M
Critical Issues
And the Truth Shall Keep You Free: Recollections by the First Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Albert D. Wheelon
"We must know what wc
axe up against so that we can focus our efforts in that direction. Only by so doing can we survive the Cold War."
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Edilof, Wit: Dr. Albert D. Wheelon made thefollowingpmpo-memIA Htakquanent>r. bet . heai ant ef the events associated with his being honored ai4 recipient af the/t. V. fona InteUrrenceAward
I am going to comment about the environment and the opponuniliesacedame hereou may not believe it, but itot woise then than it is now.
The CIA washambles'oup of Cubana had stormed ashore in Cuba thar spring with disas' trous results for themselves, for the Agency, and for John Kennedy's pres. idency and for his conscience. Kennedy was angry with the Agency, with himself, and with others. Allen Dulles was the Director. Freeour-star Air Force generalistinguished war record, was his deputy. Dick Biiscll was in charge of the Clandestine Service and the reconnaissance activities that the Agency had pioneered. These three men were forced to resign.
Against that background. John McConc was brought back intoservice to head the CIA. He enjoyed great independence due to his wealth, an independence that Kennedy understood and respected. Heepublican in aadministration, as were McGcorgc Bundy and Robert McNamara. He wasears older than most of the people around
Kennedy, but they respected hisand keen intelligence.
Dick Helms was appointed head of Bat Clandestine Service. Thewould happen to the important CIA reconnaissancethat were under way? There were tome people in the Department of Defense who thought theseought to move to the Pentagon.
Thereroup of people,who were ouuide the Agency and were influential private diiaens: James Killian, who was President of MIT and had been Presidentscience adviser, was the first head of the President's ForeignAdvisory Board, and was really the leader of this group. Edwin "Din" Land, who had invented the Polaroid camera and was the founder and Chairman of Polaroid, was one of this group. Jimmy Doolitde. a
flyer
ine aeronautical engineer and my fishing companion, was one of this group. James Baker, adesigner at Harvard University, was one of thb group. William Baker, who was to bePresident of Bell Laboratories, was one of thb group. Jerome Weis-ner was professor of dectrical engineering and one of my mentorsas atwas Killian Webner was now Kennedy's science advbet and later became President of MIT. And there were others. Thb groupreat deal of their time and influence trying to make the intdligence system work more
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effectively. They were listened to by both Eisenhower and Kennedy.
Thb group was bound together by aconviction that inuUi-genee is the most highly leveraged component of national security- Din Land explained it to me thii way; "Wc limply cannot afford to defend against all possible threats. "We must know whit we ate up against ao thai we can focus our efToiu in thaiOnly by so doing can we survive the Coldgreed with Land.
The Killian group saw theand significance ofintelligence. This groupEisenhower torogram. This groupBusei! onirplane, nowtheheyhe wake of the Bay of Pigs withtocapabUiiies of thewere mindful of theachievemento operation inyearCIA
reserve funds aimsupport from the Air Force. Great difficulty had been experienced in the Air Force Samoa program. This gtoup had urged that theystem be suitedoint project with the Air Force. The Killian group wanted to institutionalize the partnership between the CIA and the Aira dream that eventually became the National Reconnaissance Officehey wanted to blend the Air Force's resources and experience with the developmental swiftness and Kcurity alertness of CIA- They also valued the ClA'i focus on the single task of gathering intelligence.
It was in this climate thai McCone sought to strengthen the Agency's technical collection and analysisI was brought to the Agency to replace Pete Scoville as Director of the Office of Scientific Intelligence in1 agreed to rake thb jobgreed with Land that this is the most highly leveraged eempe-nrni ef nationaly. Aird so 1 ame to the Agency2 at
Not everyone shared the Killian dream. Robert McNarnara and hb deputy. Roswdl Gilpatric,the existing arrangement that evolved around Dick Bbsell and the Agency as untidy. They weredefense space activitiesime when there was an unseemly competition among the Army. Navy, and Air Force for space projects. They wanted to consolidate allactivities under the Air Force and sought to transfer these activities from the Agency to the Department of Defense. Theya possible role tor the Agency in setting requirements, perhaps doing, and exploiting the(along with other organizations) when it was available.
Initially. McCone was beguiled by this model He hadigh regard for Air Force officers during hii time as Under Secretary of the Air Force- Heloserelationship with Gilpatric and was inclined to follow hb friendlyhere was, however, considerable rivalry between John McCone and Bob McNarnara. That rivalry was expressed in the tug of war over these reconnaissanceNeither was willing to suffer defeat on this issue, and cleanwere not made often. Even though McCone was taken in by thb Gtlpatnc model and the McNarnara model, he still had thb mandate from Kennedy. He had KUlbn and Land and others pressuring him to build up the technical capabilities for collection and analysis at the Agency, not to tear them down. He wasquandary during my first year here at the Agency.
Pete Scoville was (he Deputyfor Researchhat organization was the beginning of the Directorate of Sciencecoville had been told that he would be responsible for all of the Agency's technicalHe naturally assumed that the technical arm of the Clandestine(DSD) wouldast of ihe DDR. But the CUndestine Service was unwilling to agree to thb and McCone was unwilling to force it to do so. The Office of Scientificwas toart of the DDR.ew DDI fought successfully to keep it. Scoville was given two activities. The first was the fledgling Office of ELINT whichechnical connection with NSA and the Clandestine Service's liaison activities with friendly governments. The secondajor operationalOffice of
OSA was the organisation in the Clandestine Service that Bbsell had used to develop and operateaircraft and satellites.2 it was actively involved inupgrading, and flying operational missions withover the Soviet Union in accord with Eisenhower'sbut regularly elsewhere in the
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world. OSA was just beginning flight tests with the Oxcart. It wasfor procuring, testing, and assembling the camera and film-recovery paytoad for theroad-area search systemoint venture with the Air Force. The Pentagon wanted this robust activity. They chipped away at the Agency'sand independence from2 tobout half-way through the year, McCone conceded fiscal control of these programs to the Air Force andumber of other decisions that undercut Scov-ille. Pete ScoviHean of considerable wealth andHe resigned in3 because he felt that he had not been supported internally or externally.
I was flattered beyond beliefas asked to take Scovillc'tnew something of the problems that Pete had raced because be was my good friend and one of thereasons tor my joining theold McCone and Carter: "Well, there is no point in screwing another good light bulbocket that is shorted out. We had better find out what is wrong with thisWith theirought out ScovUle on Capeull day trying to understand what had gone wrong and what needed to be done to get theback on track. Scovillean of great good will and was gracious in hb comments. But he left no doubt in my mind that anyone would tail to achieve the lofty goals of Kiliian and others unless the ground rules wereeturned to Washington andmy thoughts.
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I said that the only way to monitor the Sovietcapabilities was to use satellite reconnaissance. In essence, to use the sun's light to illuminate their facilities and our cameras in space to take their pictures.
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I met with McConc ro discuss chocepeated Dinlogic about the importance of hardI noted that espionage in the USSR was exceedingly difficult, whatever its successes, it could not provide the broad range of answers that weoted thatintelligence against the USSR was helpful but eroding as the Soviets moved their traffic to land-lines and microwaveaid that the only way to monitor the Soviet strategic capabilities was to usereconnaissance. In essence, to use the sun's light to Illuminate their facilities and our cameras in space to take their pictures.
I had great appreciation for thesystems, particularly from my involvement the previous year in the Cuban missilead learned that airplanes can exploit breaks in the weather to photograph priority targets in crisis situations, whereas satellites have to contend with cloud cover over targets of interest andtake photographs on demand. (The large Soviet ABM radar in Sibc-ria went undetected fot almost two years because of thbe hads in service aod the Oxcart coming along. But we also had Eisenhower's commitment not
to overfly the USSR again. Even if we were not soaw lit* de possibility that we would be able to fly often enough over the USSR to provide the broad-area, repeated coverage that we required.
This left the primary task to satellite reconnaissance with its ability to overfly large areas frequently without provocation. There were tourwith the systems then in operation or being planned. First, they depended on physical recovery of the film capsules from orbit, and this meant that the coverage was always at leastays old. Second, the resolution was not good enough toigh-confidence search tor new activities. Third, the onlythen operating successfully was being progressively shifted to the DOD at Gilpatrie's urging. Fourth, the Air Force's efforts in building such systems had been marked by repeated failure. The Samos program had been under wayumber of years, and there had been one tragic accident after arioeher. We hadeet of film fot years and years of flying.
1imple case to McCone: "Satelliteoo important to be turned overnonopolbt providero weak. The country needsthe stimulus that itmore than anywherehe CIA under Bbsell had demonstrated itsto do exciting, important programs that produced realI acknowledged that dual sourdng was inefficient,eminded him that tbe country hadecond nuclear design laboratory at Livermore when
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Lot Alamos waieminded him thai this action had been demanded by the Ait Force and approved by John McCone when he waa rcaponiiblc for the Atomic Energy Commission. Withcaied my case and left him tothe matter.
McCone called me back Later and said that the Agency shouldigorous, equal role in satelliterather than go out of the business. He agreed to throw has enormous support behind my effortsould take thegreed to do so. In his parting remarks at the Deputies meeting on his last day at CIA inis primary point was an apology that he had not done enough to solve the NRO. but he had tried.
And so the task passed to me in the summert was now my turn to generate the new capabilities that the countryas sure that technology was adequate to the task,ad come from the world of missile and spaceSuccessful protects require that the technology is sound and thai appropriate public policy causes. The technology for this task was teady, or would be if wc just pushed itCertainly the need existed. The public policy also existed in the form of pressure from the Killian group, from Weisner, and from Kennedy himself that wc ought to move in that direction.
We had ongoing problems to deal with as well The Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI) finally moved from the DI to the DSeVT. It bene-fiCcd irrvmctiu(cdy ftom being dose coupled io technical .collection acuvi-
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Successful projects require
that the technology is sound and that appropriate public policy exists.
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ties. We established the Foreign Missile and Space Analysis Center (FMSAQesponse to the priori-tics of ihc Cold War. with ia missile gap and the Space race hysteria. ICarl Duckett, who was the outstanding person in missileto come to the CIA and build this organization. He didas given the responsibility for managing the CIA computertask toaid too litde attention because of the relentless pressure of reconnais-sancc issues.perations under Jack Ledford and Jimwere then wot id wide and thisreat deal of attention. Each minion required presidential approval, and we suffered painful losses year after year.
we even ran missions rrom a
Ibe
Uxxan nignt test programPeringosky consumed aof my time. It was adevelopment with aofof good pilots, it was only asmy term of governmentthat the Oxcart went operational.
I remained personally involved in both our aircraft and satelliteid so to set anlew in the Oxcart to showin the plane when it was
experiencing great difficulties,as roundly criticized by John McCone for risking my person in this way.
Therogram inplaced under Johnwe
reassumed our programmaticbilities. We were involvedumber of EUNT. grams
But my principal challenge was to make abigin satellite reconnaissance. Il was this opportunity and this promise thai had galvanisedability and determination. It was primarily this prospect thai had motivated Killian. Land. Weisner, and others to brace Kennedy on building the Agency's capability. More fundamentally, it was what the country desperately needed.
I felt that broad-area search was out top priority. The first siep was toay to improvefdot resolution of the search capability being provided by thec simply did not know whereactivities were in the USSR- Wc had to find them bysearching film at NPIClights had the
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need for complete coverage at regular intervals was driven home..
id soeached outside the Agency for technicalrell of Stanford toeave of absence. Heeam of first-class scsenttsa andto determine the natural limits ofesolution. The group was also asked to work with NPIC to establish an appropriate resolution goalollow-on searcha goal that wouldeal differ-eoce in our ability to locate and identify targets in the vast amounts of film provided by these broad-arca-scarch systems. This group worked for about four months andthat the desired resolution was well beyond the limit* to which theould be pushed by upgrades. They suggested that weew system based on entirely new principles, and this became the
1 naa myaouorsana tdiicu uic of every contractor involved with ClA in reconnaissance
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The problem was clear: the film-return systems and orbital constraints on systems then in operationundamental barrier.
arefully inquired if they had experienced problems of this sort. They were stunned by the question and pointed out that the OAoy to work with prei iiely because our people did not try to second guess their technical decisions. Rather than being discouraged or intimidated, McCone was gaMnraed by this affair and threw himself into vigorousof our effort*.
This strange event had an unexpected and salutary effect on the program.
The new
system was opposed by powerfulin the Pentagon, especiallySecretary of the AirMacMiuan. Years latersay publicly that this wasmistake that he hadThe developmentruly remarkableWith it, we could scan the entire
was the result of the effort* of Sid Drtil, Jack Maxcy, John Crowley, Lcs Dirks, John McMahon, and many others.
Another system grew out of myin the Cuban missile crisis. In that rapidly developing situation, wc needed photographs of Cuba almost as soon as they wete taken. Thewere completely uselest because their film capsules had to beoff Hawaii, flown to Rochester. New York, and then analyied weeks after the orbital passes that covered Cuba. Subsequent Soviet maneuvers in Eastern Europe showed me how irrelevant satellite systems were to current intelligence and crisisThe problem was clean the film-return systems and orbitalon systems then in operationondamental barrier.
The solution was equally cleat. Weay to take pictures in orbit and immediately transmit them by radio waves to the ground Television cameras were doing this every minute of every day for national televisionbut not in Earthalledoung CIA scientist who hadhodes Scholar after studying physics atLes Dirks. Heechnical solution for which every President has been profoundly grateful. He was awarded the National Security Medal for this
achievement and lain became DDSeVT.
In1 returnedad planned to doained the CIA. My Bargain with John McConc had been to ftay for not leu than three yean, not more than four. He agreed to those terms, but wanted to knowad reached that formula. My response was simple. 'It will take me one year to learn how the lystero works and what needs to b: done It will take me another two yean to accomplish that.are accomplishedelieve is both neccsssry andI will have irritated far too many people to stayick Helmsasked me to extend, but honored the bargainad struck with McCone.
I believe that my four years here should give heart to those among you
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If youear vision of what needs to be done and are willing to risk youryou can movein this government. Our country desperately needs courageousto supplement theservice of many.
who want toifference inIf youlear vision of what needs to be done and are willing to risk your career, you can move mountains in this government. Our country desperately needs courageous leadership to supplement the loyalof many. It is true now as it was true then that bureaucratic inenia and turf issuesarge overhead burden on your efforts. What you need to remember is that individuals
make things happen- Jack
tem happen, tea Dirks made thepeople are gone now, butUvea on. The country istheir debt.
Thisough time for the Agency. As bad as it is, it is not as difficult as it was in the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs. The CIA came out of thatand made an enormous contribution to the winning of the Cold War. Each of you canifference. You must begin from fim principles and try to undentand what really needs to be done in the next decade. Then, you mutt devise realistic plant to meet those needs. Finally, you must have the courage to make things happen,
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