ASPIN COMISSION STAFF ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION OF CIA'S POLICY ON HUMAN RIGHTS ISS

Created: 3/29/1995

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

MORI COCumer.C

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJBCT: Aspin Commission Staff Roundtable Discussion of CIA's Policy on Hunan Rights Issues

On Chairman Les Aaoin and Cession staffers Britt Snid.r. John MosSS. lohr John Bellinger. Dick Ciza and Sarah Holmes? met 2ith

he allowing CIA^ ofviHon

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legal advisor; LA Division; CTC Assistant Generalhief CTC; pcS. Mr. ASt by explaining that hetereated in gaining an understanding of CIA policy in two areas:

Wh?Ctoward informing US citizens of

the fate of relatives? What are the

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^Kl!Jf C ance exists to help the COS determine- Certainare accepted, but others like human rights violations, are not. The COS is expected to inform headquarter, if there are humanriahts

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2!hl?h. Merest to the US government then we

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n response to Mr. Aspin'srief^^logy of events in Cuate^Ia^lTSSedajJBBajHflsaid that the Agency acted prorotlv flnrt

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citizens; therefore we do not inform relatives of any activities. However, we do work through other agencies

through the state Dept. Thereiscussion of instances in_which the CIA does provide warn-nasi

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4. Mr. Moseman asked whether we wereby over regulating their activities andmen fBHWhW and 4bVHHb^ discussed

the difficult standard? and dealing with rore oversight, we are trying to build flexibility into the system and pay more attention to the risk/benefit analysis. Mr. Aapin questioned why human rights violations werector inxplained that the internal agency policy evolved frceaota Congress and the Executive Branch. The aieeting ended with,rief discussion of other types of lows, rules and regulations that hamper Intelligence. copyright laws.

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on .Guatemala Case

Note: The following update is for internal use only and responds lo the inaccurate media stories about iht bVmgt in Guahrmole, indtiding the murder of American citizen MkhoeiOxJy thai the nedm tnB cennw to run tiona about Guatemala for tt least the not several days in the (WBtfiw. thiseing pirxndfd for

CMy*e

AccounO of the tragic deaths ot Michael Devir* and Efrain Bamaca Vsuueruez have implied and in some cases stated that the Central Intelligence Agency lied, purposely withheld irdorrzution. oc was impUdUyin these kfflmgs. Such accounts are wrong and mislead the American public

Recognizing that independent coruir-mabon ot the tacts would be needed, the Acting Director of Central Intelligence directed onhat the CIA's Inspector Generalhorough investigation of the alleged relationship between OA and Guatemalan officials That effort is well underway and should be completed in several weeks. The current level of cusundersttnding demands, however, that we provide an accounting of the facts that are available at this time. However, the conclusions contau-ed in this commentary are consistent with the IC wcruiry to date.

Charges that CIA withheld' information or that it is "out of control" are withoutThe Agency fulfills its mission at the direction of the President, its functions and performance are cWfernuned by law and monitored by Congress.

Questions about whether we should be operating in Latin America disregard the fact that the United States has extensive rational inleiests in that region of the world. The

Intelligence Cornmunity's role there, asis to support US poucynuuiers by providing informal)onide range of issues, inducting drug trairacldng, political and mui tary trends, active btturgeroes. and human rights issues. Importandy. hadeen for its intelligence collection capacities, the US government soli would know virtually nothing about the circumstancesthe deaths of Michael Devine and Efrain Bamaca Velasquez.

In developing sources of information, our intelligence services must deal with many types of people, including some of question-abte character These often are the only people with access to important informationillingness to share it with the USOn occasion, intelligence assets take action that is neither directed nor condoned by us and is in direct contravention of US law. When that occurs. Agency policies require that such relationships be ended and that possible violations of US criminal law be reported to the appropriate US law enforcement

US intelligence agencies have several independent statutory resporvubuiries with respect to possible violations of US criminal law. One is to report the facts to theUS authorities. Another Is to protect sources and methods, an obligation that often limits our ability to make public allacquiredhird is to keep our cr*errighl committees in Congress fully and currently infonred.

In the cases of Mkhael Devine and Efrain Bamaca Velasquez. OA fulfilled these responsibilities with the exception of its pos-ttble failure, as noted below, lo inform Con-

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imely fashion of some reporting on the death of Michael Oevine.

In the case of Michael Devine. who was murdered in

CIA received information concerning Devine's death in0 and promptly disseminated it to the appropriate US authorities. This information helped lead to the arrest and conviction by the Guatemalan governmentumber of those involved.

Inhe OA receivedinformation about anotherpossibly involved in Devine's death. This information was provided promptly to appropriate US authorities. OAetter containing further details to the Department of Justice on November

Basedearch to date of1 records, it appears that CIA may not have briefed either one or bom of ouroversight <xcimittees on theof possible violations of US criminal law. We should have done so, and we are discussing this matter with the committees.

In the case of Efrain Bamaca Velasquez, who was murdered in or about1

CIA received intelligence reporting on the disappearance and possible death of Bamaca In the Spring2 throughe received conflicting reports; some indicated that he was dead, some that he was alive. This information was disseminated immediately to the appropriate officials and agencies.

InIA received credible new reporting with information regarding Bamaca's death and the circumstances of his death. This information wasimmediately to the National Security Council staff, the Department of State, and a

number of other government agencies

The National Security Councilomplete review of the new information which had not been corroborated and which conflicted with previous information, also widely disseminated within classified consumer channels. Two days later, CIA's completed analysis was provided to both the National Security Council staff and the State Department

The OA worked quickly and dosdy with the National Security Council staff and the State Department to dear the information for useemarche to the Guatemalan government in early

- By earlyIA had briefed the staffs of bom oversight committees, as well as the Chairman and ranking member of the House Permanent Select Coxrunittee on Intelligence, about this informatiort-

It is appropriate and desirable that OA's performance be examined. When the Inspector General's report Is completed, it will be made available to the Administration and the intelligence oversight committees. Within the necessary constraints imposed on OA by the statutory obligations to protect classified information, the results of that report will be made available to the American public '

The Inability to discuss publidy all the facts involved in this case has made OA the target of inaccurate charges that it has acted inesponsibly and withheld information from appropriate recipients. OA is responsible for providing all information concerning possible crimes to the appropriate US executive branch authorities; in the cases of Devine and Bamaca, it has done soimely fashion. It is the responsibility of those authorities topossible violations of US criminal law and to determine how the information should be used in representations to foreignIP'im-

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