National Intelligence Bulletin
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Tht Chinesehad an vntny ftMllng for time that they went betting onwrong horn In Angola. The recent fighting There has done little to assuage thna fears. Tha National F'oni for tha Liberation of Angola, which has been receiving the bulk of Chinese military aid. has held lo own but has been unable to gain any ground tinea being toted out of Luanda in July by the Soviet-becked Popular Movement.
The National Front would have bren in even woree shape If Peking had not accededew request for armi end gone out of its way to make sure The supplies were 'tcarved quickly. Thetill considerably iets Than the Soviets art supplying te tha Popular Movement.
" At this point, Peking may wall Harbor some regret* at having switched It* supporl from The Popu'ar Movement to the Nationalearalf ago. Even though the Popular Movement waa the preeminent liberation group at that time, tha Chinese had become thoroughly disenchanted with therowing ties to Moscow. Furthermore, by3 China was attempting to curry favor with Zamen President Mobutu who had longtrong backer of the NitKinil Front.
Earlier this summer, the fast-changing situation in Angola led Peking tu toy briefly withrestoration of ha contacts with the Popular Movement. In June, for tha first time In almost twoopular Movement delegation visited Peking. The Chinese tried to perauede the group to reduce Its dependence on the Soviet Union, but its tympathiea with Moscow reportedly were Quite evident.
Having failed In thb approach, the Chineee have tried other ways to more up their position in Angola. In addition to channeling more aid to the National Front, Peking has reportedly begun to grva weapons to Angola's smallest group, the National Union. Tha Chineea-who have given fundi to thb grouphe peat-epparenUy want to preempt any Soviet move to establish linkj with the Union. In tha future, tha Nationei Union could .if'ect the balance of forces should It throw ha iot In with one of the other group*.
Ideally. Peking would like to see en effective cane-fire in Angola. Tha New Chine New* Agency has Taken every opportunity to play up the theme of unity among tha threehe short-lived ceasa-fim errenged at tha and of June wes given particularly fivonble treatment in the Chinese media.
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Intelligence Bulletin
China evidently sees brighter prptpectt for the National Front at the bergatning tool* than on tha battlefield. Tho Chinese push for negotiation! tt an cfevtout attempt tourther deterioration In the Front's military position. While Peking ii not optimlttlc about chanceseasefire In the near term. It may hope that Its aid to the National Front will hetp stalemate th* fighting and eventually persuade the Popular Movement to come to the bargaining table.
If this strategy fails and the three Angolan groups continue to fight, Peking will be placedore ewkvrard position. The Chinese could simply cut their losses end halt military aid, but this would be regarded throughout Africa at capitulation to the Soviets,topular Movement victory would aubetantialry bolster Moscow'i position In southern Africa.
On the other hand. If Peking deepens Its Involvement, the price would be. Peking would be required to increase its military assistance and invest more of ha political prestige, but it would still face, et best, an uncertain outcome. For predsety these rations. China haa been reluctant tn the past tn become Involved in third-world internecine conflicts.
With few other options available, the Chinese most likely will continueaid at approximately the currant level. At the tame time. Peking willbacket; of the National Front, principally Zaire, to Increase military aid.not be easy for Kinshasa because its own economic diffieurties haveon thertai- It can deliver.
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If the Soviets step up their aid to the Popular Movement arvjranslated Into battlefield successes. Peking may increaae in military aid to Zaire somewhat, on the understanding that this would be turrsd over to die National Front On the rlplomatic front, China wfll probably continue to lobby with thether African states for an effective ceasefire.
Original document.
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