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AMERICANramework for the Future
APPROVED FOR RELEASE RATE:?
CIA Study Group5
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table of cohteiits
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
PART I - INTRODUCTION
PARTRGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS
IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
THE CENTRAL ROLE OF THE DCI
Statutory Basis
The Three Roles of the DCI
Authorities of the DCI
RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Different Customers in Intelligence
The Transition of National Intelligence
to
The Merging of National and Tactical
Intelligence
Crisis Management and the Extended
National Military Command Center
The DCI and Defense's Budgetary Process
Consequences of the DCI-Defense Impasse
RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF
THE DCI AS MANAGER OF CIA
Production
Science and Technology
Operations
CIA'S CURRENT ORGANIZATION
The DCI and Covert Operations
Continued Subordination to CIA
TABLE Or CU,jTE.1TS (Continued)
Page
DCIS AND THEIR MANAGEMENT OF THE
COMMUNITY
DOES THE COMMUNITYANAGER?
The DCI5
PARTHE FUTURE ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT
OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
BASIC APPROACHES TO COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION
The Monolithic Solution
The Defense Solution
A National-Departmental Balance
A CRITICAL CHOICE
THE PREFERRED PATH
OPTION ONE
OPTION
Necessary Conditions
THE DGI APPROACH
The DGI's Resource Controls
The DGI and the Community
The DGI's Relationship to the Department
Of Defense
Specific Problem Areas
The DGI and the
RECOMMENDATIONS
GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS
HE INTELLIGENCE
OLLECTION MANAGEMENT
ATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAM
ROBLEMS IN THE PRODUCTION OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
HE NATIONAL/TACTICAL PROBLEMHE DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS
RODUCT REVIEW CONCEPT OF RESOURCE ALLOCATION
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3
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
For the past year American intelligence has been subjected to intense scrutiny by both the press and Congress. In5 the President established the Rockefeller Commission, and the Senate and House eachelect Committee to investigate the American intelligence system and make recommendations for change. The Rockefeller Commission focused onimproprieties in the domestic area and recommended ways to prevent the American intelligence system from posing any threat to civil liberties. The Congressional investigations still underway are broader. Theyandate to consider the full range of questionswith intelligence, from constitutional issues to the quality of the product.
These developments led the Director of Central Intelligence to commission this study, in the beliefhorough analysis of American intelligenceroup of experienced professionals couldseful contribution to the ultimate decisions to be made.
This paper does not address past excesses or steps to correct them. Nor does it address theissue of oversight. We fully recognize the need for stronger oversight, but we believe thearrangements for this function require more than an intelligence perspective.
This study concentrates on basic issues which will need consideration in any reorganization of American intelligence. The President has aopportunity not available to his predecessors, who saw to varyingeed for basic reform in the intelligence structure but also recognized that basic reform could not be carried out without amending the National Security Act. Now the Act is cortain to be reconsidered, with orresidential
The intelligence structure must be made moreand effective. It must also be made more acceptable to tho American polity. Thus, efficiency achieved through rationalization and centralization of authority is not the only test. Structuralmust be accompanied by provisions forcontrols and internal checks and balances, evenost in efficiency, to develop and sustain public confidence. Changes in the elaboratein being must also be justified by thewhich would be achieved. These must be weighed against the losses and disruption which would result from altering the existing machinery; ourmust build upon the present, rather than start front scratch.
* * a
escribes the present environment of Part II focuses on present problems in the organization and management of intelligence,the central role of the Director of Central Intelligence and the difficulties in meeting hisresponsibilities with the limited authorities vested in him. The expanding breadth and depth of national requirements for intelligence and thesophistication of the technology developed to meet them add year by year to the difficulty of this management task. We place particular stress on two problems:
first, the relationship between the DCI, who has at least nominal responsibility for all USand the Secretary of Defense, who hasauthority over the bulk of its assets. This relationship is ill-defined and hampersoherent national intelligence structure.
Second, the ambiguity inherent in the current definition of the DCI as both the head of theCommunity and the head of one element of the Community. This poses internal management problems for CIA and also reduces the DCI's ability to carry out effectively his Community role.
Part III outlines three basic approaches tothe Intelligence Community. These are:
Transfer most national intelligence activities out of the Department of Defenseeconstituted and renamed Central Intelligence Agency, responsible for servicing the fundamental intelligence needs of both the nation's civilian and its military
Absorb the Central Intelligence AgencyDepartment of Defense, eliminating the DCI'sit has been conceived7 and placingfor effective coordination ofeputy Secretary of Defense for
telligence who would absorb the Communitynow exercised by the DC i, as well asby the present Assistant Secretary of.
7V
Leave mostly unchanged the division of labor between Defense and CIA which has evolved7 and, instead, focus on the office of the Director of Central Intelligence; modifying that office, and its authorities, in ways that will enhance the DCI's ability toore effective role in contributing to the overall effectiveness of the Intelligence Community, at the same time reducing his direct involvement in managing CIA.
The study argues that fundamental politicaland the unquestioned need to maintain both Defense
z
involvement in intelligence operations and anCIA preclude the first two of these solutions.
The third basic approach structures the office of the DCI so that its holder can discharge theof Community leadership without adverselythe legitimate interests of the Departments of State and Defense. The DCI clearlytronger voice in decision making on fundamental substantive intelligence judgments and on management issues in the Intelligence Community. At the same time, individual program managers in Defense need to retain considerable latitude and flexibility in the conduct of day-to-day operations. Both goals can be met by increasing the DCI's voice in the processes which determine howjudgments are made and disseminated and how resourcesmoney and peoplewill bein the Community, while preserving an independent CIA and continuing Defense responsibility for actual operation of most present programs.
There immediately arises,ritical choice, namely whether:
he DCI is to be responsibleajor way for stewardship of the resources this nation devotes to intelligence and, simultaneously, to be the nation's principal substantiveintelligence officer, or
he substantive and resource managementare to be split, with the DCI being replaced by two senior officers; one charged exclusively with resourceand the other with substartive
For reasons explained, we reject the second of these choices and argue that the Community leadership role must include responsibility tor both resource and substantive matters. We present two options forthe office of tho DCI, leading to two quite different DCIs of the future.
In the first option, the DCI retains directfor CIAtaff role with respect to the balance of the Intelligence Community. This option would much resemble present arrangements, but would differ from them in several significant respects. This DCI's ability to influence decision making on certain important issues would be enhanced somewhat by creation of an Executive Committee, under hisfor the Consolidated Cryptologic Program, along the lines of the present arrangement with respect to the National Reconnaissance Program. His linefor management of CIA would be reduced by creation of two statutory deputy directors, one responsible for day to day supervision of CIA and one for Intelligence Community coordination.
Implementation of this option would improve inways the overall management arrangements which currently exist within the Intelligence Community. The study group is convinced, however, that the changes needed are more fundamental than those reflected in this option, and that an opportunity for effecting such basic changes now exists.
The second option wouldew kind of DCI called the Director General of Intelligence (DGI). He
would be separated by statute from the presentwould be renamed the Foreign Intelligence Agency
ith its own DirectorIA). Funds for
US intelligence programs would be appropriated to
DGI, then allocated by him to program managers for
operations. The DGI would assume broad
production and resource coordination functions and
receive staff support to exercise both
Finally, the DGI wouldtatutory member of the
tional Security Council with concomitant access toand standing with the Secretaries ofand Defense.
Under this arrangement, two important andquestions roust be answered:
To whom should the Director of the FIA report; specifically, should he report directly to the NSC (as does the presentr should he report to the NSC through the DGI,ember of the NSC?
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Should the DGI's staff include the production elements of CIA or should these remain in the new FIA?
Wo present two workable solutions to the problems raised by these questions. Both have importantand serious disadvantages. The study group did nothoice between them. hart of these organizational choices appears opposite
If fundamental change could be attentral issue developments suggest that the National
rity Act7 will be rewritten, at least to
degree. Our analysis of the Act and the
structure it established convinces us that it
i,
be. We have made no effort in the pages which
to set forth how precisely the law should be
o
but rather have addressed the broad principles which
wc believe should be incorporated in such an
8
It is not an exaggeration to observe that we are
approaching an historical moment and unique opportunity
to charter the Intelligence Community to meet future
neuds for effective intelligence support. It may be
anotherears before events provide the President
a comparable opportunity. Our detailed recommendations
aro presented at the end of Part III.
PART I
INTRODUCTION
The Central Intelligence Agency and the outlinesational intelligence structure were created by the National Security Act They grew outonsensusin Congress, the Executive Branch, and major elements of public opinionthat the experience of World Waro more Pearlnd the emergence of the United States as the first superpower required the creationermanent national intelligence structure.
Today that structure is under intenseand the consensus out of which it grew has been seriously eroded. Moreover,ears of experience suggest that the intelligence provisions of the Act are obsolete and toooundation for the large and complex system that has evolved over that period. This paper examines some of the problems that besetintelligence today. It recommends ways themight be modernized and broad support for it Both are necessary, and the former cannot be achieved without the latter.
7 Congress had in mind the creationmall independent agency, not subordinate to anyDepartment, to "correlate and evaluate" theof the existing, largely military, agenciesfor strategic intelligencea term then understood to cover primarily the military intentions andof potential enemies. The Congress placed on the
Director of Central Intelligence responsibilities thought to bo modest and provided him with what itcommensurate authorities. After almost three decades, it is apparent that the contribution ofintelligence organizations is immeasurably important, that the responsibilities imposed by Congress areand that tho authorities it provided are less than adequate.
Those who drafted and enacted the National Security Act7 neither anticipated nor could have foreseen:
That5 the national intelligence effort wouldajor part of Government, larger in the peace5 than in the war
That the definition of strategic intelligence would expand to cover diplomacy, commerce, economics, and sociological and political trends worldwide, as well as the more traditional military considerations.
That the extraction of intelligence from closed societies capable of threatening major US interests, or even survival, would require theof large, complex, and expensivesystems; and that efficient employment of these systems in the national interest wouldcentral, unified management.
That the Act would notasis for resolution of important management problems, primarily
involving the Department of Defense, inherent in the development of these major systems.
That incorporating within the new CIA the operational elements of OSS, but not its analytic ones, would require CIA to start from scratch in its primary functioncollation andtaff heavily oriented toward espionage and action.
That the onset of the Cold War would compound this problem byritical need for acovert actionesponsibility that would logically and naturally be assigned to the CIA at some further cost to its original mission, thereby causing it to become publicly identified with covert actionthan with correlation and evaluation.
That the silence and total secrecymaintained by governments about their intelligence activities would prove impossible to maintain in the United States when its intelligence structure grew large and complex.
That, further, such secrecy would be considered inappropriate within the American political system for something playing so pervasive and soole in decisions vital to the national interest.
With respect to the last point, the framers of the Act evidently believed that the intelligenceof silence and discretion could be maintained in
the United States. The OSS-trained cadre of CIA were thus encouraged to follow this path. Secrecy wasbut at significant cost: it prevented the education of the public and of allew Congressmen in the realities of intelligence and helped to insulate intelligence itself from detailed oversight.
Intelligence thus had as its political basesmall group of senior Congressmen, who bothfrom and blocked its exposure to theira quarterentury, however, age andtook their toll of this small group of Congressional The position of those who remained inwas weakened, partly because the nationaloferiod were changed andthey reflected was eroded by theand by Watergate. Intelligence becamea rapidly growing new generation of national
ship that shared neither its traditions nor its
3.
of the world. The oversight of intelligence
a battlefield both in the generational struggle within Congress and in the overall struggle between Congress and the Executive Branch.
The national turmoil of recent years had two other related effects: intelligence security was damaged and the public was presentedistorted image of intelligence. The intensity of political emotionby the Vietnam War led to intelligence being leaked by both supporters and opponents of that war for advantage in partisan debate, and the atmosphere
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thus created ledreakdown in intelligence discipline. When subjected to the investigative reporting in vogue since Watergate, some intelligence activities were exposed for the sake of exposure, or at the behesthigher morality.* Many skeletonsreal and imaginedwere dragged from thecloset. Disclosure of some activities that were illegal and others which were injudicious gaveto those hostile to intelligence itself. Further, those encouraged by recent events to believe the worst of their Government have been tempted to accept at face value often exaggerated imputations ofto legitimate activities.
5
This, then, is the dilemma for Americanin It has failed to win publicbecause public attitudes have changed,its own secrecy has prevented it from
tho public to the need for intelligence and to the costs, moral and monetary, of getting it. Yet the nation's need for foreign intelligence has never been
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greater.
To the intelligence officer, if Pearl Harboralid reason forational intelligence systemhe possibilityoviet first strike is an equally valid reason for strengthening it today. The argument that nuclear war isor that the construction of nuclear armaments is driven by the military-industrial complex, is to him largely irrelevant; so long as the USSR continues to build and improve its strategic forces, the US must know how and why.
To tha intelligence officer, the new challenges of supporting negotiations and agreements on arms limitation and force reduction give rise to important new requirements and demanding new methodological approaches. At the same time, the increasinglyenvironment confronting military field commanders leads to difficult new challenges for intelligence support.
To the intelligence officer, the knowledge that the world's resources are finite, and that population growth is rapidly overtaking food and energy supplies, means that national interests once considered important will soon become vital. When there is not enough to go around, intelligence on the capabilities andof foreign producers and consumers becomes as essential to the survival of the United States ason Japanese intontions was
To the intelligence officer, the turmoilmuch of the world in many cases directly affects important American interests; he sees in this new demands for intelligence on the political and social forces in foreign societies.
Pursuit of such intelligence has required the development of procedures, techniques, and programs far beyond any conceived These haveew dimension to the concept of intelligence, andto the satisfaction of theumber ofopious flow of
quality intelligence is essential to the conduct of national security policy in today's complex world.
riut these efforts have sometimes been wasteful and tne product sometimes less useful than it might have been,onsiderable extent because neither the organization nor the management of the nationalstructure has kept pace with the evolving complexity of its techniques and the expanding scope of the requirements placed upon it. The Act7 aid not provide the bCI with authorities and anstructure aduquate for the management of tne Intelligence Community Instead, there iias evolved an accretion of improvised structures, lacking statutory basis, over which the bCI exercisos varying degrees of influence.
There are therefore two sets of needs: to
store public confidence and tooundbasis for American intelligence for theare not irreconcilable. The President, in meet- Congressional requirements for reforms in the of intelligence, can at the same time meetrequirementncarr.ental improvements manageriLiMit.
Any President will probably:
trong intelligence system,esponsive covert action capability.
Want roassurance that the system is under control.
Want tho system run efficiently, with due regard for budgetary considerations.
Want intelligence activities not toource of political difficulty or embarrassment.
want independent advice, particularly in time of crisis, from capable people primarily loyal to theand independent of the departments that execute policy.
ystem that can function well in both peace and war.
This Presidentarticular opportunity not available to his predecessors, who saw to varyingeed for basic reform in the intelligence structure but also recognized that basic reform could not beout without amending the National Security Act. This they woro unwilling to undertake. Now, however, the Act is certain to be reconsidered, with orresidential initiative.
The intelligence structure must be made more It must also bo made more acceptable to thepolity. Thus, efficiency cannot be achieved simply by rationalization and centralization of authority. improvements must be accompanied by provisions for extornal controls and internal checks and balances, evenost in efficiency, in order to develop and sustain public confidence. Congress and the public must be satisfied that foreign intelligence activities pose no domestic threat and thathreat cannot be created. Parts II and III which follow are addressed to efficiency
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and needed changes in the organization and management of intelligence.
Thure are two other aspects to the question of how to establish effective Executive andoversight of intelligence; and how to reconcile the need for secrecy in intelligence with greater public pressuro for disclosure and accountability. We fully recognize the need for stronger oversight, but wo believe it inappropriate for intelligence officers to suggest how they might themselves be overseen.
On the other hand, the need for secrecy is critical to the continued effectiveness of American intelligence. Intelli-jenco operations require some measure of secrecy and cannot be conducted unless Congress and the public accept this fact. This is not impossible. The public acceptsbecause it understandsthe need for secrecyide range of private and public matters from the lawyer-client relationship to the Federal Reserve'sin the nation's monetary system.
Tho issue of secrecy, however, is complex: Resolving the probloms it raises in our societyresh analysis of what aspects of intelligence actually require protection {of what kinds and to whatresh analysis of the concepts involved,arefulof tho kind of legislation needed. These issues go beyond the scope of this paper and should be the subjecteparate study.
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PART II ORGANIZATION ANb hAUAGEMLiJT PROBLEMS IN THE IUTELLIGEiJCE COMMUNITY
At thia writing, the "intelligence proolem" isas one of combatting an assault on civilprofessional intelligence officer, however, seesproblem and view3 itifferentoelitves that domestic civil lioertios are notby the US Government's foreign These domestic liberties could benowover,oreign adversary whoseand intentions wore not understood by our The intelligence officer, in snort, seesas the protoctornot the subverterof hiscitizens' liberties. For him, theis defined by tho noeu to improve our foreign intelligence capabilities to thedegree. He is, however, fully aware ofto protect civil liberties; the suggestions do not in any way impinge upon them.
Tnis paper addresses tho organization andof US intelligence from the point of view of the professional, describing thu present state of USand cataloguing some of its problems. Because we are proposing changes, our emphasis is necessarily on those things we think need to be changed, and not on the many strengths of American intelligence. Equally important, it must be noted that our concern with tho
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organization and management of intelligence is baaedonviction that these issues are importantof the ultimate quality of the intelligence product: its scope, perceptiveness, timeliness and eveii availability.
Of these issuus, several of the most importantthe Office of the Director of Central Intelligence. This paper therefore discussess
The central role of the DCI as it isand as it is in
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I O
.iis relationshe departments of Defense and State.
His maiiagewsnt of CIA: why it complicates the oischar'je of .iis responsibilities for the Intelligence
How various DCIs and Administrations have nandled this office, and how it appears now.
THii CEmYRAL ROLE OP THE DCI
Statutory Basis
The present American intelligence structure derives from the national Security Act* Laying the foundationational intelligence structure was
1 The Central intelligence Act3 only alarifiedaiminietrative authorities of the DCI.
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neither the primary purpose of that legislation,nor the topic on which its drafters focused the bulk of their attention. Their main purpose was to merge the old War and Navy Departmentsewof Defenseivilian secretary,the Air Forceeparate service, and sketch the outlinos of the National Security Council. Theportions of the Act were secondary.
The Act's legislative history suggests thatwrote its intelligence sectionslear
pose in mind but knew they were venturing into
waters. There isuggestion that they
a second look at the intelligence portions of the
ew years to make more permanent arrangements
the light of experience. They certainly do not scorn to have realized that they wereoundation
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which would last without significant legislative
for moreuarter of a
Tho Act implicitly makes tho DCI the leader of something that has come to be called the "Intelligence Community." It does not, however, specify hisbuyond providing that the CIA which he heads should "correlate and evaluate" andervices of commonhat] can more efficiently becentrally." Nor docs it provide him with specific authorities over the agencies that now make up the Community.
secret
1 President Nixonirective, developed by an Executive Branch task force on intelligence neadedhe present Secretary of Defense, which elaborated andxplicit certain responsiuilitics of the DCI only implicit in tho Act. In so doing, that directive increased the DCI's responsibilities without increasing his powers, ue was directed to:
and review all intelligence activities including tactical intelligence, and the allocation
of all intelligence
national intelligenceand other national
Chair and staff all Intelligence Community
a.
advisory boarus or
Reconcile intelligence requirements andwith budgetary constraints.
The Three Roles of the DCI
On the skeleton provided by these two documents* there hus grown, byongeries ofmechanisms, doctrines, and the equivalent of
* Muoh of the following dieouseion concentrates on formal responsibilities and authorities. It should behowever, that the effectiveness of eaoh DCI has been directly proportional to the confidence placed in him by the President and Congress and the belief of his aolleaguea in the Community that he had that
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case law precedents all centering on the institution that we call the DCI. To understand, one must first define some terms. First, what is the nationalthat the DCI is supposed to produce? Second, what are the functions he must carry out to produce it? Third, what is the Community he is supposed to lead? Fourth, what management tools are available to him as leader?
National Intelligence is used here to denote that foreign intelligence neeaed by the senior levels of Government to do their job in making andpolicy.
This paper discusses the production of national intelligence in terms of six functions: the collection of information, its processing, its analysis, theof findings and judgments, research andand support. Covert action,eparate area of DCI responsibility, which employs assets also used in collection but is not directly related to the production of national intelligence.
The composition of "The Community" is aquestion, discussed in detail in Annex A. There are separate, though overlapping, communities of collectors, producers, resource managers, andeachew primary members and several peripheral ones.
Management tools or controls include the line authority the DCI exercises over the CentralAgency, and four instruments by which he can exert influence ovwr the Communityi (a) the management of resources: including manpower, money, andpeculiar to intelligencecover; (b) collection management: by which we mean the allocation of collection resources to substantive requirements, specific tasking of those resources, the continuing review and assessment ofresults, and the identification of collection gaps and deficiencies; (c) product review: whichboth the final shaping of the intelligenceto match the needs of tha national consumerontinuing evaluation of the product against those needs; and (d) inspection. All of these exceptare interdependent.
In some senses, the DCIember of all the communities identified above, although in precisely what sense is not always clear. He wears threo hatsas Presidential advisor, as head of "the Community" and as line manager of CIAbut his hats by no meansfully with the four functional communities. Moreover, he also has responsibilities to the Congress thatomplicating factor.
The UCI as Presidential advisor. In thishe is the primary source of nationalfor the President and the USC. He personally
advises the President and the NSC on all foreignmatters, including budget, and serves on the various NSC sub-Committees.
The DCI as head of the Community. Here tho DCI is the primary source of national intelligence for the Federal Government and is its senior foreignadvisor. He coordinates, to varying degrees, administrative and operational matters that concern more than one intelligence agency. He advises the President on the Community budget. For the Congress, he provides intelligence, defends the Communityand advises on foreign intelligence matters.
The DCI as Manager of CIA. As the head of CIA,
the DCIino officerargo independent agency under the NSC. Heroducer of intelligence for the mechanisms over which he presides in hi3 two other roles. In addition, hepecialized line function as the agont of the NSC in thu conduct of foreign poliay through covert action. For thethis DCI tooource of foreign intelligence. Congress expects him to present and defend CIA'sand to account for its performance. He is alsoto inform the Congress of covert action programs.
Authorities of the DCI
Charts such as this are misleading, for theythe DCI has great authority. This is true morethan in fact. In his capacity as ChairmanUnited states Intelligence Board (USIB), forhas less authority than is suggested by the factpaper, the USIB is only advisory to him asthe "observers" at USIB have the right tothe DCI's Estimates. His authorities asother boards and committees are similarlyDCI has direct or line authority only over thosoof the collection and production communitiespart of
Though they pay lip service to the DCI's
program managers within the Community (outside of
are primarily influenced by the views of their own
S
superiors or of those who control their budgets.
is possibletaff officer who controls resources to exert as strong an influence over an organization, at least on some issues, as its nominal departmental superior. In Intelligence as elsewhere, money talks.
There is no single manager for an enterprise as complex and as expensive as the national intelligence system which has evolved over the past quartor century. The DCI not only lacks line authority, but his ability to use the management devices we have identified is at
best limited. In cases of conflict, the DCI's only real recourse is to go directly to theourse of action that must be taken sparingly.
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5
In the resource field his nominal authority is limited to giving advice to tho President through the Office of Management and Budget. It is sometimes further limited by the DCI's inability to acquireinformation on resource issues in timely fashion.ull discussion of this problem follows in the next section.)
In collection management, the DCI has nocutting across independent and autonomous systems. As head of the "Community" heetUSIB Committees, developed ad hoc and operatingresponsible for individual systems. range from the Committee on Imagery RequirementsExploitation hich is elaborately developed and in which he has strong influence, to the' Human Sources Committee, which is rudimentary and through which his influence over Foreign Service reporting is minimal. Also, important collection managementare often made outside the USIB structure, in the Intelligence Resource Advisory Committee (IRAC) or in the National Reconnaissance Program Executive fEXCOM). Here at least the DCIajor role, but sometimes such decisions are made betweenproducers and collectors, or by individualmanagers acting on their own. eals in greater detail with these matters.
t
ho DCI'3 authority in product review is more fully established than in any other field, probably because it was so clearly tho intent of7 Act to give him this power. He exercises it through USIB's consideration of National Estimates, through the loss formal procedures of current intelligence, and through his contribution to the NSC and its sub-Committsss. The Act that set up the DCI also authorized the continuing production of departmental intelligence, however, and the distinction between departmental and national gets exceedingly blurred at senior policy levels. views regularly bypass the national system. Mechanisms for the evaluation, or consumer response, aspect of product review are less structured and much less effective. The National Security CouncilCommitteeharged with this function, has met only twice in four years. urther analysis of national intelligence production appears as Annex D.
No DCI has ever asserted, much less exercised, the right to inspect in the traditional senseagencies other than CIA, althoughight is implicit to some degree in the basic statutes and directives.
We believe that at the national level resourcecollection management, and product review andshould all be parts of an integrated system. In fact,eginning has been made in relating thcso functions systematically to one another, they are fragmented.
RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Through the preceding discussionommon thread: the difficulty the DCI has in dealing with the Department of Defense. The drafters of the Act did not address this squarelynd itundamental problemne that has blocked the creationoherent national intelligence system. In the absencelearly understood and mutually agreed relationship between the DCI and Defense, the best each can hopo for is compromise andto bridge differences of view and perspectivea wide range of issues.
These differences fundamentally affect the overall management of national intelligence and, ultimately, the intelligence product. The responsibility of theof Defense in peace is to prepare the forces needed to defend the nation; in war, to fight and win it. These responsibilities dictate certain organizational,budgetary, and other needs* The responsibility of the DCI in peace is to produce intelligenceariety of nationalesponsibility which is also mirrored in his programs and priorities. His responsibility in war is nowhere defined.
It has been argued that this difference isin peacetime, the DCI and Defense missions can oe made more or less compatibleertain amount
of goodwill; major war, in the unlikely case it ever comes, will make any extant arrangements meaningless in any event. This argument misses the point. For Defense, wartime requirementsritical impact on peacetime priorities and organization. Defense must plan for war, regardless of its likelihood or consequences, if only to prevent it, and must assure itself in peace that it will have the intelligence capabilities it will need in war. Of necessity. Defense takes thisseriously. In so doing, however, its interests often run counter to the interests of the DCI.
Different Customers in Intelligence
The basic difference in mission and responsibility outlined above is reflected in differing perceptions of the ultimate customers of the intelligence product. The DCI must serve the President, the National Security Council and its staff, the senior economic policy officers, and, to the extent he is invited, the leadership of State and Defense. Defense intelligence, on the other hand, must meet the needs of what Defense terms the National Command Authorityingle chain of command reaching from the President through tho Secretary of Defense to the Joint Chiefs of Staffand those of the entire range of field commanders.
For his customers, the DCI must provide intelligence across the entire spectrum of national interests. He recognizes the importance of major strategic questions
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but also must give attention to the large economic and political issues which will be central concerns of our foreign policy for the rest of this century. For the NCA, however, military questions must be paramount and must be considered from both the strategic and the operational viewpoint. The field ccoBBander at every level needs intelligence in groat detail on the forces and weapons that might oppose him. Moreover, he must amass it in peacotiue if he is to be effective in war. lie believes he must exercise in peace the collection assets that will support him in war, both to collect intelligence and to train them for their wartime missions.
These institutional differences are reinforced by the attitudinal ones standard to civilian-military There is understandable resistance in Defense,
b
particularly in the uniformed military, to the
that civilian outsiders should provide
analyses to the President which affect decisions
garding US military
i
Thus, there is inroad divergence of national and departmental intelligence interests. This can be seen in what we have called the "transitionhich is our shorthand description of the fact that Defense fights hard to assert control over certain technical collection assets in peace because it will need them in war. It can be soen in the closely related "national-tacticalhere, because tactical intelligence needs must increasingly be met by centrally
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controlled national systems. Defense naturally tries to assert effective control over those systems. It can be seen with respect to the "crisis managementinally, it can be seen in the resources world where the DCI's attempts to assert his staff responsibility with respect to Defense intelligence budgetary matters meet understandable resistance.
The Transition of National Intelligence to War
The transition problem arises from the absencecoherent national plan for the evolution of
over intelligence systems from peacetime throughwar. In peacetime, centrally managed
collection programssuch as the National Reconnaissanceand the Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP)controlledariety of mechanisms in which
DCI's voice ranges from dominant to marginal. Init is generally understood that Defense'sbe
There are however large gray areas in times of peace and particularly in times of "crisis." At what pointrisis should control be passed to Defense?
Defense naturallyo define this point as far toward the "peace" end of the spectrum as possible. To the DCI, however, political and even economicremain at least as important as military ones until the actual outbreak of hostilities. political assessment is essential if the
door is to be kept open for negotiations and war to be avoided. To turn intelligence support of theover to an organisation for which intelligence is secondary toar, is to make military considerations overriding. Thererave danger that, in the absence of independentof enemy intentions, the actions and reactions of opposing forces willomentum of their own.
-a
This isilemma. In the absence ofunderstanding between the Secretary ofthe DCI, the two will dispute the control overcollection systems in peace. ajorindividual assets would be transferred to Defense in confusion andharp drop inime wnen the nation needs efficiency most. Again may be argued that this eventuality is toomatter in the light of real present-day
concerns. Perhaps it is, but because Defense takes itsseriously, it will continue to
9
the developmentoherent peacetime system directed t those concerns until the civilian authorities accept Defense's wartime concerns as equally valid.
The Merging of National and Tactical Intelligence
The question of national versus tacticalwhile asroblem for the Secretary of Defense as it is for the DCI,ew dimension to their wartime-peacetime dilemma. ew years
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ago, tactical intelligence was collected for the field commander by assets under his control. The moreportions of this intelligence wore passed to the next echelon above, and by successive steps of selection and aggregation became an input to national intelligence. In return, general conclusions on enemy doctrine, tactics, and weaponry were passed down through the chain for the background use of the field commander.
ystem the DCI had neither responsibility nor great interest. He was not brought into the problem formallyhen the President's directive made him in some way responsible for budgetary aspects of tactical intelligence. This was done partly because, given the growing capability of tactical intelligence assets, it was thought necessary to consider whether money could be saved by using these assets in peacetime for nationaloncept that put the DCI squarely at odds with the military from the JCS on down. Even if he had not been given thi3 budgetary responsibility, however, we believe the DCI would increasingly be forced to involve himself deeply in tactical questions, because these questions have become thoroughly ontangled with national onos.
I
To fight an enemy equipped with nuclear weapons, missiles, and sophisticated electronics, the fieldneeds equally sophisticated intelligence support, often of the kind that can only be provided by national collection and analytic assets. Moreover, the rapid
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pace of modern war moans that this support must bealmostoncept that has come to be termed "real time."
On the other hand, the perspective from thehas changed as well. When even the most minorcan rapidly escalate into strategicnational authorities must have timely andon activities which in the pastseemed purely local and tactical inhappened as earlyhen the President wasfollowing by radio the actions oftanks in Berlin. Moreover, local
activities can be of great political significance
the nationalheueblo and the SS May aguesuller discussion of the national/tactical problem is included as Annex E.
"national/tactical" problem is being
complicated by the advent of new centrally managed collection systems whose capabilities provideessential for national decision-making but equally essential for the conduct of tactical operations.
These considerations suggest that, if the US is to maintain an effectivo military force over the next few years, it will have to develop an integrated military intelligence system incorporatingtrategic and tactical interests and serving both the NCA and the field commander. It can be argued that development of such
a systemepartmental responsibility for Defense. This is true as far as it goes, but because of its scale and because of the many overlaps with national concerns and with national intelligence assets,ystem will tend to displace the national one unless itarger system devoted to all national intelligence purposes including the tactical. This obviously affects the DCI's responsibilities, and he is already being forced to deal piece by piece with some of its aspectsa danger in itself to comprehensive national planning.
Crisis Management and the Extended NationalCommand Center
Many of the issues between the DCI and Defense are illustrated by Defense's current plans for the Extended National Military Command Center (ENMCC) as the national center for crisis management. The ENMCC, which is toational Military Intelligence Centers to serve the NCA. There is minimal recognition of the roles of the Secretary of State and the DCI in Defense's emergency plans.
The concept of the ENMCC is of course valid for the conduct of military affairs in wartime. It is not well adapted, however, to national security policy making in conditions short of general war. Here, as we have noted, most decisions have political, and often economic, as well as military dimensions. The Secretary of State
sechet
and the DCI bothot inconsiderable responsibility to the President. This is presently reflected in the composition of the NSC and its sub-Committees and in the flow of intelligence to those bodies. he arena for crisis management has been one of thosethe Washington Special Action Groupnd the DCI is responsible for its intelligence support.
Defense is proposing that the ENMCC serve this function, that all intelligence be directed to it, and that it be the source of intelligence support for national decision-making in tines of crisis. Such an arrangement would make it extremely difficult for the Secretary of State and the DCI to contribute toconsideration of policy, not only in general war butroad range of politico-military crises. Again, whenituationrisis? At what pointrisis does the military security of the nation override political considerations? And canystem be effective in crisis if it is not functioning effectively when no crisis exists? The ENMCC concept, intentionally or not, will sharply reduce the influence of the DCI in crisis situations if accepted as designed.
Another problem is in the area of tasking collection systems. The NHIC is toentral taskingwhich,risis, is supposed to control all collection systems including overhead satellite systems, NSA's assets, and CIA's stations, in support of the NCA.
These plans are moving forward with minimalwith the LCI. Again the factystem is being doveloped to function in general war is acting to distort arrangements for serving broader national interests in times of peace or of crisis short of general war.*
The DCI and Defense's Budgetary Process
Our final point about the overall DCI-Defense relationship concerns the DCI's stafffor resource review with respect to allactivities.
* It should be noted that the creation of NM1C,eohantem for focusing military intelligenceand for supporting the JCS and its major eubordi-note oommande, meete long-eetabliehed and important needs. The problem is how to make it compatible with the DCI's interests and fit it into nationalmaohinery.
We have noted that the DCIesponsibility under the1 directive to propose solutions, balancing national and departmental interests, to the problems catalogued above. It is difficult to strikealance when the resourcesinglefar outweigh those of all the others combined, including those which the DCI can himself marshal. We can identify at least four ways in which the DCI's ability to exercise his responsibility is limited in practice.
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First, the1 directive changed none of the legal authorities that charge the Secretary of Defense with sole responsibility for decisions on Defense Regardless of what any DCI may conclude about how Defense allocates its intelligence resources, in the last analysis it is the Secretary of Defense who isfor these decisions and accountable to theand Congress for them. Clearly, the directive was not intended to change the Secretary's line authorities. Rather, its intent was to give thetaffto the President on Intelligence Communityole which is of course compatible with Defense'sexercise of its line responsibility for budgetary matters. However, Defense has, from time to time and not unreasonably, been reluctant to share information about resource recommendations with the DCI in sufficient time to enable him to havo significant impact on theprocess.
partly this is due to the fact that final Congressional decisionsurrent year Defense budget have, at least in the recent past, been made in November and December after extended negotiations between the Executive Branch and Congress. The need to pullurrent year program halfway through the fiscal year and toudget for the following yeargiven the enormous size of the Defense budget, the literally thousands of decisions which must be made, and the very short time available to finish the taskforces reliancerocess in which fairly arbitrary numbers are handed outariety of program managers and the related
Service components late in the year. The program managers themselves and tho Services must decide how they will live with the levels they have been given. It has proven extremely difficult for the DCI to involve himself or his staff effectively in this important part of the decision-making process, which is generally compressedery short time period.
M1MIVn
IS)
Defense expenditures for intelligence, while they include
decision about intelligence within the total Defense budget is relatively minor in comparison with major issues relating to weaponsthe overall size of our military forces, and so forth. It can be difficult for top Defense management to give major attention to an issue critical to the Intelligence Community but of very minor consequence when considered in the context of the total Defense budget.
Over decades, the cumulative action of many Congresses has contributed to the problems which faceCI,ecretary of Defense, in trying to involvedeeply and effectively in the myriad details which characterize the United States Government'sprograms. Tho various intelligencedescribed above are fundedariety ofappropriations made to different organizations within the Pentagon. The numbers of people who must
participate in decisions about the Consolidated Cryptologic Program, for example, make difficult the conductomprehensive review of the resource requirements of the total program. An outsider who lacks the necessary time or information to do much more than monitor the process by which these programs aro shoehornediven overall total will always be frustrated.
Consequences of tho DCI-Defense Impasse
The DCI's responsibility to provide national
ligance cannot be discharged unless thore is an
system in which national needs can bo balanced against
departmental needs of Defense, including those of
tactical commands. But Defense's control over thethe Community's collection resources inhibits the develop-3.
ment ofystem. Conversely, the DCI's
authority and influence Inhibits the establishment of a
herent departmental system. This situation serves no
RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE DEPARTMENT OP STATU
The DCI's relations with the Secretary of State, though less complex than those with the Secretary of Defense, alsoumber of important andproblems. (We speak here of the generalnot of the unusual situation created by the dual responsibilities of Dr. Kissinger.)
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As Defense resists independent intelligence assessment and reporting on matters affecting theState resists on matters affecting diplomacy, on the other hand, the DCI needs State support to balance the military hand in intelligence assessment.
The most important single source of political and economic intelligence is Foreign Service reporting. State does not consider this to be intelligence and will acceptoose linkage between it and intelligence requirement mechanisms.
The Intelligence Community must work with State through the Bureau of Intelligence and Researchut INR has little influence over the operational arms of State that control roost matters of vital importance to intelligence.
Some of these problems would probably yield to the changes we propose below. There does not now exist, however, any mechanism by which the entire range of
secret
Community-State relationships can be regulatod at the policy level. We believe there should be an arrangementenior officer at the Undersecretary level is charged with these matters in the Department, and the DCI is charged with coordination between him and theelements concerned.
THE DCI AS MANAGER OF CIA
The DCI's Community responsibilities would bybe overwhelming, but the DCI must also manage CIA.
CIA, like the Community, is not the organizationthought it was creating CIA did not evolve present structure by reasoned design, but throughresponse to challenges as they arose. with its investigation of Pearl Harbor freshlywas seeking to ensure through CIA that neverthe US Government be disadvantaged because itconsiderholo all the information availableparts. (An agency set up for this purpose could serve other necessary purposes as well, andauthorizes CIA to carryumber of largelyfunctions in addition to "correlation
Production
Seen in the context of Pearl Harborand of HiroshimaCongress obviously meant by "intelligence
-si^sret
relating to the national security" politicaltrategic nature with emphasis onaspects. (Peacetime applications ofin support of diplomacy or ofwere apparently given little if anyCongress was acting in response toindividual failures of War and Navyandesser extent of tho State Its solution was to establish anby inference largely civilian, centralto "correlate and evaluate" strategicthought of in largely military
while CIA was to be the instrument through
tho DCI would correlate and evaluate, the Act didwhether it would also "produce"
or conduct intelligence research. Congress seemshad in mind that it would not. Experience
the Office of National Estimates (ONE)the DCI, to be independent in his judgments,
to be able to do independent analysisheck on and stimulus to the other intelligence agencies. ONE found that it could not take issueilitary serviceof events without the analytic resources to back up its argument. Moreover, the progression from policy needs to requirements to tasking ornd the resource decisions which both flow from and control this process have come more and more to depend on an independent substantive evaluation capability. Over
time, therefore, CIA developed an analytic andcapability in the Directorates of Intelligence (DDI) and Science and Technology (DDSfiT).
Science and lechnoloay
A second major influence in the growth of CIAalso unforeseenas been technology. odest analytic effort against Soviet science on the one hand and with the development ofn the other, CIA has overears developed major national assets both for scientific analysis and for technical collection. These two aspects were tied together in they the creation of the Science and Technology Directorate.
At the sameroad research and development program was formulated with the objective ofenter of expertise and technical capability focused on areas of unique interest to intelligence. This growing technical expertise, when married to other unique CIA operational capabilities, has led to aof relatively small but extremely productiveprograms.
The existence of these operational and technical assets, independent of the Department of Defense, has provided an essential stimulus to the much largeractivities in similar areas. Interaction between technical and engineering personnel of CIA and Defense
has led to an exchange of information to theof both, and has made programs not under the direct control of senior intelligence managers more productive and better focused on real needs*
Operations
Long before this had been achieved,owerful arm of Government throughdevelopment of its espionage and covert
capabilities in the Operations Directorate. This
about because the CIA, just created by Congress,
the only place to lodge the remaining operationalOSS, Almost by accident,IA
to concentrate on correlation and evaluation was
adre of clandestine operators steeped in
security discipline and no-holds-barred tradition of
War II. The onset of the Cold War and the resultant
need for extensive covert action programs, especially in Europe,remendous impetus to an organizationinclined in that direction, and successive DCIs devoted much attention to this aspect of their Their preoccupation had an important impact on the DCI's bureaucratic position: the more he was seen as leaderingle operating agency, the less he could claim to preside impartially over the entire intelligence effort. Their attitude also had aneffect on the public image of CIA. Clandestine operations are sexy; correlation and evaluation are not.
-
SECKE1
CIA'S CURRENT ORGANIZATION
As now organized, the CIA has four Directorates, each headedeputy Director:
Intelligence, responsible for analysis andother than scientific and technical.
Operations, responsible for clandestine(principally from or through humanovert action and the control of CIA's overseas stations.
Science and Technology, encompassinganalysis plus the development andof technical collection systems or activities.
Adminiatration, encompassing communications, security, personnel, training, finance, medical services and other internal housekeeping
The first two DirectoratesIntelligence and Operationscame to be housed in the same agency more or less by historical accident, as explained above. The thirdScience and Technologywas created out of evolving components of the first two. All three directorates developed virtually independently of one another and came to have quite distinct, some might say
SEKRET
Introverted, characters.* (The Administration Directorate nas its own individuality, but it is better integrated with the other throe than any of them are with each other.) In practice, CIA always has been largely managed at the Directorate level, with all threads ultimately coming together only in the office of the DCI, which has traditionallyery leanly manned institution.
This is not to imply that the Directorates do not cooperate, but that their cooperation is frequently achieved through something akin to treaty alliances among virtually independent fiefdoms. In somethe DCIedieval king ruling over four baronieB. He, and only he, can adjudicate among them. (With but one exception, no DCI has yet found it possible to delegate these functions in any meaningful way to his principal Deputy. The brief exception was Admiral Raborn, under whom Mr. Helms became the only DDCI ever to exercise significant line authority over the day-to-day management of the Agency.)
Each Directorate hae tie oun career service, covering all General Schedule grades through Apart from short-term, avowedly "rotational" assignments, the number of Agenoy officers who have been permanently assigned to more than one Directorate during the course of their careers ie very email.
The above described arrangements have had two one obvious, one easily overlooked. The obvious oneurther, continuing burden on the DCI. Less
obvious but also important is the anomaly produced when the DCXi as head of the Community, isisagreement between two or more Community components where one party to the disagreement is the CIA. In such situations, the institutional equities of each of the otner Community components involvedigorousthat component's headwnile the CIA,has no advocate. The DCI is thus placed in an unenviable position: he must be both partisan advocate and impartial arbiter simultaneously, run the risk of appearing to be unduly partial to his ownor give the legitimate concerns of his own Agency short shrift.
The DCI and Covert Operations
As head of CIA, the DCI is responsible for, and spends considerable time supervising, the activities of the Operations Directorate which controls the Clandestine Service CCS).
In Annex f, we discuss the Clandestine Service and the questions posed by its operations, particularly those posed by covert actiona term here used toide variety of activities, ranging from small scale media-influence operations to large-scale paramilitary operations bordering on conventional war.
At the moment, covert actionubject muchin Congress and in the press. Some argue that
the US should not engage in such activities at all. Others accept the need for covert action in certain situations overseas, but question whether such operations should be conducted by the same service or organization alsofor the clandestine collection ofspionage.
Except perhaps for large-scale paramilitary activities, it is unlikely that any US government will actually denyapability for conducting covert action operations, though it may be necessary for the US to limit the actual conduct of such operations for some time to come.
A theoretical case can bo made for the separation
of covert action from clandestine collection on the grounds
that tho former should not contaminate the latter.
addition, it has been argued that personnel in the
destine collection service might be able to
-n
better cover and security if they were not involved in
inherently less secure covert
j
On the other hand, there are several strong practical arguments against separationi
Clandestine collection and covert action are very closely related, often involving the same agents. Clandestine collection suggests theolitical situation; covert action provides the means to exploit these vulnerabilities.
are clandestine activities and can use the same support structure to provide cover positions abroad, communications facilities, budget and audit staffs,and personnel. Duplication would be expensive.
the two together provides the United
States with one representative to meet with the intelligence services of other countries, thus reducinginimum the abilities of those countries to play off against one another several representatives of the United States.
senior government officer can be heldfor both typos of activities so that thetne NSCi and the Congress have only one official with whom they must doal on clandestine activity. To have two such officials, one for each activity, would create involved coordination problems in the best of circumstances and constant argument in the worst.
The two activities appear to belong within the same organization for the reasons given above. This paper will not review in detail92 period, when titers were two separate organizations, but itoted that virtually every professional intelligence officer who lived through this period and emerged to serve in the unified service haseturn to that earlier arrangoment.
Assuming the Clandestine Service remains onethe question remains where in the government it
should be housed. There appear to be three options: under the Department of State, under the Department of Defense, or under CIA.
Placement in the Department of State. Just how the department would react touggestion or how it would include the service organizationally is difficult to judge. There are the following advantages:
of covert action should be easier.Planning would be easier.
Cover would De facilitated. Clandestine service officers would also be Foreign Service Officers. Field assignments would be easier and probably more rational.
There would be educational gain on both sides. The FSO would come to better understand the methodologies of the CS. The CS officer, in turn, wouldider educationroader knowledge of foreign
There are also disadvantages:
Foreign Service Officer would find itto accept the missions and methods of the CS.
The FSO views his role as one of reporting,and policy-implementation in the diplomatic world. He would resent the fully integrated CS officor whose
efforts in espionage might embarrass the diplomatic service and who would have separate duties and separate communications channels.
There wouldendency to restrain the CS from carrying out its activities because these might endanger diplomatic equities of the United States. on independent reporting from the field would be harder to resist.
There would be great difficulties ineparate line of command, separate communications
channels and the degree of compartmontation*
to the conduct of clandestine
e
would present problems since it would
be difficult to hide tne CS budget within that of
State
-
* "Compartmantation"onaept central to the eeoure conduct of olandeetine activity which, in taw, reets on another concept: "need to know." Under it, acoeee to eeneitive information ie reetrioted to those who need it to dieoharge their epeaifio responsibilities, with no one being automatically entitled to suchby virtue of other coneida rations such as
rank.
Placement in the Department of Defense. At first blush thisore logical choice. The Defense Department includes intelligence organizations, the
military services are traditionally prime customers of Intelligence, and the Defense Departmentarge organization with many functions in which the Clandestine Service could be sequestered.
Advantages:
CS officer couldivilian employee of the Department of Defense. This cover is adequate in the United States and does not pose the problemsin State Department integration.
of the support now available to the
in CIA is available in the Defense
'lblHWStrs IS)
c
Current close working relationships between the CS and the Department of State would be weakened.
The ability of the Clandestine Service to serve the production elements of CIA would diminish, since there would be increased emphasis on department military It would bo more difficult toalanced intelligence collection effort directed atgoals.
It is doubtful thut much saving would be effected through joint budgeting. CIA's current flexibility in the use of funds would disappear if the CS had to adopt more restrictive defense procedures.
Continued Subordination to CIA
Against the arguments for transfer elsewhere must be considered tho advantages of leaving the Clandestine Service within CIA.
First, it can be argued that the CS would lose some, or most of its "objectivity"ollector ofshould it be moved into eitner of the two large customer organizations. radition has developed in the Clandestine Service that it serves everyonethe Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, other departmental secretaries, the working Foreign Service Officer, his counterpart in the military and any other US Government officeegitimate need forprocured information. While it serves these customers, its primary responsibility to the Presidont and the NSC keeps the CS focused on national objectivos.
Second, the clandestine service is now supported by the rest of CIA. CIA's Directorate of Administration provides the CS with communications assistance, physical security for its personnel and its buildings, computers and other data storage, transportation, the recruitment and retirement of itsost of housekeeping advantages,ink to the administrations of other departments and agencies. The Intelligence Directorate provides the CS with finished intelligence papers to be used by the CS and with foreign intelligence services. It also provides guidance for the collection ofguidance and assistance in relationships with other deportmentsparticularly in communicationsnique exchange of ideas onpolitical, economic, and military events
In return, the CS supports other elements of the Central Intelligence Agency. Its reportsajor input to the Intelligence Directorate,
If the Clandestine Service is to be placedthan in CIA, it will be necessary to develop such support either within the Clandestine Service itself or within the host US department. In short it is probably best to leave the CS where it is.
DCIs AND THEIR MANAGEMENT OP THE COXMUKITY
McCone saw himself as Presidential advisor, and found
seful instrument for that purpose.* Raborn
only in office fourteen months. Helms concentrated on
Faced withewildering array of functions and organizations, each DCI has chosen to concentrateart of his responsibilities. Dulles saw himself primarily as director of the Government's covert ani,
the management of the Agency; under President
he functioned to some extent as advisor but
2
asserting his authority over the Community.
appeared in the short time he served to be putting
Community role first. Colby has sought to give equal weight to his Community and Agency responsibilities. More broadly, he has sought to bind both thesetogether, across collection, production, and resource management, through the concepts of the National Intelligence Officer (NIO) and the Key Intelligence Question (kiq).
* Only HaCone chose to do battle with Defense onmatters, and even he was not notably success-ful.
- 49 -
SEhfiET
0
The Schlesingor studyttemptedthe role of the DCI with two statedmoney and improving the product. Itpossiblo organizational/managerialthe Community, some quite radical, and analyzedterms of the bureaucratic equities andinvolved. As noted above, theof1 ultimately selected theof these options, one that might be"status quo plus." The DCI was to go on wearinghats and was to receive limited additionalin thu resource field. He was to havestaff for managing the Community, andto be created by which the assessment ofconsumers could be brought to bear on
73
x
Whether under Holms, who did not feel he had
Presidential backing necessary to carry out the
intent of tho directive, or under Schlesinger, who set about to implement the plan he helped write in athat set his newly formed Community staff inbittor opposition to his own CIA, or under Colby, who has been too involved in dealing with the external difficulties he inhorited to give full attention to the problem, tho directive only marginally changed power relationships and therefore solved little.
To the two objectivoa pursued by Schlesinger, recent events have added two more: the need to build effective internal and external oversight, and the need to aevelop public confidence in the effectiveness of intelligence that will permit it to function.
DOES THE COMMUNITYANAGER?
No DCI or anyone within Defense, before the Schlesinger study, considered that his Intelligence Communityincluded making recommendations on all the various resource questions arising within the Intelligence Community, should there beole at all?
The need for an effective overall management mechanism in the Intelligence Community was clearly recognized in1 Schlesinger study; the need is no less important today. The Intelligence CommunityS is larger and vastly more complex and sophisticated than Evolving technology is increasing, not reducing, both the need for effective centralover all intelligence and the difficulty of that management task. In addition, the size of the Intelligence Community and the demonstrable need to balance themade by all of the various components argue stronglyoader. The compartmentation which characterizes many individual intelligence programsthe likelihood of unnecessary duplication of This requirespecial effort be made to
insure that someone in the Community, who isabout all of the programs, coordinates theand use of rosources. There are signs that if the Exocutive Branch cannot find an effective way to carry out this responsibility, the Congress will try its hand.
The question, in our view, is not whether there ought to be some such role within the Community, but rather how that role should be defined, how it should be exercised, and by whom. On some elements of the role there is probably little disagreement. Most would agree, for example, that one individual shouldotal Community budget to Congress and help defend what has been agreed to, and there would be little quarrel over the need for someone tonified recommendation on Intelligence Community resource requirements to the President. There is, however, little agreement within the Community that tho DCI, the statutory hoad of on agency in his own right, shouldignificant role in the decision-making processes of other intelligence programs for which he has no legal responsibility in other than the staff capacity in which he now serves.
The DCI5
As Presidential advisor, the DCI has always beenremoved from the President he is supposed to advise. his separation is increased by the fact that the current DCI is head of an agency underattack for "improprieties." If the position of the DCI as manager of national intelligence was seen1 as too weak to accomplish the job, that position is even weaker relative to his problems today.
PART III THE FUTURE ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT OF THE INTELLIGENCE COiillUNITY
Based on the analysis presented in preceding sections, this section outlines three basic approaches to effecting necessary changes in the currentarrangements and organizational structure of the Intelligence Community: creating an independentnational intelligence agency; placing allcomponents now independent of departmental control within the Department of Defense; andon reordering the office of the DCI.
We find the first two approaches create more problems than they solve, and hence reject both in favor of the third: building an intelligencewhich has both independent and departmentalbut is under an independent authority.
When one goes through the gate of this third approach, however, the path immediately forks: One fork follows the path of separating the substantive and the resource management responsibilities now combined in the Office of the present DCI; the other keeps them combined. For reasons explained in our argument, we opt for the latter.
Having concluded that the US intelligenceought to be presided over by an independent senior official who is (in all senses) the nation's principal foreign intelligence officer, we set forth
the conditions under which this officer can boand propose some new organizational concepts for making him so. Change is not suggested for the sake of bureaucratic neatness. Rather, it is proposed to bring about improvements in the quality and efficency of the American intelligence process.
BASIC APPROACHES TO COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION
The number of possible organizationalinfinite. Practical considerations, includingand weight of Defense Department interests,this range to three basic approaches. Thein collaboration with Congress,
Transfer most intelligence activities out of the Department of Defenseeconstituted andCentral Intelligence Agency, responsible for servicing the fundamental intelligence needs of both the nation's civilian and its military leadership.
bility for effective coordination of all American in-
Absorb the Central Intelligence Agency within the Department of Defense, eliminating the DCI's role as it has been conceived7 and placing responsi-
telligenceeputy Secretary of Defense forwho would absorb the Community responsibilities now exercised by the DCI, as well as those exercised by the present Assistant Secretary of
Vrs IS!
Leave mostly unchanged the division of labor between Defense and CIA which has evolved7 and, instead, focus on the office of the Director of Central Intelligence; modifying that office, and its authorities, in ways that will enhance the DCI's ability toore effective role In contributing to the overall effectiveness of the Intelligence Community, and at tho same time reducing his direct involvement in managing CIA.
The Monolithic Solution
The first of these basic approaches was considered in the Schlesinger study. It would involve consolidating
one individual responsible to the President or the National Security Council. This approach is superficially appealing in that it would create an organization with control over all aspects of the intelligence process, establishing the preconditions for solution of theproblems outlined above. One man could be heldfor rationalizing existing structures, creating effective management processos, and getting results. There would bo far fewer barriers to effective decision making across the Community, and the head of this newwould have effective authority to resolve those that did arise.
For several reasons, however, we believe this basic approach is unsound. First, we doubt Defense could be
persuaded to give up all control over thenow conducted within Defense. Militarywho are entrusted with our nation's defensea measure of control over their "eyes andpeacetime as well as wartime. If all existingintelligence organizations were toingle head, we believe that manyand outside of Defense could arguearallel though perhaps smallerapparatus would need to be reconstitutedDefense Department control. Second, overterm (and probably for many years to come)needs of the programs now carried out in
but incorporated by this approachewprobably only be met by military personnel,
cept at extraordinary cost. Thus, some continuing
fense involvement would be required in any event. most fundamentally, there is the political
We doubt either the President or congress could agree to
"Tl
the establishmentery large organization that
I
feel certain would be widely characterized,
unfairly,hreat to civil liberties.
The Defense Solution
We have argued that there shouldtrong overall leadership function exercised within theCommunity. The alternative discussed above is one extreme approach toward meeting this objective. At the other end of the spectrum, it can be argued that this responsibility should be lodged not within anintelligence agency but within the Department
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of Defense- The CIA program would in effect become part of the Defense intelligence program and budget, CIA would no longer be an independent agency and the DCI's role as Community leader would be eliminated in favor of an appropriate Defense official- After all, as has been pointed out many times, the bulk of the dollar resources in the Intelligence Community already belong to Defense.
This second basic approach also would allow control over all US intelligence to be consolidated in the hands of one individual, though it is questionable how real such control would be unless all existing intelligence organizations were placed under his line commanda difficult move that would be strongly resisted within Defense.
There are, however, more fundamental disadvantages to this approach. First, we do not believeiscipline would receive the attention it ought to have in Defense, where it always has been and always will be legitimately regardedupport Quality in intelligence, as in other matters, can best be achieved by an organization which regards this as its sole mission.
Second, and even more important, this approach would effectively repeal7 Act's most basic provision with respect to intelligence: placing the correlation and analysis function in an independent agency. We doubt anyone would seriously advocate this
basic change since the need for independent intelligence appraisal seems well accepted everywhere.
The argument for an independent CIA is based on tho need in policy councils for "objective" intelligence on which to base the discussion of policy issues. CIA does not necessarily perceive truth more cloarly than others do. Nonetheless its views can bo communicated directly to the ultimate decision makers without being influenced by departmental superiors who have otheron which these intelligence judgments willimpact, orifferent world view.
Q it
If CIA were integrated into Defense,substantive independence would not be easy. Astipulate that the DCI,ofensecontinue to report to the National Securityor even the President on ell but resourcewould be similar to the arrangements underJoint Chiefs of Staff now report independently
the President. But this independence, ovon ifby law, would be difficult to maintain.
One early task of the nowly created Deputyfor Intelligence would certainly be to examine and rationalize the diverse production elements for which he would nowesponsibility. Resource and other pressures would make sensible an effort to combine the existing DIA and Service production organizations with the newly transferred DDI androduction entities.
We doubt this process could be completed without perhaps irreparable damage to the capabilities of the CIAentities and to their independence of view.
There would also be other statutory and bureaucratic problems: different legal authorities,ould need to be made consistent with other Defense authorities or explicitly excluded from them if what is now CIA is tolexible instrument.
A National-Departmental Balance
The third basicay to assert greater control over the whole intelligence process while loaving both Defense and CIA in the intelligence businessseems to us the only practical one. The fundamental political and substantive problems described above preclude classical organizational solutions placing command and control over all or most intelligencein one individual, either the Director of Central Intelligence or an appropriate Defense Department official.
Moreover, there are cogent argumonts for theexistence of an independent intelligencenot subject to the control of any other lineor agency.
At the same time, the Department of Defense, charged with responsibility for defending the nation,easure of control over importantprocessing and other intelligence activities in which CIA alsoajor continuing interest.
seorji'i
The key to successful implementation of thisapproach is structuring the office of the DCIits holder can discharge the responsibilitiesleadership without adversely affectinginterests of the Departments of State The DCI clearlytronger voicemaking on fundamental issues in the At the same time, individual programDefense need to retain considerable latitude andin the conduct of day-to-day operations. can be met by increasing the DCI's voice inwhich determine how resourcesmoney
peopleill be allocated in the Community,an independent CIA and continuing
responsibility for actual operation of most
programs.
A CRITICAL CHOICE
If the President and the Congress opt for this third approach, they will soon find themselves at a
fork with two diverging paths leading to quite different future Intelligence Communities.
The Act7 established the DCI, and the CIA, primarily toet of substantive to "correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security." Over time, the DCI that the Act created came to be acknowledged as the nation's principal foreign intelligence officer. His orientation in this sphere was primarily toward sub-
stance! the collection of intelligence, and the synthesis of all information available to the USinto objective and comprehensive appreciations and estimates. As the techniques and instruments of technological collection became more complex and costly, however, the DCX was inevitably drawn into basic issues of resource allocation and rosource management. This process was gradual and,arge extent, unplanned.
Part II of this paper explained how and why the foundations Congress laid7 are not adequate to boar the structure that has been erected upon them. It devoted particular attention to explaining why the office of the DCI, as now constituted, is ill-equipped to discharge the substantive and especially the resource management responsibilities with which he is now vested. If structural reform is to be grounded on altering the DCI's role andrucial decision has to be made, namely whether:
The DCI is to be the true head of the Community in both sonses;o be responsibleajor way for stewardship of the resources this nation devotes to intelligence and, simultaneously, to be the nation's principal substantive foreignofficer, or
The substantive and rosource managementare to be split, with the DCI beingby two senior officers; one chargedwith resource management and the other with substantive responsibilities.
If the lattor decision is made, one of thesewould be concerned with broad managementin the Intelligence Community but not withsupport to high-level consumers. Ho might be called the Intelligence Comptroller and would be provided strong authority over resource matters. Funds for all Community programs would be appropriated to the Comptroller; he would use an Executive Committeeto seek Community guidance and counsel, and to arrive at major policy decisions on programs. The DCI would remain the senior substantive officer.
The principal advantage of this approach derives from the division of responsibility for the management and substantive functions. The responsibilities of each position would bo spelled out in law. omptroller would find it easier to be impartial in the Community, since it could not be argued that he was favoring his own production components, or the collection systems which support thorn, at the expense of others. ull time resource manager could give morenot only to problems within the Intelligence Community but also to the presentation and defense of that Community's budget before Congress. Finally,these positions would be simplified since there would be no need to find an executive who couldequally well both sets of responsibilities.
There are, however, major disadvantages. This approach would create two Community leaders. Conflict between them would be inevitable as they tried, from
the quite different perspectives of substance andmanagement, to influence major decisions within the Community. Although this conflict might helpthe issues surrounding major policy questions, it would crystallize over the issue of who was the Government's principal intelligence officer: theor the DCI. Which one wouldember of the NSC or attend its meetings? Would both? The Comptroller would have little to contribute to substantive NSCbut his position would be undercut if theofficer {the DCI) attended NSC meetings and he did not.
Furthermore, without substantive background or his own substantive staff, the Comptroller would be ill-equipped to evaluate the qualitative contribution of analytic approaches or collection systems competing for scarce resources, or to adjudicate disputes over such issues between Community components withresponsibilities.
Any Comptroller would be strongly tempted tohis own substantive capability in order to do his resourceemptation to which some Comptroller would be bound to succumb, thus starting down theslope of redundant duplication.
The basic problem is that the intelligence process is seamless, and divorcing resource questions from
stance does inevitable damage to the adequacy of the Community's response to both. There aro betteroutlined below, which will achieve theof this concept while minimizing itscosts. It is worth noting that ourhore supports one of the most fundamentalof1 Schlesinger studythe need to combine responsibility for leadership on both substantive andmanagement issues within the Intelligencein one individual.
For these reasons, we believe the path of separating the substantive and resource responsibilities of the DCI, divesting him of the former so that he may betterthe latter,lind alleytemptingly simple on first inspection but leadingituation even worse than that which now exists and which clearlyfundamental improvement.
THE PREFERRED PATH
If we stay within our third basic approach bat follow the path of keeping substantive and resource management responsibilities combined, there are two broad options for restructuring the office of the DCI. They would lead to two quite different DCIs in the future.
The firat optionCI with Una responsibility over CIAtaff role with respect
- 64 -
STORE!
to the balanoe of the Intelligence Community, as now. In appearanae, thie would much resemble presentbut it would differ from them in severalrespects. Thie DCI'e ability to influence decision making on certain important issues would be enhanced by creation of an Executive Committee, under hisfor the Consolidated Cryptologic Program, along the lines of the present arrangement with respect to the HBP. Bis line responsibility for management of CIA would be reduced somewhat by creationtatutory civilian deputy director charged with thie responsibility. This approach is discussed as Option One below.
The second option would eliminate the DCI's direct responsibility for day-to-day management of the CIA but materially enhance hie authority over the allocation of resources to all elements of the Intelligence Community and giveuch stronger voice over the Communityhole.
Under both options we propose that the DCI
ember of tho NSC. This would reconfirm
position as senior advisor to the President on major intelligence issues and increase his statureis the Secretaries of State and Defense.
Implementation of the first option would require relatively minor adjustments to the current structure. These could be carried out with only slightto existing legislation. Achievement of the
skgrkt
second option would require considerable effort; it involves fundamental change, and wouldajor revision of the intelligence portions of the National Security Act7 and the CIA Act
OPTION ONE
This option is based upon the promise that it is not feasible to increase substantially the DCI's legal authority with respect to resource matters within the Intelligence Community, but that steps can be taken to improve his ability to exercise tho Community aspects of his responsibilities and to clarify responsibility for management of the CIA. The following steps would strengthen the system at the points we believe are weakesti
dapt the Rockefeller Commission recommendationeputy director of CIA responsible for lineby amending the Act to provide the DCI with twoivilian to run CIAilitary officer to preside over the Community. Mako theember of the NSC. Amend7 Act to clarify the DCI's responsibilities within the Intelligence Community, and to establish the new Deputy DCI's managementfor CIA. Those changes would strengthen the DCI's hand intaff role with respect to resourco issues in tho Intelligence Community, and it would help to ease tho management problem within CIA presentedCI who personally wears two hats.
By statute, specify the relationship between the NSC and tho National command Authority.
Charge the DCI with providing the President each year an evaluation of the contributions made by various collection systems to the solution of intelligence This proposed annual evaluation would supplement the roport to the President required under the1 letter calling for an independent DCI recommendation on tho overall Intelligence Community Budget.* Include language in the amended act establishing the DCI's staff responsibility to tho President for Intelligence Community resource matters. This point is discussed at greater length in Annex G.
Create an Executive Committee for overall policy direction and budgetary oversight of the Consolidated Cryptologic Program, the largest and most Importantprogram in which the DCI now has no formalrole. As in tho case of the NRP, the DCI should chair the ExCom, but final decision-making authority would of course be retained in Defense. White House and JCS representation on the ExCom would be highly desirable.
* It would have the effect of suggesting to Defense and to the President (OMB) the desirability of oertainabout Intelligence Community resource matters without, however, significantly extending the DCI's direct role in decision making.
ational/Tnctical Planning committee chaired by the DCI's military deputy with appropriate
Defense representation. Charge it with considering how to make better use of centrally-managed national collection to support tactical requirements and with developing plans for the transition of the national intelligence system from peace to war.
Establish an Intelligence Coordinating Committee to deal with problems between the Intelligence Community and the Department of State other than in the production area. This Committee would be chaired by the DCI and wouldenior State Department officer at the Under Secretary level. Herehito House presence would be desirable.
Retain the USIB, under the DCI, for national intelligence production and for such other functions of USIB as are not assigned to the other bodiesin these recommendations. Re-examine itsin the light of these changes.
Make the DCI Chairman of the National Security Council Intelligence Committee. The DCI needs consumer reaction and no consumer has ever systematically provided it.
Under this option, the statutory relationship of the DCI to CIA would remain unchanged, but he would be fresd to the extent he permitted himself from hisfor administering CIA. The DCI would be
odest increase in authority within thehe would be provided better machinery forcommunity activities, and he would be given an opportunity to increase his influence in the management of the CCP.
Implementation of this option would improve inways the overall management arrangements which currently exist within the Intelligence Community. We are convinced, however, that the changes needed are more fundamental than thoss reflected in this option, and that an opportunity for effecting such basic changes now exists. Our suggestions for more of these basic changes are spelled out, in considerable detail, in our second
OPTION TWO
This option i3 based on the premise that it is feasible to make major changes in the DCI's legaland, hence, to consider stepsmore drastic than those outlined abovewhich would get to tho root of the problems and structural weaknesses that now inhibit the effectiveness and efficiency of the US Government's intelligence system.
Necessary Conditions
If the DCI is to have the authority he needs, there are three necessary conditions.
The first is delicato and double-edged. The DCI must have, and be known to have, the President'sand support. He should have, and be seen to have, regular, frequent access to the Oval Office. While it is essentialCI have the President's continuing confidence and support, it is equallythat the DCI's office neither be, nor appear to be, politicized. The institutional organization and physical location of his office should be fixeday which emphasizes that the DCI supports the Office of the Presidency.
Secondly, the scope of the DCI's authority should be defined in statute. Even if the DCI does enjoy the relationship with tho President described above, it is reasonable to expect that the Secretaries of State and Defense will also have the President's confidence and even greater access to him. If this is indeed tha case, they will readily outweigh the DCI unless his position is buttressedtronger framework of statutory authority than that which now supports him. The main girder of this framework should be resource management. The stronger the DCI's voice in theof funds, the easier it will be for him to impose rationality on other aspects of his job.
Thirdly, our intelligence system must meet not only the national level requirements of the President and the members of tho NSC, but also the departmental requirements of the Secretaries of State, Treasury,
and Defense, the other principal officers of state, and their staffs. Tho relationship between the head of the Intelligence Community and the Secretary of Defense is of particular importance. Their respective interests must bo, and be seen to be, congruent rather than competitive or divergent. This relationship should bo sot forthtatute which clarifies theirroles in tho management of intelligence andtheir subordinates to cooperate rather than compete.
THE DGI APPROACH
After carefully considering other alternatives, we are convinced that tho best answer to tho problemsby this study lios in making certain major changes in the nature and functions of the office of the Director of Central Intelligence. For the purpose of this paper, we propose to call this new officor the Director General of Intelligence, or DGI.* We would put him at the apexramework which provides him with stronger statutory authority over the Community than that of the present DCI but which places him at
The beet title for thie officer would probably be the Director of national Intelligence. That title, however, was used in1 Sohleeinger Report to label adifferent from that which ae are here propoeing (and, in fact, one we epeoifioally recommend against adopting, for reasons explained on pages Henoe to minimize the risk of aonfusion between our recommendation and that of1 report, we label our concept with thetitle.
a greater distance from CIA. The DGI approachTwo) entails:
A new concept for the funding of mostprogramsi
A new concept for the DGI's role in relation to the Intelligence Community;
A new concept of the DGI's relationship to the Department of Defense and to major collection programs;
A new concept of the relationship between the DGI and the CIA.
In carrying out his responsibilities, the DGI would be supportedubstantive staff andtaff to assist him in the critical functions of comptrollership, collection management, and performance evaluation. This last function is of particular importance since regular careful review of the Intelligence Community product and its responsiveness to consumer needs is central to effective community management. The evaluation function would also extend to the effectiveness of the various communityin contributing to the product, particularly the expensive and complex technical collection systems.
We also propose that the DGItrongwith access to the entire Community. This organization would put the DGIosition to exercise
T
SECRET
effective internal oversight, in cooperation withexternal oversight organs are created.
The DGI's Resource Controls
In resource management, our concept is simply stated, although we are fully aware that itajor step. It ia that the bulk of the intelligence budget now appropriated to Defense and CIA be instead appropriat to the DGI for further allocation to the various existing program managers in the Community.* At the same time, the present DCI's responsibility for direct management of the CIA would be eliminated. New legislation would of course be required. This legislation should provide for the DGI, in handling these larger funds, as much of the fiscal flexibility given the DCI by the CIA Act9 as politically feasible if the major technical collection programs are to be efficiently managed.
The DGI and the Community
This option would not involve placing operational control over all community programs in the DGI or, in the case of most Defense programs, moving those programs out of the Department. As noted above, the concept of
Suoh an arrangement has been effectively employed before During, for example, certain funds wereto the Director of the Office of Economicbut then delegated to the Department of Labor for actual program operation.
A CONCEPT OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PROCESS
a unitary command structure for intelligence, either under an independent office or within Defense, has been considered and rejected. Rather, in this new concept, the DCI would exchange hie preoent powero (variously to command, adviee, and persuade) for the DCI'e moreand less oonspiauous management powers at key points in the structure.
As noted above, there are variousresource managers, collectors, producers, andintelligence. In the simplest terms theseare intor-linked as followsi funds flow frommanager to collector and producer; finishedflows from producer to user; the userwhether his needs have been met andneeds to resource managers and producers;producers state new requirements toor resource managers provide funds tocollection
i
this option, the DGI would provide policy
and would work to ensure an efficient,and coordinated community program. He would pursue this objective without exercising direct lineover any of the operational elements in thebut instead indirectly, by regulating the linkages among these elements (see sketch), largely through chairmanship of several boards and committees. The DGI's control over the allocation of funds would ensure that tho decisions of theso boards were implemented.
The DGI's Relationship to the Department of Defense
A proposal to transfer substantial funds andfrom Defense to the DGI will no doubt meet The success of this approach will depend upon the establishmentew relationship between the DGI and the Secretary of Defense, basedecognition of tho impact of planning for war on intelligence operations in peacetime. As has been noted, the failure to deal with this problem has frustrated the creationruly national intelligence system for almost three decades. We propose now to turn the question upside down, to consider the question from the wartime end rather than, as wc haverom the peacetime one. The inherentin the current structure might be resolved by new legislation as follows:
The DGI shallember of the nationalCounail responsible to the President,that in the event of major hostilities he shall be responsible to the President through the Secretary of Defense, unless the President directs otherwise. When he ia subordinate to the Secretary of Defense, he ehall retain the right to render substantive assessmentsto the President.
ormulation would help to cause the interests of the Secretary of Defense and DGI to converge where they are now adversary. The Secretary would be more
interested in seeing that the DGI trongsystem in peacetime, while the DGI would be more concerned that tha system be designed to meetneeds in peace or war. The DGI would be deart of the National Command System, and his relationship to the National Command Authority would be clearly established. In the event of war the entire system, including the DGI, would theoretically move under the Secretary of Defense's authoritynit with less disruption of internal command mechanisms than would take place under such understandings as now exist.
Much more important in today's world, thiswould help open the door to developmentore coherent overall intelligence system,nitary budget, in peace. This should, over the long run, make possible improvements in the ultimate quality of the intelligence product at lower overall cost. At the same time, the Congress could be assured that the peacetime DGI was in fact independent of departmental interests.
This arrangement would work to Defense's net gain. Tho same disagreements that have prevented developmentruly national intelligence system hove alsodevelopment of the military intelligence system. With the DGI clearly responsible both for wartimeof the military and for effective organization of that support in peace (in collaboration witherious problem for military planners could be reduced.
Defense could also expect national intelligenceto be more responsive to its needs.
The extent to which the intelligence structure can be rationalised and its management strengthened depend* directly on the degree to which the DGI-Defense rela-tionehip can be clarified and made compatible. in this relationship ehould ultimately be reflected in the final product of intelligence.
Spocific Problem Areas
Wo have discussed above the broader question of the DGI's relations with Defense. There remain,more specific questions relating to the two major technical collection systems under Defense management.
National Reconnaissance Program. GI armed with budgetary powersetter defined relationship with Defense will beosition to manage technicalmore efficiently, to make more sensible choices, and to respond more flexibly to new requirements. arrangements will bo needed, however, to link him with technical program managers. The current operational structure for the National Reconnaissance Program is the National Reconnaissance Office. The NHO in its current form is an anomalous patchwork originally constitutederiod of bureaucratic strife. Competition within the NRO will not be as useful in the future as it has been in the past, and the coordination problems within a
structure designed to accommodate competition areincreasingly difficult. More important, the need for military commanders to derive direct support from satellite collection resources is becoming increasingly important, and it is questionable whether the current NRO organization, with the Under Secretary of the Air Force as director, is well suited to meet this problem.
An alternative to present practice would be tothe NRO as an integrated, operationaljointly staffed by elements of the Department of Defense and CIA. In this arrangementRO would become the line manager of the various NRP programs. This would create an organization in some ways analogous to NSA, which has underlear line of command over the CCP. This organizational structure for the NRO has appeal from the point of view of streamlined management and tight, coherent program direction. It wouldmeet the increasing insistence of Congress on efficient use of resources and elimination of neodless duplication. It would also be well suited for dealing with the increasing complexity and growing diversity of consumers, which is likely to occur as direct support to military commanders becomes more substantial.
However, an integrated operating organization of this type raises the problem of appropriatelocation. tructure would probably beif not totally infeasible, as an element of the Secretary of Defense's staff. For different rea-
S^UsT
sons, establishing such an organization within one of the three Services wouldumber of serious If the role of the DCI were to be changedand the Intelligence Communityetter location for the NRO might be found.
In considering the future organizational location of the NRO, an important problem associated with the funding of the NRP should be discussed. Theand expenditure of NRP funds isniquen anomalous process.
There would in fact be serious penalities indollar efficiency, and ultimately, performance if this privileged status of the NRP were not preserved. On the other hand, it seems extremely unlikely with the current mood of Congress that such arrangementsew key senators and congressmen and certain Executive Branch officials will be allowed to continue outside the normally applicable statutes. Thus, in addition toa proper home for the National Reconnaissancea means for appropriating funds for the NRP must be established outside the normal Defenseprocess if an aggressive and effective National Reconnaissance Program is to be continued. This problem would obviously be solved by appropriating funds to the
DGI proposed under this option, if the DGI retained the flexible funding authorities given to tho DCI by the CIA Act Of
Consolidated Cryptologic Program. As noted,ives the Director, NSA authority over tho national SIG1NT system. This provides strong management for NSA and protects it from many of the bureaucratic pressures that affect other organizations of the Community. It also tends to isolate it from the Community, however, and to make itumber of ways difficult for amanager to handle.
NSA with its control over the serviceagencies is virtually self-contained, andseparated from the rest of the Community. This makes NSA the hair shirt of any DCI seeking to measure its effectiveness or to form balanced judgments as to its responsiveness to national needs.
For reasons valid in the past but less so today, NSA continues to be dominated by the military. It is controlled by Defense and most of its intercept work is still carried out by the service cryptologic agencies. Ovorall military influence is declining,
Nonetheless NSA remains moreto military requirements than to the growing
cannot bo obtained without much greater access to the details of its operations.
It seems unlikely that the DGI can succeed where all DCIs have been frustrated unless heajor voice in the management and funding of the CCP. In the context of the other arrangements proposed in Option Two, it seems logical to give himoice. Under this option the CCP as well as the NRP would be funded through the DGI, and we propose that theof the NRP EXCOM, chaired by the DGI, be extended to covor the CCP. If the DGI had these powers, information and responsiveness would follow.
DGI and the CIA
3
reatly increased role forin Community matters, we also recommend a
change in his relationship to CIA. In fact, we
a statutory separation.
f
Divesting the DCI of direct management for CIA has been suggested before and rejected, largely because of arguments such as the following:
The National Security Act would have to be changed.
The President could no longer look to one man for both intelligence and covert action support.
DCI, separated from the resources of CIA, wouldubstantial staff.
The first of these reasons is no longer valid since the National Security Act may be revised in any event. The second is not necossarily true. The third has merit, but it is not byundamental argument forthe status quo.
On the other hand, there are strong reasons for separating the proposed DGI from the CIA:
DCI has important responsibilities for managing the whole Intelligence Community,which would bo increased under the DGI concept.
The DCI's ability to exercise his Communityhas long been complicated by his concurrent role as the administrative head of CIA. Within theitself, he is seon as the head of one Community component with its own vested interests in certain programs and policies. Furthermore, the time andthe day-to-day management of CIA inevitably requires detracts from the time available to the DCI for concentration on Community problems. In point of fact, no DCI over the pastears has been able to do full justice to both sets of responsibilities.
the new DGI's overall management and budgetary role is to be considerably largor than that of the present DCI, his management span must be reduced in other ways.
CIA itself has become the subject ofcriticism. Separating the new DGI from direct management responsibility for CIA (or its successor) would enable him to concentrate on his newwithout encumbering legacies from pastor the political onus of being the nation's chief "spymaster."
In light of the above, under this option theCIA would be separated by law, and the CIA wouldthe Foreign Intelligence Agency*iecedesigned to stress the break with theoperating head, the Director of the FIA, wouldby the President and confirmed by the
By increasing the DGI's power over the
while divesting him of operating responsibility for
FIA, we believe greater efficiency and politicalcan be obtained. Two issues however
mediately
whom should the Director of the FIAspecifically, should he report directly to the
NSC (as does the presentr should he report to the NSC through the DGI,ember of the NSC?
* Hereafter, in speaking of the future, we will use the term DGI and PlAj in speaking of the present and past, we will use DCI and CIA.
he DGI's staff mustubstantive group essentially similar to the present NIOs. Should
Schematic Sketch cf Optionour Variants
NSC
DGI*hH
CIAS
1 ciJA Huinan
ChlnHm
*
Tookoieol Collection
ProcotsM
AnSyw*
CoHkW
D/FIA
C|*5
cr.
NSC
^ off/our vmriemts,C,
it also include the production elements of CIA's DDI and DDS&T, on which the NIOs now heavily rely, or should these remain in the new FIA?
These two questions may appear to be separate, but they are actually intertwined. As stated, they may seem of small consequence, involving only niceties of bureaucratic subordination or protocol. This is not the case; for wrapped up in them are organizational and functional considerations of major importance.
There is no set of arrangements which will
accommodate all of these considerations. The
involved can be most clearly distinguished by
the two
3
jj>
IA subordinated to DGI;CIA analytic and production
-
VariantIA subordinated to DGI;retains CIA analytic and production capabilities.
Variant C: IA subordinated to NSC; DGICIA analytic and production capabilities.
Variant D: IA subordinated toIA retains CIA analytic and production capabilities.
In our view, only two of these four theoretical choices are viable. The arrangement under Variant A,
if the DGI were given the funding authority and other enhanced powers we propose, would approach thewe have already outlined and rejected above. The DGI of Variant D, on the other hand, would be too weak to be effective. IA with control of intelligence production and of clandestine operations, who was not required to report through the DGI to the NSC, could easily come to rival the latter as the Government's principal foreign intelligence officer.
nd C, however, are better balanced. They both provide workable, although quite different, structures for theIA relationship. Under both, the DGI would have tho personal staff discussed on pagebove, including an entity withsimilar to those of the present group ofIntelligence Officers.
Variant B. Under Variant B,IA would be subordinate to the DGI and report to the MSG through him. IA, in turn, would have direct control over all line functions of thi-IA, including its analytic and production elements.
This variant places major emphasis on effective management. It divests the DGI of responsibility for the day-to-day direction of the FIA and fixes that responsibility squarelyeparate official who would be accountable for the efficacy and propriety
-EGRET
of the FIA's activities.* At the same time, itfor thelear line of authority over the FIA, and hence over covert action, retains the present DCI's ability to respond to NSC requests, and minimizes the risk ofIA'sival to the DGI. Moreover, it keeps intact and independent the closely integrated collection, processing, and productionthat make CIA an important national asset.
The DGI's impartiality on substantive and resource issues would be less open to the challenges levied against the present "two-hatted" DCI. In thesphere, however, the DGI would need to draw heavily on FIA's production resources, both to develop positions independent of departmental views and to make informed decisions on resource issues.
But this would create problems. It would re-raise the question of his partiality, unless he significantly augmented his own staff's analytic and productiona move that would undercut the rationale for maintenance of the FIA's production organization.
Moreover, this DGI would have difficulty providing current intelligence for the President and the NSC. Thereignificant difference between national esti-
* In effect, the DGI becomes Admiral of the intelligence fleet andIA Captain of tte flagahip. If the flagship rune aground or goes off oourse, that isits Captain's reeponaibility.
niative assessments and national current intelligence, even though they serve the same customers, deal with similar questions, draw on the same intelligenceand are closely linked. Estimates can be producedmall coordinating staff, drawing on contributions from throughout the community. Current intelligence, however,arge integralcomplex procedures, and considerablesupport. The NIOs supervise the production offor tha DCI, but he needs the full analyticof the DDI ando produce current ould split these functionsmaking it difficult for the DGI to koep them in step.
Many of these problems would be eased ifIA were co-located at Langley. Theoperateuch smaller personal staff. subordinates could draw on the talents
resources of FIA analysts in the same building,
there would be minimal need for duplicative overhead support.
There are, however, at least two flaws in this Having the DGI and hio staff in the same building would make it difficult forIA to run his own ship. The more serious objection is that it would not appear to be muchhange. The statutory separation would be seen by many to be cosmetic,in effect, the present DCI's relationship to
CIA while greatly increasing his authority in other areas. This would especially be the case if DGIIA were both resident at Langley. Despite thesignificance of this variant's changes, itsof similarity to present arrangements might not make it politically acceptable at this time.
Variant C. Under Variant C,IAas does the present DCI, directly to thewhich the DGI wouldember) not to orDGI. CIA's present analytical and production
bilities would be incorporated into the office of
new DGI. The FIA would be explicitly limited to
nical and human collection, related processing,
search and development and supportand covert
tion. It would have no production role. The
would not usually attend meetings of the MSC or
This variant places major emphasis on political acceptability. It has two major advantages. First, itlearly recognizable change! the increase in the DGI's powers over the Communityin Option Two is balanced by an obviousin his authority over CIA. Second, it provides the DGI with the substantive staff he needs to meet his responsibilities as the President's seniorofficer and to assist him in his resourceand collection management responsibilities. Moreover, his responsibilities for current intelligence could readily be met.
SECRET
Under this variant, however, the DGI could not easily contend that he was impartial on substantive issues. The rest of the Intelligence Community would see tho DGI's analytic and production componentslosed corporation that paid little more than lip service to their views and their dissents. (As noted in Annex D, other elements of the Community do not accept CIA's present production as having morestanding than their own.) In fact, however, the DCI or the DGI will have to rely primarily on analysis that is not prepared for departmental This means the DGI must be "partial" to the independent organization created for his support.ould frankly recognize that thisis necessary, its impact on the other agencies of the Community somewhat mitigated by their right to dissent. At the same time, the DGI and hisstaff would be fully separated from the interests ofIA as well as other Community managers, and hence free to be genuinely impartial with respect to resource issues, the most important of whichto collection and processing. This change might be recognized by grouping the FlA's program with the NRO and the CCP under EXCOM management.
A major disadvantage of this variant would be the danger thatIA mightompetitor to the DGI. The DGI's membership on the NSC, his control of funds, and the status and access conferred by his position as the nation's principal substantive foreign
intelligence officer would put him in most respectsominant position overIA, but the latter would not be formally subordinated to him. Despite the DGI's formidable powers,IA's position as the nation's covert action officer would generate strong temptations to by-pass the DGI, especially in crises or on ultra-sensitive matters. Thebetween the DGI andIA under this variant would therefore be messier. It would, however, be more politically acceptable than that under Variant B.
There is another serious risk. If this variant is adopted, the present organizational integrity of CIA would be ruptured. It could then be argued that, with the independent production elements of CIAtransferred to the DGI, the formation of FIA would be unnecessary. The collection and processing elements ofould be transferred to Defense and theService to State. We believe there would bo serious damage to important national assets if this occurred. As mentioned elsewhere in this paper,longnd technical collectiondevelopment and operations to importantneodsundamental problem. as been andtrong positive force in this regard. Consolidating all technical collection in Defense wouldtep backward, leading to substantial long range losses and inefficiencies.
The Three Basic Approaches
Monolith
Balance
UndtrtX Defense
Divergent Paths
Resources and Substance Combined
Two: Strong DGI, Separate FIA
Four Variants
subordinated to NSC; DGI acquire CIA analytic and production
D
L^ordl-nated tolA/retains CIA^analytic and/ production capabilities
For tho reasons outlined above on, we consider the arguments against placing thoService under the Departments of State or Defense to be compelling.
We believe that the best approach to correcting the Intelligence Community's present structural flaws, and simultaneously solving other current problems, is to be found in Option Two, under eitherr variant C. Each of these, however, has greatand serious shortcomings. Which is the better choice, more likely to contribute to the net national interest of the United states,udgment call. How that call is mado hinges on the relative weights one assigns to the numerous considerations
Before proceeding to the specificneeded to implement Option Two, we believe it would be desirable to recapitulate the complicated argument which brings up to it. The sketch on the facing pageoad map for the reader.
RECOMMENDATION
If fundamental change could be attentral issue Current
political developments suggest that the NationalAct7 will be rewritten; our analysis of the Act and the intelligence structure it establishedus that it should be. It is not an exaggeration to observe that we are fast approaching an historical moment and associated unique opportunity to charter the Intelligence Community to meet future needs forintelligence support. It could be anotherears before events provide another Presidentomparable, opportunity.
On both substantive and tactical political grounds, we suggest consideration of legislation to establish the arrangements envisioned under the Option Two above. This proposal could serveoint of departure for constructive debate within the Executive Branch and ultimately the Congress on the future legal andbasis for the conduct of American intelligence.
In summary, we recommend the following stepsi
New legislation toCI separate from the FIA and toorking relationship between him and the Secretary of Defense. Make the DGI aof the NSC.
Provide the DGItaff capable ofthe substantive, coordination, resource management.
and evaluation functions outlinedheIntelligence Officers and the Intelligencestaff, reconstituted and strengthened. Under Variant C, the production elements of CIA/DDI andould be included as well.
Charge the DGI with preparationotalintelligence budget covering the FIA program, NRP, CCP, and portions of the GDIP. Appropriate funds for the programs covered by this budget to the DGI for reallocation, according to detailed procedures to be developed. Provide for DGI staff review of otherintelligence expenditures. Retain IRAC to advise the DGI on resource matters.
Charge the DGI with responsibility for better support of the needs of Defense in peace and especially in war through use of centrally coordinated collection programs, and with planning for the transfer ofassets to the Department of Defense in time of war. Charge Defense with cooperating in this endeavor by providing access, staff support, and qualityCharge the DGI withationalAactical Planning Committee, on which the JCS would be represented as the regulating mechanism for this program.
ew Foreign Intelligence Agency (FIA)irector appointed by tho President and confirmed by Congress. Place under him the present CIA minus the
secret
DGI'a staff. Under Variant B, he would beto the NSC through the DGI. under Variant C, he would be responsible to the NSC collectively.
Reconstitute EXCOM with the DGI in the chair and appropriately senior White House and Defenseofficials as members, including the Chairman of the JCS. Charge it with broad budgetary and policy guidance over the NRP and the CCP and, under Variant C, over the Foreign Intelligence Agency program.
Reorganize the NRO as an integratedjointly staffed by FIA and Defense.
the DGI Chairman of NSCIC, as in Option One.
As in Option One, establish an IntelligenceCommittee to regulate relations between the intelligence systom and State (except for substantive production).
Lastly, as in Option One, retain the USIB, under the DGI, for national intelligence production and for such other functions of USIB as are not assigned to the other bodies proposed in these recommendations. its membership in the light of these changes.
These changes add upelatively cleangiven the complexity of the matters involved.
We believe they would greatly improve tho management of US intelligence. We are fully aware that these recommendations are revolutionary as change goes in the buroaucratic world, and that they will meet strongin many quarters. In particular, the abilityGI to meet military needs has not been tested and will be suspect. Nevertheless, thoso are traumatic times. They create both the need and the opportunity for fundamental improvement.
GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (Army)
Atomic Energy Commission
Air Force Intelligence
Advanced Research Project A
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
Consolidated Cryptologic Program
Council of Economic Advisors
Central Intelligence Agency Programs
Committee on International Economic Policy
Central Intelligence Group
Communications Intelligence
Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation
Clandestine Service (CIA)
Deputy Director for Intelligence (CIA)
Deputy Director for Operations (CIA)
Deputy Director for Research and Engineering
(Department of Defense)
Deputy Director for Science and Technology (CIA)
Director, Foreign Intelligence Agency
Director General of Intelligence
Directorate of IntelligenceIntelligence Agency
Director, National Reconnaissance Office
Directorate of Operations (CIA)
Directorate of Operations/Management by Objectives
- 97 -
ET
Electronics Intelligence
Extended National Military Command center
Energy Research and Development Administration
National Reconnaissance Program Executive
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Foreign Broadcast Information Service
Foreign Intelligence Agency
Foreign Intelligence Report
Foreign Instrumentation Signals
3
Foreign Service
Foreign Technology Division (Air
GDIP General Defense Intelligence
i
3
ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic
INR Bureau of Intelligence and Research
of
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Key Intelligence Question (Derived by Director
of Central Intelligence, in consultation with the United States Intelligence Board, to identify key national-level intelligence questions to serveocus for the Intelligence Community's collection and production activities.)
IRAC Intelligence Resource Advisory Committee
MBO
Management by Objectives
NIE NIO NMIC NPIC NRO NRP NRP EXCOM
NSA NSC NSCIC NSCID
Command Authority ingle chain of command reaching from the President through the Secretary of Defense to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.)
National Intelligence Estimate National Intelligence Officer National Military Intelligence center National Photographic Interpretation Center National Reconnaissance Office National Reconnaissance Program
National Reconnaissance Program Executive Committee
National Security Agency National Security Council
National Security council Intelligence Committee National Security Council Intelligence Directive
if
3
5
ONE ONI OPC OSO OSS
of Management and Budget Office of National Estimates Office of Naval Intelligence Office of Policy Coordination (CIA) Office of Strategic Operations (CIA) Office of Strategic Services
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
Research and Development
Secretary of the Air Force, Special Projects
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
Signals Intelligence
United States Intelligence Board
World Federation of Trade Unions
Washington Special Action Group
3 3
x
I 1
HE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
The United States Government has anwhose shape and functions have beenby pragmatism and accident than by conscious This structure is sometimes callederm that is elusive, meansthings to different people, and is aof confusion. In the broadest sense, the"Intelligence Community" encompasses thoseof the US Government responsible for theand processing of intelligence Information, production of finished intelligence, the provision various kinds of intelligence support to the Execu- Branch (including, for example, covertsome moasure of support (largely in tho to the Congress. It is not easy toprecisely what components of the USare, or ought to be, considered part of that community."
Thereommon notion that the Intelligence Community can bo defined by the membership of the United States Intelligence Board, but the apparent simplicity of this approach is illusory. Init, one Immediately has to face the question of whether USIB consists of its full members (CIA, NSA, DIA, State/INR, and the Treasury, plus ERDA and
ther these plus the three military services' intelligence components, which are technically only observers atr this larger group plus those other entities which from time to time attend USIB meetings.
Attempting even the more limited task ofdefine the intelligence production communityleads onewamp. There isthat the principal producingCIA, INR, DIA, and the Service intelligence
ciesplus ancillary entities such as the AirTechnology Division, the Army's MissileAgency, and the Naval Intelligence After this point, however, distorting
73
rV
NSA, for example, ajor collector and
sor of intelligence information and has an
analytical capability. The latter, however, is
applied to an "all-source" environment since NSA is primarily keyed to signals intelligence. The rest of the Community, therefore, does not regard NSAroducer of finished intelligence in the political and strategic areas, though NSA is an importantof tactical Intelligence for the three military services.
ERDA (formerly part of AEC) is unique in away. ull member of USIB, ERDA neither
skcxft
collects intelligence norignificant analytical effort. It owes its Community membership to tho fact that itnique and exclusive body ofinformation and to the language of certainof the Atomic Energy Act
The FBI isember of the Intelligence Community, and of USIB, by virtue of itscounterespionage, andesser extent) law enforcement responsibilities in the nationalfield. The FBI does not perform any meaningful substantive intelligence analysis, however, nor does itajor role in collecting positive foreign intelligence.
Defining the Dofense Department productionposes other problems. One set lies in theof the relationship of DIA to:
The Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, JCS. (Opinions differ on whether the Director, DIA, is equally subordinate to both or subordinate to the former through the latter.)
The Assistant Secretary of Defense, who sits at the USIB table but whose right to sit there is debated.
The three Service intelligence components (the Office of Naval Intelligence, Assistant Chief
A-3
SKOttFT
of Staff, Intelligencend Air Force
Though Treasury isull member of USIB, many do not regard itember of the Intelligence Community. onsumer of intelligence. Treasury hasember of USIB by virtue of its increasingly important requirements forsupport. Though Treasury does both collect and analyze information in tho course of its business, opinions differ on whether what Treasury does is With the rising importance of economic considerations as matters of intrinsic intelligence concern, as well as key ingredients of many military and political intelligence judgments, this whole area is nowrocess of transitional flux.
The Department of State adds its own complexities. It is represented on USIB by its Bureau of Intelligence and Research. INR, however, is not regarded by many in State as being within the main stream of thethough tho current head of INR happens torusted, valued momber of the Secretary of State'sstaff andey role in assisting him in his dual capacities as Secretary of State and asAssistant. Also within the Department is the Foreign Service. The Intelligence Community regards the Foreign Servicerime collector of political
RET
and economic information; but many Foreign Servicewould be aghast at being included in anyone's definition of the "Intelligence Community."
The Intelligence Rosources Advisory Council (IRAC) includes another set of entities which are clearly part of the intelligence process and, therefore, meritas members of the Intelligence Community, even though IRAC's primary focus is resourcenot production or collection.
IRAC is chaired by the DCI and includes among its formal members the DDCI (representingheSecretary of DefenseMB's Associate Director for National Security and Internationaland the Department of State's Director of INR. The NSC Staff's Director for Intelligence Coordination, tho Director of DIA, and the Director of NSA alsoIRAC meetings but as observers, not full members. In addition, othersincluding the Director of NROalso usually attend the IRAC meetings. Collectively, those who attend IRAC meetings control almost all of the personnel and dollar resources associated with the United States intelligence establishment.
IRAC also has links intoommunity,heavy consumer of intelligence-related resources. Under the chairmanship of the Department of Defense's, IRAC has established an Intelligence Research
and Development Committee whose members include the heads of therganizations represented on IRAC, the Service Assistant Secretaries, the Diroctor of ARPA, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Telecommunications. Though these entities certainly fall outside usual definitions oft is nonetheless clear that theretrong bond of common concern and technical affinity tying these entities into that Community.
The above considerations demonstrate that there is not any single intelligence community easilyas such. Instead, we should recognize and frankly acknowledge that there are at least four "communities" with intelligence-related responsibilities andall of which interlock and overlap. These include:
a. The collectors of intelliger.ee information and providers of intelligence services. Thiswould include CIA's Directorate of Operations
(t)
and Commerce attaches, the military service attaches, elements of DIA, plus elements of ACSI, ONI, and AFIN (and of other DoD entitiesto the extent that they run collectionnd the FBI.
b. The analysts and producers of substantive intelligence. This community encompasses CIA'sof Intelligence and certain parts of its Di-
roctorate of Science and Technology, elements of DIA and the three service intelligence agencies, other Dofense Department components SAin sometate/INR, and occasionally ERDA and the Treasury.
resource managers. tartingcommunity can be defined in terms ofamily with its own branches andclans reflecting varying degrees of kinship.
consumers. The consuming communitycomplex and has several distinctthe Executive Branch.* These include thethe members of the NSC, and their seniorsubordinates. They also include the SecretaryTreasury, and,esser extent, the
of Commerce and Agriculture and their senior
5
and subordinates, as well as tho economic policy
munity (CIEP, CEA, the Special Tradeof tho Federal Reserve, Chairman of the
port-Import Bank,
* There are aleo, obviously, additional groups ofn the Congress andsome would argueoutside the Government asn the academic world, the print and electronic media, and among the whole body of voting, tax-paying citizens. This study focuses on the Executive Branch and does not address Congressional (or Judicial) consumers of intelligence, nor does it address theof coneumero outside the Federal Government.
The abovo are primary (and primarily) consumers of national intelligence. The consumers of tactical (primarily military) constitute an additional galaxy or, actually, series of galaxies.
OLLECTION MANAGEMENT
One of the central problems of intelligencemanagement is that of establishing mechanisms and processes for insuring the efficient and offective allocation of collectionollection management.
Collection management has as its objective the matching of collection capabilities to intelligence problems. Collection management, therefore, deals with the communications process between the managers of collection systems and the intelligence production community. The critical feature of this process is the translation of intelligence problems into specific requests for information. To bo successful, this translation must put the information requestsorm (or format) on which collection managers can take action. While clearly related to resourcecollection management concerns itself with existing resources and their best use to collect data toiven problem. (Resource management per se is not the subject of this Annex and will not be further addressed in it.)
The Principal Sources
Current collection programs can be classified into seven categories, covering information or data obtained from:
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Human Sources;
COMINT (communications intelligence);
ELINT (electronics intelligence);
Instrumentation Signals
Optical Signatures;
Imagery; and
or unclassified sources, such asthe press, and the monitoring oftelevision and news circuits.
Human Sources collection is concerned with people getting information from other people, or with covert technical collection systems which have to be emplaced and/or serviced by humans. Dominant in this category is the CIA's Clandestine Service. Defense attaches and the Foreign Service are primarily concorned with the overt gathering of information, although the military serviceselatively small amount of clandestine collection.
iarge number of civilian orgarv^atTons. The National Security
Council (in NSCIDas given NSA the leading role
in tho tasking of all SIGINT resources and the process-
ing of SIGINT data for dissemination to all consumer organizations. NSA has the paramount role in the col-
COMINT, ELINT and Foreign Instrumentation Signals fall under the general heading of SIGINT (signals. SIGINT is collected from ground, aircraft.
lection of COMINT since all the Service Cryptologic Agencies are under its direct control.
NSA alsoajor part in collecting and processing ELINT, although several other organizations also do one or the other, or both. The Assistantof Defense for Intelligenceanages some aircraft- and ground-based ELINT collectors which are assigned to the Services.
)
Instrumentation Signals (FIS) collection concerns itself chiefly with the collection of telemetry and is analogous to ELINT, for here too NSAajor role but is not the exclusive manager.
HSA operates some ground sites, and the military services operate some aircraft and ships which are aimed primarily at the collection of FIS signals.
Q
n
7Z
a
SVrs IS)
D - 3
R (SI
At one time aircraft were the sole platforms used for imageryprincipally photographicreconnaissance Now most though not allphotography of strategic importance comes from NRO operated satellites. Excep-
overage of
esser degree, theoverage ESI
There are also sixn the Air Force inventory which have been used for coverage in |
inally, there are
ariety or tactical aircraft equipped for photographicF-4sbut these are normally useful only in specific localizedsuch as tactical intelligence support to forces in combat.
Collection from open literature (books, magazines and other periodicals) is done by the simple expedient of buying books or periodicals of interest. CIA has the primary responsibility in this field, discharging itentral service of common concern. Reporting on the press is done by the State Department's Foreign Service/ by the Defense attaches and through regular
rs
IS)
of foreign wire servicesroadcast Information Service (FBIS). FBIS alsoon foreign television.
The Four Budgets
secret
Another way of looking at collectionhrough the four major intelligence program budgets;
National Reconnaissance Program (NRP) is de-
voted exclusively to satellitehotography
rs (Si
The table on the facing page relates thecollection categories to the principal intelligence budgets. In the body of the table, "Primary" indicates that the principal collection assets are funded and managod within the indicated budget. "Contributory" indicates collection assets within that budgot whichubstantial contribution. "Supplemental"collection resources whichseful, but not necessarily unique, contribution.
orldwide network of human beings focused on intelligence collection and covert action. They alsoechnology that puts almost every conceivable sensor on every possible kind of platform. Themanager tries to orchestrate these diversified resources to gather data on important intelligence problems quickly and efficiently. In tho course of doing this, he often has to decide where, and how, moro than one collector canontribution. This task is complicated by tho need to bridge the gapcollector and producer, who view the problemfrom different perspectives and, hence, are likely to see them in different ways.
8-6
The Communications Problem
At the current time there is no single, simple channel that connects the analyst with the processor and the collector. At the one extreme are operational managers of specific collection assets who are tied to the production community through relatively formal mechanisms which have evolved over the years, several of which haveigh degree ofOMIREX in the imagery field. At the otherare operational managers who direct day-to-day operations, many of whom know little about theirand may or may not have an up-to-dateof today's real intelligence problems. In between these two extremes thereotpourri of formal and informal arrangements.
At the formal end of the spectrum are the Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs). These attempt, at the highest level, to coordinate and to rank by priority the most important Community intelligence problems. Although new, the process of generating KIQs shows signs of being an effective mechanism to facilitate communications between collectors and analysts. From the point of view of the collection manager, however, this isirst step. He does not "collect" the accuracy of theCBM or the projected yield of the Soviet wheat crop. Be collects raw data orto which other data may be added from sources outside his own collection responsibility. Any such
requirement must thus be further translated into specifics for collection.
Tho COMIREX Solution
COMIREX is the single most elaborate and formal mechanism that attempts this translation. COMIREXgeneral requirements for imagery into detailed statements in terms of geographic coverage, image quality
.
I
The SIGINT World
The process of generating requirements and detailed tasking for the SIGINT machine has some parallels with the photographic community but is very different in its essential elements. ThereIGINT committee roughly
While NSAlear charter and direct authority over money and people, it nonetheless mustast worldwide empire not easily coordinated. the COMINT collection process is complicated by difficulties in evaluating results. There is no gen-
n
IS!
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In the past ten years, NSA has recognized that there is more to SIGINT than COMINT and has focused its resources more sharply on ELINT and Foreign
(SI
as managed by NSA exemplifies theprogram whichell defined mission but which operates on the basis of general statements of needs and priorities issued by those whom NSA is charged with supporting. In principle, tho CCP is the resource with which NSA must fulfill intelligence needs. NSA's principal foedback comes via two routesi first, direct feedback comes from those agencies and organizations which get SIGINT support;ifferent sort of feedback comes through the budget review cycle, as NSA recommends and defends its specific operating In principle, one manthe Director of NSAis chargedob and given resources to perform that job. There are mechanisms, more or less formal, for feeding back to him some indication of how well or how poorly he is performing. He has under his control, again in principle, the right set of people, authorities, and responsibilities to discharge his tasks. In many ways this is theoretically an ideal arrangement. In practical fact, however, thereumber of problems.
Unlike COHINT, NSA is not tho sole collector and processor of ELINT and FIS. Thereumber of Service programs which are only loosely coupled to
I
b - 12
STYLET
NSA. Additional programs are managed within the GDIP and still others are under the management of the CIA.
is another category of technical collection systems funded in the GDIP and managed through ASD(I) although daily operations are run by the military Most of these systems
MIHIMSVn ISI
but beyond that there is nothing for him to do except to make them run as best he can.
were designed for specific and relatively narrow collection tasks. The operational manager is responsible for performing that specific task up to the capacity of the resource and withinlimitations.
Human Sources World
Human sources are an important and in manynique source of information. Even more than in the
case of COMINT, it is difficult to devise ameasure of value. Nonetheless, human sources make major contributions to most categories ofnational intelligence, particularly on issues dealing with the plans and intentions of foreign(as opposed to their physical capabilities) .
The human sources collection manager is concerned with the long-range development of human sources ofby country and by general area of intelligence interest, it is almost impossible for him to predict the degree of success that will be achieved or the amount of time required toiven level of coverage. While he can improve his chances ofsuitable sources, he is usually at the mercy of circumstances beyond his control because human behavior is unpredictable and because many target countries restrict opportunities for contact with potentially knowledgable sources and can easily discourage such sources from establishing relationships with American intelligence officers. Unfortunately, the higher the priorityarget country and subject areathe more difficult it is to conduct human
As in the case of COMINT collection, it is seldom possible (or reasonable) to ask human sources collection managers toiven piece of informationiven time, for there is seldom any way in which the collection manager can be sure that at some given
moment there willource who canpecific question of interest to the production
The Clandestine Service of CIA is predominant in such clandestine collection from human beings. Its collection activities are structuredanagement-by-objectives system which includes tho requirements of the Community. Formal Communitysuch as KIQs, play an Important role, but the main concern of tha manager is to allocate resources by country and by intelligence problem area to the development of sources with long-range potential. supporting insight flows to him throughinformal contacts with the production community.
State Department Foreign Service Officers also have functions which can be classified as human collection. At least officially, however, FSOs are concerned only with overt collection. In addition to the collection of information, FSOs often are called upon to perform other duties and therefore are not usually fullyto the collection of information. The FSO,responds more to State Department requirements for information than to the requirements of theCommunity.
The DIA attache systemhird component in the human sources area. The attaches are managed by DIA but are generally responsive to national priorities,at posts in countries such as the USSR where in-
B - 15
S&SJLET
telligence collection ia the most important aspect of the attaches' duties.
While in some broad sense USIB has the responsibility for defining collection requirements for human sources, USIB has not until recently made any systematic approach to this function. At this writing the USIB's relatively new Human Sources Committee is still in the process of defining exactly how to get on with its assigned tasks. At best, applying the collection requirements approach to the human sources category of collector will be difficult, and it remains to be seen whether the mechanism of the USIB Committee willseful and constructive function.
odels
To examine tho relationships of the collectionto the production or analytical community is to uncover the diversity and casualness of these Nonetheless, two basic approaches are evident. One of these can be called the "NSA model" and the other the "COMIREX model." The NSA model is characterizedightly structured management chainingle senior individual, Dlrector/NSA, responsiblearge collection and processing resource and who operates with only general guidelines for collection. The COMIREX model focusesommittee whichreature of the production community and which concentrates on developing extremely detailed tasking of appropriate collection
terns. In these terms, the two somewhat idealized models represent two extremes as mechanisms for relatingproblems to collection resources.
The NSA model has several positive features: tight, highly integrated management control hasfor flexible resource trade-offs andto changing intelligence needs; processing and preliminary analysis toclosely coupled anduthority for decisions can be distributedtotal organization and, in principle, beappropriate points. On the other hand, there areweaknesses! SA is exclusively concernedand finds it difficult to judge when SIGINTmost efficient collection resourceivenas opposed to other collection resources;approach tends toargewhichlosed community; and
because of its closed community character, there is
tendency to relate more to the resource manager inthan to the intelligence production community and USIB.
The COMIRZX model also has pluses and minuses. On the plus sidet he COMIREX productpecific detailed set of tasks which are easily understandable by the collector; tructures of this type are in principle closely coupled to the requirements ofproduction; there is total production
7
sfesret
community involvement in the evolution of specifictasking. On the other hand: ecause of the many and diverse interests in the productioncommittee" approach is inevitable, which in search of consensusommon denomination, tends to dofocus important issues; there is an endemic and perhaps fundamental problem in establishing andigh-quality staff; it is virtually impossible toresponsibility for collection performance.
Theue
A pivotal issue in the consideration of collection
management and the relationship between collectionand the user of the collected information is the meaning of the term "requirements." An essentialthat needs to be answered is whether the process is best served by (a)efinition and prioritization of intelligence problems by the user community withtasking, or (b) by providing collectionin the form of detailed, highly structuredof the particular elements of information which the collector should try to provide. For either approach, the minute-by-minute operation of technical collection systems requires in the end specific and detailod
The question is: who is in the best position to work from general problems and priorities to the specific and detailed tasking statements needed to drive the col-
seckj-t
lection machinery? In the caee of technical collection, if users are to perform this function, the user community mustetailed understanding of the characteristics of the technical devices and devote the appropriateand analytical resources to the task. Mechanisms must be identified to ensure that the user communityurrent and detailed understanding of the collection environment which, in many circumstances, is changing rapidly.
On the other hand, if collection managers arewith statements of intelligence problems,manager musttaff whichand has experience in intelligenceproduction. In this case the collectionbe responsible for, or at least work closelydata-processing function so that he has acurrent assessment of the quality and utility ofinformation. In examining the best waytogether the collectors and the users of
a number of practical considerations must be
The character of tho various segments of the user
munity aro of critical important in this matter. For example, tho military commander by the nature of his organizational structure isoor position toufficient understanding of technical collectionto deal effectively in terms of detailedstatements. He perforce must resort to general problem statements and encourage collection managers and processors to daal with him on these terras.
ever, in other segments of the user community otherare feasible, at least in principle.
Also, the specific characteristics of the collection asset must be considered. In collection system dealingeal-time, dynamic environment, where feedback of collected data to operations must occurimely basis to ensure efficient collection, the collection manager must understand the user community and have tho capability to deal with more general problem statements. Certain collection operations must by their naturewith broad statements of intelligence problems and broad guidance or priorities and cannot deal with detailed specifics. The best example of this class of collector is covert human sources collection. On the other hand, some collectors can function equally well with detailed tasking statements or with broader intelligence probloms and priority statements.
In any case there is always the difficult problem of cross tasking. This is the process of allocating collection resourcesiven intelligencewhere more than one resource can provide usefulor data. Here the problem is particularly acute when efficiency or cost effectiveness issues are involved. These problems by their nature cannot usually be resolved by the managers of particular collection systems and must be addressed at the highest levels of Intelligence Community management.
Tho Evaluation Dialogue
A key element which is requiredigh levelCommunity, independent of the specificfor relating collection resources to users, Collection assets and collectionto be regularly examined to assess efficiency This function is important both tofeedback so that improvements can beontinuing measure of the utility ofassets to support resource allocationthe same token the performance of the user
in articulating information needs requires review
ensure that collection guidance is being properly
lated and prioritized. Again, both feedback to the
formerin this case, the user communityand
tion information for Community management areis this evaluation process which relates theprocess of collection management to the larger
lems of resources
NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAM
The current National Reconnaissance Programis basedemorandum of Agreement dated5 between the DCI and the Deputy Secretary of Defense. That agreement was born out of strife between the CIA and the Department of Defense over the future shape of the NRP. The strife centered at that time on two proposed new programs:
the desirability, technical feasibility and program management responsibility in one case; and
the requirement for, the configuration of, and the management of an improved satellitesearch system in the other case.
Although those two program issues were the focus of the strife, there were more fundamental issues. Defense at that time was striving to achieve total control over satellite reconnaissance. However, history to that) had suggested that Defense was both unwilling to givo proper weight to national intelligence needs and unable tocarry forward large, high risk programs.
The then DCI felt that heeasure of controlrogram as essential to intelligence
IS)
as the National Reconnaissance Program. To achieve this objective, he felt that CIA must have direct, operational participation in the NRP. He was strongly supported by the White House, in particular the President's Science Advisor. It was generally agreed, at least outside Defense, that CIA expertise, both technical and managerial, was an essentialtoatellite reconnaissancecapable of meeting perceived intelligence needs. Although many of the particulars of5 agreement have been set aside by subsequent events, it remains the chartering document for the NRP.
At the same time, the growing convergence ofand national intelligence needs has introduced new and as yet not fully understood factors in program and resource management. In the future, military field commanders will need direct support from intelligence satellite programs.
3
s
1
a -
3
This has generated increasing pressure from the Services for participation in satellite programs. The Navy wants more of the satellite action; the Army wants toegree of equity in satellite collection; and the Air Forcearger and different role. The
regular Air Force in particular has never liked the Special Projects organization and the associated strong civilian direction of NRP programs and would prefer to "normalize" the organization, with the Air Force established as the developer and operator of satellites through their line organizations to meet all intelligence as well as other Defense needs. However, it is impractical for eachservice to have its own satellite collectionas each has in the past had its own aircraft and ground based collection capabilities.
In important respects, the factors which
the NRP agreement between Defense and CIA, andstructure of the National Reconnaissance Organization ave been replaced by another set ofissues The atmosphere of conflict and
agreement between CIA and Defense whichajor
5 is not the dominant factor in The
in future years will be to insure that collectionneeded to meet evolving national requirements are maintained, while at the same time essential support to the various military services, particularly military field commanders, is provided. The most serious conflicts are likely to ariso in defining the realistic needs of military field commanders, allocating collection resources to military field commander requirements, and developing effective tasking and product dissemination arrangements for these users.
These new factors are likely to require aof the National Reconnaissance Program, as well as the
National Reconnaissance Organization. Tho NRP EXCOM will continue to be an essential high level policy and major program decision body, preserving the strengths andof the current arrangements. However, theof the EXCOM should be examinod. Consideration should be given toenior White House EXCOM member. In the past the President's Sciencewasember, but when his position was abolished2 no White House replacement was Particularly in view of the growingfor military use of satellite collectedCS representative should also be considered. Depending upon other organizational changes and their impact on the DCI, reconsideration of the appropriate Defense member of the EXCOM may also be desirable.
The Under Secretary of the Air Force is likely to find it increasingly difficult to fill both his Air Force and his Director, NRO role. As the seniorofficial responsible to the EXCOM, ho is charged with preparing program recommendations and carrying out EXCOM decisions. At the same time heenior official of the Department of the Air Force and therefore must concern himself with Air Force equities and requirements. As satellite reconnaissance becomes increasingly important to the Air Force mission, it is likely that these two roles will generate real conflicts of interests. Inter-service rivalries, where satellite reconnaissance issues are at stake, may produce strong pressures in support of
Air Force views on specific issues to the detriment of the NRP.
In anticipation of this problem, at various times in the past there has been serious discussion ofthe NRO outside the military services. Most recently during Dr. Schlosinger's brief tenure as DCI, he considered several proposals, one of them generated by the PFIAB, which would have placed the NRO reporting directly to the Secretary of Defense. However, draft NSCIDS which would have rechartored the NRO and readjusted its organizational placement were not carried forward.
ISI
There are two options for the restructuring of the NRO. First, earlier proposals which would have the NRO reporting to tho Secretary of Defense could be reconsidered and adjusted so as to bo pertinent to today's needs. Any such arrangement would no doubt need to provide for more direct involvement by the Army and perhaps expandedby the Navy,
need to be continued in something like their current form. Also, an appropriate position forRO would need to be created.
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A second option would be to reconstitute the NRO as an integrated, operational organization jointly 8taffed by the three military services, CIA
In this arrangementRO would become
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of the various NRP programs. In addition to program management resources, the NRO wouldull range of contracting, security and administrative support services. This organisational structure for the NRO has appeal from the point of view ofmanagement and coherent program direction. It would help meet the increasing insistence of Congress on efficient use of resources and elimination of needless duplication. It would also be well suited for dealing with the increasing complexity and growing diversity of consumers, which is likely to occur as direct support to military commanders becomes more substantial.
5 2
an integrated operating organization of this type raises the problem oforkablelocation. tructure would probably be inappropriate as an element of the Secretary of's staff. For different reasons, establishing such an organization within one of the three services wouldumber of serious issues as discussed above. If the role of the DCI is changed along the lines ofTwo as discussed elsewhere in this paper, and the CIA were correspondingly renamed and rechartered, the NRO could be placed within this structure. On the other hand, there is considerable doubt as to whether Defense could accept this arrangement.
5
In addition to the issues surrounding theplacement of the NRO, there is another serious pro-
^StlcSR^ET
blem associated with the funding of the NRP. Theand expenditure of NRP funds isniqueprocess. to date the NRP budget hasof the funds
been governederies of essentially undocumented
understandings with senior members of the relevant
Congressional committees. These arrangements have
madeegreo of flexibility and efficiency
for the NRP which could not be achieved if the normal
requirements applying to Defense appropriations were to
be required. Some legislative provisions covering the
expenditure of Defense funds have been waived in these
various informal agreements and
It seems extremely unlikely, however, with
current mood of Congress, that these private,
arrangementsimited number of senators
congressmen and certain Executive Branch officials
be allowed to continue. Thus, in addition to
a proper home for the National Reconnaissance
tion, consideration should be given to developing aappropriating funds for the NRP which will both
evolving Congressional moods and the requirementlexible and effective National Reconnaissance Program. This issue needs further study; there is no immediately obvious solution. One suitable arrangement would provide for the appropriation of such funds to the DGI developed under Option Two.
PROBLEMS IW THE PRODUCTION
OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
When Congressentral agency devoted to final "correlation andt expectedsmall and simple. The reality is large and complex. Congress did not give the DCI the tools he now needs because it could not foresee that he would require them, ne has improvised some from the vague wording of other authorities in the Act or the language of such documents as NSCID'si he has simply done without others.
Because correlation and evaluation are by statute the DCI's primary duty and the one most specifically airccted by law, there is inormal workingthe United States Intelligence Boardor producing coordinateo national estimates. Through it, the bulk of the information and expertise available to the federal government is assembled and weighed. are drawn, dissents are included when appropriate, and the results are forwarded to the President and the riSC. Similar mechanisms, less structured, govern to varying degrees the issuance of less formal monographs and the production of current intelligence. On thethe mechanism appears to be precisely what Congress wanted, and it seems to work.
The appearance is deceptive, however; the DCI in fact suffers from having responsibility without authority as much in production as he does elsewhere. The USIB
production machinery works, but it does so in part occause the participating agencies know they need not be inhibited by it when they do not want to be. ho independently has access to the President canerious product from USIfl and personally ensure that tiiis product will be read by the right people. Simply being named DCI does not give him this standing; he must have earned it elsewhere.
The fundamental weakness of the DCI'sshows up across the whole range of hisresponsibilities, but most seriously into establish the primacy of nationaldepartmental ones. On the otner hand, theagencies are unable either to compete with
to contribute fully to the national product. Finally, USIB itselfybrid body not particularly well configured for handling production.
The DCI's Production Responsibilities
If one looks atCI needs to correlate andoomprehensive, accurate, coherent flow of policy-oriented intelligence reports and assessments to the national policy officerone sees how inadequate today are the tools Congress gave nim. To do the job the DCI needs:
Independence, to prevent the warping ofby policy concerns.
Feedback, so he can be aware of policyand actions and can judge the quality of his output.
Access to all pertinent information available to the federal government.
Analytic resources on which he can draw to do the final stage of the job.
Independence. Congress, by making the DCI and CIA
subordinate to "thentended, as is clear from the
legislative history, to make them independent of State
and Defense. In practice, the DCI within the bounds
discretion has been able to maintain his independence,
though no DCI can or should be totally independent
p.
the President.
Feedback. Feedback is of two kinds: information on policy concerns and consumer reaction to the product.
The DCI keeps track of policy through hisin meetings of the NSC and its subcommittees, through his access to cable traffic, and through his personal dealings with senior policy officers* In fact, his participation in meetings is virtually complete, but his freedom to share what he learns with his subordinates is limited. His access to cable traffic of State and
Defense, especially concerning sensitive policy matters, is intermittent and invariably spotty. For thesein many matters of greatest national concern, national intelligence is not privy to the policyin which it must assess the capabilities and actions of other
the DCI receives consumerHSCIC, created by the Presidential directive rtSCIC has met twice since that The Act specified that the DCI was
o
nave access to all intelligence held by other
and indeed his right to it has generally been
There nave been important exceptions, however,
in intelligence contained in Foreign Service
("not intelligence atn some NSAnd in certain navalp-
erational information"). Beyond the DCI's right of
to existing intelligence, however, he has other
[national needs for which he lacks explicit
is, for instance, other intelligence that the DCI believes is needed and that can be collected by existing means if they are properly targeted. Thus he must be able to translate feedback into requirements, and requirements into tasking of systems to meet
these requirements; he should be able to enforce this tasking, in other words to manage collection.
The legislative history of the Act shows that Congress probably intended that the DCI could collect (under "services of commons well as evaluate, and of course he has done so when other agencies have not.
Finally, there is other intelligence that is needed but that cannot be acquired by existing means. To obtain it the DCI must develop or stimulate the development of new collection systems and methods.
The Multiple Channels Problem
The most serious problem in the production ofis the DCI's inability de jure to forcehome. Although the Act is explicit that CIA
der the DCI) is to be the central mechanism, DCls
been somewhat ambiguous about it, and otherto rejoct the notion altogether. Moreover,
DCIilemma. The more the DCI uses CIA as
substantive staff, the more he is seen by the other members of the Community as short-changing theirand the more they feel justified in pleading their views through other channels.
National vs. DepartTental. Channels froe of the uCI are readily at hand. Tho doctrine that has developed under the Act calls for the DCI to deliver neatly packaged national intelligence, comploto with dissenting views.
secret
to the NSC. The Act also authorizes, however, the continuing production and dissemination of departmental intelligence. Thus the DCI is responsible forsupport of the Secretaries of State and Defense as members of the NSC; but, INR and DIA are, properly, responsible for support of the secretaries as their respective department heads and thushannel for oirect dissemination of their product to the white House. Moreover, while both agencies insist that CIA's national product be coordinated with them and exercise vigorouslyas they shouldthe right to aissent, neither hesitates to issue uncoordinated views in conflictational intelligence position. The resultlood of overlapping papers, of varying degrees of validity, unleashed on the policymaker. No DCI has felt strong enough toalt to thisor even to offer his services in bringing coherence to it.
"Just Another Agency.'1 The policy officer is not acutely aware of the delicate but important distinction between national and departmental products. Toational Intelligence Estimate isIA paper, with no more standing than one from DIA. This attitude is reinforcod by the ambiguity of the DCI-CIAand encouraged by buroaucratic opposition to CIA's claimirst-among-equals role. CIA, in turn, has been able to establish that role only by the recognized
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excellence of its product in the competition of the marketplace. But because that product does not carry the necessary bureaucratic cachet, it often does not reach many of the consumers who could use it best. The intelligence agencies of Defense, for instance, feel no requirement to distribute the CIA product to policy officers within the department.
Competition
As noted, thereendency for departmental agencies
to seek independent channels for their own views.
views obviously overlap broadly with what isintelligence. Thus CIA, DIA, IHR, and to some
extent other agencies produce intelligence that is
duplicative or competitive. Obviously, sheer
is to be avoided (must every intelligence
urrent intelligence/briefingut
petition is something else
The normal tendency in reorganizing government is to decide what group is best equipped toarticular job and then assign that job to that group alone. This should not apply to intelligence production. Intelligence analysis seeks to know the unknowable and penetrate the impenetrable. When evidence is insufficient or ambiguous or absent, the more minds and the more lines of analysis pursued the greater the chance of approximating the truth.
Each organization is stimulated by the critical work of others; none can afford to stand pat on the conventional wisdom. -Moreover, analysis is cheap relative to the other costs of intelligence.
CIA. Of all US intelligence agencies, CIA hasrange of analytic capabilities. Itstoo thin to provide comprehensive coverage,some topics of lesser importance it reliesother agencies. Nonetheless it is able todepth on all questions that are of majorUS policy (in some cases with the aid ofCIA is able itself to produce on thesewell as to evaluate andationalis also able to check the production of other
It can goad them out of long-held positions and intoof attack on stubborn problems. To get the
national product, however, it is necessary that the
peting analysis centers be strong enough to play
game and to keep CIA on its toes. At present,nor INR is Strong
DIA. This Agency has many problems. DIA isby the division of its production elements between Arlington Hall and the Pentagon, and it has never been able fully to solve the problem ofilitary command and staff system with high-quality civilian professional personnel. Its greatest problem, however, is its dual mission. It is responsible for support both
of the Secretary- of Defense and his office and of the Joint Chiefs and their field commanders. Theof these two sets of customers are not the same, and they add up to considerably more than DIA canaccomplish. In his dealings with the DCI, the Director of DIA represents two masters; his efforts to serve the national authorities represented by theof Defense often compete with the need to meet the tactical requirements of field commanders and theones of the JCS.
IHR. IWR has for many yearstepchild ofof State. Prior to the present Director,State was on the verge of eliminating itintelligence production organization (but not asin other intelligence matters). The DCI tookthat hatrong INR as ato DIA in the production field and as auseful national analytic center but notedif necessary could pick up some of its
The Service Intelligence Agencies. To some
agencies appear to be vestigial and duplicative, but they do useful work that contributes to national As long as this work is done by them or by DIA, whether they continue to exist or not would appear toepartmental problem for Defense,ational one.
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USIB aa Regulator of Production
The DCI's role as correlator and evaluator isin his chairmanship of USIB. As noted above, themechanism under USIB works reasonably well, but the DCI's real authority is measured by the closeness of his personal relationship with the President and the degree of his access to inner policy circles. To the extentcan use such access to gain acceptance for USIB's product as the voice of national intelligence, the other members will take him, and their work there, seriously.
As noted in Annex A, USIB has other problems
from the effort to combino in one board too broad a
of responsibilities. For production matters, CIA,
and INR are the primary players, and all are
But so are the service agencies, ERDA, Treasury,
NSA, and sometimes The service agencies
classed as observers, and do in fact make useful
butions in areas of their specific technical
ERDAember, but makes an even more limited
bution than the services. Treasury is primarily a FBI has no role in production matters. NSA and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligencere special cases discussed below.
USA's problemroducer i3 that nationalis all-source, and NSA is one-source. Occasionally, for operational use or for highly specialized analysis
D - 10
problems, USA's product can stand by itself, butneither the analytic resources nor the accessthat would put itlass with theproducers. On the other hand NSA is morecollector and processor; in this its situation isthat of the National Photographic(NPIC). The traditional view ofin CIA, DIA and INR has always been "justthe facts. NSA is to diagram nots. NPIC is to We will integrate these into anbudgetary pressure, however, and faced withamounts of data, analysts have given wayin fact looking for help. They are nowand NPIC to go much deeper into such subjects.
I
over, they are coming to recognizeSAa feel for his source that enables him inand complex situation to draw usefulthat are beyond the competence of an
further removed from the communications traffic.
ASP(I) was invited to USIB primarily because of his responsibilities in the resource field and in NRO matters generally, lie has no role in production. Buts experience is instructive in any reconsideration of the LCI's responsibilities. To handle his resource decisions he finds he needs substantive capabilities, and as these grow ho finds himself running athwart DIA.
Conclusions
The major problems in the production ofare external to the production process To belabor the point again, the moreDCI is in real terms and the more he ishave the President's ear, the better the processand the less weight will be put onviews. Making him more powerful,be accomplished only by extending his authorityfields; his nominal authority overexists. CI who has the strongest voicemanagement, in collection management, andmanagement could use the interplay among
to produce better national intelligence, perhaps at
Tl O
ANNEX E
THE NATIONAL/TACTICAL PROBLEM
Until recently the general view has beenuseful distinction could be made betweenand tactical intelligence. At thelevel the interest in militaryprimarily strategic in character. Theand planners wore and arelong-range weapon systems, the effectivenessweapons research and development,structures, and military budgets. Aof intelligence information, called
cal, although not well defined, was presumed to be
primarily of interest to military
eaningful distinction betweon
or strategic intelligence and tactical
no doubt did exist in the past, it is no longer adistinction. The military commander, facedmodern weapon systems needs equallyintelligence support. Heurrent detailed understanding of the fightingthe weapon systems arrayed against him. Heknow the disposition of opposing forces,ood understanding of thethese forces. The long range and flexibilityweapons make warning of the imminence ofboth more important and more difficult Once hostilities have commenced, the military
commander needs to have the means for following the rapid course of battle. His intelligence must be as close to "real time" as feasible so that he can make both offensive and defensive command decisions. These requirements for military commandersupport allevel of collection and analytical sophistication which historically has been associated primarily with national strategic intelligence.
The distinction between national and tactical intelligence has been further blurred as thefrom the national viewpoint has changed. Even the most minor military skirmish has the potential for rapid escalation into an exchange of strategic nuclear weapons. Heightened military tension can be of great political significance. The President must have timely and accurate intelligence covering activities which in the past would have been considered purely tactical in character and therefore of little interest at tholevels of government.
The table on the following page outlines three major categories of intelligence which are relevant in the current and future time frame: NationalMilitary Departmental Intelligence, andcommander Intelligence Support. For purposes of this paper the emphasis in on military relatedso the several categories of non-militaryintelligence are suppressed. Thereange
5
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CATEGORIES OF INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Non-Milltary Military
Military
Military Field Com-aander Intelligence Support
Military Detailed Weaponsudgets foraance
Adveraary Military Vulnerability Capability
Adveraary Force Doctrine Structure and General Deploy-Bent
Strategic Weapons Counterforca Weaponsrisis Management
Deployment Readiness Status Operational Capability Reliability
Logistical Status Reserve Status Operational Plan Warning Combat Support
E - 3
SECkK
of subjects which are military and have high national interest and priority. These include the majormilitary questions having to do with threats against the United States and the planning for the US military capability needed to maintain an acceptable defense posture.
addition to these national level militarythereange of departmental military interests. These include many of the same subjects that are of interest at tho national level, but also include mora detailed issues. At the departmental level, intelligence supports systems design for both offensive and defensive weapons. Intelligence is also important in developing military doctrine and tactical plans, such as electromagnetic countermeas-uros and force deployments.
The military commander is, in the end, theof much of the national intelligence, and, in principle, of all of the departmental intelligence since this intelligence influences the design of new weapon systems and the theater force structures. On the other hand the military commanderumber of special requirements having to do with the nature, structure, and status of the military forces deployed in direct opposition to him. His intelligence support requirements in the face of present and future weapon environments far exceed the traditional boundariesby the term "tactical intelligence." Tho unique
a H
2
intelligence requirements of the military commander need to bo carefully defined and placed in proper perspective with respect to national and military departmental requirements.
In the past, theater intelligence has been largely in the hands of the theater commander. He has acquired his information through aircraft, foot patrols, forward radar installations, and in more recent times, COHINT resources under his direct command authority. derived in this manner was (and is) calledintelligence." Because of the relative simplicity of the opposing weapons, the field commander's need for strategic intelligence support was not critical.
The term "tactical intelligence" is still in common use, but the situation facing the field commander has undergone important changos. Tactical aircraftmilitary ground operations are equipped with guided weapon systems and have an operating radius of hundreds of miles. Accurate ballistic missilesey element in the opposition force structure. These "tactical" ballistic missiles have rangesew tens of miles to hundreds of miles. Helicopters have enhancedand changed combat tactics in important ways. Man-carried guided weapons are altering the oncecharacter of armored vehicles, particularly tanks, in the fighting force. This vast array of complicated and flexibility weaponry has in turn impacted thedoctrine and fighting strategies of opposing foroaa.
Most of the important weapon systemnot derivable by the military commander usingunder his control. This factor places aon strategic and departmental intelligenceand timely countemeasures orto be available when needed by commanders, andrange weapon system development decisions are to Strategic intelligence, including detailedcharacteristics, is derived from nationalcollection resources, such as photographic,COMINT, and human sources using
sophistTcaxeofimaiyTica^Tiethodologies. With theof modern weapon systems, the need forintelligence has been well understood andserved by the Intelligence community.
-
Recently, however, it has become clear that thesupport to the military commander falls far short of the capability required if he is to effectively deal with active hostilities where modern weaponare employed. The intelligence resources under his direct control remain essentially as they have been for many years. The intelligence support derived from the national community has been useful but limited. intelligence frequently has not focused on the weapon systems characteristics and vulnerabilities of most interestommander. His limited collection and analytical resources cannot provide him with good measures of opposing force deployment and status or warn him of impending hostilities. There are serious
se(
questions about the military commander's ability to track events after the outbreak of hostilities and to couple this intelligence to his own tactical
In response to this intelligence gap, two things have happened. First there has been increasing priority placed on real time collection resources. This istrue of SIGINT, where there isubstantial effort under way to integrate SIGINT col-
nd
processed information directly to military commanders at the theater level and below. These requirements are supportedapidly developing technology,in communications and data processing. As aof the "new" intelligence needs of military commanders and the ovolving capability of stratogic intelligence collection resources to support military problems, the distinctions among strategic, tactical, national, and military commander intelligence have virtually vanished. Within the next five years, all critical collection resources which are essential to support national intelligence will have capabilities which are useful to and in some cases essential to field commanders.
The implications of this suddenly changed situation are profound. Resource decisions and collectionin the future will be more complex because of the broader range of needs which are competing for atten-
tion. New factors must be considered, such asof collection systems and the rapidof intelligence information to those who The field commander can no longer be regarded asentity who must and can have his ownintelligence apparatus. Complicatedand associated doctrine and tacticscomplicated and effective intelligencethe nation is toiable militarycan no longer be left in the hands ofofficers primarily trained for conduct ofoperations. The disciplines of modern
are becoming increasingly specialized and complex. intelligence must rise above its historicalstatus in the military
O
All of this implies that, as leader of the
t
ligence Community, the DCI must deal with aof intelligence problems and requirementsbeen of concern to him in the past. Questions
tasking national systems in support of military
ers and questions concerning real-time forwarding of information are critical questions which are extremely importantilitary force standpoint but can only be addressed and resolved at the national level, while the Department of Defense and the Military Services mustey role in providing intelligence support to military commanders, many relevant resource andissues cutar wider range of Further, because of the deep substantive
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background which is available in the Intelligence Community at large, the DCI isey position to guide and influence the improvement of military intelligence. However, if the DCI is to play the key role which he must in these matters, it isthat he take steps to provide himself with the background and support which he will require.
HE DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS
The Directorate of Operations (DO) is the Clandestine Serv.ce (CS) of the CIA. The CS has two roles: collection of information and covert action.
cisely; it is equally difficult to define just where such action oversteps the mark. The key appears to lie in establishing an appropriate oversight capability which has the confidence of the American people and theof all three branches of our government. Such oversight can ensure that covert action is used only in those situations in which it reflects the consensus of US Government opinion, but is nonetheless available when needed.
rs IS)
5
SEhftET
ANNEX G
A PRODUCT REVIEW CONCEPT OF RESOURCE ALLOCATION
In conjunction with Option One the Productwould involve making someand other changes to provide theyear an evaluation, based on the knowledgeto production elements, of the contributionsby various collection systems within thethe solution of intelligence problems. Inapproach would draw heavily on the presentQuestion concept and associated This annual evaluation would supplement
report to the President required under the November
letter calling for an independent DCI recommendation on
o
the overall Intelligence Community budget. It
have the effect of suggesting to Defense and to
President (OMB) the desirability of certain
about Intelligence Community resource matters
significantly extending the DCI's direct or line
in decision
Under this approach, we would expect the DCI, with the aid of an independent product review group inwith CIA and other production analysts, to supply to the President around July of eacheportthose collection assets in the Community which have contributed in important ways to the solution of problems in the past year and identifying systems orwith great potential for solving future problems.
This report would be made available to Defense and OMB, and they would use itool to help shape resource decisions relating to various intelligence programs.
This approach would raise fewer troublesome questions about direct involvement of the DCI indecisionmaking than does the present approach. That role would bo reserved to the Department itself and to OMB which has recognized legal responsibilities in assisting the President to develop his overall budgetary strategy.
The DCI's focus in this evaluation would be
tially limited to collection programs for which he
the best substantive information base. As these
the most costly activities in the Intelligence
this approach is reasonable. On tho other hand,
would be many resource issues within the Intelligence
Community on which the DCI would have no basis for effective comment. Ho would not, for example, using this approach, be easily able to comment on the numerous importantissues which arise within the various expensiveor support programs in the Community.
The issues which arise between CIA and Defense in the processing aroa need attention. They are among tho more complex and difficult problems which confront us
jointly* On the other hand, one can question whether resource issues in the support area ought to be his responsxbility in any event. During consideration of6 budget, for example, there was much discussion as to whether the DCI should support DIA's attempts toew DIA building. It is unclear, however,CI view on an issue of this kind is of any real consequence to Defense, the President, or Congress.
There are other difficulties inherent in thisapproach which can be most graphicallythe Comprehensive Cryptologic Program (CCP),
they can be seen in some measure in other programs
well. In the case of the CCP, if the DCI determined
any given year that five particular facilities made
outstanding contribution to the solution of certain
telligence problems, this would in all likelihood not
stitute any effective basis for making decisions
resource levels for those or any other CCP. It isdifficult to tell when, or if, anyfacility willontributioniven
Also, so often the CCP contributioniven problem results from the combined effortsumbereriod of time, each piece of raw data being important but none being essential.
The fact is that with respect to both the CCP and the DO, no one can predict which of many facilities (and the people in them) will yield the hoped-for re-
suit. The nature of tho problems which become importantiven time tends to determine which particular installationsoteworthy contribution in any given year. For this reason resource decisions for these programs tend to be dictated by the desirability of maintaining the existence of an overall apparatus or capability as conditioned by cover, workingand other shifting concerns, and the "product review" approach would bo of little real value. there are judgments that may be made from year to year oronger time on which country or area may become more or less important to US policy. From these qualitative assessments, some resource decisions are possible.
On the other hand, on some of the largest issues which face the Community, the "product review" approach could enable the DCI tooherent view for implementation by others. For example, it is possible that in coming years new overhead reconnaissance systems may substantially change the need for analysts and theater commanders for the kinds of COMINT information which have been supplied in the past by CCP assets.ong-term trend ought to be discernible under the basic approach outlined in this option, and thus the DCI would be able to comment that new assets havearge portion of an existing program irrelevant. It is also true, howevor, thatonclusion could be reached by others.
3
We believe the "product review" function would
Carrying through this approach would suggestthe DCI's intelligence Community Staff to"product review" function. It would alsoof procedures requiring productionCIA to report periodically on themade by various collection systems to theintelligence problems. Finally, there wouldbe improvements in the flow of informationas to which programs provided which The latter may be difficult to achieve,in the case of NSA and the CIA Operationswhich have strong traditions of resistance
5
this basic
to be carried out by an organization separate fromcomponents. This would help overcomeof analysts to continue to require all
formation, no matter how marginal, on problems of
to them in the belief that such information may
day prove essential. Such an organization would alsomall group to investigate major issues of the type suggested above.
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Original document.
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