ITEM PARA, (b)
Soviet Expectations froro Western Technology
The declining productivity of capital and the very slow growth of labor productivity have reduced economic gorwth to levels which the soviet leadership considers too low. To help spur technical progress the Soviets are importing Western technology and equipment and concluding technical cooperation agreements with Western firms and governments. Soviet leaders believe that importing foreign technology will provide production capacityuch shorter time, and at less expense than it would take to develop the technology in the domesticector.
The Soviets have had numerous disappointments with Western technology and equipment. Machinery from western firms has frequently failed to mesh well with existing Soviet equipment, with other foreign equipment, or with Soviet inputsroduction process. In part, this interface problemsatural one. The Sovietector, however, takes an inordinate length of time to solve problems of compatibility'within the civilian economy. The Kama Truck Plant is being furnished with the most modern equipment, but the interface problem is being complicated by Soviet bureaucratic inefficiencies and secrec and completion of the complex will be-dolayed by several years. For much the same reasons, the Fiat-equipped plant
at Tol'yatti becameears behindolor TV plant, bought8 is operating atraction of its rated capacity in part because of improper operating procedures and poor maintenance. There are many other examples.
With all these problems, the Soviets believe that imports of Western equipment and technology have made, are making, and will make important contributions to the level of their technology and are therefore willing to pay substantial sums of foroign exchange to acquire Western equipment and technology. Tho Fiat plant has expanded automobile production substantially and in less time than the Soviets themselves could have done it. The rapid expansion of Soviet production of intermediate products for plastics and synthetic fibers could not have been accomplished without Western technology and equipment. It is estimated that Western equipment to produce ammonia ordered9 will furnish at least half of the increase in annual output of ammoniand perhaps two-thirds of the increase to be achie/ed.
Soviot imports of foreign tec-.nology have enabled tho Soviets to upgrade the technological levels of the motor vehicle and chemical industries as well as other sectors. Moscow is acquiring invaluable know-how and experience for
its engineers and technicians trained to use Western equipment and processes. Based on such experience and on licenses acquired from the West, the Soviets are able to develop their own designs and processes. Soviet imports of foreign technology probably will also raise technological levels in key areas such as computers, electronics and oilfield exploration, among others.
What is most important is that thestablishment itself cannot provide the equipment, technology, and know-how that the leadership believes is required to achieve planned goals. There is thus no real alternative to Western suppliers. The proof of this is in the value of contracts concluded with Western suppliers in recent years. Known Soviet orders for Western plant and equipment have increased6 billion2 to more thanillion Moreover, billions of dollars worth of Western equipment and technology are now being negotiated for purchase during the next five-year plan foaturing equiptnent for the metallurgical and petrochemical industries, oil and gas exploration, transmission and refit.ing, earthmoving equipment, nuclear power planus and others.
The Soviets are also continuing to sign technical cooperation agreements with Western firms. They have concluded more th.inith US firms alone suggesting thnt the number
of agreements with firms in the entire developed West is wellundred. Such agreements generally fall in areas of technology in which the Soviets are most interested computers, semiconductors, chemicals, oil and gas, etc. Moreover, the Soviets have concluded agreements covering the same technology with soveral firmsedundancy designed to maximize the acquisition of information and know-how.
S2 a Illegal Negotiations and Trade
iew of tne extensive Soviet efforts
to acquire Western technology and equipmentariety of channels apd means, reported cases of trade diversion apparently represent the tipery large iceberg. Some idea of how extensive and organized Soviet efforts are to obtain Western technology, including controlled military and industrial technology can be gained by looking at Soviet institutional arrangements for accomplishing this task (attachment) Some Examples
Intelligence reports document some attempts to
the illegal shipment of embargoed items by-various m
the Communist countries:
The illegal purchase of embargoed items from witting
middlemen at blackmarket prices has served as an important
year, the Soviets are known to have illegally purchased a
weapons-oriented minicomputeravid Mann pattern
generator (semiconductor manufacturing equipment) from European businessmen. In both cases the incident wontand/or unreported by the exporting country.
On several occasions embargoed commodities haveshipped to the Communist countries under Recent intelligence has uncovered
.embargoed semiconductor test equipment to the USSR and the
PRC. Discussions are presently underway between this firm
and Bulgaria for the sale of technology to produce There are also indications
exported metal-oxidentegratedtechnology andto the USSR
without COCOM clearance. In none of those cases hasaction been taken
In responseS confrontation inssistant Secretary Dimov of the Yugoslav Chamber of the Economy
confirmed the diversion oC US manufactured automatic computer
memory core testers and semiconductor manufacturing equipment
ugoslav import-export firm to the USSR. Similar
confirmation has also been forthcoming on the diversion of
embargoed equipment to other Communist countries. It is
uncertain whether there have been cases of trade diversion
which were not admitted to by the Yugoslavs.
items of only limited assistance to strategic-military production.
Enforcement and Attitude
The multilateral controls arrangement (COCOHJ lacks
adequate enforcement machinery; participating countries have -never agreed to any administrative system for policing or imposing sanctions. In recent years companies
ave exported important COCOM-erobargoed technology and equipment without the approval of COCOM, and in certain cases these exports have beenwith government approval. US unilateral controls also have been frustrated because the US has been unable to exercise effective extraterritorial control over subsidiaries and licensees. End-use assurances, destination checks, and other US enforcement procedures have
not eliminated the diversion or transshipment of US-origin
Diversions and illegal* trade would take place even if
other COCOM countries exercised asegree of control
and enforcement as the United States. But such trade is
ore lax attitude of both government and
businessmen in most of these countriesis trade with
the USSR and other Communist countries. These countries,
morewer,-exercise no special control over tho export of technology to 'Communist destinations. They are more' concerned
There are also strong indications thatf COCOM countries have been establishing firms in non-COCOM countries which manufacture and/or sell embargoed items in order to circumvent existing trade controls. As an example,;Holmus
manufacturing equipment based on Western tech-
nology in Switzerland and exporting it to the Communist
the West German Government
charged the headest German firm withexporting computer hardware and software to the USSR through an Austrian-based firm. He had br" denied US export privileges0 for similar charges intelligence reports also indicate that the vice-president of an electronics firm in Vienna, Austria, has been purchasing US semiconductor manufacturing equipment for assembly and export to the USSR snd the PRC.
The ease with which tho USSR can acquire- embargoed items
illegally varies greatly with the size of items and .their value. For example, significant guantities of integrated
.circuits are believed to be finding their way to the USSR
and other Communist countries relatively easily, while larger
items may be obtainable only in small quantities and ot con-
siderable expense. The relatively limited quantities and the unreliability of the supply sources tend to render such
visiting the Soviet Union as vehicles for obtainingand follow-up leads to US business firms. clandestine activities involve the spotting,eventual recruitment of US businessmen as agents forUnion. In this last connection, it is notfindarge percentage of the staff of theof Trade and Industry are KGB officers of
with export promotion and many of them regard the sale of technology very much the same way as export of products.
as well as governments
tend not to be concerned with future competition resulting
from the sale of most technology and more concerned iwith short-term gains. Those technologies that are protected by the firms are guarded just as zealously against acquisition by non-Communist firms as by Communist countries. f
Soviet Clandestine Acquisition of Foreign Technology
The bulk of Soviet foreign technology is obtained through overt mechanisms of foreign trade, licensing, scientific ax-
changes, and other means. The responsibility for gaining access to the restricted hard core of foreign mililary and
industrial technology belongs to the intelligence services.
The Committee of State Security, or KGB, through its Scientific
nnd Technical Directorate, collects,orldwideon the most recent developments inery wide range of industrialmilitary intelligence arm of the intelligenceGRU, the other major clandestine collection agencysince then the shadow of thelatter is thus the mainspring of the Sovieteffort. The intelligence services of thecountries are available to the KGB for theforeign .
Two organizations serve as focal points for the generation of collection requirements, the State Committee for Science and Technology (GKNT) and tho Military Industrial Commission
The former is responsible for coordinating
resources to civilian research and development and tho
latter .for coordination of the.efforts of defense industry, including itp research sector.
One of the primary functions of tho GKNT is to servelearinghouse for requirements for foreign scientific and technical information submitted by the various Sovr.et non-
military scientific and industrialith the
assistance of KGB and GRU officers on its staff, the GKNT
determines which requirements can be satisfied by overt. methods, and which can be answered only by the intelligence . services. Also with the aid of intelligence officerswithin its foreign department, the GKNT prepares the annual plans for Soviet participation in scientific conferences, and for the exchanges of scientific and technical delegations which take place within the framework of cultural exchange agreements. t
Theresumably,imilar screening exercise with its KGB and GRU representatives, levies defense industry requirements on the intelligence services. It is assumed that the KGB's Scientific and Technical Directorate serves as the coordinator of this phase of foreign technology collection
as well, and that there is liaison between the VPKthe GKNT
to avoid duplication of collection
While much Soviet civilian technology intelligence activity
merely piggybacks industrial negotiations, Soviet intelligence
makes full use of exchange students and technicians' visiting the United States as well as exploiting American scientists
B2b. Trade Activities in Technology
In its efforts to obtain foreign technology and equipment, the USSR has increased its purchases in the West substantially. Soviet orders for Western equipment rose6 billion21 billionn addition, Moscow6 billion in large-diameter pipe for natural gas transmission Soviet orders for equipment4 were concentrated in the fields of chemicals and petrolchemicals, mining and construction, oil and gas, and motor vehicle manufacturing. Orders for Western electronics also increased considerablyest Germany, France, Japan and the United States are the main suppliers of machinery and equipment to the USSR.
oscow will probably continue to depend heavily on the West for technology and equipment. Based on current negotiations and estimates of import capacity, Soviet equipment purchases may reach an average ofillion annually in the next five years.
irrent negotiations and general agreements already reached indicate that the Soviets will be importing equipment for an iron ore reduction complex from West Germany; chemical plants from Italy; an aluminum complex from France, and for timber, coal, and oil projects from Japan. rrent negotiations ilso suggest that the USSR will rely heavily
on the West in other areas: the buildingecond gas pipeline from the Orenburgajor paper/pulp complex in Siberia; an oil refinery in the Soviet Far East; the BAM railroad,umber of hotels. Moscow may also turn to the West for wide-bodied aircraft, complete plants for consumer goods, food processing plants, nuclear power plants, and other plants, equipment and technology. Finally, the signing of agreements to develop Siberian gas reserves, specifically the North Star and Yakutsk projects, could require S7 billion in Western equipment.
The chief constraints on Soviet imports of Western equipment and technology are Western export controls on certain multiple-use (as well as strategic) equipment and technology; Soviet import capacity, and Soviet ability to assimilate advanced Western technology. Export controls have been relaxed in recent years and only the most sophisticated technology and equipment are now denied to theery powerful computers, semiconductor production equipment, and similar items largely in the electronics category. It is assumed that Western controls will be further relaxed at the current COCOM List Review, and export controls will be even lessonstraining factor in the future.
4 Soviet import capacity was an important constraint. Increased Soviet imports of Western capital
goods led to an increase in debt to the west because of
Soviet inability to generate sufficient export earnings
to keep pace with import demand. But the sharp rise in
prices for oil, raw materials and gold34 has substantially increased Soviet export capability and consequently import capacity.
Assimilation of Western equipment and technology continues toroblem area for the USSR, but over time may ease somewhat as Soviet engineers and technicians gain experience with Western equipment. Much will depend on how the Soviets deal with the problems that currently inhibit the diffusion and use of both domestic and foreign
t!2I) Impact of Technology Transfer on Soviet Economy
Soviet imports of Ifestern plant and machinery0 are not expected to provide dramatic boosts to the economic growth rate. First, the volume of machinery imports will be small relative to total domestic investment in the USSR. Even if machinery and equipment imports grow to the estimated S5 billion per yearnd all are directed to industry, the growth of industrial investment will increase by only about one-half of one percent per year. Moreover, the ultimate impact on economic growth depends upon the use to which the resources freed by Western imports is put. These resources could be allocated to investment, defense, or consumption. Based on Moscow's announced policy to pay more attention to theubstantial share of the additional resources will probably be used to produce consumer goods, reducing the effect on economic growth.
Nevertheless, the technology transfer should help overcome bottlenecks now threatening future growth. Siberian development, for example, is essential for maintaining an adequate flow cf raw materials to industry. The Soviets have admitted that Western technology ant! equipment are needed for petroleum exploration and drilling, particularly in permafrost areas and offshore. The lack of this equipment is contributing to the current slow rate of discovery which
could result in dueling oil production. The Soviets are also becoming increasingly dependent upon Western equipmentipe, compressors, and valvesfor extracting and delivering natural gas.
The acquisition of Western technology could also break the production bottleneck in the computer and semiconductor industries andore concentrated use of native RfiD resources. The introduction of modern computers, peripheral equipment and know-how would be felt throughout the economy, both in civilian and military sectors. Soviet accesseliable supply of Western semiconductors could speed Soviet development of complex electronic systems and instrumentation for advanced weapons.
Western technology should also contribute to raising living standards, avowed by the leadership to be the primary goal of the current five-year. The Soviet program to expand and modernize the automobile and truck industry has included purchases of aboutillion Of Western machinery and equipment. The large amount of fertilizer equipment and plants bought from the West will also benefit the consumer by increasing grain supplies in support of Brezhnev's livestock program.
42b Impact of Technology Transfer on Increasing Soviet Dependence on the West
In aggregative terms, Soviot dependence on the West is insignificant. In trade with the West Soviet exports (or imports) currently represent little more thanf GNR. If imports increased, say,nnually over the next five years and GNP grew at about 5t (about the sane as in the last fivehe share would still be less thann the trillion dollar Soviet economy
But Soviet trade with the West is very specialized. Imports, particularly of capital goods, have been of considerable importance to those sectors of the economy which the Soviets have made great efforts to upgrade the chemical and petrochemical industries and the motor vehicle manufacturing sector. Such imports, together with imports of Western grain and other goods, have increased the importance of the West in Soviet foreign trade. Looked at in the perspective of two decades, continuing Soviet efforts to obtain Western equipment, technology and other products are, in fact, leading the USSRreater dependence on the West. The West now accountsf Soviet foreign trade, up fromsomeears ago.
Although it is doubtful that the Soviets will subscribe to the ideao-called international division of labor for many years to come they have even resisted it for
themselves in CEMAhe kinds of transactions it is becoming more involved in may very well increase Soviet dependence on the West. For example, in the gas-.for-pipo deals with firms in Western Europe, the USSR has agreed to deliver natural gas for periodsears. Long-term Soviet supply commitments to the West Jare] also involve aluminum, wood, and chemicals. The sane type of arrangements apply to the proposed multibi1lion dollar projects calling for US and Japanese development of Soviet fossil fuel resources.
The traditional Soviot policy goal of self-sufficiency Im dead even if it has not beenecent burial. This does not mean that tho Soviets are now ready to espouse the principle of comparative advantage. What it does mean is that without imports of Western equipment, technology, and capital the Soviet leadership is aware that its plans for upgrading Soviet industry and exploiting untapped Siberian resources would stand little chance of being fulfilled for many years to come.
Soviet orders are expected to be heavily concentratedew sectors, however, and mayajor stimulus to manufacturers of chemical equipment, large-diameter steel pipe, and heavy construction equipment. For example, much of Europe's production of large-diameter steel pipe in the rest ofs earmarked for Soviet oil and gas lines; Mannesmann of West Germany ispecial plant to fill Soviet pipe orders. Several other large European firms, including Krupp of West Germany-and Creusot-Loire of France, sell meref their output to the Soviets.
It is also unlikely that Western Europe and Japan will become dependent upon the USSB for supplies of raw materials- Although natural gas deliveries to Western Europe will increase rapidlytoillion cubic meters or more annually0 Soviet, supplies will still account for lessf the total projected consumption of natural gas by the EC at the end of this decade. Soviet deliveries of coal and timber to Japan will increase
substantially, but will also representmall share of total Japanese imports of these raw materials
ft3b. Problems in Assimilating Foreign Technology
Machinery purchased from western firms frequently fails to mesh well with existing Soviet equipment, with Other foreign equipment or with Soviet inputsroduction process. In part, this interface problematural one. The Sovietector, however, takes an inordinate length of time to solve problems of compatibility within the civilian economy. In the case of the mammoth Kama Truck Plant, Western engineers and managers estimate that several years will be necessary to interface all of the foreign equipment into an integrated operation. The USSR is making integration even more difficult by limiting Western suppliers" visits to the site and by withholding from them useful drawings of the existing buildings in which the foreign equipment is to be installed.
Another Soviet policy that makes assimilation slow and difficult is the importing of equipment that is too advanced for rapid assimilation given existing levels of Soviet technological development. This overreaching is especially evident in the computer field. Co".or TV production provides another example. ho USSR purchasedSomplete package of very advanced, automated machinery and technology for the fabrication of shadow masks for color television tubes. By the endear's
training in the US for Soviet technicians, the equipment still was not operational and in fact had suffered severe damage through improper operating procedures and poor maintenance. Thus, the Soviets were forced to procure additional technical assistance and parts to restore the line to its original conditionost greater than the original purchase price. This line is now operating atraction of its rated capacity andajor bottleneck in Soviet production of color TV. The USSR has now decided on turnkey purchases from the US of equipment and technology to achieve large-scale production of color TV tubes.
Soviet assimilation of foreign technology also has been hampered by the low quality of the labor force which often fails to master unfamiliar and complex foreign machinery. The FIAT-equipped passenger car plant at Tol'yatti became operationalears behind schedule. Labor problemsajor factor in the delay. Soviet workers frequently shut down an entire line to make minor adjustmentsingle piece of machinery. Supervisory personnel at the working level, reluctant to make even minor decisions, bucked upstairs virtually all problem-solving decisions. Despite intensive training in Italy, technicians commonly reassembled machines improperly after repairs. Furthermore, in the FIAT plant as in other foreign installations, workers were casual in their approach to maintenance of precision machinery.
In the case of the0 computer at the Joint Institute of Nuclear Research in Dubna, reliability problems are serious because technicians will not conduct routine testing of electronic equipmentan important factor in preventive maintenance. Part of the problem is the Soviets' lack Of experience with computers prior to acquisition of the
The management problems in the USSR that inhibit the diffusion and utilization of domestic technology also work against assimilation of foreign technology. Soviet enterprise managers are still rewarded primarily for fulfilling output plans and are unwilling to interrupt production to install new equipment, foreign or domestic. Management in the applied RtD system is also rewarded for fulfilling plans and not for developingchnoloriy or facilitating the wide dissemination of technology. The Soviet economy, in short, offers little incentive to upgrade technology or means for effectively diffusing technology to all potential users. Soviet management also lacks the experience and ability to plan and oversee the construction and start-up of huge, Western equipped factories. The Kama Truck Plant is the first, large-scale Soviet attempt to act as prime contractorarge, Western equipped factory. Plans to build another truck factory in Siberia are evidently being held in abeyance while Kama's success or failure is assessed.
12b Impact of Technology Transfer on- apan on
USSRarketupplier traditionally has been or marginal importance to the major Soviet trading partners in the WestWest Germany, France, Italy, the Uk, Japan and the United States. The share of the USSR in tho exports or imports of any of those countries is less thannd some cases even less In terms of the dependence of these countries on the Soviet market for machinery and equipment, the percentages are not substantially different. Based on projected Soviet imports of machinery and equipment!ron the West the USSR could account for as muchrr the machinery and equipment exports of some of the Western countries
Moscow has frequently cited the importance of Soviet orders in helping the West through the recession, and, in fact, the recession hasactor in the recent willingness of Italy and the UK to advance large linen of long-term credit at subsidized rates. But most Western European countries as well as Japan traditionally have sought to expand exports to tho USSR; the major limitation has been Soviet demand, in part dictated by foreign exchange availabilities. These BUM constraints will limit the importance of the Soviet market in the future.
If the USSR continues to import Western technology, some of the assimilation problems might be reduced over the next ten years. For example, much will be learned from the Kama plant about equipping, integrating and managing
Western-equipped plants. In the short or medium run there
is no indication that the soviet record with respect to assimilating technology quickly andide scale will improve markedly, but some improvement is likely as Soviet experience in dealing with Western technicians, equipment and technology accumulates. In the long run, whether there will be more incentive for enterprises to upgrade technology is questionable. The USSR already has struggled with this problem forears with no appreciable effect.
S3e Tlio SovietGame Plan TechnologyStrengths and Weaknesses
The USSR traditionally has sought to tap theresources of the west to bolster its own lagging technological position. The level of Soviet technology varies greatly from industry to industry, partlyesult of Soviet economic priorities. Most notably, the military-industrial sector" has been given preference with respect to allocations of high-quality manpower and materials. Thus, sectors important to defense programs have flourished. The same is true of some sectors important to the USSR's massive investment program. On the other hand, industrial sectors concerned with consumers goods are,ule, saddJsd with outdated technology, supply shortages, and management problems that do not plaguethe military sectoror even key capital equipment producersto the same degree.
The basic industries whose output directly supports both military production and investment programsteel, fuels, electric power, producers equipment, and chemicalshave indeed received sufficient priority so that their
technology occasionally equals that of the West. Sut much
of Soviet output is still produced with technology obsolescent
by Western standards. Imports have been heavily weighted in
favor of machinery, equipment, and production know-how to modernize these basic industries. In industries producing consumer goods, tho USSR is operatingechnological level well below Western standards. Greater leadership concern with consumer welfare, however, has led to larger purchases of consumer-related technology.
Western Technology Wanted
In recent years the Soviets have stepped up their drive to acquire Western equipment and technology. Primarily, they have bought chemical plants, offshore drilling equipment, oil and gas field equipment, wood processing equipment, mining and construction equipment, motor vehicleeouipxent, and food processing equipment.
The USSR is also actively interestedide range of other capital goods to improve its ability to produce integrated circuits, numerically controlled machine tools, very large and very small computers, avionics, computer
peripherals, semiconductors, and communications switching equipment* It wants to obtain technology to manufacture construction equipment, oil field' and pipeline equipment, industrial process controls, large tractors and heavy trucks, airframes and engines, and chemical equipment. But Western technology for consumer-related products are on the shopping list toofor example, machinery for
making tin cans, paper containers, room air conditioners, artificial fibers, and color TV picture tubes.
Large amounts of Western technology will be employed in developing Siberia. They have purchased large Japanese and US tractors for timbering, pipeline, and railroad construction operations, and they have purchased US mining trucks with capacities in excessons for open pit coal mining. The USSR excels in blast furnace operations but will spend SI billion on the new Western technology for the direct reduction of iron ore because the availability of cheap fuel and electric power make this process economical in Siberia. Because the Siberian gas fields are remote from the major markets, the Soviets aro buying largo Western pipeline compressors, automated pipeline valves and remote control systems. The USSR is also seeking to use surplus hydroelectric power to produce aluminum, forro alloys, and pulp and paper.
Channels Used to Acquire Western Technology
Imports of machinery and equipment represent the main channel for the flow of Western technology to the USSR.
However, other channels of transfer have been increasingly used, including the acquisition of technical data, licensing agreements, cooperative production arrangements, collaboration in research, the exchange of SfcT information with private Western firos as well as governments, attendance at international meetings, and visits to Western plants and laboratories. Moscow has been pushing hard to tap all possible sources of Western technology, both overt and covert.
The particular approach enployed often seems to depend on what is expedient. Direct contact with Western scientific and industrial experts by those Soviet personnel who actually need or will apply the teov-how is preferred over the use of non-technical interreciaries such as trade representatives or KGB officials. If the overt approach is unsuccessful, or the technology falls under COCOM restrictions, the covert approach is the ready alternative.
Moscow's highly-centralized direction of foreign trade coupled vith its willingness to use all possible means of
the USSH has concluded with Western companies, re with US firms; five to ten more US agreements are expected by the end of this year. One of the strongest motives for Western participation is the hope of developing product
markets. Advanced scientific technical knowledge can
probably be more easily transferred, through these agreements,
which can include joint RfiD projects and exchanges of data, personnel and the like, than through the government-to-government agreements- So far the implementation of these agreements has been spotty and our information limited, but the net flow of technology has surely been in the USSR's direction.
The fact that much technology can now beshould enhance the effectiveness for covertresources can be concentratedmallertargets and the access to targets will be increasednumbers of Soviets involved in overt relationshipsfirms. The KGB has been tasked to intensifytofo -mation in tho United States,the PRC on particularly important
work having military applications.
In laying out foreign intelligence tasks for the major Western countries were ranked accordingtechnological development potential. The US the UK ranked second; the Soviets expect thecontinue serious research in many fields havingboth for its own use as well as onthe US. Japan and West Germany were put in thirdthat the USSRn thesebecoming more military oriented. Franceotation that it possessed developedand used of the "latest evelopments. Incategory, the PRC vas identified as amilitary country, and Israel, Italy, Canada, Belgium, and Sweden were singled out asfron the point of view of military technology
In terms of topics, the KGB's intelligence targets
center on foreign military intentions, advanced military
technology, andevelopments having both
military and civilian applications. Theechnology
IntelligenceKGB was to concentrate
on obtaining intelligence on:
Plans by potential enemies (above all the US)
for preparing and.carryingudden attack on the USSR
and its allies.
RiD that could lend to the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction.
Development of new or improved weapons systems.
Results of private orrganizations (industrial or military) involved in the studyrends, technological application and/or innovation, and the dcvelop-ment of militaryoctrines.*.
The achievements of the principal western countries
that could provide maximum aid to the Soviet economy. The
fields of chemistry, radio technology, electronics, and
metallurgy were specifically cited.
As an example of the focus of the clandestine require-
ments, the KGB targeting in four of the six technological areas addressed in the present study*included:
guidance. US MIRV systems including Mi nu tenia andan) submerged launch missiles with MIRVs. The increase in (foreign) guidance accuracy of the warheads was identified as an important task.
Improved Court! generation computers,
using LSI, electro-optical, devices, and holographic mcrcory
systems as well ah mini computers. All categories of
computer applications civil as well as- military appear to
be of interest.
other two areasenergy and agricultural technologynot mentioned_
viation. High-speed multiple-purpose aircraft having long-range and high, altitude performance. Supersonic transport and passenger aircraft withpeeds. SST engines and high bypass ratio engines with greater economy of operation. The materials technology required to develop such engines such as nev heat resistant materials, cooling methods, and high temperature lubrication materials.
Industrial Automation. Automation processes associated with semiconductor production, especially these-designed to increase the reliability of the final product. New industrial processes for the production of fuels and other important chemical products. Computer driven control systemseneral category.
ENERGY EXTRACTION TECHNIQUES
Civilian/Trade Promotion Technology
Petroleum Equipment State of the Art.
The United States is the world's leading producer of complete systems for onshore and offshore exploration,and pipelining of oil and gas. The most advanced geophysical equipment and related computer hardware and software can be acquired only in the US. US firms alsothe most advanced drilling and production equipment in the world. Only US companies, subsidiaries, or foreign licensees manufacture fully automated pipeline valves,and pumping equipment for large diameter pipelines. Permafrost technology in the west is controlled largely by US firms and their Canadian affiliates and subsidiaries.
Certain types of seismic and geophysical equipment arc produced in France, West Germany, and the United Kingdom. Large diameter line-pipe and some oilfield equipment isin Western Europe and Japan. Some offshore technology is being developed by Dutch, French, Norwegian, British, and Japanese firms.
In general, the USSRears behind modern US exploration and drilling know-how. The Soviet Union lacks sophisticated geophysical equipment used routinely in the
West, such as modern seismic instruments and computerized field units to analyze seismic data. As the USSR strives to locate new oil and gas resources in permafrost areas and in deeper, more complicated geologic structures, the lack of such equipment will severely limit discovery capabilities. Poor quality drilling and producing equipment alsoottleneck. Shortages of good quality casing and drill pipe, the lack of high quality drill bits, special drilling tools, drilling fluids, mud pumps, and blowout preventers contribute to inefficient operations in Lhe field.
The Soviet turbodrill, which is used forf all drilling, is an excellent tool for the relatively shallow, hard rock formations encountered in the Urals-Volga region but is very inefficienteet. Continued heavy reliance on the turbodrill has contributed to rising costs and reduced drilling rates as depths of wells have increased. Because of the lack of processing facilities in the field, large volumes of associatedillion cubic feet per yearare beingarticularly wasteful practice.
The USSR haslight capability to explore for and produce oil and gas in offshore areas. Although oil has been produced from deposits in the Caspian Sea for someears, most of the output is obtained from wells drilledetwork of fixed platforms extending from the shore.
The Soviets haveobile drilling platforms (jackup type) with only one capable of drilling in moreeet of waterepth0 feet. These and otherhave led the USSR during the past few years to turn to Western suppliers for much needed technical know-how and modern equipment.
The USSR, however, has some strength in two areas of the petroleum industry. Itaterflooding program in producing fields that is unique. Unlike Western oil producing countries that use waterfloodingeans of secondary recovery after formation pressure declines, the Soviet Unionater flood shortly after the initial stage of production to maintain oil flow. This procedure is designed to prolong the producing life of the field and increase ultimate oil recovery, but in practice serioushave been madewater has been injected in some cases at inappropriate pressures and with improper spacingresulting in low recovery of reserves at some major fields.
The USSR has laid more large-diameter oil and gasand has had more experience building pipelines in permafrost areas than any other country. Sovietin this field, however, have not been without problems. For example, many of the pipelines do not operate at full capacity because of the lack of the required pumps, compressors, and valves which must be imported from the West.
Soviet Attempts to Acquire Petroleum Technology and Equipment in the West
Soviet purchases of and contracts for Western petroleum equipment have risen sharply during theears, totalling more0 million. Not included in this total are5 billion for large-diameter pipe ordered4 from West Germany, Italy, and France. Almost two-thirds Of the equipment and technology ordered or bought from tho West2 is for construction of pipelines, primarily for gas.
A vital part of the expanding Soviet energy base is the increased output of natural gas, primarily from deposits in the deserts of Central Asia, the permafrost regions of West Siberia, and from Orenburg in the southern Urals. Because gas can be delivored economically only by pipeline, the growth in gas production is dependent on the expansion of the network Of large-diameter pipelines. Aboutof the total equipment orders were for gas processing and oilfield equipment. More than half of these orders were placed in France to be used in the development of the Orenburg gas field. Host of the US oilfield equipment ordered by the Soviets consists of submersible pumps (and spare parts) for increasing the fluid flow at older oil fields.
To date Soviet orders for geophysical and exploratory equipment have been small. However, ouch orders may increase. The rate of discovery of new oil reserves ir. the USSR is lagging badly, partly because of the poor quality seismic
and drilling equipment. In recent months Soviet petroleum
officials visiting the US have made offers to buy or obtain
licenses to manufacture large amounts of US equipment for
both onshore and offshore oil and gas exploration.
Potential Economic Effect on the USSR of the Acquisition of Western Petroleum Equipment
The USSR could carry out its petroleum exploration
and development programs with its own equipment, despite the
inadequacies, but at greater cost andonger period
of time than would be the case if it had access to Western
technology and equipment. On the other hand, difficulties
arise in the use of unfamiliar advanced oilfield equipment
from the West, especially when the Soviets do not specify
the conditions under which the equipment is to be used and
will not permit Western technical experts to supervise its
initial operation. Nevertheless, imports of western petroleum
equipment and technology will become increasingly important
to the Soviet economy. Expansion of the gas pipeline network
will require Soviet imports of western valves, turbines, and
compressors in larger amounts during the remainder of the
s domestic manufacturing capabilities are inadequate
to keep pace with demands. Certainly the urgent Soviet
need to locate new oil reserves will necessitate increased
reliance on Western know-how, especially in the offshore
areas of the Arctic and the Par East. Soviet technology in the use of mobile offshore platforms and subsca production is far behind the West, and without Western assistance in exploration and development any meaningful results in the offshore program would bo at leastears away.
Coal-State of the Art
The level of technology in the Soviet coal miningindustry is, in general, below that of its counterparts in the US and Western Europe. The lag is greater infor surface mining than in underground mining machinery. For example, the USSH has yet to put intoragline withcubic meter bucket, the design for which wasto have boon completed By comparison, the US coal mining industry has draglines in use with bucket capacities of upubic meters. The largest Soviet trucks in scries production for surface mining operationston capacity, less than one-fourth the capacity of tho largest US vehicles. ecent article by Sovieton surface mining of coal indicated Lhat the USSR hoped to have dump trucksapacity ofons and coal carriersapacityons in series production
Soviet Attempts to Acquire Technology in the West
In thehe USSR imported from Eastern Europe more0 million worth of large bucket wheel excavators for surface mining of coal ln Kazakhstan. Purchases from the West of all types of coal mining equipment have averaged no more thanillion annually in recent years. Substantial amounts of surface mining equipment, however, will be imported from Japan, and possibly from the US, for exploitation of coking coal deposits in the Yakutsk ASSR. Inhe Japanese agreed to provide credits0 million for this project with repayments to be made in the form of coal. Inhe Soviets contracted to purchase fromargo crawler tractors for use in the Yakutsk coal field, and inquiries have been made regarding possible purchase from the US ofcubic yard electric mining shovelsen blast hole drillsillion) and eighty to oneillion). The Soviet shopping list for the Yakutsk project reportedly also includes truck cranes varying in size fromons. Additionaland technology for surface mining of coal may be sought in the future as the USSR has ambitious plans for expansion of coal production by this means over the nextears.
Potential Economic Impact of Acquisition
Equipment for the Yakutsk project will enable the USSR to begin large-scale exploitation of coking coal deposits in this areaource of foreign exchange. Deliveries of coal to Japan from Yakutsk are toillion tons per year At present prices, the value of thesewould be0 million. Later, the coal will also serveasis, along with nearby iron ore deposits, for further development of Soviet steel production.
Hu )tnle-Use Techno logy
Industrial Automation Background
Industrial automation is the technique of improving human productivity in the processing of materials, energy^ and semifabricated parts by using machine self control (through feedback) and automatic product programming. Automation therefore excludes ordinary mechanization and
Two major categories of processes susceptible toare distinguishable: the flowhemical, petroleum, steel, electric powerand the machining and assembly of discrete machine partsparticularly prominent in the manufacture of motor vehicles, tractors, railroad equipment, antifriction bearings, and pipe fittings.
The Soviets have been interested in automation and active in its development since the term was coined in the. Their interest stemmed from.the advantages automation offers for rapid large-scale industrializationncreased labor productivity, improved control of quality, better use of inputs (reduction ofnd higher returns to capital.
The USSR lags behind the industrialized Western countries in the application of automatic control except in the automation of iron and steel furnaces and hydro eloctric plants. The Soviets were early innovators in tho mechanization and automation of very large blast furnaces. They rival the Japanese as world leaders in blast furnace technology, with the US and Western Europe trailing. The USSR probably is the equal of other industrialized countries in controlling open hearth and oxygen converter furnaces, but lags considerably in the automation of roiling, tinning, galvanizing, and annealing thin steel sheet. They have serious problems in controlling sheet thickness and roll motor speed. US firms are world leaders in this area, but west German and Japanese technology is also excellent.
At almost all Soviet hydropower stations, including the vory largest, the generating units are started up, connected into the distribution system, loaded up, and closed down automatically or by remote control centers. At tho majority of Soviet steam power plants, the primary production processes are automatedomprehensive centralized control system. The complexities of the stationsegawatt (MW| generating units require the use of computers to collect and process performance data to properly dispatch
power into the distribution system. AtW stations, control functions and data collection are carried out by computer on an experimental basis and the Soviets plan to install automatic computer control on ten of the largest thermal stations. ontinuing shortage of computers has contributed to the lag in automation of steam power stations. The USSR has not sought to import equipment from the West for this sector although good technology is available in all the industrialized countries.
In the automation of chemical plants, the US, West Germany, Japan, France, Italy, and the UK arc generally superior to the USSR. All export complete chemical plants to the USSR. The USSR haserious effort to automate process controlew leading plants, but widespread diffusion of automation technology throughout the industry is still years away. The Soviets lack the broad experience of the Westerncountries in flow automation, and instrumentation and computers for monitoring and controlling continuous processes are not yet available in sufficient quantities.
There is reason to believe that much of what is termed computer control of processes in tho USSR would be more properly called data handling and display, and that corrections to process parameters are made manually. In the course of selling modern petrochemical plants, US engineers have found that many Soviet engineers haveudimentaryof computer control of the processes. This discovery suggests that their experience with application of computers at major production facilities is small,ew Soviet engineers haverasp of the technology from participating in automation programs at demonstration plants.
The USSR has been building pipe lines for years and has managed to install the necessary communications and automation equipment to operate many pumping or compressor stations by remote control. he first installations with computers for measuring and controlling flows in pipelines had been completed. The USSR has also made considerable progress in automating the pumping of oil from wells to central collecting points. Not all Soviet investments in automation in this area are rational, however. The outlays for remote control of facilities in one oil field will not pay off from operating economies in less thanears, when the technology will be obsolete. In these technologies the US is the world loader.
Tho US exercises general world leadership in automating machining and assembly processes in the machinery industries, although firms in Japan and Western Europe are closing tho gap and have taken the leadew instances. The use of automation in Soviet machine building is mixed. Automatic transfer lines arc widely used for mass-produced parts, but too little use is made of ordinary mechanization. The USSR io probably at about the world level in design of automatic transfer machine tool lines, which it has been producing It is below the world level in automatic assembly and in the application of numerically controlled (NC) machining to batch production.
Many Soviet automatic transfer lines have been by enterprises that connect automaticmachines by automated conveyors of their At the start of the current Five Year Plan,had only two machine tool plants
in producing automatic transfer lines, and thesecould produceets of equipmentthe end ofnew specialized plants to produce
automatic lines or standardized tools and components for them are to be in operation.
Numerically controlled (NC) machines have been growinghare of Soviet cutting machine tool output, and4 amounted0 unitsotal productionhe USotal production5 cutting machine7 were NC types. The Soviet assortment of machine tools includes someapability for contour cutting simultaneously in three or more axes, but most are controllable in no more than two axes simultaneously, and many have only point-to-point control. Soviet,NC machines are weakest in their electronic controls and servo mechanisms-
The Soviets arc beginning to produce machining centers with automatic tool changers but apparently are still in the prototype and demonstration phase of such advanced NC systems as. computer numerical control irect numerical control
nd direct computer control of manufacturing systems
connected together by controllable conveyors (CMPM)*. The
East Germans seem to have made greater progress in advanced
machining systems than the Soviets and apparently are
working with them on NC applications.
The US leads the world in the technology of numerically
controlled and computer controlled machining and manufacturing.
This technology was born in the US in thend
T Systemsthis kind are called computer managed parts manufacturing (CMPM) systems. Another term for this is variable mission systems.
nurtured by the Defense Department until economic applications were found for it in the civilian economy. Numerically controlled tools now provide an economic means for producing parts in smallcale of production that is typical of many investment goods and military products.
All the industrialized countries of Western Europeproduce NC tools and machining centers. OutsideUS, the state-of-the-art is most advanced in Japan. and the US have put CMPM systems into operation- butsystems are more advanced because they can handleassortment ofEuropean firms do not.
seem to be putting much effort into such systems at this time East Germany, however, has put several systems into service
and probablysupply them to Other CEMA countries.
Soviet Interest in Foreign Automation Equipment
The USSR is not avidly purchasing the technology of industrial automation, per se. Its money is being spent for industrial production equipment, and, in the process, some very advanced systems of industrial automation are being acquired.
ompilation of morearge contracts for imported industrial equipment from the West in the last three years, less than ten appear to consist principally of industrial automation equipment. Of these, the most
significant are automation technology for rolling mills and oil and gas pipelines. However, the Soviets have not acquired the technology of automation nor the know-how for producing automation equipment. They have bought only the equipment to automate specific installations. The assimilation of the design and production know-how embodied in the equipment is usually difficult.
Since8 the Soviets have bought between SI and S2 million per year worth of laboratory instruments for defining the chemical and physical properties of gases, liquids, snd organic compounds. While intended for laboratory use, the technology in these instruments can bc adapted for the automated control of flow processes in the chemical industry. The quality of Soviet instruments of this type is below that of US equipment.
Soviets also have an
scientific and technical ,
cooperation, which includes, inter alia, data collection and communications, and industrial control equipment of unspecified types. The agreement covers exchange of information, production samples, acquisition or transfer of methods and processes, and know-how for the manufacture of products.
Significance of Acquisition of Automatquipment Economise
For the USSR, the principal economic advantages from automation are large scale outputs and uniformly high quality of product. Automation raises the productivity of both labor and capital. Automated processes set the pace for the workers tending them and obtain more useful hours each year than manually controlled processes, the utilization of which is affected by worker fatigue. Moreover, by providing continuous process control, automation ensures uniform quality ofand optimum use of inputs.
Some processes cannot achieve naxirr.um production rates under conditions of manual control- High speed rolling of sheet steel with uniform thickness is possible only when the screwdown devices on the rollstands are under the continuous control of automatic thickness gauging equipment. The Soviets have had difficulty in this area, and recent purchase of such equipment from West Germany for the Novo Lipetsk mill will permit large increases in the production of hot rolled sheet.
The acquisition of Western automation equipment as integral parts of imported chemical plants is of great importance to the Soviets. The alleged poor quality of many Soviet chemicalolyethylene and polyvinyl-chloride tor high voltage power cable insulationpoint to poor control of the productionondition that can be corrected by automation.
The Soviets are also relying heavily on Western equipment to complete large diameter domestic pipelines. In addition to pipe, pumps, and compressors, they are importing communications and automation equipment. Automation will raise pipeline throughput, because it permits quick response to changing flow conditions at various points in the system.
The large number of automated machine tools imported by the USSR in recent years for the motor vehicle and tractor industries were necessary to supplement domestic supplies of tools for very large new factories. From the US the USSR ordered highly productive tools that are unavailable from Japan and Western Kurope. The US, the UK, West Germany, France, Italy, and Japan all have sold substantial amounts of production machinery for the Kama plant. US firms got the bulk of the orders for automated transfer machine tool lines because of their greater experience and know-how in this technology.
The availability of NC controls and servo drives from the West is very significant to the USSR at this time. Soviet production of controllers and electro mechanical servofor machine tools, like their production of computers and peripheral, equipment, suffers from insufficient development and poor quality control. US visitors to Soviet aviation
plants in4 noted that. Soviet NC machine tools were fitted with foreign transducers and resolvers and that many of the controllers had foreign tape drives.
An examination of the Soviets' want list for industrial equipment in the last three years shows little that would be of direct military benefit to tho USSK from industrial automation per so. They have acquired equipment specifically designed for civilian products. Usually, automated equipment is uniquely specialized 'or the production of certain parts and products. Automation that controls chemical plants, cement plants, steel plants, electric power stations, and pipelines is dedicated to the installed task. Moreover, no readily identifiable military activity Or product can employ these particular automation devices.
Automation for parts machining and assemblyloser look. Automatic transfer lines can be changed to machine very similar products if their sizes do not change
much. The Kama Truck Plant transfer lines are designed to machine partsedium-sized tiuck engine and probably cannot be re-used to machine parts for very large tank engines, especially since the Soviet tank engine is completely different from that for the Kama truck'.
The Kama foundry could be converted to make castings Cor military products but this would idle the special machine shops. Moreover, the foundry was designed to produce castingsnginesrucks each year. No military requirement exists Cor similar sized non-truck parts in that volume, so much of the foundry would go unused if converted to military products. This isast ironaterial not much used in military products.
It is possible to transfer to the military industries the know-how built into the automation of Kama'sprocesses, but the automation equipment obtained from the US, Western Europe, and Japan for truck production is not essentially superior to that produced in the USSR. The Soviets were as capable of automating the production of military products before buying the Western equipment for Kama as they will be afterward.
Manufacturers located in Lhe UK, Prance, West Germany, and Japan are the major non-US sources of technology in advanced computers and related equipment,specifically, large-scale digital computers and high capacity auxiliary storage devices. Other Western Euorpc.in countries such as Italy and Sweden are important sources of technology in very selected computer products, such as paper tape equipment.
In addition to domestic computer companies, the UK, France, West Germany, and Japan have major subsidiaries of US firms which are engaged in the development, production, and distribution of computers and related equipment. arge percentage of computers installed in these countries, and often the most advanced varieties available, is of US manufacture. US computer company facilities in these countries are also important sources of trained and experienced computer personnel who can support domesLic computer programs.
The technology base upon which most of the foreign computer companies have developed their products is also of US origin.
Current computer systems offered by Japanese andmanufacturersincorporate US-
manufactured components and subsystems, particularly advanced semiconductor components and peripheral equipment such as magnetic disc units. As long as the US maintains its strong technological leadership in these component and equipment areas, foreign dependence is oxpected to continue, although both France and Japan have strong programs aimed at reducing their dependence on US products.
No manufacturer in Japan,
or West Germany offers digital computers comparable with the largest US models such as the
0 or the. Tho largest models commercially available from these countries approach but do not match the overall capabilities of thehichrocessing data rate (PDR) of moreillion bits per second (mbs)." These models are offered by the United Kingdom, West Germany, and Japan. All four countries have announced during the past year new lines of computers to be competitive with theeries. Most of these new models are scheduled for delivery later this year and next year, but the firms may not be able to produce them in quantity in this time period.
The processing data rate does not accurately reflect the power and performance of many computers inarket, but currently is the only recognized measure of computer power comparisons.
In the USSR as in th* US, digital computer developments of theere largely aimed at solving scientific and engineering problems, in many cases, defense related. In theomputers were used increasingly .'or military needs but their considerable potential for civil uses, including business data processing, was recognized and begun in the US, but in the USSR virtually all production model computers were for scientific and engineering problem solving into the. 7 data processing has received growing emphasis, but it will
be well intoefore the Soviets are likely to have the kinds of equipment, software, and experience which nowignificant role in US military as well as civil data processing applications.
The USSR is well behind the US in the quality, performance, and number of computers for general purpose uses. Soviet openly-announced general purpose computer hardware including central processing units, internal and peripheral storage, and input/output devices are approximately equivalent to someodels. Computer maintenance, software, training support and documentation in the USSR lags somewhat more than the hardware. Although the USSR is close to the US in the comprehension of advanced computer theory and isear or so behind in experimental work, it has yet to translatechievements into high quality and quantity production.
In general, small- to medium-scale models based on discrete transistor circuits dominate the USSR's general purpose computer inventory. The Soviets arc judged to haveimited number of computers specifically for classified uses which may be four to five times more powerful than their biggest openly announced model, the BESM-6 bs).
The most publicized current computerin the USSR is aimed at using integratedbuild the Ryad series of computers copied from theRyad series is
being developed in cooperation with othor CEMA toomplete lino of
compatible peripheral equipment that aro to be standard models in all the countries involved. Plansnnounced for the Soviet Ryad computers appear to have slipped atears. Two models,00 corresponding to tho0Oespectively, are reported in production, but only significant numbers of
the smaller model,, are claimed to have been made. Production ofomparable to the5
9 mbs)7 is doubtfularger planned model,oes not yet appear to exist even
Designs copied from IBM and other US companies also are being used ln the ASVT computers recently introduced into production and intended for use in industrial planning and control. The largest of the ASVT models,0 corresponds to the03 mbs) and smaller models, based on US
* 0DRbs ond0DRbs.
minicomputer designsare now beginning to appear. Peripheral devices in the Ryad series also are used with the ASVT computers.
Until very recently the USSR has neglectedof the types that have been used in large quantities in the US. Lags in minicomputer developments deprived the USSR of important assets for establishing teleprocessing systems and computer networks. Some experiments on microprocessing have been reported but no Soviet off-the-shelf typeside range of industrial and possibly military uses have been revealed.
There haveumber of fragmentary reports on special computer developments for classified areas. Some
of these were general purpose types but most have been specialized. In some cases the Soviet designers appear to have
experimented with advanced or novel logical design concepts which probably would bc too expensive for use in quantity civil products. Also some of these classified projects used components and circuit techniques which had been revealed in literature but which have never appeared in openly announced computers. To date, Soviet weapons system developers have tended toward designs that can be satisfied with less sophisticated computers than ore used in US systems. Soviet uses of computers in military logistics, communications and command and control applications similar to US civil
data processing uses still appear to be in early or
experimental stages. This lag may be dueack of enough general purpose computers and related equipment in the USSR comparable with the civil products used by the US military.
The Soviets have continuing serious deficiencies in most types of peripheral devices needed to make effective use of thoir computers. Punch card and tape devices probably arc adequate though below Western standards, but good line printers have not been available. Magnetic disc units comparable withS vintage are claimed in production but good disc packs stillroblem. Magnetic tape units have improved but supplies of good quality tapes are inadequate. Magnetic disc units and tape-units from Bulgaria have boon used with both Ryad and ASVT computers. Smart terminals and interactive graphic display terminals are not yet readily available for general use and good communication channel interface devices also are lacking.
The Sovietsmall number of centers with very strong capabilities for software and computer language research but until now machine language programming has predominated. This will change markedly as the Ryad type computers with their broad range of software copied from
IBM become available. As more and more general users, who are not computer specialists obtain computers, use of higher level language progiaruning will become essential.
Soviet lags in supplying good integrated circuits and other advanced components has been an obvious constraint on their ability to supply large numbers of modern computers to general users. These lacks also constrain computer developments by specialists who do not have sufficient priority to get scarce components. Tho Soviets are able to produce fair quality ferrite cores and plated wires for memories, but they have been an successful in assembling quantities of core memories using the very small diameter cores. The Soviets appear committed to the use of ferrite cores for main memories for the next few years. They are doing research on semiconductor memories similar to those
of modern US computers, butew more years they are not likely to produce adequate supplies of suitable semiconductors without foroign assistance. Soviet Attempts to Acquire Westerr- Computer Technology
During the past year the USSF has continued efforts to acquire large computer systems and computer technology in the West. Efforts are concentrated mainly in the United States, but there is activity in Western Europe and Japan as well. The Soviet Union is pressing for comprehensive deals that
include technology, equipment, and training. It is also seeking computer peripherals and components. The Soviets appear willing to purchase in large quantities only if production technology is included. Finally, the Soviets seem bent on exploitinggreements with the OS government and with US firms to gain technical advice in problem areas of both hardware and software. The Soviets want informationevel of detail that wouldechnology transfer.
Specifically, the Soviets want the following: Computers for high priority, non-military applications where requirements for speed and capacity exceed the capabilities of domestically produced computers; for example, for management of the Kama Truck foundry; for research
applications such as high energy physics and for global weather forecasting. These deals involve very large, time-shared, systems, with all system analysis,and training provided. a. Know-how to produce high capacity magnetic disc drives and related disc packs; technology for other peripherals and supplies, such as high-speed printers and
magnetic tape. Turn-key facilities to produce computer
components such as integrated circuits for
e Licensing for the production ofthese will be used to implement Soviet plans for industrial automation, and to set up teleprocessing systems.
As the Soviets become more cormitted to modern large-scale computer applications they will be less able to satisfy their needs from domestic sources, and will need to acquire hardware and software from the West, or forego their demands.
Potential Economic Impaet of Computer Sales to the USSR
The Soviet Union isong-range plan for an
integrated nation-wide network of computers for management
and planning, and for the wide use of computers in the
direct control of production processes. The extent to which
Western technology can aid in these goals depends on th(?
form and amount of the assistance provided.
Sales of discrete subsystems are beneficial to the
USSR only to the extent that they can be incorporated into
domestically produced computer systems without Western
assistance. That capability has not been demonstrated.
Such sales can provide the Soviets with limited design
and manufacturing information, but not in sufficient detail
to permit the item to be reproduced.
Acquisition of large quantities of Western peripherals or components together with technical aid for their incorporation with Soviot parts could help solve the current critical shortage of reliable computer subsystems, but
the Soviets have shown little enthusiasm for importing
large quantities of peripherals or parts under any conditions
as they arc reluctant to become dependent on Western supplies
The potential impact of sale of discrete computer systems in proportional to tho volume of such sales. arge number of Western computers, even with minimal support, could have significant benefits especially for the management of large industrial complexes, and probably also for planning. However, as with subsystems, the Soviets seem unwilling to import large numbers of computers because it would force dependence on the West for spare parts. mall number of discrete Western systems would be of some benefit to the USSR, but the benefits would be restrictedpecific installation and would have little effect on the economy, generally.
Sales of computer systems with full installation and maintenance support could yield substantial extractable benefits in the area of software and systems analysis. For example, training and experience included in the proposed sale of the Kama computer system will contribute to the developmentadre of Soviet specialists capable of training other specialists. Moreover, trained specialists will be able to apply their skills to the development of similar native software systems.
The sale or licensing of manufacturing technology-would be of enormous benefit to the USSR; it would permit the USSR to produce modern, highly reliable third-generation computers and to produce them efficiently. Current Soviet models are technologically inferior to Western models and are produced inefficiently and at high cost. Such sales would not necessarily improve computer utilization, which probably would require further assistance in the form of programming, systems analysis, and maintenance training
Cooperative or joint ventures are possible in the areapplications, support, manufacturing technology, or some combination of these. ruly comprehensive agreement along those lines including provision for follow-on technology would provide the greatest benefit to the USSR. It would allow the Soviets to develop an advanced native manufacturing
and utilization capability, while allowing them to keep up with the latest developments in the West. The current computer gap would be decreased significantly, although some gap probably would persist as long as major innovations continue to occur in the West. Potential Military Impact
Military benefits from computer technology can be divided, with some overlap, into two categories. The first category includes the use of general purpose computers
either inroblem solving or in connection with communications and command and control. The second category includes the use of computers, usually special purpose, as integral parts of weapon systems.
Direct diversionmall number of imported high performance Free World computers to supportevelopments undoubtedly would be of some benefit to Soviet military projects. Realization of these benefit, however, would be hindered by the need for reprogramming of on-going problems and by the jeopardy to security of classified Soviet projects due to needs for spare parts ond maintenance support.
The systems analysis, software, training, and experience gained through tho acquisition of Western computer systems for civil uses probably would provide the greatest potential benefits to Soviet military capabilities. Systems such as those being acquired for airline reservations, Kama River Truck Plant, and Intourist reservations require that the Western supplier provide thereat deal of support in the above areas. This knowledge and experience can then be transferred to the development of their own advanced military systems which have many functional similarities to the civil systems obtained from the West. Tho Soviet military intends to use Ryad series computing equipment, which uses designs for US general
purpose computers, for military applications similar to the civil applications for which they are now trying to acquire Western computer systems.
With respect to specialized computers for use in weapon systems, the Soviets are most likely to make important gains from their determined effort to acquire Western production know-how and production equipment. Although they may have used some imported components in special purpose military computers, particularly in experimental or prototype stages of developments, their main emphasis is on capability to meet deployed system needs from domestic sources. rograms with Western companies also could made significant contributions to Soviet capabilities for developing specialized military computers for signal processing and for uses requiring untended, long-term reliable operation.
Some of the cooperative programs also call for construction of facilities for producing advanced computer peripheral devices and components. This type of technology would contribute to the Soviet base foride variety of military computer needs.
. F'rontot ior. Vechnolouy
Soviet Agricultural Technology
Agriculture is the nost technologically backward sector in the Soviet economy, lagging far behind that of the US.esult, the Soviet farm worker producesf the output of his US counterpart, appliesf the fertilizer allocated to US crops, and uses much less machinery per acre than in the US. f the potato and sugar beet crops and about one-third of the cotton crop arc harvested mechanically. Specialized machines such as carrot harvesters, tea pickers, and grape pickers have been used experimentally, but the level of mechanization in vegetable and fruit growing remains low. Little mechanization is used in Soviet livestock production. Only aboutf the poultry in the USSR is raised on fully-mechanized operations, andf the milking in the socialized sector is still done manually.
Soviet Interest in Western Technology
Soviet leaders now are stressing farm modernization and are soliciting Western help. Under3 US-USSRon Agricultural Cooperation Lhe Soviets proposodexchanges in genetics, selection, and seedof grains and soybeans; feeding of farm animals and the design of large livestock complexes; optimalof chemical fertilizers, perfection of technology and systems of machinery for crop cultivation and harvest; techniques of land reclamation.
Since the early, when US firms were instrumental in designing and equipping the first Soviet tractor plants at Kharkov and Volgograd, the Sovi;ts have looked to the US for assistance in the area of firm machinery. The Ninth Five-Year Plan was expressly desigied to upgrade tractor quality and performance and to bring tractor design and technology closer to that in the West today. Plan directives call for delivery to agricultureractors that will bc more powerful, durable, and faster.
For yoars, the Soviets have favored tracklaying over wheeled tractors. They now recognize that the tracklaying type is not os versatile as the wheeled typo in agricultural applications. Consequently, they face the tremendous task of not only meeting their overall requirements for large numbers of additional tractors but of replacingf the
tracklaying tractors with wheeled types, and of replacing low-powered wheeled tractors with more powerful machines. To this end the Soviets are actively in contact with US manufacturers:
In3 theyarge US diesel engine corporation to obtain 4S0 horsepower engines for use in agricultural tractors. They appear to want to buy tlie technology so they can produce the engines themselves.
In4 they provided specificationsS manufacturerroposed orsepower wheeled tractor, possibly to be designed and manufactured with US assistance. achine is needed for pulling heavier implements at higher speeds.
They have expressed interest to US firmsorsepower-range tractor featuringtransmission. ractor would supplement thehecl drive tractor currently inat Kharkov.
2 the USSR has purchased several thousand tractors from the US and Japan, but these have beentracklaying machines for industrial projects such as pipelaying and open-pit mining. Little interest has been shown in purchasing large numbers of Western-made tractors for use on Soviet farms. Trade discussions have typically centered on technical cooperation, participation in Soviet manufacturing facilities, licensing agreements, and construction of turnkey plants.
Feed is the important factor in animalmechanization in general and properLyin particularlose runner up foroperations. he Soviets were to billion rubles worth of machineryic equipment mechanization of animal husbandry and "feedto officials of the Soviet Ministry ofUSSR plans to build0 cattle feedlots in theyears. These will be located in the Ukraine andCentral Asia where extensive irrigation projectsconstruction. 3 the Soviets contracted withthe construction of 3
0 head facility near Krasnodar, andead faciliites near Volgodonsk and Tbilisi. While-is providing only equipment for the Krasnodar and TBi^ij
feedlots, the Volgodonsk facilityurnkey operation. The latter went into full operationnd Soviet officials have been very pleased with the progress achieved so Car. The feedlots provide grain storageeed mill, trucks for transportation, feedyard equipment, and the farming equipment to grow and harvest the neededlocally.
The Soviet goal of constructinghan0 Coed-lotsears appears tremendously optimistic. Although the Ministry of Agriculture has apparently received ample funding for this program, the Soviets lack sufficientand administrative understanding of the operation of large scale cattle feedlots to enable them to accomplish such an extensive program. Their knowledge of animal nutrition is entirely inadequate forrogram, and the size of their operations will necessarily be limited by the unavailability of the small process control computers which are utilized in the US to control thu apportionment of feed rations and other such operations. ore likely achievement would be the constructionmaller feedlots on the larger state farms each with the capability to feedead.
Feed Production Plants
One of the most important shortcomings of the Soviet cattle feed industry is inadequate processing and The short growing season which prevails in the USSR makes early harvesting imperative, and the roughage that results is utilizedreen, unconcentratod state thatery high water content. This not only incroases the amount of Ceed an animal requires, but it also reduces the nutritive value of that received. Thus, weight gain is rather slow in tho average Soviet cattle herd. The second deficiency is that the bulky, unprocessed feed cannot be shipped the long distances fron where much of it is grown to the areas where it is needed, and while feed may be abundant in the one area it can be in short supply in another.
In4 the USSR requested US quotations5 deliveryomplete plants for the productionrca-based animal feed. In September the request was reemphasized and increased tolants. Each plant willxtruders and associated storage bins to provide acapacity ofetric tons of protein concentrate per hour. The extruders combine grain, urea, and bentonite pre-mix into an animal feed which can contain as high asercent protein equivalent Cor ruminant animals. The process is under high temperature which permits the nitrogen from urea to be combined in the starch of the grains.
This eliminates many of the problems associated with urea feeding. The USSR will have to import bentonite pre-mix from the US because the only known deposits of sodium bentonite are located in Wyoming and Montana. The total price for the feed plants, technical assistance,ears of spare parts will probably exceedillion.
High level emphasis is also being placed onmanure recycling
The Soviets have repeatedly" asked for bids on different sized facilities, and are very interestedecent proposal submitted by the US company. This would call for the establishmentlant utilizing the company's process for recycling manure into cattle feed in conjunction with an appropriately sized feedlot. In addition, US equipment for cutting, drying, and cubing alfalfa and other roughages would be provided. Rou-jhage could thus be thoroughly processed and cubed so that it could be easily shipped throughout the USSR and stored for as muchears. Only US companies make equipment in this field on the scale in which the Soviets are interested.
Two million dollars worth of this us equipment was exhibited, at Soviet request, in Moscowand purchased afterwards by the Soviets. Included0 dehydration plant.
>, Alfalfa Harvesters and Processing Plants
in4 the Soviet Minister of Machine Building for Animal Husbandry and Forage Production, K. N. Belyak, indicatedS company that the USSR wants to purchase the license and one complete plant for the productionS-made alfalfa harvester, with an overall plan to0 harvesters. Belyak was also interested in alfalfa processing plants. He said that ;he USSReedf these plants but would set ;le. Initially he would like to buy aboutlantsone for each Republic -and acquire the licensing rights to build the rest. The plants come in, andetric-tons-per-hour capacities, but the Soviets are only interested in the largest size. The Soviet requirement isachine that willaw productercent humidityercent0 tons per hour, with loss of carotene no more than ercont at dryingercent at pressing. Belyakzed pellet, but when advised that this isractical size to produce, he andm
pellet dies. Pellets of these sizes will give the Soviets the capacity to feed poultry, hogs, and cattle. The interestm pellet indicates chey are more interested in feeding cattle than smallci livestock.
The Soviets have scheduled the development of this projectear periodinal goal of complete Soviet independence in this area. Belyak. stated that when his Ministry completes the preparationomprehensive schedule inormal contract will be signed with the US companies involved. The overall cost of the licenses, engineering and technical expertise for the alfalfa harvesters, and the plants for processing and alfalfa into pellets would probably beillion.
At the beginninghere wereilos in the USSRaximum capacityillion metric tons of processed silage. The amount of silage and cured hay produced in the USSRowever,illion metric tons. Thus, ercent of the country's silage was inefficiently stored. Much of it is simply piled by the roadside nr put into barns and sheds where it soon rots. Almost one-third of state-procured silage was estimated as being spoiled in0 and more than half of its feed value lost. Storage improvement, then,remendous potential for reducing feed shortages which the Soviets have only recently begun to enphasize.
9 the Soviets2 mijlion contract
B'.-sscr the delivery ot
5 complete automatic plants foe. the manufacture
blocks for silo construction. i. ..
The contractthat the Soviets aremanufacture thetransfer the technology to third parties. Sovietthat after the performance of the initial plantsevaluated they may purchase
will need at leastlants*nationwidc.
Another US firm reached an agreement with the Soviets2 to supply octal accessary parts for concrete silos. The firm isumber of machines to fabricate the accessories and also the know-how. The Soviets should be easily able to manufacture the machinery and accessories in the future.
It is difficult.to exaggerate the importanceto agriculture, of the numerous ways ofcrop yields' (fertilizer, improvedpesticides, farm machinery) fertilizerthe most important and financiallythe Soviet Union it is playing anrole, particularlyethod of raising For exmaple, during the five-yearore thanercent of the
grainn averageillion tons per year, was based on larger amounts of fertilizer.
The Soviet Union has made definite progress in supplying the agricultural sector with fertilizer. The total availability of fertilizer was increased more than nine times0 2 the Soviets produced overillion tons of fertilizer, almost as much as the US. But acreage in the USSR isercent greater than in the US andillion tons does not begin to meet Soviet needs. Moreover, the quality of Soviet fertilizer is poor, single nutrient materials predominate, and phosphate fertilizers ore in chronically short supply. Other shortcomings in the industry include delays in new construction, poor operating efficiency at existing plants, and transportation and storage problems.
To alleviate some of these problems the USSR since thes has purchased from foreign countriesproduction equipment, including complete plants for production of multinutrientand keysuch as ammonia. " ;cldcntal Potroleun Corporationyear barter deal with the USSR 1 worth SS billion for the construction of eight ammonia and two urea plants in the USSR. The barter portion of the arrangement provides for the exch;tnge of ammonia and urea produced in the new plants plus Soviet potash for US phosphoric acid.
The agreement provides several specific advantages to
Soviet industry will acquire modernfor the production of ammonia, the basic ingredient of all synthetic nitrogen fertilizer.
The expansion of urea production willfor increase in its useeed supplement for
cattle and therebyignificant impact on the critical Soviet "feed protein" problem.
3. Imports of US superphosphoric acid will help reduce the shortages of phosphate fertilizer. At least half of the arable land in the USSR is deficient in phosphorus and larger supplies are expected to increase crop yields, raise protein content, and speed the ripening of grain. The latter is an important consideration in regions thathort growing season.
The priority now accorded fertilizer production by the Soviets is likely to continue into. Domestic production of fertilizer is certain to increase greatly during those years; however, persistent Sovietuggest continuing interest in Western fertilizer production equipment ranging from additional plants for the production of raw material, such as ammonia, to granulating and packaging machinery.
Soviet agriculture also needs assistance in developing pesticides. Losses from insects, weeds, and plant diseases may be as high asercent of potential yields. This is largely attributable to the fact that becausehortage of pesticides only about half of the total sown area is being treated. Also, with the exception of cotton and certain other industrial crops which receive special attention, the rate of application for those crops that arc treated is necessarily less intensive than that recommended in tho West. Supplies of pesticides continue to fall short of requirements despite increased production over the past decade. 0 tho USSR reportedly met its needs for insecticides and fungicides by onlyercent, and for herbicides by onlyercent. Prospects are poor for filling this gap between supply and demand in the oears.
Although tho major types of pesticides are manufactured in the USSR, the variety of products available to agriculture is very limited. asic pesticide chemicals are produced in the USSR comparedn the US. One reason is the soviet attitude toward toxic preparations which has limited the number of pesticides available at any one time and plowed the introduction of new compounds into Soviot-agriculture. Their stringent interpretation of toxicity, in relation to the environment, has resulted in the phasing out of certain highly toxic compounds in favor of loss toxic types. This attitude limits sales of both pesticides
and manufacturing plants to the USSR, and aggravates the problems causedigh level of crop losses and pesticide shortages.
The structure of Soviet purchases of pesticides from the West has changed in the last' few years from large quantities of formulated pesticides to supplement domestic production to smaller but increasing amounts of morehighly active ingredients for formulation in the USSR. In the same vein Tech mash import* has expressed an interest in purchasing US licenses and technology for the constructionhemical pesticide plant capable of producing at0 tonsarticular fungicide per year. The Soviets have alsoS firm to quoteurn-key chemical plant that could0 tons per yearrade-name pesticide, plus the training of the Soviet personnel required to operate tho plant. Another US firm attempting toematocidc to the Soviets is resigned to the fact thatale is negotiated they will be selling the technology, not the product.
The pattern is clear. However, despite their obvious preference foranufacturing plant ratheready-mixed product it docs not appear that the Soviets are attempting to become self sufficient inproduction any time soon. On the contrary, it would bc to their advantage to continue to purchase the new compounds, and/or the technology for their production, developed through more advanced Western research in this urea. In support of this line ofajor Soviet study on pesticides, initiatederiod in which their pesticide production quintupled, was to determine, among other things, which pesticides would be produced in tho USSR and which would be purchased abroad.
The present limited variety and known pesticide shortage in tha USSR almost assures that the Soviets will be looking to the US and other Western countries for the advanced technological help tliey need, at least0 and probably beyond. To date, however, although several negotiations have been reported, no contracts with US firms for pesticide technology are known to. have been signed.
Agriculture is possible in one-third of the USSR, but only aboutercent is cultivated because the rest lies in areas without sufficient rainfall. Thus the problem of developing agriculture in the USSR depends on theof land and especially on.irrigation. Drainage, a
less expensive method of reclamation, has had considerably less emphasis during the course of the five-year plans. But both Irrigation and drainage are now being brought to the fore because of lack ol alternative opportunitiesajor expansion of cropland.
Primary water sources are damned reservoirs, rivers, and irrigation ditches. The Soviets have developed an excellent canal system to channel snow melt and rain from the mountains into the desert regions. The major drawback to their system is insufficient reservoirs and inadequate distribution systems on the farms, in fact, the USSRoor record in maintaining drainage and irrigation systems in operating conditions. For example, in the past the covered and tiled drainage systems which are scheduled to expand rapidly and to account for more than half of total drained acreageave been built with inferior tile that collapsed under the weight of heavy farm machinery. In irrigated areas about two-fifths o' the land is subject co snlinization to some degree. Annual washings carried out in rotation to lower salinity remain partially ineffective because of disrepaired and uncleaned collection and drainage networks. esult of these and other nroblems, the rate of retirement of reclaimed land from production has been high enough in the post to nullify the 3izoablc acreage added annually.
The Soviets now have someillion acrescompared to SO million in the US. Fiveare under sprinkler systems, about half of whichpivothe USSR undera .NebraskaSoviets paid
or its tecnnology several years ago,i nave visited the US plant at least twice since then to review production techniques. Tiny now want toicensing agreementew add-on system thatthe cornersield not covered by the circular pivot system, the technol>>gylant totho steel pipe required foe these systems.
The USSR is workinglan up to the0 to irrigate an additionalillion acres. 4 the Soviets spent moraillion rubles on capital investment for melioration and irrigation; in theillion rubles will be required to reach their land reclamation goals. Tho USSR would like to fulfill its goals by utilizing only Soviet resources and equipment, but the scale of work and technology required is too great. Consequently they have turned to tlie
S engineering firmood
international reputation, for help. The Soviets have requested the US firm to submit proposalsumping plant, excavation work for diversion of water from the Ob River to the Caspian Sea area, canal lining techniques, jointless pipe, trickier irrigation, and ionic desalination plants. They are also interested in fuM automation of the irrigation systems themselves. If
participation is acceptable to the ind j. ULions on credits in the US are carried out successfully, the US company will be asked to contribute at increasing technical levels.
Crop and Livestock Improvement
The development of high-yield, non-lodginggrain with drought and disease resistance is theof Soviet plant breeders. Interest inof grain has been stimulated by problemsrecent years. There hasecline in proteincontent, and hence in suitability for milling andthe same time, yields of forage crops havethe burden of supporting the expendingon feed grains. To help achieve theirthe Soviots have solicited qerm plasm from USexperiment stations and US commercial firms. wheat and corn seed have already been purchased andobviously plan to purchase additional seed ofof these and other crops, viz. soybeans,alfalfa. In fact they aro believed to be close todecision toillion in US corngerm plasm, technical assistance in aand seed processing plnats. The use of USin their breeding programs may increase Sovietcorn and sorghum by at least 20
Feed supplies and an enlightened approach to genetic progress are tho two biggest prob'.cms the Soviets face with respect to livestock production. The USSR needs toits livestock breeds, especially cattle. Soviet agriculturists are only beginning to realize the advantages in feed conversion efficiency and cost reduction which specialized breeds and improved technology offer. They also realize that genetic improvement of their livestock is necessary before they can reach the quality standards achieved ln the US- To narrow this gap the Soviets arc importing some US breeding cattle. They believe that US and Canadian cattle arc aore adaptable to the Soviet climate than those of Western Europe. They have also dismissed
the breeds of Argentina and Australia as not being the type animals they require. Besides US beef* and dairy cattle, swine and goats also have been added in recent years to the existing foreign breeds in Soviet herds. All will be used5 years) program of crossbreeding and selection. In addition to these purchases the Sovietsumber of agreements with US cattle industry organizations whereby they receive livestock technology and methodology to assist them in their breeding programs.
Tho majority of tho cattle in the Soviet Union arc dual purpose (milk-beef) animals in which productivity is generally very low. Their quality is roughlyto that of poor-grade Holstein in the US. They suffer severe inbreeding problems and are susceptible to all the common livestock diseases. The high quality US and Canadian beef cattle importedre being used with these dual purpose cattlerogram of crossbreeding and selection. Crossbreeding is an effective way of improving quality in spite of past mistakes. The Soviets will probably continue to import bulls from the US in support of this breeding program. They arc also interested in importing semen from US Holstein bulls. Actually on artificial insemination program using frozen semen from superior sires ore rational approoch to the vast crossbreeding program necessary to solve tho Soviets chronic meat shortage. The Soviets claim that by the end0 artificial insemination is to bo extended to the entire livestock program.
Tho Soviets are also interested in improving pork and poultry production with US assistance. In their program to increase meat production, in fact, poultry has top priority, followed by swine, and then cattle. Although the Soviets have made impressive advances in poultry breeding in recent years, their birds are .till poor feed converters. They have expressed interest in pjrehasing large numbers of US hybrid chicks, and last Fall the Soviet Embassy requested preliminary US bids on technical assistance in dairy cattle, pigs, sheep, and poultry.
Impact of Western Technology
The transfer of Western agricultural machinery and technology to .the USSR willmall impact on agricultural growth. The amount of imports will likely remain small compared with the size of the Soviet agricultural sector. More importantly, Soviet agriculture's lag has resulted
largelyyriad of organizational and incentive prog lens, and poor climate, as well as inadequate technology. The speed of agricultural development0 will depend raoro on improving the efficiency of existing resources in agriculture than on acquiring Western technology. The only area where Western technology is likely toignificant impact is in mineral fertilizer. Fertilizer shortages haveajor retardant in grain yields, and Western chemical equipment will likely be crucial to Soviot plans to double application rates during tho next five years. However, the impact again will depend upon the ability of farmers to use efficiently the additional fertilizer, which they have failed to do in the oast.