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Aflo Two Year* of
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!Ii . I Political Outlook
The military Junta Ihil replaced Salvador Allende remalruIn control ifter eompkimg two yein In power on September II. There is every reason to expect that the junta, or somethnuj like U. will nil) be running Chile two year* hence. Neither Hin IntemitloniJ outewt nor the grave econor.ikt muM deal with have produced any tubiuntiil wavering in the Pinochet government'* determination to follow the course It hat marked out In mkiuc, thb caHi for maintaining an authoritarian ityle of rule and letting it* own pace for any taunt of aecurity measure* or of restriction* on political activity. Pinochet'! reported ourter of four Influential civilian advisers- all exponent* of the hard line-mayoil Hep In the directionore moderate approach.
The regime mil command* the backing of the tnflienllal upper clatse*ajority of the middle and lower middle cusaci. The people of the pooreit economic atrala. who *upported AJIende to ruhvartly, rum been rendered apathetic by their preoccupation with the *truggle to rurvive and Intimidated by their fear of the timed forces. The political partie* have largely been Uknced: those on the left hare been outlawed and the other* have beenespite itrong rupport from Moscow and Havana. Chilean* in exile abroad pose no direct threat and many concede that they have little hope of overturning the government Unity within the armed forcet wrn. awured aiurther wrkHrt oVtrnor* Hon In the political or economic rituatton. We do no ocrwe thing* worsening lo the polnl that that unity would be threatened. There b. In sum. no base of opposition fromucomful challenge to the authority of the present regime could be launched.
For the frnt time atnee aeWng power, leading military officials apparently are beginning to discus* theoliticalubfect that had been ihunted aikle by the moratorium on all political activity and the need for emergency economic measure* after the coup. Crowing International crltlctimew encouraging economic Indicator* may be prompting President Pinochet and hi*
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thought to (he kind of political structure they win: to MtihinJi in place of what (hey hm termed an outmoded system otMcoiogjcalheir Idcai about what thould transpirehe yean ahead are vague, however. sufsrstlng that the path toward any tort of institutional reform will be long and arduous. Pinochet hat frequently asserted that the armed forres thould not relinquish control for aome time to come, and he has sllll nottmelrbk for political "normalization,"
Contradictory statements bygovernment spokesmen surjest (hattile consensus about what type of political and legal system shouldommission has been at work since3ew constitution to replace5 document, but completion rsong way off. Pinochet has announced that prcrrtskmslstatutes In certain specific areas an In preparation. Although some official*onstitutional referendumheir optimism suy be premature,
Pinochet provided his thinking on Chile's future political structureelevised Interview In September. The president said thatew constitution he saw room for no more than three political Tartlet. He clearly Intends to exclude the Communists. Socialists, and far leftist fsellout of other parties. Senior army generals have raised (he possibility that these parties would represent the conservative, centrist, and moderate leftist Beg* menls of the political rpectrum. Pinochel's statements east some doubt on whether thb last category would Include the Christian Democrats, the country's largest and best organised political entity. What docs seem certain is that the military will sef strict guidelines for overseeing any future pelillcal process. To avoid what Pinochet termed the "unrestricted ideological pluralism" of many smallubetantlal minimum rtjutrstion would be required for IciaI recotriillon.
Some political eafle groups, notabty the less extreme members of Allende's former coalition, have reached an agreement with left-wing Christian Democrats tonited front. Thla unity will probably enable them lo espitallre on the widespread anti-Chilean arntimcnt abroad in IsoaMa of undermining the regime at home. The esOes procabiy cannot mobilize much support within Chile, and their pro pa rand lima wil amount touisancehreat to the Junta.
The government's outlawing of the leftist parties that supported Allende and the ban on ill political acthity by the remaining parties have squelched any weUorfsnized channel of domestic criticism. The moratorium haseal dilemma for the Christian Democrats. If they refrati from any political role (hey risk becomJii atrophied, while on the other hand
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of outright defiance could provoke ton! proscription. Fifty leaderformer president Eduardo Frel has tried to avoiddirect confrontation between lbs party and the government, but ill statements and those of other party functionaries have bordered dangerously on the Umlli of criticism tolerated by the Junta. Extreme right-wing adviser* have urged Pinochet to ban the party, but he has preferred toragile modus vivendi, probebly lo avoid Inciting additional censure from Europeanwhen the Christian Democrats have Influential friends.
Pinochet's recent proposal lo form an advisory councilhst would include all former presidents, as well as othertuens. can be viewed as primarily an effort to mollify foreign critics of the regime's anti-democraticrel would not participate without clear cut guarantees of an early ntum to democratic rule, however. And that appears ircrcarJniiy unlikely In view of Pinochet's categorical rejection of any reversion to the status quo ante. This viewpoint was further highlighted by the government's ringing rebuff to recent statements by parly leadersesire to reach an understanding with the military regime. What Pinochet may have Ino divide the Christian Democrats and at the same time make II Impossible for them lo cooperate other (run on his terms. If Frel rejects the Invitation to Join the council, Pinochet can then proceed without the Christian Democrats, putting the bbune on them for being obstructive and uncooperative. The council, which in any case it notto wield much Influence, might then emergeandplcked body of sycophants.
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forces for broader civilian participationgovernment. As In other policyivision of views probablyirst wiihii. the Junta on the desirabilityove b. (his direction Civilianarticularly titose on the economic (cam, alreadyignificant role In somaf policy making, but the military dom"nates the cabinet and much of the bureauct.vcy. Military leaders an likely to give continued Up service to (his Idea, but 'he paucity of "nonpolitical" civilians will ntard any strong khlft toward greater cPrihan enoroachrnent in theraUon. Some cosmetic changes may be made In response to continued International prevsures on Chile, but tha armedI he army Innot likely to yield their prerogatives In key areas of responsibility.
Disagreementi within (he Junta, which nearly erupted into an open dash in August between President Pinochet and General Leigh, the sir force member of the Junta, have been smoothed over for iha moment. Pinochet apparently bowed to the demands ofthree Junta colleagues and agreed to cooailt more rtgulariy befjra making important decisions andlthough tempers have been cooled, the apparent strong differences between
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Pinochcl and Ia Ji will very likely pgl them it oddiWhile General Leigh'i outspoken ilstements lo-xtenievil's advocate role, he alio reunti Pinochet's lendency tone-run show with III tic respect Tor the views of his ostensible partners. He has repeatedly slated that the government must show more concern for the Impoverished sector of Chilean society. His recent comments suggest that he to trying to put some distance between himself and the president by advocating more relaxed economic and political policies. Leigh's candid remarks have frequently antagonized ihe President, but the Utter has compromised where necessary to preserve thc unity of the junta, Pinochet obviously ii loath toivided factenerally hostile outside worldime when the government still has more than enoupfi problems to deal with.
Despite thcae Internal differences. It appears now that there will be no major shifts an the Junta's basic outlook. Its com positron mar change In lime, but Pinochet teems assured of his primary position. Navyon with the pcrfurmtnee of Junta membTT Admiral Merino, who has been notably Iructtve. may result in his replacement al some point. Leigh might also consider resigning or leaving the government if disagreements with the President become irreconcilable. There Is atemote chance that the navy, sir force, and Carablnrros will gradually relinquish all political activity and, in essence, leave Pinochet and the army In charge of the government. In no case, however, do wehange in the army's predominant role,
Opposition to the military government from the remnants of left at groups remaining in Chile Is largely checked by thc vigilance of the security forces. Thei controversial Directorate of Intelligence (DINA) has clamped down sternly on all potential and real dissidents. DINA's heavy-handedods, the source of much of the furor over human rights abuses, make it unlikely that irrythlng more than occasional minor acts of terrorism or sabotage will disturb the present tranquility. Indeed, the absence ofarmed opposition to the regime and the international ciarnor over internal security practices seeme slowly drawing high officuh into curtailing the activities of the anti-subversion agencies. Pinochet recently ordered the circulationecret deem demanding compliance with canting procedures for detentions throughout the country. Thej^pjMf came after an Investigation verified thai maltreatment of privnd that people am being arretted and imprisoned without Dotlfcation of their whtrrea.
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The excesses of security forces have stimulated wide express!oni of international concern, but there have been few echoes st home, except among the church hierarchy and the Rcessed political parties. Whatever doubts Chileans may havi about the propriety of their government's
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ey tend to comidrr Itdomeitk affair and mcnt my outside interrerrr.ee or que*tloning. Seven relets.few notable voter* are being ralaed In raw of greater liberalization. General Leigh hat expressed hts own coivjci.on that the government shouldrocess of "detente" and hat argued against holding political prisoners Indefinitely or jailing anyone on ideological grounds.
1 With little appreciation for the International repercussions, however, the government continues to take steps that are certain to create unfavorableozen former Allende officiali were rektsed ont wai revealed that tome charge* were still pending against them. Now the navy hatecrel trial agalml nine mdividuarr-rnchidlngiome of thou released in September-on charge* of subversion. If Indictment* are nude, theikely toauae eclebre to rival the4 nr force trials. The inclusion of Lui* Corvalan, aecretary general of the outlawed Chilean Communist Party, will provide Mottow and Havana with renewed ammunition for their attacks on Chile.
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The measures Pinochet announced recently to put hi* governmentetter light have done littleuiet even hb mildest critics. The decision to reduce "Ae itate ofo moreesture; it Is supposed to iBow limited review by civil courts of cam prevWuily considered by courtt-martial.ould easily be circumvented. Unlet* the govern memenuine determination to abide by measures designed to limit abu.es of Its arbitrary power-and so far It hi* not-ll cannot expect to Intptre confldence aboutirjIrjtntfJoBr-{
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1 Chile isstruggling through an agonizing period of economic readjustment to overcome the problems inherited from the ADende eraven before. The difficulties are ttaggertnt, for Chile must deal with an InfUtioei ratene of the world'* highesteriou* balance-of-payment* problem brought oo by sharply reduced world copper prior* and costly imperii ofetroleum, and capitalovernment economists are issuing optimistic forecast* that tomen tight, but the government'* ability too of It* cconomk strategy willreat deal on the general pace of the world-wide economic and Industrial recovery.
Meanwhile, the high social cost of the government'* auiterityorrying those military leader* who are most apprehensive about the regime'* ability to cope with the socUl dislocation ouited by the de-fbtiorwy program. Unemployment, forp fromercent In4 to anercent In recenthile the
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Among the negativenduitriil output It expected to dropercent for the yearkimp in domestic demand will reduce real GDP byercenthe low price of copper on the world market-It dropped from in average ofenta4 lo an average ofent* to far thai year- ii thr moat Important reason for the country'* failure to Ktrease erport earning* and reduce Its foreign debt, which now lotahillion. Brazil* BJJIjBJBIdemmn toopper purcruvei from Chile and the likelihood of Brazilian Investment In Chilean copper mining enterprise* might bring some relief. In aay case, copper production Is not likely to Increaseha short terra. Production is expected to slipercent his year, mainlyesult of an agreement among producing nations to curtailrder to prop up the world market pries.
Even the positive side of the ledger showsew modestly hopeful signs. In recent months the annual inflation rate has been cut lo halfevelercent, but the trend could be reversedringing Inflationary pressures under sustained control will notuick or easyolicy of gradual devaluation probably will help curb Chile's endemic bafUllonrry psychology in addition to stimulating isorMradltional OtpOfttVI
The government's restrictive fiscal and monetary measure* haverestrain domestic demand and curb Import* Ihb year, perhapsB orercent4ood import* alone have decreasedpercent this year owingotable growth in agricultural productionsince lasthese gams,0 percent annual increaseexports, have encouraged the government to believe thatslightly eat* the balancc-of-payrarnls gap Better prospects forwill itJH be conditioned to sometentn copper prices. Current Indicators suggest that any increase willat '
government la likely to succeed In trimming Its deficit toercent of expenditures this yeas compared withercent3 when ll assumed rower. The slash in public spending,fusinginvestment outlays to shrink. In addition, uncertainty resulting from the antHnflatlon program has made Chilean buUnessmcn reluctant tonew projects. Private foreign Investment Inflows, on tbc other hand.
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picked up slightly bul are little morerickle at thli point. Continued large capital flow* from international financial institutions will br poselble only if Chile can Improve lulntematronal imagt. j
- We continue to believe that if the junta doei not tee tubttanlial nrtulti from in auiterity efforts by the end or the year. Pinochet will soon thereafter be casting about for possible new policies and new economic managers. As of now, however, we see at least an even chance that the current economic learn headed by Minister Jorgewill bring about enough of an economic recovery lo guarantee retaining the basics of the current program. ' M. ill
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Chile hai had scant success In countering charges that ii violate* human rights or generating sympathy and support through diplomatic offensives and public relations campaigns. It fs doubtful that Chile can expect much support at International forums, where it frequentlyarget ofby bloc* of liberal and radical nation*.
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Leftist* outside if Chile will never forgive the junta for overthrowing the firstlected Marxist government in Latin America and suppressing the political Institutions that brought it lo power. AHende's exiledermanent e'eque of living -martyrs" who manage lo lura empathy for thexecuted and imprisoned victim* into politicaleilern capital* and much of the Third WorM.
Pinochetware of the high penalty Chile i* paying for It* poor image, bul hit action* suggest thatl not deter him fromo-it-eJone position no matter what thei* last-minute decision loN human rights fact-finding mission In July hardened the negative bitematL >altoward Chile. Even nation* nominally disposed to be cardial and impartial began to see Chilehe bete wire of InletneUonal society. Prediction* by ChOean diplomat* that Pinochet'* September speech would rectify this situation crumbled when he defended hu decision to keep Ihe UN group out of Chile and held out no hopehange of mind.
The incident I* receiving wide play In the current session of the UN. The highly unfavorable report of the UN Human Rights Commission contain* shockingndestern European covernments plan toetohitlon condemning Chile'* stand on humanittle doubt but that this advene publicity will further accentuate Chile's ostracism and diminish it* ability to attract credit, erpedally in Western Europe. 1
Continuing intemitlooal prrnvra on Chile to crungs Its ways may producetoken responsegrowing awareneii of Its isolation forces the Junta to be moreopeful sign was the recent releaseumber of labor leaden who apparently had fceea arrested by security forces on spurious charges, gtmfjgfgtaaam
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tiallng ill foreign debt, will convince the regime that adoptionore
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Aside from the problem of overcoming lis international Isolation.
ator fonign policy concern is ihe perceived threat posed by Peru.
Chile's northern neighbor hasrowing arsenal of weapons fromSoviets and has made rapid strides In improving Its military capebililiet. Anxiety over Ihe possibility that Peru plana to avenge Its defeat byhe War of thaontinues to dominate the thinking or military men In Santiago, War fever swept the borderittleonth ago when it wasrumond that Peru would strike if Chileract of bod to Bolivia in an area of former Peruvian territory. Tensions have largely subsidedesult of the change of government ht Urna. The new Peruviancs Berraudei, is believed to be more level-headed than former President Vefaaco and seas lately to engage in militaryNeverihelest.ingering drttrutt of Peruvian motives, and Chile will continue toeoocupied with building up Ita own forces, concentrating mainly on defensive preparations In thc northern border ana.
Chile has had little success in obtaining weapons abroad, and Itsot likely to change soon. Most of the western governments that would be likely arms suppliers an dblnclbsed to deal with the present military regime. Strong condemnation of Chile in thc UN win further complieste difficulties In finding new sources of military assistance. Brar.il has extended some help, buttill far fromorce to match Peru,
Much of the concern about future Chllc-Pcni reutrom Is now focused on thc problem of Bolivia's quest for access to the sea. Chile agreed to negotiate the matter when diplomatic relations rrere resumed bit February, and Lartastng hard for an carry settlement. Chile, meanwhile, probably haa no intention of ceding territory and running the risk of alienating national In sentiment. Moreover, diplomatic flexibility bby Ihe terms9 protocol which requires Peruvian consent for any boundary rearrangement. Ssnibgohinking along lines of granting greater communications, transportation, and port faculties to Bolivia, perhaps under some long-term lease arrangement.
The negotiations hare only recently approached the stage ofproposals, and Chile has Indicated that ft does not want toolution. It Is eager to retain Bolivia's good will in (he event of conflict with
Pr.ru. bui thereimit to the price It will pay. Plnc<hct'sBJj]fJJJJJptopg^1
to give Bolivia controltrip of [and only if Peruto grantsimilar stretch along Its side of the border appears toell-cnlculated stroke to put the ball In Peru's court. Peru would almost certainly be unwilling to go along withcheme even though It has indicated support for Barucr's general objectives. As things stand now. thereood chancetalemate will develop.
In the meantime, Hie dangerlash between Peru and Chile over this or other problems willbtinct possibility, Chile can be expected to use every avenue to keep relations cordial, but there ishanceiplomatic blunderinor border incident could Wow up Into aTalks on arms limitalion among the Andean nations have brought the two nations to the conference table to discuss acceptable limits on weapons procurement, but negotiations ore likely to beand probably will not have much impact In stemming the headlong momentum toward acquisition of new and more advanced weapons. At best, these meetings will serveehicle to allow both sides to talk and perhaps to lessen suspicions about each other's intentions.
Relation* with (he US have been cordial but somewhat strained. From Chile's viewpoint the difficulty stems from tiie US Inanity to respondhile's perceived needs, especially regarding weapon* that Chile has *ouaht to balance Its currently unfavorable positionis Peru, Chile's continuing excesses In the human rights area make it unlikely that Increased US militaryill be forthcoming. The Pinochet government still consider* the US to be It* major ally and hopefully the chief source of capital and technology, although the US trade and investment stake in Chileow minor. However, growing frustrationrolonged restriction of US arms assistance Is likely to create bitterness in the month* ahead.
Nonetheless, there i* little chance that Chile's military leaders williable substitute for the US even though they are looking actively outside the hemisphere for new friend* and assistance. The most they can hope for is to ride out the current difficult situation with the expectation that an improvement fai the economy and diminishlni world IntereM fat Chilean affair* willng greater support from the US arid Western Europe.
Original document.
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