THAI WE speakou aho THE american feople TODaT ABOUT ISSUES
relatedia's involvement in guatehala. there serious and the issues are complex, ould liu to ie as expansive as possible. civen tbe open and unclassipieo nature op this hearing, there are classified aspects of thisill not bt able to adoaess and.ill have to defer these issues to closed session. similarly. as tou know. host of theill adoaess are under review bt various inspectors general or the justice depart mkt wo* king with the intelligence oversichi board tasked bt the faesioint. finally. heitber the oci nor cia makes foreign policy; accordingly, question* muted to polict need to be deferred tc the state department and the national security council, nevertheless. civen the treatment of these issues and the mediaill provideelieve to be the facts or conclusionsnow at present.
extremely serious allegations have been made RECaRDINC cia's conduct IM THC'evckts surrounding the murder of. citizen michael divine inmd THE FATE of the CUaTEMaLAM insurgent leader efrain bamaca veusquee. LET me state EMPHaTICAJ.lt that the CJA is not conplicit in the murder of KR. DCVIHt NOR in tic apparent killing of mr. bamaca. nor has the cia DELIBERAlELT withheld Is format ion. ON the contrary. cia information provided important insights into what transpired ik these TWO cases. ave ALREaDT made available to the oversightompalkensive package of intelligence materials related to them.
let me review the record.
cia acquired ITS first significant piece of information on THE killing of mr. devine innd prompt it SEAT AN intelligence report on tbe matter to tbe national security council staff. the departments of state, defense, andhe federal bureau OF investigation. INDEED. THIS informationt element in furthering us efforts to press guatemala* authorities to take decisive steps leading to the arrest and convictionumber Of those directly involved.
more than one YEAR latex. inia received information trat shed light on the possible presence of an adoitiokalcolonel julio roberto alpin the interrogation of ma. DfiVIHE. again WE promptly provided this information to THE natiokal security council. the departmehts of state. defense. and justice. amd the federal bureau of investigation as an intelligence report. WE alsoormal written "crime report" containing even more detailed information. this report was delivered to the department of justice oh
ih sum. all the intelligence in format ion related id the killing Or mr. ocvine WaS reported to relevant us executive branch authorities imely fashion. it is important to note that there IS nothing ih our current review of the devine case that chances our VIEW of the guatemalan judicial system's verdict that army captain comtreras and his soldiers killed mr. devine.
at the same TIME,ant to acknowledge that we failed 10
inform ike imilligenci committees in tni house and the senate about THt specific information we acquired ik october i
regret THIS failure to keep the concrissional oversicht
comm1TTCES pulitd.
now with recaro to bamaca:
the firstormat ion that THE cia received on the capture of bamaca came ih THE spring2 and this was provided to the departments of state. defense, and treasurt, the national securiit council, and the us southern command. at that time, we received ho tasking io collect additional information concerning the fate of BAMaCA,uatemalan citizen.
we nonetheless continued to receive conflicting information sporadically over the neat three yeaxs. all OT this information was also provided PROMPTLY to the appropriate us officials in THEasst in CUATtHAlA and in washington.
in october us policymakers asked us to review the information oh the BaHaCA case that nt had up to this point and
to seek additional information indetermine his
fate. this effort resulted in tht productioneries of intelligence assessments.
in Lateia received new riportinc regarding bamaca's death. once received at headquarters, this information was provided immediately to appropriate us government agencies. ik addition. because of the cumulative effect or tpiis report, cia undertook an analysis of this new information in light of all prcviouslt available reporting. and
two dats later FORMaXDED this assessment to appropriate us government agencies. ih the course of researching this assessment, we learned additional information about ana report. ihe senior guatemalan military officer. cited in TBE report whourrogated bamaca in2 WaS ikdeid COLOKEL alpirez.
THE CIA also worked with THE nsc and tni state department to clear the informationresentation to tmc guatemala* government ih EaRLYs.
ebruary. the CIA KaD briefed this information to the
staffs of the senate and house oversight committees. there haveumber of other classified briefings and hearings since then.
i would stress that. like some of the rcportihc ik the devine case, our information on the fate of bamaca has been fragmentary. sometimes contradictory. and or vaxtihc reliability. for taawle. let mx describe some of the conflicting information we have iecm deal inc with regarding bamaca. wereceived reporting tkat:
he was killed on the battlefield*.
he committed suicide to avoid capture;
he was seriouslt wouxded. captured,died shortly afterwards;
SOKE SOURCES BELIEVE HE HAS KILLED WITHIN WEEKS Or HIS CAPTURE; OTHER INFORMATION HAS HLK ALIVE AS OFND WE HAVE HEARD ALLEGATIONS THAT HE WaS SICHTED ALIVE IK THE PRESENCE OF AN AAKY PATROL as LATE AS
IP he FOCUS ON the MORE CREDIBLE INFORMATION HOST RECCNTLT RECEIVED, TOGETHER WITH OUR ANALYSIS OF OTHER DATA, OUR ASSESSMENT IS THAT BAHACA DID NOT DIE ON the BATTLEFIELD AS ALLEGED BY the GOVERN KENT OF GUATEMALA: RATHER, HE BELIEVE THAT HE WAS CAPTURED ALIVE..WITH HI NOR HOUNDS--AFTER AN ARMED ENCOUNTER with GUATEMALAN ARMY TROOfS ONARCH2 AND TAKEN TO san KARCOS FOR INTERROGATION.
OUR'BEST JUDGMENT, BASED OH the INFORMATION AVAILABLE, WAS THAT BAMACA WAS XILLED WHILE IN GUATEMALAN ARMY CUSTODY WITHIN SEVERAL weeks Or HIS CAPTURE. BUT weOT KNOW the SPECIFIC CIRCUMSTANCES OF HIS DEATH. we HAVE THE NAMEUATEMALAN OFFICER. THE PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED COLONEL ALPIREZ, WHO ISOLY KNOWLEDGEABLEPERHAPS INVOLVEDPRESUMED DEATH OF BAKACA. THIS INFORMATION HAS BEEN PASSED BY STATE DEPARTMENT TO THE GUATEMALAN GOVERNMENT FOR ITS INVESTIGATIVE FOLLOW-UP. EPEAT THAT CIA WaS NOT INVOLVED IN THE DEATH OF BaKaCA. OR IN ANY COBEAUP RELATED TO THIS CASE.
ONCLUDE THIS ASPECT Of HY STATEMENT. OULD LIKE TO ACAIN OBSERVE THAT THE US GOVERNMENT"ANDAR LESS COMPLETE PICTURE OF TNE FATES OF DEVINE OR BAKACA HAD IT NOT BEEN FOR CIA ANO OVERALL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY REPORTING.
the NEATILL ADDRESS are THAT CIA FUNDED INTELLIGENCE PROCRA.HS IN GUATEMALA JK CONTRAVENTION Or us POLICY OR THAT IT SURREPTITIOUSLY REPLACED US MILITARY AID CUT OFF IN DECEMBER0 through soke KIND OF DELIBERATE BAIT AND SWIICK EFFORT. THESE ALLEGATIONS are ALSO FALSE.
the PROGRAMS THAT CIA CONDUCTED WERE AUTHORIZED UNDER SEVERAL PRESIDENTIAL FINDINGS. TREY WERE REGULARLY REVIEWED BY senior OFFICIALS IN the KEY FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND NATIONAL SECURITT AGENCIES OF the EXECUTIVE BRANCH. THEY were ALSO REGULARLY REVIEWED by the INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES in THE HOUSE ANO the SENATE. all FUNDS EXPENDED IN these PROGRAMS WERE FULLY AUTHORIZED AND APPROPRIATED BY the CONGRESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEES.
annot go into the details of these programs in an
OPEN session,AN DENY CaTECCRICALLY the CKaRCE THAT he INCREASED FUNDING DURING9 .5 period. ik fact, total CIA FUNDING OF GUATEMALAN INTELLIGENCE PEAKED AT ABOUTILLION IN FT9 AND FELL CONSISTENTLY TO AROUND St MILLION in THE PRESIDENT'S RECENT DECISION TO SUSPEND US ASSISTANCE TO THE GUATEMALAN HILITARY WILL REDUCE SUBSTANTIALLY THEURE. this STEADY DROP REPRESENTS AN ORDERLY PHASE OUT OF OUR CENTRAL AMERICAN PROGRAM.
these DATES ARE IMPORTANT because IT IS DURINGECEXBERCIA IS ALLEGED TO have INCREASED FUNDING TO OFFSET the LOSS OF us HILITARY AID.
SF
I CANNOT comment authoritatively before IKE WORK Or the cia inspector general is COMPLETtO. nevertheless, elieve we HAVE KADE SCkE HANAGE.1ent and procedural mistakes in THESE TWO CASES.
first,AVE already noted. Nt OIO NOT BRIEF THE oversight committees on important1 INFORMATION RELATED to devine in THE SAME NAT he had BRIirCO THE DE parF JUSTICE. ME regret THAT we DIO not do so.
second. the potential significance OF ONE PIECE Of INFORMATION obtained inas not recognized until we received new information in
third. THERE is one instance in5 ourinc whicw AN important report WaS delated in the field for SLR DATS;believe THISanagement lapse, WHICH contributed to our decision to recall our CHIEf Of station in cuatlmala.
CIA KANACtfttNT is reviewincits procedures to ihple.1ent corrective measures. AT KO TIME. however. did THE CIA deliberately witkhoio or suppress INFORMATION on THESE CASES. THE charge that WE DID is false.
as TOU wow, reviews are UNDERWAY ik OTHll us government agencies recardisc ALLICAIIONS associated WITH THE IaKaCA ano
divine cases, the investigators were also taskxd to loor into informatiow on other cases involving the human richts of several us citizens.
in addition. the president has assigned the intelligence oversight board certain specific review tasks working mith the departmental and agencys. all agencies involveo are in the process of securing documents relatingnise inquiries and arc cooperating fully in the
investigations.
I have been as candid as possible in this ii ear inc.
although ik cae are limitsanlt sayl'blic for un.annot and will not talk in unclasslfled. open session arout imeelicence sources and mcihods.ill be happy to do so ik classirleo sessions.
i tare this position not out of some abstract devotion to secrecy but becauseert real sense. it is essential for tm protection of thc lives of the people who assist the intelligence community and our own national security interests, indeed, our success depends on our abilitt to protect the iocmiiies and activities of those individuals who agree to worr with uslandestine basis.ue inc to do so. thet put themselves at great personal risr. if wt fail to satisfy this fundamental obligation to our sources, ne will
find few people willing to support our efforts.
to conclude. let ke reflectarger sense on the role of the intelligence communityemocratic society.
at thef us policymakers. we provide information on such difficult issues as civil wars, terrorisk. narcotics.
wIaPOKS PROLIfera!ion. organized crime. ano instability related
Current CUssificacion:?
SEC
REGIONAL, ETHNIC. TRtlAt, OH RELIGIOUS CONFLICT.
IIONTINUING DtLErtKA THAT IN COLLECT IK VITAL INFORMATION ON SUCH TOriCS VEOT NECESSAAILV FIND OUR SOURCES AHO.vCPRISTINE, THE HOtfORAjLE. akd THE CLCCaNT.
O JWf, HOWEVER, USE THIS OR am OTHER RATIONALE TOR OVERLOOKING OR COHERING UF CAlrtlS.
wl FULL* ACCEPT THE NECESSHT OF RE INC HELD TO HlC* STaKDaROS OF CONDUCT.
WC ALSO RECOCTIEl TKaT THE UNIQUE CHALLENGES WITH WHICH TBI INTELLIGENCE PROFESSION NUST OUPFLEIT ALL THE PORE IKPORTANT TO ENSURE CONTINUOUS aNO PROPER EXECUTIVE AjfO CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF PAST. PRESENT, AND FUTURE INTELLIGENCE and COVEAT ACTION PROGRAMS.
THIS CONCLUDES MT RLIaRKS.
St
Original document.
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