' Tup
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE AS SANITIZED
NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE
ESTIMATE
Soviet Forces (or Intercontinental Conflict Through the
ey Judgments and Summory ADVANCE DISSEMINATION
-Ten-Secret-
1
N? 53
Illf OIBKIOtIRAI IN1HUG.NCIt,ioi
AETROVED FOR RELEASE CIA HISTORICAL-REVIEW PROGRAM
MEMORANDUM FOR: Recipients of national Intelligence. "Soviet forces for Intercontinental Conflict Through the'
Bush
Hatntelligence Btimate is the*
official appraisal of the Oirector of CentraMnteiTiocnce This tstunate. including Us Italicized sutcawnts of differing views by members of The National foreign Intelligence Board, was drafted and coordinated by professional intelligence officers of the US
ntell lgence Community and was approved by me withdvice of tne Board.
Z. The judgments arrived at in this tstuate were made after all parties to the UUnate had the benefit of alternative views from the various elements of the Coitrnunity and fro* panels of experts from outside governncntew selected subjects
hefthe consider-
ation of their views, was agreed upon by me and the President's foreign Intelligence Advisory Board as an experiment, the purpose of which was to determine whether those known for their raore somber views of Soviet capabilities and objectives could presentonvincing way to alter the analytic* judgments that otherwise would have been presented in the attached document. The views of these expens did have some effect But lo the extent that this Cstiwtetarker a'pprec.at.on of Soviet strategic capabilities and objectives, it is but the latesteries of estimates that have done so as evidence has accumulated on the continuing persistence and vigor of Soviet program in the strategic offensive and defensive fields
3. The experiment in competitive analysis that was begun with this Estimate has not been completed, and any final judgment on Its utility cannot be rendered. Nevertheless, thereegative aspect that is already clear and wliich concerns me deeply; namely, the selective leaks'regarding the details of the process and, worse, the substantive conclusions developed by the "Teamanel that was concerned with Soviet strategic objectives. Inspired by these selective leaks, allegations have appeared in the press that the judgments appearing in this. werey pressure from the
4,
in
There is no truth to such allegations. The judgments the attached Estimate are the best that can be made on the basts of the analysis of the available evidence.
t
a
5. Although these leaks may appear to discreditontinue to regardorthwhile experiment, they have not diminished the integrity of the Estimate itself, ror the integrity of the Intell igence Comiiunity.
Attaclment
?
APPROVED FOR RELEASE C'A HISTORICAL-REVIEW PROGRAM
SOVIET FORCES FOR INTERCONTINENTAL CONFLICT THROUGH THE
THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.
THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS, EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT, AS FOLLOWS:
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the estimatei
The Central Inie%*nee Agency, theofiliation! of the Department* of Stole and Defense, Ihe Notional Security Agency and the Energy Research and Development Adminimotion.
Concurring:
The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence representing ihe Central Intelligence Agency
Tho Director of Intelligence ond Research representing the Deportment of Stalo Tho Direclor, Defense Intelligence Agency The Direclor, National Security Agency
The Deputy Assistant Administrator fo- Notional Security. Energy Research ond Development Administration
Abstaining:
The Special Assistant to the Secretary for Notional Security, Department ofreasury
The Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of livcstigaiOn
Afso Participating:
The As.islanl Chief ol Sloll for Intelligence,the Army
The Director, of Naval Intelligence. Department ol
The Assistant Chiol of Stoff, Inielllgence, Deport menAir Force
CONTENTS
NOTE
KEY JUDGMENTS I
II
THE USSR'S CURRENT STRATEGIC
FACTORS INFLUENCING SOVIET STRATECIC 13
LONG-TERM SOVIET OBJECTIVES FOR
I'HESENT FORCES FOR INTERCONTINENTAL ATTACKFOR
A. INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILE
IS3
Deployed Forces
Hie New Missiles Deployment Plans Follow-on Systems
it!
B. SUBMARINE LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILE FORCES 23
Present Programs Submarine Patrols
eployed Forces
Backfire
Future Systems
D. STRATECIC CRUISE MISSILES
8 32
32
SOVIET FORCES FOB STRATECIC DEFENSE AND PROSPECTS
FOR
A. DEFENSE AGAINST BALLISTIC
Warning. .
Antibulhstic Missile Systems
IR
Air SuivciUancc and
I i. '
Surface-to-Air Missile*
or Improvementw-Altitude
AGAINST BALLISTIC MISSILEOceanTrailof Future ASW
DEFENSE AND HARDENING OFFORCES AND THEIR
Uncertainties
Meeting the Vladivostok ClUhgi
Alternative Force
OF OFFENSIVE FORCE
Quantitative Measures
Interaction
Soviet Countersllo Capability
Soviet Silo Survivability
Residual RVs Alter Surprise-
Threat to US Bomben nnd
Assessment of Alternative Offensive Force
C IMPLICATIONS OF DEFENSIVE FORCE
Aii and Mbsilr Dchines .
Defense Against SSBNi
D. IMPLICATIONS FOR THEGIC
Deterrence and the
Potential for Dramatick!
Thc Likely Strategic
INTERAGENCY REPORTS AND MEMORANDUMS RELEVANT TO
NIE
lap Sanei.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE ClftHISTOMCAL-RHiEWPRGG^:
SOVIET FORCES FOR INTERCONTINENTAL CONFLICT THROUGH THE
NOTE
This Estimate is primarily concerned wiih present and future Soviet forces for intercontinental attack (ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers) and for strategic defense against bombers, missiles, and ballisticsubmarines. Other Soviet forces which might have some role in an intercontinental conflict are discussed inSoviet Naval Policies andnWarsaw Paeind inSovicl Military Posture and Policies in the Third World."
The findings of this NIE arc contained in three volumes.resents the key judgments and the summary of lhc estimate from which they arc drawn. The full estimate is Volume II. In Volume III arc annexes providing tables ol future force projections andtechnical material on ICHM accuracies and dirccted-cnergy weapon systems.
The contents of all three volumes diaw on lhe findings of severalreports and memorandums prepared by committees of the United States Intelligence Board and ad hoc interagency groups. (See the last page ofist of these issuances.)
-Top-Sw*.-
KEY JUDGMENTS
In this Estimate, we call particular attention to current anddevelopments which could markedly increase Soviet strategic capabilities during the next ten years:
The Soviels are steadily deploying new types of ICBMs. In0 they willorce of upissiles of these types, most of ihem with MIRVs. They are also moving ahead wiih thc development of several ICBMs beyond those now being deployed.
The capability of the Soviet ICBM force to destroy US Minute-man silos is growing. It will probablyajor threat iu lheore rapid increase in this threat is possible hut unlikely.
The Soviets have the potential Io make the task of penetration by bombers to targets in the USSK considerably5 than it is today.
The Soviels are pursuing extensive research and development in such areas as submarine detection and defensive lasers.
We also call attention io tbe large uncertainties about some aspects ul Soviet strategic policy and forces, especially about ihc quality of key weapons and supporting systems in the future. Forecasts of the strategic environment over the next ten years must therefore be made with varying degrees of uncertainty.
Il is almost certain that, despite prospective improvements in Soviet forces, the USSR will not acquire deployed forcesofuclear attack so effective that the US could not cause devastating damage to the USSR in retaliation.
It is probable that US and Soviet strategic capabilities will remain in roughly equal balance, although the long-standing US qualitative superiority in stialcgic weapons and supporting technology will come under increasing challenge.1
' The Aitiiunt Chiefnittlipetxe. fXynimiwui ,i, tlic Air Puree, believes iheiv is tittle reauHwiMt! doubt that the Soih-Ii on- itinint: ceneral utatceic ttijxrionti/vver lhe US liyecade. It lite eimen'tbt>afhiec* the. hteak-iJi'cvfilir being wim'tf, an important fluff in lhe/nr-irhc tlratvc'c bakmCvftOflirS.
possible but unlikely that thc Sovieis will acquire capabili-tics ihat would be perceived as providing them with morepower Io back up their policies than that available lo thc US.
Recent Developments
In strategic offensive forces, thc Sovieis continue their broadof major improvements. The trends are about as we had forecast in lasl year's Estimate, but the diversity of the ballistic missileprogram and thc potential hard-target capabilities of ICBM system* arc somewhat greater than we had expected. The main things we have learned during this past year are:
new ICBMs are being deployedoderate pace. About , f thc new ICBMs. most of them with MIBVs. are now
operational in new and converted hard silos. In Accordance with thc Interim Agreement, the Soviets have started toolder, soft ICBM launchers in exchange for new SLBM launchers.
Despite some continuing developmental problems, the new ICBMi are estimated to have belter accuracies and higher yield* lhan we had expected, implying somcwhal better capa-biliiies to destroy hard targets like Minuteman silos
Developmentand-mobile ICBM could now be complete, bui there is as yet no sign of (ts deployment.
Two and possibly three models of ballistic missile submarines capable of carrying long-range Sl.BMs arc believed to be inew and large type of ballistic missile submarine may have startedew small SLBMew or modified large SLBM have begun flightIKV payload has recently been identified on the latter.
Tin: Soviets continue to maintainew ballistic missile submarines on patrol stations. Limited probes near North American coasts were conducted this year, possibly portending changes in patrol patterns. There is also an increasing number of SSBNs with missiles of sufficient range to reach targets in Ihc US at any given time, even without leaving port.
The Backfire bomber has Iwcn deployed in small numbers thisth in Naval Aviation and in Long Range Aviation at bases occupied by intermediate-range bombers. Thc Backfire has extensive capability for use in various missions in Kurasia
3
and for naval missions over the open seas. We continue toii has capabilities for operation againsi lhc continental US. There are differing views within the Intelligenceaboul Soviet intentions lo use it for this purpose.
We have obtained no confirmation of Soviet hints-ew heavy bomber is being developed.
There is no firm evidence lhat the Soviets are developing long-range cruise missiles, bui they have ihe design andexperience to be able tn do so.
The Soviets continue to devote more resources to strategic defense; than they do to forces for intercontinental attack. In addition to routine improvements in what is by far the largest air defense system in the world, the following are the main developments in Soviel strategic defenses we have noted during thc past year:
The Soviets continue to construct ballistic missile detection und tracking systems lo close .small gaps in existing coverage, to increase their assurance of reliable warning, and perhaps to provide some additional warning time.
They are placing additional emphasis on surveillance systems and training for defense against airctaft at low altitudes, though there are no indications of major improvements in performance.
We have obtained additional evidence supporting earlierlhat nuclear warheads are availableignificant number of Soviet surface-to-air missiles.
Thc Soviets continue tbeir lescarch and development on ABM systemsace not significantly reduced from that which existed prior to the ABMn radars, on SAMs designed" for low-altilude air defense, and on directed-energy systems which probably include lasers willi capabilities against low-orbiting satellites.
They have continued their extensive investigation offor overcoming their deficiencies- in detecting andSSBNs at sea. Soviet attempts to trail US SSBNs near our Operating bases have resulted in no known successes.
Soviet Objectives
Our judgments about tbc strategic objectives of the Soviet leaders are based on what they say (in public and sometimes inn whal wc observe of their programs, and on our apprecialion of theand cvternal foices Operating on them in the present period of
CluU
risky opportunities. It is apparent tliat they see no contradictiontheir policies of detente and arms-limitation negotiations and their continuing buildup of strategic forces. Much that we observe in their present poslure and programs can be attributedombination of traditional defensiveilitary doctrine which stresses war-fighting capabilities, superpower competitiveness, worst-caseabout US capabilities,ariety of internal political and institutional factors. But thc scope and vigor of these programs,ime when the USSR hasowerful deterrent as well asas the strategic equal of the US, raise lhe elusive question of whether ihe Soviet leaders embrace as an objective some form ofnuclear superiority over the US.
Deeply held ideological and doctrinal convictions impel ihc Soviet leaders to pose as an ultimate goal the attainmentominantover the West, particularly the US, in terms of political, economic, social, and military strength. We do not doubt that if they thought they could achieve it, the Soviets would try to attain the capability touclear attack so effective that the US could not cause devastating damage to the USSR in retaliation. Although the Soviet leaders may now entertain somein the view of some agencies, alreadyUS resolvetrategic competitor is weakening, they know realistically that the US need not concede theuperior position in the next ten years. Nevertheless, tbcy are probably strivinglrategic posture which has some visible and therefore politically useful advantages over thc US and which would give the USSR better capabilities than the US touclear war.
The Soviels probably view SALT as having thc potential for limiting the costs and risks of the strategic arms competition Their objectives for the SALT process probably include constraining US optionsin areas where they fear they may be less able to compete) and leaving open their own options to the extent possible. Considering the history of Soviet strategic policy and force improvement programs, we believe thatALT TWO agreement based on theaccord, the Soviets would probably seek in their slrategic
to ensure deterrence of all forms of nuclear attack on the USSR;
to improve war-fighliug capabilities, aimed at the survival of the USSRational entity should deterrence fail;
to counterbalance, with both peripheral and intercontinental forces, the combined nuclear strengths of the US and its allies and of China;
5
narrow or dose the gap between tho US and the USSR in important weapon technologies and to hedge againsi future US force improvements; and
acquire strategic advantages, real or perceived, should US behavior permit.
ALT TWO agreement is noi achieved, we believe that tbe Soviet leaders' objectives for their strategic forces would be much the same. But they would be free of SALT TWO restrictions, which would have forced them7 tomall reduction in the number of their intercontinental delivery vehicles, and thereafter to have confronted the difficult choices involved in trading old weapons for new to stay withinggregate ceiling. In the absence of such restrictions, we would expect the Soviets to build and retain strategic offensive forces larger than the limits proposed at Vladivostok and considerably larger than US programed forces. Increases in force levels would be especially likely if US-Soviet relationsworsened. In any case, the Soviets would not expectcompetition to alter the strategic balance. Implicit in theaccordoviet judgmcnl that the USSR amid not achieve significant advantages over the US by continued competition in numbers of strategic weapons. The Soviets have evidently come to recognize lhal the strategic environment inill be affected most importantly by the qualitative aspects of the forces of the two TWO ThCU" Progress in this area will be largely independent of SALT
Dramatic near-term clianges in Soviet strategic policy would nor be likelyost-Brezhnev regime. The policies now beinghave emerged from the interplay of many factors which would remain unaltered. To lhe extent that Brezhnev as an individual mayoderating influence, any changes would likely be in theof increases in strategic capabilities, especially if SALT TWO fails to produce an agreement. Other adjustments in Soviet policy for strategic forces could result from the USSR's own technologicalor from US-Soviet confrontations over the next ten years. Finally, changes could emerge in response to US force developments such as improvements in hard-target kill capabilities; deployment of ^m'I.ong-range cruisend concepts and options for the selective use of nuclearimiied intercontinental warfare.
Sowct-
Fulure Capabilities
Varying degrees of uncertainty diaracterize our estimates of Soviet strategic policy and of the quantity and quality of Soviet forces.for thc next few years can be made with relatively highby extrapolating from current evidence. For the period ofconcern, five to ten years hence, estimates of systemand force composition must be based on very limited evidence and indirectALT'TWO agreement based on the Vladivostok accord would considerably reduce quantitativeabout forces for intercontinental attack. We warn, however, that uncertainties aboul lhe quality of strategic weapons, andwhich exist now and will persist in thcin some areas large enough to affect judgments about Important aspects of the future strategic balance.
Our best estimate of Soviet offensive force development over the next ten years,ALT TWO agreement, is that deployment of new systems will continue at about tlte pace now demonstrated, that ICBM accuracy will continue to improve, and that forceand flexibility also will improve. Soviet ICBM forcesajor threat to US Minuteman siloj in the, assuming that thc Soviets can perfect techniques for precisely timed two-RV attacksingle target. This is somewhat earlier thanlast year. Moreover, by theoviet offensive forces will lead programed US forces in numbers of missile RVs, though the US willarge lead in the total numl>er of missile and bomber weapons combined.
We haveumber of other alternatives for future Soviet forces, which arc all plausible but not equally consistent with past trends and current evidence. These range fromorce lhe Soviels might regard us meeting minimum requirements for slrategic parity and military effectiveness againsi currently programed US forcesALT TWO agreement, toorce the Soviets might build if thc SALT process failed, US-Soviet relations worsened, and thc Soviets achieved high rates of deployment and technological advance. The principal differences in tlie countetsilo capabilities of these alternative forces are encompassed by the large range of uncertainty in ourof such key weapon characteristics as ICBM accuracy, At the more threatening but highly unlikely extreme of this range ofSoviet ICBMs wouldajor threat to Minuteman silos by the end.
7
The Sovicls could increase lhe threat against US bombers on alert by deploying tome ol* their SSBNs closer tu tlie US coastline to reduce thc potential warning time of an attack. In assessing (he.militaryof adopting this more threatening posture, the Soviets would have to consider planned introduction ofomber and counter-measures available for existing bombers. We believe the Soviets would conclude that thc US could preserve the survivability of most of its alert lumbers against attacks by SLBMs throughout thc next ten years.
In the field of strategic defense, it is unlikely that the Soviets will significantly improve their low-altitude air defenseshe must likely improvements wc foresee in their air surveillance and control, interceptors, and SAM systems would have thc potential for overcoming most of the technicalheir capabilities to counter low-altitude botnlnrsut it might be possible for them lo do so earlierery high level of effort. Assuming rapid anil widespread deployment of such systems, low-altitude penetration of Soviet air defenses by bombers will be considerably more difficult5 than it is today. The actual effectiveness of Soviet air defenses, however, would continue to depend heavily on the degree ofresulting from ballistic missile strikes and on the performance of US electronic countcrrncasures and bomber penetration aids and tactics. Neither we nor tlie Soviet* would likely be able to predict these effects with confidence.
The future effectiveness of Soviet defenses against ballistic missile submarines on patrol will depend in large pail on how successful the Soviets are in detecting anil tracking SSBNs in broad ocean areas. From our understanding of thc technologies involved and research andprograms in the US and the USSR, wc conclude that the Soviets have little potential for achieving success in cither ol these areas in the next ten years. Moreover, improvements in US SSBNs andof their operating areas will compound the Soviet problem of finding, tracking, and attacking them. Thesejiidgments must behowever, by gaps in our knowledge^
possible future Soviet developments. The Soviets will almost certainly continue to develop their strategy and capability for detection of SSBNs. and wc expect improvements in their capabilities to detect and destroy SSBNs In confined water areas. Wc conclude, however, that these improvements will not overcome deficiencies in open-ocean iletection anil submarine tracking, and th.it Soviet ASW capabilities will fall short of being able to prevent most US submarines on station from launching thru missiles.
Despite prospective improvements in their forces, the problems and uncertainties which the Soviets would face il they contemplatedthc US would remain formidable for the next ten years:
The Soviels would be uncertain about the outcome of an attack on US Minuteman silos and would probably expect anumber to survive.
They would almost certainly consider their ASW forces to be unable to locate and simultaneously destroy moreew US ballistic missile submarines at sea.
Under the ABM Treaty their ABM defenses would be
They would still not have high confidence in their ability to defend against US bombers.
They would probably expect their civil defenses to be able toolitical and economic cadre and to contribute to the survivability of the Soviet Unionational entity, but they would have to expect massive casualties, industrial destruction,reakdown of the economy.
Under these circumstances, with the forces and weapons we can foresee, it is extremely unlikely that during the next ten years theleaders would come to believe that either side could launch an attack which would prevent devastating retaliation. During the period, however, Soviet offensive forces will gain nmsiderably relative to the US iii such ijuantitative measures as missilr throw weight and missile RVs. although SALT TWO limits would establish and preservein total delivery vehicles and MIRVYd missile launchers.the long-standing US qualitative superiority in slrategicand supporting technologies will come under increasing challenge. Under lhe most threatening but unlikely circumstance of very rapid Soviet technological advance, especially if combinedargebuildup in the absenceALT TWO agreement, thc USSR could achieve capabilities that might be perceived as giving it more strategic power to back up its policies than llmt available to the US. Foreseeable Soviet slrategic forces, however, would not eliminate the USSR's vulnerability torisis resolution, therefore,would not rest on the strategic weapons balance, but rather would depend on other factors, such as the couvparalive strengths andof US and Soviet conventional forces.
Wc have reexaminedrograms and prospecls for major advances in fields having slrategic offensive and defensive applications
1
thai might seriously erode US deterrent capabilities. We have given particular attention to lasers for use in air and missile defense and to systems for detecting and trailing US ballistic missile submarines. The Soviets are working actively in both fields, and there arc gaps in our knowledge of this work. The available evidence, together with our appreciation of the physical, engineering, and operational hurdles which must br; overcome, leads us to rate as small the chances that the Soviets can sharply alter the strategic balance throughadvance in the next tenevertheless, the scope and progress of. particularly in strategic air defense and ASW. bear especially close watching in the years ahead.
Aindiml Chief of Staff,ol lhe Ait Force, helunti lhat Ihenboiled on a ruchr< lhalajvr if noi riccuiu* in.iwn on ihebalance before ISSi,
10
e-et-
THE USSR'S CURRENT STRATEGIC SITUATION
bc Soviet Union is pressing forwardroad programimproving strategic lorces.the past year, its size. pace, ami genera)have been about what wc expected, but its diversity has been somewhat greater than
In offensive forces, three new ICBM systems are bring deployed at thc expected moderate pace, and development workourth is essentially complete Ihese systems have somewlm belter accuracies and higher yields than forecast lasl year. Tlie nuclear powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) forceto grow, and as many as three types are now in production. New generations of ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic(SLBMs) are being developed, and there are hintsew heavy bomberew and very large SSBN.
In defensive forces, thc Soviets continueIheir air defenses,their capabilities for early warningissile attack, and improving civil defense. They arc pursuing developmental work on ABM sys-
tems.rograms also includefor defense against lowair attack,ontinuing search for ASW capabilities
to counter thc US SSBN force.
hese developments follow more than aof large-scale deployment and modernization programs (tee Figure I) which have moved Soviet slrategic force*Kryond lhe minimumof deterrence. The Soviets* motivation* for improving then Strategic poslure involve theirabnul thc military and political utility of strategic forces, their perceptions ol US capabilities and intentions, their goals and expectations for detente and SALT, and Internal factors, such as economic pressures and institutional concerns.these consideration* is the larger and more elusive question ol how seriously, if at all, the Soviets are pursuing an objective of some form of slrategic nuclear superiority over the Untied States in the long term.
inimum. Soviet leaders viewto strategic nuclear capabilities usthe '"f (lie USSR's superpower status- They believe thai the growth of Sovietpower, along wtth political and economic events, has helpedew 'correlation of
Historical Trends in Selected Aspects of Strategic Forces
ICBM and SLBM Launchers
tnousarnfa
2.6
10
Forces
(Noi Addtne)
Soviet SAM Launchers
US SAMLaunchers
Soviet Interceptors
73 75
r
On-Ltnc Missilo Throw Weight
miuon pounds
r
J
7
J
12
ore favorable lo tbc USSR. This, in lurn.redisposition on tho part of Western policymakers to sec thc USSRecessaryin dealing with various world problems. In potential crisis situations, it gives thc USSRleverage and greater latitude for action. In the event of direct superpower confrontation, the Soviets expect their strategic power to enhance the prospect of favorable outcomes while reducing the likelihood of nuclear war.
FACTORS INFLUENCING SOVIET STRATEGIC POUCY
he Sovietsigh regard for theindustrial, and economic prowess of the United States ond assume lhat tbc US will continue to improve its slrategic posture. Illustrative of this attitude is the Soviets' expressed concern about US development programs foromber. Trident SSBN, and strategic cruise missiles. In SALTand higher level diplomatic con versa! ions, thc Soviels have shown great eagerness to stop, slow, or limit these programs. They have voiced concern that US policy on limited nuclear options will spur further weapon improvements. Theirabout US technological advance is also
such areas aswarfare and laser and charged-partide beam weapons.
evertheless, the Soviets are probablyabout the resolve of the US to remain astralegic and political competitor. On the One hand, they observe tho US seeking improvements and innovations in weapon technology, funding now weapon systems, and adjusting strategicin responseew strategic environment. On the other hand, they witness strong pressures in the US to limil defense spending, already eroded by inflation, to reduce militaryabroad, and to accept the fraying of US alliance relationships. Soviet leaders do riot know
' il <i(seilXe-ilxi
roughly synonymous with "baliiKf ol power" but more blindly construed to encompass political,nd-is well as milium' elements.
how contradictory trends in US altitudes will net out during lhc next decade.
Tlie Defense Intelligence Agency, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, the Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy, anil tlie Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence. Department of the Air Force, believe that Soviet leaders expect the US to be forced by international onddevelopments toess effectivecompetitor. (See Volume II, Chapter I, for further discussion of this subject)
Tlie Soviets appear to maintain an ideological faith that, in the long term, problems in the Westanother phase in lhe steady retreat of the capitalist world before the advance ofoviet power. In tho meantime, however, thc situation is fraught with both dangers andthat have to be manipulatedelicate mix of pressure and patience.
Uelenle for the USSR is the quest for limited spheres of cooperaiion wiih thc US and its alliesarger context of continued competition. Soviet policy is intended to nurture changesto Soviet interests while avoiding challenges to thc US and its allies which would provoke ihem inlo conceited counteraction. The Soviets are com-tnillcd lo detente and arms limitations as well as ambitious arms development programs. Despite ihese contradictions, Soviet leaders will probably have little reason to change thc general character of their detente policy in Ihe next few years. They see in detente opportunities to reduce Western competitiveness, to constrain US strategic programs, to improve Ihe Soviel economic base, ami tumilitarily significant Western technologies. At thc same time, the Sovicis expect lo exploitderived from any weakening of thc United Statesompetitor.
Future Soviet policy is not immutable. It will be affected over thc nest decade by (a) leadership changes within the Soviet party and governmental slructure. (b) major technological advances, or (c) US-Soviet con Irns arising from regional con-flicls of interest.
TCS flfl9flSfl-?pV-*
Top
For the present, stiategic arms limitation is central lo Soviet detenteSoviet lenders value SALT as an incentive for US commitment toand as confirmation of their strategic and political equality with the US. In Soviet eyes, tlie mosl tangible achievement of SALT to date has been the ABMostly anddangerous COmpttltion in AHMwhen thc Soviet* viewed the US as having major technological advantages. By comparison,strategic interest in limitations on offensive amis hat been more conditional and leu pressing. Although admitting that any comprehensive treaty* on offensive forces would have to accord roughly equal treatment to both sides, the SovieU have generally sought in SALT TWO negations toargaining situation in which they can (a) pursue programs to hedge against future threats,eep open their own optionsatch up in qualitative area* wliere they now lag thc US. and (c) constrain US options in areas where they fear they may prove less able lo compete.
Soviets probably view SALT aspotential (or limiting the costs and risks ofarms competition. Implicit in theunderstanding Is thc Soviet judgmentUSSR could not achieve dramaticthe US by continued competition instrategic weapons.
For thi' vietes of the Airufitnf Chief ofDepartment of the Air Force,potential that
might remit from Soviet research andprograms, see
Nevertheless, the Sovietsigorousstrategic arms competition with the US and presumably believe they could maintain andimprove* their relative positionituation in which an agreement limited numbers to equal ceilings.
SALT TWO fail to achieve anSoviet strategic behavior woulda good deal on lhe tesultant politicalDetente between the US and theno doubt be set'ii a* havinget-
back, but the Soviets would probably seek to mini-miie the adverse impactALT TWO failure on other aspects of US-Soviet relations, in part by continuing thc negotial ions'. In these circumstances, tha quantitative aspects of Soviet forceprograms, including lhe.paoe of thc Sovietactivities, would probably not bealtered. Indeed, in tlie event that negotiations were prolonged, the Soviets might seek to eatend the limitations of lhe Interim Agreement in or.ln In help sustain detente and to forestall possible US abrogation of llw ADM Treaty. On the other hand, if the failure of SALT TWO were accompanied or followedignificant worsening in US-Soviet relations, or if tbe Soviets decided deliberately to risk such worsening in an attempt to pressure tlie US, then their force levels and the pace of their building programs could. Increase considerably.
II. Even with moderately paced programs,offensive force levels would probably grow in tbe absence of the Vladivostok ceilings. They could be considerably higher than those ceilingsS if US-Soviet relations worsened.llustrates lite grots quantitative aspects of our alternative projections of Soviet force levels in thc absenceALT TWO agreement, and compares them with our cnneni best estimate assuming an agreement and with <mr estimate of Soviet forces atoFor quantitative and qualitativeof these projections, and for the rationale behind each of them, seef Volume II andf Volume III.)
c believeorce approsimaling the "modeiale" force is. in th" absence of political or military slimuli to higher foiceorr likely reflection of Soviet behavior if there is no SALT TWO agreement. This projection assumes lhal the Soviets intend to avoid further erosion of US-Sovietnd that Ihey concentrate on qualitative foice Improvementv ll ctlrapolates Ihe current Soviet modernization pioijtamv andevel ol effort comparable to that demonstrated In the recent past. Thc "high* force without anon the other hand,rasticion of US-Soviet relations and the highest plamible level of Soviet effort and achievement
- Socio!-.
Projected Soviet Force Levels Under Varying Assumptions'
Estimated
as of5
Projected0
Projected5
Bast Estimate With SAL CFoic* i)
Moderate Estimate without SAL (Force 2)
Hioh Estimate Without SAL (TO'Ce 4)
y-anm. IG
Armani Chef of Staff, Intelligence,of the Air Force, believes Oust whiteikely Soviet respons*ALT TWO failure tn terms of the weapon systems projected in that force, current Soviet efforts in directed energy and other oilvanced technologies suggest that strategic programs may be quite different from those protected. For further discussion of his views on tfiat sub-sect, see.
The Department of State believe* that the political assumptionsfailure" of SALT TWO are too vague foe the resulting force protections to be useful to policymakers. It is not clear, for example, whether we expect the Soviets to continue SALT negotuitionsin the absence of any progress. It Is the Departmerit's view tluil if "failure' of SALT' I* intended to sugjiest that no SALT agreement is concluded over the next ten years and the Interim Agreement is noishort, that SALT falls totally-then thu could onlyeverein VS-Sovict relations which almostwould be accompanied by expansion ant! modernization of Soviet strategic forcesaster pace than projected in Forcen these circumstances, it is tlie Department's view thatnderestimates the likely threatmall morion0 andery margin in
oviet strategic policy continues to beby military doctrine which calls for war-winning ca liabilities. Central to ihc Soviet concept of "victory*avorable force balance combined with skillfully developed wrapons-employmeiitresolute political and military command,etter capability than the US to survive nuclear damage As part ol their concept of survivalalional entity, tbe Soviets stress active and passive defense of the homeland,licncy, and social discipline. While ihey acknowledge insources and lhc current dominance of offensive oser dcfcniisr technology, ihey recognire thai this situation could be alteicd. They value theof thrlr present active and passive slrategicand are devoting considerable resources lo Iheir improvement The Soviels' commitmentoncept of national survival in nuclear war is also re-
flected in lhe coiinterforee emphasis in planning for the use of offensive weapons and in their concept of prrempboti Mutual assured destructione-siiable. and lasting basistable strategicrelation* hip between superpowers hai never been doetrinally accepted in the USSR Bul Soviet political and military leaders probably regardassured destructioneality which will be operative at least over the next decade.
he Soviets arc evidently considering theol US weapons employment policy calling for limited utM of strategic forces. In the few theoretical discussions in available Soviet sources, however, theic is scant suggestion that limitednuclear operations al the intercontinental level are being planned. In their writings and statements, the Soviets have generally rejected the possibility lhal either the US or Ihe USSR would be able to cxeicise rcstrniiil once nuclear weapons had been employed against ils homeland. There is tentative evidence, however, that the Soviets could belimited nuclear employment concepts inlo iheir miliiary doctrineheater war.
IS Soviet decisions on strategic force rrioderniza-lion aie probably based on gcneious assumptions about US capabilitieserception of thcthreat as dynamic and improving. They take into account not only the US-USSR balance innuclear forces but also US forward-based systems plus the nuclear forces of US allies and China. Such decisions are lhc result of complei institutional, organizational, and persona] politics, as well as objective considerations of strategic needs The interests of the armed services, missile and airiraft design bureaus, and industrialundoubtedly are also taken ink* account in arriving at national defense needs nnd integrated with the level of resource support available. Theleadership recognizes (he need loarge, cflicient. nnd functioning ban- ofnd Industrial componentsational defense asset The Soviet military has not opposed detente, partly because this policy has not unduly interfered with ambitious programs for the armed services. Nevcilhelcss, perns tent rhetoric by the military in the Soviet press on ihe need for vigilance is aof the case made lo political leaders that thc Interests of Hie military cannot be ignored as the policy of detente is pursued.
lthough ihu development and production of strategic weaponry require an appropriation of scarce, high-quality resources, strategic programs have been well funded and executed, even during periods of lagging economic growth. The estimated dollar costs of Soviel strategic offensive andforcesis, what we estimate il would cost in the US to develop and produce Soviet hardware and operate thesenearly doubled over the past decade and have exceeded US spending for comparable programs every year4 We estimate that they were at leastercent higher than our ownhile some leaders have expressed concern over the burden of defense spending, and numerous Soviet sourcesto thc need for nioie cos! effectiveness indecisions, the Soviets have no! acted as though costs have inhibited military programs lhc leaders regard as important.
ecent information suggests, however, that Ihe Soviets' total expendilures for defense (in rubles) have been substantially higher, and lheof their defense programs much greater, than we ihought. Thus,ALT TWO agreement is reached, some economy-minded leaders may pushore critical scrutiny of stralegic programs. Reducing expenditures would lie difficult, given the momentum of strategic programs, perceivedrequirements, institutional factors, and theavailability of resourcesonstantly expanding industrial sector.
or many years thc Soviets have beenin various forms of concealment andactivities relating to Iheir stralegic missile, naval, and air systems. Examination of all aspects of the Soviet concealment and deception program suggests that it may have three fundamentalrelevant lo Ihc conduct ot nuclear war. Firsl. il may bo intended, in thc future, to deny the US sufficient intelligence lo assess confidently theof new weapon systems. Second, it may be intended to prevent us from determining thc pat-ferns and extent of deployment of land-basedmissiles and ballistic missile submarines. Third.
'The Soviel cosn licif totaled exclude ASW.e -rc not jble lo icpaiati' into *fi.iWi[rf and tactical ck-menlS
bctnus* of Ihe dual-purposecaun-power, ships, and weapons.
in the period just preceding oruclear war, Ihe Soviets may hope that concealment andefforts would add to the survival of stralegic weapons and degrade the US capability forwarning.
*
LONG-TERM SOVIET OBJECTIVES FOR INTERCONTINENTAL NUCLEAR FORCES
Deeply held ideological and doctrinalimpel Soviet leaders lo pose as an ultimate goal the attainmentominant position over the Wesl, particularly lhc United Stales, in lerms of political, economic, social, and military strength. Thconvictions about the eventualof their system remain strong, and recent events probably have increased their optimism about Ihe long term. While thc Soviets may be optimistic about longer term prospects, their strategic policies and programs arc likely to be guided by moreand attainable goals during lhc next ten years.
Wc do not doulvt that if they thought Ihey could achieve it, thc Soviets svould try to attain lhc capability touclear first strike so effective lhat thc US could not retaliateountcrstrike powerful enough to causedamage to thc Soviet Union. We do noi believe they presently countombination of actions by thc USSR and lack of actions by tlie US which would produce this kind of superiority during the next len years. Soviet expectations for strategicand defensive forces during the period of this Estimate, however, evidently reach wellorce Ihat merely continues to assure retaliation sufficient to deter an all-out attack. Thc Soviets piobably will have thc following objectives for ihcir strategic programs during the period of this Fsh-mate:
to ensure deterrence of all fonns of nuclear attack on lhc USSH.
to improve war-lighting capabilities, aimed at Ihe survival of the USSHational entity should deterrence fail;
to counterbalance, with both peripheralei continental forces. Ihc combined nuclear strengths of llw US and its allies and of China;
lo narrow or close thc gap between Ihe US and tbc USSR in important weapon technolo-
and tn hedgeuiure US force Im-peovemcnB; ami
to acquire strategic advantages, real orshould US behavior permit
he Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence. Deportment of the Air Force, belieoet that the emphasis in the preceding paragraph onnuclear capabilities places far tooocus on Soviel long-range goals Current evitlence cited in thu Estimate on increased Soviet defense expenditures, doctrinal imfinrj regarding the necessity of affuininr. strategic superiority, strategic hardening programs,of new offensive missile systems, and research on advanced weapon technology, along with significant improvements in general-purjiosc forces, leaves little reasonable doubt tliat tlic SovieU ore striving for generalsuperiority over tlie US (encompassing political, economic, and tecltnologicol as well as miliiary power) by the end of tlie nextHe further believes that, if the current massive Soviet programs in ASW and directed-energy weapon technology achieve thebeing sought, an important shift in the strategic balance in the USSITs favor could occur5
PRESENT FORCES FOR INTERCONTINENTAL ATTACK AND PROSPECTS FOR IMPROVEMENT
A. INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTICORCES
Deployed rorces
she SovielsotalCBM launches at deployed(four less than lasthey also hadaunchers at the Tyuratam test center which we believe are part of the operational force. Ofereere under construction, conversion, orandbove-ground launchers remained nonoperatlonal. .'Characteristics of Soviet ICBMs are shown innd the status of the force is shown in
hiiles
initial developmental testing of threefour new Soviel (CBMs has beena total ofSS-lTs., andnow operational. Testing of the SS-Xvirtually complete, and deployment couldanyit is not already under way.
Themall scJid-propcUant missde is probably being developedeplacement for the silo-basedt has about doubh the throw weight of thcU theested hareingle BV, but the systemostboost vehicle and may eventually be MIRVed. The Soviets are also workingobile version of this system.
Theedium-size liquid-propcllairt missileop-up launch technique It has somewhat more throw weight than pre-
, vlouslymore than twice the throw weight of theissiles which it Ls replacing. Exceptew initial tests, all theirings have been with MIRVs,thatIRVed version will Ik-deployed.
Thebe second medium size liquid-propellant missile carrying MIRVs. has been characterized by Soviet leaders as the "main missile' It has sligfady more throw weight than fhehe initial flight test program for theas been completed, and like thet is being deployed as afor the
Thearge liquid-propellant missileop-up launch technique like thet has slightly more throw weight than thet isingle-RV version of tlie missile, theods now deployed, and flight testing of thcith MIRVs is virtuallyecond single-RV version, theodas been tested and has longer rangeighter RV than the Mod I.
This year we have refinedof the accuracies of the newnow believe that the circular errorsfor thendCBMs arebetter, and that the CEPs of thend
- lop
TABLE I
Slalus of ihe Soviet ICBM Force1 (Number of Launchers as
ICBM sol.
Subtotal.
rf
8eV7
SS-8
SS-9
SS-11
fiS-IJ
SS.1T
SS-18
Subioul
elieve
ruction.
ation
'
w
1
Non-
(Jja-inliOTiiil
Total
0,
IS
auncher* <uM lorami training
* Theseod 1ire out oflornstall* Hon of It*r Mod
havermoyed.
rCBM. currentlyS-19 .nd
lilo, bcr*he
ii month: during nodtrniuiion for
. . .
v/cre bulli Irom scratch.
re considerably better, than forecast lasl year. I_
SS-18
andCBMs arc potentially the more accurate of the new systems
his year wc have addressed thc effects of operational factors on Soviel ICBM accuracies mom specifically than we havr in the past. In addition toescimating the technically feasible CEPs. wr have estimated operational CKIS phased over time. (For our Current estimates ol operational systembetween nowce Table II.)CFPs on Hie order0 nm could bo
19
TABLE M
Operational Aeeutaeira of New Soviet ICBM Systems'
achieved by theith majorto tbe new ICBMs. We believe that the Soviets could develop entirely new ICBM systemsS which would have potential CEPs05 nm. However, operational CEPs toward the lower end of this spread probably could not be achieved until thc.
arheod Yields. Our estimates of the war-head yields of the new Soviet ICBMs have increased slightly tines last year/
3
Wify. The new and converted missile iilot provide much better protection than Ihe older ulos against blast overpressure, against ground
Shock, and probably againstffects. Analysis conducted during the past yearhght upward adjustment in ourof the hardness of the new Soviet ttlos. Even if the true hardness values are at the lower end of tlie ranges of our uncertainty, thc new silot will make the Soviet ICBM forces much more suiviv-able. Survivability would be further enhanced if the Soviets deploy mobile systems.
Ovploymoni Plans
s noted, deployment of three ol the four new ICBMs-them!Is now under way. Silo impiovemcnt and deployment of the new missiles are proceeding at about the steady and moderate pace forecast last year While tlie Soviets could deploy thc new systems more rapidly, they appear to have decided to have no more thanoercent of their ICBMs off line for force modernization at any one time. It is now evident lhat all ol thendomplete, are now or soon will be involved in silo nmvcision and modernizatione estimate lhat DAMN Soviet programs call for the deployment of tlie
nodernized silos byt is unlikely that further change in tliesc silos Is planned during. On the basisumber of factors, includingactivities atomplexes, we expectonvertedilos will haveith MIRVs. and thatith MIRVs will beinll-new silos and convertedilos.
he deployment plans for thend there less dear. During the past year,atomplexes indicated lhat allilos will be converted for theeploy ment of then these silos, as well as Inll-new silos (started prior to the Interimwill resultorten the field. We are uncertain, however, about the mix of slngle-RV and MIRV variants.^
f the Soviets follow past deploymentwhile having no more thanoercent of their ICBMs off line, the picsent siloconversion, and modernization programs and deployment of the new ICBMs will be completed by thc. Thc Soviets svill continue to dismantle olderndaunchers in exchange for SLBM launchers as required by the terms of the Interim Agreement.
follow.on System
he Soviets haverograms under way which are likely lo result in Rightof several more new and modified ICBMsnow and thc early
we believe lhat the bulk of theorce will have MIRVs, testingecond single-RV variant suggests thai lhe Soviels see some military requirement for long
range, high-yield, single-warhead ICBMi. at least
during Ihc near term.
heill probably be deployed in theilos. As observed caihcr, thc MM program for this system is essentially complete, and deploymenl.t not already under way, could begin
he Soviets are also workingobile version of theut we believe that tliey have decided to forgo ils deploymentALT TWO agreement based on the Vladivostok accord is reached. Thc Soviets will nlinosl certainlywinkingobile version ol theo maintain their technology iu tins atea. ami to hedgereakdown in SALT' negotiations and the pussibiliry of an increase in thcof silo-based ICBMs.
svif?
It is likely, however, that future Soviet ICBMsave operational accuracies on thc order5 nm CEP in lhc, advanced reentry vehicles, belter warheads, and improved components leading to increased targeting flciibdtly and prolonged missile leadiness.
See imcuiison of follow-on ICHMi. Volume II, Chapter II. for lhe view of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Inielligence, Department of the Air Force, on the Soviet ballistic niissaV pro-grams.
B. SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED BAlllSJIC MISSILE FORCES
Preseti! Progdimi
s5 the SovietsLBM launehers onuclear-powered submitiinet which had reached opcratiunxl status andaunchers on five new SSBNi on sea (rials. Inthere were alaunchers on nine nuclear submarines still under construction. There arc alsoauncher* oolder diesel-powered units. Tlic Interim Agreement permits tlic Soviets upaunchers onodern ballistic missile submarines, provided lhal foi all Inunchcrsn nuclear-powered submarines ihey dismantle or destroy equal numbers of older ICBM or SLBM launchers. Tlte Soviets presently have
Operational Soviet Ballistic Missile Submarines
D
class
D
class
lass
Opcritinul ' PmpuWin
n
ii
nxlw 3 m)
(Minn) lewl o>
3 5 art
COflv*ila0lOlCSl tnoOOOnmSSNBcHSHC'tuliei
I. accountable SLUM launcher* onhus requiring tbc dismantling of some older ICBMTrie charaetrmtics of Soviet ballistic missile submarines and SLBM* are shown in5 andnd lhe statu* of th* force is shown in Table UL)
ii-,
he diversity ol the current SSBN program it greater than we previously anticipated. It possibly include ;is many as three types ofais,lian the two we est Iil last year, andew vluts of submarine.ie past year two additional launches uflass Mibmalines earryitii;miivsile brought tohehus units launched as. AImi. four lengthened'. ii. units (which wc have ib-signaled thc Mod D) were laiiiacluil. thchich is nowod l> Haw SSBN carriesfiuilct Evidence nf activity at lhc mam Soviet SSBN (ModiK Ihiiinstruction is under way on af version oflas* which wc have designated the Mod l> follow-on./
missile complement could be us low asi as high as 20
tatements of Soviet official* and SSBN con struction activity sugcrsl ihat ihe Sos'icts arc woik-mg On yel another new ballistic muvili* subiTijrmr cotuideralily larger than any ofariants. If to. Ihe new sutimariue could be operational by9
here is evidence that the Soviets has*two new SLBM, under oVs-cfaprm-nt- Amissile,ihejilight Inl-
ine The tot nmules [trnlhibTyingle wnr-lvead.Q
could be ready fn: de ployment byA. probably onl.is*withubet which hut been underfur sewrut years.^
In-m
expect the
Mian m. perhapsuch as
TABLE Ilt
Status of Ibe Soviel Ballistic Mlaaile Sobmaritu- Force (Number of Hulls-Tobes as
HitaVTuboa
anBuilding
Subauuaa 1
i
MoJ
Mod DHO*
I*
la-
S
I
T-ui Tibci Com ted Coder latenoi
113
O-l. MoT
Totw attw tMViaa-m
' Include* UltlSI unotJCiWnc redialing, overhaul, oi dinvfino"
laat lunminne modified lo canyather rhan lo uiiuOci- counted withobrcal lac SALT atoaiianag porpoaea I* coaatdefed laIn labee aaU taa inala befta.
' Ta daUIarauaha Daiaaa.OaWnly daatfaatad Uttt. mbntenae aa taat-tube aait at thaad Ih?exeM at thaollow -on."
Sovieli also areewhls new missile, with liquidIn iU stages sliiiilar lo those ol theas lest-fircdangem in late October and again in earlyhis is the first Soviet SI.BMjo carry MIRVs. Ilostboost vehicle vvithl
^ MIRVs. It could lie ready for deployment7 ot8 in theollow-on
3
he Soviets continue lo maintainmall portion ol their SLUM force atolicywith their vieweriod of International tension would prrcede any nuclear war. Only aboulrcent of tlieir Y-lass SSBNs arein transit or on patrol (the patrol areas are tlsown in Figurelass units are normally onoff each coast of. During the pastIatt patrols, inilially Intermittent and limited to the Barents Sea. progressed into tlic Greenland Seacgulat
Tap
BEST COPY AVAILABLE
Figure 7
Patrol Areas and Missile Ranges of Soviet SSBN Force
D-class submarines become operational areas will probably expand.
J
e believe over Ihc next ten years thc Soviets will continue to deploy only aboutoercenticit SSliN force on patio! and in Uimsit. Wiih longer range missiles and espanded operating areas, the Soviet foice will have lictter survivability and substantially more SLBMs wilhin range of
C. BOMBERS
Deployed foKU
tt Tlie Lung Range Avialion (LRA) lorce lias been al about ils present size for the past decade, and we believe lhat the Soviet* Intend Ioelatively small intercontinental bomber foicr to complement their formidable ICBM and SLBM forces. Trie bomber units continue to trainariety of other missions, including attack on enemy naval forces and reconiiatssance- The LRA bomber and tanker component of tho Soviet intercontinental attack forces consistsear and Bison bombersison tankers. There arc cimcntly aboutackfire aircraft operational with LRA andith the Soviet Navy. (Seendor char-actciislics uf Soviet strategic aircraft and their ranges fromin thc USSR.)
BocWire
iming lhe past year deployment of theew (wui engine, swing-wing bomber. Backfire II. confirmed our previous judgment lhat the Soviel* would give first priority to deployment of Ibomber lo* peripheral missions. Aboutackfiics have been produced to dale, anddeliveries of the alrcralt to operational bases aie opeitcd More tbe end of lhe year.
nalysis of the Backfue* pciforrnancc has continued ovci lhe pall year, icsultiiigsmall reduction in otimaie*ange
iovember. TinWuCicn oo op-agonalnd 72
en uniu on w* milt. II exclude*aunched dolait nuclear lubmnrion.
Profrcilow *io ai olMidl.om Few I. oui boilofoom Itvdi6 undfrSAL
acludciuniiiHiilmaied lobe oil lor convection oi overhaul.
"al ih- Soviet! coodou. io meinialn0ir SLBM force on
iaao j'tM monawt trm pr (mention io about is percentti.
ECRET
29
Soviet Strategic Aircraft
13M
Backfire
CUrinMrvl Mnn. Maiicecd iii
adger
CaveatSO rnASM; {a; SIS In] SOum Willi
Mi. ! ^
2
CenMiinASMi
litm wilt. uamo.
Mutit
L. T
no
fop 6fW
-Top,0
Distance Contours from Long Range Aviation Home and Staging Bases
CAPABILITIES FOR
REFUELING1
MISSION
* Bomber
bombload
SM Carrtaf
raw
bsi
B'C 6oobor
i)
bombload
li Bomber'
bombload
CIA (prdimnary}:
ison tanker.
31
We believe il is likely lhat Backfires wiU continue to be assigned to theater and navallhe exception ol the DefenseAgency, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, and thc Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence, Department of the Airbelieve ll Is crxrespondingly unlikely thai they will be specifically assigned to intercontinental missions.
The Defense Intelligence Agency and lheChief of Staff for Intelligence,of the Army, believe it ir premature to fudge Soviet Intentions far fvture employment of the Backfire. They and thr Assistant Chief of Staff, InteUigence. Department of the Air Force, note that its intercontinental capability, regardless of present intentions, gives thethe option to use that capability at their initiative Further, the Asnrtanf Chief of Staff, InteUigence, Department of the Air Force, bcllexus some portion of the Backfire force will be used for missions against theUS.
(For cUbosabon of positions coocerrunr; therole, see Volume II. Chapter II.)
hile all Backfires seen to date have bad refueling probes, wr are uncertain what tanker the Soviets would use with the bomber. Earfy In the flight-lest program. Backfires conducted air-to-air refueling operalions with Bison tankers. liven if all Uisons were converted to tankers, however, the force would be too small toarge number of Backfires as well as Bear bombers. We therefore would expect lhe Soviets toew tanker if they Intended to conduct extensive air-to-airfor Backfire operations.3 the SovieU apparently weie engaged in researchanker version of theandid jet transport, but wc have no indications that the program has proceeded beyond ihis preliminary stage.
Fu'vre Syttc-mi
ince4 Soviet officials haveto the developmentew intercontinental bomber and. on several occasions, have stated that
the aiicrnft would have 'characteristics similar toe have not seen any evidence to support these claims. In anyew bomber probably would not be in service in- significant numbers
before the.
D. STRATEGIC CRUISE MISSILES
here is no lirm evidence that the Soviets are developing long-range cruise missiles. They have Ihc design and development experience to do so. however, based on the variety of cruise missile systems which they have developed since. Should the Soviets pursue suchthey could begin by modifying current cruise missile systems lo give then increased ranges and unproved accuracy. Such modifications could be ready lorear ot two after flight testing began. By0 the Soviets couldew generation of large long-range cruise missiles based on current technology,with multiple warheads and ImprovedDevelopment of small, highly accurate air-and soa-launched strategic cruise missiles vs'ould requite technology which wo believe will not be available to the Soviets until.
SOVIET FORCES TOR STRATEGIC DEFENSE AND PROSPECTS FOR IMPROVEMENT
lie Soviets continue thc emphasis onof the homeland that has characterized their military planninp since World War II. They are pressing ahead In Iheir strategic dofonse programs with improved air defenses, HAD on ABM systems, extensive efforts to develop better ASW capabditics. research or. advanced technologies for defense, an ongoing civil defense effort,arge program for hardening strategically important facilities. The long.standing Soviet commitment to strategicwhich has produced in Ihe USSR what is by far the largest air defense syrtern in the worid. contrasts sharply svilh tlie policies of the US, which have ni'.oiled in the deliberate dcemphasis offorces. The level of resources devotrd to strategic defenses of all types in tlie USSR has for year* exceeded those devoted tu lorces for inter-
I :itf I.
n addllionumber ofin each of Ihe dements of Soviet strategic defease forces, Ihc following are noteworthyprnentt of tlie past year;
Soviets coniinue to comtnict ballistic missile delection and tracking systems to close small gaps in existing coverage, to increase tbeU assurance of reliable warning, andto provide some additional warning time.
are placing additional emphasis onsystem* and Iraining for defense against olieraft at low altitudes, though there are no Indications of major improvements in performance.
have obtained additional evidenceearlier indications that nuclearare availableignificant number of Soviet surface to-air missiles.
SovieU continue their research andon ABM systemsace not significantly reduced from that which existed prior to the ABMn radars, on SAMs designed for low-altitude air defense, nnd on directed-energy systems which probably include lasers with capabilities against low-orbiting satellites.
have continued their extensiveof lochiii'pies for overcomingin detecting and trailing SSBNs at sea. Soviet attempts to trail US SSBNs near our operating bases have resulted in no known
A. DEFENSE AGAINST BALLISTIC MISSILES Warning Systems
hen lhe new Hen House at Mukaehevo Is operationalhe SovieU will havecomplete ballistic missile early warning radar coverage of missile* launched into tlte European USSB (sec. In addition, next to the Hen House at Olrticgotsl they areew large phased-array wluch wiU probablyredundant ballistic missile early warning cov-*rage. Hen House radars can provide aboutinutes" warningS ICBM altack on Moscow
believe that over-the-horizonradars the Soviets are constructing atKomsomol'sk arc toS ICBMbut we cannot yet rule out the possibilityfor aircraft detection. OHD radars are notas Hen House radars butinutes' svamlngS ICBMKiev radar may begin initial operationsanti the Komsomol'sk radar could8
AfliiboiliDk Missile Sysicmi
ABM system atbe onlySoviels have deployed. It wouldassive US altack, butMoscowairly wide are* ofUSSRmall, accidental, orlaunch. Similarly, smallagainst lhe Moscow area by thirdcould be defeated-
he Soviets have not chosen to deploy the additional ABM radars and interceptors allowed by the ABM Treaty, These factors, plus tlte recent relatively slow pace ofrograms at Sary Shagan, lead us to believe the Sonets have become dissalisfird with the effectiveness of conventional ABM systems. Nevertheless, they areedge against treaty abrogation and to explore potential solutions to the problem of ballistic missile defense.
t Ihe Sary Shagan missile test center Iho SovieU are working on an ABM system whichcould be deployed much more mpidly than thc Moscow ADM system.
pace of testing of the interceptor has boon slow. Tlie interceptor has not been firedallistic missile target. If the Soviets were tooncerted effort to solve their technical problems, thc system could be readyear or so. Although one complex of the new system could be deployed in less than six months, an extensive deployment program would require several years to complete.
m analysis of the system shows that,external baltlc management data. It wouldonly marginal defense against US ICBMs and none at all against Poseidon. But it could provisli*
" Top fo#>
(omc defense against US Potaris and Chinese mis- role, f" riles. The systems performance could be signifi-srntly improvedigh-performance interceptordevdoped to perform enEanements in the atmosphere.!
least three years of flight testing
would be required befoieissile could be ready for deployment
A system tested at tlic Emba tactical air defense teat center Is assessed as possibly being intended for defense against tactical ballisticIts missile could have substantial potential as an interceptortrategic AtlM rote.
Another system being developed in aarea at Sary Shaganechnical potential for improving the Moscow ABM defense. However,
construction of what isaser at uSetacility lead us to believe the Soviets may now be investigating advanced concepls for ABM and antisatellite applications. The laser does not have sufficient power to destroy missile warlieads but perhaps could be used to discriminate small warheads hidden in chaff clouds.
ho Soviets have high-priority HAD programs to exploit advanced technologies for strategicand they appear to be convinced that these programs have potential for weapon applications over the long term. (See Volume II, Annex C) Wo do not believe, however, they could develop laser or charged-particle beam weapons for ballistic missile defense before
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence,of thc Air Force, believes tluitmbarkedttap om research program of ruch magnitude that II couldafor if not decisive impact on tlic strategic balanceS. Forevidence on this view, see
lic current Soviet SAMs were not deployed to provide ABM defense and probably are notfor tins role Thc ABM Treaty prohibitsof SAMs for an ABM role and further prohibits testing of SAM equipment in such a
1
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence.of the Air Force, lielicoes that modi-ficalion of theor terminal pointof reentry vehicles is basically simple to
land that it may already have been
done.
B. AIR DEFENSE
e believe thai the USSR's present airwhile the most extensive in the world, could not effectivelyir attack. Most of the currently deployed Soviet air defense systems were designed to counter tbe medium-to-high-altitude bomber and stand-off missile threats which were evolving in thondut Soviet air defenses have criticalin combating low-altitude attacks. Wc havectivities, modifications tosystems, and deployment programs whichintended to overcome these deficiencies.
Air Surveillont* and Control
he Soviets have deployedarly warning and ground -controlled intercept (CCI) radars. The spacing of radar sites in tbc western USSR and selected portions of the remainder of the country suggests lhat continuous coverage exists ateet, and even lower in heavilyareas. But fj**
3'he Soviets still have
low allitudes.Q
J
he Sovieis currentlyemi automatic reporting syslem with much ol the air surveillance force
3
n an apparent attempt to overcome these deficiencies, the Soviets began introducing new data systems and changes tn the air defenseand control structure in thend.
firsl deployed9i these, the high-altitude, high-speed Foxbat Interceptor and the latest version of the Flagon point defense in-torceptor continue to be produced. Thc Flagon and the older Firebar currently are the mostinterceptors against Ipw-altitude largcts. Their low altitude capabilities, however, areby their radar performance and weapon(See Figureor characteristics of thc newer interceptors.)
he I- logger mfeicerXof. which is nowwith Soviet Tactical Aviation, will likely be deployed within the PVO Strany in thc near future. The Floggcrimiled capability lotrack, and engage low-altitude targets lielow its own altitude. To exploit this limited capability, uilKt.iiti.il improvements must be made in the supporting air surveillance and CCI network, f"
BS. An alternativeupplement lo widespread improvement In CCI would be the InUoduetion of an effective airborne warning and control system (AWACS) which could detect, track, and vector Interceptors againstt all altitudes over both sea and land. AWACS aircraft probably would be more sophisticated than the ground radars re-miired to do thc same fob. but fewer would be needed because of their greatly increased line of sight An AWACS could be particularly effective if employed with an Interceptor wiih an advanced lookdown/shootdown system. However, as in the case of Ihc lookdown/shootdown system, there is no evidence of Soviet development of an effective AWACS. If the Soviets elected lo buildystem, it could be IntroducedS. but several years more would be required for widespread
Interceptors
hc current first line interceptor aircraft in thc Soviet Air Defense Forces (PVO Strany) were
Jimprovements over current low-altituaocould be achieved ineriod.igh-priority Soviet effort, this capability could be achieved even sooner.
Miss-le.
ll Soviet strategic SAM systemsndave been modernized during their lifetime. The new versions have Improved performance such as low-altitude capability or in-croaved range. (Figureives characteristics of currently deployed SAMs, and Figuiehosvs SAM cowraijo of thevidence^
confirmed previous indications lhal nuclear warheads are available lo somendnits. Wc further believeonsiderable portion of thcorce is so equipped^"
^1'he increased lethal radiusuclear war-
tkrtffA
1 Top
Newer Soviet Strategic Defense Interceptors
*4Mi
if6
oxbat'
Suieiunt unit irtiimjfii
3Daim
AAl'i
Tin0
Flagon E1
icffic
pa
AMi lat Mtiiiiintl Mil
irebar-
hin it) fem-inatfe kwctpui
in
no
t* MMj
ljjc in
SIS An lAAMl
"tWtH It* IK ji: fj'tinit
Minion polwrnviw*coiruigini ic-invert"
PiO'llr.
J. Million tinrlormincectt>t
BtO'to.
-SKOCT
J-
Currently Deployed Sovlot Strategic SAMs
-
Miiinum ranee
Elhtiive jlinudc
opoitioriil IHIil
r.
SO If
SA-1
m
SD.DM(I
i
If;,
-fctcnu.
could compensate for tbe huge min distances inherent inperations al low altitudes. Tlic use of nuclear warlicadi would extend tbc effective range of thet low altitudes, but the filed sites would continue to be vulnerable to the tactics of avoidance, destruction, and possibly jamming.
here is evidence that the Sovietsew low-altitude SAM system under developmentomplex in thc Sary Shagan test center. Oneof iheadar with an elevatedincorporate* desirablcfeatnres fordetection and tracking
3
The Soviels might also improve their defenses by deploying the mobileystem to PVO Strany Another possibility is that thc defensive system under dcvclopmnil at the Emha teilppears iniended for use againsi tactical ballistic missiles could alsotrategic air defense application lhe systemapabilily against the short-rangemissile (SHAM) in its hlgh-altitudc semibal-hslie flight mode, bul il piobably would not be
effective against low-altitude SRAMs because the system's radar would need sophisticated clutter processing equipment which Is not required for use against tactical ballistic missiles.
Prospects (or Iroprovenwnl o( low-Allilude Dafamaa
t is unlikely lhat the Soviets will have Sig-mfieandy better low altitude air defenses before IfXSO. In suliscriuenl years, however, we foresee In Soviet airair surveillance and control, in interceptors, and In surface-lo-airpotential lor overcoming most of thc currentdeficiencies for defense against low-altitude bombers.f die Soviets carry out thewe have judged as likely, they will haveong way tmvaid solving thegainst today's low-altitude threat, thus making tlie lasl of low-altilude penetration considerably more difficult. Tlie actual effectiveness of Soviet air defenses, however, would depend heavily on theuius tan ces of lhc attack, on the degradation of air defenses resulting from ballistic missile strikes, on the effects of electronic warfare, and yn develop-
-
N- In US offensivewhiclii' unable to measure. Wr belien the Soviet* will not have an effective defense againit the SHAMnd will have to rely on attacking the SHAM carrier prior lo missile launch.
e have considered the possibility of air defense applications of directed energylasers and other beam weapons. We do not believe feasible applications of theseduring the neat decade would have any better prospect for overcoming Soviet deficiencies in low-altitude air defenses lhan the improvements wc have estimated as likely.
C. DEFENSE AGAINST BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES
he Soviets currently do not have an effective defense against the US SSBN force To counter US SSBNs the Soviets would base to conduct near-simultaneous strikes against virtually lhe entire force. This wouldide-area oceansystem to determine the location of all SSBNs at approximately the same time, or It wouldearly continuous trackingby means ofmaintaining contact on submarines locatedomewhat longer period unui the time selectedimultaneous attack.
vidence from Sovietindicates that the Soviet Navy would try to destroy as many SSBNs as possible rjcior to the outbreak of hostilities We believe the Soviets desire, but do not expect to attain, the capability looordinated strike against all SSBNs, The Soviets' ASW capabilities are eiiircntly limited by their inability to detect SSBNs in broad ocean areas and tu maintain trail once an SSBN is detected. Thc fulute effectiveness of Soviet ASW capabilities will depend in considerable measure on the extent to which new acoustic and nonacousttc systems are developed to overcome these deficiencies. We note thai thc Soviets are continuing to develop new ASW sensors, platforms, and weapons.
Wide A'Oo Ocean Surveillance
t is unlikely thai lhe Sovieis will develop an open-ocean acoustic system as capable as the US Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) during the period of this Estimate. This judgment is based
on the technical difficulties live Soviets would have in developingystem and the geographic constraints on deployment. Furthermore, they may be discouraged from pursuing thb approach by the prospect lhal US SSBNs will be quieter and have cipanded operating areas in tho future, and that the background noise levels In all ocean areas will increase.
he Soviets could also conduct coordinated acoustic searches by ships. Thi* approach would require development of high-performance acouslic systems such a* hull-mounted sonar* or towed-array *en*ors with high search rates. It would alsoLuge number* of ASW platforms, rapidof acoustic data, and coordinatedtechniques and control systems. Consklering the demands of Oils approachide-area search capability, its pursuit does not appear promising
e expect that the Soviets will try to develop aiihomc systems with longer rangeas rndais and infrareddetection of surface effects. There arc unknowns in assessing the potential of such systems, but given ourof submanne-produced surface effects, we doubt that reliable detection systems will lie achieved during the next ten years.
long-Torm Troll
SO. Tooordinated strike through the use of trailinghe Soviets would have tu establish and maintain trails on SSBNs at sea for periods as long as several weeks before any sizable number of deployed SSBNs would be vulnerable. In overt trail uV target L> aware of being followed and could take evasive measures to break trail Covert trailiogelicate balance on the part of tlie trailing submanne to follow close enough to maintain neat-continuous contact but lo stay far enough (mm thc target to avoid detection itselfrail using acoustiche trailing tub marine mustecided acoustic advantage to remain covert and maintain trad for extend ol periods. US submarines nowubstantial advantage, both in quietness and In passive sonar perform jncc, over Soviet submarines. The Soviets would have to ov.*eome mayor gap* in both area* before ihey couldapability to trail US SSBNs covertly for extended periods uWiQ
Seen*
iejt- Beer
techniques. Wc have identified no serious program by tlie Soviels to control radiated noise to Ihe same extent as has the US. It is doubtful that they could achieve in thc noxl ten years lhe required acoustic advantage, even in the absence of further US improvements in quieting. We oon-dudr that successful acoustic passive trail over long periods will remain beyond Soviet capabilities for tho foreseeable future.
he Soviets could alterrrpt toong-range trail with active sonars
3
the
While there are many unknowns in assessing uie Soviet potential foruccessful system of this type, its achievement is unlikely.
he Soviets could develop, using thethey have been conducting, nonacoustic techniques for detection of submarine submerged wakes for use in covert trailing. ^
y"JA large force of attack submarines would be necessary to realize the full potential of wake detection trailing ngaiasl Ihc SSBN force al sea. In view of these considerations, we do not believe lhat an effective Soviet system of any type for long-range nonacoustic trail will be folly operational during Ihc nexl len years.
Aslapabilities 83 Tlie future effectiveness nf Soviet defenses against ballistic missile submarines will depend on
how successful thc Soviets are In detecting and tracking SSBNs in broad ocean areas. From our understanding of the technologies involved and of the research and development programs in Ihe US and tho USSR, wc roncludo that the Sovicis have little potential for achieving success fn either of these areas in the next ten yean. Moreover, improvements in US SSBNs and expansion of their operating areas will compound the Soviets' problem of finding and tracking them. These judgments musi be qualified, however, by gaps in our know!-
lot possible fuiure Soviclhe Soviets will almost certainly continue totheir strategy and capability for detection of SSBNs, and we expect improvements in theirto delect and destroy SSBNs in confined waler areas. We conclude, however, that these Improvements will not overcome deficienciesIn open-ocean detection and submarine tracking, and lhat Soviet ASW capabilities will fall short of being able to prevent most US submarines on station from launching their missiles
D. ANTISATELLITE DEFENSE
Soviets have anhey have had an operationalwhich can conduct nonnudeai intercepts
of satellites which pass over tlie USSB at altitudes belowautical miles. Calosh missiles armed with nudcar warheads could also be used to attack satellites at altitudes up tom.
jit is unlikely, however, lhat the Soviets would use the nuclcar-alined Calosh in any situation shoit of nuclear war.
Soviets have completed constructionwc believeaser system al tho Saryrange. While wc cannot yet determinepurpose of this system, it could be anweapon system. If so. we estimate thatdisable satellites belowmfavoraWe conditions. However, short ofration for war or in retaliation (or whatto be prior US action against Iheirwe believe it is tinlikdy lhat tlieattack any US satellilcs.
E. CIVIL DEFENSE AND HARDENING OF FACILITIES
h* Soviel Union hai lhe largest and most highly developed civil defense organization and program in Ihc world. We believe its main goal is to protect top government authoritiesadre of key military, political, and economic officials. In the eventuclear war. we believe that civil defense would not be able to prevent massive casualties, industrial destruction, and theof thc economic structure. The Soviets would probably expect their cavil defense to be able toolitical and economic cadre both during andar and to contribute to the survivability of thc USSRational entity.
he Soviets have made Urge ins-estments in passive defense through hardening of facilities. These are designed to improve the survivability of their military capabilities and toimited industrial base for recovery alter the cessation of hostilities The scope of thc hardening program is another Indicator of live USSR's effort to Improve its stralegic pollute.
FUTURE FORCES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS A. FUTURE FORCES UmM*Mm
n projecting thc size, characteristics, and mix of Soviet strategic farces we face varyingof uncertainty.
the near (erm, we rely most heavily upon the extrapolation of observed activity. Soviet decisions involving the next two years or so have generally beennd the activity resulting from lime decisions is now under way We havr relatively high confidence in those estimates.
Soviet forces for the midterm, tlw penod two to five years hence, are less easily determined. We liavc Mime confidence in our forecasts for this period because lhc foices will belargely of existing syslems.
We can not estimate with confidence andon ihe (oncer lerm fntcesive to ten years_
^Soviet decisions affecting this time period may not yet he made or may be subject to change
B'l In constructing alternative force projections to examine possible Soviel foices and capabilities in the midterm and longere have varied not only the deployment rates and levels ofjichicvemenl but abo the characteristics of weapon systems lo take account of uncertainties. Some of thc uncertainties in our estimates of some weapon system characteristics are not significant for our judgments about Soviet stralegic capabilities. Other estimates of weapon system characteristics have ranges of uncertainty which allow markedly different implications for strategic capabilities.
n illustrating lhe impact of thesewe assign our "best" estimates of weapon char act eristics to those projections which assume level; of effort and itcady progress in technological development comparable to what the Soviets have demonstrated in lhe past. For those illustrative force projections thaiigh love! of effotl. rapid lechnological progress, and eatly Introduction of new wrjpon systems, we assign thc moreend of our uncertainty Interval in weapon system characteristics. Thc least threatening end of our uncertainty interval is assigned to theforce proiection that assumes low levels of effort and technological achievementiehly unlikely lhat all of these extremes of weaponwould occur in combination.
Mealing lheL*giggregate. Between nowhe USSR will haver more strategic delivery vehicles beyondlimit proposed at Vladivostok. The actual number will depend on the precise termsALT TWO agreement. We have no conclusive evidence lo help us estimate which systems lhesvould dismantle Iu reduce their forces toa bruitt is expected that the Soviets themselves will experience difficulties inwhich forces to cut, For purposes of projecting Sos-iel offensive forces under the limits of the Vladivostok accofd. wc have made reductions to the loroo levels of all threeSLUM', and bombers. These rcduclium involve
cutting back the Bison and Bear bomber force by about one third, and dismantling allnd SSS ICBMs and all seven 1MI class submarines.
IRV Launchers. The Vladi-vostok limitaunchers carrying MIBVs is no* likely to impact upon Soviet forces before thc. As Ihe Soviets approach tbc limit, the principal impact will probably be on follow-on systems which may appear in. We believe that the bulk of Soviet systems with MIHVs will be in the Strategic Bucket Forces.
Alternative Force Projections
c have projected five ways in which Soviel strategic forces might develop under different cir-cuinstances through ihrsee Tablelthough all of the piojoctions arc consistent with currently observed activity and arc within Soviet resource capabilities, ihey are not considered equally likely developments. In all of ourwe have assumed that the Interim Agreement remains in force7 and that the ABM Treaty remains in effect over the not tenor three of these projections we have assumed thai Ihe Vladivostok ceilingsotal delivery vehiclesissiles carrying MIRVs are ratifiedALT TWO agreement to take effectn tlic Iwn other projections we have assumedALT TWO agreement is not reached.
Besr SAX.ssumes that the US and USSRWO agreementn the Vladivostok accord and thai Soviet-US political iclations do not deteriorate. This forceeductionelivery vehicles among the three elements of Sovietaltack forces. In this projection, force deployments are at rates consistent with past Soviet practices, and our best estimates of Soviet technoloipca! achievements are used.
TVlemi haveu,leJ inof iklivf-rr vrtiirlra: nil Backfire boiiiben. ISat Tyuralnn. Ill SLUM launchers on older inuied ji le.it jilutfoims.LBMisonai5 Dear mwiunwixt aircraft, andBear aircrafto Ka-al Avlatior. SkroU ia,ipi-n, be countedpro
lectma -mido be
This projection is our best estimateALT TWO agreement. (Tlie estimatedof tlie Soviet ICBM force under this projection is illustrated In)
ssumesALT TWO agreement cannot be ootaincd; lhat both sides, after lhe lapse of lhe Interim Agreement, continue to support the SALT negotiating process; and that US-USSR rela-lions do not deteriorate significantly. In this projection, thc pace of Soviet force deploy-ments and technological achievements is not markedly different from that of Forcehis forceoderate level of effort in Ihe absenceALT TWO
(See ttaragraphiscussion ofas lo the likelihood oforce In the absenceALT TWO agreement.)
SAL.ssumesALT TWO agreement based on the Vladivostokis ratified, but that Ihe Soviets step up Iheir deployment programs within the SALT TWO limit and also nchicve high levels of technical success in weapons improvements. This force represents lhe highest level of effort and achievement we believe plausible for the Soviets under SALT TWO constraint*.
HtghXo-SAL,ssumes that noarms limitation agreement can be reached, and that US-Soviet relationsdrastically. This force represents thc high est level of deployment effort andachievement we believe plausible for lhe Soviets tn Ihe absenceALT TWOWe ttunk il is hsghh, unlikely, howetxr. thai Ihe SovieU loiU ezhieve oii lhe technical successes implied bynd 4.
Lmo-SAL.ssume*ALT TWO agreement based on the Vladivostok understanding is reached. This forcero iecfion of Ibe lowest level of deploymentand tethnological achievement wc believe might occurALT TWO agrcemcnl
TABLE JY
fl'frr.HW S * Kit m IOC DttU*
CBM*imp-wvd tor rauraty
Marelotov-oa ICBMi
M IKUM
Nt* iy(P- of SSBNW* ICBM DtpWjnx-ei Rauv
(annual AVHrac*)
SawICBMs
M-
accural* folio*-on ICMMny>(ra IOC Date*
AWACS
Ut* ctobik3AMf I* ia |
ICBMi BUM
a-vaia-m* SAM IhocUi
Airarccffl***
Force Uveh4 ICBM -UoMrSLBM*
raiwife*
Bum. Ba*r. tadRa-Utiw in LootAratata *)
SAM r.
oirrorpian
Force i
4
J
1
, H
nx%
VI
76
11
77
B
15 'BO
7G
7a
7il lo
7*
ISO
130
250
t
t
1 ll L-
300
300
'*3 '
p
70
'80
*
78
*ki
7*
1
tea
OI0J
3
*
K.
P52
I.IM
l
-MIS
M4..
1
hi,iduding
; ^cJ^,ft6vWl4au aad IW aircraft in NnvnJ Ariatioa ^cludmft itaMirfa alignedKavaJftd thc*umn* rofc
Soviet ICBM
Nunbcc ol
I9T0 2 3 4 S 8 7 8 9 0 1 1 * -
IMPLICATIONS OF OFFENSIVE FORCE PROJECTIONS
Qvaniilaflic Measure*
ompare thc fiveSoviet oKensivc forces with thc USoffensive force. Thc graphs show that:
In total delivery vehicles the Moderale-No-SAL and Uigh-No-SAL forces exceed USforces Ihroughoul the period of Ihe Estimate.
In total MIRVcd delivery vehicles the two No-SAL forces surpass the US programed force beginning
In oil-fine missile throw weight, all five Soviet forces exceed thc US programed force from the outset hy substantial and growing margins.
on-fine missile throw weight and bomber loadings comhined, only the High-No-SAL force exceeds thc US programed force
In on-line missile RVs, the US programed force, begins to lose its leadfirst to the High-No-SAL and High-SAL forces mid eventually to all five forces.
In total on-line missUe RVi and bomberonly Ihe High-No-SAL force overtakes the US programed numbers.
In on-line couioalent megatons, all Soviel forces now outstrip the US. and all but the laiw-SAL force will be well ahead of the US
Inleroction Anolyiii
he interaction analysis presented in thisshows changes in selected Soviet capabilities
-Top fetftf-
the next ten years and compare thecapabilities irnplied by the five Soviel force project]"' It is limited to scenarios involvingoounterforce attacks by One side's ICBMs against tlic other's ICBM silos. No attempt has been made to include bomber and SI.BM attacks or to assess the effects of strategic defenses against attacking forces. Furthermore, tlie analysis is not intended to portray thc most likely resultsudear exdsange lietween tlie US and Ihe USSR nor to predict major US programmatic decisions. Such an assessment would require consideration of many additional factors, not least of which would bo tlie effectiveness of command andon both sides. Only stereotyped scenarios and nominal measures of tbc dfectiveness of Soviet forces have been used, along with announced US programed forces and force options and standard Department of Defense planning characteristics for US weapon systems. Our purposes arc tomajor aspects of lhe strategic, environment tlie US will confront In thc next ten years, as well as key considerations which would afreet Sovietof the USSR's prospective strategic
e have used the projections of ICBM forces in Ibe US and the USSR over the neat decade to examine Soviet ICBM counlersilo capability and the vulnerability of Soviet ICBM silos to anby tlte US. We are uncertain of Sovietagainst US silos and tbe capabilities ofsilos toS ICBM attack. Tlie USSRomparable problem, although over Ihe next decade it will probably face sornewhal less uncertainty than tlie US in judgments aboul Ihc opponent's capabilities. Tlic Sovicis havefree access to Information on US programs and weapon systems, and are evaluating theof their own silos in field tests using high explosives ami underground nuclear devices.
n the face of uncertainty, prudent military planners lend to make conservative estimates of iheir own force capabilities and to make worst-case estimates ot the capabilities of the opponent's forces. These pcnpectlvcs could lead one side lo believe (hat ils own force poslure would noiignificant silo-killing capability, while the other side might believe that the very same force posture was threatening to it. On Ihe other hand,
Il Is possible for either side to overestimatecapabilities. We expectudi matters during the nextIt is in the context of this uncertaintyat SALT and for strategic forcebe
Soviol Counteiiilo Capabilily
isplays calculated results ofattacks on US Minuteman silos byICBMs in lhe five force projections.illustrates the degree to which thcsuch anacks is influenced by several variablescapabilities ol differing importance.
the deployment of the newsystems, both sides will have sufficienttn fatgcl more than one RV against eachsilo. However, the actual capability tothe damage expectancy (DE) bymore than one reentry vehicleingleis dependent upon whether "fratrlddc"be overcome (Seenetailed discussionecause of unccrtainileseffects, counlersilo capabilities arein thc figure for attacks using oneRVs.
The Assistant Chief of Staff. intelligence.of the Air Force, believes the twc-RV (damage compounded) case overstates thethreat to US silos. In his dew, the onlyV attack the Soviets could reasonably attemptbe one in uhich the. second RV is effective only if lhc first RV is unreliable. Thisresultlireat to Minuteman somewhere between that shown for the anc-RV and two-RV ernei.
urstimate shows an increasing but moderate threat tosilos throughf the Soviets were able to develop fully cffeclivc two-HV attack techniques, onlyinuteman silos wouldttackI lhc Soviets targeted only one RV per silo (whether It svas because tliey were unable to solve the problemswo-RV attack or because Ihey lacked confidence in its success under opcrariotialinuteman silos wouldttackThese calculations
Top See
do not take into account variations in operational performance likely to occurarge-scale attack or the possibility that US missiles might be launched on tactical warning.)
different eountcrsilo capabilities ofarise almost entirely from theircharacteristics, largely independentforce levels are constrained hy thelimitationsALT TWOthe principal differences in theof the fivo force projections areby the range of uncertainty in ourof such key weapon characteristicsaccuracy.
Soviet Silo Survivability
possible Soviet view of the USSR'sSurvival problem is shown inthe estimated number of Soviet,after hypothetical attacks by twoUShe attacks involve one oragainst Soviet silos hardened toonservative Soviet plannerthat even with thc improvements innow inery substantial partICBM force could be in jeopardy beforeThc Soviets' emphasis onand their MIRV deploymentthat they perceive requirements forof warheads. Should US hard-targetimprove in the future more thananticipated when they authorized their
' Thr lint US force, derived ftoin lb" Department of Detente Five-Year Detente Programfontain! an Improved Minuteman till
"Triie iccond
odification to live FYDP(or the purpose ofighly threatening US eoun'erforcc potential in the abtenceALT TWO agreement Tlii* hypothetical force atmmet thatC0 Minuteman silos receive tlie improved Mioulcnuin III and thai new Silo launcher* bulll forre added lo the force bi'Bmninp. in lOSS-CT
ntlvenALT TWO agreement,ould lc deployedeplacement foe Minuteman IU, hut MIRVingCBM lilot andauncher* would ciowsd Die limits of thcaccord unless Ihc US OriMically reduced iu planned force of MllWcd SIhi* force is not intendedrediction ol actual USnciili, li.it at lepreii'iili-ig the kindigh US option conicivalive Soviet planner! might consider.
present silo upgrade programs, they may feelto alter thc mix of their olfetisive forces in favor of more survivable systems. If so, Soviet emphasis may shift toward larger numbers of mobile systems than are projected in our bestand Iho reductions we forecast as being shared among force components may in fact fall most heavily on fixed ICBMs.
Residual RVs Aflor Surprho Attack
ompare die US and Soviet residual ICBM and SLBM warheadsfor immediate retargetingypothetical attack by either side on the other's missile silos, employing up to two RVs per target. It is assumed that neither side launches its missiles on warning, and that thc SSBN forces are deployed normally.ompares the differing results ofusing thc SAL-limitcd projections offorces (Forces',ses the No-SAL projectionsn both cases thc US force used is from thc US FYDP. This is for illustrative purposes, and variations in future US strategic forces would change the results.
hc calculations show thatypo-ihelical Soviet surprise attack, the Soviets would have to expect the US to retain^ surviving missile RVs, largely on SLBMs at sea, through the nexl ten years. In the near term, the SovieU would retain fewerVs for attacking targets other than US silos. As more MIRVcd missiles become available in thend, however, this number growsin Forcehich would have more0 remaining RVs.
I OS.ypothetical US Surprise attacksilos, all of the Soviet forces except ForcehaveVs or fewer survivingFor Forcehc residual would bethat. The number of US RVs remainingan attack for use against other targetsthe period.
Throat to US Bomber* ond SSBN*
hc USarge day-to-day alert bomber force, capable of becoming airborne upon warning by satellite and radar warningurprise Soviet ICBM attack could destroy most of
Top
rot-
Soviet Threats to US Silos: Comparison of Force Projections
Fan* 4
bin
US Silos Surviving Soviet AttackV per Silo
,
urn 77
US SNos Surviving Soviet AttackVs Maximum per Silo (Damage Compounded)
graphs above show ihe calculated results otos. usinge different Sovietoih Quaniiiauve and qualitativeferences in iheling capabilities.ndccuracy and yield for ihcse forces.hreatening extremes of our estimates in both respects, extremes. Thc reader is cautioned that these extremes result In unrealistic, conclusions.
hvpot.rioi.cal Soviet ICDM attacks on US projected in Ihis Estimate. The forces vary ith the latter accounting lor most ofncorporate our besi estimates of Sovietombination of ihe most whileeflects the least threatening are highly unlikely, and lhat Iheir use may
50
Soviel ICBM SilosS Attack ol Two RVs per Silo (Damage Compounded)
Hole: If onrv one RV were uwd aoauuto. ttV number of wnnon would increaseilos. Otoenalna on caw and year.
The Soviet force hypotheucally attached by tne US FDVP forcehisur best cm-mate of Soviet forceiAL aoreement
The Soviet force hypo Us* tic ally attacked by thoUS force in thlt scenario ii Forceurof Soviet forces given no SAL agreement.ii not intended to predict major USdecisions.
For detaili about assumptions, uncertainty, and caHermg mews, vw Volumehanter V.
nonalcrt aircraft. Current Soviet SLBMs fired from the present SSBN patrol areas, assuming that our missile detection system provided timelywould be only shghtly more effective
he SovieU could increase the threat against the^current US bomber* on alert by deploying some of their SSBNs closer to thc US coastline. SLBMs red on depressed trajecloiius could further reduce LS reaction time, although theie is no indication that the SovieU have tested this technique In evaluating their present and future capabilities to destroy US bombers prior to launch, the Soviets would have to consider improvements lo the US bomber force such as the planned introduction ofnd availablesuch a. changing the basing and alert posture of thc hnmbei force We believe tlie Soviets would conclude that lhc US could preserve the survivabilily of mosl ol its alert bombers against
attacks by SLBMs throughout Ihe neat len years Moreover, because of lhe difference in flight times of ICBMs attacking US missile nlos and SLBMs attacking US bomber bases. Soviet planners could not count on maximizing thc prepunch destruction of both US bombers and ICBMs.
ICS.urprise attack during lite next ten years, Soviet offensive forces could destroy those US SSBNs inhalf of the total US force Survival of the remaining US submarines, those at sea. would depend on Ihe effectiveness of Soviel ASW forces.
Asseisment of Alternative Offensive Force Capabilities
he alternative Soviet offensive forces we have projected differ in their capabilities for wag-
ing intercontinental warfare and in thrir political significance:
he imago of Soviet offensive power grows gradually, hutthroat to the survival of the US Minute-man force ii not attained during the period of this Estimate. This force might beas meeting minimum Soviet standards of perceived strategic partly and forceagainst currently programed US forces.
3 (IliphSAL) orHigh-No-SAL} would appear far more formklable to the US and its allies. In the, either of these forces would surpass thc currently programed US force in most conventional static measures of offensive strategic power.
. In someon-hne missileRVs. missile throw weight, and lota!advantage would be very substantial. Moreover, these forces are assumed to have high accuracies and yields and thus wouldore severe threat to Minuteman silos lhanr Forceven in combination with Soviet strategic defense, would not provide thewith the capability to prevent devastating resolution If. however, thc Soviets could attain these force capabilities withoutUS counfcrelforts greater than implied by US programed forces, they then could be perceived as giving the USSR more strategic power to back up its policies than thatto the US.
Best-SAL) andModeratere leas formidable thanr Force A, but closei in overall capability lo those forces than to Forcevouldajor threat to US Minuteman silos hy thewnRV attack. Moreover, by that time, Sovietforces will lead programed US force, in numbers of missile RVs. though lhe US willargehe total number ofand bomber weapons combined.
C. IrViPtlCATIONS OF DEFENSIVE FORCE
. There are major differences In the fiveforce projections in both Ihe number and quality of stralegic air and missile defenses;
he Soviets make litde effort to increase their defeme* against thc threat from the US. implying acquiesence in (though probably not doctrinal acceptance of) the concept of mutual assured destruction. The defenses projected in this force would beprimarily against limited strategic attacks. The ABM defense at Moscow remains
3High SAL and High-No-SAL) assume high levcis of deployment and technical achievement in providing improved air, missile, and SSBN defenses ABM Uunch en woo Id be increaseds rserrnitted under the ABM Treatyhe Soviets would have two new low-altitude SAMand al least two inlercepiors which would
capable of engaging low-altllude bombers.
The rationale foralls for higher levels of effort in ASW than Ihe other three projections. The stralegic defenses inould largely overcome many of the technical deficiencies In current "airF.ven with the effort implied bynd i, we believe technical deficiencies would remain in defenses againit SSBNs.
Best-SAI. and Moderate-No-SAL) aie generally in line with past Soviet practices and current trends in development and deployment of strategic defensesmissile launchers would be increaseds permitted under the ABM Treaty, and Ihe current high level of effort to develop effective ASW systems wouldew interceptor, anew SAM. and improved ground-based air surveillance systems would be introduced in thc early to improve low-altitude
t
r
L
r
t
tinmbcr defenses. These defenses would have, improved capabilities against limited atlacks They would not. however, overcome as many of the deficlcnces in current strategic defenses as wouldnd 4.
Ail and Mmlle Defenses
hus the changes in Soviet strategic air and missile defense capabilities wc have projected range from modest improvements to very high levels of effort and achievement, with the exception that, tn all five forces, missile defenses are limited by lhe ABM Treaty. It is unlikely that the Soviets will significantly improve their low-altitude air defensehe most likely improvements wein their air surveillance and control, infei-ceptors, and SAM systems would have the potential lor overcoming most of the technical deficiencies in their capabilities to counter low-altitude bombersut it might be possible for them to do so earlierery high level of effort. Assuming rapid and widespread deployment of such systems, low-altitude penetration of Soviet airby bombers willconsiderably5 Ihan it is today. Tho effectiveness of Soviet air defenses, however, would continue to depend heavily on the degradation resulting from ballistic missile strikes and on thc performance of US ECM and bomber penetration aids and tactics. Neither we nor the Soviets would likely be able lo predict these with confidence.
Defense Aooinu SSBNi
he future effectiveness of Sovicl defenses against lullistic missile submarines will depend on liow successful the Soviets arc in detecting SSBNs in broad ocean aieas and in trackingbydetected. From ourof the teebttologies involved and research and development programs In the US and lhe USSK, wc conclude the Soviets have little potential for arliicving success in either of these areas in Ihe nest ten years.
here arc geographic and technicalon Soviet deploymentS SOS US-type system. The limited ranges of acoustic and non-acoustic submarine detection sensors which wecould be operationally deployed during the next ten years would require prohibitively large
numbers of ASW platforms. Wake-detection sensors which might be feasible for use in trailing would probably be ol limited range and subject to coun-tenneasures. For covert trailing with acousticlhe Soviets would have to overcome andthc substantial US advantage in quietness and passive sonar performance. Moreover,in US SSBNs and expansion of truirareas will compound lhe Soviet problem of finding and tracking them. These judgments must be qualified, however, by limitations in our
*^of possible future Soviet developments.
lie Soviels will almost certainly continue lo develop their strategy and capabilities for de-lection of SSBNs We do expect improvements in Soviet capabilities to detect and destroy SSBNs In confined water areas- We conclude, however, that trior improvementi will not overcomein open-ocean detection and submarine trailing, and that Soviet ASW capabilities will fall short of being able to prevent most US submarines onfrom launching their missiles.
D. IMPUCATIONS FOR THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT
he Balance
he future Soviet farces we have projected represent differing capabilities for waguignuclear warfare. They also wouldin their polilical significance, depending on how they were perceived by the Soviets, tbe US. and othei nations Whether lhe Soviets' strategic capabilities would givesychological edgerisis would depend heavily on how perception* of strategic forces In (he USSB and lhc USthe resolve of bolh sides and their views about over.ill military capabdrties.
espite prospectiven their forces, lhe problems and uncertainties which the Soviets would face if they contemplated attacking (he US would remain formidable for Ihe next ten years:
The Soviets would be uncertain about lhe outcome of an attack on US Minuteman silos and would prohabiyonsiderable numln'r to survive
-'IVy would almost certainly consider their ASW (ones to be unable to Locate and simul-taneously destroy moreew USmissde submarines at sea.
Under thc ABM Treaty their ABM defenses would be insignificant.
They would still not have high confidence in their ability to defend against US bombers.
would piobably expect their eiv4to be able toolitical and economic cadre and to contribute to theof tho Soviet Unionational entity, but they would have to expectcasualties, industrial destruction,reakdown of the economy.
nder these circumstances, with the forces and weapons we can foresee, it is extremelythat during the next ten years tbc Sovietwould come to believe that either side could launch an attack which would prevent devastating retaliation. Thus, the stralegic environment will be characterized by continued mutual deterrence during the period of this Estimate. Nevertheless. Soviet forces will be much stronger In several quantitative aspects, such as missile throw weight and missile RVs. even though SALT TWO limits would establish and preserve symmetry in totalvehicles and MIRVcd missile launchers.thc long-stauding US qualitativein strategic weaponry and supportingwill come under increasing challenge. Under flu- most threatening but unlikelyof very rapid Soviet technological advance, ihe USSR would achieve capabilities lhat might be perceived as giving it more strategic jiower. lo back up its policies than lhat available to lhc US. Foreseeable Soviet strategic forces, however, would not eliminate tlie USSR's vulnerability torisis resolution, therefore, probably would notest on the strategic weapons balance, but rather would depend on other factors, such as the com-paialive strengths and dlsiiositiom of US and Soviet conventional force*.
Potential for OrornalK technological
I IS We have again assessed Soviet HADand prospects for major advances in field* having strategic applications that might seriously
erode US retaliatory capabilities. Our assessments arc based on our understanding of Ihe Soviets' strategic research and interest in advancedtheir present and projected technological achievements, and Iheir requirements for strategic weapon systems. Our assessments are .alsoby thc results of analogous US research
or many strategic missions, theof important new weapon systems mayonly relatively modest advances. We found this to be true in the offensive area, where the Soviets could choose several different alternative paths to the problem of attaining high-accuracy ICBMs for hard-largrt kill other than bylo inertial guidance and ballistic RVs. The Sovicls currently possess thc technology to initiate developmentiound radio beacon navigation update system fnr ICBMs and could ineriod begin development of precision navigation satellites or terminally guided maneuverablevehicles (MARVs) as alternative solutions to lhe accuracy problem. If the Soviets chose to do so they also could begin development of large, low-accuracy strategic cruise missiles prior0 and small, highly accurate air- and sea-launched cruise missiles ineriod. It is not likely that such developments in the offensive weapons area could, in and of themselves, sharply alter thebalance
or strategic defensivedelense against ballistic missiles ur SSBNfortechnologicaldo mil iipticar imminent and, indeed, may not be feasible. Nevertheless, interest In advanced weapon concepts which might provide long-term solutions is high in the Soviet Union Accordingly, wc have reviewed indicaiiocis of Soviet research in Ihe more advanced weapon concepts whose suddVn appearance in the Soviet Union would beWe have given particular attention lo lasers fm use in ah and missile defense and to non-acoustic systems for detecting and trailing USmissile submarines on patrol lhc Soviets are working actively in both fields, and there areur knowledge of this work However, theon their programs, together with ourof the inherent physical and engineering hurdles which must be Overcome, leads US to rate as small the chances that in the next ten years
lhc Sovicl* will be able lo field operational system* so advanced that they would sharply reduce the US potentialetaliatory strike on (he Soviet Union. Furthermore, in the more exotic areas, such as particle beam weapons, wo do not believe lhat these concepts are far enough developed to provideor effective defense againstallistic missiles, or SSBN's during the period under coruideralion.
n the coining years, however, the Soviets willrowing potential lot significant and perhaps novel weapon developments Sovielinelevant to advanced weaponare bolh broad and intensive, andjhe Soviet base of applied lechnology is growing.L
3
iven given these uncertainties, wc believe that there are no avenues of research known to the United States, including Ihe application of lasers and charged particle beams, that show much promise of overturning the strategic balancetne neat decade. Nevertheless, lhe scope and vigor of Soviet research and development,in strategic defensive systems, bear especially close watching in the years ahead
V Aiiutam Chief of Stall.Department of thc Air Force, believes that tlie USSR is embarkedirected-energy weapons research program of suchdial tl couldajor If notimpart on the strategic balance_
"^Overall, this research clearly leads tlic West in both level of effort and aclu'evcment. The Sooiet investment to date in related dt-
rectcd-encrgy facilities, construction,costs, research, and testing could ujcll be on the orderoillion dollars. P
vidence further suggests tliat pivotal experimentaland testing in directed-energy programs is presently under way and should hebyeriod.
n die view of the Assislant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force, Soviel advances in directed energy must also be viewed in context with other significant investments being made by the Soviet Union in at least eight major new ballistic missde programs (beyond those now beingew aircraft and naval systems;trategic hardening program conservatively estimated as having cost the equivalent of aboutillion dollars lo date (on the basis of USAF civilcostonsequence, the Soviets may anticipate major clianges inwhich, in their perception and thai of otlxer world powers, would give Ihemagainst US ballistic missiles,ide range of slrategic!tactical land and ocean weapon systems considerably beyond those implied by this Estimate.
tlie likely Strategic Environmenl
f thc USSR's forces develop according to our best estimates, Soviet leaders can expect to achieve some gains relative to the US .during the next ten years even though their forces will fall far short of givingear relaliation-free first-si rite capability. We have projecteds fhe most likely Soviet programALT TWO agreement on the basis of current evidence and past Soviel practices. Itigorous, highly competitive Soviet effort to maintain and improve offensive anti defensive forces and is generallywith previously observed Soviet activities. Wc can interpret many aspects of thc Sovietforce developments which underlie ourrojectionmdenl response to the presentsituation. Silo hardening. MIRVing, mobile ICRM development, ami even RfcD on rapidly de-ployablc ARM systems can be explained in terms of Soviet securily needs, including needsedge
'rH-
against potential US force improvements and the failure of the SALT process Some other aspects nf what wethe growing threat to the Minuteman force from large nambers of more accurate, high-yield ICBM warheads, and the vigor of Soviet research and development in strategicbe interpreted as motivated by ato achieve important strategicover tbe US.
onsidering lite history of Soviet strategic policy and force improvement programs, we believerogram likeALT TWO agreement would be intended by Ihe Soviet leaders to serve the following purposes:
to ensure dcteiience of all forms of nuclear attack on the USSR;
to improve war fighting capabilities aimed at the survival of the USSRational entity should deterrence ftll;
to counterbalance, using Imth peripheral and intercontinental forces, the combined strategic strengths of the US and its allies and of China;
to narrow or dose the gap between the US and thc USSH in Important weapon technologies, and to hedge against future US forceand
to acquire stralegiceal orshould US behavior permit,
(For the views of the Assistant Chief of Staff, InteUigence, Department of the Air Force, see)
thc absenceALT TWObelieve that Soviet programs would beserve much the same purposes. We wouldSoviets tn build and retain strategicsuperior to those of the US. Thewould not expect quantitativea SALT TWO failure to alter thebalance. The Soviets have evidently comethat the key to theill lie in Ihe qualitative aspectsforces of the two sides. Their progress inwill be largely independent of SALT TWO-
Soviet leaders will continue lonuclear power as central to theirThey do not readily recognizethey deem essential'to their securitybe read as threatening to the USa countervailing US response Bytoken, they tend to assess UScertain features of thc USas deliberately threatening. In tlieevenALT TWO agreement,faced by each side in assessing theof thc other's future forces,qualitative characteristics, will tend tomore fundamental concerns about thestrategic objectives.
TC,r, MOOOQ-fOfi
INTERAGENCY REPORTS AND MEMORANDUMS RELEVANT TO
Prospects for Determining Accuracies of Soviet Stralegic Ballistic Missiles (Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence4
Annex C: The Problem of Fratricide,oviet Forces for Inter-continental Conflictolume III, Thc Annexes,4
Assessment of Sovietlass SSBN System Accuracy (Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence5
Capabilities and Potential "Employment of the Backfire Force (Ad Hoc Inter- agency
Soviet Approaches to Defense Against Ballistic Missile Submarines snd Prospects for Success (Ad Hoc Interagencyurthcoming
Prospects for Improvement in Soviet Low-Altitude Air Defenses (Adorthcoming
Soviet Capabilities to Develop Strategic Laser Systems (Ad Hoc Interagency5
Soviet Dependence on Space Systems (Ad Hoc Interagencyorthcoming
Concealment and Deception in Soviet Strategic Programs (Ad Hoc5
60
- -
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WAllflNOrOH.OJW
Noiionol IntelligentMarch7
APPROVED FOR RELEASE
MEMORANDUM FOR: Holders of
CIA KiSTORiCAL-HEVIEW PROGRAM
Sheet for Volume I, Key Judgments and Surrmary
OVIET FORCES FOR INTERCONTINENTAL
CONFLICT THROUGH THE, dated6
N1FPen-and:lnk,cnrrections should be made infinflict Through the
Intermediate-Rang.
Bo^ejs for1 the tabulationTTun^eT
SlST ^radiuseadtm
Page under
(lineor bothndo;"ireptors pvM< lso under "Force-Levels IRVed Missiles (lineoroespectively
h^ P'0tting errors
Infprrnnti k 9 ^OlUlUyeJ^risons of Forces Attack- Because of these errors, the projectionTTorr-pmAiA charts, although the end points fo
5 iy , Samc '" each CdSe' Theseffect
Houre ^ftrTS^M thPreaderto,orrect version of this graphic.
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