INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS REVIEW

Created: 7/1/1995

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

International Narcotics Review

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This Review is prepared by ihc DCI Crime aad Narcotics Center, withfrom other offices. It assesses narcotics-related developments nvrldwide. file report leadshort Perspectiverug-related issue or trend ihat we believe is of special importance. The Perspective, which does not represent aDirectorate of Intelligence assessment, is intended to be speculative and in generate discussion. The Perspective is followed by feature articles, and the remainder of the report examines various dimensions of the drug problem by region. Questions and comments are welcome and should be addressed to the

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interdiction efforts in both Colombiasince3 appear lo have disruptedof cocaine along the .nfur yearsconduit of coca derivative* moving fromColombia Intensified law enforremeniibe uresis of majornarcoticsit forcing cocaineto alter mclhods uf operation, includingmodes of transportation These change1significantlic*

coca.at least in some areas There also arethai some trafficking groups in Peru arc in cisjrray and may be stepping up ailcmpisribe couniemarcoltcs personnel lo ignore illicit shipments.

Importance of Ihe

Drug traffickers have long preferred iir routes to move semire fined cocaine base to Colombia for final processing The airbridge:hem lecurity from intcrdiciion hy ground-based pot.ee units aahl also from possibleheft of narcotics by bandits and guerrillas Air transportation also has allowed traffickers topeedier return on their invctfmcm. reduced possible spoilage or sernirefined narcotic, because of hot and humid conditionsin drug areas, and permitted the use of staging areas with poor roaddecreasing the chance of drug operations bring disrupted by

Principally for ihese reasons, ihe airbridge is the most important chokepoini available in Peruvian and Colombian security forces trying to stem the flow of narcotics between ihe two countries. Lima and Bugola have sought to exploit this keyarlymainly on attempting to deny traffickers tlie use of airfields by deploying security forces lo municipal airports

and by blocking runways of rudimentarysucceeded in disrupting many drug flight* fromgrowing jrcas in the Upperalley, bat trafficker* ton* dispersed their actitioct to other areas of Pern, particularly in the Aguaylia. Apuri-mac. and Paciitea river valleys1eru purturd an aggressive aerial interdiction effort lo force down trafficker aircraft lhai was set back when the United Slates suspended intelligence and radar trickinghave been critical to the effective use of Andean air assets inllowing traffickers to resume direct flights wilhoul concern for their safety. Changes in US law and the Andean governments' willingness to enture full compliance with intcrrational norms regarding sltootdowns allowed US intelligence support to resume last December, however, the Peru-Ecuador border war earlier this year effectively delayed implementation until March.

Renewed Turgellng of the Ah-bridiy-

The resumption of US intelligence support has allowed recent Colombian and Peruvian interdiction uprrations to disrupt the airbridge more effectively US detection and rsonrtoring airplanes and ground-based radar have helped both countries seite. destroy on ihe ground, or force downillegal drug trafficking planes

Lima alone has seized or destroyed nine di upplanes sincehese successes have bolstered the confidence of interdiction aircrews and increased their sense of -ownership" of domestic antidrug program*.

Peru has been lhe most assertive in denying iu national airspace to trafficker flights.

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by helicopter ihe following day. After troops drew fire from traffickers, the Colombian Ait Force used ground-attuck aircrafttrafe portions of the

Peruvian force* adhere to internationallyof engagement' for potentially lethalaircraft; ibesc include the declarationflight zones, radio and visual warningand the firing of warning shots In late lune.Air Force airciaft based al Tarapotoa single-engine Cessna north ofwas heading toward Colombia. The Airtracked the Cessna for nearly twohich it ignored radio and visual warningsas warning shots.

authorized the interceptor to fire on the Cessna, which disintegrated and crashed in the jungle someilometers south ol the Columbian border.

Colombia also has been aggressive in targetingOn numerous occasions this year,have used US-

provided tracking data lo follow suspccied narcotics-carrying aircraft. On at least five occasions, Air Force planes later strafed suspected drug planes while on the ground

After several of the

Air Force helicopters reportedly airliftedteams to Ihc airfields to seize any aircraft that remained .it the Sire.

Impact on Traffickers

Improved air interdiction efforts have forced traffick-

ers to reduce iheir use of the airbridge.

traffickers appear to be stockpiling druguntil pressures ease.

Theof coca derivatives probably is the cause for waning prices in many areas;

[some traffickers have lowered iheir price of coca base by as much as SO pereenl

Such prices

probably approach the break-even point and may force some producers to lay off workers or suspend production soon if prices remain depressed.

Trying To Find Ways Around the Problem

Airbridge inierdiction efforts arc compellingto change their methods of operation

aircraft was detected in southern Colombia. After being informed of iis landing site, Colombian interdiction forces urrived at the airstrip

. oic itl-nlllfeil7 .Mc-rulon-lonial-on (Ctncsgo Ccvvcaticn) and by tubsttfjcntaw-

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Outlook and Implications

Already offood start, aerial interdiction efforts have the potential to cause more serious, systemic problems for traffickers over ihe long haul. If pressures arc continued, traffickers arc likely io become more desperate in their attempts tointerdiction forces. Many, for instance, are likelylep up efforts lo buy off key mililaryby offering enormous sums for iheirShould these attempts fail, some traffickers could be expected to try to coerce security personnel through violence and intimidation. Eventually,Ihreais to US detection and monitoringat presentincrease as traffickers conclude ihat ihe gains from relieving ihe pressure outweigh the risk that such violence might intensify international antidrug resolve.

Al least some traffickers may be noisedvoidentirely by using tivchne or land routes

fickers undoubtedly will make grealcr use of Peru's rivers lo Iry to minimize disrupiiom to iheir opera-

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Mosl major narcotics producing areasasy access lo ihe navigable headwaters ofiver: these tributaries Howtowardare suitable for carrying even large loads of narcotics. Some of these same rivers arc already being used by traffickers to bring in precursor and essential chemicals to jungle

and to move at least some narcotic? to stagingTraffickers have avoided riverine iransfcr) because :hcy arc slow, but ihey arc likely to sec the rivers as a" increasingly attractive alternative if aenal inierdiction pressures arc sustained.

A serious aiicmpt hy Peru and Colombia tn improve their riverine and road interdictionwith ihcore pronounced impact in curbing trafficking. At present, Peru's fluvial highwayssable, if inconvenient, backdoor to efforts to control theWilbout them and the few extant roads in the drug areas, traffickers would have to rely on far less efficient means of transport, including human ard animal pack trains. Such clumsy transportationwould further reduce profits and put traffickers* valuable drug cargoes al greater risk of theft or loss.

Over time, intensified and sustained aerialcomplemented by operations to disrupt other avenues of moving coca derivatives lo processing laboratories in Colombia, could erode theofffields' operations, substantially reducing their incentive to continue producing and trafficking in cocaine. Those traffickers that remain in the drug business probably would become fiercely

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ossibly spurring confrontations between groups, which would furthersttess the i'.licit trade. The troubles faced by the Caliresult of the recent arrc-sls and surrender* of ley leaders and securitywith an effective airbridge program couldrend toward processing finished cocaine in Peru by othergroups and by Peruvian drug traffickers. Some Peruvian groups already have sold finished cocaine directly to traffickers from otherappear increasingly reluctant lo pay high middleman prices for Colombian -produced narcotics. Cocaine carried overland and exported through Peruvian ports would, as it is now. beto aerial interdiction efforts.

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