of African and Latin American Analysis
5
Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru: Implications of Antidrug Decertification
Bolivia. Colombia, and Peru reportedly believe that their antidrug performance over the past year warrants full US antidrug certification.
They argue thai their cooperation with the United States in successful interdiction programs and expanded anticorruption efforts outweighs any failure to implement politically difficult eradication measures or to arrest drug
kingpins.
Decertificationational interest waiver would temporarily strain bUateral relations with all three countries bul would not irreparably damage antidrug cooperation with the United States.
publicly decryingove, the three countries probably would continue to support joint interdictionseeking to reduce their reliance on US support Peru and Bolivia, however, would continue to resist the expansion of politically costly eradication efforts.
Full decertification, on the other hand, would weaken the administrations in Bolivia and Colombia anda-ong nationalist backlash in all three countries, leading to reduced cooperation with the United States across the board.
Bolivia's Sanchez de Lozada, facing the loss of millions of dollars in US-sponsored foreign loans and the evaporation of his slim majority in the legislature, would become less willing toew extradition treaty and an agreement to share seized assets with Washington, or to thwart attempts by congressional critics to soften Bolivia's tough antidrug law.
Colombia's Samper, who could face renewed allegations of drug ties, would be inclined to forego US antidrug funding,the US advisory role in Colombia, and pull back from other bilateral initiatives such as free trade.
Peru's Fujimori probably would view decertification as an effort by Washington to embarrass him in the runup to the presidential election and would reduce his government's contact with the United States.
: date:3
Bolivia
Bolivia recognizes thai its prospects for antidrug certification are slim bul hopes to avoid full decertification-last year, Bolivia was decertified bulational interest waiver. Since assuming officeresident Sanchez deLozada and key government ministers have repeatedly voiced concern that counternarcotics decertification would weaken their government politically and impede progress on their counternarcotics, economic reform, and good governance
| The President has argued that US-threatened punishments, sucn. as an aid cutoff or withdrawal of US support for Bolivia in international financial institutions, would be tooenalty for failing to meet US coca eradication targets, given domestic political costs. Recent fluctuations in his administration's antidrug policy have resulted primarily from concern about sparking renewed violent protests by coca growers. I-
In trying to fend off decertification, La Paz has highlighted its cooperation with Washington on narcotics interdiction {see Tabicnd promised to expedite the signingew extradition treaty-last month, Boliviaraft treaty to the United States for review. The administration has also cited its efforts to root out high-level corruption, including its investigations of several prominent politicians and the recent arrest ofaval officers charged with drug uafficking. Bolivian officials also point to politically costly efforts to control coca markets and forcibly eradicate coca fields despite violent reactions by growers in3 andhe administration is also likely to argue-as it did before last year's certification rating-that it has been moving ahead on its new antidrug strategy, the "zero option" plan, whose goal is to eradicate coca through compensation of growers and alternative crop development programs.
Sanchez de Lozada probably would view decertificationational interest waivereprieve, although the embarrassment of publicly falling short of US expectations could cause him to lose some support in the legislature. The government survived US decertificationaiver4 largely because it suffered no significant loss of international aid or loan support, allowing Sanchez de Lozada to continue to fund alternative development and other social programs. To try to ensure the continued flow of external funds, the administration probably would continue to support US-backed interdiction efforts and to pursue an extradition treaty with the United States. However, while La Paz probably would make an effort to address some of Washington's concerns over stalled cocaby going after less politically-charged cultivations in national parks-it would remain reluctant to mount
Thit nwawcauduiupf epucdOffice
of African aud latin American Analysis, wilh contribuUraw from |
prune aod NajaXicsCtutci. CouaaeuBmd qucric* are welcome ana mayto Ibe Cteet,
t
an aggressive eradication campaign given Ihe prospect of renewed violent protests from coca growers.
Decertification of Bolivia's countcmarcotics performanceational security waiver would weaken the Sanchez de Lozada administration by opening it to opposition criticism ihal it has failed to meet its own antidrug and good governance goals. Full decertification would increase the likelihood that some ruling coalition legislators might boll from the government, causing the President to lose his fragile four-seat majority in the Chamber of Deputies. Although the President is not likely to make good on his numerous threats to resign in the event of decertification-prim atily because his successor, the leftist Vice President, would substantially reduce Sanchez de Lozada's party's participation in the government-he almost certainly would view such US actionersonal attack. He would probably become less willing to help Washingtonew extradition treaty and an agreement to share seized assets, or to expend political capital trying to thwart attempts by legislative critics to soften Bolivia's tough antidrug law. Because of the related cutoff of tens of millions of dollars in nonhunianitarian aid and the potential loss of multilateral development bank loans, decertification probably would also slow the adroinistration's progress on decentralizing government, improving income distribution, and creating alternative crop development opportunities for coca growers.
Colombia
The Samper administration had expected to be certified this year and was caught off guard by the US Ambassador's comments onanuary that prospects for Colombia's antidrug certification were not good. While administration officials have publicly played down the Ambassador's remarks and continue to assert that Colombia should be certified, they now appear to have reluctantly accepted that certification is unlikely and aretrategy for dealing with decertification.
would severely
weaken ihc administration and that Samper is fearful that the certification process will reopen the "narco-tape" scandal, whkh indicated that the Samper electoral campaign accepted multimluion dollar contributions from the Cab" cartel.
In making its case for certification, the Samper administration has argued that it has exceeded the Gaviiia administration's last year in office on several antidrug fronts, including cocaine seizures, combined coca and opium eradication acreage, and
precursor chemical he government also has pointed to its
operations against the Cali cartel, us indictment of top Cali kingpins, and its plans to try Cali drug lord Miguel Rodriguez Orejuela in absentia. Samper, in an address to the nationebruary, also highlighted new legislation before Congress to criminalize money laundering and his establishmentommission to recommend reforms to the country's plea bargain laws. The President also pledged to eliminate in two years
Colombia's illicit coca and opium crop and to improve government control over the traffickhig huh' of San Andres Island. Samper also repeated the long-standing claim that Colombiaisproportionate share of the antidrug effort and that consuming countries, including the United States, need to do more.
Decertificationational interest waiver wouldajor blow to Samper, who almost certainly would take it personally. In response, the admMstration would undoubtedly step up anti-US rhetoric to harness already high nationalist senuraent-as it did at the height of the "narco-tape' scandal-accusing the United States of meddling in Colombian affairs and ofouble standard on the drag issue. Samper would face significant pressure from the legislature, where drug traffickers exercise considerable clout, and some Cabinet officials to forego all antidrug assistance from Washington, and he may threaten to curtail or terminate the activities of the US Drug Enforcement Administration in Colombia. Accordingecent polL for example,ercent of those surveyed believe Colombia should reject US aid in the event of conditional certification. However, while publicly decrying the US move, Samper probably would be restrained by possible criticisra from the country's elites and businessmen, who value the US relationship, and he is likely to continue to bargain with US officials regarding criteria for recertification. Cabinet officials who are pressing Samper to reduce Colombia's dependence on the United States, such as Defense Minister Botero and Foreign Minister Pardo, would probably become less cooperative with the United States and try to convince Samper to scale back the US antidrug presence in Colombia.
Full decertification would give Samper little recourse but to reduce the counternarcotics relationship with Washington. The President would almost certainly seek to prove his independence from the United States by foregoing all US antidrug aid and severelyelirainating--DEA and other US counternarcotics programs in Colombia. Having less to lose from the United States, Samper would also be less inclined to intervene against narco-influenced legislation in the Congress. While not jeopardizing other bilateral issues where Samperersonal stake-such as human rights-decertification would probably make Colombia less supportive of US policies on Cuba, proliferation, and ecology-issues over which Colombia, as the new chair of the Nonaligned Movement this fall, will wield increased clout. Moreover, while remaining committed to expanding Colombia's free trade agreements, Samper would probably write off NAFTA accession in the near term, concentrating instead on strengthening Latin American trade ties through the Andean Pact and MERCOSUR.esult, bilateral investment treaty and intellectual property rights negotiations with the United States would probably stall. I |
Decertification would also weaken Samper politically. The potential loss of multilateral development loans would force the President to scale back his social program, which is the centerpiece of his domestic agenda, or risk heightened inflation
t^
through deficit spending, threatening the loss of popular support.ecent interview, the ruling liberalresident expressed concerns that members of samper's cabinet from the conservative party might withdraw if colombia is decertified. liberal members of the cabinet who harbor presidential ambitions-such as vice president de la calle and defense minister botero-probably would also try to distance themselves from samper to avoid being tarred with the decertification brush, further eroding the president's ability to govern. many, both inside and outside the goveriuuent, would blame samper-and his alleged drug ties--for ruining the us relationship.orst case, some officials could try to force samper to step down by revealing "proof -specious or valid-of trafficker financing of his campaign.
Peru
peru appears far more attuned to tbe us narcotics certification process this yearwas in previous years and has stated that its antidrug performance should befor example,
lima would find anything short of unconditional certification "incomprehensible.'1 given peru's increased emphasis on counternarcotics during the past year.
^certification only on national interest grounds would be badlypresident fujimon andeleterious effect on overall us-peruvian relations.
although fujimori has not personally lobbied for certification, his numerouspointed comments on peru's counternarcotics efforts strongly indicateexpects the highest certification rating.
failure to eradicate coca undercuts umas claims to unqualified
certification.
to make the case for certification, peruvian officials point to what they considerexpansion of lima's counternarcotics efforts during the pastantidrug activities by the military, increased anticorruption initiatives,seizures of coca products (sechich they say more thanto implement puliticily difficult eradication measures.has met four of the five conditions the united states
identified last year as vital to receiving full certification, pointing to lima's effortsdrug-trafficking aircraft, arrest drug kingpins and dismantleeradicate coca seedbeds, and interdict and destroy coca-processingits economic problems. peru
has devoted significant financial and personnel resources to counternarcotics, and last year continued an air interdiction program even after washington suspended intelligence-sharing programs. finally, lima may contend that the national drug control strategy signed into law in4ealistic gameplan for continuing coca cultivation by meansroad-based alternative development program.
although lima would be disappointed with and mildly critical of certification on national interest grounds, we doubt thatuling woulderious or long-lasting backlash from lima or dramatically strain bilateralational interest waiver probably would fuel fujimori's suspicion mat washington is determined to keep him ai arm's length, deepen his perception that the united states is an unreliable antidrug partner, and reinforce his tendency to develop and implement counternarcotics strategies with limited foreign input if pressed publicly, he might characterize decertificationaiver as inconsistent with the cooperative spirit of the summit of the americas. he probably would not resort to strident nationalism, however, for fear of creating new doubts about his international stature in the runup to the april presidential election. moreover, because fujimori has increasingly madeomestic priority, be probably would continue military and police counternarcotics activities-provided that the current border conflict with ecuador subsides-step up anticorruption initiatives, and give tacit supportxisting joint us-peruvian antidrug programs. his reactionational interest waiver probably would be muted if he were convinced that the ruling was based mainly on lima's failure to eradicate coca and was accompanied by general expressions of approval of lima's other antidrug programs. i
full decertification almost certainly wouldery strong adverse public reaction by fujimori and sour bilateral relations.uling would deepen fujimori's belief that washington is intent on embanassing him and undercutting liis adrainistration in the runup to the election, which he is currently well positioned to win. in die wake ofuling, fujimori probably would feel compelled to defend his counternarcotics performance publicly while further limiting his administration's contact with the us embassy and the us ambassador. although decertification would not prompt fujimori to abandon counternarcotics programs altogether, the effect of exclusively peruvian-and very likely scaled-back-programs would be limited. in any case, we doubt that fujimori would be overly alarmed about the economic implications of full decertification-unless the conflict with ecuador drags on for moreew weeks, calculating that growing private foreign investment and international support from japan and western europe would offset any cutback in us assistance and allow peru to overcome us opposition in seeking loans from international financial institutions. i
Tableounternarcotics Trends: Bolivia
Fradlration (hectares) Coca
issa
Seizures (metricHydrochloride (HCI)
Total base and
Precursor Chemical Seizures
Sulphuric
1
1
LJK
7
M
I 72
4
4
418
6
17H
106
540
Destroyed
Cocaine HCI Base
17
34
6
' Throuih
tin nmiiiiiiTi Pn|_
Tabicounternarcotics Trends; Peru
im im
Eradication (hectares) Coca
Narcotics Seizures (metric tons)
Cocaine Hydrochloride (HC1)
Total base and
Labs Destroyed
Cocaine
ThroughNot broken down into Base and HCI
In
Original document.
Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: