tmure suggests lhat hrrotrssmnal who remained aloof Irum politi-tal infightingyisl protee.tiunighci leader like Podgorny. He was reportedly inelined tosvard leniency in handling dissent. Feilorelmk. by contrast, came from outside the Ukrainian ap parat. although he is an irhnketeran ofcrias secunty apparalns. he appears to be dose to Brezhnev's clients in ihe ccnhalnd may svield some authority in dependent of Shcherbitsky. Fedorchuk clearly came
tu the Ukraineandate to rout nationalist dissidents
Shcherbitsky has rallied this revitalizedatur crusade against dissent An intensive cflort lias been made lo step up tbe idisilogic.il education of young pcuplc. and oblast ideological
VetUrttyn Molanchufa. ioVotogy wKidory ol rhe Ukrainian Communni Pony
n have whippedadre* into action.
Lvirv lias been (he chief large! in thi> campaign Twit seiisulioual trials ol tourists, accused ol tiling agitatorsUkraim by emigreioiiii annationalists, haw Ihth vlaged liken Ami'si- nnd dismissals have kept theol Lvov in turmoilegime has succeededing Mrveral well-known disstdi ntiuba and 2ina Frauku. lite granddaughter ol the lelcbeated Ukrainiannarm pnH Ivan Fr.mko.eading tie-lender yl Ukrainianany otherhave bcni driven uisdrrground The- orl noiseone mi far thai un one occasion Malaruhnk was reportedly deterredommission tent by
through with a
pi annul
Shelter bit sky has also trumpeted Brezhnev's pet ei-iiiwiiienies theprimacy ot theote in minomic administration, the high priority ofthe oil and gas industiy, the push tu develop Siberia. Inhcheihitsky svas noi su docile. On at least two occasions he openh took to task policies of all-union administrators Today Shcherbitsky has curbed his parochial appetite. In an elfort to sell the policy ol developing the eastern HSFSR. Shcheitucsky has repeatedl) temmded his audience that the Ukraineatge debt to the Russians for its economicNow, he argues, it is the turn ol Siberia.'" Slsthcrbitsky haspaid homage to (he "immense historical role" of (he Ureal Russians Typical4 Kommuniil Ufcrainy article denouncing the nationalist emigre "riff-raff" for mahgning the "high spiritual dignity of Russianie wrote of the virtues of "Russian man" in rhapsodic fashion, concluding thai "whoeverthe Russian people oflends all Soviet people "
Shcherbitskyajor article on nationality relations for lhe4 issuef. Thi* article contained no sharp departiircs from Ihe policy Brezhnev outlined at Ihe fiftiethcelebration, but in lhe process of enlarging on some of Brezhnevs pronouncements it toned ihem down somewhat, andense of reassurance tn (he nationalities.
It is possible lhat Shcherbitsky ts trying to broaden the base of his personal popularity byoil somewhat from his harsh stand on national aspirations With his chief ailing,is stepping forthcomer" in thewriting frequently on economic questions as well as on lhe nationalities problem, but there are no signs of any divergence between Brezhnev anil Shcherbitsky. Tbe more soothing tone of Shcher-bilsky's article may reflisi BrczhniVs desire lo dee striate his Russibcalioudrier lhan any move by Shcherbitsky lo dissociate himself from Brezhnev's policy.
Even if Shcheibilsky were so inclined. j| would probably be politically disadsantageous lor him loenient attitude toward lhe grievances of
the rationalities. Shchcrbittky's greatest liabilityBrezhnev's mantle it probably his
cloie association with the Ukraine. If anjjlmi' far Ihc succession, he would probably lean overlo prove hi* loyally lo Brezhnev and his ideological purity on Ihe issue of nationality rights.
VI. THE UKRAINE IN THE YEARS AHEAD
In an effort to evaluate the strength offorces in the Ukraine, we have broken the Ukrainian problem down Into its component parts. First, we have seen that the Ukrainians possess most of the ingredients necessary for politxa) self-sufficiencyeople who hasr not enjoyed independent statehood in modern times, they have an unusually rich cultural heritage andegree of pride that they are more "European" lhan the Creal Russians Theyelatively balanced economy, and over the last half century they have been transformedeasant peopleationiversified dass structure.
Yet our survey of linguistic and demographic Ireiiils -unveils 'liltliny I- ondc of the force* of assimilation, at least in the East Ukraine Linguistic Russifieation is proceeding steadily in the urban areas of East Ukraine.most Ukrainians there (ontumc to think of themselves as Ukrainians, and continue to claim Ukrainian as their native tongue, the Russian Ian-gunge is replacing Ukrainian in official and public communications. The use of Russian in public may be largely due to official pressure, but many Ukrainiansbase come to feel that speaking Ukrainian is "nckulfumyi" or unsophiHi-caied. The process is slow, but lhe Russian elemi-nl In the East Ukraine is growing, particularly In thi! cities, through assimilation of Ukrainians andof Russians.
In West Ukraine the statisticsornrwhat different slory West Ukraine has more than held its own against Russian encroachments. This fait points to another dimension of the UkrainianThc history, culture, and religion of East Ukraine basereat degree been intertwined with the Russians, but the Sosiet annexation of West Ukiainc introduced into the Sosiet system an alien and generally hostile population which can
be Russified, if al all. onlyassive and prolonged effort
While assimilation is gradually taking place in East Ukraine, this does not preclude the possibility lhat Ukrainian opposition to Russian rule may be increasing, partly because of the Wesl Ukrainian infection The two tendencies svould nol necessarily be incompatible. The very forces of urbanization, social mobilization, and mass education which work lo efface national differences in the long run may simultaneously heighten consciousness of those differences in lhe short run. In fact. Ukrainian nationalism does appear to be growing, or at least becoming more vocal. During tlie last several decades Ukrainian dissent has undergone anthe armed resistance of World War II. lo the formation of conspiratorial groups in, to the flourishing of open protest in. Overt dissent probably reached its peak in the period$n Ihe wake of the invasion of Czechoslovakia and during Ihe period when Shelest was permitting dissidenteasure of latitude. Shcherbitsky'sfor idnological conformity has put theon the defensive, but they have not been completely silenced and the reintroduetion of more draconian measure* may have radicalized them (See page
A geographic andakdown ofreveals tliat dissent is not completelylo the intelligentsia, or lo one section of thc Ukraine. Although nationalism has always hern stronger in West Ukraine, particularly in Calicut, in recent years dissent seems to have been on lhe rise in ihr cities of East Ukraine as well. And although the bulk of Ukrainian dissidents ate inteBcctuals. Ukrainian nationalism probablyreater popular base than Russian liberal dissentew recent occasions workers have engaged in strikes wllh nationalist overtones, butbetween workers and intellectuals is doubtless impeded by the general failure nf the nationalist intelligentsia lo articulate rower class grsrs-ancrs concerning living standards and material welfare Overt nationalism seems to remain an urban phenomenon; if nationalist disturbances involving the peasantry have occurred in recent years, we do nol know id too I them. Larger portion* of the
;Mi 'i-nti,- Hi
lull sinechb period witnessed the Omffpoceew type ol nationalist dissent, avowedly Marxist in orientation, which appealed lo new Soviet elite* for whom traditional Ukrainian nationalism seemed outdated
The ease of the Ukrainian dissidents issomewhat hy support fiont other dissident elements in Soviet society. Recent years haveradual convergeuce between the aims and tactics of the Ukrainians and other dissident groups,iminishing of old hostilities. The Ukrainians have received some cautious support from the Jews, and Soviet propagandists have taken to charging collusion betweenndore important, Russian liberaln the past lukewarm or hostile toward Ukrainian separatist sentiments, have' shown in-creased sympathy lor Ukrainian aspirations, and Christian dissent, particularly that of the Umates, cm itrv tu reinforce Ukrainian nationalism
Another variable is the degree of externallor Ukrainian nationalism As the regimes detente policies make it increasingly vulnerable to criticism Irom "tlie othernd open upol communication between the Soviel Union and the West, organized protest of Ukrainian emigres in the United Slates ami Cinadaotential shield lor Ukrainian dissidents, and could perliaps encourage them to engage In Imldet acts of dissent The Ukraine is even moreto East European Influence, due to theassociation of West Ukraine with bordering East European countries, and the polyglot character of tbe affected populations. If discontent in the Ukraine mounted sulfiviently to createevolt in Eastern Europe couldatalytic effect Evidence that this level of discontent has not lieen reached is found In the even Ishen svhat was probably wldc-spuad sympathy for the Czechoslovaks created enough unrest in the Ukraine to make Party officials jittery. Iml lo our knowledge did not result in any violent incidentseriousuccessful revolution in Czechoslovakia mightore jolting effect on the Ukraine, but to speculate aliOot rhis is to call in the unforeseen to account leu ihe iimute.
The fear that in ihe event of war with China the Ukraine might try to break away has been voiced by Russian dissident Andrey Amalrik and is evidently shared by some high Soviet Party officials.,J* In recent years the PRC has stepped up its efforts to exploit the Ukrainian nationality problem by producing propaganda about Russian repression and by making contacts with Ukrainian emigreong drawn out and debilitating military encounter wilh ihe Chinese might well stimulate Ukrainian fracuOnalism yet it is unlikely that Ukrainian nationalists would side with the Chinese. Ukrainian dissidents dislike the Chinese regime more than the Soviet one. the onlyto Maoism in Ukrainian lomizdol areones. Nationalism in the Ukraine appears lo be waxing rather than waning,erious separatist effort is not in sigh I.
Even if the Ukrainians resented Russianas greatly ai do the East Europeans, at leas! Iwo major factors make the Ukrainian situation dilferent from that of Poland or Czechoslovakia. First of all. the Ukraine has no national military units of ils own. The various Soviet nationalities are thoroughly and deliberately integrated in the Soviet military, troops stationed in ihc Ukraine probably do notigher lhan proportionate percentage of Ukrainians. Secondly, although the Ukrainian Party and government are in the hands of native Ukrainiant. if put to the test they would probably by-arid-large east iheir lot with the regime. The leaders of the Ukrainian Party are more corn-pletely integrated into the Soviet system than were their counterparts in Czechoslovakia, and thehas been good to them The central regime has accorded Ukrainian Party apparatchiks career advantages perhaps sufficient to prevent them from nurturing significant grievances
Yet the Ukrainian Party has not been completely free of nationalist tendencies These most frequently take the form of economic localism. Rut unless Ihe cast of Shelest tie regarded as anit iv unlikely that he would have taken the Hands be did without the support of important segments of the Ukrainiantendencies may continue to be manifested in other attitudes. These may irKhnle support lor sett.-uses of politicalitialiration. relative leniency toward dissident
writers,eneral unwillingness to accede to tne claim of Russian superiority in all things. At-titudcs toward nationalism seem to be dependent in part on factional alignments, wiih thefaction traditionally taking the lead in Russifying campaigns On the basis of slimsupported by common sense, we may pre some thai Party officials from the West Ukraine are more amenable lo compromise with nationalist elements, although there are exceptions to this rule Malanchuk. who hails from Lvov, andative of Tianscarpatlua. are both fiery champions of Russifieation. Finally, the policies pursued by Ukrainian leaders are complicated by the presence of powerful patrons at thc center who originally came Out of the Ukrainian Party organization, and continue to meddle in Ukrainian affairs.
At present Shcherbitsky seems tohe Ukrainian Party in band. He has purged those who dragged their feet in the ideological crackdown, and most of those who had obvious connections with Shelest. Yet Lyashko. Shcherbitsky's strongest rival, has long been identifiedritic of Brezhnev's economic policies, and his Donetsk faction is strongly represented in central Ukrainian Party and gosernrncnt institutions. Even Sheher-bltsky has not alwaysatsyes-man in his dealings with central authorities IM He Is so closely identified svith Brezhnev that it would be difficult for him toolce-taee on nationalities policy while Biexhncv remains in office, but if the political climate changesuccession he might findxpedient lo seek accommodation with nationalist elements in the Ukraine
Under Bre/hncv, the leadership hasard line againsl all forms of Ukrainian nationalism The lenders have cracked down on nationalist dissent and pronounced dogmas which appear to give official blessing to intensilied Russilicatiun. They have also resisted proposals to decentralizeadministration, hinted al constitutional changes which might reorganize administrative units on economic rather than on rationality lines, and fired an independent-minded Ukrainian Parly host svho stietched his authority anil svho seemed sympathetic In some forms of national "deviation" But campaigns lo root oul nationalism are hard lo suslain for long periods, suice they tun the danger
of exacerbating the problem they sveie intendedAnd the vice olahsm" can la*rear its beadrstjunal Partyhu nalmnuliiy. for tin
economic performance nl his union republic He naturally lobbies for its interests in the nllucatiiin nl resources.
Both afler Stalin's death and alter KhrushchcVs ouster, the temporary dilliision of authority nvultcdelaxation of Russilicatiun cflort*rowth in assertiveness of union republicimilar relaxation may well follow Brezhnev's demise, but will probably be as short-lived as previousn lhe whole, central authorities can be expected tomuddle through"policy, to continue alternating spasms ofwiih periods of malign neglect, in ad hoc clforts toagging problem under control without aggravating it. They may hope thai long-rangi forces of economic modernization and social integration will do what out and-out repressionnationalism by graduallyIhe national diMerences which he at its base
II particularistic attitudes in the Ukraine and in other border regions persist, and cotin to be pet ceivedortal threat lo the central regime, hosveser. it is conceivabletflerentmight be adopted. Theonder ant* ol thc Cteal Russian nationality would make it difficult toenuinely federal system, even il Ibis were desired,s the prepondeiance of Piussin made federalism in imperial Ccrmany unsvoik-able. Consequently, if concession* came they ivould probably lake the form of granting greater r'c It/Co autonomyew key nationalities, in an effort lo buy their support for the .system. By such an action nineteenth-century Austrian* gieve. thea slake in the preservation of the llahsburg Empire and thus pacified (hem. Czechoslosakia provides an campleumirbst stale in whichinorities havedegree of autononi).
Yet the impulse toward Russian domination and the creationnitary state is strong This urge has Ideological as svell as historical roots While classical Marxism was as hostile lo Russianasinority nattottahsm. the mam thrust of Soviel Marsis! ideology has been toward centralized political and economic decision-making, and uni-
(otm cultural lurrrtsi tralizalioi inali where onr nationality is larger lhan all the nthen combined, as well as being (heir historic master, inevitably results in domination by thai nationality Economic efficiency is enhanced if planneis arc able to treat the entire Soviet Union
as aui'. entity, placing industries and
assigninghere most profitable or strateg) tally useiul. witliout regard for local desires. II culture and language are lo be 'Internationalized" or standardized throughout ihe Soviet Union,languagi and culture is thehicle lor ibis purpose. This process ofhy whkh Russian language and culture become uni-cersahzisl In icrvv the needsoationalfor communication and integration, can be defended on pragmatic and even ideological grounds In practice, however, "Russiamzation" has led lor the process by which tbe regime attempts to transform the minoritiesand psychologically into Russians Hereof icdpoutik are probably paramount Soviet Russian leaders doubtless have ihe usual prejudicesominant ethnic group, but they are not Creal Russian chauvinists consumed wilh an emotional desire lo convert alien populations, there is little indication of this sort of zeal in theRalher. it is the desire lor more political control over the minorities which Irads the central authorities to sltive for the eradication of national diffeieiicev, and has been among ibe main factorsem to shy away from scliemes ofor economic decentralization. Finally. Ihe
sheer weight ol an old imperial tradition argues against systemic changes to relax central control over the provinces
It is even possible that Soviet leaders might move In the other direction,adicalol authorily lor tbe union republics,resiiltuig in the formal abolition of ihe Soviet Federation, and open association of the Communist regime with traditional Russian nationalism. Some Soviet leaders today flirt wilh Russian nationalism because of Us possible usesolitical tool, in the same way that the Tsars, not Pan-Slavspromoted Pan-Slav ideas for great-power purposes During Writ Id War II Stalin discarded Marxist slogans in favor of nationalist ones with greater emotional appeal. With the waningorce capable of motivating people and legitimizing the regime, some leaders may beaboutubstitute "integrative myth" for Ihe regime
After the Russian Republic itself, there is no area ot the Soviet empire more important to Moscow than Hie Ukraine. Neither the center nor theare easy in their present relauooship and in one way or anothct ihis is bound to change in coming years. This change may be gradual and evolutionary, but it may also resultecision in Mcncow lhat special measures are required. If so. the direction of change will more likely be toward greater centralization, ralheirvolu-lion of power.
BLANK PAGE
Cfcl
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ohn Armstrong made th* observation in FAcurwum. The trendtocontinued
4 From appropriate volumeknm-itoy flSfl
b Jle uumgii uupvji. tleeCentral Anditim;lected byh CPSU Radio Liberty Research. CRDnd "Anof Ihe Current Compwbthe Soviel Central Partyo 2
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Tnvi.l. uml Implie.L
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2
8
and V.
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BorisSourcei of Cordlfclihe Top
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KomeiMiM.
P-aido.2
SSSfl,o.
o. 5.
riWKi). lkuim. nroriau's In.
preeuons. Mnrliuan Quanetlg.
3t. JVoWnoeoficrciMiatyo.o.ument5 Wuy] Veryba. "Slarus uf National Lansuah-ei in Soviet TVeroin.au puo.rrrfu.S. XXVII. Noferororonie.
..3
Kadi" Liberty Ausii-iice Reeearcb anil Program Evnb ujlionhe Huisibcalirxi vl tbeatkgrouud Report74
oJuicnr.. Tins Ir Iheo( lva.ii Dryuh.i. fui eaample,
in liislrfnoir <Undnn. Iftogl.
iind of Vs-vlie,, Ssersiyuk. "Cathedral In
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ciku* inforiitdMinUad
Htu'cMvawifo.SSR,
IV, and Irani liugi csesi'Owirwim rvrrfulVtwi'mJaifM SSfi
lKiiwlDn irf these pmbktib see Robe-it A. Ia-svIs.andmioimliim and II* Demographicn Kds.-ardoei'ff.ru ProMeiiuT
ruk in 1'oJiMfco. I.edentses-n
. Dvmli. jm| Hid.uu! ) ilrnl
in, (Columlicw..
Ilogi txnovHsmu pe-rriUMifa. VII; Sfaltftiitl mlgniiu naieUaiuxi (Mowiw._
v-ipnv.twhmyo SSSfl4 J,. | Nub.,a
Wroino,piil
Stoe Rapawy of thelM-Wn DeiiiQirraphir Divi.mn hr.wuht thi.n my alltntion.
Vyadimlav ChoriMvil,. p. 20
t. wnen mum loiwwutctl BrT information about un iiurul in unoa lomm Chief aaanc ulrm ate: The CHonteur! Fapen.amine (aol aansiiafaf).
Nf"rnrnrCl/ain-
iflB ItrroMi Julian Diirh, "Tlw Nalcoo and Sounri oln theaper un'wntrd al the Ml.fctenc* ota ihr Carvtrnpnranindiiiril.frrrpnati.
suih imtdrnti are mentioned inutler (trow.XI,o.
nd I,3
'A*W. Vplrn.brr
47.
i'elrr rlcitua-tiy..1
Rcxvinled inltlMJt.Aiilmm,
niia. No an. 5
Statement nlo2
a Ve-or> .4
fnrfenatinnarnrriRuttifkaivm'.
lie Conitudlnu Slalemrtit of Vwhen SvrMyuk Al MMnpublished dmumfit
appeal lo thr Utumu Sa-prri-ar brM,
f^mi imuar p. IBL
hornovil, ilotmu! at hn NmrntJ-ei lWi7 liul,erment in rile l'*roine..
uhj.tuui/iidlmn'.
?T7
lump have been Innnl.ilrd andV .ilniiyotor, fliyifneraruj. 7'i- Ct'fipleie Writing!ami in |ohn Kolasky.
eport From the Hen* Rnene ThtitmgtmWmtfm.
ryubas partial leaantatam in Ijettatmta* t'l'onaa.eio-ui'iin "Aiiwnc the Snuwi.'
ji>. ifcinh,,
BUiedial iii StalTolJtrili" p. Conchidinu tlalemenl uf Mykhaylo lloryn altrial.r Faprn. p. II],
9
ichs. "Tne Filth Wnleci'nkrm^om ftnvw. XIV. No p
t.'tJ u> Ivan M. MyhulandSmirt Uirameody- ofrmmin lunpuhlnhed Oilurnhm ilu
^IIIS Speiial Avpurt. II July
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