Prospects for Arms Production and Development in the Republic of China
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PROSPECTS FOR ARMS PRODUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA
| CONCLUSIONS
Tbe Republic of China would prefer to rely on the US for military assistance, but has apparently concluded that it can no longer count on doing so indefinitely. Totrong defense posture, the government is attempting to expand domestic arms production,new weapons systems, and find other sources of modemand advanced technology.
As these programs advance, the Nationalists should be able to reduce further their dependence on the
They will continue to be heavily dependent on foreign sources for modern
Tho ROC appears to hnvo little prospect of becomingIn arms production within the next
The major problem the government faces in manufacturingarms, munitions, and spare parts is the lack of defense industries, similar to those in the USand other advanced countries, j
of ils reliance on the US, the ROC has never developed the high technologies and skills necessary for manufacturing arms and military suppliesommercial basis.
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mcmwuruiiim hnt hcen perrnrvd fntntly hy (hr Centralio-nty nntl ihr? Ofrfw Intrlllvncn Awncy ami coin limited wllh the Bun-aii nfite ixe uml Ih-nsnh nl the Department of Sliilc.
The relatively small amounts of weapons ami munitions nowproduced on Taiwan come from military armaments plants ond research centers. The facilities arc not capable ofthese items in large quantities.
To increase production, the government is currentlycommercial companies to expand their product lines toweapons, munitions, ond spare parts.
The corporations have the skilled manpower and much of the technology needed to produce many milltury Items. They will, however, require technical assistance, specialized equipment, and technologies to manufacture large weapons such as tanks and artillery and sophisticated electronics such as radars.
Commercial companies will prolably lie reluctant to commit large amounts of capital until they hove gained experience in producing weapons for government and foreign markets.
Thus, while the potential exists on Taiwan for an expanding arms industry, growth in this field is likely to be slow initially.
The ROC has found several countries outside the US that areto sell arms and technology. The procurement of advancedfrom these sources will, however, create additional problems for the government.
The Nationalists probably would have difficulty maintainingweapons systems with which they are unfamiliar,
This problem could be severe if the ROC had to rely on foreign suppliers for critical spare ports. For this as well as economic reasons, the government is seeking licenses to manufacture most items on Taiwan^ |
The ROC appears to be achieving some success in its nuclear,and chemical warfare programs, although none of these programs will contribute significantly to Notionalist military capabilities for at least several years. i
The ROC is attempting to develop the capability to fabricate nuclear devices. If the ROC violates safeguard agreements, it probably could develop the capability ond acquire the materials torude nuclear device in three to four years.
The ROC program to develop short range surfocc-to-surfoceIs still in its infancy. The Nationalists obtained nssistnnce from Israel and hove Iwgun producing limited numbers ofantiship missiles based on the Gabriel Nforkallistic
THE DETAILS
US has been the principal supplier of arms iukI military equipment for tlte Republic of China since the Nationalists were forced tofrom the mainland someean ago. But tlint I* changing, tn recent years, tho US has sharply reduced its military presence In Asia and continued to move ahead in its efforts to normalize relations with the People's Republic of China; the US has iu fact been cutting hack its military assistance to Taiwan.
These developments have raised serious doubts in .Taipei nbout the long-term reliability of tho USajor source of weapons and supplies. Tho ROC clearly would prefer tn rely on the US for military assistance, but has apparently concluded that it can no longer count on doing so indefinitely.
In an attempt to maintain its defense posture andredible military deterrence, the ROC Is nttctnptlng to Isocomc more self-reliant byIts own capabilities for developing and manufacturing weapon systems. In ailditicm. Taipei is nctivcly seeking new sources from which it can procure advanced weapons and technology.
Domestic Arms Production
ROC alreadyarietynnd munitions in limited quantities.nr. ground, and naval forces. Formamifactures Infantry weapons Michmachinem howitzers, rccoillcss rifles, antitank rockets, land mines, hand grenades, cxrdoslvcs, and munitions. In addition, tlie ROC produces militury vehicles such as jeeps and trucks and communications equipment.
ost Items now being manufactured In Taiwan are copies of USdesigncd weapons and manykey components made In the US. The only non-US weapon that is produced In significant quantities Is4 rlflel
friie ROC plans to purchase plants and equipment so that It can expand its production of ground forces equipment and munitions. Taiwan also plans to begin producinc IntRCT nrti'irry pieces suchni guns and howitzers.
he ROC aircraft industries nkooproductiun agreement with the US. Taiwan lust year started assemblingE fighter. Taiwan manufactures some parts forE. hut major components of tlie aircraft such as avionics. Jet engines, and weapons systems arc produced in the US. Tlie ROC lias already built aboutEs and plans tootalf the aircraft within tlie next two years.as requested nppnwol to build SO4rainers, but prnductltm has slowed aid may lie ending. Tlie ROC is also coprodiieinc thetclicnpter under llceirw to the US. Mure
lionf Ihe UII-lHs have beenotalre to lie completed under the contract. Aircraft repair und maintenance fucillllei onare capable of tcrvldng virtually all nlrcraft now in the ROC Inventory.
he ROC Is also making ptmtm In Improving its navy, although it still relies heavily on the US. Taiwan manufactures small patrol boots and service craft and ta rmidernlring Use older ships prmklnl by the US. The major emphasis lias been onold naval ships with more modem weapons. For example, the ROC has installed the US-made Sea Chaparral surface, to-air missile systems on four destroyers. Three oilier destroyers are being eriuippcd with Ihe US-designed As roc antbub-marinc rochet system, hut tlie ROC lacks trained personnel to maintain the Asroc equipment
iih US aMiitonce. the ROC ta aho moving ahead wiih plnm lo liegin construction on larger naval ships. Taiwan recentlyontractS firm to build two multi-mission patrolwhich will lie nrmed with surface-to-surfaee missilcs. The first unit is being built in the US and should be completed next year; the second ship will be constructed In Taiwan using materials and technical assistance provided by the USThe ROC plans to buihlf the patrol ships; most arc tosembled nt shipyards in Taiwan.
shipyards have demonstrated the ento handle maintenance and major repairnaval vessels. The Nationalist Chinese arcovcrhaulinc the two submarine the USfor training- This Is the first tune theoverhauled submarines on its own. Theresome delays in this program, but one ofshould lie completed this spring.
Overseas Markets
ROC taajor supplier of armsnot likely to become one in the near future.has provided several million rounds ofammunition to the Philippines andliy training some pilots, Ateam consisting nf fourechnidans Is now In Jordan to assist Inof pilots nnd maintenance pcrsiKinelFZE aircraft.
There ta no evidctvee (hat Taiwan hassignificant amounts of vecapnns or munition* to any country. Isecent reporting does suggest that thereeady market especially In Southeast Asia for the conventional nrms. munitions, andsupplies that Taiwan manufactures or is now developing.
Indonesia,Malaysia, and the Pliilippinet have arn,irr*aehcJ Taipei aboutmilitary equipment. ScAcral countrieshave expressed interest In the turboprop trainer that Taiwan is currently developing, nnd Singapore has asked aliout buyingE fighters. Any sales of coprodiiced weapons would require US approval.
Most of Taiwan's arms and munitions and militaryroduced at military research and armament plants and arc not yet available in sufficient quantities to export. These facilities are expanding their capnbllitic> to produce weapons systems, but they cannot meet the needs of the ROC armed forces. I
aipei appears to recognize this problem and ta actively encouraging commercial companies to enter the field and manufacture arms, munitions, and military supplies. The governmentilitary products exhibition fn Taipei onhe exhihliirected at promoting self-suffidcncy through cooperation between the government and private firms. Moretems have been displayed but onlyr so are locally manufactured. Most of the Items represent US parts and components that the government would like to get commetvial companies to
The ROC has sent delegations tn numerous countries to discuss the possibility of Taiwanmilitary hardware and assistance. Taipei ta apparently trying to drum up Lnsiness so that It can demonstrate to the cranmerdal companies that therearket overseas for any surplus wenpom and military supplies that tproduce. In addition. Taipei prolsably sees InU-rnstJonaladvantages In developing domestic weapons production for sales overseas.
Tliefield in which the ROChe potential ton|nr source far foreign
markets It clifinit-.il warfare. Taiwan has aadvanced chemical agent program, andcountries have rsportcdly apprunchcd itto purchase agent* and technology.hastrict policy thatcircumstances will it export chemical agentstechnology. The ROC program isU'chnology and assistance provided bythis policy may well have been one of thein the orlgind agreement that Taiwan
Third Country Arms
he ROC haa achieved limited recent veats finding new sources for technology.'
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At the present time. Taiwan can only get some of the weapons, technology, and equipment that It seeks from countries other than the US.of their relations with the PRC, severalhave already refused to sell arms to Taiwan, but others have continued toillingness to sell weapons and military hardware to the ROC.
Taiwan reportedly considers Itselfime-hind and believes that it must hurry if It is to get the modern weapons and technology that it seeks. The ROC appears to be concerned that additional sources of military hardware will dry up as other countries follow the US lead and move to Improve their ties with the PRC.
f the countries from which Taiwan has sought arms, only Israel is likely to remaine-llahle source well Into the fuhircj
he ROC has sought to obtain additionalrpilpmcnt, and techno*>ey from these and other countries, but no deals have bes-nso far. Taiwan Is particularly Interested In
rance. Italy. West Germany, and the UK ore receptive to selling weapons, equipment, and technology to the ROC hut all of them probably would put rrstrirtrons on the types of hardware that they would provide. Both the UK and France have sold aircraft and technology to the PRC and they are unlikely to risk losing this market by sclllne, advanced aircraft to the ROCl
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wo.rU be willing lo sell them to Ibe HOC. If the US arsproved the
rance. West Germany. Italy, ami the UK manuf.-cturc defensive rnJseflt* that the BOC faIn acquiring. I
/US approval andfiucV sales by"third countries might induce them totliese and other weapons ond technology to Taiwan.
Research ond Development
n addition to the weapons that it is already producing or obtaining from foreign sources, the ROC is conducting research and development workariety of weapons and equipment. Tbeprogramigh priority; Taiwan is aliowork on aircraft,nd chemical warfare.
TV* Nationalist Chinese ore developing three aircraft on theirtrainersmall transport. The turboprop trainer prototype, which first flew Inas progressed slowly.of this trainer hinges largely on the ROC rtbtalning rights to coproduce the US-made gasengine; the US has recently agreed to provideof the engines. Tbe transport is scheduled to begin flight testing in two years,et trainer prototype Is planned for construction byaiwanarge pool of experienced engineen ond technicians, hut they have had relatively Httle design and research training. For this reason, the HOC will be hard pressed to produce an advanced fighter without massive technical assistance from Ihe US or other countries.
The Nationalists committed themselves to the development of advanced weapons as carry5 when they established the Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology. The Institute consists of four researchnuclear,and electronics.
Missile Proorom
This program Is still in its infancy, hut isslow but gradual progress. The ROC efforts appear to lie directed primarily towardshort rangeantiship missile that can be used offensively as well as defensively.
The HOC has Imlll and Is cspandingupport of iu missile program. They include test facilities at theissile test range on tho southeasternolid propellant production plant, and several missile component production plants tliat are in varying stage* of construction.
The HOC apparently obtained sufficientdata anddevelop its own version of the CabricTMark II antiship missile, which it calls the Drone Bee. rsetween5 andhe HOC test flew this missileimes, but more than half of them were failures. The last three test flights in late April failed.Is developing Ihe Drone Bee as an antiship weapon to counter PRC naval craft equipped with the Stys missile as well as for defense againstforces. The Drone Bee is suitable fur use on ships or from shore insulUtions, Taiwan hopes to complete testing on the Drone Bee by ihe endhen production is scheduled to begin. The ROC plans lo producef the missiles.
The Drone Bee l> also serving the important function of providing the Nationalists esrpetiencc in the development of missiles. The ROC also has plans to build other lurfBce-to-surface missiles and one of them will be capable nf hitting targets on the mainland from launch sites on Taiwan.
ortedlym rangemissile, called tbe Green Bee. in the planning slice. This missile is eipeetcd to carrym paylond- The Creen Bee cannot reach the mainland from Taiwan, but there ore reports that it will eventually be deployed on the offshoreThe IIOC considers the Creen Bee as an intermediate step towards the developmenturface-to-surface missile that willange ofilometers. From Taiwan, that missile would he capable of hitting targets more thanhundred kilometers deep in the PRC.
sclent bis have abo worked on aartillery-type rockets called Working Beeshighpi calve and chemical enrheadsilometers. In addition, the ROC hasonire-guided antitankbased on the Sovietagger, which itfrom "nuthof theystem and perhapsThh program has temporarily
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Missile Technicians
The scientists and technicians assigned to the various missile projects appear lo be very capable and in the majority of cases, well trained, mostly in US iristitutioro. These people, however, are largely theoretically oriented and lack technical training and experience. The ROC has recognized thb problemrying to correct it by training programs.
The ROC scientists started out wllh noilc design or dc^tiopment experience, and thiswill have to be acquired on the fob. Within the next two to three years, they willbe able lo work out most of their problems, while they acquire the necessary experience. It seems likely that development nf the moremissiles, even with outside help, will require longc times than allowed by present schedules.
Foreign Technology
As ROC scientists try to develop larger rocket motors, ihey will have to rely more onassistance. Specific areas Include ablative matc-rinls. ease bonding and insulation technlqiiea, high strength materials, and precision controlAll nf these types of technology are. however, availableumber of other countries.
So far, the ROC has been quite successful in acquiring the necessary equipment to carry on the development of their smallaiwan nbo seems to have acquired the minimumto develop nn Inertia) guidancefor the Creen Bee missile, ind possibly form mkslle a* well. Tlie Nationalists do not, hrrwrver, have sufficient solid-propeltantcapability to produce grains form missile. Ihey may abo have crouble producing the grain for the Creen Bee if they do not obtain extra mixing equlpmsnt, and the ROC may have trouble acquiring such equipment if the US denies It an nport license for the larger equipment.
Nuclear Program
The ROC has been conducting thestudies and experimentation in nuclearnnd high explosive technology that arcfor It touclear device. The leader ol the research team conducting these studies believes, however, lhat Premier Chiang Ching-Uo would not order the fafjricatsOnuclear device7 at the earliest, and then only if the ROC fek it was nec*nttary for Its survival.ot likely that the ROC will actually beosition to lake that step until later thb decade. In any event,of nuclear materials to fabrication of andevice would entail violation or abrogation of IAEA safegiiardi. Detection ofiolation could lead to sanctions by nuclear suppliers. These sanctions would prolsably take the form of Inter-ruprJon of deliveries of nuclear materials andthb could seriously interfere with Taiwan's civil nuclear program, which depends on foreign sources for enriched uranium. Sanctions would not materially affect Ihe weapons program, because the ROC already has enough fuel for the researchfor many years. I
A first device could be delivered only bymeans orarge transport aircraft such.rude nuclear device has beenlt would take the ROC al least twoyears touclear weapon small enough to be carried externallyacticalNuclear warheads stritahlc for use with tbe surface-to-surface mbsiles now In the planning stage or under development would require many more years to develop.
The Nationalist Chinese have steadily ex-ponded their facilities at the Institute of Nuclear Energy Research while attempting to obtainones sucheavy water production plantomplete nuclear fuel cycle. The main facility at the Iml.liitr is the Taiwan research reactorueled with nahtrnl uranium and moderated with
heavy water. When operating under averagethis reactor produces aboutilogramsgrade* plutonJvm per year. Theobtainedwith fuel for more
than two full core' loadings and heavy water. The ROC ahoons of uranium metal from South Africa; thisabricated at theInto fuel elements for Ihc reactor.
order to use the plutonium producedreactor touclear device, theChinese must separate ihe plutoniumspent fuel.3 the US pressuredontractilot-scale fuelfacility that It had signet |
The ROC ll currently ncgottat-
!ngfor the procurenient of
the components and technical designilot reprocessing plant. Acquisition ofacility would provide Taiwan with the capability to obtain sufficient plutoniumignificant nuclearprogram.
very small reprocessing, laboratory hasbeen completed at the Institute. It willscientists useful training and practicalhut It is not capable of separatingof plutonium. Meanwhile, theresporadic reports and some physicalsmall amounts of fuel from the reactor arereprocessed at other hot laboratories tobut the amounts recovered wouldsmall.
Nuclear Weaponi
he ROC will not be able to develop aweapons capability until significant quantities of plutonium are available. The ROC may beto acquire tho capability to developew lest devices rather than weapons. The work at the Institute appears to be directed at the basic theoretical design and research required for such devices,
4roup of ROCscientists reportedly uted computer facilities at the Chung-Shan Institute of Science andto conduct cstemive Ihecevticallnt generation nuclear device.were carried out.he areas of high ei plosives. Shockwaves, andsystems. Problems were encountered In tbebut these were solved ond the program wasuccess inhe success of this design work probably led to Ihestatement to the press lost fall that the ROC now had the capability to manufacture nuclear weapons.
Nuclear Scientists
The ROC has sufficient trained manpowt- to build and operate oil of tlie existing researchfor tho nuclear fuel cycle, hut may encounter difficulties If they build additional or largertouclear weapons program. The only problem area that has been specificallyso farack of trained reactor operaton for future nuclear power plants. By the lime these plants or orry other nuclear facilities arc completed, however, the ROC should be able to train enough operators and technicians.
Most top nuclear scientists In the ROCtheir formal education and training fa) US schools. Many have store returned lo the US,France, and Israel for spcdalu-ed training hi various aspects of nuck-ar science engineering.
Nuclear course* now being taught on Taiwan at the Tsing-Hua University have alreadythe ROC nuclear program.8or example,cientists received advancedrees In nuclear physics, nuclearnnd .meteor engineering. These students formed the nucleus of the ROC nuclear research program. The Institute of Nuclear Energy Research is the only mn|or organisation In Ihc ROC that does work In the nircicar field. It employseople. They ore relatively well qualified and have excellent facilities lo work with.
E'ec'ro-'ei
he only electronic* cqulpervcnt that the ROC currently produce! In quantity for the armed force*ANield radios, which are crmroduocd underUS license. Thereodem electronics Industry on Taiwan; however, relatively little of Its technology Is suitable for manufacturing the sophlstlcfttcd equipment needed by the military.
he ROC Is encouraging commercial firms to produce military electronics systems andBefore the com ponies can do so. however, they will have toarge amounts nf capital
lo build and equip modem plants. The commercial firms lack experience In manufacturing equipment for the military and probably will bo slow tocapital lo such enterprises.
OC research and development work onIs fust beginning. The Nationalists willheavily on foreign sources for technical data and assistance to develop and build sophisticated military equipment such as radars, avionics, and missile guidance systems. Even with advanced foreign technology and participation byfirms on Taiwan, the ROC will probably not be able to meet the requirements of tlie armed forces for atecade.
SeCKT
Original document.
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