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Tho purpose o*'t study Is to Identify those Soviet Institutions ana personal .'ties Involved In the formulationmenn or* policy on the Strategic Ar-ns Limitations Talks. (SALT).
In general, 'our groups confrl&ute to Sovlj* ooilcy on
SAL T:
The top 'oadft'shlp of the Communist Party, reoresented by the Poiltfcuro, the Defense Council> facto sut>-comnltteee Poltrsurond the Central Committoe Secretariat. Tne Politburo gives final approva' to ailInitiatives and acree-^entsj
The Ministry cf defense and Its General Staff, -hlc* advises on ail military and technical aspects of the ne<;otlfff lonsi
thercustrlat cco'ex, represented by thecommlss1on (vpk) and the production mlnlstrlos it oversees:
the ministry of foreign affairs, whlen influences Salt largely though such personalities as foreign mjnlster gromyko, ambassador to the us dobrynln, and deputy foreign
minister kornlyenko.
the leadership. general secretary srei^nev is the preeminent spokesmen for foreign and defense policy and sincee has exercised direct responslblitty for salt. the key military figure in sal policymaking is marshal grechko *ho, next to orezhnev, is probably the slr.gie most intiuen-lai personal ity in determining sal policies. linking the political jeadorshlp and tne military is perty secretary, ustinov, who aspears toentral coordinating role.
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key aspects of the dec!sion-making process: prior to and curing these negotlations, brezhnev has re'led heavily on *ho military for advice and support? the general staff
is doerly the key military organization involvsd in sal p'anrlng;
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institutions and actors
four key groups contribute to soviet policy on salt. they aro the top leadorshlp of the cowjnlst party represented by the politburo, its defense council, and the central co**it+ee secretariat; the military establishment, represented by the ministry of defense ana the general staff; "he defense industrial complex, represented by the military-industrial commission (vpk),armaments and space ministries it overseas and to some extent hy individual scientists vlthln the academy sciences; and the ministry of foreign affairs.
an extraordinarily large part of the business of the soviet state. including notional security affairs, is conducted at the politburo level. thiser stive lady makesdecisions on ali fundamental and many minor issues of foreign end defense sol icy. thesecretariat supervises tne execution of the politburoand has at itsonerfgl professional sta" 'n fie contral party apparatus *nleh gives directions to endperformance by the fjovarnnont aqencles. the la'te* are primarily responsible 'or prov'dlng information and technical advicety-ind carrvlng out party directives. in practice,.ind policy administration overlap at severalen
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the sovernnent end party structures, and at rhe too of the 3arty hierarchy thev coalesce ^cmoletoly in the party andleaders -ho sit on the politburo and secretariat. another factor that tends to blur divisions between party. industry and governmentolicy orientation which is almost totally responsive to defense-heavyeedsoo priority. this policy orientation appears to be an essontfal component of soviet political cul*ure.
tho political management of national security
tho politburo is currently comprised ofull members with voting rightsandidate members with consulta-lve rlgh+s. It Is an oligarchical institutior whichcs has decided no'lcy issues on the basis ofonsensus. while some of its members reoresent institutions ana interests which are directly related to national security po'lcv snc others do not, all key decisions on salt are subject to final revie- enc approval by the politburo. at important junctures in the salt process, for example during summit meetings in moscow2hp entire politburo plus military and technical advisers met several times in lengthy sessions. the results ofrezhnev visit to the united states and4 vladivostok moe'ing were submitted to tho polltburo for its consultationnon conclusion of these summl-s.
routine decision-making in rogorfl to salt, at in other matters. is influencedarge extent by the persona' authority of brezhnev and the division of labor within the politburo. bre2hnev is tne preeminent spokesman for foreign end defense policy, andas exercised direct responsibilityt within the leadership. for the purpose of managing foreign policy, brezhnev hasersonal staff of foreign affairs experts -ho appear to haveauthority 'or coordinating policy end negotiations, these experts probably advise brezhnev on the broad domestic andaspects of salt. none of their backgrounds and career patterns, however, demonstrate substantive knowledge or technical
competencels military policy issues.
reiow qreznnov on the politburoore of sexier readers who exercise major influence on national security policy decisions. this group includes dresldenf podgorny, premier kosycln, ce*ense minister grccnko, foreign minister gromyko, and kgs chairmen andropov. th* latter three leaders were e'evsted together to full pdltpuro membership it had previously been rare tor the bureaucratic chieftains who manage the major national security agencies to be represented in the politburo.
another key figure in dofense policy-making is candidate pemtburo member and party secretary ustinov, who oversees *he
sovle*industry, working 'hrough the secretariat's
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arm, the Central Committee Department otnse industry and the vP<. it Is the VPX which handles coordination bet-eonMinistry of Defense, ministries Involved In military production, and Academy ot Sciences' Institutes ongeged In military resoarch and development. The VPK Is headed by L. V.eputy chairman o' the Presidium of the Council of Ministers who played an Important part In the eleventh-hour negotiations surroundingoscow during the2 summit.
Pol Iflcol-ml11tary and military-technical po!'cy-maklng Is Institutionalizedpecialized Politburo commission, the Defense Council. Tho Defense Council has dealt with SALTumber of occasions. Chaired, itxo the Politburo Itself, by Brezhnev, theoum.ll brings together leading political and military officials. Kosygin, Sodgorny, Grechko, Ustinov, end Chief of the General Staff Kullkov are believed to been* me-se-s. re is evidence 'hat Gromyko and sometimes Andropov at*cnd Ce'ense Council meetings on an ad hoc basis. Subordlnaterom tho Defense Ministry and the General Staff also -ay be Invited to attend particular Defense Council meetings, ass Sefrnov and VP* representatives.
Tho Defense Council Is ultimately subordinate to tne Politburo for which It prepares policy positions ind advice, tn -ractlce, however, there seomstrong tendency for Sreznnev jre his
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moscow the main locus o' *ork on preparation of positions for salt is inministry of defense andeneral staff. the general staff is centrally involved by dint o* its overall, coordinatingy tor defense planning,research and development, and force posture planning. it reconciles tne competingcf tho individual branches of tho armed services or enfe-cesositions, and formulates tee military's position on arms limitations. the bulk of the -ork apooars toarried out in the senerein operations olrectora'e,oviet military vie* that arms control should ba closely tied to the operational requirements o' the soviet armed forces. the maindirectorate (gftui provides information and analysis on us force deployments and developments and is believed to befo* monitoring compliancearms control agreements.
next to grezhnov, marshal grechko is probably the single most influential personality in determining soviet policy on arms limitations. grechko's rise in poi icy-ma*ircles correia'm|tn the substantial increase inrvessicnai, as opposed to political, autonomy "he military's present influence, prestige, and role tnare unequalled in soviet history.
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Geneva Senior Sovlvt military 'epretentatI ono Soviet SALT delegation has aeon divided Intoilitary delegate General Gryilov, has describedoldiers" and "technicians."
Curing the first three rounds of SALT from0 until the end ofQ, the senior "soldier" -as the socond-'onklng member ot the Soviet delegationColonel General N. V. Ogarknv, then First Oeouty Chief of the General Staff. Thelilttry technician on tho Soviet doiegaflcn durlnq those earlyessions -as Coionol General Niholay Aleksuyev. an officerackground Inroseerch essl ?ne^eneral Staff. Oqarkov -as dearly In change of the military side of the SALT defecation.
initkseyev -as transferred from the General Staffe- post which subseouenfly was Identified as Oeputy Minister of Defense for Armaments. Followingtransfer Ogarkov and Aionsnyev -ere not present at tne sam# time during SMS Ions of the negotiations. The Soviets -ore apparently attempting to finesse the (sensitive) question of the relative rank o' *he two
Currently, Colonel Genera! I. I. Beletjky and Lieutenant Genera' . Truscv areilitary members nf tho Soviet obligation. Trusov, -ho has also been Involved Inpons resea'ch, joined the Soviet delegationl and It the acknowledged senior
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military representative, although he Is junior to 8eietsky In ml11rar/ rank,
8oietsky has stated thatand Trusnv reoorf to different
Qeietsky Is
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Deputy Chief of the General Staff for General Ouestlons.
as being actively Involved In
Befctsky doeseneral Staff background and we te'Ieve that hi reports directly to and receives guidance from Colonel General M. M. Ko2iov, Fii-st Deputy Chief of the General Staff. Kcziov, -ho attended the Vladivostok summitilitary expert, has been notec
planning In Moscow, and Kozlov was directly InvolvedALT matters. Tn.;sov,
is Alekseyev's
deputy and logically should report to htm. Although Semonov has stated that Alokseyev Is not directly Involved In SALT, his Involvement with armaments suggests that he plays an Important Indirect role, perhaps In monitoring tho technical aspects of the SAL negotiations.
The Oofenso Industries "
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Inteqrai, and edmlnlstratI voly separate sector of the economy. Tne defenso Industries sector exhibits greater continuity of personnel and organization then any other. It has been called an "economy within antechno togore advanced than the civilian sectors, anc enjoys peroulsltes, privileges, and priorities denied to non^elIItary production activities.
The VPK pecial coordination mechanism made up of
military, and government. Smlrnov
manages the delonso Industrial sector. It functions under the overall supnrvlslon of D. F. Ustinov of the Party Secretariat, ore qroup
of eight ministries Is represented on the VPK by Their respective
ministers. Including the Ministries of Defense industry. Aviation Industry, Shipbuilding Industry, Electronics Industry, 3adIo Industry,
Machine Building, Modi urn Machine Building, and General MdCiilne Building.
These eight ministries are Identifiable by thel' omission from the lists of "plan fulfillment Indices" published guarterly and annually
for the rest of the Sovln* economy.
During the2 summit negotiations, this mechanise proved toignificant link In *he SALT de-lslon-makMg process. The VPK has had its representation on ihe SALT delegation In the pnrsons o* P.eshekov (no* Minister of the Radio Industry) and A. N. Shchukln, who Is Deputy Chairman of *hn VPK and has
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confirmed that he works 'or Smlrnov. ritical stage In the talks on arms limitations, Smlrnov himself was assigned to work dlrect'y and authoritatively with Or. Kissinger Inumber of remaining difficulties.
Academy c* Sciences
Certain sections of the USSR Academy of Sciences apoear to have some Influence, albeit Indirect ana limited, on SALT matters. Leadingi the de'ense researcharge ana Influential element In the Academy, are consulted py -he political loadorshlp on technical aspects of arms limitations affecting weapons systems on which they have worked. In addition, through unofficial contacts with Western scientists, scholars, and anfense Intellectuals, Soviet scientistsonduit for ideas anc Informationpolitical, scientific, and strategic Questions reieted to
SALT.
Two foreign area research Institutes of the Academythe. institute of World Economyur net lonai Relations and the institute ot the United States and Canadarovide Information and analysis supportiveALT policy-making primarily In the political and econcmlc area. Both Instltytes nalntdin special sncto's dnallng with political-military and arms control aspects of Ame-ican policy. The sectors are largely staffed dv retiree
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military officers endessor oxtent civilian specialists. The institute ot world Economy and International Relations alsolosed ml IItary-technlcal sector which does cijsslfled research. Institute researchers ara known to provide background and briefing papers on SALT matters to the leadership, and at times the directors of these Institutes have servedoc advisors to 3rezhnev.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)
Tho Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Input Into SALTved to oe large Iyl ted to the diplomatic and polItlcai aspects of the negotiations. Including developing tac*lcs fcr the negotiations, the drafting of traaiy language, end lirernational legal conslcerations. At least three divisions within the Mlnls'ry have provided delegates and advisors for SALT and backstop the negotiations from Moscow. They are the International Organizations Department, tre >JSA Department, and the Administration for Planning Foreign Policy Measures from which SALT delegate Karpov came. The last named organization Isormal planning body. If dees not set goals, but Is concerned with procedures for securingof Party policy directives.
The Ministry's Influence on SALT Isrgo Iy -hrough certain koy Individuals. Four of Its leading officials who ar?
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Involved -Ith SALT probably contribute to high-level declslon-moklnq.
foreign Minister Gromyko Is concerned with SALT policy In tne general context of Ms responsibilities tor dealing with US officials at the highest levels,olitburo member, and as, at leastarticipant In Defense CourcM proceedings.* Gromyko has been Increasingly Involved in directwltn Or. Kissinger on SALT.
Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin, has been an Importantchannel of communication and negotiation with the US administration, and he can readily draw onears experience In Interpreting American politics. The DobrynIn-KlssInger channel provided contldontlsl and informal communications between the top Soviet and American leaders, through which an Impasse between the SAL* delegations -as broken by the1 understanding. Dobrynin hasentral figure In all summl* meetings. He Is known to have B'ojhrev's trust and confidence and has the right to report directly to the Party leader.
Another MFA Mgwa who has been prominent at US-Soviet summits and Gromyko-Klsslnger meetings In Gwgvpecialist
In US affairs who65 headed's USA Oopart-nent. ?ornlyenkoelegate to SALT. Last
Octoner hn was appointed Oeputy Foreign Mlnlater.
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Deputy Foreign Minister Se**enov,course, heads the Soviet delegation at SAL I, bat his Influence Is probably limited to tha tactical details of the negotiations. The negotiating latitude Of the Soviet delegation Is tightly controlled by Moscow, limiting the possibility for independent Initiatives. In private Bilateral! with Ambassador Johnson, for evampfe. Semenov seldom departs from prepared *yoed Briefs.
specie* authority to prooe US positions and suggest alternative approaches Is VPK Deputy Chairman Shchukln. This authority, Illustrated bv the private Initiative on mirv verification he made with Or. May last session. Is unique to the Soviet delegation and mayunction of Shchukln's claimed special relationship with Brezhnev. Snchukln has stated that he was seiec'edrincipal delegate by the top political leadership an-irect reporting and Mai sen function with Brezhnev to whom he provides personal assessments of the negotiations.
Seme observers have speculated that In? or8 Soviet preparations for SALT included the establishmentpecial Ministry of Foreign AMalrs/winlstry of Defense work inn group to study Issues and cref* positions forreview, this cannot an confirmed, andule, directbetween gov*rn*ont bjreiuc-acles without=arty
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supervision Is no* permitted. It Is more likely that routineand Backstopplng in Moscalls within tne province of tne special group In the Central Committee referred to aDove) which Brings together under Party auspices reoresentattves from varlour. ministries and agencies Involved In SALT. This process suggests that the coordination of foreign Ministry and Defense views on SALT occurs eDov* the ministerial level and within the purview of the Party's Central Committee.
t tne Summit
The foregoing discussion has presented the general 'ranework In which Soviet policy on arms limitations Is formulated. Summit-level negotiations, however, exert unique pressu'es as they compress the time available for decision-making and turn declsfon-mekeri Into negotiators. The evidence from summit pe-lods reflects the Interaction of personalities and Institutions from -he military, the defonsa-lndustriai sector, and the Party apparatus when an Issue of military policy such as SALT Is In the final phases of planning.
Prior to and during summit-level negotiations, Brezhnev has
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participated In the final decisions. He -as In contactGrechkoumber of Issues, and to'd him at one point that he valued Grechko not only as Defense Minister, but alsoo"IfIcal figure.
This pattern has continue-'. Ourlng the Moscow summit In lata June-early4 and the Vladivostok summit Irneraisov (first Ceouty Chief of the General Staff) and Monsky (former advisor to the Soviet SALT delegation! directly participated (In the -orklng-level discussions) as experts.
Tho key .mlllfvy orgpnUat'on Involved in SAL ni inning has
Curing2 summit. General Kullkov, Chief of the General Staff and his First Deputy Genera' Ogarkov -ere Invo'vod Inthe Soviet draft rents for Article III o* the interimand the Protocol -hlch dealt with SLBM levels.
On the evening ofhe General SUf'i Ooera-lons Directorate In Moscow -as preparing preliminary estimates of Sgvlptlevels while awaitingation from Generar Ko:iov on the progress of tse Sal talks taking place at Vladivostok. The estlmatfls were to bo cased on the ffnal agrend figure uel5.
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Tho coordination Q* the planning and staffing of SovietnI stuns has Been ewerclsedfv channels
in particular. Party Socretary. Ustinov hns appeared toentral coordinating role
with Gererai Kullkov. his deputies and officials from the Central Coomfttee's Defense Industries Department.
working closely with Ustinov In this role has oeen N. h. Detlnov,in the past >es assoclateil with VPK matters, wasen4 as Deputy Chief of the Central Committee's Defense Industry Department, and was present at Vladivostok In Novemcer4 as an "armaments advisor" of the Central Committee.
Technicaluccor*isrole Is prppaPiy provides By *he yp<
The participation of VPKmlrnov, In the working-level negotiations during2 summit Indicates the Involvement of the VPK In SAL" planning and suppor'. ts presence and rote on the Moscow negotiatingould "ova Been attributed to his expertise In Soviet weapons prcg-ams and his Cose relationship with Ustinov, It was obvious to US negotiators that Smlrnovremendous fesesrch andM>lllfy Behind him. apability may have beenrom the
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per-anont staff, which Is supplemented by experts from technical committees o' 'ho defense Industries.
Prior tc .milummit, Soviet positions on tha SALT Issues Peine negotiated arp probably formulated and arS'tntefl -Itnln 'in Defense Caur-cl I o-Traat|ons sent toolitburo for 'Inal approval .
Probably not a" SAL-rei^ted decisions require the PoHtpure's stamp of approval and If may Indeed have delegated authority to the Defense Councilubcommittee of the Politburo to decide thetechnical Issues that arise during summits and those high-level mootlnrjs which precede and prepare the way tor summits. Onor example, the Defense Council cot immediately prior toissinger's final meeting wiih brerhrtev. This meeting procodod tho Vladivostok summit by one month.
Major Initiatives, however,ote of the full Politburo. During the Moscow summit Infe Politburo "otfS prooosal on SALT,
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