NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE
ESTIMATE
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE IN fULL
The Soviet Assessment of the US
THE SOVIET ASSESSMENT OF THE US
THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.
THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS, EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT, AS FOLLOWS)
The following intelligence organizations parHcipotod in the preparation of the Estimate:
The Cenirol Intelligence Agency, the inieDigerxc orgoniiot ions of the Deportment! ol Stole ond Defense, ond the Noi-oool Security Agency.
The Deputy Director of Control Intelligence representing the Central Intelligence
The Director of Intelligence and Research representing the Deporiment of Sfnt. The Director. Defense Intelligence Agency TKe Director, Nolionol Security Agency
The Acting Deputy Asiiilont Administrator for National Security. Energy Research ond Development Administration
The Special Assislonl lo the Secretory of the Troosury representing the Depaitment
ol the Treasury
Abstaining;
ssistant Director, federol Bureau of Investigation
Alio Participating:
Ihe Assntont Chief ol StoH for InteDigervce, Deportment of the Army
The Drfeclor of Na-o! Intelligence. Department of the Navy
The Assislant Chief of Staff. Intelligence, Department of the Air "arte
CONTENTS
KEY JUDGMENTS
DISCUSSION
cn
Moscow! View of the International Setting The Soviet Assessment of tlie Overall US Posture
US Politics and Society
US Military Capabilities and Intentions
The US Economic Position .
US Foreign Policy .
The Soviet Appraisal of tlse Current USImplications for Soviet Policy .
ANNEX: Tlie Soviet Assessment Process
THE SOVIET ASSESSMENT OF THE US
KEY JUDGMENTS
2 of this Estimate are an examination of the Soviet assessment of US strengths and weaknesses as these affect both the"correlation of forces" and US attitudes toward the USSR in the context of detente. The major implications of this assessment for Soviet policy arc as follows:
Soviet leaders, comparing their own domestic and international positions with those of the US, believe that the balance sheet is changing in the USSIl's favor. Despite problems of their own and the greater realism in Soviet thinking that has accompanied the USSR's expanded involvement in world affairs, Sovietremain convinced that their system will, by degrees,predominate. But there are importanttechnological, military, andwhich they continue to believe the US has great strengths and thc capacity tovigorous competition with thc USSR. They recognize that US leaders remain determined to sustain the international roleuperpower, and they suspect that recent setbacks,the collapse in Vietnam, may strengthen thisand public support for it. Thus they do not accept,asis for policy making, that the US is in permanent decline.
The Soviet leaders perceive thc present US-Soviet relationship in strategic nuclear weapons to be one of rough balance.they may now entertainin the view of some
Agencies, alreadyUS resolvetrategicis weakening, they know realistically that the US need not concede theuperior position in the next decade. Thus they believe that in areas unconstrained by agreement they will have to compete vigorously to deny the US anynuclear advantage it might seek by exploiting itsstrengths, and also to keep open the possibility offor the USSR.'
The Soviet leaders recognize that US-Soviet relations arcsensitive to developments in Europe, and the USSR's policy toward Western Europe aimsteady buildup of its influence without arousing alarm in the US and WesternThe Soviets seek ineduction in Americanpresence and influence and limitations on West German armed forces. The Soviets have rejected Western proposals for substantially asymmetrical ground force reductions. They will continue to argueimited, mostly symbolic, agreementirst step. They evidentlyestern offer ofelements and arc probably prepared to bargain about trading asymmetrical reductions of.ground forces in return for reduction in American nuclear forces.
There is constant conflict in the minds of tlie Soviet leaders between the temptation to seize tactical opportunities as they arise, in Europe and elsewhere, and their desire to preserve profitable relations with thc US and the West generally. If the Sovietsecline in US readiness to react against developments such as those in Portugal, if the benefits of detente should appear to be diminishing drastically, or if more militant attitudes should become dominant among the new leaders soon to emerge, these tensions could be resolved in favorore assertive policy. But at present the Soviets remain concerned to preserve the benefits of thc detente relationship, and to avoid arousing negative US reactions.
Because the Soviet leaders can foresee China's remaininga fairly useful lever in US hands, they will beof the need to be somewhat more considerate of USand interns in certain policy areas than they wouldbe. It will be clear to them that in some areas, such as
ore cilcntive discussion of thu Sovket view of strategic competition with lhe US,substantive differences within tbe intelligence community, will uppcar in NIK, 'Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Conflict Through the Mid-lSAlk."
SEC*,
Southeast Asia, the weakening ol the US role is more likely to provide opportunities for the Chinese than for themselves.
Soviet leaders may believe that the growth of their own strategic power and constraints limiting the US capacity for armed intervention abroad will give them more room forin support of their clients. This, however, is athat the present leaders would want to. and as occasion arises well may, lest incrementally. They recognize thc dangers in challenging US resolve in such areas of mafor US strategic interest as the Middle East or Korea, or in the delicate case of post-Tito Yugoslavia.
regarding the US as their adversary, the Soviet leaders do not welcome those American political divisions that threaten the bilateral relationship Moscow has cultivated within. They will be hoping for the election6 of thc presidential candidate, whatever hb party affiliation, who is in their view most committed to US-Soviet detente and best able toirm consensus behind this policy. Between now and6 they will be giving some thought to the possible impact of their own policy actions on the election's outcome. Their decisions in this regard will depend on whether they estimate that detenteontested political issue will be affected by the voting results. If this is its reading. Moscow might make some extra effort to improve the atmosphereUS-Soviet relations.
for Brezhnev's position, while his colleagues agree with him that detente now provides the most advantageous general framework for relations with the US, he probablyreater stake than they in achieving specific successes, the more so as he sees time running out on him and looks forward to his last Party Congress as General Secretary next February. The strength that he can muster behind this line depends upon both policy factors and political relationships. With regard to trie latter most of the changes in Politburo membership in the last few years have worked to strengthen his personal authority. But as he grows older and less energetic, old loyalties andmay be eroding as his colleagues cast their minds forwardost-Brezhnev period. With regard to policy, there is some evidence that he was embarrassed and weakened last winter by the US Trade Act affair. If so. he subsequently recovered,
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only to suffer another setback with5 harvest, whichuch more potent political issue than the ups and downs of dealing with the West.
We believe that Brezhnev willecision on SALT II, Hnd thus the Summit, anxious touccess, but with his political freedom of action more etrcuinscribed than before. On balance, considering both thc USSR's larger strategic and political interestsALT II agreement and what the Soviets would probably see as the consequences of failure, we think the USSR will be preparer} to make some further concessions in the bargaining, although by no means to the extent of meeting all outstanding US demands. All agencies except CIA believe that; whileAL agreement, the Soviets will offer only minor concessions: they will refuse lo accept any inhibitions on the improvement or tnodernization of their own strategic forces, and will continue to press for limitations on US cruise missile development. CIA believes thai, in the end, the Soviets arc likely to prove willing to make more than minor concessions on the key issues of cruise missiles and Backfire (although not to the extent of counting Backfire inggregate).
ALT II agreement prove unattainable and thesummit meeting noi occur this winter, the Soviels would face serious problems. They realize that atear's wail would piobably bo necessary before another try. It is possible that in the pre-Congrcss politicking this failure, combined with other factors, woulderious challenge to Brezhnev's policies and leadership. Nevertheless, we think it more likely lhat the Politburohole would prefer to minimize the internal political repercussions in order to keep detente intact as thc USSR's general line and to preserve as much of ilsas possible in thc short run. In such ci ecu instances, however, the Soviets would bc even more alert to the possible further growth of anti-detente forces in American politics. If they perceivedrend, there could easilyrowth ofwithin the Politburo that the price of the present bilateral relationship was becoming too high. In this event, we must face lhc possibilityarsher reaction marked by the stronger assertion and pursuit of Soviet interestsumber of arenas.
DISCUSSION
. hither theuestion atart lhan ever being asked in Moscow these days. The Soviel leaders realize lhat Ihe answer lo this question Is also essentially Ihc answer lo the question "Whithern undertaking lying at lhe heart olforeign policy and having vital importance fo* Soviet domestic policy. Soviet definitions of detente with the US have taken various forms, but most basically detente means minimliinfi the risk ofwar and redirecting the global competition with Ihe other superpower into safer channels, where the Soviets can pursue long-standing goals with instruments ranging from diplomacy to miliary' pressures. Detente for thc Soviets has abo meant selective muling of their compelllion with tho US In the pursuit of specific Soviet objectives in trade, technology, and political atmosphere. The Soviet leaders sense thai US international and domestichat they would ordinarily welcome could have thc effect of putting detente off the tracks. They recognize these difficulties havehelped lo harden US resistance to detente This problem, which would preoccupy Moscow at any time, does so even more nowumber of reasons:
An assessment of the stale of US-Sovietmust be presented to lha Party Congress inl willreat deal of difference lo Brezhnev how convincingly
ho can say. in what is likely to be bisCongress, that the delente approach he has championed is achieving specific benefits without Jeopardizing Soviet security interests.
Thc5 summit meeting, thc first full-dress one since the change of US Presi-dentsould give new momentum to ihc detenle process or, particularly if II did not take place, add to the doubts now sur. rounding detente.
A crucial lactor in the meeting's political effect will beI, agreement on which requires some hard decisions by both tides.
nderstood in Moscow that the terms, conditions, and future of US-Soviet detente will be under debate in6 election campaign.
Moscow's View of the International Sailing
2 Thereommon outlook among the Soviel leaders concerning major world trendstrong consensu! in favor of thc detenle course. This does not mean that there are no differences among them regarding the interpretation of events, the choice of specific policy decisions, or the price to bo paid for the sake of maintaining detente. There must be such differences, given the manifold majortouching the sensitive areas of security, economic policy, and domesticdetente raises.
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Such importants Podgomy and Suslov. for example, have repeatedly stood out from the others as being relatively more negative in their estimates of the benefits and prospects of detente, ormore concerned that it will weaken the USSR's "ideologicalith regard to arms policy, the inclination of the Soviet military is lo put masurium stress on the US military effortto the USSR's and to look hard for pitfalls In arms negotiations with thehere are likely to be at the top level, as wc know there are atechelons, divergent opinions about.the amount and the utility of the economic andassistance the USSR can look for from thc US. Such factors as these limit Brezhnevsof action to concert Soviet detente policy, as may his health and questions about his tenure. However, given his personal identification with the USSR's detente course, he will be inclined toward interpretations of US policy lhat enable him to por Iray detente as successful.
3 lhe Sovietthe shadings of difference amongsee the larger international setting that provides the framework for the US-Soviet relationship as favorable to the USSR. As the USSR's power and weight in the world have grown, so has Moscow's sense of long-term confidence. More than to any other single factor, this is ascribed to the improvement of the USSR's military position, csrtecially in the stralegic nuclear area. But the Sonets also find encourage, mentumber of other perceived trends:
that international relations arefundamentaln which the non-Communiit industiial states are witnessing the crumbling of long-held positions vital to their economics and their international standing.
lhat capitalist society is inrisisdeeper and more long-lasting than those it has recurrently undergone In tbe past.of this are serious economic and mono-
'The Defense Intelligence Agency, the Acting Assistant Chief of Suff foi Intelligence, Department ol the Army. Hie Director of Naval Intelligence. Depariment of the Navy, and the Aetinit Asslatam Chief of Staff. Intelligence. Depart-ment of the Air Force, wish to empliaiiie the fact thai the top Soviet leadership, including rhe Soviet military, basically agieet on Soviet policies and objectives, and that the militaryajor role in shaping those policies and objectives.
tary dislrxabons, the accompanyingpolitical and social turbulence, and the resulting erosion of rhe West's sense ofpurpose.
that tbe USSR, basing Itself on the world's second largest economy, powerful strategic forces, and constantly improving conventional force capabilities, is gaining steadily instature
that the Soviet position in Eastern Europe is strong and has been further strengtheneduropean security agreement that in effect confirms thc division of Europe.
t is impossible to say how firmly andthe Soviets hold to these optimisticthey arc also conscious of weaknesses of their own. Civen the sense of stillS power, of the continuing limitations on their own power, and of the unpredictability and uncon-trollabillty of many of the other factors in thearena, the leaders are inclined to be fairly cautious in their eipectationt about being able to translate favorable trends into particular gains. Furthermore, the confidence arising from Western difficulties is undercut by such long-run problems of their own as China's bitter hostility and tbe lag in Soviet technology. And recentSinai Accord, fresh uncertainties In Portugal, and most of all5 Sovietarc bound to reinforce this counteieffect.
The Soviet Assessment of the Qveroll US Posfurc
5 The Soviets believe that detente has been "forced" on the US: in the words of one of the Soviet leaders, "the most powerful country of thc capitalistbeen forced to talk with us asoscow believes that US power in the world has been reduced not only by the growth ol Soviet power, but by other causes: thc weakening of US leadership in ils alliances; the resistance to US "domination" on the part ofnations and regional groupings, and theon the US monetary, raw materials and energy positions. The Soviets believe that,esult of these and domestic US developments, they are dealinghastenedabon winch has been obliged to recognize the limits of its power.
SITRFT
and one whose confidence in ils old international role has been undermined. They aba welcome signs llial the utility of military power as an instrument of foreign policy has come inlo question in the US. Out of all this has come, according to thisore "realistic" American foreign policy approach, including, mostS realization of the need for detente in US-Sovict relations.
Soviet analysis permits tbe USSRthat it may now beess potentthere is considerable ambivalence inperspectives arising out of two quitekinds of cousklciations. First, thesome Soviet leaders appear to giveweight than"imperialism."aggressive and expansionist, hasits character.ess doctrinaireobservers arc often purzlcd by turns inwhich do not square with thcanalysis ol US aims andfrequent references to the contradictions.and "zig-zags" in US policy. Second,would not in fact welcome aof US inlernational involvement atbecause this could have consequencesto their interests
US Politics and Society
The social and political unrest which has marked the US scene in recent years is an easy opportunity for Soviet propaganda, but is also taken seriously as further evidence of Ihe US' present weakened condition. Despite tlse trendetter informed and less stereotyped treatment of Ihese subjects. Soviet observers usuallythe resilienceluralistic society and its ability to accommodate dissent.ypicala Soviet journalist recently summedour of the US by saying that hb "most general impression of present-day America is that it least of allountry of serenity andOn the contrary. seething."
The Soviets believe that domestic dissent hasorrosive, though not crippling, effect on US ability to act abroad, and hasactor Inthe US Government toward improving relations with the USSR. They have been attentive to the pHtt the anti-war protest movement played in foie-
ing US withdrawal from Vietnam. They have seized on signs of sou of public confidence in the political system and governmental institutions, devotingcoverage, for example, to the controversy over the role of US inielligence. Soviet commentary continues to dwell on thc various svcll-known social issues that have arisen since, butconcedes lhat thc beat has gone out of some of them. Some of the moic sober assessments issuing from Moscow ore now allowing that the end of US involvement In Vietnam may contribute to aeasing of social tensions.
Tlte outcome of the Watergate episode cameurprisehock lo Moscow and aroused strong anxiety about possible consequences for US-Soviel relations. The Soviets had assessed President Niton as "pragmatic" andthe highest terms of praise they can confer on ahis administration had come to represent thc kind of known quantity valued by the Kremlin's bureaucratic leadership. Theirtells them that one of Watergate'shai been to weaken llie Presidencyis Congress, which has limited the administration's ability to carryetente
The Sovietseen trying to make up lost ground In their appreciation of thcrole by. among other things, broadeningcontacts with members of Congress and putting more effort inlo studying its composition atariBut the Congress obviouslyighly uncertain quantity for Soviet analystsprior indications, there was surprise In Moscow that Congress was able in the end to overturn Ad-minisiiation plans for expanded US-Soviet trade and credits. Soviet observers have particular trouble, since it is outside their own experience, in grasping how interest groups influence policy through the legislature. They are evidently learning that chang. ing Congressional coalitions form around different issues, making il hard to gauge its response incases. Viewed from the standpoint of their own interests, lhe Soviets evidently find theelectedixed bag: they welcome what they see as its increasing readiness loAdministration military spending andproposals, but also believe that it:more negative attitude tosvard US-Soviet
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may mean trouble for them in armsand trade negotiations.
is partly because o( Congress' diversitythat the Soviets prefer aassuming the Presidentanthey can work veiih. Everything elsetheir preference would abo be forin the office. The present Sovietthe outcome of8 Presidentialguarded. The appraisals being forwarded byprobably are no less tentative thanin open Soviet publications, whichwith fluctuations in US press reportagefindings of the public opinion polls, onwhich they rely heavily. As of now, Sovietarc saying that the election could go eithercritical factor being the degree ofbetween now andso, thc Soviets are taking care to allow-number of contingencies, and have begun toclose look at President Ford's potenialKennedy hai received friendlypublished commentaries,reat dealof itbeen said, publicly andabout Senator Jackson than any of lhesome Soviets belittle his chances,not. and although some in Moscow arebelieve that, as President, Jacksonore "realistic" stance toward theSoviets undoubtedly do not want to seeproposition
US Military Capabilities and Intentions1
trying to make judgment* aboutresolve to remain ti vigorous stiatcgicthe Soviets witness mi the one handin thc US to limit defenseeroded by inflation, to reduce militaryabroad, and to accept the fraying ofrelationships On the other hand, theythe US seeking Improvements andweapons technology, funding new systems,military doctrines in response to aenvironment Soviet leaders do notthese contradictory trends in US attitudesout during thc not decade.
Issues ratted tn paiapaphiiU receive fuller ueaimenl In fortftcerrimic NIK ll-.VB-TS. "Soviet Korrei for Intercontinentalhe
Nevertheless, lhe Sovietsigh regard for llie technical, industrial, and economic prowess of the Uniled Slates and assume that the US will continue to improve its stralegic posture. ForDie Soviets have shown gtval eagerness lo stop, slow, or limit US development programs foromber, Trident SSBN. ond strategic cruise missiles. Ihey have also expressed concern about US programs lo Improve missile accuracy and the possibility that US policy On limited nuclear options will spur further weapons improvements.
The prevalent view among lhe Soviet leaders is that SALT has so far produced satisfactorySince Vladivostok, however, differences have arisen between the Soviet and US interpretations of those accords. Soviet sources have noted with some anxiety the public criticism of thewhich has arisen in thc US. While the Soviets still believeALT II treaty based on their interpretation of Vladivostok would be desirable in both military and political terms, lhe moreelements of US interpretations haveraised questions in Moscow about whether an agreemenl can be achieved.
How much anxiety announced changes in US nuclear employment policy actually arouse in Moscow is difficult to judge, Ihe consternation registeredariety of Soviet sources is to some degree props gandistic Objections have been raised to the policy on both strategic and political grounds. With regard to Ihe first, some Soviet commentators have asserted lhat the US by taking this step was edging away from "assuredounlerforce and Limited Nuclear Options strategy. Although these statements may exaggerate realanxieties, ihcre appears lo have beenconcern that lhe changes in US targeting and deployment principles would require an increase in numbers of US warheads and in weaponsThe SovieU are doubtless more uneasy, howcvei, over (lie implication lhat Ihe US and its NATO allies will calculate that in the event of crisis thc US could couple,ower perceived risk of escalation, the limited use of nuclear weapons witb conventional defenses. Tbey further see tbe US doctrinal modifications as manifesting an anti-Soviet poliiical attitude lhat can complicate al) their bilateral dealings with Ihc US.
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The Soviet! believe thai the relative balance of con ce nil ono/ forces ii lielng Improved by the increasing strength of their ground and air forces and by tlie steady growth of their navalAt the same time, however, theyealthy respect for US miliiary capabilities and do not doubt that the US has the physical and technical means to sustain and develop them further. For Moscow tbe question has become; does the US have the will to do so?
According to lhe Sovietardinal objective of US policy in recent years has been to make adjustments to insure lhat its roleowerful one. Close attention and much comment have also been devoted, however, to Ihe contrary currents running through US public andopinion. The Soviets know that inhere is not the same support from these sources. for military programs as there was throughout the postwar period inlo thc I'KSOs. Soviet US-watchers have carefully chronicled the evidence of this,to close Congressional struggles over military budgets, thc Diego Garcia pro|ect, and thc like, and they cite the economic nnd social needs which ought to make the US Governmeni see lhein culling bad its arms expenditures.
ut Soviet sources contend only that public and Congressional opposition to arms spending has grown, not that it has svon the day. The so-called military-industrial complex in the US Is said to be still highly influential, and it is regularly claimed that US defense spending is nsoving steadilyThere is evidence that such claimso employed in private budget discussions on Soviet force posture
The US Economic Position
he Soviet leaders, most o( them closelywith economic issues throughout theirlives, pay special attention to the state of the US economyey index of overall US power. They have alivuys had great respect for the capacity, diversity, and innovativeness of thc US economy. Habitually preoccupied withof the US economy to their own. thc Soviets
Warsaw Pact Forces OppositendSoviet Naval Policy andlor fuller treatment ol these topics.
see themselves currently ninning ahead in terms of overall rate of grosvth. but by other measures they continue to concede thc lead lo the US. Soviet publications regulatly carry dala whichide US lead in CNP and industrial production The same holds true for farm output, where the comparison is painfully unfavorable, particularly in the recurrent years of poor harvests. The Sovietsubstantial edge to the US inan index to which they assign increased weight as they seek to shift the emphasis in their own economy from extensive to Intensive growth, and in managerial techniques, which they view as an important source of productivity gaius.
The Soviet judgment concerning comparative economic strengths has shifted over the last few years as thc US has been afflicted by seriouseconomic difficulties. Soviet commentators frequently make the additional point that thecl the US and Ihe oilier industrializednations are now so fully interconnected that they inevitably encounter similarnflation and recession, whosetherefore has become moreumber of leading Soviel economists and political analysts have now concluded that presentnot only pose the most severe economicthc US has faced in the postwar period, but are no longeremporary character. Yet Soviet observers are subject to the same uncertainties, and the same tendency to revise their short-termin the light of new trends, as their Western counterparts. Whereas until recently, most Soviet commentators had predicted. like the previous year, would bc one of the hardest in the entire postwarhere are now signs that they are revising their expectations Several high-level Soviet economists have acknowledged that the lecovery in US industrial production has already begun. Meanwhile, (he USSR's5 harvest willownward revision of the Soviet estimate of comparative economic prospects, as will the adverse shift in the USSR's hard currency
In science and technology. Soviet respect for US capabilities is urtdimmed. Soviet observers eon-cede tbat the US is lire world leader in many areas of high technology such as computers, electronics, and chemical equipment, and Is constantly moving
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further ahead of the USSR, One Soviethas acknowledged that, while the USSR has more or less reached thc US level in the gross output of certain basic commodities, thc USin important areas of technology is actually growing. The proposition that the USSRong way to go to close the technology gap appears to be uncontested in Moscow.
The Soviet leaders undoubtedly have asked themselves whether or not they should not be seeking ways to exploit current US and Western economic difficulties.ertain impatience is visible within Western Communist parties, and exists among thc faithful in thc USSR itself, on thiselated question has also been posed: is thc USSR not, by expanding its economicwith thc capitalist states, in effect helping them to lift themselves out of tlieir economic slump? Thc Soviet Party's public response has been to counsel patience and restraint and to argue that, through its contributions to economic recovery in the West, the USSR is contributing to the relief of thc hard-pressed working class.
But there are many indications that Soviet thinking on this matter is affected by otherOn thc political level. Sovietrecall the causal connection betweenand rise of fascism innd profess alarmossible recurrence. On the economic level, Soviet officials have shown concern thateconomic instability could severelySoviet trade objectives and long-rangeplanning. In fact, thc USSRecord hard-currency deficit5 largely because ol reduced Western demand for Soviet products,Soviet purchases of Western manufactures at inflated prices, and large-scale grain purchases from the West.
The Soviet leaders have given high priority to and expected much from tlie expansion of US-Soviet economic relations. They saw anto gain US Government support for long-term commitments by American companies that could be synchronized with their own economic plans and related to certain particularly largeschemes, especially in Siberia. Hardly less important were the potential political benefits they could see flowing from thin increased inter-
national acceptability, cultivationympathetic constituency among US businessmen,arger US stake in its relations with Moscow. In the wake of US trade-credit legislation, there is more realism in Moscow about thc future prospects for these relations. But if Moscow perceives lhataction will be put off until after6 elections, the importance attached to expanding trade with the US will diminish somewhat, because by that time the USSR would be well into the Five-Year Plan now being developed. Accordingosplan official, however, the policy of expanding long-term economic relations with the US cannot be changed because Cosplan views thc US as the only country capable of providing the whole range of equipment, technology, and managerial know-how that thc Soviet economy requires.
kepticism about the economic benefits of detenle is spreading, particularly among Soviet economists. Some Soviets have voiced an economic nationalist viewpoint, whichanger to the USSR's future control over its natural wealth in expanded Easl-West economic relations. There is, however, no sign that these fears enjoy strongwithin thc top leadership. Indeed, one Soviet official has said lhat Brezhnev and much of the Soviet elite continue to attack great importance lo economic relations with thc USey factor in getting the USSR out of ils own economicThc fact that generally only thc US has grain surpluses capable of meeting Soviet needs can only strengthen this view.
US Foreign Policy
2G- Soviet analyses of US foreign policy during recent years have consistently seen ils main line as an attempt to adapthanging international environment. This adaptation is said to amounthange, begun under Ihc Nixonin the whole structure of US foreign policy, aimed alowerful world role for lhe US through use of balancc-of-power methods, best illustrated by the accommodation wiih China, and limitations on direct foreign involvement consonant with diminished resources and public support.
his Soviet interpretation of US policythe dominanl one in Moscow during thc. It has been viewed as an improve-
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on the ground* thatasedproper" sense of the limitations of US power and onto the Soviet detente approach. Yet even those most inclined to take this positive view arc not convinced that these trends arc set for good. The suspicion persists that thc US will, in fact, not be satisfied to accommodate itself tochanges but will try to reverse litem or to find ways to lurn ihem lo advantage, not fust to maintain its power but to regain clearover lhe USSR.
evelopments during thc last couple of'years have introduced an additional clement ofinto Soviet thinking about the US. Taken together, many of these developments are regarded by lhc Sovietsoon to themselves: UStribulations, the weakening of NATOfrom events in Portugal and Ihc Creek-Turkish dispute, the collapse in Vietnam, andUS vulnerability in the face of OPEC. But these US setbacks also worry Ihe Soviet leaders: thoy are fearful that the US. from an urge toils losses and restore its prestige, willarder stonce in adveisary situations, they believe that increased US preoccupation with domestic affairs and with shoring up the Atlantic Alliance has adversely affected the development of US-Soviet detente; and by and large, they are lessthai they can read thc intentions of live Ford Administration than they wete in thc case of thc Niton Administration. Moreover, some signslhat questions have arisen among the Soviet leaders about Ihe current detenle balancewhether the costs associated wiih ithe USSR's dirrunished position in ibe Middle East) and thc constraint* on Soviet behavior the US is asking foris Portugal) are noi sending thc price of detente for Moscow appreciably higher.
he US and lit Ames. Although the Sovietsome easing of US-European strainshereeal belief thai thc US posilion in Europe has eroded over the last decade TheyIhis trend to:
Thc growth of their own power, together wiih Ihc improved Image of themselves they have succeeded in impressing on many
The loss of US prestige In European eyesesult of ils international reverses aridtroubles.
European doubts about the reliability of the US security commitment, accentuated by what Europeans see as the heavy emphasis in US polky on superpower relations.
Stresses on US-European ties due lo inlerna-lion.il monetary and energy problems, growing competition in the spheres of trade andand European resistance to the influx: of American Inveslments. The process ofeconomic integration Is now also seen as placing some burdens on US-Europcaninstead of merelyevice promoted by the US for its own advantage
Tlie weakening of NATO caused by Greece's partial withdrawal. Turkey's disaffection, and1 the change in Portugal.
The divergence between US and West Eu-rnjieiin inleresls in the Middle East.
oviet observers arc in no doubt, however, lhat tbe US continues to regard Europe as crucial to its national interests, and they sec the US as now-engaged in efforts lo shore up its position thcre. Wlial emerges from the variety of Soviel comments on these US measuresense that Moscow more than half believes lhat thevirtue of its political influence. Its economic and technological superiority, and the Europeans' dependence on its militarysucceed in doing"so, at least in the near term. It is claimed, lor example, lhat the Europe an members of NATO have been increasing their military budgets under pressure fromOne commentary has noted that the US is now trying to obtain concessions from the West Europeans (and Japan) in such domains as reform of the international monetary syslem, foreign trade, and thc system of governing foreign capitaland leaves the impression that because the economic positions of the others "have to somebeen weakened by thc energy crisis and itshe US might very well obtain what it iseeking. Furthermore, it hu been noted inlhat lhe West Europeans had blamed USin Vietnam for Its neglect of Weslern
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and thai Ihc prospect lhal lhc US may now pay more atlenlion lo the area ha* been greeted with latufaetion.
eighing (he present US poiilion on Europe against lhcir own, the Soviets are almost certainly convinced thai they loo have made some recent progress. They see thai thc Wesl European states are more and more inclined to set (heir own courses in dealings with the USSR, and they think that their prospoets are good lotigger voice in tike political, economic, and security affairs of ihe area. Fears are also expressed, however, lhaldisenchantment with the prevailing order in Europe couldangerous revival of the extreme right, and some have recognized the riskacklash from the US and the West Europeans if the USSR tries to push the Communist cause too hard, as for instance in Portugal Meanwhile, much as it would like to see the US sooner or laler gone fiom Europe altogether, Moscow fears for Ihefor polilical and military stability in Ihetho poteniial increase of West Cermany'sthis were to happen loo quickly.this process is one of the major Soviet concerns in the MBFR talks.
n ideological terms, the Soviets place Japan in the same category as Western Europe: itssviib the US are said to be subject to lhe samehey are two of tlie major centcis of capitalism, each motivated by on urge to free itself from domination by the third. Ihe US Interms. Japan is recognized as the anchor of the US position in East Asia and the western Pacific, and It is believed In Moscow that the US isnow to goad the Japanese to takearger political and security role in the area. Yet Soviet sources do not devote anything like thc amount of attcntinn to thc state of US-Japanese relations lhat is devoted to US-West European relations, nor do they try as hard toelationship In flux, although it may be too eaily for them to have judged tbe effects of the collapse In Vietnam. They allude to increased frictions stemming from intensified trade rivalry, technological competition, andover thc size and function of the Japanese armed forces. But it has also been argued thatchanges in the Japanese and US economies are increasing mutual interest in trade Altogether, in the sober evaluationeading Soviet expert, thc
pioblems in US-Japanese relations "iu lheill not be able lo radically undermine lhe military, political, economic, and ideologicalthat is advantageous and necessary at the present stage to tbe ruling elites of the"
'te China Factor. Moscow has never doubted that the US gained significant advantage,is tlie USSR by bringinguantum change in its relations with China. High levels in Moscow were for long able to sec nothing but seriously negative consequences for the USSR In the US-ChineseSuspicions were expressed, byamong others, that the US and the PRC hadecret agreement, presumably with an anil-Soviet intent, and it was alleged that tlie US strategy was to apply pressure on the USSR from two flanks. Even the possibility that tlic US goal was to fan thc Sino-Soviet dispute inlo full-scaleseems to have been taken seriously. Moscow feaied that,inimum, tlse US would conclude that it could raise its asking price in variouswith Ihe USSR
concerns are evidently no longeras they had been. The Soviets seem nowthat tbe US would not want to seetension boil over into war. They havethat Washington assigns higherits dealings with Moscow than with Pekingbecause of thc greater range andUS-Soviet engagement, this will continue toestablishing this point has been aof the USSR's detente approach. Thcmeanwhile, have moved toward thethe US Chinese rapprochement has reachedand that further progress must awaiton the Taiwan issue and the opening ofrelations
is. however, probably also the Sovietthese are Impediments which can and, inprobably will be surmounted Moscowanticipate that in the wake of Vietnam thewill be to proceed more actively inleast thishought that willto lhe Soviet leaders. In any eventChina as, inuasl-ally of thethe triangular relationship, and they seeof significant change in China's attitude
SMtftET
If the Soviet leaders are less concerned about Peking's capability or Washington's inclination to disrupt detente, they also realize that thcconnection places constraints on Soviet (icedom of action. Moscow no doubt calculates that any Soviet action arousing alarm either in China or the US is likely to strengthen thc Sino-Amcrican relationship. And in heightening their competition with China, the Soviets are already attempting to exploit fears of China in their relations with the US in Asia.
US in the Third World. Moscow seesthe US toreater degree ofproviding the overall framework ofin thc Third World, now and for somecome. In general, Soviet analysts haveUS will be attempting toowerin Third World countries, and it will bethan previously to bring militarybear in support of its policy.
is no indication, however, that theare expecting an extensive USthe Third World. It is. of course,them that the US role in Southeast Asiabeen reduced, and Moscow wdlits best to measure the effect of this onand credibility in other parts of Asia.lecturer in Leningrad told his audiencethat thc US will reduce its presence inarea. He also observed, however, thathas said it will continue to supportand this seems likely to reflect thehigh levels in Moscow.
oviet observers have concluded that USIn the developing woild increasingly arm at safeguarding access to raw materials and energy sources, particularly in the Middle East and Latin America. They recognize that Ihc US position in lhe Middk Fast relative to their own has improved markedly, and they calculate lhat lhc US plans lo further diminish Soviel influence in the area.however, ihey fear lhat. despite thelve delente hasew Arab-Israeli wai
could once again create the danger of US-Soviet confrontation. While oil concerns are seen to have heightened the US need for progressettlement, some Soviet analyses convey an even keener sense thai the US might act vigorously ii ihis Interest were threatenedesultew conflict. The danger area, In Ihe view of one of Ihc USSR's top experts on lhe Middle East, has been enlaiged to take in thc Persian Culf. which he hu said might become an additional area of conflict between thc US and the USSR.
atin America In Ihe Soviet view, is no longer an "exclusive UShe Soviets note that the US has lost its unquestioned leadership within the OAS. and that Ihis in turn has helped to move Washington toward some kind of "normalization" of its reUtionship with Havana. Beyond this. Soviet commentaries On Latin Americaather mixed picture regarding Ihe future US role. One of Ihese has declared that "Washington has still not come lo any final conclusions about the overall political course of lhe US in this region of thet notes, nonetheless, lhat the "exacerbation of the energy crisis and thc newith regard to raw materials is compelling the US to activate its policy in Latint hu abo been Implied that Ihe US has several assets: thc anti-Communism of many Latin Americanlhe support it gains through its military aidprograms: and the still considerable influence of American business, which, moreover, is showing some readiness to make practical adjustments lo lhe changed Latin American climate
The Soviet Appraisal of the Current US Mood
be Soviet leaden believe that what happens in the Soviet-US relalionship is not only central to iheir national security, but also shapes the entire movement of international events. They sec lhat over thc last year hitches have begun to develop in these relations, Such as to raise doubts about the firmness of the US commitment to detente. They continue to believe that inajority of thc US public, the Administration, and, with some qualifications. Congressurther easing uf tension with the USSR. But the Soviets now speak less often and less confidently lhan theyear ago about lhe prospect* for making detente
nd are more ready to concede that there are "serious forces' opposed to detente in the US. In addition, Moscow senses that, since US-Soviet relations willentral foreign policy issue in the US elections, the neat year will bein determining whether the US chooses to giveiderarrower scope.
ome Soviet sources Iiave expressed thethat this Administration, while wanting lo move forward with the Improvement of US-Sovietnonetheless is more reserved toward this undertaking than its predecessor. Although such doubts and suspicions had begun to recede last winter under the Influence of Vladivostok,events have rekindled them. More broadly, al seen from Moscosv the climate for detente in the US has become perceptibly cooler. Thc sources of Soviet unease are multiple:
Soyiets have noted the objections raised against the Vladivostok agreement, causing them some concernALT II agreement will be harder lo achieve or, once achieved, will face hard going in Congress.
Trade Bill proceedings suggested to them that both the Administration and Congress perceive them to be more susceptible toleverage than they want it to be thought
are face to face with American consumer fears (hat further grain sales to the USSR Ihis year svill raise US food prices.
Thc Soviets cite as additional evidence of some "haidening" US allusions to possible military intervention in the eventenewed Arab oil emlsargo and the continuing publicizing of nesv nuclear employment policies
The setback in Indochina and concern over developments In southern Euiope could, they believe,urther stiffening in tbe US posture toward the USSR.
Moscow recognizes that, apart from suchfoes as "tbe military-industrial complex, the Zionist lobby, the Cold Warhe trade unions, and parts of the intellectualrossing body of opinion in Ihe US is skeptical that thc US isair return from detente, believes the US should
drive harder bargains in its dealings with the USSB. or contends tliat no effort should be made to extend thc detente relationship beyond Us present limits.
So mo Implications for Sovietoviet leaders, comparing their own domestic and international positions with those of the US, believe tlsat the balance sheet Is changing in the USSR's favor. Despite problems of their own and the greater realism in Soviet thinking that hasthe USSR's expanded irrvolvement in world affairs. Soviet leaders remain convinced thai their system will, by degrees, ultimatelyBut there arc important areas ecooomic. technological, military, andwhich they continue to believe Ihe US has great strengths and lhe capacity to maintain vigorous competition with the USSR. They recognize that US leaders remain determined to sustain thc international roleuperpower, and they suspect that recentespecially the collapse in Vietnam, may strengthen this determination and public support for It. Thus they do not accept,asis for policy making, that thc US is in permanent decline.
he Soviet leaders perceive the present US-Soviet relationship in strategic nuclear weapons to be one of rough balance Although they may now entertainin the view of someeadyUS resolvotrategic competitor is weakening, they know realistically that the US need not concede theosilion in thc next decade. Thus they believe that in areas unconstrained by agreement they will have to compete vigorously to deny the US any strategic nuclear advantage it might seek byits technological strengths, and alto to keep open the possibility of advantages for Ihehe Soviet leaders recognize thai US-Soviet relations ore particularly sensitive to developments in Europe, and the USSR's policy toward Western Europe aimsteady buildup of its influence withoul amusing alarm in thc US and Western
mot* .of (lie Srr*set view of
tcf,ie com pr-tit ion wiih (he US, inchith"l[ substantive dlf-(erenees within she intallificnee community, will iprieai In. -Se-Set Forces for laaeecaatJneerttl Co-fhet Through
SfifftET
The SovieU seek ineduction in American military pretence and influence and lirni-tationi on West Cerman armed forces. The Sonets have rejected Western proposal* for substantially asymmetrical ground force reductsons. Tliey srill continue to aigueimited, mostly symbolic, agreementirst step. They evidentlyestern offer of nuclear elements and arcprepared lo bargain about tradingreductions of ground forces In return forin American nuclear forces.
There is constant conflict In the minds of the Soviet leaders between the temptation to scire tactical opportunities as they arise, in Europe and elsewhere, and their desire to preserve profitable relations with the US and tlie Wesl generally. If the Sovietsecline in US readiness to to react against developments such as those in Portugal, if the benefits of detente should appear to be diminishing drastically, or if more militant attitudes ihould become dominant among the new leaders soon to emerge, these tensioni could bc resolved in favorore assertive policy. But, at preseni, the Soviels remain concerned to preserve the benefits of the detente relationship, And lo avoid arousing negative US reactions.
Because tlse Soviet leaders can foresee China's remainingairly useful lever in US hands, they will be conscious of the need to be somewhat moie considerate of US attitudes and interests in certain policy areas than they would otherwise be. Il will bc clear to ihem thai in some areas, such as Southeast Asia, tho weakening of the US role is mote likely to provide opportunities for the Chinese than for themselves.
The Soviet leaders may believe lhal the growth of theii own strategic power and const rain ts limiting the US capacity for armed intervention abroad will give them more room for maneuver in support of their clients. This, however. Is athat the present leaders would want to, and as occasion arises well may, test incrementally. They recogmae thc dangers in challenging USin such areas of major US strategic interest as the Middle East or Korea, or in the delicate case of post-Tito Yugoslavia.
While regarding thc US as their adversary, the Soviet leaders do not welcome those American political divisions that threaten the bilateralMoscow has cultivated with Washington in. They will be hoping for tbe election6 of the presidential candidate, whatever his party affiliation, who is In their view mostto US-Soviet detente and best able toirm consensus behind thi* policy. Between now and6 ihey will be giving someto the possible impact of their own policy actions on the election's outcome Their decisions in this regard will depend on whether they estimate that dcteuleontested political issue will be affected by the voting results. If this is its reading. Moscow might make some eatra effort to improve the atmosphere surrounding US-Soviet relations.
As for Brezhnev's position, while hisagiee with him that detente now provides the most advantageous general framework forwith the US, he probablyreater stake than they in achieving specific successes, thc more so as he sees time running out on him and looks forward lo his last Party Congress as Ceneialneat February. The strength that lie can muster behind this line depends upon both policy factors and political relationships. With regard to the latter, most of the changes in Politburoin the last few yeats have worked to strengthen his personal authority. But as he grows older and less energetic, old loyalties and depend- -euros may be eroding as his colleagues cast their minds forwardost-Bieihnev period. With regard to policy, there is some evidence tliat he was embarrassed and weakened last winter by the US Trade Act affair. If so. he subsequentlyonly to suffer another setback with5 harvest, whichuch more potent political issue than the ups and downs of dealing wiih tbe West.
We believe that Brerhnev willecision on SALT II. and (bus thc Summit, amtious touccess, but with his political freedom of action somewhat more circumscribed than before. On balance and considering both the USSR's larger strategic and political interestsALT IIand what tlie Soviets svould probably see as the consequences ol failure, we think tho USSR
SEjfEr
will be prepared lo make some further recessions in bargaining, although by no means to tbe extent of meeting all outstanding US demands. All Agencies except CIA believe that, whileAL agreement, the Soviets will offer only minor concessions: they will refuse to accept anyon tbe improvement or rnodcrniiaUon of iheir own strategic forces, and will continue to press for limitations on US cruise missile development. CIA believes that, in the end. the Soviets are likely to prove willing to make more than minor concessioni on the key issues of cruise missiles and Backfire (although not to the extent of counting Backfire inggregate).
ALT II agreement proveand rhe projected summit meeting not occur ihis winter, the Soviets svould face seriousThey realize lhal atear's waif would
probably be necessary before another Iry. It is possible that in the pre-Congress politicking this failure, combined witb other factors, woulderious challenge to Brezhnev's policies andNevertheless, we think it more likely that the Politburohole would prefer to minimize the internal political repercussions in order to keep detente intact as the USSR's general line and to preserve as much of its content as possible in the short run. In Such drcumstances. however, thc Soviets would be even more alert to the possible further growth of anti-detente forces in Anverican politics. II Ihey perceivedrend, there could easilyrowth of sentiment within thethat the price of the present bilateralwas becoming too high. In this event, we must face the possibilityarsher reaction marked by the stronger assertion and pursuit of Soviet interestsumber of arenas.
SBfREr
ssJiE.
ANNEX
the Soviel Assessment Process
foreign policy decision-making ilsclf. lite evaluations which underlie il arc Ihe province of (hc Soviel ruling group. It is the roughly two dozen members of the Politburo nnd Secretariat whose judgments, opinions, and impressions arcfor Soviet policy. Thc kinds and amounts ofand analysis ihese men receive arequestions of considerable interest.
But no mailer how accurate thc information on the US available to thc Soviet leaders, il would be transformed to some degree by subjective influences, group or Individual. The role of Soviel ideology is not negligible in their intcrpreparation of theof others. The belie! in Ihe eventual victory of thc Soviet system over lhe Western is for Ihc present generation of Soviel leaders as solid as ever. Trends of recent years affecting the relative strength of the two sides have, in fact, seemed to Ihem to corroborate these beliefs. Bui to go beyond imputing lo ideology Ihis kind ol broad influence on the leaders' perceptions would overstate the case. This belief system is neither fixed nor in most cases capable of providing anything more lhan the general framework for analysis. The Soviet leaders are not the mere servants of their ideology; they arc also its interpreters and can revise il as deemed necessary. In practice, the opinion of the dominant group in the Politburo determines what is the correct ideological line, and in thispolicy imperatives and practical politics tend to outweigh philosophy.
In Ihe Soviel system, as in others, policy issues arc usually decided not on their merits alone but also according to Ihe presumed eflect on thepolitical interests of thc decision-maker or
on the bureaucratic in!crest hc represents. This factor, important for an understanding of theprocess under the Brezhnevfor ils careful balancing of major political and bureaucraticaffects how members of the leadership interpret facts and events. Each leader wil] tend to be receptive to information or analysis lhal supports those policies closest to his heart or thai promises increased in fhiencc to himself or his bureaucratic corrstituency *
Available to this group al the top is an enormous fund of information on lhe US provided by: the USSR's diplomatic missions (ils mission inheaded by an ambassador withears of experience in his post and with extremely good personal sources ofhe KCB and military Intelligence; tho large file of reports which Soviet journalists prepare for official circulation, and, not least, Ihe great amount of fact and analysis in Western publications of all kinds Valuableknowledge has resulted in recenl years from expanded exchange* and negotiations, from which the Soviet side habitually lakes more information than it gives
Because even the final product of thiso large, the Soviet leaders are frequently faced with the problem of choosing among conflicting or confusing information and analyses There are. in addition, good indications that they are inclined to be distrustful of openly published material,it of being inspired or controlled. These cirrumstances help to account lot the great value Soviet leaders attach to meetings with highly placed
irpirate view on thun6.
American) and to commit meetings, which they believe give them better insights as to which of the many viewpoints oo the US side deserve attention.
Many examples in recent years show that the Soviet leaders, increasingly involvedomplex: world, are Irving to reduce the hazards of operating on an inadequate or distorted understanding of that world. Corrective measures have been directed at old-line organizations such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the KCB. whose personnel have regularly been officially exhorted both totheir information collection and to provide better analysis. Important innovations have also been undertaken in the assessment process. One such development has been the increasedof expert opinion to the top leaders,in Brezhnev's case in the addition of foreign policy specialists to his personal staff.
A further new dimension has come from the growth In number and Importance of the foreign affairs institutes. The principal institutes for the analysis of the US are the Institute of Ihc World Economy and International Relations (IMFMO) and the Institute of thc USA and Canadahe Isvo Institutes have within their walls abody of specialists on thc US* international relations and economic position, on its domestic
economy, politics, and society, and.ore limited extent, on military-strategic affairs.views are neither highly objective nornor do they by any means represent tbe svhole spectrum of important Soviet opinion. One has to look, for example, to the Party press and thc organs of the Ministry of Defense. Theand their directors are, however. Influential andajor part in explaining US'to the leadership.
Bul despite their resources and efforts, the US stillifficult target for the Soviets in their assessments. To tale one prominent example, not only were they late in foreseeing the outcome of Watergate, but they rriispesceived the entire process, believing that President Nixon's opponents were, at liottom, enemies of detenteomestic scandal to sabotage foreign policy.personal experience of the US remains quite limited: it is still possible to reach membership on the Politburo without having had any significant personal contact with non-Communist foreigners. Thus there is considerable scope, at the top level of Soviet politics, for erroneous conclusions and differences of opinion in interpreting the US,at times when Soviet political instability may give greater play to personal political and bureaucratic factors in thc assessment process.
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