SOVIET DEPENDENCE ON SPACE SYSTEMS
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C Cal.braOonCheckout H. Other New Minion* and Uar*
SPACE SYSTEM DEFENSES
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Euiting Features . .
Potential Franca
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FOB SOVIET INTERFERENCE WITH US SPACE
SYSTEM*
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B The Preaent Situation and Prorpectt for the Nearor Conflict
C Long-Term Proapecta
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Soviet Dependence/Derradarion: Space Syrtemi for Int.lll.
genoe and Military Support .
Levels ol Dependence and Doeradanon
Current Soviet Space Syiterm and Their Auodatrd Military or Intelli-
gence
Soviet Dependence/Degradation: Orbital Intrrcrptor
Sovirt intelligence CoTtecnon
15
ft Estimated Soviet Dependence/ Degradation Communication* Satellite* 19
ScMet Dependence/ DejjadaWn: Navel Support Salrflitei
(For NavfeaOon)
ScMet Dependence/Dqpadatwe: Meteorological Satellite* 22
Soviet rXpeTrfenee/Degradatlon: CeodetteEatlmaied Soviet Dependence/Degradation: Calibration and Checkout
soviet dependence on space systems'
SUMMARY
Thit memorandum examines the millions of the moil importantspace systems. It identifies the 'asks those missions support, assesses the USSR's dependence on those systems, and assesses theof Soviet capabilities if the system were not available. Also examined are the Soviets' defense of their space systems and thefor their interfering wilh those of the US.
The USSR's space effort is directed tcvard three broad applications* those having scientific and national prestige value, those relating to economic activity, and thjse supporting military and IntelligenceThe latter comprise the great bulk of the eflort and thisassesses the degree of Soviet dependence nn them.
Three out of four Soviet satellites in the pastan have been associated with military and Intelligence activities. Theya variety of missions in the areas of intelligence collect wo.relay, navigation, weather, geodesy, anj rv*uIn addition, the Soviets haveatellite interceptor
that can be placed in orbit. We have identified one or more military or intelligence tasks to which these space systems contribute. These tasks in turn support the operations of military forces either directly or through the national-level decisionmrking apparatus.
Dependent ond Degrodofion
Soviet dependence on these satellites is assessed in terms of the availability of non-space substitutes for the missions they perform or the support they provide. Insofarpace system is the only mean ofarticular mission or providing support. Sovietis judged to be correspondingly high.
Also assessed ishe reduction in capability to perform specific tasks that the Soviets would suffer if these spacewere rendered unavailable. Dependence differs frombecause there are satellites for which the Soviets have noyet we believe their absence would have little impact on Soviet capabilities to perform the particular task.9
Judgrrtnts about dependence and degradation are provided for the present and for the period ten years hence, and are applied to three situations: peacetime, crisis, and conflict. Three levelsigh, moderate, andthree levels ofsevere, moderate, andused. They are summarized in Tablet shows that at present the Soviets are highly dependent on three of their space systems: those that perform orbital intercept,reconnaissarce, and radar calibration missions. The tableestimated increases over the nest ten year, in Soviet dependency on space systems for electronic reconnaissance, radar oceanand the detection of missile launches.
*It ihauld be noted tKil Ihe lush* lo which the "ClIiM comnbutf if* not nnruirJy ol umc* or vahirituttion. Il rt brrerri the trope el thU mrnvmmlumetiflxe vakm lo the mMiion* if mmniaMow mwn cvmmunkalionni>in.
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Increased dependence on future versions of Soviet electronic and radareconnaissance systems stems from what Are likely to be improved technical characteristics fur target discrimination and faster response tone. The high-altitude system for detecting missile launches, which we project, willew capability that will extendwarning of missile attack by some ten minutes.in communications satellites and an expected substantial increase in the numlier of thei* military users will tead to increased dependence on them despite the continued expansion of alternate means of communications. High accuracy and faster response times are
characteristic! of unproved navigation and. meteorological satellites that wili lead to increased dependence in conflict should alternate sources of this support be denied.
In terms of degradation, the table snows thai the impact would be severe if the capabilities off the Soviet space systems were not nowhose for satellite interception and photographs reconnaissance. The assessment for the satellite interceptor is based on the lack of non-nuclear alternatives for performing its mission. The assessed level of degradation the Soviets wr dd sufier through the loss of theirreconnaissance systems stems from the diverse tasb Ihey support
5 Ihe degradation which would occur if the Soviets lost their photographic reconnai-sance systems would be even greater than today due to expected improvements in the capability andof those systems. In connection with the loss of the satelbtrthe possibility ihat the Soviets might use ground-based lasers lo attack satellites is the basis for lowering our judgment to moderate-to-severe leva's of degradation. The loss of the projected high-altitude satellites for delecting missile launches would severely degrade Soviet capabilities to react to warning of missile attack, despite the exbt-nce of their long-range radar systems. New reconnaissance, commui.ica-tions. and navigation systems with more rapid response time willmilitary tasks in crisis or conflict; loss of these prospective new battle-management capabilities is renected in the increasedlevelsin the table. Although there is no alternative forABM radars without satellites, the effect of the loss of these satellites on effectiveness of ABM systems is fudged to be slight
System Mfttn
The USSR almost certainly understands the requirements andfor the defense of its space systems. Soviet interest in defending its space systems ster.is from the Soviet perception of US antisalellite research and development and the development of the USSR's own satellitehe satellites slready have at least some inherent protective capability by virtue of their technical deslfn features, :uch as bulky and thick-skinned construe'ion. and maneuverability. The use of multiple spacecraftapability to launch backup satellites
Theay iudge that theireasure ol detent nt protection. For existing, or follow-on. space systems the Soviets could add various types of defensiveat any time, but we do not know if they areo nowill do so in the future.
Noninltrftrenct Prospects
The USSR has participated in de facto, mutual noninterference with allstems for yean. The Soviets gradually muted their position that space reconnaissance was contrary to international law as their own capability expanded, as detente progressed, and especially after the signing2 of the strategic arms limitations agreements. The Soviets probably do not regard US rxxi-recoonaissance. militarysatellites as "national technical means' of verification protected by the provisions of these agreements. They have long reserved the option to interfere with direct broadcast satellites, and while they have toned down their subsequent discussions on this issueheir posit-on apparently has not changed significantly.
Short of preparationonflict involving the use of Soviet and US forces or what they believed to be US action against their own satellites, we believe it highly unlikely that the Soviets wouldwith any US military or intelligence-related satellites in thefuture. We believe that the degree of Soviet dependence on space systems we have forecast for the next ten yean is not by itself high enough to deter the Soviets from interfering with US satellites in the face of other compelling reasons to dooviet decision lo interfere would dependost of other facton, notably on Soviet estimates of the overall political costs, of how much and for whit purpose the US relied on its own satellites, and of the US ability and will to respond.
Increased Soviet dependence on space systems, however, probably will increase Soviet incentives not to interfere with US satellites and to enter into explicit non-interference agreements. Nevertheless, we think it unlikely thai ihe Soviet leadership would find acceptable an agreement covering ail space systems. In particular, we doubt that the Soviets would agree not tn interfere with direct broadcast satellites.
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DISCUSSION
INTRODUCTION
A. Overview of Soviet Spoct Systemsince iti incept von. the USSR* space urogram has grown Io encompass the use of utclllte systems*rood range of military and nonmilitary anplicabons upon which the Sovleti have become increasingly dependent Itscan be broken down into three group* of activities: that which provides scientific information and creates rwitonai prestige, that used for direct economic benefit, and that which supports military or intelligenceThis memorandum focuses on Sovieton space tystrms thai support militar) or intelligence actjvitlra.
1 The bulk of the USSR'i efforts, inbased on the number of satellites and variety of use* is in support of military or intelligenceThree out of every four Soviet rpaceerart launched in the past foot years or so have provided direct or indirect support for such operation* The Soviet) regularlyignificant part of their
Another areato the Sovites is space communicationsfor the command and control of military and intelligence operations. Additional space efforts In support of military or Intelligence activitiesthe use ofoe poslttoning and cero-municsiting with naval forces, meteorologicalfor collection of weather data for operations worldwide, geodetic satellites for the contribution they make In improving :he accuracy of ballistic missiles, and satellites for exercise and calibration of ABM radars- And the Soviets also have anorbital Interceptor, although it ha> not been flown since
i The number of Soviet military and intelligence related space launches per >ear grew rapidly In. then leveled off In. We erpeet that the present level of launch activity will remain approximatelyor the nest year or so. The number of launches may then decline at the Soviets come to rely upon satellites capable af more tune in orbit of performing multiplend of more efficient or direct recovery of data they collect
A. In moatpecific space rysirm per-forms one mission of significance that aipporrj a
v.-rieryor tasks. For example, a
photographic reconnaissance system lhalh-resolution imagery tida in lhef agreements on strategic weapons, asn analysis of foreign weapon systems.
oncepts of Dependence ond Degradation
o assess the Soviets*n llieir military or Intelligence ipece rystemv wehr availability of substitutes for theIhey perform or live lupport (Ley provide. We also assessed theis. Use reduction in capability to perform specific tasks if the variousena were not available. Thb itudy does not address such other important .uneco as uteliite replacement cents or thenecessary topaceapability.
e have estab'lshed three leix-ls ofmoderate, andthreeorresponding lew-Is ofmoderate, and slight (secpacehe only means ofarticular mission or providing support, forSoviet dependence is Judged to be high. There is not.ne-to-ooen between the assessed leveb ol depciKlencc and degradation. Therespace systems fee which the Soviets have no substitute, yet the absence of the ipacc systems would create little impact on Soviet military or intelligence capabilities. (For example, see the dbcusston of radar calibration salclliies on)
his memorandum does not address specific scenarios in which various space systems are. or would be. employed, Instead, we dc'mv thrrx* gen-eral situations as follows:
military forcesormal alert Hatus .iihI no crisis or conflict exists for lb* USSR
period of tension in which Soviet military forces ire in an incrcasrd "tale ofluch as in3 Middle East war. (I'se of the orbital .alellitc InterceiMUr.definition, wouldTills situation and might le.id to conflict)
or nuclear warfaremajor Soviet military forces.
inn situation, the tasks to which lhe space systems contribute are not necessarily of the same importance or value. It is beyond Ihc scope of the itudy to anign relative values lo reconnaiuance versos communications versus navigation, and so on.
S The evaluation of dependence and degradation .lepmdsreat extent on our undentandina of the role ano effectiveness of non-spaceIn mnc cases, there ii more than one type of substitute,ingle space iistem mayto several military or intelligence activities or tasks. Ccnernlly. the substitute would beexample, high frciuencylinksubstitute for commui.icatioi. utcbut the substituteoviet space sistem could alsomvSovtet spaceas L'S navisystion and tendctic spacecraft
ur understanding nf Soviet capabilities provide lubstitulis for current space systems, and hence our pjdipnentt about dependence andare made with fair confidence overall. Our
1
. of Dependence aad Degradation
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reafeit io th* Judgment* concerning those Soviet raae* systems In which 'heigh and/j* theevere. Forwe are certain that the Soviets tr* hj^hly dependent on utcUito systems for pho'sgraphlo reconnaissance of areas denW to .Soviet personnel or aircraft overnights. We are less certain about our evaluation of thoaetems Jultasks for which the Sovietsrvad range ofuch as for tbeirsatellite*.
onover, our assessments apply to ansituation In which Soviet space systems, asas the alternate ways of performing the bfltS, lemaln Intact and otMraHnganner mostfor the irtuattona of peacetime, crisis, or conflict We hav* assessed each type of spae* lyrtern Independent ot" the other ones.
ur confidence 'n our Judgment* tt lower than for today. Our assessments ara baaed on the npected technicsJ clsaracterisrfcsj of Soviet ipse* systems, at weD aa on our estimates of likely
Soviet policy about the uses of space systems.
Obviously, bo'h of these factors are subject to
change during tbe nextyears.
VtE7 SPACEAND DEGRADATION
ur discussion of Soviet spoor systems it organized according to functional categories: wcap-om, Intelligence cUlectfon, communications, rnwal lupport loteteorolopcaLand callbranon. Within each catrsrory. the discus-tion of each space system covert Its function and uses, Soviet dependence on the ryrtem, and ii* degradation In Soviet military capabilities which would remit trots Its loss (seeor the uses or tasks rapported by Soviet satellite lyttems).
A.Interceptors
d (Send. the USSR developed and tested ao anUaalruite (ASAT)employing an orbital interceptor which destroys tale Cite*oo-nuclemr kJQ mechanism. Seven ^intercept tests were conducted
ull operational capability at Ty-uratam titerrt lett in Decemi
The system has demonstrated (be capability to intercept targets at altitudes up to SSO nm when launched by the SL-Ubooster that uses theCBM as tbe first twoith this booster we believe the system is capable of Intercepts at up to WOO nm alUlude.
he Soviets have also Demonstrated ato perform some of the orbital operations required toatellite in geoifattonary orbit We therefore believe the Soviets couldth* orbtal Interceptcr of their present ASAT system with th* large booster (used to launch Soviet geostationary satellites) and thus attackrpacecraft. They have not err Juried airy tests ofombination, and we therefore Jo not believe the Soviets now have an operational capability for this purpose.
iv The Soviets may believe thr';eterrent roleis the US. It thertfor* will serve essentially two purpose* deterrence in nddinVn lo its actualrole- Nevertheless, we judge the USSR'son its orbital interceptor to be low io peacetime (see Tableber of other factors contribute lo deterring ihefromwith Soviet rpace systems. Tbe atiociated degradation la slight. In crisis or conflict, the Soviets hav* no other way to fully replace the interceptor's capability; therefor* the dependence ts jvderd to be higholcrttial alternative to tbe orbital interceptor. Soviet anllbaflistic missiles armed with "wclrer warheads could be used to attack satellites up tom. Drpending-on tbeir character-istJea, however, both US and Snvtct satellite* would be vulnerable to the effectsuclear etp'osion inat very long renjcct- In due course, the Sovtet* may be able tomost low-alnrude satellitei with the large,aser ryrtem at Sary Shahus, trythe USSR's overall
Tabic 3
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frllrmaied SerinrWiai Id
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dependence on orbital Interceptor satrllitr* ind th* degradation ld capabilities resulting from iis lou would likely be reduced somewhat
B. Intelligent*
be USSR hu been involved longer with rpace system* to collect intelligence data than with any other type having military Importance. Photographic reconnaissance satellite* were first launchededicated satellite* forreconnaissance appearedlso7 the first flight tests occurredatellite program that2 bad evolvedadar ocean reconnaissance ryrtem.2 (he Sonnets began flight test*atellite that may 'ead to some type of surveillance from hlghaltirudc orbits. And4 the Soviets began flight tests of two types of reconnaissance satellite* to acquiredata more rapidly.
Photographic Reconnaisiance
hotographic reconnaissance If the single most active Soviet space activity tn terms of numlet of launches.here are aboutf these satellite* launched, and eachormal lifetime ofouch frequent launches provide some (Inability because tbe satellite* oan ba placed In orbits suited for specific targets- These satellites operate in the perigee range0 nm. Cne of these spacecraft Is almost always In orbit and In many Instances two or three satellite* are ln oibrt at the same time.
he Soviets have two operational photo-graphlc rreonnaissance system*.
.-type of satellite is used in
"search" missions to look for targets and also to obtain coverage of large areas for mapping. The second typeugb-resolution camera ivs-
he Soviets used their rpace ilation. Salyuto test the feasibilitygain experience insatellites for IntelligenceThe space station had an encrypted voice link for theata capsule ihat was subsequently dcorbtted,ensors that apparently can monitor iCDM launches. Moreover, thr Soviets deployed at Tyuratam the most elaborate set oftarget* ever seen In the USSR, probably for testing sensor* on Sah/ute suspect thatas used high- and low-resolution tensor* In the visual and near-infiared spectral bands, having application to future reconnaissance systems.
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rrcrsery of Imagery. Only two launches ot tho new satellite havo occurredar, although earlier some of their operational satellites also may have de-orbited rucb bucket! for testing purposes. The first of these new satellite*umber of theof Soviet photoerspfuc reconnaissarvre spacecraft, particularly the orbital parameters, the command link, and the recovery of the main pan of Ihe satelliteday misiion. During the lifetime of the first satellitebucket appears to have been deorbitrd fntn the USSR on one ortwo occasions. If the Sovirti Introduce this bucket recoveryoperationally, it will lOow them additional flesabiuty. Tbey could, for rumple, recover some satellite imagery without having to end the spacecraft's mission. In addition. tbe Soviets might not have to launch as many spacecraft tolow of data comparable to that obtained by current systems.
e expect evolutionary Improvements Inphotographic reconnaissance systems Including changes to their present hiih-rrsolution system which will permit operation in lower orbits with more precise altir"He control. We believe their objectives for this system will be lo achieveof about one to two feet and lo obtain better coverage and response by recovering imagery in buckets. They probably will also improve thetensors on Salyut-clais spacecraft. We do not believe, however, thai the Soviet willinble-frrquency. near-real-time rystrm withresolution before the carry toecause of limitations in sensor technolorv. data handbng. and imar- dbplay.
acki.igear-real-time Imanrythe Soviets might choose toimited optical reconnaissance system In which imagery data are stored on board theandto the ground periodically when the satellite Is over the USSR. Retrieval of some imagery data would be much more rapid than with the present technique of recovenng the entire spacecraft or by recovering several bucketsingle satellite. However, the number of frames of data which could be taken between each retrieval would probaNy be limited because of restrictions In data storage in the spaceemft and in the time available forof data lo ground starlr-ns.
Electroniche Soviets have elc-ctronic intelligence (ELINT) systems on three types of operational spacecraft to collect Information on tlie location and characteristics of land- and shin-based radars. Because of the major differences between these as a
he Soviet first-Generation ELINT systemimple one that collects rudimentary data from emitters. These emitters have Included US space surveillance radars and shipborne <urveillance radars. We suspect the eystera can detect other emitters as well In an uncluttered radardata from one satellite pass can be used to derive the position of rotating cmitten with known characteristics.
econd-gencratlon ELINT system, first launchedonrevoverable satellite designed specifically for electronic reconnaissance. Samef these spacecraft have been launched, and the Soviets maintain an active network of four to stl of them simultaneously.
nc soviet* appear lo use ihn systemprotimate movement* of foreignnircraftn transit. An estimatehip's movemenb con be mnde after many satellite passes have occurred and the ELINT data has been analyzed. By providing the apprmi-mate location of ships, this satellite system provide* some support to Soviet ocean surveillanceThere is evidence that 'hip position dala from theseorrelated with data from other more conventional ocean reconnaissance wureea.
eginning inhe Soviet! launcbrd an advanced ELINTnon-recoverable satellite designed specifically for electronicEight ofitd-generation satellites have been orbited, and tne Soviets rrcendya network of three active
ELINTappear to be similar to those of thethird-EWnerahon
If so. we
expect that positional data would be included in llie information provided to weapon platforms through the satellites' data transmission system.
he Soviets will likely use their tecund. tnd ihiri-grneraQon ELINT satellites for several more yean, Tbey may make additional improvements in (hem. iuch aa expanded frequency coverage to Include emltten not within the frequency band o( current satellites. They may also add capability to measure radar parameter! for fingerprinting" sufficient to allow the Soviets to differentiate one radar from anotherhe same class.
Rodor Oceon Reconnaissancelight test programoviet radar ocean reconnaissance satellite was underhr objective appears to have beenpaceboroe. active radar system for de-trrtton of large surface ships. Fourteen launches have occurred In this program and tbe last seven, beginning Inave carried the radar sensor. These satellites use an orbit about HO nm high andarrow area of the ocean,m wide. The satellite can detect mcd-lum-siied and some smallas cruisers andfavorable sea conditions, and probably can detect largeasunder adverse sen conditions.
_Jthe Soviet Navy would have th* primary operational interest in data collected
nhe Soviets launched two radar ocean reconnaissance satellites into coplanar Indicating one possible pattern for operationalWith two satellites in that orbitalportions of the ocean at middle latitude* can be covered daily, and overlapping coverage can be obtained severalay at higheployment does not provide enough coverage by itself for monitoring worldwide ship deployment It doe* offer,imitedto determine some ship locations and tosuch data with that obtained by other means of intelligence collection.
by th* satellite system. Tlie satellites are used to collect data over parts of the ocean where Ihe Navy is operating, in what appear to be efforts coordinated with the Navy.
In addition to providing data to Moscow, Uie radar satellites transmit locnhoni of surface ships directly to nival units, and perhaps to air units. The Navy, and even Long Range Aviation, would be interested in receiving such data tuother reconnaissance missions and th*of antiship weapons, such as ther th*e doubt, however, that th* Soviets would commit anbship weapons solely on th* basts of data from their radar ocean reconnaissancesince the data are not adequate for target identification. Dataadar satellitewould be collated with other information for targeting anhshrp weapons.
We expect the Soviets will develop anradar ocean reconnaissance satellite some-tlnw within the next five years. Themore than likely will includeradar. We also mightore extensive network of (he current type ofspecially if th-irlifetime can be extended tignificantly beyond theay* seen so far. The Sovicti place great emphasis on the US naval ihreat particularly the came* tasknd attach censiderabl*vce to drtecong, rraddng. and targeting ruchore capable radar satcuit* wouldsigniheantry to this objective. Development of an improved system appear* to be possible withSoviet technology in space and radar systems, and cvnkt be accomplished by the.
Surveillance by High-AhStudt Sattllit**
Ihe several types of satellites whichhave In bigh-akirudeost arelommunications relay.
USSR doe* notpace system to detect missile launchestoday, but we expectyrtem to b* In usehe flight test program foryrtem appears to be under way now.
n2 the Soviets began flight (erring utellitei that eventually may leadh-aJntude
strategic surveillance tyilem. TV first fourwere Punched In highly elliptical orbitsan altitude0 nm over theof the Northern Hemisphere. TheIseostationary orbit driftingA trie
eof these satellites, the more likely poukbilitieithe defection of mluile bunches and nuclear
detonations and/or metcorological and arinosphenc
research.
he Soviets are capable of developing andpecebome early warning system,of several satellite* In high-altitude orbit* to provide nearly complete coverage of US ICBM launche think the Soviet* bare sufficientpace system, and we know they have experimented with appropriate equipment. In addition to pouible testing of launch detection sensors on high-altitode satellites, we believe the Soviet* have tested roch tensors on board their manned Salyut spacecraft.5 the Soviet! are liVely toissile-launch early warning satellite, using infrared sensors for detection dunng the boost phase.
o provide worldwide, real-time data rssen-tialompreHensive early warning system, the Soviet* would require some type of data relay capability. Thi* most likely would be achieved through an additional ground station in the Soviet Far Cast althoughsatellite-tu-satrllite relayu conceivable. The Soviet* might choose to deploy an early warning satellite system to cover those elose-in SLBM launch areas near Europe as an initial step before they have the data relay system. In anypacebome early warning system would provide as much as IS minute* more warning than Soviet early warningearly warning system would provide only about five minutes more warning than an over-the-horiton detection system, |
cihysicol satellites
cries of latdlites launched during the past three years apparently collects basic mapping and geophysksJ data having military/intelligence value. The latellites operate in orbitsm high andow-resolution camera that pre> vtdri extensive coverage of land area* and polar ice fields.
Tn addition, these satellites carrylor uoppler tracking that may he monitored at many overt and covert Soviet satellite tracking nations around the world. Tracking from an ex-tensive network of nation* permit* accurateof the satellites orbitalhich in turn allows coordinate petitioning on the imagery for compiling charts.
Dependence) ondf courte, recognticd that Intelligence irdoemation. for whatever purpose* and* collectedariety of SovietIn addition to space reconnaissance iyv terns, support for balk intelligence activities Is provided by public information, human sources, andSICINT of leveral types, as well aa air and naval reconnaissance. In most cases, non-spec* resources provide more vcJuminou* amount* of data. And sometimes non-ipacedatareater impact or are more timelyfor intermediate and low-level commands. We are confident, however, that the Soviet* use satellites for Intelligence collectiontheyoviet-controlled, independent, and reliable way of corroboratjrig Information gained from other sources. Moreover, by their nature, space rystemi are capable of providing Intelligence conecbonlobal basis, particularly against remote or denied targets. O* equal
lance, tuch satellite* can help verify that certain unreported events have not In fact occurred.
In general, the tasks performed with data from Soviet Intelligence collection satellites change with the escalation from peacetime to crisis, as well asransition from crisis to conflict. Hie emphasis on the tasks changes too. In peacetime, for example, Soviet photographic reconnaissance satellites collect data that assist in the detailed analysis of foreign weapons systems. In crisis or in conflict,ask Is of lesser importance.Soviet electronic reconnaissance satellitesdata from the radars of US surface ships. In periods of crisis for the Soviets, or when their Interest in US ships Is raised, lhe Soviets increase and concentrate Iheir ELINT satellite collection and they retrieve the data moreexample,ay instead of once.
Just as the Soviets change lhe use of these space systems, they also change their use of other sources of data. TheT collection, their sir and naval reconnaissance, and their human reporting are all upgraded during crisis or conflict periods. This occurs because of the need for more specific information more quickly. The upgrading: also occurs to make these non-space sources more effective, since the targets being collected against will undertake steps to deny 'or at least control the amount of) dala available to lhe Soviets.
Considering all of thesediverse space systems, the variety of tasks they support, the alternative sources and the change* ia data need* and uses which occur under differentjudge lhat the USSR's dependence on these spacecraft ranges from low to high (seeighesl dependence is on photographic reconnaissance systems during peacetime.
eacetime environment. Soviet space collection systems primarily support the activities of basic intelligence and warning and theprocess for international agreements. As an example, support for verifying the compliance of Ihc US and other nations with internationalas for strategic arm* limitation, mutual force reductions, and nuclearalso Is provided by open source material, human reporting, SICINT. and (in some limitedair reconnaissance. Satellite photographic rcconraissance of US 1CCM and ABM facilitJcs, however, undoubtedly Is the only continuouslymethod of data collection available to the Soviets to verify2 Strategic ArmsAgreements. Although the Soviets wouldsome capability to detect violations of Inter-national agreement* without space reconnaissance systems, the USSR probably is more reliant on these system* for thi* function than for any other.
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rUii or conflict environment space rc-roeinaissancc system* primarily lupport threatand locating enemy forces and assessing their readiness. Photographicsatellitei become somewhat less Important for this activity than they were for verifyingagreements. Tn contract, although theupgrade their other sources of data,on their eltvtronie and radar reconnaissance tpacecrtft rises because Ihe alternate coUectinn methods are expectede less effective. Delays ot* one to five days in receiving photographic datathe effectiveness of this lupportlimitation that could be especially significantonflict Tn contrast, delays in receiving CUNT- ta can beew hours, and data from radar ocean reconnaissance satellites can be rransmitted to users in real time.
etween now5 we expect that the improvements in ex using intelligence collectionwill result In greater dependence.arc liVely to embody bruader areamore frequent coverage of any given area, more precise data, and faster recovery of theIn addition, because non-space altcma-tlvrx are likely to be less able than now to match the performance of Improved rpace systems, tbe Soviets are more llxejy to view data fromcollectionwell as the uses of suchessential.
e iudge that the USSR would experience degradation in capnbilltlei today ranging from slightve re If Intelligence collection spacecraft were not available. Degradation would be sharpest for the photographic reconnaissance systems.e expect that tbe degradation the Soviets would experience would be greater than for today for all of these systems except for that of thegraphic-geophysical satellites.
C Communications Relayuring thet yean the Soviets base greatly expanded their use of satellite systems to relay communications. Not only are new systems emerging for this purpose, but the older onesg used In newechniques are now used by Sovietbe reabnjne satellites are publiclyas relay systems and given names inseries. Three types (Molniyaolniyathe new Molniyara in high-altitude.orbits,ourth type) isgCPstaBonajY print
1
olniya ll arc the oldest of tho real-lime relay satellites, first launched in1 satellite*igh-altitude orbit and the spacecraft is visible to the USSR for nearly ten hours at aMolniya It havearor natsonal communicarons relay system EachIimitedwo-way carrier capable ofelephone channels,ingle television channel. This limited capacity requires the USSR toarce number of activet present there are at least eightfor use.
Mo4
Vrf arewo spacecraft In lha Soviet geoata nonaryaleUite program, both launchedhe fint was anteat of tbe booster and latellile propulsion units. The second latelUte. nameds. wasover the Indian Ocean. It uses relayilmilar to that ofrid has been used for what probablyimited series of mJitary-relateH communications expenr its
Fvtura Developments
viet* might be able to introduce and .tart testingpacecraft In theC- or.
Between now5 we expect that (he Soviets will introduce follow-on, real-time om-munlcntiona latrllites with Improved capabilities. These improvements will include technologyiucharger communication* capacity and more powerful relay signals. This should make use oft mi more convenient and, in thena, more available to lower echelons thane case today. Thoe new users mayrmall, fairly mobile equipment We are likely to ice the Soviets install equipment for the use of cuminon* satellitesariety of mobile weaponsuch as surface shipsircraft Moreover, by thee expect that geostationary relay satellites will be phased Into operation and will carry the bulk of military ccenmunicanons to ground station* In the more remote areas of the USSR.
We expect operational useSonv municatton* relay spacecraft that can support the relay of data from Soviet intelligence collections systems, either through satellite-to-satellite relay or through an Intermediate ground station. We think the Sennets would denveatellite rystem that ccnd-icts latcllite-ro-*atcIHte data .clay. This could allow the Soviets to relay data from reconnaissance, early warning, or ocean surveillance satellite* to the USSR or to military force* outside the Soviet Union In real
be key element In our assessment ofdependence oo communieatlo>tf satellites is the growth in users. Use* ot Molniya satellites for nuLtary/intelligence purposes are expected topartly with the introduction of many mora terminal* at lower echelons of command- Also,now3 we project the availabilityulti-user Molniya which vol) permit direct, two-fftc with mobile UK
esult3 the USSR will be using communlcationi relay satellites much more widely than today, for both mibtaiy/lntelllgcncehis will especially be the case in the Central Asian, Siberian, and For Eastern areas of the USSR and for cemmianicaoons with naval units at tee.
We fudge the USSR's dependence on all of tbe Molniya ipacecn.'t todaye low during peacetime, crises, or conflicts (seehe functions and uses of theseprovide reliable, relatively high-capacity met, ofto the Soviet government and military commandl alio are performed extensively (but by no mean*y Individual
present, noi
of communications relay probably could fulfill basic Soviet military,'intelligence requirements in peace-rime, crises, or con/bets. The Soviet* apparently have adequate redundant meant of communicarions so that the baa of any one. while causinginitial confusion and delay, would not seriously damage their capability to conduct essential affairs of state or to prepare for and conduct military ooeratlon*.
Eatlasaird Sonet Dependent;Sale Hi le*
ii: Mm
MolMia
5 the expected tatcllite developments and growth in! lead to increased iepend-enc* of military users on space ceanmumcaoons. This will be the case especially if automated data tupport systems for command andrequire considerable channelput into use as we anticipate. At the same time, ho'vever, the Soviets nowolicy to maintain key military communication* redundantly so thatcommand and control nets can be rscenitituted in case any one means were lost. The Soviets will probably be unable, however, to maintain redun. dant ground-based system* with capabilities equal to future satelliteherefore, we expect their dependence on Molniya communication*will increaseoderate level
e judge that the USSR would suffer only slight degradation in military capabilities 'oday if theeecraft were not available.e expect that degradation in their capabilities from loss of Molniya communications will riseoderate leveL
D. Naval Support Satellites (Navigation)
oviet satellite program to providerupport to naval entitle*n active rlnee' There now are two fenerations of
these ipaceeraft active in separate orbital nctwoiksm high.ong dcsclopment andphase,icrics of first-gencration sateltltei became available for use In the. Tha Soviet* generallyetwork of three of these lalelbtrs active at one time. Second-generation sat-el lite* were first launched inour have been orbited so far. AH are active at present, and appear to be undergoing testluation.
these latelllte* for navigational rupportange instrument* hoos. oceanographleship* (including mow conducting Infi of sensor* for amuobmanncnd theV<|au submarine* used in scientificIan Soviet .liliatic miiiite sub-marlne uied one, pcrhopa two, of the firstsatellites fer navigational lupport during5 Soviet naval exercise QVean.
Other pov
sen coula oe motnie uno-oaied balintic missile units, geodetic lurvey teams, andpropagation research grouot.
S tbe USSR probably will havefollow-oo satellites intended to Include an extremely accurate navigation capability to lupport follow-on or new strategic offensive weapons, such as replacement* projected for thend theoreover. If the Soviet* try to develop an air-launched ballistic missiletrategic cruise missile, Ihey would probablyrecision navigation satellite which might be able to update theidane* lystem during flight.
We judge tbe USSR's current dependence on these spacecraft for navigational support to be low, eicept in conflict situations (seeependence In conflict is judged to be moderate.e expect this dependence to remainunchanged, except tbatonflictoviet dependence on much-improved navalsatellite* will become high and the associated degradation will be nvodorate-to-severe.
of conflict, Ibe navigation supportof these spacecraft more than likely cantoday.(or ballistic missileOther means which the Soviets usepurpose are celestialeatherconditions perniortomnavigation, and probably the USand the US LORAN radioIn conflict, these substitute*tthe navigation support rote as well assupporthey are not asin some cases arc not as reliable or secure.
E. Metrorolocjkal
Soviets orbited their firstsatellites9 after several yearsThe satellite* still have certain'collecting wealhrr data, including aorbit (now atn opticala relatively narrow field of view, and astorage and baitsmisskm capability.required multiple satellite* to providecoverage. The Soviets keep aboutspacecraft active in orbitEach has an instrument packageof several radiometers that yield data onbalance of the earth, and television andscanner* that provide cloud roverthe earth's daylight and dark portions. InSoviets modified their mcteoroloelcalpermite transmission of imagery.
n addition to normal wratlirr forecasting, the Soviets also could use the data from these lateilire* to:
improve weather data irammiOed to ship* and other out-of-orea statioiUL
7
Estimatedt^ndence'Drgradatieii; Naral Support Satellliea
Caafiirl
ISMS
he targeting of photographicsatellites.
provide post-itnk* vrnfkacion of nudear weapon alternations;
ice packs ard floes.
'f thii capabdity were linked to ground andcomm jrucaticn networks, the Sovseta could also provide ir-rorrnationear realtime tomilitary units and ihlp*lohal basis.
Cm*llB*it
Low/Sllftht
Conflict
MooeriW-Hidv/
Hedcnai
Pnoftlm* CoaVSllsW
t
wo
Soviet officials haveuture three-Her meteorological satellite program. The three tiers apparently are to consist ofIcne-alnrode manned spaceedium-altitude satellite (similar to the current Meteorystem of geortationary satellites. We believe the Soviets are proceeding with this program, and they could have it In use by thehe low- and medium-aJLn.dc satellites could havesensors. a
Recently the Soviets launched the firstew. of weather satellites named Meteore know littJe about this ntrllite at present, but expect thatn improvement over the earlier Meteor ipacecrrJt. and that it will be part of the three-tier
We juHge the USSR's dependence 'n these spacecraft today to be low norpt in conflictwhen, the dependence is assessed to be moderate-to-nigh (seee espeet this dependence to remain buicrdl/ unchanged. Meteor-otogicaJ spacecraft can provide tbe Soviets data on weather conditions around the world, particularly on cloud coat. Ignorance of such conditions could adversely affect the Soviets' air aod ire operations, aa wd! as use of their own photographicsateiiites. Additional data on weather over Soviet territory and peripheral arras areby ground sensors, balloons, and aerialMoreover, during Deacefure. worMwsde weather data are exchanged by the developedCompared to Soviet-acquired data, though, this information generally has reduced usefulness for open ocean and underdeveloped areas, and is not always timely. More importantly, duringwlaen the exchange of weather datawould be interrupted, the Soviets woolbe much more dependent on thnr own metrot-ologica] satellites for weather data over hosrJ* territory and open ocean arras.
judge that the USSR would sufferdegradation today if these spacecraftavailable. In conflict situations, theto moderate.expect tJw degradationbasKaUly unchanged for the
f. Geoca'.e
Sinehe Soviets haveimited amount ofata, using mensuration techniques on imagery from their photographic reconnaissance satellites. This effort has been worldwide, but the emphasb has been on collecting data over the US- The Soviets have also gath red geodesy-related data through the opticalij of Sovieton-Sovietpart, under intei national cooperative
0 the Soviets began launching geodetic satell'trs to Improve their overall effort tn geodesy and gravirnetry. These spececraft have it anysimilar to the naval support satellites, but now ore in orbitsm high. These orbits allow eitensive tracking from 'he Northern Hemisphere, where Ssviet ICBM hunch sites and nearly all ICBM targets aree orbits also provide several opportunities each day forto be made on the same revolution fron both the USSR and North America.
oviet geodetic spahave flashing lights lhat permit the Serviets to take measurements under controlled situations and without relying on solar Illumination. Light-pubw sessions and Dopplrr
T^ScnH
trinm. mious ar* programed to occur over iclected am* around the world where the Soviet* have etubluhed opfcal tracking nations. These opticaJ tracking life* are located within the Soviet Union, at overt Soviet itationa In Antarctica, nt overt itaMon* locatedew countries around the *orld. covertly in official installations in many ccajntrlee, and perhaps on certain Sovietght-pu'ie sessions hove been correlatedf somenown or suspected optical tracking sites,
ecdetie satellites probably arc intended to provide Improved worldwide geodeticand to improve gravimetric and geodetic models of the earth. The moat ngnificantof these daii Is to Increase the accuracy of strategicmissile*
e judge tbeoverallon uVs* spacecraft today to be moderate inand low In crises and conflicts (sec5 this dep-ndence probably will not change. Ce-jdctic satellites are used to refine knowledge about tbe earth's shape ind field of gravity. These data allow the establishment of an accurate geodetic grid of the earth's surface, and thmoy reduce errors In delivery of some weapons. There is no other way to perform these tasks to the ncceuen degrees of accuracy. Thisong-range, research-oriented effort which ha* some key militarytuch as for missile targeting, but la not al ays time-sensitive. The support provided by ge. ieticumuiatlva and much of tbe required data couevtJon and analysis almosthss already been accomplijhed. Littlen.pport of this type could be provided by non-space lyrtems, bul practically any near-earthorbe tracked h> provide aome of this support.
TABLE t
c tudge that the USSR would suffer only slight de-nation if these spacecraft were nothe impact of the satellltn' ibsence,very small at (he beginning, would grow sternly. We believe that between nows the Soviets push for improved accuracies cf their strategic ballistic missiles, the overall impact of the unavailability of these satellites could rise.
G. Colibrotlon and Checkout
be Soviets orbit two types of satellites to calibrate and eiercise ABM radar systems. I
fromom. One type of radar calibration satellite hassed since theew. more versatile type of satellite, first launched insed for radar raJibra-
rrT^^
about five of these typts of iate"ites active in orhit.
he calibration spacecraiin important role for the ABM -ystems by allowingand thus removal, of tracking errors.
| Into calibration, the Soviets probably use the satellites In their radar-related operations toand track real objects which simulate portions of SUM orrajecttsries.
I9S3
Low/ShaM
hi
IIP]
* ft
'OK
SOVIET SPACE SYSTEM DEFENSES A. Aworenes*
he USSR almost certtlnly il aware of ell the more fundamental way* toefenie for. or protect, lb) ipece systems- And we suspect
has been givenariety of defensive counter-measure* /ot satellite* coming under attack.
he Soviets roust also have investigated the vuloeribllides of spacecraft during the development and testing of their oven orbital satellite Interceptor. Thisj>douade the Soviet* aware of the ways that inch idnerabdloes can beor overcome.!
B. Capabilities
espite the foregoing, we are not aware thai the USSR ha* had, or now has, any on-going program* specifically intended to provide defenses for its spacecraft- Over the last ten years, however, we have seen the Soviet*umber of spacecraft having characteristicsrovide at least some inherent protection. But we do not know whether they have any significant overall capability to defend their satellites beyond their inherent designs. Moreover, we are not able to define the specific situation* against which the Sovietsthe need to use. or rely upon, any defensive or protective capabilities their space systems m'ght actually possess.
Existing Feorure*
in the technical design of the spacecraft or were deliberately incorporated, although it Is not clear that the purpose was protection. These features are presented belowat ere assess to be their degree of protection for the Soviets.
SVtu*-ry of command, telemetry or minion data links,chieved either by the erHTyption of the command link to thethe telemetry, or mission data links from it, or the use of ground stations so located as to make the exploitation of luch debtSuch steps reduce or deny access to the satellites housekeeping data, whichthe status of subsystems, such as attitude control and propulsion. Encryption oflinks prevent* electronic "capture" of
- Bulky and fhlck-akinned constructionprotection for the satellite againstand debrisuclear detonation, the pelletson-nuclear warhead, or laser radiation. The USSRifferent approach to space systems design from that of the US. For variouseasons, the Soviet Union has produced bulky, thick-skinned spacecraft which are relatively
They tie sealed tnd. pressurizedoeitrolled bilercal environment. In contrast, the US generally develop* thin-skinned.sophisticated, and vaeuijm-certiiicd spacecraft. Although it may be inadvertent. Soviet design preferences resultegree of protection that the US systems do not have, particularly against thermal and laserand electromagnetic pube. Most Soviet photographic reconnaissance satellites are also thermally and mechanically "hardened" (or reentry. This technical design feature more than likely provides these satellitesurther degree of protection.
- MorteuveroMity is the capability to change the orbit of the satellite by the use of asubsystem. This capability can be used to make corrections for ibe drag effects of tbe atmosphere, lo remove the satellite from orbit, or to evade an interceptor. Changing aorbit makes tracking of the spacecraft more difficult, which in turn makes it more difficult to predict where the satellite will be and thus to intercept it. Maneuvers are not likely to be effective against electronicumber of types of Soviet spacecraft with military or intelligence sig-nificancc hive a maneuvering capability
We believe that these satellites hav miscapability In order to perform their missions better, and not for defensive purposes as lucb.
- Muffrpl* aateflWes,apability forarge number of satellites either in orbit, or on tbe ground available for launch. In terms of redundancy and sheer numbers, some types of Soviet satellite systems have thai mearure of indirect defense.rue of communications relay and prtc^Jgraph^ reconnaissance systems.ariety of technical and geographiche USSR keeps aboutommunications satellites active In orbit, including nearlyouia also
keeping older spacecraftormanteffect, maintaining silent spares. Moreover, the USSR useseconnaissance satellites each year. Tnero is one such spacecraft In orbit nearly all of the time, tnd there regularly are short periods of one or two days when two or three satellites are in orbit at once. The USSR has demonstrated several times Its capability toeries of photographic reconnaissance satellites, have them cover selected areas, and recover the data so as tolow of intelligence data.onsequence,ingle Soviet photographic reconnaissanceto become unavailable, the impact almost surely would be slight.onsequence, even though we earlier demonstrated that Ihe USSR now has varying degrees of dependenceumber of military or intelligence spacetbe unavailability of an" one satellite almost surely would be uiconsequentiaL
PotentiolIn addition to Ihe foregoing inherenttbe Soviets could build into theirthe following defensive capabibties.in what we judge to be the decreasingdifficulty for the
CovrUtrottoci capolrtHta. Le, prmSding the satelliteel(-defense capability toor destroy an intrrcrptor, such as through the employment of an cm-board laser.
Electronic covnlcrrruraivra whichapability to interfere with any radar tracking of tbe satellite, either by an interceptor or as partround based system.
The use of chaff which provides the satellite with tbe capability to create discreter what amount to multiple false targets.
Providing the satellite with the capability to deploy decoys that simulate its radar and/or optical characteristics.
Top.
In radar rlgnaturt by changing th* radar ctcii-scccwh of th* satellite to dis-ruisend shape, or to mak* th* satellite easier lo decoy through th* employ, ment of Inflatable protrusions and radarmaienal
Providing the satellite with tltctrenle ptvirx-lion against electronic interference, tuch as through tbe use of anti-jamming features.
Deterrence
We de not know to what ritent the Soviets rely upon deterrenceefense for their own satellites.. the threat of ret aha boo. depends. In part, on tbe estiftrnce of their non-nuclear capability to attack satellites in orbit or to attack the (pound-based systems that tup|>ortsuch as control sites or communications links. The Soviets know that the US Is awara of Soviet capabilities to intercept satellites, and theyare confident that the US does not presently hav* an operational satellite Interceptor. Thus, the USSR might conclude that its orbital interceptor does. In fact, presently serveeterrrot.
In any case, the USSR has two operational weaponsapable of intercepting and destroying satellites:
orbital satellite interceptor known to be capable of non-nuclear attack againstin orbits of up to SSO nm altitude, and probably up tom altitude. (Both riinclude the current booster.arge booster the (nlertsrptor could be used to attack geostationary satellites.)
Galosh missiles in tbe Moscow ABMThese ara capable of nuclear intercepts at altitudes up tom.
Tbe two systems provide tbe USSR with an ability to respond, alrnoat immediately in sons* cases, to any US interference with Soviet rpace systems.
Allhough Ihese capabilities may not have been intended toeterrent role, they, in effect, do to byould be attacker of Soviet space systems to seriously coruidcr them in its caJculataons.
ha USSR may havemay have ainterfere with US space systems by focusing on the ground-based elements which are located o'.tside the US. Such interference could be directed at command and control sites or communications links, and might take th* form of direct attack, sabotage, attacks by local popdations. or polilical pressure on the host government to reduce or dose the sites. If the Soviets had any such capability, tbey would be likely to try to exploit It when necessary. And. thus, any such interference capability couldeterrent effect oik* the US became aware of it
C Outlook
12S. We do not know what paths the USSR will follow in providing dedicated defenses for its own satellites or. in fact, if th* Soviets will do anything more than they have done so far. We know Ihat they are aware of US interest In the subject, andthey will continue to follow USThe Soviets can expand the use of exist-int inherent protective features, or in trad ikt some of the additional ways of defending satellites if they want to. We believe that llie Soviets would almost certainly do so if they saw the US embark on the development and deploymentatellite intercept capability.
IV. PROSPECTS FOR SOVIET INTERFERENCE WITH US SPACE SYSTEMS
A. Retrospect
oviet attitudes about th* uses of (pace and space reconnaissance systems have undergone some changes during the lastears. Initially, Ibe USSR maintained that reconnaissance from space was merely another form of espionage and. as such, was illegal. Byowever, when the Soviets hadanificanl satellite reconnaissance capability of their own, their attitude began to change. For example, during the negotiationi which led to7 treaty governing the peaceful uses
terhe So neb avoided robins satellitesance as an Issue. This was the firstsign that they had come to accept space-bated reconnaissance as an important and necessaryfunction.ow enshrined in acceptance by t're Soviet* of" "national technical means" ofincludes space-basedsystems. These meansundamentalof the ABM Treaty IS and the Interim Agrec-ment on Offensive Missiles, ond will be included tn any subsequent strategic arms limitationsccords. The Soviets probably do not regard US non-reconntiss-ince. military support satellites as "nations] technicalf verification protected by the provisions of these vgreemenb.
Soviets have expressed concernabout direct-broad cast satellites,that the US might use. Although thethe capability to build such satellites of itsindicated recently tb Intent to establishe thinklong ago that it is quite vulnerable topolitical Impact of these satellites.can transmit television or radioto listeners without routing thrmighstation. The Soviets hsve focused onen till of these satelliles to relay what theyor illegal" information to IbtenersUSSR. The USSR has stated before theIt reserves the right to take actionsatellites. While it has toned downof this issue1 Ihe USSR'shas not changed significantly.
be Present Situerrton and Prospects for tho Near Term
Soviet attitudes towardwith US space systems result from an ar<political and other factors. In addition to the
"7 treaty rovems the "peecetaT activities of nation* la the einkmttooaw of outre irwee. nxtuilins lhe moon and other celestialt does no* address riptieity Uwof nonlrtrrfenmesr with ipaor interna.
nd s. Article XII of lhe APM Treaty, provide, thai; "Each Party undVrtaLrs no* lo Interfere with the national technical mum ol verification of the other Party operatm* tn accordancearmer wIHat withoentted petne-plei of Internalverall dependence of the Soviets on ipaeethey include detinle and ihc US-Sovietand military relationship, the related matter of obllgadon* under tlx SALnprotected nature of Soviet space systems, the Soviet assessment of the leve1 of US dependence on tb space systems, and Sovieb* view of the US ability and will to respond to any interference on theb part Each of the factors I* dynamic and would acquire different significance ovor time. The net effect lo date of all of them,t facto. and mutual, rionInterference.
Tlie most Important political factor atis the Impact that interference would have on Soviet-US detente. The Sovieb probably reckon that detente would not survive on attackS spacecraft and it might not even survive USof sporadic, covert electronic or laserwith is spaceoreover, the USSR undoubtedly recognizes that physical interference with US intelligence collection satellites would be inconsislcnt with ib obligation* under the SAL agreements- It rwobabl/ understands that any di-.rcct attempt to prevent the US from usingjcv system* to gather intelligence on Soviet strategic programs would constitute soiolation of these agreements that It could only be justified try an effort to dbrupt the established US-Soviet political and military relationship. Tlie USSRrealizes that such action would be soby the US.
Perhaps the most Important of the otherhe USSR's overall dependence on space systems in general, and space reconnaissancein particular. As shown earlier in thb paper, the USSR is deeply committed to Ihc use of spacearticularly for intelligence collection. This commitment illustrated by the number of launches annually, grew to about ib current level In the mid- lo, and ha* been rising more slowly in. Given their dependence on these systems now and what will be greater dependence on these and other systems in the future, the Sovieb will be reluctant to undertake any actions that could jeopardize them.
The generally unprotected nature of the USSR's own space systems bfactor that probably
Ti
also weighs against Soviet Interference.takes into account Ihe poastbdity of aa Soviet attack on US space systems,
or to some leaser form of Soviet interference. The Soviets presumably would expect the US response to include sornethJrtf, otherhysical attack on Soviet satellites, however, since they know the US does not nowpecific and dedicated capability for this pssrpose.
nother factor is the Soviet assessment of the level of US dependence on its space systems. The Soviets undoubtrdly pe-celve that the US relies upon Its space systems eitenstvelyariety of military and intelligence tasks. And the Soviets may be aware lhat substitutes for space systems do not exist In some
Despite these considerations, we believe there ta still scene small chance that the USSR might engage In activity that could appear to the US as interference. It Is conceivableoviet laser tracking device whileovietmight shine inadvertentlyS satellite. II oi rover, il* the Soviets were loround-based Imaging radar against iateJIi*es, Including US vehicles, the energy fromystem might affect US spacecraft and appear to be interference.
We cannotetdude the very small chance that for all ipaeethoseby formalSoviets would conduct activities that are truly acts of interference. Such activities undoubtedly would be tcoducted In great secrecy. We are not certain we always would recognize such acts if they were doneery limited basis, but w* believe we would recognize such nets tf they numbered moreew.
Crisis or. The USSR's position Incrisis or conflict will be Influenced by some of the same factors that an relevant ta peaortrme- Their net effect probably weald be that the Soviets would refrain from Interfering with US rpace systems antU such rime as the USSR perceived ib vital interests to b* at stake. SpedBcsusy. US space systems likely would remain Immune to Soviet Interference unci such time as the Soviets believrd that their military actions would be compromised by US spacesystems, or the Soviet nulitary position was fudged to be undercut by L'S satcthte* directly supporting US weapon systems. IWow thisUS military or intelligence satellites almost certainly would be safe until the Soviets believed the US had taken prior action against Soviet space systems.
mall possibility that theuse interference withUS or NATOincrisis situation astest of USsuch, it couldositive, though notIn the escalation toward conflict with thethe Soviets tooktep, they mightatellite not owned by the US. Thedanger for the So wets is that the USrecognize the interference jrtmediatelyUS Inaction might unmtenbonaJly
C. lonct-Term Prospects
The prospects for standoff thro-ighwhether In peacetime, crisis, orinto account the same set of factors. Among them,dependence on space systems is sure to change significantly. As discussed In Section II, It will grow during this period. The impact of this growth, assuming no significant change in peacetimehe other factors, probably will be ti make the Soviets even more reluctant to undertake actions that could put their own ips.ee systems at risk. Nfoceover, this growth will Increase Soviet desire to ensure the unimpeded use of (pace, particularly 'or military and intelligence activities- However, we believe that the degree of Soviet dependence on space system* we have frrecast for the nest ten yean is not by itself high enough to deter them from interfering with US satellites in the face of other compelling reason to do so.
The other factors that could lead us ta reconsider these judgments intrude:
a Soviet perception ofwidening pp between what the US and the USSR gain from ipaee lysteuj;
a Soviet perception or developmentS spec* system that provided tupportay which,risis or conflict sitaanon, would be extremely dlsadvsntageoos to the Soviets;
a Soviet belief ihat the US wu unwilling, or totally unable, to Interfere effectively with Sovietpace systems;
Soviet acquisition of additional, and more effective eapabOitiei to interfere with US rpace systems;
the Introduction by Ihe Soviet* of mean* of countering US Interference, iuch a* anti-Jam feature* andencryption, and
Sovieto discuss an agreement prohibiting interference.
While the growing Soviet dependence on spaceactor that contributes to dr factoIt also might contributeoviet interestoninterference agreement. It may have played this role already, since the USSR is at least somewhat interested in the general topic of noninterference wifh space systems. At Ceneva inuri Kolosov of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affair*peech to ibeuters pace Committee suggesting that ih*might wish to examine ncmntcrfefence withterns.l
The USSR might view negotiations toward some sort of agreement on noninterferenceseful means of buttressing detente. While any such afferment would have to be acceptable to the Soviets on its own merits, we would erpect them to portray the possibilitycminleKerence agreement, publicly and privately, as aof detente, even if that were to be. in fact, much lest important than the technicaland benefit*.
We conclude that the prospects seemthat the USSR would be willing to participate In negotiatloniormal noninlerfrrencc agreeent. including some and perhaps nearly all (pace systems. (Civcn the Soviets' position on direct broadcast satellites, if they could not achieve an agreement limiting the use of such spacecraft, through the UN for example,ery unlikely ihat they would want these satellite* Includedoninterferencehe rationale for Soviet participation could Include the technical information diey nieht gain during suchalthough thc> would have to expect toal least some information on their own lys'ems. The exSitencc of the Soviet orbital interceptor could have an effect on ihe USSR's altitudeoninterference agreement. The Interceptor could stimulate the Soviet* to leek an agreeent that might prevent the US from developing orimilar lystcm.
If the US commits itself to dr*riot) or deploy its own satellite Intercept system. Soviet interest In tbe subjectormal.Isea or Soviet obtvctivc would be shutting off the US effort, either by direct prohibition or by underc>>tiing the US rationale for iu system.
We susyect that any ncjtollntlon* toward iuch an agreement vould last several years and would be techrically. if not politically, difficult. The following specific (nature* of anv potential afveement probably would be among those the SovseU would find meit appealing;
po*itive protection of key Soviet system*;
barring US development or deploymentnh-taicUite system*:
a focus on tulisrts of space system*:
limited duration: and
bilateral.
Original document.
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