NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Created: 9/27/1975

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

National Intelligence Bulletin

5

PORTUGUESE TIMOR

Neither portion ofronged program foe Timor has produced noteworthy results. On the diplomatic front. Lisbon has continued to assert its desire toettlement, but has set no timetable. None of ihe various parties seems to bo in agreementenueormat for discussions. The governor of Timor has been recalled tn Lisbon lor consultations, but thereo word about what proposals, if any, are being considered.

JsasaVsj has been keeping the pressure on Lisbon, butconcerned that Portugal will ultimately wash its hands of Timor and recognize the de lacto rule claimed by the leftist Fretilin party, which now controls mosl major towns. Lisbon thus lar has been careful to do nothing that might be interpreted by Jakartaeliberate threat to Indonesian interests, but at the same time It Is clear that Portugal is in no position to enforce its will on Fretilin. Fretilin's kaden, buoyed by recent military six cesses, areard line against cooperating with the other Timorese parties or participating In any negotiations that Include them. Fretilin asserts that its control ol east Timor entitles it to represent all Timorese in discussions with Lisbon

challenge to the Fretilin forces. The core of the pfO-Fretilin fighting units are former members of the provincial militia trained by the Portuguese, in whrch Timorese served as the rank and file and filled some noncommissioned officer positions.

The pro-Indonesia forces also sullerheir inability to arouse Dopular enthusiasm tor iheir cause. In towns they have occupied with Jakarta's help, they often face an indifferent and sometimes hostile population, and once the Indonesian troops have withdrawn, the Timorese have been unable to defend iheir positions.

Jakarta thaieiiljnTorces

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press reports attacked Indonesian

ftv-

Timor may have been released, by military officers in an effort to add pressure on Suharto. He will find It hard to refuse to' authorize military retallalldn. and the commanders clearly hope that he will permit more thanit-foe-tat reprisal. Thus far. however, S'_hartO has onlytrengthening of Indonesian positions along the border, leaving open the qtiestion of whether he will permit pursuit of the alleged atwcl'.crs Into Timorese territory..

Original document.

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