DCI BRIEFING FORUNE NSC MEETING
I. The current situation in Angola is highly Rivalry between contending nationalist groups has featured increasing violence, with each group trying to stake out territory and gain military superiority before independence on Novembernd final Portuguese withdrawal by next February.
A. The fighting over the past few months has
been between the two largest groups, the
Popular Movement for the Liberation of
Angola, led by Agostinho Neto, and the National Front for the Liberation ofled by Holden Roberto. hird group in the picture is the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, led by Jonas Savimbi.
1. In action early this month Neto'sMovement pushed the National Front
out of some areas north and east of Luanda, thus blocking the Front'slines into the capital.
there were some clashes inmonth, the two remaina standoff there.
a. Military control of Luanda bywould necessarily notof or influence over theAngola, particularly in theareas or along all
main transportation routes.
National Front stillentrenched in large areasAngola where it has substantialsupport.
New fighting can erupt at any time:Thereontinuing buildup of theforces of all three nationalist groups;
Armed and undisciplined civilians are in
Luanda on behalf of the PopularJ.JJJ"
Neither major group is able or willing
to exercise effective control over its own forces;
All three groups are initiating military operations in parts of Angola yet untouched
by the fighting where no single group has
an edge; andPoliticking for the October elections for
a constituent assembly will increase tensions
C. The oil-rich enclave of Cabindainde
box. The Popular Movementlight military edge there, but both other groups also have forces active.
All three want the enclave toart Of an independent Angola.
The picture is complicated byactionalized separatistsupported by both Zaire and Congo.
Both countries have endorsed Cabindanand any intensification of the fighting there could bring outside intervention either directly or inof the separatists.
II. The transitional government installed last January has proved unworkable.
is constructedystem of checksbut in the current climatethe throe liberation groups, asconcentrate on the competitionthem.
Portuguese officials are not effectivethey are caught in the middle.
The liberation groups have nottheir commitment to establish anational army as called for in the inde- !?
ortuguese troops are mostly keptLuanda. They will intervene in the fightingto protect the whites.
1. The Portuguese have in effect abandoned
IlimiilloMITri inost* countryside to the
ii nm iiiiiisMi-
2. Portuguese forces are scheduled to bo-gin withdrawal in October and are to be totally removed by next February.
3. There is nothing in the independenceto prevent the Portuguese fromas fast as possible after October.
Lisbon's policy insofar as it has one, is
neutrality among the factions.
Portugal wants to protect its important agricultural and mining interests.
The Portuguese also want to be on good terms with whoever ends up in charge after independence, but their ability to affect events is diminishing.
At this point, the Portuguese leaders' major concern is to prevent civil war, which could have serious political repercussions in Lisbon. They hope to avoid, foran increase in the number of white refugees returning to Portugal whodd to the turbulence there.
Thus, Lisbon can be expected to expend considerable diplomatic effort to reduce tension in Angola, and would certainly welcome similar efforts by interested third countries.
III. The role of outside powers in supplying military assistance to the nationalist groupsey factor.
A. The Soviet Union hasong timeof Neto's Popular Movement, providing both arms and cash during the years of the insurgency against the Portuguese. 1.
3. Soviet long-range goals in Angola arebut in the short run Moscow supports the Popular Movementituation where all three nationalist groups are viable contenders for power. B. Peking has had some association with all of
the liberation movements in the past, but
the Chinese are most closely associated with
rto's National Front.
igmiuiMip have supplied riUtary equipment
as well as some training.
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to establish its forces firmly inAngola.
C. Roberto has had little success in finding assistance elsewhere.
1. Zaire's President Mobutu has loose
family ties with Roberto and has long supported him and the Front with funds, arms, and training. He has also allowed Roberto to maintain his headquarters in Zaire.
however, Mobutu hashis assistance to thepart because of hisserious financialbecause he is cooling toward
is alarmed over thesetbacks and feelshas been damaged becauseto leave Zaire and go
2. Mobutu, of course, has some seriousof his own.
a. Zaire isevereexchange shortage because of the low price of copper on themarket.
prospects for Angola between now andare poor. Further violence could take place and edge the territory closer to civil war. At best, Angola will lurch along and become independenttrong leader. A. The constituent assembly scheduled to be elected in October is supposed toead of government of an independent Angola, but new violence couldostponement.
B. eeting in Kenya last week Savimbi, Roberto, and Neto reached what amounts to an uncertain truce that merelyonfrontation.
"agreed"umber ofas disarming civilians,prevent new fighting. Similarin the past have failed, however.
three contenders seem to recognize
the inconclusiveness of the pact. They
state that they will meet again to
another form for the transfer of power
if the elections are not
V. After independence, it now appears that no single ir
liberation group in Angola will have the powor tompose its own ideology as national policy.
civil war is averted and the threegroups establish some kind ofthe government's policies probablya delicate mix of the philosophies ofmajor groups.
major groupson-alignedand will seek to maintain someEast and West.
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Popular Movement, ifigh-centralized andone-party regime with aorientation and close tiescommunist world, with US ties kept
National Front would probably seeka highly nationalistic andregime. Because of thenarrow political base, an FNLAbo highly coercive. The Frontaccept development and/orfrom the West as well as the East.
Both groups con be expected to nationalizemajor productive enterprises, but the Front probably would be more hsopitablo toward selective Western investment than tho Popular Movement.
As long as an independent Angola doe3 notaccess to its transportation facilities, good relations with its neighbors Zaire and Zambia probably can be maintained. 1. An independent Angola will give moral and political support to black nationalists in
Rhodesia and South Africa. It wouldnot become immediately involved in supporting insurgencies there, however, because of distance and the dominant role now being played by Zambia, Tanzania, and Mozambique inettlement with the Smith regime. VI. If, on the other hand, protracted civil war develops Congo and Zaire could be brought into the conflict.
war could also convince either one,to move into Cabinda in an attempt toor neutralize the enclave.
fighting in Angola, wouldconfrontation between black and It would intensify the fearsand South Africa concerningrule.
South Africa is particularly concernedommunist or unfriendly regime in Angola might support guerrilla activity in Namibia.
A hostile or unstable Angola would increase South African pressure on us to support its domestic and international policies. This
would complicate our efforts to promote peaceful solutions to Southern Africa's racial problems. 3. South Africa does not seem to be planning any action to counter this threat.