CHANGING SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF WORLD POLITICS AND THE USSR'S INTERNATIONAL ROLE

Created: 10/1/1975

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

CIA HISTORICAL REViEW PROGRAM RELEASE A3 SANITIZED

Research Study

Changing Soviet Perceptions of World Politics and the USSR's International Role

Stent

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INTRODUCTORY NOTE

Misperception has played an important role throughout the entire postwar period of US-USSRthe opinion of some observers asole as actual conflicts of interest. Problems of perception will undoubtedly persist and perhaps even grow as the superpowers adapt lo new international conditions and as world politics move increasingly in ways that differ from the familiar patterns of Cold War interaction. For example, ii is by no means self-evident just what new opportunities or risks the Soviets perceive in such potentially momentous changes as their attainment of strategic military parity with the US.

The purpose of this study is to describe the current principal Soviet perceptions of the international political environment and of the Soviet role within it. To do this the study examines statements regarding foreign affairs made by the Soviet political leadership and by certain public commentators, especially the analysts of those academic institutes which focus their work on international affairs While such statements are frequently intended to support current policy positions, they are nonetheless valuable in assessing Soviet perceptions of and attitudes toward international affairs. This material is supplemented by diplomatic and intelligence reporting of views expressed privately. These latter sources are particularly useful in helping to separate actual views from publicconstant problem encountered in dealing with material laden with doctrinairein assessinghat extent general ideological beliefs affect particular Soviet views.

SYNOPSIS

A new note of Soviet self-confidence in international affairs, seenas validating the conceptrogressive historical march,in. Other major powers are not viewed astheir basically hostile attitudes toward the USSR, butfeel greater assurance about their capacity to deal withless exaggerated concern for their effects on Soviet security.hasajor factor motivating Soviet policies in theis not surprising that new directions in Soviet foreign policythe new psychological mood. Moscow perceives atoday for normalized relations with major states, especiallyand has learned from experience that working within thesystem is more likely to serve Soviet interests thanto other great powers or to the system itself. Largely forthe Soviet leaders have developed an increased stakestability and have come to accept the prospect ofperiod of coexistence with the

Moscow still expects and seeks international change. But the USSR cannot,eriod of detente, be the direct agent for much of the change its leaders still hope will occur. Andesidual belief in the eventual attainment of ultimate Soviet aims in the basic world struggle still exists in the USSR, the Soviets have increasingly adjusted their sights, conceptually and operationally, to short-run and intermediate-range goals. Achievement of even these, the Soviets realize, depends on success in working with forces that often act independently of Soviet sway and in overcoming simultaneous countervailing trends.

Sources of Soviet Perceptions

Soviet ideology supplies the basic conceptual framework used by Soviet observers in analyzing international affairs. The interpretation of world events this ideology provides is dynamic: itundamental strugglelobal scale, presupposes constant change, and gives impetusn aclivist foreign policy. Yel while Marxism-Leninism attunes Soviet observers to the key role thai events wxihm states play in affecting international behavior, it explains little beyond the general and abstract about relations among slates. And although ihe Soviet outlook could be called Utopian in terms of its stated goals, most Soviet leaders fromnwards have consciously stressed realism and

caution in practical policy matters and warned of the dangers of adventurism in the long-term international competition between the emerging new order and the declining old. In this regard, Brezhnev follows the examples of Lenin and Stalin rather than Khrushchev.

The wider Soviet involvement in recent years in world affairselief that internal progress, especially toward economic goals, is increasingly dependent on international relationships have led Soviet leaders toore accurate picture of the world. They have tried to enhance the capabilities of their channels of information about foreign events and, of particular note, to obtain more and better analysis of thatarger role has been assigned to the academic institutes in Moscow, especially the Institute of US and Canadian Studies and the Institute of the World Economy and International Relations, which are involved in providing policy-makers with estimative judgments about international affairs.

How deeply rooted the newer Soviet perceptions have become cannot be told with certainty. The current leaders lived through the Stalin era, with its articulate and heavily propagandized set of ideas stressing the hostility of the international environment, Soviet insecurity, and the necessity of avoiding foreign contact. This era has left deep and widespread Soviet doubts about the wisdom and orthodoxy of enmeshing the USSR in dealings with the capitalist powers and making compromises with the West. Yet despite the persisting influence of ingrained views, perceptions do not remain static. Doctrinally pure positions arc possible only when events are viewedistance. Involvement with events requires that dogma make room for pragmatism, lest unrealism drive the Soviet state into an isolationist position. The post-Stalin generation of Soviet leaders has already changed its outlook in significant ways because of international experience, ihe influence of personal and institutional roles and interests, and newly perceivedew generation of post-Brezhnev leaders could also develop new perceptions of international problems and new ideas of what Soviet national interests require in lerms of international behavior.

The New International Situation

The measuring standard and key determinant of the USSR'* progress in the worldwide political struggle postulated by the Soviets is ihe international "correlation ofn weighing the strengths of ihe two sides, the Soviets attach greai importancehe power of ihe principal states, especially their economic and military capabilities and potential But less tangible social and poliiical factors are also

considerede important, hence the continual Soviet assessing of US domestic cohesion and willpower.

In the Soviet view the world7 has been in gradual transitionurely capitalist systemocialist one, the most dramatic single advance being the Sovietization of East Europe after World War II. But, the Soviets argue, haveurther significant, even radical favorable change in the international balance. Some Soviet commentary seems toipping of the balanceotional midway point, as though "socialism" now possessed more than halforld power pic. The factor mainly responsible for the new correlation of forces, in Moscow's view, is Soviet strategic nuclear strength, built up over the last ten yearsevel roughly equivalent to that of (he US. Also contributing to Soviet optimism is the combination of economic', social, and political problems currently plaguing the West, which Moscow views as unprecedented. In Soviet eyes these problems have made the present phase of capitalism's "general crisis" unusually deep and persistent and have thrown the West into its most serious disarray since World War II.

The Soviets are unsure about what developments will flow from thisowever, and realize that any relative advantages they now enjoy rest on an uncertain foundation. More pronounced leftward trends in West European politics (especially Communist participation in coalition governments in France and Italy) seem likely to ihcm, but they also sec in the present-day Western condition the seeds of possible civil wars and the specter of revived fascism. The Soviets apparently believe that capitalism cannot escape suffering permanent disabilitiesonseqcncc of its problems and that it is alreadyualitatively new stage of its decline. But at the same time they have respeci for the capacity of the capitalist system to devise effective methods for coping with even such serious problems as the oil issue and to bounce back because of the overall size and resiliency of the Western economic system.

The Soviets have also had difficulties in determining the meaning of the Western disarray for their own foreign policy. Some Party elements reportedly feel that not enough is being done to lake advantage of the new international situation, and West European Communist parties are receiving conflicting signals from Moscow on just how best to improve their individual political positions. So far, however, in line with the Soviet propensity inncreasingly to dissociate the world revolutionary struggle from the ordinary conduct of intcrsiale relations and place emphasis on the latter, the most authoritative Soviet expositions of the Western "crisis" have been more

in ihe nature of efforts to steer the detente policy over the shoals of this unanticipated situation than justifications for revising course.

In no case has this been more clearly true than for Soviet relations with the US, which remain the key factor affecting the overall Soviet international role. Inhe US moved toward detente with the USSR and accommodated itself to the growth of Soviet strategic forcesoviet role in resolving major world problems. Whether this "realistic" US attitude will be sustained is the chief question for Soviet policy-makers. The Soviets believe that the US altered its foreign outlook in theargely for pragmatic reasons: the old policy was simply becoming less effective and too expensive. But the new US policy, the Soviets believe, rests on an unconsolidated domestic base; the consensus supporting earlier US policies has broken down, but no agreement has yet been reached on what should take its place. The Soviet reading of the situation in the US throughout5 "pause" in detente has been that the pro-detente forces are still more powerful than their enemies, but that the latter remain strong, stilleservoir of anti-Soviet feelings not yet completely dissipated from the Cold War.

The newfound Soviet confidence is not free from counterbalancing factors', and Moscow docs not see the shifts in the international "correlation of forces" wholly one-sidedly. For one thing, the favorable changes that have occurred inre not irrevocable. In this critical regard they differ from postwar Soviet gains in East Europe, which are judged to beven the lengthy and expensive Soviet nuclear missile buildup does not guarantee future strategic stability or even parity.

Moscow is also clearly aware of 'the storm clouds on its international horizon. Chief among them is China, whose "loss" greatly damaged the USSR's image as the nucleus of an ever-increasing international political movement and whose deep-seated hostility threatens to outlive Mao. But Europe too, the recent collective security agreement notwithstanding,elf-assured West Germany and has shown little susceptibility to increases in Soviet influence despite spells of political turmoil and lessened fears of the Soviet military threat. The emergence of several secondary power centers in the world is welcomed by Moscow asecline in US authority among its chief partners, but the Soviets are uneasy about what direction these newly independent political forces will take While the Soviei perception of the world as enemy is changing, ii has not been replaced by one of the world as oyster, ripe with opportunities to be exploited.

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The So vial International Rota

Soviet policy today is informedense of "having arrived" internationally. By successfully weathering critical trials over the years, the Soviets believe that the USSR hasapacity to sustain itself and growangerous and unpredictable international environment. There is also considerable national pride connected with the Soviet international role that is importanteople whose sense of inferiorityii other great powers and cultures has been great andegime in need of evidence of its own competence and legitimacy. The Soviets feel that their international prestige is more solidly based today than was the case under Khrushchev, whose incautious political moves aroused rather than impressed adversaries and bought little influence in othertronger and more secure USSR docs not guarantee success in all foreign undertakings, but it doesore active and influential Soviet international presence.

Current Soviet perceptions of world affairs, however,egree of instability for Soviet policy. Although political changes such as those in southern Europe, from Turkey to Portugal, tempt Moscow to see and act on opportunities for Soviet advantage, the Soviet leaders are aware that greater militancy would damage their relations with the West without assuring any expansion of Soviet influence. While the Soviets are prepared to intervene abroad in areas and on occasions when they think the political and military risks areseems to be the case inmust, continuously reassess the costs involved. In the rest ofnd beyond the USSR may find itself even more subject to the strains inherent in its contradictory international roles: how effectively can it continue to represent itself as revolutionary, progressive, and the patron of the have-nots of this world while seeking expanded friendship with the US, recognitionich and advanced country, and stability in certain regimes and regions? There will probably continue totrong Soviet attitude in favor of keeping relations with the US and other major powerseasonably even keel, despite inevitable ups and downs. But mutuality of inlcrrst and viewpoint between East and West has long been anathema in the USSR, and reaching genuine compromises with the West will never be an easyatural process for Soviet leaders.

DISCUSSION

PROBlfMS IN THE STUDY OF PERCEPTIONS

A. The Importance of Perceptions in

Perception* of the outside world are important elements underlying the policies adopted by any national leadership. The judgments political leadersoot the capabilities, intentions, interests, current policy objectives, and decision-making processes of other countries are often critical factors affecting the enlire range of national foreignactivities: what objectives to pursue, whai means should be employed, what plan seems best, what reactions to expect, etc. Indeed, some scholars believe thai perceptions arc almost as important in international relations as objectivefter all, ihc interpretation of realily thai any observer carries in his head is realily lo him, however partially and imperfectly it may be drawn from actual facis.

Policies can often be correlated lo the percepiions thai condition (but do nol necessarily determine) them. An example of this in Soviet foreign policy is the contrast between ihc predominant view of the US held in Moscow during Stalin's last years and thai which emerged under Khrushchev. In ihe mosl frigid Cold War period ihc US was helde an implacably hostile adversary. Soviet policies reflected little expectation of reaching any meeting of minds or undertaking cooperative actions with the US, and diplomacy between ihe iwo stales was limitedrosty negotiationsettle issues left unresolved al the end of the war. With Khrushchev,ew image of ihe US emerged. "Sober" realists were perceived as exercising greater influence over US policies, and withew American willingnessccommodate al lean some Soviet interests. control over East Europe, the buildingtrategic nuclear capability) was discerned Soviet policies accordingly turnedxpanding areas of cooperation as mutual interests were articulated and emphasized.

Apari from this broad relationship, however, ihc links between perceptions and policies are often difficult lo describe. Causation, or even determining which occurs first, policy change or new perceptions, is especially complicated In the example just given, ii can be argued thai Soviet policies on major issues shifted relatively soon after Stalin's death) and btjert the basic Soviet perception of the US had changed appreciably. It can also be argued ihat the US-USSR relationship could not warm up very much orustained period until the Soviet perception of the US had shifted. In either case, however, the main point is that percepiions and policies cannot get very far out of line with each other.

Because perceptions and pulicics correlate, it is not surprising thai competing percepiions play an important role in policy debates:

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pmqxioni thai livoi ihrit own pTfcrtnm far Sovki pobcfundermine tnr optionrivi' argumrmi '

The more moderate image of the US associated with Khrushchev, for example.not without challenge Also voiced in Moscow hh an alternative perception thai siressed continuing elements of American hostility toward the Soviet system, in proponents cautioning that ihe "nature of imperialism" had no; changed. This occurredenod of debateluster of Soviet national security policies that coincided with international negotiations about ihe nuclear test ban question. Owing to the uncertainties inherent in the international environment, differing plausible intelligence pictures or ihc world can easily be constructede used a> weapons in debate

B. Soviet Recognition of Mitpercepnonroblem

The Soviets have given Utile indication that they regard perceptions ai being, in themselves, key determinantsation'i policies or mnpercepiion as being an important problem in interstate communication

Geoegy Arbaiov. head or ihe Institute or US and Canadian Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences, has discussed the susceptibility of perceptions.

images, and intentions u> misinterpretation and

ihe heightened importance of this

problem in the nuclear

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C. The Influence of Preconceptions on Perceptions

Perceptions are usually thought of as whai is sensed or received as information about the environment. But how events are interpreted {and, for that matter, which events receive attemion ai all) depends not only upon ouuide stimuli; it is affected also by what is already believed in thehus, what are normally considered to be perceptions are in part derived from already existing conceptions, or preconceptions. There arc no "pure" perceptions in the sense of uninterpreted or objective representations of external events.

Soviet perceptions of the world outside the USSR arc affected by several binds of preconceptions- One kind is the body of fundamental assumptions or beliefs about the world (international politics, the process of historical change, ihe sources of wars,erived from Leninist ideas that have long been accepted virtually as articles of faith. Another set of beliefs comes from accumulated pastmemories and lessons drawn from the nearlyears of inter national involvement experienced by the USSR. There are alio psychological factors derived from cultural influences or political experiences that affect the thinking of Soviet observers of the international scene (including the top political leaders) by making them more or less suspicious, cautious, bold, persistent, etc'

These assumptions, lessons, and attitudes, in combination, obviously influence the formation of perceptions. They actens through which information about the environment, is passed The relevant academic: literature uses the concept "belief system" to describe this mix of preconceptions, and usually attributes toreat, even governing influence on perceptions* In effect, Aowonc looks at things goes far Inward delcrmining aJinl one sees.

O. Sources of Distortion

What kinds of inaccuracies flow from these preconception* and the filtering process? First, there is the problem of information selection. Information that does not fit easily into existing beliefs is likely to be ignored, given inadequate importance, or distorted.oviet analyst who believes that the policies of the Communist Partyolony are controlled by the Communist Party of ihe metropolitan country will tend to discount or not look for signs indicating that local reasons account for those policies.

A related problem, especially true of Soviet thinking, is that of projection. Inubjective belief is takene objectively real.oviet perception of much latent sympathy and support for the USSR among the factory workers of other countries may persist with little solid evidence to support it and even in (he face of contradictory facis.

Values and objectives also canistorting effect on perceptions. Soviet preconceptions organize information about (he outside world not only with respectha( is believed about the behavior of other states, but also with respectonceptions of Soviet ideals and foreign policy aims. Perceptions of the world environment must, after all, be somehow related to Soviet interests. Thus if there is positive value seen in economic cooperation with the West, more .mention will probably be paid, and greater influence attributed, t6 those elements on the other side willing to do business with (he USSR.

Personal andoles and interests also affect perceptions. For many years elements of the Soviet military establishment have generallyerception of greater sirategic threat from ihe US than have other pans of the Soviet political system because of (heir special responsibilities in countering ft. There is probably working hereonfusion in assessment between whatinable danger, in lighi of (he enemy's capabilities, and whatiobablt our. based on his likely intentions. This kind of correlation is not invariable, nor is ii exclusive: some particularly dire ouilooks regarding ihe US threat have come from non-military sources Bui ihe influence of an organizational outlook can be an important factor affecting perceptions.

It should also be noted that perceptions, even distorted ones, can sometimes lead to changes in reality. In the early poslwar years the Soviets greatly feared political unity in (he Wes( dircc(cd against the USSR. They sought to consolidate their control over lands ihcy had occupied during the war before ihe West took steps to challenge Moscowposition ihcrc

By their acts in carrying this out, ihe Soviets helped to hasten and guarantee the emergence of the very unity they feared and to end their own hopes of additional advances elsewhere in Europe in the near term.

Perceptions Change

As has been noted, preconceptions tend to admit for consideration information that confirms them and to block out contrary data. Thus, both preconceptions {especially basic views regarded as principles) and the perceptions they shape resist change.'

Yet perceptions do change. In individuals (his usually resultsradual, cumulative process of feedback and occurs only when (he underlying beliefs affecting perceptions have themselves changed. Actions basedarticular perception may not work out as expected, orew perspective comes into play."

While some beliefs may become fixed in one's mind and mold perceptions for many years, experiences, roles, and other factors affecting personal developmem over time can alter perceptions significantly.

For nations, the coming to powerew generation of leaders might bring the influence of new perceptionsolicy problems. This factor may be saidave affected ihe change in the Soviel image of ihe US that occurred after Stalin's death and could affect the post-Brezhnev period. The coming new leadership in ihe USSR might be more truly called post-Stalinist in the sense that ihcir basic attitudes are probably much more affected by the era of limited US-USSR cooperation than by the earlier period of unremitting mutual hostility. They might also hold somewhat different conceptions of Soviet national interests that could lead to new views of the world

Self-image Affects Perceptions

Just as one holds at anyet of beliefs and perceptions about the outside world, he also has an image of himself. This self-image can. and often does, affect his views of the outside world

The Soviets portray the USSR as ihe most progressive State in the world, politically, socially, and economically, and iis policies as supporting the interests of workers and peoples in all pans of the globe. This self-image underlies the mistaken Soviet belief about latent proletarian support ol ihe USSR cited above. As Niebuhr has pointed out, this kind of error introduces an element of unrealism, andource of misperception.ational outlook:

t indnwlnlt. lend to drttit* iSemirlxt -hen theyelf-image to iheihM obscure* ihe dotninam motira of foreign'

Self-deception can resultonfusion of the normative roles that Soviet leaders think the'r/pljy in international affairs and the actual roles itplay. Unquestionably normative roles help to energize Soviel foreign policy and provide goals. But they can also gel in the way of realistic assessments of how much influence ihe USSR actually wields and whal kinds of Soviet actions will be tolerated. Soviet leadersuickly discovered that they could not represent themselves as the vanguardevolutionary order and at the same time expect cooperation from existingnhe USSR may find itself even more subject to the strains inherent in its contradictory multiple roles: how effectivelyontinue to represent itself as revolutionary, progressive, and the patron of the "have-nots" of thb world while seeking friendship with the US, recognitionich, advanced nation, and stability in certain regimes and regions'

Self-image alsoey part in forming percepiions ofo the extent Soviets actually believe that ihe USSR stands for virtuous positions, they are led also to believe that opposition lo it must be driven by dark motives.his kind of self-righteousness probably affects leadership as well as public outlooks andasic obstacle to Soviet acceptance or normal international lelationships.

II. THE SOVIET APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

A. How Important is Ideology in Shaping the Soviet Outlook?

Ideology serves several functions in the USSR. It prescribes goals and some guidelines for actions to achieve them, and it is usefulhe puny in moinaiini; the society to work and live within ihe

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of orthodox behavior. But it has been no less important as an analytical key lo Soviet understanding of then this role it affects the thinking of the political leaders as well as otherhe key questions are to what degree is this the case and whether the influence of ideology is waning with time.

It has been argued that ideology is especially Important to the Soviets in dealing with foreignhe basic reasoning behind this judgment is thai:

eu rdront ai home than in the days of forced rnduMrialiiiiiion. bothuideolicy andalvanizing force spurring extraordinarynd new proof of in relevance and important* it lougbt abroad;

domestic attain the contradiction! between ideology and rcafiiy are apparentll Soviets; there it ten tangible experience involving Ihe outride world and doctrine is suit used there to fill in gaps in Soviet

the interikiiotat political environment it replete with umtHguout itiuaiioro and conflicting data, (be role of canting belled in organizing data and forming interpretations it enhanced.

But even if these general observations are accurate, they hardly prove that ideological preconceptions alone will determine Soviet perceptions of the world. Perhaps the most fundamental limitation on the influence of ideology upon perceptions is the general and abstract nature of that which Marxism-Leninism hasay about international affairs. Marxism is centeredhilosophical conception of mankind and on social phenomenahin, not among industrialized nations. Neither Marx nor Engels had anything at all to say about peaceful coexistence between socialist and capitalist states, now the central doctrinal and actual problem in Soviet foreignnin applied ihe Marxist critique of capitalism to ihe international system in his tmptrtalttm: 7A* llighfitSlagf of Capilaliim, which is still the bask doctrinal text for the Soviet view or the world, and accounted for international phenomena such as economic imperialism and Worlds resulting from capitalism's projection of internal

nbierien lirtior thai cynicnm iM he intellectual hallnuilthigh Suviri oTkiili and thai pragmaiic. non-xtealnin and lari-nlx Latum largely determine ifirir views, including those on inicm;iiiiinalpoint qui that parly buirauerais arc ihe nxni likely nf allm retain diKiriiwircor at least

p-tiilvby ducirinr. because ideologyrincipal ik-rtii-nl .ifl ami Nans loi Iheii'v contradictions onto the world scene. Bui only this monograph, some additional writings of his, and the actual policies of ihe Soviet stale during its initial years before his death provide present-day Soviets with basic doctrinal guidance.esult, Soviet ideology can guide Soviet interpretations of international events onlyroad sense. Much room is necessarily left for the other beliefs, experience, or current informationnfluence the construction of Soviet perceptions.

The analysts of official public Soviel documents (from party congresses) by Triska and Finlcy bears out this point. Doctrine is invoked more in discussions of broad trends, general expectations, and long-range planning. It has relatively "little operative significance in formulating Soviet short-range or crisis expectations differently from the expectationsheir data also bear out the proposition that doctrine affects the foreign affairs outlooks of those officials who deal extensively in foreign matters less than the foreign affairs outlooks of those who deal primarily with domestic issues."

The general point underlying these findings is thai the more one worksubject, the less doctrine guides his judgments on that subject. Since foreign policy concernsrowing part of the business or the top political leaders in ihe USSR, their outlooks and decisions on foreign affairs should logically reflect more the complexities of the growing number of practical problems that accompany increased international involvement and reflect less adoctrinaloctrine may still be takenuide for the most basic motives of other slates, but it cannot explain ihe details of another state's stance un specific issues. For that purpose specificanalysis of thatnecessary. The longer-run and ideologically purer view of wot Id affairs taken by Lenin from his desk in Switzerland prior to the revolution or by Trotsky in initially assessing the probable work of the fledgling Soviet foreignillew revolutionary proclamations to the peoples of the world and then close ups simply not sufficientl cannot answer all the questions thai arise from ihe large number or relationss that now involve the USSR

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B. The New tmporlonce of Internotionol Relations to the USSR

Soviet internaltonaI involvement has grownumber of ways: large programs of economic and military aid have become established, ihe merchant marine and naval presence abroad have increased enormously, diplomat it and economic representations abroad have expanded steadily, and detente has brought more extensive relations of all sorts with the major industrial powers. Thus it is not surprising thai iniernalional relations are regarded as having acquired particular importance for the USSR in.

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postwar politics naoualitatively in- stage in ihc last Johey have been important, of course, evernd Lenin is cited by Soviet writers as stressing that from the outset "the questions of foreign policy and international relations confronted us as ihe most important" However, even though today the USSR no longer faces an imminent threat lo the survival of the regime, Soviet commentators argue that "today the significance of this issue, far from diminishing, has, on ihe contrary, increased.""

A major aspect of the growth of ihe importance of iniernalional relations for the USSR is their impact on domestic affairs. The Soviets generally regard domestic affairs as very closely related to foreign affairs, and in the final analysis, more important. Bui Soviet writing shows thai ihe intrusion of foreign events inio Soviet domestic affairs has become more marked in recent years;

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Ii is in laci ihe growing domestic impact of increasingly complex iniernalional events lhat has most concerned the Soviet leaders and led them in reteni years lo undertake an unprecedented Soviet involvement in external relationships. Trade with the West is seen as an importantby no meansin improving Soviet economic performance, and in cffeci, progress toward Communism wilhin the USSR is viewed as increasingly dependent on the iniernalional situation. An exampleomestic ideological goal seen as affecied by international evenis is the "withering away of Ihcoviet scholar Fyodor M. Kurlatsky notes that, given an environment dominated from ihe outset by capitalist states, this goal "no longer depended on just the internal conditions, but also on the iniernalionalnd, "today,e notes, iiarge extent" on externalhis continuing need to deal with international affairs, he argues, means thai Ibosc slate organizations involved in foreign relations will have lo continue to exist longer than those concerned with purely domestic matters.

C. Increased Study of

Affairs Needed

Given increased Soviet involvement abroad and ihe greater importance accorded iniernalional relations, ii is noi surprising thai the Soviets have, in recent years, given more attention to the study of, and the need lor additional information about, iniernalional relations, called by Suslov "the most complex sphere of ourhe mosl recent edition of the Sovietliulionaty has entries noi found in previous editions on such subjects as "ihe theory of foreignihc iheory of foreign policynd "ihe theory of iniernalionaln the section on "ihc iheory of the collection and processing of foreign policy information, "ihe editors plead lor accuracy in foreign reportingecessary loot for the policy-makers:

I Ik i.iitin, .mil J rjlmiuil lorriijn polity

<lti ia*noi-iui inly whenmher organs ijlinerlnniim*inrrcti JnfuriiMiion about ihe lunduiiui ;inrlmd tinrlupmeni in the

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AiMithci cnuy echoesords by asserting thai (ircilicling tufchfn events is "one of the tnosi complex

aspc-Us" <if prognostication and points oui ihai the aim of estimating is

ihe increasing erf* ihe cflcctr-cnrii olftanr.iiand ihewe by it of the opportunitiei in in internalituaoon for ihe attainment of iis foteign polici

Thus ii can be seen ihai increasing ihe accuracy c! one's view of ihe world is viewed as having an immediate and important impact on policy.

Both ihe need lor more specific factual information and the need for iis systematic analysis are noted bj ihe Soviets. Ina Soviet wrilcr pointed out "ihe necessityareful analysts of every concrete international situation, of taking into account ihe various external and internal conditions of iishis same charge was placed on

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goimj beyond the need loria and asserting thai modern inter national affairs, "more lhan any other sphere of public life,horoughrgues that "what Vroul'l be most fruitful for ihe study of the new phenomenaystems analysis of the entire aggregate of international* Implicit in these calls lor more information and better analysis is the recognition that ideology dors nnlihe immediate and pressing questions about current international relations

D. The Role of Ihe Institutes

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mformaitrin anrl analysis aboin (he outside world ha* been iiTi.on academic institutes Ihe principal ones ,irehe- Insiuiiti- of the Wot Id Ivconomy andKciatious (IVMvMO. from its Kottiaiiikol.iy N. Inwcmmtv. and the

r

of the USA and Canada (IUSAC. from us Riiglisheaded by Gtorgy A. Arbaluv. Rathonchly journal These journals, logciher with ihc monthlyain, in which articles by foreign service officials oflcn appear, provide ihe mainstream of Soviet commeniary in depth on foreign affairs. In the institute journals in particular much nf the discussion is conducted in relatively non-ideological terms and centers on the impaci ol "newuch as nuclear weapons, which sometime* involve mutual interests with the West and iniernalional cooperation Thus it is important tohow much influence institute-held viewpoints have in high political circles.

The very nature of influenceon-regularized process thai consists of occasional personalthe submission of papers, and other less direct channels and methods of communication makes precise judgments impossible, and thi* would remain true even if Substantially more was known about ihe process Bui expert opinion from the institutes issought by Soviet officialdom, including ihe politbiiro, and the institutesrimary means by which Soviet perceptions may gradually be made more accurate.

There is no evidence of the transmission from institutes lo high policy officials of specific policy recommendations. In faci, institute analysis involved in long research projects and permuted extensive contact with foreigners usually find themselves purposely frozen oui of ihc policy-making processui information, analysis, and estimative judgments produced by ihe institutes do reach importantIMfcMO prepares classified documents for policy officials, and ihis kind ofmay well constitute by far the giraler pan of the institute's products

"hose impression* seem largely based on informed Moscow gossip, believes th;il IUSAC rqioris arc "widely read, even ai top levels of the .Soviel government

In some cases ihc classified in-tiiiuir ptoducls an: general estimates. IMKMO preparedprojection of rin Itin i't I- i.

ky planning siafffwiihEMO reportedly ha* close conlaci) which favorably impressed ihe recipient officeIMEMO hat also reportedly been lapped toraft document forh CPSU Congress (lo he held beginningn the effect* of ihe "seientihc-leehnical revolution" on the USSR and thenoihcr caws ihr asscttmenis may be more specific and more closely related lo imminent policy decisions

This kind of direct input of analysis to high levels is dearly ihe most influential rote played by the institutes, and it seems to depend very much on the personal siatus of the institutef course, the inaii'i it! they provide isart of the totality of inputs and existing preferences relating to foreign policy thai operateolitburo member makes up his mind In addition, ihe domestic considerationsigh official musi wetgh inio the balance areart of institute-written analysis. But ihe basic detente policy line in recent years seems to correlate very well with what we know of Arbatov'i vtcws>

J

How accurately do public writing* by institute commentator* reikit what ihey prepare for policy officials' There it some indication thatritten for officials never sees daylight in ihe pages of the public iouinals, and in fad Western visitors in Moscow have been told not necessarily to believe thai whaii-viunder an author's name in an open, .inkle represent* his actual view. On other occasions, however, foreign readers of the journals havearticles with author* and gained the impression thai some of these pieces contained sincerely expressed views. It is probable that,1 tiudie* prepared in response to specific official requests may find little if any reflerlion in the open liieraiure, generalized conceptions of ihc

mtum IihyC noted ho- pruud imuiuir ii*Hen are of

ih.ii rmi.id.; of

cii*"i'iIm! rfletl Arhaivttn ihr Omal

ci'iWm <hrS hHrMlrfl iiw-IihonJ tandU both men lo ihe

the fir" Mr

* M'ipiM'i ranU-in S

IMWH lirr.eeiied ihe .Sovel <J ihe una

iniernalionalfrom/mm ideologicalbe relied uponeasonably accurate portrayal of beliefs held by the author At least they seem to accord generally with what is learned in private discussions and are noi contradicted by logical inferences drawn from Soviet policies

It is likely that both Arbatov and Inozemisev, in order to protect their personal and their institutes' roles, are careful not to give high-level consumers product* ihn fmnially challenge their known biaseserest*.*

The -sews of most institute staff members, to the extent we know them, especially in IUSAC, arelthough thereprinkling of dogmatists ami radicals (there issizable minority" who believe in the imminence of revolutionary outbreak* in the West) "Such an image of the institutes may limit their influence among high policy officials, who are prone anyway lo suspect the views of analysis whose main sources and contacts are Western To ihe extent this may be true, ihe potemial existsacklash against the institutes if ihe policy-makers come to believe lhai tl)cy have been oversold or if deienie rum into serious problems Hut, in this age of rapid international change and growing Soviet involvement abroad, ihe need of ihe political leadership for more analysis and estimative judgment* about foreign affairs will persist, and the rote of foreign affair*oth academic and official, will probably continue to grow.

E. Are Soviet and Western Views of World Polities Converging?

A mote informed and less simplistic view of ihr world on ihe pan of ihene which accepts 'he coexistence of various kinds of stain and welcome* the accommodation of conflicting interest* (and noi just Ihe overcoming of those held by oneould seem lo be reasonably closeypical Western outlook on internationaloviet respect for the rokowerrykm in ,ic!eiminini ihe course nf international evenii (as well a* ihe Soviet cmph.'in on building up Soviet militaryeem* alio to fit in ihe Rumpean tradition of Some observers have argued thai Soviet views 'in world potiiK* have in fact moved towardcloser approximation of Western view* and thatpmim .mil intcrcsis have emerged. '*

In dealing wiih problems related lo nuclear weaponshas in faci been the case. Common perceptions of great danger in an uncontrolled arms race and continued high political tension can be abundantly documented for both the US and the USSR. Cooperation, even when forced by external events and undertaken by distrustful and antagonistic partners, docs foster changes in thinking. The partners' concerns are included in one's own estimating and planning, and actions pursued together to advance common interests encourageertainly. SALT continues the process of discussing and defining areas of common interest and outlook begun with the negotiations that resulted in the partial ban on nuclear testingnd nuclear proliferation is feared by both superpowersotential threat to their political position and even security.

ense nuclear arms controlpecial problem that affects the bilateral superpower relationship in ways not applicable to other issues or to relations with other powers Fruitful US-USSR negotiations on arms control continued throughout the Vietnam war when the bilateral relationship was otherwise uneventful and was the leading edge of improvement in relations after the hiatus causedy the invasion of Czechoslovakia (although that invasion did set back the initiation of SALT by moreut the more general Soviel policy of detente undertaken since theeavily stresses the cooperative aspect of East-West relations over the competitive and is the embodimentoviet willingness to accommodate conflicting interests and expand areas or mutual advantage, especially economic, but including political affairs as well

This most receni "peaceful coexistence" campaignogical continuation of ihe post-Stalinist trend toward giving greater attention to common, overarching problem* llmllb socialist and capitalist slates and relatively less to the differences between them. An example of this trend is the basil Soviet attitude toward international law. E. A.rominent pasi Soviel expert on this subject, long argued that there were two separate systems of international law; ihe progressive socialist system and the unjusl. outmoded. Tunkin. now the leading Soviet expert in the field. It<ts argued for more than vc.irs. thai there is one system that encompasses both types of states and is based primarily un agreements between them. This law is called the law of peaceful coexistence. It obviously suits Khrushchev's and BWhnevs policies better than the other view and has become the generally accepted Soviet approach to international law. Anotherncreasing Soviet acceptance of imemational ccc-^omic interdependence and division of laboringle world economic system. There remain capitalist and socialist pans to this system, but massive inflation in the one is recognized to affect the other. The Soviets are careful to point out, however, that congruent intcrnattonal interests do not imply convergence of views or internal policies. Nor does it mean that oil foreign policy issues will become matters of common interest; conflicting issues between states will continue to exist.

These changes in Soviet perceptions are important to note because they enhance the possibilitieseaceful accommodation of interests between East and West. But it would be premature to conclude that the new views are irreversibly gaining ground in supplanting older outlooks that emphasized differences, fears, and hostility, or that the existence of some shared views is just the preludeurther development of Soviet thinking along familiar Western lines. The Soviet historical experience has been different. The political history of the USSRarticular kind of background for Soviet [mliikians The very fact of having lived through the Stalin years, under the influence of an organized, articulate, and heavily propagandized set of ideasostile international environment, Soviet insecurity, and avoiding foreign contact,onsiderable obstacle that even today causes widespread and deep Soviet doubts about the wisdom uf enmeshing the USSR in international affairs and making compromises with the West. Mutuality between East and West-ehas long been anathema in the USSR, where differences between the two kinds of political, social, and economic systems and the unique justice of Soviet view* have always been intoned. Reaching compromises with the West is not an easy or natural process fur Soviet leaders. Instead Moscow has sought to proselytize its views, reject those of other parties as una,cepiablc. and take IHiliinal action to overcome opposing views and the griKt|is that hold them Ihis "tension ofs rewarded by Moscow as the normal condition of world ,Htlilks ami is cxiKacd to end only with successful revolutions in other states. Thus many of the older

ideological categories of discourse will no doubt continueart Soviet statements on internationalreJlccling the hold of concept! developed in ihe Sialinut ihe persistent, il somewhat in term litem attention lo and elaboration of peaceful coexistence docsillingness on the Soviet side loay of accommodating conflicting interestsanner thai is more nearly acceptablehe West and less one-sidedly demanding

There will continue to be problem* of understanding between Easl and Weil-Misunderstandings of language, as in ihe instance of Khrushchev's "we will bury you" statement, are less likely now. but notnd lack of common understanding of concepts such as irusi, which the Soviets say must come first in improving relations with the West while Wesiemen conceive of its gradual development as rclaiions improve, will continue io dog negotiations Bui Soviet percepiions of ihe world have now come far enough away from Stalin-era viewsasis lor hopes lhai al lean some areas of cooperation and lessened tension can be consolirlaled. acceptednormal" pariutually saiisfactory status quo. and perhaps even gradually expanded. "Hie overall Soviet view of ihe iniernalional scene is still much influenced by Marx ism-laminism. and "purer" ideological rhetoric ran sidl be afforded in areas of less thanne em But the Soviet perspective on ihe narrowei subject of interstate relations hat become more inftoenccd by practical problems anting out of involvement with other nations. This taiter outlook does stem now somewhat closerhe Wesi European and American view than il waseurs ago.

IW - . idlUonaj

andm no.

i tn"New iUhki inWwi. XIX., p. JS

"Inheihnugh >ivid In ir> imageryaiil

liwrymiranlai inna* nwah lew aVaawtii andatari im ihe

al noi intended lo pnr-iay ihr USSR at acnn| dandy

in uiiif Ihe "dralli" of ihe US or ihr Wen In

. i. i. nidv (unwryrden lueeal uamlaiion

1 uM hewhen yawrni dors, at

ewamitm idkn firm rnoVr andh in bark

|fl Ijnnt ami ihrrfMwal drmtu

F. The Role of the Soviet Stole in International Relations

Ihe original Bolshevik leaders who seized power in Russia7 were immersed in beliefs and hopes aboul world revolution. They expected radical political changes to occur elsewhere, particularly in industrial countries, above all Germany By and Large they did -aj expect that the Soviet siaie itself would bring aboul thesethey did believe the Bolshevik example might show ihe way for others and ihey tried unsuccessfully0 to exploit momentary military success to export revolution to Poland. They were more concerned with ihe inter national dangers ihey perceived threatening the survival of their experiment than with the use of their newly won siaie power io further ihe world revolutionary process- The establishment of the Communis! International9 was aimed, in fact, atechanism other than ihe slate io implement Moscow's attempt* io foster political changes in other countries.

Successive gencraiions of Soviet political leaders have increasingly stressed ihe importance of the Soviet Male mid of intcrsiaie relationships The stale has become In effect the "supreme' rallier" of Sovietn discussing ihe Central Committer decree of} on foreign policy, one Soviei writer notes that il "emphasized the active, engaging international policy of the CPSUain/lArami futuigttitf ilatt, and on ihe support of all theEmphasisoviet concern with the iniernalional image of the USSR has grown accordinglyAnd for ihe sake of "lhai image surpming Soviei concessions involving principle and domestic affairs have accompanied ihe deteme policy of

A concomitant change in ihe Soviet view of world politics it the increased acceptance of ihr international rdationi system more or less as il exists The Soviet view of how international relations should

riamplr. ike hindlnhc id Ihe Jrvmh ena^ranon- hanVac ihr Mnl nj *va

.he I'ili4l tneba-klavhnmiin deii-.inii.iir, ihel

duet mil imn'idait ihe main |xtini In Ian, it was Ittvtei coneern oti'iwihn<4pliable Kremlin thai in pari led

ihr liakLokf ih>mcii*tv> beirayi a iaarrmikmal (rrmnj and the MMcr

akakfeH drwwir-ritaicdwm easy: ihey nana

rlunai*

rogressed through several stages:tatelessUtopian, pre-revolutionary view of Mara andorld in which, as socialism triumphed in successive countries, states would either incorporate themselves into the USSR, federate into another version of the USSR, or replicate individually the Soviet model;he gradual advance of socialism to include additional independent states, gradually shifting the overall balance againsthe current view is basically the Khtuihehevjan view, the last given above, but perhaps construed even more modestly. The USSR seems in many cases to be satisfied with, or at least to aim realistically at no more than an increase in the willingness of States outside the socialist erjfYimunity to support Soviet diplomatic efforts for organizing international affairs.

This perspective on international relations is practically devoid of ideological content and at variance with the traditional Marxist new that class interest! are more important than traditionally conceived national interests The Soviets have justified such an outlook by, in effect, disassociating the world revolutionary process from the ordinary conduct of interstate relations:

Theii'iaglr.is beiac-nig immungtymuti be clearly irpaialcd (rum the iphnr of inter, national relations between totiajitt ccmnirin and eapiialiii mm.ii-inii which air baaedthe principle ol peaceful

o-it ate rrtatiorahapsart of the largerconflict only in the sense that, at the pres. ent time, cooperative relations arc seen as live best way to advance ihe socialist cause.

G. Changes in the Soviet Approach

Possiblyf increased involvement in and knowledge about iniernational affairs, there does seemlear Soviet emphasis on short-run issues ami intermediate goals Long-term Soviet goals remain unchanged, but they are treated as though ihew rcaliulton is highly unlikely and incffeci pushed farther into the future. As one Soviet writer has put it, ultimate Soviri aims in the basic world struggle will eventually be achieved, but "meanwhile, ii is the ups and downs of ihe struggle thatUu main constitutecontent of internationalEmphasistvorirr.range, specific problems naiurally become the local points of attention

If facts and analysis of specific situations compriseever larger proportion of the data about foreignflowing into Moscow, are not the importance and content of ideologyuideorld politics likelyuffer? Does noi the need for detente between the superpowers perceived by the Soviets imply the depreciation of the Soviet conceptorld struggle*

Some observers believe these questions mult be answeredepresentative statement of this viewpoint, which correlates Soviet policies and perceptions as changing together, states:

TVwi ideotogitcardan

bower* ihe cagMalm and tecialmwhich Ihat not

dictated the eUy-by-day drctiiomhe Kremlin leaden, hat at Uatieir Hunting, it in the proieu of erosion The Kremlin'teing tianllormed at ibe tame lime at iheir mugc ol the word!

Putting off hopes of realizing major ideolcirical aims iniu the distant future isense an erosion of faith Certainly they become less relevant to daily concerns. But the Sovieti have always believed that iheir ideology enabled them to be especially realistic in understanding political events, and there has been an rffoeidapt ideology to important new factors. Thus, ii is notallei of postponing the realization of ideological goals or pulling them on ice. The clearest and most important instance of adjusting deology to international political facts of life was the reviuorusm undertaken by KhruiSchrv inhe impact of nuclear weapons on the Leninist doctrine of the inevitability of war was acknowledged, and peaceful coexistence between Fast and Weil was elevatedosition of greater permanence and

.

Thus some concepts are permitted to erode while others arc given new life. The ideology itself is not rejected; rather, its content is adjusted in response to outside evenn and pragmatic concerns related to Soviet involvement abroadherefore less sharp in ns distinctions between friend and foe and less clcar-cui and inspiring in its definitionpecial, progressive tolr for the USSR Docirinally pure, radical omlooks are possible when events are viewed atdistance Hoi Involvement with those events bringsore differentiated, less radical mix ofhich the dogmatists must nuke room for ihe reviirorusts or lisk advocating ihe reversion ol the Soviel state lo an isolationist posture

This change in basic perceptions is notonscious process,as come about gradually

with time in responsepecific events. Stalin's death) as well as slower moving tiendt The Soviet image of the main adversary, ihe US. has been altered under pressure stemming from the existence of nuclear weapons and ihe emergence of China as an increasingly serious Soviet rival The Soviet estimate of the international "correlation of forces" has likewise changed For several years now Moscow has drawn attentionavorable shift in this relationship, with the principal basis for ibis judgment being the increased strategic might of the USSR itself, bui also with referenceconomic and political trends in (he west And finally, the Soviet image of ihe role of the USSR in this new world political Idling it lomcwhat different in an era of detenie. The USSRew need (or "normalized" relations with major states today and thus cannot itself be ihe direct ageni for much of ihe change its leaders apparently still expeel to occur. The devolution of the idea of ihe USSRontroller and source of revolution elsewhere in the world is accompanied by an escalation of the USSR's roleariety of other foreign relationships and in seeking lotable international environment for further internal Soviet development

III. THE SOVIET VIEW OF THE US: DETENTE WITH THE MAIN ADVERSARY

A. USf oreign Policy: The Nixon Doctrine

As Soviet policies and views of ihe world have changed in recenl years, so too have Soviet perceptions of ihe USasic antagonism still marks the bilateral relationship, and as was ihe case throughout ihc posiwar period ihc US remains lor Moscow the principal opponent of Soviet influence. But the Soviets deled new elements in US foreign policy as Washington adapts lo new iniernalional conditions, noi least of which is the new level ofsiraiegic strength.

The US response to ihese conditions, ihe Soviets believe, is the Nixon Doctrine.2 1USACook on this subject, and itoviet definition of whai Moscow understands the essence of the policy to be;

The 'Nlion Itaeirine" rrjierwiHj *n Jllrmpi by ihr

American lulim;n incominem. undmore.(oni'.iditiixyiv id.ipi inell tooiielmlun iJ farm in ihe worldheHrueiurr of imernaiional

relaiioni. lo ntjfHitc pram*in ihe imper ulmwhile balancing ihcid owninaiWDOll itmt

wMfc ihe lew* erporiede ral

Worth noting in particular ii the last part of the definition It identifies ihr main contradiction ihe Soviets see in the policy: ihe US will be more cautious in undertaking dirrci actions, basing iis policies moreost-benefitealism" in ihe Sovietut it still hopes to keep mosl existing positions intact.

How important, in Moscow's judgment, is the Nixon Doctrine for actual US foreign policies? The IUSAC volume refers to the doctrine'conception of (he Republicanereby implying its possible demiseemocrat were to become President. Bui overall the book stresses the importance of ihe doctrine and contrasts it favorably with the policies of the Kennedy period. The US policy of thes charactrnrrd by ihe Soviet authors as based on "an inflexible foreign policy conception" thai led directlyarge-scale US involvement inhat is happening in Washington, the book declares, is the "formationew foreign policynder conditions of i reduction of American global capabilities.""

Jinai the Nixon Doctrine, that n. ihe present American strategy, has enough impetus to keep ii moving on ihe same line for six. seven or even ten years.

Ii ii possible that ihc Soviet leadership is less sanguine than Soviet academic opinion about ihe prospect of real changes in US policies (Indochina aside)esult of the Nixonestern visitorMF.MO2 was told that ihe official Soviet estimate was thai tlie pioclamaiion of ihe Nixon Doctrine brought "no change" in US foreign policy inifference between academic and official viewpoints should not be surprising in light of the emphasis given in Soviet assessments lo the inconsistency in US policies: "The current foreign policy philosophy of the ruling class of (he USA is profoundly contradictory

The roots of the contradictory nature of US foreign policy, the Soviets believe, are found in certain

"significant shifts in the very structure of international relations:"

growing strength of socialism;

appearance of many new states, attended by greater

complnily in international retalionihlpi.emergence of new economic powers vmong key US allies; -problem in the socialist world, particularly Peking't

polmev"

For Moscow the key elements of the US response to these changes have been:

with ihe USSR;

leu acimtt US attitude, particularly with respect to

militaryreater degree of muttipoiariiy in world

polMici and. with it, tome what different relation! with

important allies;uie of improved relation* with Chinaolitical lever

in bargaining wlih ihe USSR

It is apparent from this list that Soviet reactions to various individual elements of American policy are likely to be far from uniform, ranging from satisfaction with the first iwo to uneasiness about the last two. Because the elements differ so greatly, judging what is likely to be the dominant trend in US policy has proved difficult for Soviet analysts. The IUSAC volume gives several possible lines of development, noting thai more than one may coexist in varying degrees over lime:

adventurism, or the creation of crises in an

attempt to retrieve lost positions with one blow;advantage of ihe development of other couniriei and thereby conserving US resource*.

having divided the world into ftphrm of

inllue nee.and detente "

No doubl the actuality of detente over the last three years is encouraging to Soviet observers, academic and official alike. But many of them have serious doubts about the constancy of the American interest in detenic, and alternative lines of US policy continue toconsidered as active possibilities, depending on circumstances both outside and within the US.

B. Multipolorily

Among the circumstan.es contributingoviet uneasiness is the question of the future policies of key alliesboth superpowers whose power has caused Ihemuigrow their former status as passive and dependent paritiers This is the problem of growing iniernaiional political multipolarity. and the new power centers of greatest concern to Moscow are China, West Europe, and Japan

This image of world politics, like the bipolar image it succeeded, is shared by Soviet andut the implications of muliipolariiy for the two countries are seen as quite different The Soviets believe that the US views this prospect with relative equanimity, some US commentator; even welcoming it. Observers in Moscow view supporters of the Nixon Doctrine as putting stock in the possibility of harnessing this new power to serve American interests. With respect to Soviet interests, however, the prospect is far less sanguine japan and Germany (particularly ihe latter) are remembered as enemies in the last war, ihey have long been US allies, and5 (hey have not undergone any basK political or social transformation! that might make ihem more pliable or friendly. China, the one major power thai did undergo extensive political and social change and in factormal Soviel ally, has become now ihe USSR's most bitier enemy All these states lie on or close to Soviet borders It it litile wonder that the Soviet imagination is inclined toward contemplation ofxii'asr" poiiiriilit iei and thatn articulating Sonet concern on this score, concludes that

Wornrmatiapaiar hatant* oftuch now haw

idespread eireutalto" in the Vlni. and ibe policy anting out of ihnr notions, reprrtennng cwn tally one of the modern nrianli nf Ihe old powi-on of urrnglh'polity, will in lime inevitably begin, il we lomliWr ihe longer term prospects,etard the pnxrtteidetenteItH'rtl ihem to ex. ireoieti narrowor Moscow clearly the most imponani new "pole" in the international political realm Is China. Chinese hostility toward ihe USSR has become more stndeni and politically important in the ll'O.ense it enables the US torimming back of international obligations with lessened concern thai new opponunitiea for Soviet gain will occur and be exploited by Moscow:

In* lb*he IVfc. the WjiAanpon ieadm par*redthe |mw ihai. as Long as

ihe prima* Oma is pretmrdleadmrup i<

Cr* wdla tatalatay* ihe IW* in aoy entn liiiMliuri tnwrvmg rarWary sravoraw b>r

alUe.

Moscow has also claimed il sees evidence of growing collusion between Washington and Peking. Juxtaposing US non-interference In the Paraccl

r

Islandi aiapute and Chinese silence regarding US plant (or Diego Garcia, an authoritative Soviet assessment of Chinese policy declares-

Itvn nparallel bnma ihr Mtm of ih* FRC and

ii of rbr ui!

uamforrnaiaHi of 'anutul undeiiundiie. mi*uer* tally thrn1 dnrojn Imo ipherri of intlwiur. which i : otrnlial ihreilhina'i nriflhboii "

As tor other poles of international power lhai Moscow sees Washington counting on within the framework oT'the Nixon Doctrine, "in fust place of importance the authors of the concept of 'selectiveneis' unanimously place two other 'power centeri' of the capitalistEurope and Japan1 "he Soviets attribute US interestew role for Japan in pan to ihe more pressing economic competition Washington faces in:

Not only lh( I'cniagon bui aim ihr monopoltei at ihr USA art iniereiird lhaiake uponilitary iole in tht far I'-aii Burdened by military nmrcim.ouldin livalry with ihe United Siair* in domexK and International market*"

The Soviets also follow US debatesto which other countries or areas are worthy of US commitments and refers lo places such as Souih Korea and Israel as "strongut none of these are seen as carrying notable -eight as another major focus of power

With respect lo US alliance relationships, ihe Soviets believe thai ihereoniradiciton implicit in ihe Nixon Doctrine: the US sees strengthened allies as new pillarsoint enterprise, bm some allies may wish to use their new statusursue national interests independent of US wishes. Western alliance relationships were furihei shaken by the consequences of the3 war. The Soviets believe that this event caused "very serious and diverse changes" in ihe"changes in the relations between the developed and the developing stales, between ihe Western powers themselves, and social and political changes within many of theses an example of the changedoviet writer noted that four major USBritain. France, andnegativelyhe idea of using force in ihest over the oil issue. The chief political factsmergeesult of the worldwide economic upset among ihe major powers are seenecline in US authority among its chief partners, and the "Heady establishment ofa self-assured WesiAt ihis time the Soviets do not believe thai the shifting of power among key Western countries has toned itself out, and they watch intently for indTtationi of change "

C. The Domestic Basis of US Foreign Policy

nmiim ltrestei ihe primary importance of domestic factors in determining the foreign policytate In ihc Soviet view one of the main "epicenters" of ihe foreign policy reappraisal undertaken in Washington in theas

(hr -icoie dometiii potimal and social emu in Ihr lOunlry. Forfini lime in die pmiwai yeaii ihe weakeiuni) ol ihe world iMi.ino.li of the maintowerlearlyiiifnlJvl, ,ia internal diffnuliies"

Much or ihe Soviet commentary on US foreign policy revolves around the relative stienglh of various domestic forces that affect foreign policy decisions, the debates among them the roles of individual and institutional actors, and ihe current political trends

The Soviets believe that ihe consensus which underlay US policies during ihe Cotd War has broken down, andew but shifting and unstable airangrmeni of domestic politx al (on es has aiisen on questions of foreignhe Soviets recognize lhai internal contests and dehairs over US foreign

nbjrci of inrreotrdanada Arbaiov'

utxtiuic recently .trtditl Cati.tda lo ill lilk and ArtiMiiv Itai imrt ili.il In: mmtWV*'

. V

policies have occurred in (he past. Bul the crucial question for ihe US then, in the Soviet view, had been biii< to use force to attain policy goals, not, as now, whrthrise ii. Ii is this shift in the terms of the debate in Washington that makes the Nixon Doctrine appear to ihe Sovietse an important change in US foreign policy. The Soviets believe it came about largely for pragmatic reasons: the old policy was simply becoming less effective and too expensive.

Theeme in Soviet commentary about the domestic basis ofthe new policy is instability- This factor naturally concerns them most wiih respect to detente. American postwar policy in general is describedfusion of ami-communism andhile this latest phase has involved greater emphasis on the latter element, it has not overcome the former, and thus the possibilityhift back is not foreclosed. This is one of the main things the Soviets have in mind when they raise the issue of making deienic "irreversible."

In addition to internal struggles ihe.Soviets believe recent international events such as the revolution in Portugal and the collapse of (he US position in Indochina further unsettle the domestic basis of US policy. Owing to these events,harp discussion is taking place in the United Slates regarding the direction of the country's foreignhich will lead toainfulith so much at stake regarding the outcome or this debate over US policy, ihe,Soviets have given much attention to the key US participants in il.

J. The Executive. Probably no single US actor has so engaged Soviet attention and hopes as the President and ihr key executive branch officials involved in foreign policy-making. In Moscow's view the executive branch and business have been ihe twin main pillars ofthe American interest in detente, and the greatest Soviet efforts to influence the domestic American debate about detente have been directed at them The foreign policy of the largest capitalist state has long been seen in Moscow as controlled by big business. But increasing weight in recent years has been given by Soviet analysts lo the independent role of the US executive branch in formulating policies:

ihr gnvtf omental methanitm ctfablnhed tohe foreignof American imperialiim It it sett beginning 10

eticrvbrireil influence on it "

Soviet observers give President NixOn ihe lion's share of ihe credit forosihve American policy toward improved relations with the USSR. His prior reputation as an anti-communist madearticularly effective leader because the domestic political right was reluctant to attack hts position And the image of his power thoeie all the brighter in Soviet eyes because many in Moscow felt that he had neuiraliied potentially significant opposition and overcome policy inertia and ideologicalursuing detente (Reportedly Moscow was also impressed wuh how he was able to resist public and congressional pressures for rapid withdrawal from Vietnam and to maintain an even, gradual disengagement policy.)"

This attribution lo President Nixon of considerable domestic political stiengili andey role inositive American attitude toward detente led the Soviets to be particularly shocked by the outcome of Watergate. The main Soviel suspicion was that anti-detente lorces pushed President Nixon fromublic lecturer in Leningrad expressed this ideaay that probably reflected accurately the general Soviet reaction

Oneu. tW> of the HXaaVd Vaamgaac afuur. tailaJtaVararwanl a> Naaa began la ewabaah helm, abr Sonet laaon ptaa hit mat to Ike USSKaftt -ah Chaarmannd proeme ratenuen ol nalinH naiawi iteatBvni foe US

Sonet

ptarda columniste rived dark forces and motives behind Watergate'

t Ineallluw. olad on* not been

;ibleee.looming behind ihr dubnon*liti*s

mine in. much moee lubwantii *oreei -hirh

;ire wimming againti ihe tide and at* unwilling to become ret untiledungrier which ii taking iilaee from the mill wielaiaiain of tentlon."

Thus while pro-detente lorces remain more powerful than those opposing deienic. the departure ol President Nixonhift in the IIS domestic corrclaiton of form to <lie dctiimeni ol the former grouping

More sophisiaraird Soviet appraisals ol Watergate have been made t_

I am quite aware that those Americans who currently oppose Niton are not necessardy rapptatrd tond it is likely that such reports were gnen to Soviet political leaders Butntirely probable ihai Wate.gatease where the general Soviet outlook, which lends to *ee hidden designs and forte* behind everv evenl.

overcame possible specific intelligence reporting to ihe contrary, and high Soviet officials probably even today harbor suspicions of the kind described above about Watergate

There is no doubt that, whatever its causes. President Ninon't resignation was interpreted by the Soviets as at leastpause" in the advance of detente and as beingajor setback. Almost nostalgic references to the former President have occasionally been expressed in subsequenl Soviethe general Soviet feeling is that Moscow had worked out an understanding with President Nixon and at least knew where he stood. This element of stability in bilateral relaf ions is fell to have beenell-informed Soviet newsman has said that it is difficult for Soviet leaders to accept (be new limitation* of US executive power and that they view the increasing influence of Congress asuch views may reflect patterns of thinking drawn from Soviet political culture as much as natural Soviel concern for superpower relations

The Soviets have watched carefully to seethe new President would have on USassessing the initial months of theill rat ion, including the Vladivostokihe trade agreement setback, the Soviets seemtentatively concluded that President Ford isasolicy of driente asIne reason for this change in liveihe Soviets believe, is not ihni theof the new President is different, bul ihaipowerarshal support for detenie ismost unvarnished public statement lo lhisbeen provided by Darn! Kruninov. ihe chief the Soviet in the

immediate wake of the collapse of2 trade agreement "We now notice thai Ford has less backbone than we could foresee and is more dependent on pressure groups than one could have Imagined ""

tven alier ihis setback to deiente the Soviets felt that President Ford worked sincerely and hardore favorable US trade act ihan the Congressut the rest of the eaecutive branch is not leen by the Soviets ai entirely ofind Arbatov claims to believe that the middle level of the US eovernment bureaucracy has changed lis irwimrnt* in the direction of more negative views regardiiaj thehe image of an internally cnnteniious executive branch was true of

President Nixon's administration as well. Some past Washington "bureaucratic scandals" involving dramatic rcvelalions (ihe Pentagon papers, the US "tilt" in ihe Wl India-Pakistan war) have been intcrpreied in Moscow as resulting from "ihe keen rivalry in the ruling clique of Washington and the tiruggle for power andpecifically referred to in this context are the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs But while these elements are believed to have existed during President Nixon's tenure, ihe Soviets did not judge them capable then of seriously threatening detente.

rii. The most serious internal pressure threatening the US commitment to deiente comes, in Moscow's view, from the Congress. The Soviets paid much less attention to Congress than to (he executive until Watergate. Arbatov reportedly was in temporary disfavor for wrongly predicting that President Nixon would ride out Watergate, andesult of that experience the Soviets decided to examine more closely the role of Congress in US domesticne clear sign of greater Soviet interest in influencing Congress was4 parliamentary delegation visit to the US led by Borisandidate member of ihe Politburo, in hii capacity as Chairman ofthe Foreign Affairs Commission of one house of the USSR Supreme Soviet. It was the first such visit undertaken by Moscow

A major change in Congress seen by the Sovietsew willingness to challenge foreign policy positions of the executive, combinedew sense of power in the policy-making process. This is particularly true of the Senate, where any major treaty suchew SALT accord mull be approved, and was convincingly demonstrated in (he trade bill controversy The new Congress is seen as more liberal in composition, and therefore more inclined io emphasize domestx needs

Bul the Soviets are still very reluctant to predict what specific tendencies will be imparted to US foreign policy by the newly liberal and assertive Congress. One domemr trend ihai has been noted is the growth in the number of Americans who declare themselves independent of the two major political parties. This, along with the low level oft iiciparion ins cited as evidence ihai ihe basic siructute of the two.party system as ai- inhe likely consequence of this for

r

policy is instability. With respectey dc'enic issue, one Soviet account tinticiiuiiigingly that "even" Senator Thurmond expressed the belief that an agreement along the lines of the Vladivostok formula would be approved by the Senate But while this is taken as evidence thai ihrrr is broad agreement on the value of SALT,broadening of tne zone of thes noi disiinguiihcd by its stability and is capable at times of rather rapidly changing.esides, in the So-'let view, broad agreement alone is noi sufficient toolicy. Well attuned to the poweredicated minority from historical experience, the Soviets believe thai il was an underestimated, "vociferous lobbying minority" that thwarted the US trade bill."The same could happen ioI.

Another specific local point of Soviet attention has been the "liberals" in American politicsought ofpossible 'illirs of Moscow in promoiim;

drtrntr. ihc liberal and intellectual communities ofUS air now thought lo have an ambiguous and unstable aliunde toward ihcrbaiov has publcily ndtculed liberal politicians, scholars, and journalists who cnticue defence as political faddists *

i tendency associated wiih liberals

is brlirvcd in Moscow to be an unthinking, or "involuntary" threat io detente arising simply because nil foreign policy (jucstioiu air bring pushed in the btiilmround "

( lluun-'- The most consistent pro-deieiiie force in ihe US is now sern by the Soviets as American business. cs,>criallt big corporations. It is paradoxical that this should occur just when trade has become relatively less important to detente, as compared to

the expectationshe Soviets hare always believed lha! Wrstrm capiialbiscould lie ainacied lo expandmv; business relations with the USSR

ninn'n teaches thai imperialism is

constantly setting new markets abroad to absorb excess production, and the imageapitalist thirst to exploit the untapped Soviet market seemed to be confirmed by Western investment in the USSR undertaken in the early years of the Soviet regime. 'Ihe Soviets hope to cultivate US business interests related to detente and use them as allies of Soviet foreign policy in affecting the American attitude, public and official, toward detente."

D. The Bilateral Superpower Relationship

The Soviet preoccupation with the "instability" of US foreign policy iseflection of Moscow's concern over the future course or US-USSR detente. Soviet politicians and commentators alike are deeply suspicious of the depth of the US commitment to detente and alert to the smallest piece of evidence indicating US doubts or qualifications on this score. The struggle between pro- and anti-detente forces hasasic dividing line in virtually all commentary on the US side of the detente process, and Soviet rhetoric and policies frankly aim at strengthening, where possible, the "realistic" side in the US that favors deiente The Soviets feel this efTon is necessary to keep the US from backsliding to Cold War altitudes and policies "

The Soviet concern for dctenie has been ihe chief reason for the restrained fashion in which ihe Soviets have treated recent political and economic problems the US has encountered. The Soviets fear that these problems will displace dctenie issues as priority items on the American policy agenda. The US will not necessarily feel compelled lo throw detente overboard, the Soviets realize, bui Washington mighi halt furiher progress in the superpower relaiionship while aiiempling lo stabilize its economic and otherlicy fronts.

The Soviets perceive anti-deicnte forces as well organized and slill quite strung, fhr upsetting of the administration's version of ihe US trade bill is cited as evidence supporting thisrbatov has noted American articles about the careful attention and hard work of the Jewish lobby and Senator Jackson's office in shaping the finalhe Soviets have been prone in the past to stress the "hard" elements in ihe US decision-making process, and this tendency persim today Tlieie is probablyertain amotini of unconscious attributing of Soviet attitudes to US policy-makers

Whatever their sources, the Soviet concern over "zig-zags" in US deiente policies, ihe constant emphasis on ihe need for imparting momentum to deienic and for making detentehe doubts expressed about ihe US capacity foronsistent foreign policy over many years, the great importance attributed to (he2 agreement on principles to govern bilateral relations, including explicil recognition of "peacefulthese are based in great measure on ihe fearard-line, anti-Soviet policy may recmerge in the US at any time.

Despite the persistence of these themes in Soviet commeniary. the Soviet assessment of the balance between the "realistic" and "hard" elements in the US, and thus the Soviet judgment as to the status of deiente, has continued to favorhe IUSAC journal published an article in the Spring5 asserting that:

no the wlwlr in American society foreign policy Italian hucrowded out prejudice and recognition of theolicy bated on oppotiiion to ihe CSSKbecoming all ihe more

The major Soviet leadership speeches ofhile they did not provide such specific assessments of US political opinion, stressed the possibility for further dctenie and gave relatively linle attention to ihe "hard" elements on ihe US side.*

The moments of gravesi Soviel doubls about this judgment occurred in the Winter. Somewhat at sea about US altitudes after President Nixon's resignation, the Soviets were shaken by the baitle over the US trade bill in the US Congress Moscow fell it had made significant concessions in accommodate Senator Jackson and probably also fell ii had been reasonably forthcoming on SALT at the Vladivostok summit by agreeing to drop the forward-based systems issue and to accept equal aggregate ceilings on siratcgic weapons Bui the publicity surrounding live alleged Soviet acceptance of the Jackson amendment proved too much lor the4 CPSU Central Commit iceromyko letter denying Soviet acceptance nf any numerical quota for Soviet emigration was made public afier this meeting- and the passage of the final act, with iis limited credit provisions,oviet renunciation of its obligaiious under2 US-

'.ShcficrlHidit .mrienice aueminn hi

iliew' furtl> Ih.iri ihe ihIkh

USSR Trade Agreement. Arhatov ha* portrayed the US attitude in this whole episode, as expressed by congressional actions, as that of coming illusions, the chief one being that of misjudging enthusiastic Soviet statemenis about the possibilities existing in trade as Soviet weakness."*

4 Senator Jackson was portrayed by Soviet commentators as riding high, and pro-detente forces in the US were viewed as being on the defensive. But infter the Soviet retaliation forresirklions in the US Trade ActC

ssessed Senatorbate as too narrow for him toAnc ' as

further studies have

e were elected, Senator Jackson would be limited by "objectivehis overall Soviet judgment of the strength of pro-detenie forces in the US it framed in terms of years. Thus setbacks late the one over the trade btbt are by no means excluded from the Soviet view of possible, even likely events affecting US policies-

While the Soviets are anxious not lo project an image of weakness and there are Soviet limits to the concessiom Moscow will make in order to further detente, it does seem clear (hat the Soviet desire to improve superpower relations is very strong. One of the unarticuUted Soviel attitudes thai seem lo underlie this urge is the notion of condominium leadership of world polities This idea goes beyond the Soviet desire forat the US is not going to attack the USSR, or more broadly, that US and Soviet interests can be accommodated in potential hotsputs without approaching the brink of war. It alsooviet wish lo prevent third parties from drawing (he superpowersonfrontation These more "drlerniveoncerns remain unresolved in Moscow's judgmem. at least in any permanent way Presumably, success in making detentewhatever that might mean in concrete terms- -would satisfy these concerns. But the Sovietsaised the issue of moving beyond dctenie toward "the creationolid generalhis goal is seen as possible for the present generation of Soviets and Americans, and its key aspects are outlined as*

(nirxc ol the ihreai ol -or.

ere* erf an cfleeuw slobal vruean oltotmv.

an ir,

lawg al tbe etaiagital emu.

iit an .me'national divitton of laborruly

and long.levm ham "

This scheme is partly visionary and partly bused on current Soviet policies. But the role of (he tu|ierpowers inorld would clearly beie machinery thai would guarantee (his kind ofowhere defined by (he author of the preceding passage. Bul Marshal Crcchko, (he Soviet Defense Ministerolitburo member, has provided one possible mechanism forlobal status quo by asserting relevance Tor the anti-Hitler coalition in today's world:

thee USSR Meat the UaateeJ Sum of Acenca. Cerat Bniaan, France.other caoiiiaatutaied iheir effort, lor the devroetion of the mmu.Hl roiuVracd iheof eflfiive political and military cooperation of tialei vvilh tHTeren* tocial niterns In

pmrni'tay cirtumiiancn lie tarred utaomeril ol Ihe

ciptmr of dm eooariatda anl th* chawiag fromf uiefj'

leuona haveonportan? meaning "

Grechko may have China uppermost in his mind as the power most needfuleminder of this example of US-USSR cooperation, bul the relevance would easily be the same for any power which arose in the future to challenge Moscow.

This Soviet altitude remains an inchoate and implicit element in the Soviet view about world affairs. Il is in part wishfulesire that the main adversary become somehow sympathetic to ihe Soviet view of world politics and cooperate in doing away with threats to thef only the US and USSR would gett is also virtually impossible lo express publicly without alarming third countries, and was explicitly rejected by the US in the case of (heJ war. Vet the impression remains that Ihe Soviets would welcome an expansion of bilateral cooperation on international political issues with the US

E.Personal Touch

One aspect of formal interstate relations that the Soviets have increasingly used and ascribed importance lo in recent years is summit meetings. Meetings with American Presidents are viewed as particularly critical because of ihe importance of the superpower relations hip, bul summits are also valued in relatKien with other key. France. Germany, and Britain Soviet commentary stresses ihe idea that summits haveeguUi and normal fixlurc ol world politics. Iirci-hncv has referred to themsignificant feature of internationalnd Kirilenko has asserted that improved relations between the USSR and the US were

"achieved primarilyesult of the fthcnl two summit meetings" between Brezhnev and President Nixon."

The individual personal and political characteristics of the opposite number whom .thc-(iencral Secretary meets arc considered by the Soviets to bedocs not simplyational viewpoint that would be voiced by anyoneop political post. Brezhnev notedn the midst ol Watergate and soon after the Middle Last war. thatot will depend on who in the USA will be running the ship orhis emphasis on individual leaders did in fact seem to affect the course or Soviet policy ins Georges Pompidou, Willy Brandt, and then Richard Nixon left office in fairly rapid succession. All were major summit partners of Brezhnev in detente diplomacy,ause in the major East-West negotiations at the lime probably reflected in pan Moscow's need io reassess the status of Soviet relations with ihe countries ihey had headed-

There are several logical reasons why the Soviets value summitry, especially with the US. mosl of them self-evident (eg ihe special urgency for dealing wiih Ihe nuclear armsSoviet writer claims lhat il replaces Ihe former system ofthe ability to setlle particularly knotty problems that lower-level discussions have noin addition, ihe Soviets also feel personal meetings are useful in assessing the intentions of Other panics:

A frank dMunmn nam rail) dor* noilimioaie ibftlii'i* r> of opinion, bvi it Ii al-ayi useful because ii helpsnderstand belter ihe uilrnlioni and inleieui of Ihr Ol

Information acquired in summits must of course still be evaluated, complete candor is noi expecied Bui such information is authoritative, and ihc impressions ii creates in ihe minds of Soviet participants carry extraordinary wcighi because of their source and ihcir direci impact on the topmost leaders

Whether ihe effects of such meetings go beyond giving theigh-level and current reading of ihc other side's positions, motives, and resoluteness and actually affcci more basic Soviei beliefs about the nature of ihc American (or another country's) poliiic.il system or of ihe fundamental differences between the two sides can only be speculated about. Certainly the- Soviets aic more clearly aware of the limits onS President can deliver in carrying out his sideargain after the experience of the trade agreement imbroglio. But they probably remain convinced thai ihe administrations of both Presidents Nixon and Ford negotiated the issue sincerely and worked positively in attempting io obtain US trade legislation acceptable io Moscow. This certainly was Brezhnev's position3 when, in private discussions with another world leader, he portrayed President Nixon as striving to gel trade barriers removed and not responsible for any shortcomings in the American attitude toward detente."

In this limiicd sense there seems lobean clementust" involved in summitry. There is no room in ihe general Soviet outlook for "trust" between the two competing social systems. And to the Sovietsubjective" effort by an individual,S President operating largely within his own domestic political system, must still contend with (and cannot by any means be counted upon to overcome) "objective factors" that constrain him But thereegree of Soviet confidence built up in summit meetings that good faith is being exercised by the other side and thai, while tactical advantage is still sought and used by both sides, what is finally agreedetween top leaders will be taken seriously by ihe other side as anresident Nixon's agreement lo use only Brezhnev's interpreter in private summit meetings was inymbolic gesture implying trust in his host.

The main limitation of this kind of "tiust" is thai it is personal and thus Ireaied as important by relatively few persons. Brezhnev himself probably feels its impact most because of his participation in summils and tends more ihan others io identify it as representing ihc position of the USut those noi involved (for example, regional party secreiarics) probably give little value toifferences in attitudes over detente, such as (hose rumored to have occurred in the4 CPSU Central Commit lee. plenum, flow in significant part from these differing assessments of even the limited value of "trust" in international eoniacis.

-hen charisma rombinesresident* favorable

-mimp iturm.illy crnjrndered in personaln'ii-.i' will) iheitni Kennedy managed toilin lorhile In die mind- i* in.populate ,iliih Kli'iidii-liev ilirtiiiich hi>al imafc Hul rvrn

iniKt.niii ihr <lf<i'i* ,i( ihnil'i" tit'tcliravihiii'uniii rilnd .nuti lr.iu.ilc

I'l

Revolution is one of transitionorld dominated by capitalismorld dominated by socialism. Inransitional world capitalist elements coexist with socialist elements, but in an atmosphere of struggle between ihe two sides. The capitalist elements are thoughtelong essentially to ihe past, but ihey are judged to be still quite strong in practical terms and capable of formidable resistance to their inevitable demise. The socialisthe USSR foremost among them, are Idenlified with progress, peace, justice, and the future, and are judged io have acquired great strengthelatively shoria historicalto be steadily growing. Thus world politics is pictured as dynamic, and the measure of the global contest -and the key determinant of inihe iniernalional "correlation of forces "

In assessing the strengths of the two sides, the Soviets attach central importance to the power of ihe principal stales, especially iheir overall economic and military weight avorite statistic cited by the Soviets in support of ihe growing power ofs the percentage of ihe world industrial product manufaciured in the USSR and other socialist countries (currently claimed io be aboulThe rapid economic growth of Japan and Germany prior to World Warand its consequences for their foreignimpressed Lenin, and many Soviets credit the forced pace of Soviet industrialization inith their survival of1 German invasion Today, apart from ihe superpower balance, it is once again the rise of West German and Japanese economic power thai most concerns Moscow in this connection.)

The margin of gieaier military and economic strength enjoyed by the major powers over others is seen as giving ihem panicular political weight. While professing to believe in an essential equality for all stales, the Soviets also assert "the actual situation is such that in iniernalionalhe great powerspecialhis is thought io beue in matters of peace and security

liner ihe teal means ol entunitg prate anil, ai lite tamr ilmr. trrof oar are Am and loremoal u> ihc hands of ihe greatn Iherrtarc. prarsicet, lafcri the rouiseirlinitnury agreement on queiniini among ihe great [town, uncr ihr ati'criir of agreement among ihem lenders useless, andeven harmfirl ihe adapriw of

dtnuni eanaarmnf; >airrna<ianal prnbteaa Hi ai' order

Bui if economic and militarytraditional basic dementi of nationalviewed by the Soviets as the bedrock (acts of international life, other, lea tangible social and political factors are also considered of vital importance to the inierruitoetal correlation of forces. These may be internal, such as national morale, the degree of cohesionociety, or the strength of political leadership Or they may be international, such as the amount of unity or disunity within an alliance or the impact of an external factor. nuclear weapons, the energyuch factors take on particular importanceorld in which the threat or use of force hy the strongest nations is inhibited by the risks of superpower confrontation and escalationhe nuclear level

The Soviets believe that these intangiblemorale, discipline, determination, iron leadership on the Soviet side, combined with disagreements and irresolution among the Westernthe USSR to surmount its manifest economic and military weaknesses in the early years of its existence and in the Cold War period ol Soviet ttrategic atomic inferiority

In recent years the Soviets have emphasized the theme that the international "correlation ofnder the impact of major new factors in world politics, is changing in their favor from ihe balance that prevailed during the Cold War. In fact. Soviet formulations note that ihe balance has already "clearly" or even "radically" shiftedignificant degree and that this movement is continuing Some leaders and cornmentaioti give the impression that this most recent change has somehow tipped ihe world balanceotional midway potni. as though "socialism" now possessed more than halfotal world power pie.

Theenin, who did not doubi ihai Ihe limr

would comethe nvri national cnnMlidanot of the ntiarloiuiwfwbtr of rwriev wewld eaeetiK

aViniiv infWntc on worldai come due In the thud

uu.inn of the Wih Century tocialxmvan*.drtu of

d drve'-araavent. and the iea"ucncr of il* coordinatedf ibt rouniiiei of ihe tocialtu community on ihef

nii ItIjnphaiii addrd )

Other statements are more modest in their claims, but most convey an image of politically significant change in the international balance in (he Soviet favor, reflectingense of Soviel well-beingerception ol Western decline.

There has also been some Soviet academic attention to the concept of an intcinational balance of power understood as an equilibrium'

t-tii any otfaet erncm. iheofrelation)rn-ltm) toward tcM-iireieivaikiri and tUretopmenc The lirv

icndentv a ruined through ihe tsrtnaaoniable

court ibrium of forcesThis concept ion is. of course, anathema to orthodox ideology, as it can be taken to imply possible denial of the main goal of eventual worldwide victory. But similar statements may appear more frequently in Soviet commentary if strategic nuclear parity continues indefinitely and no striking wave of leftward political changes appears.

In contrast to the most recent major shift in the international correlation of forces, the expansion of Soviet power in East Europe after World War II, whichsharp turn" in the world balance, the current shift is perceived as gradual; the tfuggle of the two orientations in international politics is so intense that movement forward is proceeding veryhe slower pace of change fits better the current atmosphere of detente. The eventual goal in the minds of Kremlin policy-makers may be the kind of Soviet control ihai is exercised over Easi Europe. But this kind of dramatic shift is not clearly foreseen for the near future, and in fact there is concern that such an event occurring in one country, such as Portugal, might well bringtrengthening of reactionary forces elsewhere andet loss worldwide. Instead, the proximate aim seems to be to encourage incremental changes that will align the foreign polictet of additional countries with Soviel positions and thereby strengthen the Soviel side and weaken ihe West on the diplomatic front.

In the past ihe Soviets have had hopes of significant gains in ihe third world. These hopes have largely given wayelief tha( ihe smaller-scale, incremental change now envisaged by Moscow can be encouraged both in ihe third world and in the advanced nations The Soviets believe that in this way both international and internal political structures that contribuie lo Western strength can be weakened

Already NATO has been damaged by ihe clash of Greece and Turkey over Cyprus and by potiticat problems in boift those countries and between them and the US. US leadership of ihe West is less authoritative, with japan and West Europe viewed as

now coequal in certain. internationalhe Organization of American Statei ii no longer viewed by Moscow simplyool of WashingtonIn addition, internal changes within capitalist countries are seen as shifting the various individual balances of domestic political power leftward, with the emergence of leftist governments in West Europeanore real practical possibility than at any other time since World

The general tenor of Soviet commentary has been that the favorable shift in the international "correlation of forces" is continuing. Put this process, as well as the factors that underlie it and the roitsequrnr.es expected to flow from it. are not viewed in Moscow wholly one-sidedly. For one thing the changes that have occurred inre not yet consolidated and irrevocable In tho critical regard they differ from the marked Soviet gains after World War II. which arc judged now to bend unlike them, current advances are neither terriiorial nor, in most cases, governmental changes. Even the long and expensive Soviet nuclear missile buildup has not assured continued strategic parity as the military balance remains hostage lo potential future US advances.

In addition, those factors promoting Western disunity are subject to repair. One Soviet view holds thai the US, once it takes (he decision to rrinvigorate NATO, will be ableorce necessary changes in Portugal and Greece to achieve Idhe Soviets further recognize that their ability lo disrupt any serious Western efforts to promote unity on financial, energy, or other issues is minimal

Moreover, the new patterns of world politics are

not all favorable to the USSR. The defeciion of China hat forced Soviet leaders to resort to strained rationalizations in an eflori to maintain an image of undamaged "socialist" strength. Thus, China is consideredave "temporarily dropped out of the common struggle for the working-class cause" and to have "in some degree prevented the socialiii system from attaining Mill more substantial uaccess."m

Tokyo's newfound, though still urtdrveloped sense

independence has moved Japan closer to China than

to ihe USSR

Other general trends, rioted intt and West, have mixed implications The growing power erfn-.tti.it countries at present disrupt* mainly

Western economics and international politics. But if more of these countries acquire nuclear weapons, they will increasingly be viewed as potential threats to Moscow at well. Nationalism hasarce (hat has upset the relations of third world countries with the advanced West and has caused problems for NATO But il has also curbed international cooperation among Communist parties and Soviet success in furthering East European integration.*"

The moil important possible consequences for Moscow of this impermanence of the current change in the international power balance, at least in (he near term, are (hose affecting dctenie. Soviel commentary lauds (he end of (he era of Cold War confrontation and the "fundamental restructuring of international relations" as steps promoting peace. How have these comeccording to Suslov

thehange in the coervtanon ofhearena in law* of peace and axial-ant undcrtiei detente And thia factor ii conMantly active, and i> truly of lhan

But,oviet commentator notes, continued detente for ihe future has not been assured:

The world situation it itill noi tuffieiently itaMe and itetain client inaitaie of transition which can lead either back to the cold war or forwardining andjuu peace based on

The fate of detente is criticaloviet calculations because deiente is seen as the policy besi able to bring about future Soviet advances internationally. In the past, world wars have brought about the great changes in the world power balance by making possible ihe Bolshevik victory in Ruwa and the Soviet advances in Fast Europe- But the Soviets recognize that in the nuclear age war involving ihe superpowers cannot be viewed as leading to similar changes in (he future. Thus, for the Soviets, deteme underlies future favorable changes in the international "correlation of forces" as much as ihe current favorable balance underlies deienic

B. Tho Current "General Crisis" of Capitalism

Soviet commentary5 indicates (hat detente clearly remains ihe main Soviet foreign policy as Moscow approachesh CPSU Congress There have been signs, however, thai the Soviet consensus backing the policy is less solid, or ai leasi less generally enthusiastic than wat the case in theh4 Central Committee

plenum it laid lo haveong hard look ai deienie.omewhat more "sober" approach reportedly emerged from that appraisal "'Some ol* the public defenses of the policy have been almost too passionate, as though extraordinary efforts were required to sustain detente in the face of potentially serious opposition.,M

Underlying the Soviet doubts about detenteview of the current phase of iheof capitalism. The Soviets believe that inespecially since the3 war,of economic, social, andhas thrown the West into disarray.are ambivalent about both their assessmentsoutcome of this situation and what attitudeadopt toward it On the one handryake advantage of itandpolitical and economic positions.also realise that such actions on iheirthe crisis itself in the absence of suchseriously threaten

The central point virtually all Soviet commentary makes is that the current crisis is unusually deep and general. The deterioration of the capitalist system is seendefinite qualitativend is depicted as representing ihe worst situation for the West since World War II. Suslov and others have even compared today's situation with that of"

The curreni crisi* is viewed as gotng beyond an ordinary cyclical disruption because ilombination of several different crises, economic, monetary, energy, ecological, intnn.il political, ideological, and in the international relationships among major industrial nations and between them and ihe lm-developed. raw material-producing states '" The main crisis is economic and ishree-pronged problem involving inflation, recession, and unemployment. Ponomarev has characieriied the overall combination of crises as "unique in the history of postwaror him. (he Wesicrn economic problems represent an "unprecedentednd "never before have crisisconomic and political, dornestic and international, "so powerfully affected eachnoremtsev has written that "ihe struggle for rawnly beginning tond one of his insinutc'a staffers has offered Ihe judgment that Ihis problem, already of "an unprecedrntrdly acute international politicals likely In continue as il is based on "long-icrm factors of an objective

Il is not surprising ihal ihe Soviets see the consequences of soesicrn dislocation as being potentially veryhe class struggle within Western counines is seen as sharpening, and at ihe height of the Western energy crisis ofinter. fNinonsatev declared thai "at any moment in one or another link in |ihe capitalist!ituation could arise which opens the way io fundamental revolutionaryome high-level Soviet academics (Sobolev and Inozemisev) privately foresee the emergence in France cr Irai, of leftist coalition governments including Communists within the neat ten yean, and they even speculate on ihe possibility of civil war in these counIries within the same limen discussing ihe key focal points of the mounting clast struggle, I'onomarcv4 listed the capitalist countries first, ahead of the formerly colonial areas and the anti-imperialist movement. "*

Bui if such beliefs are in fact held by some Soviet official! and academic experts, thereumber of indications that more modest implications are currently being comiderrd in Moscow as well. The tone of leadership pronouncements on the "general crisis" has been generally rest rained

^^Jdescrioeo

the curreni Western situationpassing phenomenon,"and in general recent Soviet opinions, expressed in conversations, attribute considerable overall resiliency io ihe Western economic system.'" One authoritative public article emphasizes thai ihe Wesi is taking active and effective measures to deal with its problems

munopotr tmirifruiue ii in nprrtrnccd. cunoing. and

remy "

has created .

is "cnminulf nnaroniif ihn nwinamsari and adapting u

tooe-hewna."

haslrastf, fa"pohmal. andsrnaffk-,-

-it ita<aaaamcs.

a mi*. inihe drujopanem el

ihe generalapnahimhe irgaidcdlobal wahrnanf of

A recent IMFMO analysis emphasizes that, despite ihe continuing and deeply.rooted diHercnres between countries supplying raw materials and large-scale Western importing nut ions, the laner are capable of retaining jeers* in raw in.sirn.ils through SI ill-existing

EO,

international economic mechanisms and concessions.'" Another article has offered (he judgement thai "il ti perfectly believable that capitalism will be able lo overcome ihe current period of crises and

The difference between the overdrawn and the restrained views can be eiplaincd in three ways, all of which are probably accurate in some degree:

itrt mm quiiTumlt iifnt-ivddSer (ran

public poum -hath are mad* parti, fee propafudi

'mora. Ihin tp innnni iW CVilm aperitvK* tonaSSSSSSaSaa -to" in the tola-Tad of the natrrnatiorial

Communal movement about ihe iilue of "ihe eoonanl prrparednetl of Ihe revutut ionary vanguard and thedrriai and not Inisr ihe boldest meant of struggle thotald the tit nation requireore eeilrictcd document pointing out that the clan enemy not removed from powerirokecaedaduaUy.

exiiu debate between two or moreonet >mw hai changed over time; whereat Ponomarrv memionrd the possibility of "rrvoluiionaryine itear laterhe danger from the right at become grcaic ""

It was virtually inevitable that Western economic and political problems on the scale of the last rwo years would upset the Soviet calculus of detente Detente as originally conceived in Moscow, with its emphasis on the development of long-term large-scale economic relations and increased political cooperation with advanced Western nations, presumed (hat (he West wouldublc trading and negotiating partner. Bypassing any claims that the Soviets can solve modern economic, scientific, and technical problems uniquely well and by themselves, some Soviet commentators have acknowledged ihe need for more international interdependence between East and West:

the nature and wale of iheac ptubtuni ate aucb thai then

practical solution cannot be lovrat waaaa Iheel a

tingle uaie orroup ofemu eltom by everyone are reo/awed here-*

Bui the Soviel interest in real economic interdependence outside the socialist community is largely limited to relationships involving the USSR with advanced Westernnd in this area the recent disappointments in trade relations with the US. although partially made up for in deals elsewhere in the West, mean lhat (he economic benefits expected from detente forlanning period musi be calculated in more modest terms than was thought previously.

In addition to ihese economic factorsoviel reappraisal of live rationale for detente, possible opportunities for more radical, quicker political gains are seen to be more likely, at least in (he eyes of anyue believers" in world revolution siill existing in Moscow. Such opportunities might be seen as requiring bolder actions, perhaps bolder than detente will permit.

^Jied (na( not enougn is ocing oone to taae advantage of the Western economic problems"*

Yet the Soviets have thus farenerally cautious approach The depression of, (hey recall, brought to power Adolph Hitler as well as Franklin Roosevelt, and recent Soviet warningsew fascist danger note the special riskseactionary swing in ihe current age of nuclearn addition, the Communists and other leftists in (he West arc judged in Moscow to he unprepared for bold action:

the pobmal mai-iity and degree of oeganuation of the

Borkl-o; etna and tht fmnrviSiancethe other uraia of working people are Ma.'to make fad vie of the malum* of ihe abyrrtwe factors of ibe namof tociarsm and Wa rrtoiute advance lo asocia*

iriiem.'"

The touchstone of Soviei commentary on the current stage of the West's "general crisis" has been at least as much the possible adverse effects of the crbis on detente as the possible opportunities the Western condition may offer for revolutionary advance. The most complete authoritative expositions on (he "crisis" are more in the nature of efforts to steer detente over the shoali of ihis unexpected phase of capitalism than exhortations to scrap deiente and seek expanded political power. Advocates of detente have seemingly been able successfully to make the argument in (he Kremlin that detente has both helped to make the "crisis" possible and stilt remains the best Soviet policy for exploiting il and further improving (heorrelation of lorces."

C. The Strategic Balance

At the core of the international "correlation of forces" is the military balance between the USSR and the US, and its most important aspect, in (urn. is the strategic nuclear weapons balance The current Soviet leadership hag apparently concluded thai the USSRosition of strategic parity with the US as a

basii for in foreign policy {Ii is noi clear whether Moscow intends or hopes lo move beyondosition, although il is unlikely thai il expects io be able to do so easily or toon) This is the principal meaning of the Soviei strategic weapons buildup of the past ten years Khrushchev may or may not have been willing to settle lor some versionecond-strike strategic capability; his successors dearly haw rejected that course.

The Soviet leaders clearly will not tolerate beingtrategic disadvantage comparableheir position in thehey believe that the US must be made lo know unequivocally that ihe USSR will defend its interest* no lest tenaciously than the US. Minimal security could be bought lor less But parity shows Washington thai the USSR i* willingay the full measure of costs necessary both to insure its national security and to support an active foreign policy.

The Soviets apparently believe that ihe US could not confront the true coniei|uences of nuclear war until its strategic advantage had been erased:

As Mac a* the leader, of the iatpniaku pown had aon aeornit weapons, and a* sea* as ihey brfceted thai ihey pollutednuilrar mceemaf)ihe Soti Uruo. rhry dad noi ihwwdeserae. bu rf rolaitg bact'

andpllilliilj-mn

The Sovieti have stressed ihe importance of the explicit US recognition ol equality between ihe two superpowers made at2 summit, even more so than ihegreement* signed at the same time. They believe that thi* recognitionhange in USrom those ofnd lies al ihe heart of ihe US acceptance of detente; it is seen as based on ihe ohjeclive circumstance of strategic parity, not simply on "goodS altitudes may not remain constant on this course, bui al least il will be more difficult for US leaders to revert io older altitudes and use them lo junify new arms programs:

The reerapMion by Use United hair* of ihc prioapte* of

ptatrttl coraiwr-ate. ewtaaVy and eqaalin tela:am

ihr USSR inmeasure lauiisa'ni CiretnKerf attcyn to achieve even ihr

appearance of vrMegsa-ee ihe Sa"Ws UMoa '"

Just how the Soviets judge the current strategic balance is not known For the eniirc postwar period ihe Soviets have generally been behind in terms of effective fortes in being, and (here may be someof leelings of intcnoiily even inio ihe present period, despite impressive Soviet gains. There have been some specific indications that the Soviets do not feel they have actually caught up. Arbatov has even argued (hat they feel behind in every respect.This may be true, but such an observation is so clearly self-serving as to be impossible to evaluate. Il is likely that thereange of Soviet opinions aboul the strategic balance, each tendency stressing particular elements in ihc overall picture and containing its own implications for Soviet policy.

The Soviets have had problems in judging US strategic doctrineen lions. Even mutual deterrence and the valuehreshold between conventional and nuclear wars have caused ihem difficulty, although both arc essentially accepted in Moscow. The Soviets should have an advantage over US observers in putting together an accurate assessment of ihc adversary because of the availability of information on American doctrines and programs. Bui though this may be iruc for existing capabilities, there is much to suggest that considerable Soviet uncertainty exists over judgments as to US programs and predictions of the future balance. Another problem resultserceptual asymmetry in which the motives of the US are viewed with extreme suspicion while possible threatening implications of Soviet programs or statements are noi considered, or if raised as issues, are rejected out of hand. Even the US doctrine of strategicuide for US programs was felt by at least some Soviets touphemism for superiority.

V. MOSCOW'S PERCEPTION OF THE SOVIET ROLE IN WORLD AFFAIRS

The Kremlin leadership probably fecb that it can view the current Soviet position in the world with considerable satisfaction. Much of that satisfaction derives from past accomplishments Victory in World War II,ears in the past, ranks as ihe major trial ihe nation has successfully withstood*

The socialistored it Is liable and invincible The Soviei Unionotld power ohose inleinationalnd position cojld no loni|ei be ignored. Socialism (rora world system covering vast trrrltory. .

That victory, the Soviets believe, earned for ihem ihe legitimate rightajor share of influence in European affairs generally, and tn Germany in particular, as well as to the territorial and political spoils gained in East Europe This sense of legitimacy, of having alieadj paid ihe price, underlies Soviei

lenaciiy over the Berlin issue and European collective security.

There isoviet feeling of satisfaction connected with having weathered the uncertainties and vulnerabilities of the Cold War. By surviving in the crisis-ridden postwar competition with the US without losing the positions gained during the war and by risingosition of rough equality with the US, the Soviets believe that the USSR hasapacity to sustain itself and growangerous and unpredictable environment. This basic achievement is of considerable importanceeople whose sense ofi other great powers and cultures has been great and whose outlook on the world has been marked by extreme suspicion and distrust. It is also important to Ihe regime, whose sense of permanence has always been subject to internal doubts and whose recent reaction to what it interprets as an act of international discrimination (US trade legislation) reflects still-active memories of Western intervention in the Russian Civil War and the lack of US diplomatic recognition

Part of the current Soviet mood alsoense of momentum in the USSR's favor. 'Ibis isatter of growth, in both economic and international political terms, relative to the US and the Westublic political lecturer in Leningrad recently told his audience that it was difficult to say which country, the USSR or the US, presently had the most influence on events in todaysince the US has long been considered in the USSR lo be the world's strongest nation, as well as ihe chief Soviet adversary, thisas it was expressed in practical, realisticimmense meaning regarding how far the Soviets believe the USSR has come up in the world. Such an impression in the Soviet mind seems also to validate the conceptrogressive historical march by Moscow, whether this attitude is interpreted in nationalistic or ideological terms: "Capitalism has lost the historical initiative, which has firmly passed to the world system of

There is considerable Soviet national pride involved in these beliefs of "having arrived" andense of forward movement. The image ol the Soviei slate abroad is felt to have been enhanced by evidence of technological and economic prowess, such as Soviei space feats, and of iniernalional political weight, recognized explicitly by ihc US in publicised summits anil officialoviet international prestige is felt to be basedore solid footing today than was the case in Khrushchev's day. Bluffing, blustering, and spectacular but incautious political moves arc believed now to have aroused rather than impressed adversaries and to have bought little lasting influence tn other countries. Concentration on and steady progress in internal and close-to-home development has been stressed under Brezhnev. While major economic tasks (chiefly related to increasing productivity and quality) continue lo exist, the Soviet economy is fell now basically lo satisfy domestic expectations, albeitodest level, and toufficient base fortrong military capabilily and an aciive foreign policy. Much attention has also been directed at better integrating ihe socialist communiiy in Europe.esult, in Soviei eyes:

The international poailUin of the socialiu communiiy hat never been as solid as no" Its authority in the eyes of the peoples of the world has never been so high."*

Notwithstanding the degree of self-confidence the Soviets deriveense of past Soviet accomplishments, from the current problems in the Wesi, or from their advances in strategic capabilities, there remain clouds on (he international horizon a? viewed from Moscow which circumscribe the scope ol actions that might be undertakenxercise ihe newfound Soviet weight in world affairs. Chief among these isroblem that adversely affects the USSR in several important respects:

"loss'* of China from ihe tociausi "camp" damaged ihe USSR's image In dse wot Id a* ihe nucleus of an always-increasing political lo ice and fragmented Ihe inieinalKwa: Communist mo>rmenl as an instrument of Soviet foreign policy,

Chinese challenge is not only teiioui bul npeiales on

several levels, military and political as well as idcologital. and no abatements in tight;

ii already mi Ihe path of beller relations wllh the US and Japan, leaving die USSR ihrman out" of Ihr

Pas air

emergence of Chinahird "pole" in inter naiionul alfans reduce* ihe potential for (avoiable rffens of increased .Soviet jiiwtei.

Oiber factors in international relations represem ambiguous elements for Moscow thai do not now indicate clearly whether ihey enhance or diminish the prospects for Soviet gains Economic problems such as the cneigy "crisis" affect primarily Wesicrn slates, which are more integrated into Ihe world economic structure, hut they also have their effects on ihc USSR

and CEMA: "socialist countries are affected by iheae problerm to ihe extern that they aiTect our externalFor example, Sorjet leverage in then ii reduced to the extent that Arab Mate* can uie the oil issue to pressure the West directly regarding Israel.

These and other problems are substantial ones that inject much uncertainly into any Soviet estimative view of the USSR's international role. Using such problemsasis, one could construct an imageorld that looks quite risky, even hostile to Moscow.iew, if it came to predominate within the Kremlin, could be expected to affect greatly Soviet foreign policy, perhaps bringing about an extreme policyut the Soviets have dealt with China and other major imeriiaiional problems foe some years without adopting extreme viewsotal world picture or guide to policy, and there is little reasonelieve that from their standpoint the world has recently become sigmficamly more hostile.

Instead, the main recent changes have been the two major factors affecting the international "correlation ofvariety of international and domestic economic problems currently unsettling the West and the emergence of the USSR as the generally accepted strategic equal of the US. The latter is particularly important. If live Soviets have not in fact caught up with the US in strategic military capabilities, they have nonetheless made impressive strides in this direction, especially in nuclear missile strength, and have successfully created in Western minds an image

aha* bee. exprened -hutuantibeetente larnprwd availe>yrmnpi moaxbryubbftrd rcfwtartyd. .al*r

raani other > product!, kepi tcxrrt (raan Weilern

iHieipoexleMtl and mayhaw been read bvand panttnei docuitei Soviet lorrarn pokey and anraei

ihai ihe USSR"again encircled by aiine or potential memieiH* charfhma. and be deon ihe nonoma: lorn r* ihr

aim. budget made norruaiy by die daneerout imrinaoorxl

en>rfonmeni He (mure* the IvoOt pohty ol mint. io dealiilioul altering policin toward olnn area! and nr.cn"

that the benpolicy wouldradual irlsiaiion ol inter national leniioni. combined with developmentr*lir ctvrtc thai the Icaderehipilien undertaking He urges that concestiont be nude un lUirapFan iiaueiienrthen the image of ihectpomtblr glialandounieract what he km ai glowing ami %oviel

and VWoo't political and moral iiolaiain inKtnn on Oriain fVobJemihenlir, of <h*

mX.p..ailabk

mB Hty itfl pp VMV ol rough equalily and continuing vitality. Thus il it not premature lo ask how parity maymay already haveattitudes toward ihe USSR's role in world affairs.

The principal effect seems io have been some lessening of the fears about the possible anions of oiher stales that have preoccupied the Kremlin for much of its existence. Other major powers may not be seen as changing iheir basically hostile attiiudes toward the USSR and potential international threats such as nuclear proliferation are not resolved, but these problems can be faced by Moscow with more confidence about the capacity of the USSR to deal with them and with less exaggerated concern for their effects on Soviet security and interests The USSR need no longer fee! so strongly thai il is inferior or an outsider in world polincs. Since insecunty hasajor factor motivating past Soviet policies, the emergenceewood might well be expected to lead to new policies This may already have occurred with the Soviet adoption of detente as the main theme of USSR foreign policy.

There is no necessary logical connection beiween parity and deiente such thai the former should bring about the lalier. Greater Soviet capabilities could be expected to lead, after all, io more assrriive. demanding behavior. But if Soviel blustering over Berlin, pointed assertions of entirely adequate defenses, deception regarding missile programs, and overblown expectations of rapid advance in various areas or countries were in reality motivated in large partoviet sense of dcfensivcncts and insecunty.ogical policy concomitant of increased capabilities and sesf^orifidence could wellolicy of more active international involvement wuh less need for the old detenseia?^ismv

F.vcn if increased self-confidence has been an important factor underlying changed Soviet perceptions of the world and of apptopnate Soviel policies, some of the old suspicion* and sense ol external ihreat remain

^JJ stressed

tin nrowih ol Soviet influence in ihe world, Sutlov spoke strongly on the theme of vigilance.'" Patterns of thinking and attitudes from the pan are not easily surrendered

More fundamentally, Soviet feelings of inferiority and insecurily deriving from Moscow's perception of other nates and of the current balance of power are

no! ihe only determinants of the USSR'* foreign policy. Theic rood of foreign policy are many and deep. Tin overall Soviei interpretation of poliiici in generalroceii of conflict prepare* all Soviei leaderi io expeel anli-Soviet motives to play an important part in Ihe formation of other countries' policies From the beginning the survival of the Soviei regime was expectedependreat extent on Communisl success elsewhere The continued relative lack of such success mean* thai major potential threats to Soviet security remain in the world, evenewly confident Soviei generation In addition, the same ideological goals and jutfifkaiion* thai ihe regime usesustain itself and its role domestically still affect Soviet thinking about foreign policy.

Such factors lie at ihr root of the difference between the Western and Soviet views of dcienie. The West seeks assurance that the USSR will give up ihc goals of advancing direct Soviet political influence in other countries and open Soviei society io what are regarded in the West a* norma! peaceful relations with other countries. Iniernalional detente, il is hoped, will then become in effect the ultimate goal of Soviet policy. The Soviets, on the other hand, see detenteean* of making ihe world safer for the USSR and of expanding Soviet influence Lenin is sometimes quoted to this effect: "any peaceundred limes greater and wider the path for our

The apparent unily of leadership support foreace program" has been impressive, ail the more so because detente teems to impose some restraints and costs on Soviet foreign policy Detente is viewed more as ihe best wayermit the maturing of conditions thai will further Soviet influence abroad thanirect instrument of Soviei action. It thusigh degree ol patience on ihe part ol ihe USSR. inlowci (and, foi Moscow, hopefully surer) advances are accepted andare mare modest than was the case under Khrushchev. Paradoxically, the USSR expected more and ran greater risks then, althoughlearer disadvantage strategicallyi ihe US. than has more recently been the case under the cautious Brezhnev, despite the emergence of near parity In broad terms, ihe Soviets might be said to have profited from international experience* in learning that rapid advances in peacetime are seldom possible and (hat working largely within the existing imernational system is more likelyerve Soviet interests than frontal challengesther states or to the system itself.

There isertain open-ended quality to the Soviet detente policy, The eventual victory of "socialism" may still be assumed by the Soviets as historically determined But detente with its gradualist approach and uncertain implications for Soviet society itself, can Kjrcdy be viewedure path to success. It* ultimate consequences simply cannot be foretold with assurance. Success in fostering an atmosphere of relaxed tensions will not. in itself, bringramatic reordering of the globe in (he Soviet favor (despite Soviet rhetoric about the "fundamental restructuring of internationalven if achieved, il will be cause for satisfaction, not triumph

Planning for and managing ihe Soviei role in iniernalional life ini, in ihe favorite Sovietcomplex" task. Moscow's perception of the world as enemy is changing; but it has noi been replaced by one of Ihe world as oyster. Although the Western countries are experiencing serious economic and political strains internally and internationally, the USSR can see no readily apparent way to exploit current possible targets of opportunity without at the same time running ihe risk of galvanizing Western will and unity and reviving an Easi-Wcst confroniation In the late of these conditions ihe Soviets have so far been realists and recognized lhai things cannot be changed quickly, and they have therefore come to accept the prospect of an indefinite period of coexisirnrr with the West

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mil Genu. "The Continent) ore Moving [rieeo'v'novo

ct-C

Cf. A. Bavin, "Thet

Provda,

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13-

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. I.

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Original document.

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