CONTENTS
the
constraints and their implications
The International Equation
Military. i.
PROVOCATIONS AND SITUATIONAL
Cradual Expinslon of PRC Activity In the Taiwan
B- Opesations Againsthhore 7
C Operations Against the Pmjt-hu (Pescadores) 0
Againstu
Against SrnaakuJJ
Against Praias Reef|f
C. Operations Against the Sprady (Nsn-iha)U
.
Islands In the Chins
Taiwan Strait
Matsu and Quemoy Island
Military Garrisons on th* Sprady Islands
prc military options in the
east and south china seas'
Thii nvrrnorandurnbeen pnrpared Jointly by the Defense Intellijrene* Agency and the Central Inf*nieence Agency with contnbutioni Irom the Bureau ol Intellstrier and Rebirth. Department of State.
w*i^
This paper assesses the military options (for planning oravailable to the PRC8 in the areas ofand South China Seas. In addition to Taiwan and theattention is focused on the offshore islands and thethe East China Sea, and on Pratas Reef and the SpratlysSouth China Sea. The conclusion is that it Is unlikely thatwilt initiate any major military confrontation In thesethe near term, although the PRC is likely to extendactivities in the waters of the Taiwan Strait and the SouthThe PRC would be unable touccessfulof Taiwan much before
THE PROBLEM
Since the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC)eking has insisted that Taiwan is Chinese territory and has vowed to "liberate" and reunite the island with the mainland. Peking has also claimed other smaller island areas in the East and South China Seas, most recently on5ough statement aimed at North Vietnam and the USSR in the authoritative Peoples Daily. Although Chinese leaders have repeatedlyolitical solution would be the preferred means of acquiring the claimedthey have also stajed that China would not rule out the use of force in solving the Taiwan problem. The PRC. moreover, used force against the South Vietnamese garrison in seizing the Paracels earlyeking, therefore, has preserved its options on how to regain claimed territories and couldorceful solution if effortsolitical solution fall or severe provocations occur. Peking's policy also allows for various military pressures as part of the option mix. For example, the PRC used force against the Republic of China (ROC) military forces on the offshore islands of Quemoy (Chin-men) and Matsu8 and carriedajor defensive build-up in the Strait
In the case of Taiwan. Peking's nonmilitary pressures may beto bringegotiated settlement:
Diplomatic isolation has not affected Taiwan's economic viabilitye fxto independent state nor weakened its will to resist negotiations with Peking. '
Peking has limited economic leverage against Taiwan because the Island republic has maintained an extensive network ofand commercial relations, because Taiwan willcontinue to have an adequate supply of petroleum, and because the island has been able to cope with ;he effects of the present world economic recession.
Peking's united front tactics have had little effect against the fairly stable internal political situation on Taiwan. Beefed-up PRC propaganda broadcasts to Taiwan in5 and the PRC release of Kuomlntang prisoners during the year were examples of Peking's continuing attempts to keep pressure on Tal-
3
However, ROC ma In landers and native Taiwanese bothreat investment In Taiwan's continued prosperity and relatively high standard of living. The principle of reunification also runs counter lo the general separatist sentiment among the native Taiwanese. . ,
Thus, military measures could appear to the leaders in Peking toecessary additional tool, although the leadenhip would be reluctant to undertake any military action where chances of success were not assured.
' 't
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discussion
ANDP1ICATIONS
are significantandPeking's use olaction to regain its claimed territories inseas (seehile thesebe major constraints upon an invasionand the Peng-hutheylessestraint against Increasedmilitary activity or small-scale operationsnot covered by treaty with the United States.
Tha Intamotionol Equation
China's reluctance to knockthebalanced Slrsc-US-Sovlet triangle Is probably the moat important political constraint. Theconnection helps China avoid an armed con-flirt with th* Soviet Union. This has been ofimportanceeking that It has agreed to maintain da facto diplomatic relations with the US despite the United States' formal recognition of Taiwan and US security guarantees for the Island. Peking would be particularly reluctant to make any major military move prior to the US presidential election
Peking Is anslous to prevent the growth of Soviet influence in Southeast Asia as well as tliat of Hanoi. Aggressive PRC military action In the Taiwan area oe the South China Sea would alarm nations in Southern Asia such ss the Philippines and Thailand which China Is currently cultivatingdirected against Vietnampush Hanoi closerMoscow.
agression against Taiwan couldaway from Cilna and perhops closer toUnion while strengthening thethose in Japan who advocate notionaland domestic development of nuctrarPRC military action agalmt Taiwancontribute to instability In the Koreansomething Peking would prefer to avoid.
Military Constraints
US-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty aobstacle to PRC military actionFor the near term the PRC probablyreluctant to take any action that reducedof formal US recognition of dieabrogjtion of the treaty. Even if thewere abrogated, Peking probably couldsure the United States would not oldIn the first several yenn after theEven while In effect, however, thenot commit the United States to thethe offshore Island groups such oi Chin-menor ofslands in the South Chinaand garrisoned by the ROC.
fl. Small operations, such as an assault on Pratos Reefould be undertaken without affecting China's overall defense posture. Also. China has sufficient personnel and materialto attempt small amphibious operations against the llghdy defended Island garrisons In the Srsratlys In the South CI,Ins Sea. Amphibiousagainst the heavily defended offshore islands or Taiwan would be extremely costly in men and
1
v
II could lake yean lot Ihe military sector to regain ib lossesarge-scale operation lo invade Taiwan. War damage in Taiwan would also mult in expensive rr ha bill la lion cost*ostile population.
To attack Taiwan, Peking would have to draw on its strategic reserve in central China as well as on air forces nowommitted toof its northern border, thus adversely-its strategic postuieu Moscow.Chinese pmyecupntsonajor operation against Taiwan could present Moscow withfor increased pressure against China, including conventional military operations against the mainland; thisisk that Peking would be est/rmely rductnnt lo run.
There are significant factors inhibitingoperations by the PRC. particularly across the Taiwan StraiL Thesehortage of amphibious landing ships, the lackodem shipbome air defenseimited air control systems, ond the need for extensive force training and the establishmentom mend-and -control system for large operations of this type. The most critical barriers to establishing andeachhead on Taiwan ore the shortage oflanding ships and the limited capability toa large force. These could be remediedut only if the PRC embarkedoncerted building program ond attempted toits logistic capability in the neara (or training program also would have to be Implemented afterwards-uilding program for amphibious ships would disrupt other ship construction projects, and there Is, moreover, no evidence that the PRC has embarked on any of these programs.
Taiwan would surelyRC attempt to Improve its capability to launch an Invasion of Taiwan. With or wilhout US support, the ROC almost certainly would respondilitary build-up of its own. This build-up could offset the Improvement of PRC capabilities. However. In the unlikely eventino-SovietIhe PRC would he able lo conccntrole lb attention almost entirely on Invasion prcpnratlims.
'This I. sot cssenusl rfhas bee- (sired
Under such circumstance* the ROC would piolt-ably be unable to malch the PRC effort
PROVOCATIONS AND SITUATIONAL CHANGES
espite all of these constraints, thereer-tain provocations and situational changes which, though unlikely over the short term, could motivate the PRC to consider military nctlon: f
A formal declaration of Taiwan Irtdepcivdeivcv. This Is highly unlikely in the near term, par-ticulnrly under the present leadership of Premier Chiang Chlng-kuo.eclnra-tion would be an act of desperation, as it couldRC attack, could undermine political stability in Taiwan, and wouldnot gain the support of the US.
An ROC approach lo the USSR. This lou would be an act of desp.ration. Premier Chiang is adamantly against this, and there seems little the ROC or the USSR could gainelationship. However, such an np-proacS could be urged upon Chiang if thereerceived loss of US guarantees of military support and if PRC actions became more aggressive toward Taiwan.
a nuclear explosive
ROC development tl device. F
suen ^
ware that developmentuclear device would Jeopardize lu relations with the US and provoke Peking.
- Leadership changes in the PRC that would coll for Increased pressures on the ROC nnd the US to resolve the Tolwnn problem sooner. Such pressures might conceivably result front Internal factors, and could be linked to some measure of accommodation with the USSR.
ietnamese Initiative to take completeof the Spratly Islands. Such action mightreemptive operation to scire the entire Sprnuy group despite possible dnmugc to Chinese foreign policy objectives inAsia.espite fears of Increased Soviet
influence in Vietnam and alienation of th* Philippine* whichresence in the islands. The PRC could, alternately, under-take to occupy the ROC-held island of liut perceived that the Vietnamese wen preparing to taVe the bland.
OPTIONS
constraintj and the limitedprrjvrxutive changes, described above, leadcoikIusIuii that it Ii unlikely lhal the PRCany major military action In thesedie near term. Nevertheless, in theof actions designed lo acquire Taiwan,well as political, psychological,eloialready present. Anof military options follows.
A. Groduol Expansion of PRC Activity in tho Toiwon Stroll
China's military strategy will piohably he one of increasing pressure in increments small enough to avoid alarming the United States while at the same time large enough to came growing concern on the port of the ROC leadership In thisrodual espansion of PRC activity In the Taiwan Strait is most UVrly (see Figure 2j.
In u> past, Peking has been reluctant toextensive air operations over Ihe Strait, and. to our knowledge. PRC aircraft have never flown sorties near or over Taiwan. To do so woulda high risk of confrontation because the ROC air force overflies th* entire Strait area. We have no evidence yet pointinghange lu this PRC policy.
The Chinese have made some mows during th* past two years that Indicate that the balance of naval power in the Strait area is beginning to change. Three Riga class gulded-mbsllc destroyer cicoits pasud through the Strait during the Paraccl Islands confrontation, the first tuncRC major naval unit had maderansit Thehave also begun to deploy missile boatIn the northern approaches to theove that substantially lncrea.es Chinese capabilities to react militarily and foreshadows the establishment of other missile boat sqssadrons In the southernn addition, small naval units have begun to venture farther from the coast. The Chinese seem deurmlned to assert their right to use themore extensively, but are expected to operate relatively close to the mainland. At the same time, they probably wiC eapond their naval forces In the area.
effect of the gradual shift in thepower In the Strait area appears to begreater freedom fo- PRC naval forces.boats are an inhibiting factor for theand Taiwan has expressed concern aboutIt is probable, however, that bothattempt to limit the risk of confrontation,possibility of miscxdcularioo dearlyforces In the orea build up
B. Operations Against ihe Offshore Islands
The likelihoodajor operation to take or blockade the offshore islands in the near term is low. The political constraints moy be slightly less serious than would apply to Taiwan and ihe PVng-hus covered by the US-ROC MutualTreaty, but conflict In the area could reawaken US memories of previous crises and arouse fear that Peking had optedilitary solution to the Taiwan problem. Moreover, the military costs to the PRC would be very high for the results that might be achieved. The Islands' loss would nut substantially affect Taiwan's economic viability and might only draw attention to Its viability as an entity Independent of the mainland. Moreover, the blonds symbolically and legally tie Taiwan to the mainland in the minds of the Chinese on both sides of the Strait
If Pekingecision to Initiate military uction, lesser measures luch as blockade ornt would be preferable to an assault.ctivity against the offshore islands or against traffic to these Islands could occur in reaction lo possible confrontations as the PRC expands Its naval activity In the Taiwan Strait. Peking also could Initiateactivity as partougher, more militant stance toward Taiwan.
IB. Tne offshore Islands controllid hy the ROC consist of four blnnd groups: Chln-mcnatsu. Wu-ch'iu, and Tung-yfn. Only two ateIn strength: Chin-men,ithin four miles of the mainland and controls access to
the port of Hila-mennd Matsu. which Is within seven miles of the mainland and controls the primary sea approaches to the port of Fuchou (seehe two smaller island groups of Wu-chiu (about halfway between Matiu andand Tung-yin (northeast ofre manned only by small Irregular units which receive low priority In ROC defense planning Chin-men has numerous beaches suitable for amphibious op erations and flnt areas that could be used foroperations. The Matsus consist mainly of rucecd hillsocky, precipitous shoreline witnew minor beaches. One of the two airfields on Chin-men could be used by jet fighters. Tlie forces deployed on Chin-men and Matsumoreifth of the entire ROC army and include units at the highest state uf readiness. Hccausr most uf the islands lie within artillery range of the mainland, the ROC has builtositions. Heavily mined beaches, defemive obstructions, and narrow, shallowprotect most tppioaches to the Islands.
PRC hasapabilitywillingness to harass the offshoreand Matsu are. of course, withinand antiaircraft artillery in some areashigh-flying ROC aircraft If they arc onside of the blonds. PRC SAMs also couldopposite the islands for moreof the air space. The PRC mightimpose resbnetions on access to the Islandmeans of exerting its control. PRC aircraftunits could interrupt military air stWor even the activity of POC PiMng :the vicinity. Tho PRC navy, however,to deploy missile combatants from theSoulh Sea Fleets In the event of ROCand Peking would have to expect onIn ROC combat air patrols and air andactivity with an enhanced probability ofsea engagements between opposing forces.
offshore bland groups dependlor all classes of supply and are thuslolockade, which Inwould be preferable to an amphibiouseffectivelyarge portion ofbest lighting men from Taiwan's ownfrom the first day. The ROC alone isoflockade
Operations Ago Inst rha^ena-hu (Pescadores) Islonds
RC military operation agoli.itng-hu Islandsost unlikely option In the near term. Not only would tbe constraints described above fully apply, but seizure of theot essentia) foe an Invasion of Taiwan and the military preparations and costs would be high.
ng-hu bland group consists of overmall blonds totaling somequare miles, which lie aboutiles west of south-central Taiwan and aboutiles from the mainland (see Figuren general, the coasts ore steep and rockyew isolated sand and pebble beaches banked by more moderate slopes. The ROCaval base therearrison of only one light Infantry divisionpeciol worfoM group Most of tire islands have well preparedposftfons. There Is one beach suitobleitcd amphibious operation on the main bland
Mvkung where thereeaport and an; terrain provides good drop xonei for airbornealthough therequentlyable except In late spring and the summer.
uccessful blockode of the Peng-husatssr gaining air isjperlority. but thb could besnplbhed onlyearful loss of aircraft. If Peking attempted to blockade the Wands without first gaming air superiority, the PRC probably,could not completely prevent the movement of supplies and troops from Taiwan, particularly by air.
he disadvantages of ottaching the Peng-hus outwe.gh the advantages. Possession of the Peng-hus would old In controlling the Taiwan Strait andorward operating baseRC In-vnilon of Taiwan. The United States, however. Is committed under the Mutual Defense Treaty to come to the aid of the ROC In the eve.it of an attack upon the Peng-hus. Even if the US did not Intervene, an amphibious assault upon the blands would be no simple matter. As Indicated, an assault
i
upon Ihc P'rop-hus would require ihe inme air nird naval prerhirultoii ai on Invasion of Taiwan.
ossession of the PViig-hus. moreover, 'fliuld almost certainly no* force the ROC government to negotiate or lunender. The ROC would not be likely to capitulateong aa there were hope of repelling PRC forces on the beaches of Taiwan and hope of US Intervention. With US support forthe PRC enterprise would end In failure. Whether or not the United States did Intervene, there woulderious deterioration In Slno-US detente. Moreover, the USSR might attempt toChinese vulnerabilities resulting fromonfrontation. Considering all of the dangers nnd costs, the PRC would undoubtedly prefer to gamble itshe Invasion of Taiwan than settle for the limited and uncertain gainsaking the P'eiig-hui.
D. Operolions Against Taiwan
Any operation against Taiwan Island ts highly unlikely In the near term in view of theand risks already described (mostthe US-ROC Mutual Defenseven in Ihe event of provocations or major changes In the strategic situation so that there was no USthe PRC probably would not have the capability louccessful nonnuclear invasion much0 without uruceeptable losses.
AsmuIi on Taiwan. If Peking planned to launch an attack about that time, preparations would probably become apparent long before the event. These preparations would Include anIn the production of landing ships, special, iied training In submarine warfare and amphlbioos operations, air-crew proficiency training, massive fleet training operations, development of modem shlpbonve air-defense systems, and the improvement of air-defense facilities opposite Taiwan.
To initiate an operation, the PRC would probably move its submarines Into positionsthe island and deploy guklcd-mlssile patrol boats to cordon off the Strait area. Once this was aceomplbhed. air and naval strikes would be Initiated to destroy ROC air and naval forces.
Combat between the ROC and PRC air forces would be extremely costly to the PRC.ronounced numerical inferiority, the ROC air force has superior aircraft, skilled and experienced pilots, and an effective air-to-air missile system'whereas the PRC has few, If any, operational air-to-air missiles. Moreover, because most air combatwould occur near Taiwan. PRC aircraft would be exposed to ROC surf ace-to-air missiles and ROC pilots would have longer time for air engagements than PRC pilots, whose operations would beby fuel rcoulrcments for round-trip flights from the mainland. j
Despite these disadvantages, the PRC couldarge number of aircraft to airfields within range of Taiwan and eventually overwhelm the ROC air force.m of Taiwan, the PRC currently hasT0 combat0 air defensel(-htrr bombers,ight bombers)OC combat Jet olr-craft. Additional aircraft could be summoned from other areas of China, permitting the PRC almost continuous coverage of Important areas of Taiwan.
The ROC navy, however, is currently being refitted with modern armament Including missiles, antl-submarino rockets, and possibly torpedoes. By the end of thisumber of units of the ROC navy should have firepower equaling that of PRC counterparts, but not that of the navyhole, However, Peking could still count on aadvantage In Its efforts lo gain uncontested control of ihe waters around Taiwan.
The most critical factors in any amphibious operation, however, are establishing anda beachhead. The PRCs shortage of amphibious landing ships and limited capability toarge force clearly restrict its capabilities until at0 It would probably take two years ofbuilding lo double the Inventory of landing ships: but this would onlyimited lift capability of about six divisions, which probably does not give the margin of superiority necessary
to overcome the ROC opposing force* anticipatedIhe landing beichet,
Because of the limited numbers oflanding ships presentlyhe PRC for the near term Is not assured of landing enough heavy equipment In the initial beach assault to break out of the beachhead andort to bring in the needed additional heavy equipment ond troops.uccessful Invasion, the PRC would need atumerical superiorityotal of someivisions.
moln limitation for Ihe submarinebe operating conditions In the Straitsome relatively shallow depths, alongnavigational obstacles, providecombat operations. An effective navalrequire attacks on foreign shipping, aPeking would be reluctant to undertake.
Against Senkokv Islands
chancesRC military moveuninhabited Senkaku Islands is low. Nomilitary advantages would be gainedthese Islands, ond any militarythis potentially oil-rich area also claimedwould endanger Sino-Japanesethe PRC could emphasize itsby occasional naval patrols to show thethe area.
Agolnil Protai Reef (Tung-iha)
PRC already has the capability toseize Pratns Reef at any lime, but theattack is low because theverv limited and an attack might have someeffect on PRC relations withand the
ratos Iscircular coral barriern diameter, with an island on the(seet Isilesiles southwest of Taiwan.Ls claimed by both Chinas, but by noThe ROCeatheren intheIsland has on airfieldootrunway but few. If any preparedWNenlydine ship, .ml th, The reef area contains no known.mall lamltna ca/t. These units nulJ lit" oil and Is of little Intrinsic military value.three lalantry dtvlaWnt and ihrtrlotilla of IS PRC ships circled the reef.
but there was no exchange of lhoti. ondps eventually withdrew.
itemion of maritime reconnaissance tothe reef area (which to within range of PRC fighlcr ond bomber aircraft) to conceivable as China expands Its activities In thenvi wsrfees. Setting Pratas
j would be patently directed
against the ROC.tep also could serve asof willingness ro use forceTaiwan. Because the* Pratasbe an aggressive military operation.probably delay action until the Chinesefeel lhat heavy-handed pressures to force osettlement were both necessary ondtolerable. The seizure of Pratasthe same time servearning to Hanoicould take possession of all ihe islandsin tlte South China Sea ond thatmilitary initiatives In the Spratly Islondsbe made wiih impunity.
lockade Is also possible and would result ln fewer casualties, but It might be lengthy unless the ROC defending troops were induced to defect. Pratas and the Spratlys are resuppUed once In four mo_nthsj
G. Oporotions Against tha Sprotly (Non-sho) Islonds
perations against Spratly Island garrisons would be more difficult than against either the
Paracels or Pratas because of the much greaterand Ihe international complexities resulting from Ihe presence of garrisons from three different countries. Near-term likelihood of PRC operations in the area to therefore low unless one of themost likely Vietnom. ottempts to resolve the sovereignty question by force.
he Spratly Islands, on archipelago of aboutocks, reefs, cays, nnd small sand and coral Islets nilotal land area of only one square mile, sprawlarge area of the southern portion of the South China Sen (seebey Heiles fromiles fromiles from the PRC island of Hainan,iles from Saigon. The most southerly Islands are located on the continental shelf extendingfrom East Malaysia. Sovereignty over the island group has been in dispute forentury. Present claimants include the PRC, the ROC Viet-nam, and the Phtflr/ptoes. The possibility of db-eovering seabed resources In the area insuresfriction over ownership. The PRC also claims they lie astride independent shipping lanes, The PRC Is the only claimant that does nota presence in tho islands. Tho ROC presence consistsingle garrison ofen on the Island of Itu Aba (also calledhereivilian population, all Chinese,. Vietnam ond the Philippines have small garrisons on four Islands each. Vietnamese garrisons totalen, and Philippine garrisonsen. Two of the Vietnamese-garrtooned Islands ore In close proximity to Itu Abo ond one. Sandeportedly being fortified wtth new pillboxes.
o our knowledge, neither PRC naval ships nor aircraft have ever ventured to the Spratlys.Major surface combatants or submarines would'be necessary for patrols in the Sprody Islands because they are the only PRC novo! ships with the un-refueled range to reach and patrol the Islands. PRC patrols would encounter no ROC air opposition, and the ROC navy presently could offer only token resistance. However, the problem to complicated by the conflicting daims to the Islands and tho presence of Vietnamese and Filipino garrisons. A
Is ntln-ted lhat BOO Chinese around rronpsIn the oceeatlon to sate the Parser! lilsndi.
The PRC, nevertheleia,aval base in iha Piruf'i and his eitended lb rubmarlne activity In tho ana of the Piraceli.
PRC presence In the Spradys could provokeair and naval rerperue and adverse political reactions from the Vietnamese and Philippine gov-emments. Further, any PRC encroachment in the aren could alarm all the other Southeast Asianregarding Chinese intentions In the general area.
An operation to scire the ROC-garrisoned Island of Itu Aba In the nest few years would not provide any great military or political advantageis Taiwan exceptemonstration ofto use force to irposseu claimed territories. *nd it would only complicate Chinese foreign policy Initiatives in Southeast Asia. It might also bring the Chinese into confrontation with Vietnam, something Peking would prefer to avoid. So long as the ROC garrison remains, it helps toChinese" claim to the Islands without risking Incidents between PRC forces and the forces of the other claimants.
Nevertheless. If one of tho clalm-nts. most likely Vietnam, attempted or threatened to resolve the question of sovereignty of Itu Aba by force, the PRC might be provoked to intervene. Minor shooting incidents Involving ROC and Vietnamese have occurred recmdyA
("The Philippines ore no match forU Dnerprobably would withdraw to avoid
confrontation. Only the Vietnamese might be willing totiff resistance, andon-frontadon the Vietnamese would have to cope both with ma|or Chinese surface combatants and with Chinese military pressures on the Sino-Vietnamese border. Vietnam could provide military fighterto cover the Spradys, while the Chinese would be limited to sorties by medium Jet bombers and light Jet reconnaissance aircraft
uccessful blockade or amphibious attack upon Itu Aba or other blonds of the Spratly group wouldarge-scale out-of-orea operation by PRC forces. Should this option becomethe required naval assets are available in the South Sea Fleet Troops could come from the Knang-chou Military Region. All the garrisons In the Islands are small and. without outside air sup-port, could defend only briefly against attack.
Original document.
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