IRAQ: REGIME UNDER GREATER STRESS

Created: 3/17/1995

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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National Intelligence Council Memorandum

Iraq: Regime Under Greater Stress

Key Lack of progress on the sanctions front and increased coup Points plotting and insurgent activity are aggravating pressures created by four years of sanctions against Baghdad. Q

Saddam docs not appear to face an immediate threat, but these developments have increased tbe regime's overall vulnerability and may compel Saddam to take stronger mililary actions to combat perceived threats.1

Agencies agree that Saddam is under increasing pressure; they disagree about whether he will react with more confrontational or more conciliatory behavior.

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Negative trends intensifying

Regime Under Greater Stress

Added Pressures Since November

In the4 Update Memorandum to. the Intelligence Community reaffirmed its assessment that undiminished sanctions, although difficult to maintain, would substantially increase the odds (to better than even) of Saddam Husayn's falling from power over the next two years. The Update cited several factors4 (including the rising cost of living, (he depreciating dinar, spiraling crime, and plummeting morale in the regular Army) that had significantly increased pressure oo the regime. Developments since November have intensified these trends and have introduced new challenges for Baghdad. P

Quick Fix on Sanctions. The NIE noted that Saddam's preeminent goal was to end sanctions as soon as possible. Recent events belie expectations raised by the Iraqi press since early this year that sanctions would be cased at the May UN Security Council review:

Iraq's tack of

accountapiiity on its biological weapons (BW) program wasrowing credibilityintjansigence on BW [

would undermine any attcnp: to case

sanctions at tbe May review.

Support for the US position on the Security Council is high in the wake of Ambassador Albright's missions, buttressed by the perception that Washington is willing to veto any attempt to ease sanctionsarrage of vitriolic press attacks againsi US "hostility" reflects Baghdad's concern and consternation over the US diplomatic offensive.!

for hardline policies

in Baghdad, identified in the NIE, are again criticizing Iraq's diplomacy. An editorial (probably written by Saddam's son Uday) in thearch edition of Babil decried the lack of progress at the Security Council and called on Baghdad toeadline for the easing of sanctions. The editorial declared thai the

sanctions review onarch was "worse than the previous one" and questioned the value of Baghdad's diplomatic efforts, Another failure for Iraq's diplomatic approach may leadurther erosion of public confidence in tbe regimeore confrontational posture by Baghdad.

Insurgents sapping Army morale

Insurgent Activity. The strongest insurgent attacks against the regime since shortly after the Gulf war have forced Baghdad to put its forces on heightened alert on two fronts since early February:

attacks led principally by the Patriotic Union of Kurdistanith the participation of some other Iraqi National Congress forces in the north, have revealed worsening morale and readiness problems in some units of the regulartrong US demarche earlier this month (and fear of damaging Iraqi diplomatic efforts to case sanctions) appear to have constrained Saddam from unleashing Republican Guard units against the Kurds.

Badr Corps, the armed wing of the Iran-based Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraqaunched incursions in early February intended tohia uprising in southern Iraq. The regime sent two small combat unitsmall Republican Guard detachment to reinforce the area, but has refrained from sending larger units acrossd parallel thai might trigger an armed US response.

Troublemaking. Since early this year, Iran has expanded its ties and support to Iraqi opposition groups, hoping to position itself as the dominant external influenceost-Saddam government in Baghdad.

value plummeting

Reaches New Low. The Iraqi dinar is currently trading at as higho one US dollar on black-market exchanges inprecipitous decline since November, when it was hovering ato one. The falling dinarontinuing deterioration of economic and social conditions throughout the

country, as well as Baghdad's incompetence in dealing with fundamental economic problems. Articles in Babil have asserted Ihat the government's success or failure is :icd to the value of tht dinar.I

INR believes that Saddam still has options to relieve the intensifying economic pressures on his regime by.(

accepting the recent US offer to implement UNSCnder less stringent monitoring conditions. He mightgreater cooperation with UNSCOM to resolvepertaining to Iraq's weapons of mass destructionorder to gain an easing of sanctions and relieve

Dulaymi andlots, since November. Saddam's security forces had advance knowledge of both plots and neither reached the implementation stage. While demonstrating the continued effectiveness of the security forces, the plots haveore jittery security situationear during which coup rumors and other security threats had appeared to decline.

An Atmosphere of Vulnerability

The trends listed above, if unchecked, couldense among Iraqis that the regime is becoming unstable:

Neither the Kurds nor Shiaserious near-term threat to Saddam but persistent pressure could speed deterioration of the regular Army, already wracked by low morale, desertion, and neglect The PUK bas taken hundreds of Iraqi prisoners (albeit from some of the Army's most poorly equipped units) many of whom reportedly were bootless despite winter conditions and were more inclined to surrender lhan to fight.

The dinar's plunge reflects an impression among Iraqis that an end to sanctions is as distant as ever, fueling resentment and frustration. Thearch Babil editorial commented that the dinar has fallenay that Iraq's enemies "did not dream of and did not think would be within their reach" and added that "the ingredientsat morsel to fill the belly and boost the muscles are no longer there "I

Coup

The Iraqi leadership appears especially concerned lhat Washington will exploit Baghdad's current difficulties:

Official press reports claim that recent Kurdish attacksS-instigated plot lo lure Baghdad into fighting Kurds to damage Iraq's standing tn the Security Council.

Republican Guard divisions were dispersed in and around their garrisonsefensive posture during the coup and insurgency alerts this month, apparently as precautions against possible US

Security Still Strong

Iraq's elite military and security forces remain sufficiently strong to preclude open opposition to the regime in the major cities and to put down the Kurdish and Shia insurgencies. The Dulaymi and Samarra'i plots show the security forces are still adept at detecung and suppressing threats io the regime. Recent coup plotting, insurgent activity, and extended periods of heightened alert have heavily tasked these forces, but they continue to do Saddam's bidding. Although no longer immune to desertion and equipment shortages, the Republican Guard is relatively well equipped andompetent fighting force.!-

Conditionsctober crisis

Options

Expectations regarding UN sanctions remain an important aeterminani of Saddam's behavior. Baghdad's disappointment with Eke us" last six-month report to the Security Council in Octoberactor in prompting Saddam to stage tbe Kuwait confrontation toegotiated settlement to sanctions. Saddam is likely to stay on his current diplomatic course at least untilpril, when Ekeus is scheduled lo report. Until then, Baghdad is likely lo appear to cooperate with UNSCOM and will claim to offer full accounting of missing Kuwaitis and captured equipment. Most intelligence agencies believe that another disappointing report by Ekeus. or lack

of progress at the next sanctions review in May, could prompt

Saddam lo favor confrontation over conciliatory diplomacy.

incursions by either Kurdish or Shia insurgents might also force the regime to take aggressiveumber of options are open to Saddam, depending on his willingness to risk military ccHjnterstrikes by Coalition forces. Saddam appears to take the possibility of US attacks more seriously after the massive US military moves in response to his move against Kuwait in October.

Saddam may punish Kurds, Shias

Options. Committing stronger forces to stem Kurdish attacks along the northern confrontation line, fixed-wing air attacks on Kurdish positions south ofh parallel, or rocket or artillery attacks on Kurdish cities would satisfy Saddam's need to take strong punitive action to protect his image at home without directly inviting Coalition counterstrikes.ull-scale assault against the Kurdish region or air attacks againsi the Kurds north ofhless likely.[

Options. If the Iranian-supported Badr Corps launches large new anacks, Saddam would be tcmpied to reinforce weak regular Army units in the south with Republican Guard or better equipped mechanized and armored units from the regular Army. He probably would seek to justify such acts by pointing to the increased Iranian threat, an argument Saddam believes will resonate well in some Arab capitals, as well as to insurgent attacks on Iraq's water infrastructure. If Saddam chooses to confront the UN, he may authorize such movements to challenge the US and UK interpretation of UNSC, which holds that Republican Guard units introduced south ofd parallel are subject to attack. Baghdad would seek to divide Washington and London from other Security Council members.1-

attacks unlikely

still feels strongly constrained by uncertainty about US intentions. He likely views the failed uprising/coup attemptS plot and is wary of failingS trap. He also remains uncertain about Iranian intentions. These factors will restrain him from launching all-out attacks in the north or the south. P

believes that while Saddam is presently under intensified

pressureesult of the failed uprising, he retains the ability to bring

the military situation in the north under controlajor

incursion into the Kurdish zone. Under present conditions, he has no

issend significant additional forces into the south.

Original document.

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