memorandum to holders
NATIONAL
approved fob release
INTELLIGENCE < ESTIMATE
Prospects for and Consequences of Increased Communist Influence in Italian Politics
/
memorandum to holders of
prospects for and consequences of increased communist influence in italian politics
1
this memorandum is issued by the director of central intelligence.
the united states intelligence board concurs, except as noted in the text, as follows-
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of Ihe estimolei
The Control Intelligeriee Agency, the Intelligence OffjaniimJom of tho Pfportrrxnti of Slat* and Defense, ond tho Nol>orval Security Agency.
Concurring:
Tht Deputy Director of Central Intelligence representing ihe Control Intelligence Agency
ocof of Intelligence ondrepresenting the Department of State Tho Director, Defense Intelligence Agency The Director, No'Jo-al Security Agtiney
The Deputy AitlUonf Administrator for National Security, Energy Research and Development Administration
Abstaining:
The Special Assistant to Ihe Secretory for Notional Security, Deportment ofaiu*y
The Assistant Director, Federal Bureau o' Investigation
Alto Participating-.
The Atsisloftt Chief of Staff for Intelligence,the Army
Tho Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of
The Assistant Chief ot Staff, Intelligence, DepartmentAir force
CONTENTS
PRINCIPAL JUDGMENTS .
1
What the Elections Mean
Short-Term Options for the Christian Democrats
Alter the Next Elections
Christian Democratic Dilemmas
The Socialist Role
Communist Strategy
Internalroblem for All the Parties
International Implications
West European Attitudes
Italian Foreign Policy if PCI Enters the Covemmcnt
Looking Ahead
Soviet Influence
PCI Attitude
APPENDIX ..
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PROSPECTS FOR AND CONSEQUENCES OF INCREASED COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN ITALIAN POLITICS
PRINCIPAL JUDGMENTS
mid-June regional ond local election results presentedDemocrats with (heir most serious challenge In nearlyas Italy's dominant party. The Communist Party'sercent brought it to withinercent of theat the regional level. Unless the Christian Democratsto improve their standing, the Communists could pull aheadin the next national parliamentarybe held nothe spring
vote had little to do with Italy's foreign policy. Itfrustration over Inefficient government, inadequatetax inequities,ther complaints for which theDemocrats were held responsible. It also reflected theseveral million new voters enfranchised when the voting agelowered tond economic strains (which have hit theharder than in thearked deterioration in thewe do not think it likely, would hurt the Christianthus might help the Communists duplicate or Improve onwhen the next national elections are held.
the period before the next national parliamentaryChristian Democrats have enough maneuvering room to avoid
stacking Communist support inovernmental majority. The Communists, moreover, do not want tn press the issue. After theif the Christian Democrats remain the largesttheir options arc likely to be cut downhoice between allying with either the Socialists or the Communists.
Christian Democrats are likely, in the pre-electionconsider:
Keeping the Moro government in place. The chief advantage of Moro'swhich only the Christian Democrats and Republicans hold cabinetthat its existence affords the parties time to sort out their options and deal with internalBut it is increasingly clear that the government's weaknesses prevents it from taking actions that could help containgains in the next election.
Making concessions to the Socialists, tchosc moderate gains put themivotal position. The Socialists want majorchanges, some of the more important ministries, and an arrangement that would force the Communists to share some of the government's programmatic responsibilities, without actually holding cabinet posts.
Forming an all-Christian Democratic "tnonocohrc" cabinet. Thisraditional way of letting the dust settle, but it istopgap.
Settingentrist coalition, substituting the small andLiberal Party for the Socialists. Although mathematically possible, the centrist coalition's slim parliamentary majority would make this alternative just another stopgap.
Calling early national elections. This choice docs not look very inviting now, but the Christian Democrats may consider it, if failure or inability to put together an effective governmentthem they would lose more by waiting
next national elections are likely to deprive theof all options except an alliance with themore favorable to the Socialists than in theaentrist coalition will no longer be possible,losses suffered by the Libcial Party in the local contests areto be duplicatedational race. Theenter-righthas neveroliticallyalso be gone if, as is likely, the neo-fascists losein the national elections as they did in June.
Socialists willard bargain, because iheythat currentiamics threaten their survivalseparate parly. They believe lhat they are being hurt at lhe pollssulmrdinnte association wilh the Christian Democrats whilearc helped by their opposition status. On the otherSocialists nre afraid they would be overpowered in anythe Communists at the national level. That Is why theconcessions from the Christian Democrats that would givea more leftist cast and obligate Ihe Communists toprogram.
the Communist Parly worksormal share init will continue lhe soft line toward NATO, Europe, and theBerlinguer has pushed since Inking over partyas been vindicated by tho part* 's electoral successes.
Tolerating Italy'smbership while resisting anyof its commitment to the Alliance or any expansion of the US military presence in Italy.
Encouraging West European Communist parties to work out coordinated positions on social and economic issues, whether or not these positions coincide with the prevailing view in Moscow.
Calling for eventual dissolution of both NATO und the Warsaw Pact as part ofente process.
1 Se*: IVmpreti for and Comnivirmri of Intieaced Communis!n Italian PtJllka. IB. andf thb memorandum.
' The Dcfente Intrllijrenc* Alency. Tn* Anbtanl Chief ot Slaff totol the Army, the Director ol Naval Intrlllirrntr, Dep-rJtroent ol the Navy,id th* Anbtant Chief of Stall. Intelartrnrnl of the Air Forte believe that the rela-tlonihlp of Ihe PCI lo Mcweoworeone than wnntnl new. Althocjh tho PCI la nofolly(.servient to thef the Soviet Politburo, the feat doet not sufflcitnlly emphaalre that the party would be recporviive to Nlovcerw. particularly cat East-Weil uiuri, once In power.
much this soft line would harden should the PCIthe national government and how responsive the PCI wouldSoviet influence are questions on which differences of opinionin the US Intelligencehere is no doubt thatthe PCI's influence on or In the government the moreNATO will have in Italy. And for all the PCI's clearMoscow, there are close ideological ties and the policies ofare parallel In many respects. In addition, there is evidencewithin the PCI on questions of foreign policy; someat least, would probably prove more responsive tothe party got into the government,"
I. If Ilicy entered the government, the Communist leaders would probably avoid at the outset any precipitate move (trying to pull Italy out of NATO, for example) that could endanger their position over the longer run. They would realize, moreover, that allowing thetrong say in how Italy is run would jeopardize the PCI's painstaking efforts over the cars to stress its Italian identity. The PCI leaderseavily influenced by tactical considerations. They would want to move cautiously, at least at the outset, in order to avoid the risks of conservative counter-react ion. or alienation from Wesiern Europe and the US, which would arise from all-out opposition to NATO or from behaving, for example, like the Communists of Portugal.CI's cautious approach would Ite complicated, however, by increased pressure for results from ils own rank and file. In any event, there is every reason to believe that the Communistsble togovernment policies substantially.
J. While Communist membership in the national government may have been brought closer by the PCI's recent success, the Christian Democrats have other options and will takeleast in the period before7 elections. In terms of real political influence, however, thenow participates directly in theof most major cities, five of theegions, andhird ofuch stronger today than before the elections. Communist leader Berlinguer has always stressed the gradual nature of his "historic compromise" strategy and will welcome additional time to consolidate these gains. Continuing his cautious approach, Ber-linguer's major aim will be to demonstrate that the party can deliver the efficent local-level administration it promised during the campaign. Any success he achieves in that respect will go far toward breaking down the remaining psychological and traditional barriers to PCIin the national government
K. Our estimate of probable PCI behavior is based on the near certainty that the PCI would not only have to share power with other parties if it entered the government, in the near or medium term, but would also have to take account of public opinion. Farther into the future, the Communists would work to gain predominant power and, if this were achieved, constraints on their behavior would clearly diminish. In such circumstances, the PCI could be expected to become more aggressive and doctrinaire.
DISCUSSION
the Elections Mean
hree conclusions emerge inescapably from Ihe shift to the left in Italy's regional and local electionsune.
For the first time In the postwar period, the Christian Democratic Party is In real danger of losing its predominant role at the national level. Its position at the regional and local levels was weakened and the party couldfall behind the Communists in the next national elections which must be held
The Communist Party, whatever its ultimate intentions. Is viewed by an Increasing number of Italiansegitimate national partyto participate directly in the governing of the country.
The Socialist Party's moderate gains,with the losses by the Christianand the parties of the right, have made the Socialist! more essential than ever toDemocratic efforts to govern Italythe Communists.
he Communist Party's gainsercent eaceeded any the party has scored since the end of World Was II and brought it topoints of the Christian Democrats at the regional, provincial, and municipal levels (seeThe surge toward the Communists was aboveote against "bad government" at borne. Italy's foreign policy wasajor issue. The vote reflects widespread frustration withpublic services, inequitable taxation, aof covered-up scandals, crowded schools and hospitals. Increasing crime rates andpublicmention only some of the things that bother Italians.
lthough dissatisfaction with these aspects of everyday life In Italy has been building for years, the country's voting patterns have remained re-markubly stable untilumber of factors and trends helped rum this dissatisfaction to the Communists* advantage in June.
The lowering of the voting age tout more new voters on the rolls than ever beforeA5any of them are unemployed and unaffected by tbe decp-icatcd anti-communism lhat influences many of Ihe older generation. Many of the first-time voters seemed to consider voting for thethe fashionable thing to do. Estimates of how many new voters supported therange fromoercent. Our calculations suggest that the figure may have Ix-en somewhatinercentwould account for overercent of the additional votes received by Ihe PCI In the regional contests. The trend
toward the Communists among new voters was probably more pronounced In the northern urban areas than In the Irss-devclopcdattern that would be consistent with PCI performance generally.
The remainder of the PCI increase came from voters who switched from other parties. There Is evidence of increased Communist support among middle class voters in particular. The country's most serious postwar recession and government policies to deal with It have hit hard at the middle class voters and may have persuaded many of themtcst by voting PCI.
New voters and others were probablyby the fact that the governing parties were more divided than usual. Differences which they were unable to settle during Italy's longest postwar government crisis late last year were carried over Into the campaign. The Socialists urged the electorate to vote against the Christian Democrats and vice versa.
Christian Democrats' grass-rootshave laccome less effective. Rapidfor example, has diminished tbe effectiveness of Church-related groups inand mobilizing supporters. The party's ties to the induitrial working class have also weakened; the Christian Democratic-oriented labor union now appears to place cooperation with Italy's other laborthe Communistof party ties on its list of priorities- Relations between the Christian Democrats and their youthhave suffered from such incidents as former party leader FanfanTs pure' of the youth movement's leadership early this year.
Tlie Communists' success, meanwhile, can be attributed tn part to their cultivation over the years ofvast network of grass-roots organ-,committees, factory councils, tenants' associations,yriad ofconstitute the only directmany voters haveolitical party.
he Communist Increase cannot be explained solelyrotest vote. In many localities, Italians were clearly voting for leftist governments, like tbe
Communist-Socialist coalitions found throughout the three north-central "red belt" regions where the Iwo parties have shared power for years. Many voters obviously accepted the Communist claim to have been efficient ond honest administrators in the localities where they have held the balance of power.
he Communists' success knocked all of the governing parties off balance. And the parties"reactions were as Indicative of Italy's political ills as the outcome Itself. Despite the widespread conviction in Italy that the Christian Democrats need to reassess party policies, their first responseredictably abortive attempt to get theinvolved in immediate negotiations forcenter-left government of the same kind and on essentially the same terms as before. This is the
land of maneuver that has contributed to popular
disenchantment with the party.
he Christian Democrats did additionalto their Image by following this ploy with one of the most divisive national council meetings Io the party's recent history.engthy session in July, theChristian Democrats'deliberativeable to agree on the ouster of Fanfatu as party chief but failed to make any final decisionseplacement for him or on policy changes. Instead, the Council tapped itsrespected but politically unambitious Benlgnoserve until the partyBetween now and their congress tbeDemocrats will not be able to avoid inter-factional maneuvering aimed at puttingajorityew party leader. And there will, it seems, be plenty of time for that. The party has not yetate for the congress.
ln normal times, the aboveof Christian Democratic internal politics ever thenot have drawn much criticism. This time, ho'.vever, many Italians were probablythat the party seemed unable to go"business as usual" in the face of its most serious postwar challenge.
The Socialists, meanwhile, are still refusing to return to full participation in tiie center-left coalition unless the Christian Democrats adoptin line with the leftward shift reflected by the
rnult of theelections. When eventually Christian Dcmocrali turn Iheir attention lo policy, they will face limited opitions.
Shorl-Term Options for Ihe Christian Democrats
n tht period before the next notional Wcc-tforu. lhc Christian Democrats could:
Try lo keep lhe Moro government in place. Nothing better rcvenls lhc extent lo which the parties nre deadlocked than the longevity of lhe Morohristian Democratic-Republican cabinet lhat depends on Socialist and Social Democratic parliamentary support. Set up as on Interim solution nearlyyear ago, Morc's government has hung on because the Christian Democrats and Socialists canno* agree on how to replace it. In not challenging Moro. each party can devote its time and energy to dealingost of internalLeaving Moro in place until the nextowever, wouldo lhe voter that the Christian Democrats and Socialists are nowhere near agreement on how to deal with the country's problems. Inide variety of Christian Democratic politicians concede that the government's weakness means It can take no actions in parliament thai are unacceptable to the Communists.
Meet tbe Socialists' terms by granting them major programmatic concessions and giving them more of the Important ministries. (The Socialists aspire to such portfolios as treasury. Interior, and defense as wellarger chunk of the patronage power in lhc public sector of thehe Socialists are also insisting on some fonts of "indited" involvement by the Communists, such as an agreement for thembstain in key parliamentary votes or be consulted formally on the government'sprogram. If the Christian Democrats were to find some way to accept the lastand put together an agreement with the Socialists that results In improved social and economic programs, rather than Just aof the perquisites of power, this mightevival of Christiancooperation: if the Christian Democrats gnt.nl the Communists some kind of(albeitole, however, it will be more difficult to avoid broaderwith lhe Communists eventually.
Setemporary all-Christian Democratic "monocoloee" cabinet.course frequently chosen by the Christian Democrats when they are at odds with their coalition partners.to this stopgap now, however, would only make It more difficult to deal effectively with the courtry's problems while limiting the Christian Democrats' ability to spread the blame for any worsening of the situation,
Try to revive the centrist coalition, replacing the Socialists with the small, conservativeParty. Although mathematically possible In the present parliament, the centristpaper-thin majority would make it hut another stopgap. It was tried after2 parliamentary elections and provedThe nationwide decline of the Liberals In the regional elecHom, moreover, confirms that the centrist alternative no longer has any real support in the country. Still, the Christian Democrats would probably prefer another try at centrismeal with theenter-right alliance with the neo-fascistsathematical possibility for the Christian Democrats but that course isunfeasible.ove would be met by widespread disapproval, violence, andopposition from the Italian center and left, including organized labor.
Call national elections ahead of schedule. Despite the risks Involved, this altt-rnativc could become more attractive to the Christian Democrats if they concluded that they would lose less in early elections thanf the Christian Democrats could keep theiras Italy's largest party, they wouldew more years to work at Improving their standing. Persistent interna! divisions oito reach agreement with the Socialists are among the circumstances that could encourage the Christian Democrats to move toward early elections.
f these options, most politicians favorthe Moro government In place at least until the
Socialists ant' Christian Democrats have held their con presses. The Socialist* will meet In February; the Christian Democrats arc aiming for sometime in the spring.
Meanwhile. Moro will need alt of his tactical skill to keep his government afloat. The Socialists, fur example, would find It difficult to continueMoro if labor disapproves of hisperformance in negotiations for majorrenewals between now and the end nf the year. On the other liand. theof economicpull out of the government if labor gels everything it wants.
The fact that it is taking the Christianand Socialists so lung to sort out their other options is symptomatic of how difficult it would be for them to agree on how to replace Moro. Even if the Christian Democrats hold their congress as early as next spring, the proximity of thethey will beearmake electoral considerations the major factor in any decisionsew government. The debates taking place inside both the Christian Democratic and Socialist parties seem to be pointingevival of their alliance on the basisrogram oriented more to the left.
The key variable in determining whether they try this before the next elections will be what the Socialists conclude about the potential effect of goven.mmt membership on their performance at :he polls. Since they are convirtcedresent circumstances government membership hurts them electorally, the Socialists arc not likely to rejoin the Christian Democrats unless the Utter agreeovernment formula and program that thecan defend to voters who arc clearly In the mood for change. If such an agreement provesseemscountry will probably go into the next elections, whether7 or ahead of schedule,aretaker such as the Moro governmentmonocolore" Christianadmin btratlon.
After Ihe Next Elections
he next national eleetions. whenever held, will almost certainly leave the Christian Democrats wilh even fewer options, ln particular, they arc likely to lose the options ofentristcnter-riglit coalition, because the losses sustained by the Liberals and neo-fascists in June willbe duplicatedationalhen, for the first time, the only course open to theeal with the Communists-will be collalwralion with the Socialists, Excessive Socialist demands underircumstances could lead more Christian Democrats to the view thai the Communists arc more "serious" and "relfuble" than the Socialists .ind, therefore, HVcly tc be better coalition pat titers.
he above scenario* assume that the Christian Democrats will remain the plurality party after the next national elections, If the Communists move into first place, however, the coalition-forming process could be alteied fundythe President of the Republic calls on the largest party tnandidate to form the government, aid. of course, the Christianhave always received the call. If the PCI outpoUed them, however, an unprecedentedwould result
t is by no means certain that In national elections the Communists would duplicate iheir recent gains, but it would be dangerous to assurr;ubstantially improved economicand/or real cooperation between the Christian Democrats and Socialists, for example, might cut down on tlie PCI's vote, but it should be noted that the PCI has never lost in substantial nun ben voters which It has won over In tlie past The main sources of its new strength (young voters inmoreover, are not likely to desert the Communists any time soon. Although voters who crossed over to the Communist) from the Christian Democrats and othrr parties may be less firmly in the Communist camp, their switch probablylong-maturing discontent rather thananger. They probably did net come easily to the decision to vote Communist and it willarked improvement in the situation to make these voters reverse themselves.
Christian Democratic Dilemmas
f the Christian Dcrrtocrats are to have any hope of recapturing the votes they have lost, they will have at least to give the Impression that the party is responsive to the electorates desire for
change In general and for more efficientIn particular. Christian Democrats who try lo reorient their party will be hinderedumber of factors:
Fanfania campaign strategy resultedhift of the party's image further to the right atime whm th" country seems to be moving left; he partially offset losses to the left byon conservative themes that drew support away from the traditional and neo-fascist right. The Christian Democrats could, of course, put more emphasis on leftist themes but the long domination of the left by the Socialists and Communists would make itfor the Christian Democrats to compete wlih then..
It will be hard for the party's diverse factions to break the ingrained habit of maneuvering for internal advantage even after policynrc taken. One symptom of thisis the paity's chronic inability to impose discipline on its parliamentary representatives when controversial Issues ore upote.esult. Communist nbstcntion has often been the factor that permitted the center-left toajority behind new social and economic programs.
Tlie Christian Democrats can field new faces capable of improving the party's tired image only at the riskajor internal upheaval and of alienating traditional supporters.
A dynamic new program might help the Christian Democrats, but theirthose of thenot primarily programmatic. The center-left's program proposals have always been ambitious, but the failure to Implement many of them has contributedeneral skepticism about political promises.
The electorate will be Influenced more by performance than proposals the nest time around. Apart from that, however, the Christian Democrats' priority task Is organizational. Years of neglect have left their vote-gathering machinery In disarray.party leader Zaceagnlnl has had someIn securing approval of Internal changes that. If Implemented, could limit the divisive Impact of the factions and help revive Christian Democratic tie* with such key sectors as youth and organized laltor. Tie Christian Democrats face an uphill strucglc. however, in competing for the allegiance of new voters.
The Socialist Role
In addition to these Internal problems, the Christian Democrats' next set of negotiations with the Socialists arc likely to be the toughest since the inception of the center-left alliance moreecade ago.
The election results have convinced thethat current political dynimics in Italy are working against their long-term survival asparty, and that their party will nffer at the polls If It remains allied with the Christianwhile tlie Communists are free to criticize from tbc opposition. In the Socialist view, that is why the Communists captured the lion's share of votes that went to the left for the first time in June.
On the other hand, the Socialists fear that they would he dominated and eventually destroyed In any partnership at the national level with the stronger and better-organized Communists. The Communiststronger press (L'Unita Is the country's third largestore influence with labor (the Communist-dominated CCIL is the largest Italian labornd more effective grass-roots organizations.
To deal with both of these problems, theare trying to distinguish themselves from both the Christian Democrats and Communistsolicy that:
rules out Socialist participati'm in another center-left coalition that leases themubordinate roleis the Christian
opposes Communist chief Berlinguer scompromise* strategy, which has as Its eventualovernment based onDemocratic collaboration. Berlinguer says the Socialists would alsoole, but they are convinced it would beat best
callsevival of Christian Democratic-Socialist cooperation based mainly on So
STCj
clalist program proposals, and with some nr-rangcnicnt tiiat wmld limit Communist ability to criticize governmento achieve the last objective, the Socialists favor "indirect'* Communist involvement but are vague alwut the form that it should take. They are apparently aiming to get themselves, theand the Christian Democrats publicly com-mi ted to the same general program through some relationship well short of actual Communistsuch as formalized consultations with the Communists on the government's legislativeThe Socialists hope thatelationship would pin some of the responsibility foractions on the Communists, and deprive them of their privileged opposition status.
he Socialists haveariation of this policy at the local level since the elections. They haverovincial, andgovernments "open" to all partierthe neo-fascists, In practice, however, most localorganizations prefer to ally with tlierather than the Christian Democrats. Even In areas where center-left coalitions were stillafter the electioniguria and Piedmont regions, and the cities of Milan and Venice) the Socialists set up governments with the Communists when the Christian Democrats balked at "opening" the center-left to some form of CommunistWhere the Christian Democrats have been morefive regions they agreed io consult formally with the Communists onSocialists have adhered to the center-left formula,
he balance sheet at the local levrl shows that the "Red Belt" has been extended from three (Emilia-Romagna. Tuscany, and Umbria) to five of theegions with the addition of Liguria and Piedmont Most major cities. Including Muan, Turi.i. Venice, Cenoa, Naples, and Florence, now have governments controlled or dominated by the Communists and Socialists. Before June, liveand Socialists administeredozen of therovinces; since then, the two parties have put together governments inhird of the provinces.
Communist Strategy
Coinim.li'arty will moveconsolidating its gains. In their post-electionthe Communists are playing down theImplications of the vote and sticking toapproach that served them wellcampaign. Immediately after theommunique emphasizing regionalaffairs and summing up what they thinkbe done to meet specific social and
has always stressed that he ishurry" to realize his goal of membershipnational government The PCI's dramaticin even the mostput Berlinguer inEvents may be overtaking hisdesire to avoid creating fear in moderatecircles will argue in favor ofbut be will have to rethink hisstrategy in the event the Communistsoiitpoll the Christian Democrats in tl.eelections.
he spread of Communist-Socialist local coalitionsixed blessing for the Communistv While the trend amountsecided increase In Communist influence, it may also complicate Be* linguer'i "historic compromise* tactics aimed at an eventual rapprochement with the Christian Democrats at the national level. When he launched the "historic compromise* proposal two years ago, Berlinguer explicitly refected the possibility of coming to powereftistheleader maintained that the country could not be governed by such aif It1 percentIt would lack an adequate consensusCatholic" com-
' Thr PCI cvfnmunlqor called for parliamentary action to correct "uriluit" provb*ons In the tax burs. OtherVj of the document fix .tide lecemuienda lions lor rnesv*-ures to itimulale the coratructlon Industry,of Investments already pros-jammed tor the undciJrveloped south, the KhedulmitatkmaJ conference on thani of Ihe vounx unemployed, the eaUblUhment of an InterparllarnenUry eonunbshm to reorganlne the itatr In-dojirkn. the rapid conclusion of parliament'i antt-MafU tnat ion. discussion of the proposal! by the fQ and Soclaluti for lhe reemjranixatton of theacetous confrontation" on the brae* of abortion and birth control
SEC^
Put another way, Berlinguer probably feels that heairly strong Christian Democratic Party to "cover" the Communists as they move toward. Christian Democraticwould help ensureoderate and right-wing counteraction.
The Communists claim, for example, that they arcit happy" about the situation inommunist-Socialist government was formed there after the GhrLvtiun Democratsa Socialist attempt to give theormal voiceenter-left city coalition. The Communist-Socialist majority, however,andful of Christian Democratic and Sodnl Democraticocialist-arranged development which the Communists fear hastheir relations with the local ChristianThe Communists are trying to patch things up by promising tbe Christianhare of municipal patronage, despite their opposition status.
The Communists are uneasy, moreover, about having to take responsibility for difficult problems in Naples and other places, while the Christian Democrats gain the freedom to criticize from the opposition. Failure to Improve things in these areas could tarnish the Communist reputation for efficient administration. Some Christian Democrats, on the other hand, thinkeriod in opposition Is Just what their party needs to rebuild itself.
Since June, the Communists have refectedchief De Martina's proposal for "indirect" Communist involvement In theear ago, Berlinguer calledormalized consultative relationship between his party and the government, presumably as another way of establishing his party's legitimacy. At the time, bcr.-ev r, Berlinguer had no idea thewould do so well at the polls this year, and he will now want to avoid any appearance ofthe kind of government he attacked with such success tn the campaign. In return for any open cooperation, therefore, Berlinguer will want some formal recognition from the Christianand Socialists of the Communists' potentiala governing party. Berlinguer will not accept responsibility without power.
Infernolroblem fot All
the I'millfl
A major factor that will complicate Christian Democratic. Socialist, and even Communist efforts lo sort out their options in the coming months is the existence of pronounced differences of opinion In each parly over future courses of action. Positions have not yet crystalized in the Christian Democratic Tarty, and the extentthe division Is suggestedoosening of alliances among leaders of the traditional factions, particularly In the center of the party. Foreign Minister Rumor has left the middle-of-the-road fiorclrl faction, which untilhird of the party. Rumor Is vague about hb future plans, but he seems to be moving toward the partyplit has also developed between Budget Minister Andreottl and Treasury Minister Colombo, who head the otherercent of the party. With such basic internal changes under way, the Christian Democrats are not likely to pull themselvesanytime soon.
The Socialists must also deal wilh internal strains. Their freedom ofimited by the same kind of Internal programmatic differences and personal rivalries that plague the Christian Democrats. On the surface, the Socialists are united behind De Martinos policy of continuing theirwith the Christian Democrats, provided the latter agree to some arrangement that wouldIhe Communists of their freedom to criticize from the opposition. Implicit in that line,he identity problem that has plagued theover the years. It only begs the question of what the Socialists will do if the Christian Democrats persist in refusing concessions to the Communists, Current trends could force the Socialists to choose between the Christian Democrats andsooner rather thandecision that would bring out all of the centrifugal pressures concealed by the Socialists* present thin veneer of unity.
tht. Communist Party is morethan Ihc others, there have beendifferences over the modalities ofstrategy. These surfaced at the PCIMarch. Organizational changes since then,election victory, have strengthened Berlinguer s
control of Ihc party, lie is determinedeing pushed into hasty moves, but he must now contend with pressure from the rank and file to translate Ihc election gains into tangible benefits. The party leadership, for example. Is having trouble enforcing its cautious b'ne In areas where the local Communis! organizations won more thanercent of the vote.
he outcome of the Christian Democratic-Socialist dispute will also hold potentially divisive choices for the PCI. An offer of limitedIn the national governing process, for example, would present the PCI with its toughest decision In years. Such an arrangement could enhancerespectability, but it would abo compromise the party's opposition status without giving it much control over government actions. On the other hand, if Christian Democratic-Socialist differences prove IrTcconcllablL' and the Socialists move closer to the Communists, this could revive support In the PCI forlternative of thestrategy that has been in disfavor since Berlinguer launched his drive for rapprochement with the Christian Democrats-International Implications
he election results will have to be seen, even byritics In the party,indication of his moderate line. He did not campaign onpolicy Issues, but he bad to meet Christian Democratic charges that the Italian Communists would behave just like Portugal's if admitted to the government and that they would ultimately destroy Italy's defense ties with the West. In response,criticized his counterparts In Lisbon while reiterating his claim that the Italian Communists would not try to remove Italy from NATO after joining the government
he Communists cannot Ignore the fact that their greatest electoral gains since the end of Ihe war cameime when they were less critical than ever of NATO and Italy's ties to tbe US. Inkey Communist leaden. Including Berlinguer, believe that PCI participation In the government cannot be achieved on workable terms without US acquiescence. These factors are likely to keep the Communists wedded lo Berllnguer's soft tactical line on NATO and Ihe US at ihey work toward government memltenhlp. They will continue, of course, to work against any broadening of Italy's commitment lo the alliance or any expansion of the US military presence in Italy. The Communistfor litis posture wilt remain centered on their cli'im to want ihe eventual dissolution of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact as part of the process of detente-
eanwhile, the Communist Party will stickuropean policy that Is designed to satisfy both Us membership and those Italians who Insist that the party demonstrate its Independence. The PCI has tried to reinforce its Imageuropean party by workingtrong West Europeangrouping of Communist parties. The aim of this effort has been tooordinated West European Communist posture toward key European social and economic Issues, In this way, the PCI hopes to appear less dependent on Moscow and Increase Its acceptability to the non-Communist parties. At the same time, the party retains its identification with the international Communistfactor lhat remains importantortion of its supporters.
approach has carried over Into thefor the European Communist partyIn which thewith theandbeen In theefforts lo prevent the meeting fromhegemony over the European parties.
West European Attitudes
participation in theatter of serious concern inespecially among top governmentalarm fell throughout Europe over thea Communist takeover in Portugal hason this point Yet Ihe Westnot view ihc situation In Italy in the samethey do Portugal. This is partly explainedbehavior In various regional bodies, such asParliament and European Tradewhere party representativesquite responsibly. In the presentof detente thererowingItalians and many of the Europeans toPCI as less threalening.
ertain polentiat Iniernational developments could heighten West European concern about the possibility of PCI membership in the ItalianFor example, if Yugoslavia in the post-Tito period became more open to Soviet influence, Italians and other Europeans would probably be less inclined to risk, an opening to the PCI.
Italian Foreign Policy If PCI Enters the Government
he most difficult question Is what thewould do with respect to foreign policy if theyole In government. Whenas published Inhe Intelligence Community agreed on several significant points as to what to eipect fromovernment: the PCI would seek to prevent any Increase in the US or NATO presence In Italy; and It would try to discredit the US military presence, to puton the use of NATO facilities, to posefor NATO activities Involving Italian armed forces, and to promote petty harailments of US facilities. PCI memlwrshlp In government also would pose difficult security problems for Italy's participation In NATO government would generateproblems for Italy's continued participation In nuclear defense planning and operations,
oreover, the Intelligence Community agrees that the long-term goals of tho Italian Communists are:
ommunist system in Italy;
removing US bases and influcnc;
withdrawing Italy from NATO;
shifting Rome's foreign policyorepostureloser alignment with
There remains, however, disagreement within and among the intelligence agencies over the tactics that the PCI would use and the alacrity with which it would pursue these goals.
he NIE of4 recorded differences of view between the Defense Intelligence Agency, the aimed services, and certain elements of the Central Intelligence Agency on the one hand and theof Central Intelligence, the Department of State, the National Security Agency, and most elements of CIA on the other, with respect to whether the Italian Communists would go much beyond thementioned inIA, the services, and certain elements of CIA continue to believe tbat these would be the minimal actions and that more serious problems would arise. Oncein the government, the Communists would probably soon agitate for the removal of US bases. Should theyosition of substantialin the government, the PCI would almost certainly move to withdraw Italy from the Alliance altogether. While trying to restrict NATO activities, the PCI would probably encourage Increasedwith Warsaw Pact military forces. Including port calls by units of the Soviet naval forces In the Mediterranean. Communist participation lnin Iceland and In Portugal have In the past
raised serious problems for NATO. Communists in the government In Home would raise even more serious problems.
Director of Central Intelligence.and most elements of CIA continue toPCI entry into the Italian governmentadverse, though not necessarilyfor NATO and Italy's role In it.that the PCI would feel It necessary tomore cautiously and would not Jeopardizeby pressing In the short term forIn Italy's foreign alignment.
Looking Ahead
key factor regarding the limits onover foreign policy would be theof the Christian Democratic Party.Democrats would not be bargainingvery strong position, however, If theor exceed their recent performance inparliamentary race. At first glance, thisthat the Communists would feet free totheir traditional caution. Any judgmentlines, however, must be tempered by thethe Communists never expected topresent position of strength to soon.always stressed the long-range nature ofcompromise" strategy and hethat by the time the Christiansufficiently "conditioned" to accept hisprocess of detente would have made NATOcontentious Issue
s one of our Communist sources observed recently, however, circumstances have transformed the "historic compromise"earer-term one. Thus, Berlinguer may have to deal with the NATO Issue sooner rattier than later and while NATO and the Warsaw Pact arc still the major elements In the Europeanpicture.
he Communists wouldougherif they maintained their present strength, hut their policy on Italian membership in NATO would depend largely on their assessment of the overall international and strategic situation at the time they were negotiating to enter the government, as well as on their perception of domestic politicalIf Berlinguer judged that the Communists could gamer enough domestic support lot pulling Italy entirely out of NATO, he would still have to weigh carefully the likely coniequcnces for agoal of thean "Italian way tof he concluded that leaving NATO woutd open the way lor meddlesome Soviet dictation to Italy he would probably try toay to rationalize continued memberslilp In theonly as the lesser of two evils.an Italian government that includedwould bring Into serious question thatcompatibility with Ihe fundamentalof the NATO organization. It wouldew assessment of Italy's rcliabib'ty as an allyime of increased dlvislveness and tension on the Alliance's southern flank. This in itself wouldignificant advance for Soviet Interests. And PCI foreign policy positions would continue to parallel Moscow'sumber of issues, especially outside the European sphere.
Soviet Influence
he longer-term question is what Moscow wnuld be able to do with the Communist Party if and as ithare of power in thegovernment Moscow's ability to influence tlie FO. through financial pressure appears to have lessened since thehen Soviet blocillion) amounted to well ove. half oc the party's annual budgetver the years, the PCI has increased its revenue f'om other sources (party-ownedprofit-making cooperatives,nthe PCIan enormous financial boost from legislation last year that provided for public funding of political parties. The funds oreaccordingarty's parliamentaryand the PCI thus received the second largest amountillion. That alone accounts for aboutercent of the PCI's published budget6 million).
A Soviet threat to cut financial support would probably not force the PCI toolicy it judged vital to its interests In Itily. Afterthe Soviet invasion of CzechoslovakiaS. for example, the PCIeduction orof Soviet aid. Although the reductiondid not materialize, there is no evidence that the PCIhange In its position. Instead, the PCI was ready with an across-the-board austerity program and studies on how to Increase Its Income from other sources,
Nevertheless, there are Important Ideological ties between the Italian and Soviet parties, and wc assume there axe within the upper echelons of the PCI Individuals who would be responsive to Soviet guidance and who could be encouraged to do Moscow's bidding once the Communistsu governing role.*
PCI Attitude'
S- Berlinguer and his associates have taken Soviet money and welcomed Soviet support but have alsoillingncsj to differscow and to Ignore Soviet pressures andwhen the Italian Communists think theirwith Italian voters Is at stake. The PCI would inevitably reevaluate those interests if Itole in the government. At least In the short run,
'The Defense Intelligence Agency, Ihr Assistant Chief uf Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, theof Naval Intelligence. Department of the Navy, and the Assistant Chief of Stall, Intelligence. Department of the Air Forte believe thai the reUtloiuhJp of the PCI to Moscow bmore fundm-enUd one than suggestedlthough theo lonerr lully wbwTvtrnt to the dictate* of the Soviei Politburo, the lest does not auffkleojy emr-hastae thai the party would be responsive to Moicow, partkulaily on East-Wertne* tn power.
Defense Intelligence Aeency, the Assistant Chief of Staff forepartment of the Army, the Director of Navalepartment of the Navy, and the Aublant Chief of Stall. Intelligence. Drpartmenl of the Air Force brllev- thai thb section of the test doe* not sufficiently emphasise that for thr PCI Ihb cautiousictated by tactical cons Id era Hons. The toft line that (he PCI has adopt nl on various btuei, Including NATO, does not reflect Its long-termat staled In paragraphf the teal.
PCI leaders wuuld be constrained by certain of the party's overridingthem:
to avoid any quick counter-reaction which would deny litem the best opportunity they have had toore or less permanent part of the governing majority;
toimilar evolution in fortunes and outlook on the part of other West European Communis! parties.
Efforts by Uie PCI leadership to stickautious policy once In the government wuuld behowever, by Increased pressure for change from its rank and file. These pressures would be directed more toward securing change In domestic than foreign policy, although they could spill over Into the foreign field.
The foregoing discussion of probable PCI behavior is based on the near certainty that the PCI would not only have to share power with other parties if it entered the government, in the near or medium term, bui would also have to takeof public opinion. Farther into the future, the Communists would work to gain predominant power and. if this were achieved, constraint* on their behavior would clearly diminish. In suchthe PCI could be eipected lo become more aggressive and doctrinaire.
In sum, the Italian Communistsundamentalubstantial part of the PCI's strength and appeal stems from the party's identification with the international Communist movement and Its revolutionary aims. At the same lime, the PCI's !tallan Identity is strong and the party rejects ivcavy-handed and excessive Soviet influence. The contradiction between theseaspects of the PCI character has been evadederies of Italian Communist leaders beginning with Cramsci. the party's principal founder. No one, however, has been more successful than Ber-linquer in avoiding the potential pitfalls of the PCI's dual identity.
here is still no clear resolution of theinfluences, and tho Impact on PCIhe party's Italian and International identities will continue Io vary with events in Italy, Europe, tbe USSH. and the Atlantic Alliance. On balance.
however, it appears that the Italian factor will weigh more heavily In the coming few yearsbecause of the PCI's need to assuage the fears of its opponents in Italy ond abroad. Thus, lhe PCI will continue to stress its rcsb'.ance tofrom Moscow. Regardless of the degree of Soviet influence, however, the PCI will maintain its potential as an erosive influence In the1 will frequently pursue policies that run counter to US Interests.
APPENDIX
Results In percentages of5 Italian regional, provincial, and municipal elections compared with the previous) and2 parliamentary elections.
REGIONAL RESULTS
Democrats (DC)
354
(PCI)
(PSI)
(MSI-DN)'
Democrats (PSDI)
(PRI)
(PLI)
Democrats
Democrats
Ll
Democrats
135
Democrats
53
neo-lftjcuu officially ibwcbed the Monarchist Party (PDIUM)hkhfor lome of the Increase In neo-fascist strength2 andhe Monarchists are Included in the "other" category
"In addition to the Monarchlitthe "other" category InchidW several small patties onn-rrr leftmattering of smaller parties that reflect highly localized totcreitj. Trie number of such groups Is particularly high at the municipal level.
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