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Interagency Intelligence Memorandum
Prospects for Arms Production and Development in tbe Republic of China
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prospects for arms production and development in the republic of china
CONCLUSIONS
The Republic of China would prefer to rely on the US for military assistance, but has apparently concluded that it can no longer count on doing so indefinitely. Totrong defense posture, the government is attempting to expand domestic arms production,new weapons systems, and find other sources of modemand advanced technology.
As these programs advance, tbe Nationalists should be able to reduce further their dependence on the US.
They will continue to be heavily dependent oo foreign sources for modern weaponry.
The ROC appears to have little prospect of becomingin arms production within the next decade.
The major problem the government faces in manufacturingarms, munitions, and spare parts is the lack of defense industries similar to those in the US and other advanced countries.
of its reliance on the US, the ROC has never developed the high technologies and skills necessary for manufacturing arms and military suppliesommercial basis.
Dwmoruxlum has betaointly bv tbo Central Intelligence Ateooy aod Ae Detenu IntetU&tttce Agency ud coordtoated with the Bureaa of lfitalUceoor and Research of the DepaiOwM of State.
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relatively small amounts of weapons and munitions nowproduced on Taiwan come from military armaments plants and research centers. The facilities are not capable ofthese items in large quantities.
increase production, the government is currentlycommercial companies to expand their product lines toweapons, munitions, and spare parts.
The corporations have the skilled manpower and much of the technology needed to produce many military items. They will, however, require technical assistance, specialized equipment, and technologies to manufacture large weapons such as tanks and artillery and sophisticated electronics such as radars.
Commercial companies will probably be rehictant to commit large amounts of capital until they have gained experience in producing weapons for government and foreign markets.
Thus, while the potential exists on Taiwan for an expanding arms industry, growth in this field Is likely to be slow initially.
The ROC has found several countries outside the US that areto sell arms and technology. The procurement of advancedfrom these sources will, however, create additional problems for the government.
Nationalists probably would have difficulty maintainingweapons systems with which they are unfamiliar.
problem could be severe if the ROC had to rely on foreign suppliers for critical spare parts. For this as well as economic reasons, the government is seeking licenses to manufacture most items on Taiwan.
The ROC appears to be achieving some success in its nuclear,and chemical warfare programs, although none of these programs will contribute significantly to Nationalist military capabilities for at least several years.
The ROC is attempting to develop the capability to fabricate nuclear devices. If the ROC violates safeguard agreements, it probably could develop the capability and acquire the materials torude nuclear device in three to four years.
The ROC program to develop short range surface-to-surfaceis still in its infancy. The Nationalists obtained assistance from Israel and have begun producing limited numbers ofantiship missiles based on the Gabriel Markallistic
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US has been the principal supplier of inns and military equipment for the Republic of China since the Nationalist! were forced tofrom the mainland someears ago. But that is changing. In recenthe US has sharply reduced its military presence in Asia and continued to mote ahead In its efforts to normalize relations with the People's Republic of China; the US has in fact been cutting back its military assistance to Taiwan.
These developments have raised serious doubts in Taipei about the long-term reliability of the USajor source of weapons and supplies. The ROC dearly would prefer te rely en tbe US for military assistance, but has apparently concluded that it can no longer count on doing so indefinitely.
In an attempt to maintain its defense posture andredible military deterrence, the ROC is attempting to become mere self-reliant by expanding its own capacities for developing and manufacturing weapon systems- In addition. Taipei is actively seeking new sources from which it can procure advanced weapons and technology.
Domestic Arms Production
ROC alreadyarietyand munitions in limited quantitiesair, ground, and naval forces. Formanufactures infantry weapons suchmachinem howitzers, recoillcss rifles, antitank rockets, land mines, hand grenades, explosives, and munitions. In addition, the ROC produces military vehicles such os jeeps and trucks and communications equipment
ost items now being manufactured in Taiwan are copies of US-designed weapons and manykey components made in the US. The Only non-US weapon that is produced in significant quantities is4 rifle
I The ROCrpranj to purer.aw plants
aod equipment so tint It can expand its production of ground forces equipment and munitions. Taiwan also plans to begin producing larger artillery pieces iuthm guns and liowltrcis.
fl. The ROC aircraft industries aho are expandroductionwith the US, Taiwan last year started assemblingE fighter. Taiwan manufactures some parts forE. but make components of the aircraft such as avionics, fee esupnet, and weapons systems are produced in the US The ROC has already built aboutBi and plam tootalf the aircraft within the nest tee years. Tbe ROC has requested approval to builds-4aiwan assembledrainers, but production has slowed and may be ending. The ROC is also ceprodudng theelicopter under license toUS. More
thanof the UH-lHs have beenoUlre to be completed under the contract Aircraft repair and maintenance facilities onare capable of servicing virtually all aircraft now fn the ROC inventory.
helso making progress ia improving its navy, although it still relies heavily on the US-Taiwan manufactures small patrol boats and service craft aod is modernizing the older ships provided by the US. The major emphasis has been onold naval ships with more modem weapons. For example, the ROC has installed the US-made Sea Chaparral surface-to-air missile systems on four destroyers. Three other destroyers are being equipped with the US-designed Asrocrocket system, but the ROC lacks trained personnel to maintain tbe Asroc equipment
ith US assistance, the ROC is also moving ahead with plans to begin construction on larger naval ships. Taiwan recentlyontractS firm to build two multi-mission patrol ships, which will be armed with surface-to-surface missiles. The first unit is being built ln the US and should bc completed next year; the second ship will be constructed in Taiwan using materials and technical assistance provided by (he USIhe ROC plans to buildf the patrol ships; most are to be assembled at shipyards in Taiwan.
shipyards have demonstrated theto handle maintenance and major repairnaval vessels. The Nationalist Chinese areoverhauling the two submarines the USfor trauiiog. This is the first time theoverhauled submarines on its own. Theresome delays in this program, but one ofshould be completed this spring.
Overseas Markets
ROC isajor supplier of armsnot likely to become one in the near future.has provided several million rounds ofammunition to the Piulippincs andby training some pilots. Ateam consisting of fourechnicians is now in Jordan to assist Inof pilots and maintenanceircraft
II- There is no evidence that Taiwan hassignificant amounts of weapons or munitions to any country. Recent reporting does suggest that thereeady market especially in Southeast Asia for the conventional arms, munitions, andsupplies that Taiwan manufactures or is now developing.
Indonesia. Singapore, Malaysia, and the Philippines have approached Taipei aboutmilitary equipment. Several countrieshave expressed interest in the lurboprop trainer that Taiwan is currently developing, and Singapore has asked about buyingE fighters. Any sales of co produced weapons would require US approval.
Most of Taiwan's arms and munitions and mditary hardware is produced at military research and armament plants and are not yet available in sufficient quantities to export These facilities are expanding their capabilities to produce weapons systems, but they cannot meet the needs of the ROC armed forces,
Taipei appears to recognize this problem and is actively encouraging commercial companies to enter the field and manufacture arms, munitions, and military supplies. The governmentilitary products exhibition in Taipei onhe exhibit reportedly is directed at promoting self-suffleiency through cooperation between the government and private firms- Moretems have been displayed but onlyr so are locally manufactured. Most of the items represent US parts aod components that the government would bice to get comoierciat companies to
The ROC has sent delegations to numerous countries to discuss the possibility of Taiwanmilitary hardware and assistance. Taipei is apparently trying to drum up business so that it can demonstrate to the commercial companies that therearket overseas for any surplus weapons and military supplies that they produce. In addition, Taipei probably sees internationaladvantages in developing domestic weapons production for sales overseas.
The one field io which the ROC possesses the potential toajor source for foreign
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Is chemical warfare. Taiwan has aadvanced chpmicid anon) program, andcountries have leportedly approached itto purchase agents and technology. Taiwan, however, hastrict policy that under no circumstances will it export chemical agents or related technology. 'Iha HOCis on technology and assistance provided by[
and this policy may well have been one of thein the original agreement that Taiwan signed withmissiles and/or related technology and is attempting to get the following systems:
Country Arms
he ROC has adueved limited success ie recent years finding new sources for weapons and technology, f
Prospects for Third-Country Arms
At the present time, Taiwan can only get some of the weapons, technology, and equipment that it seeks from countries other than the US.of their reUttorn with the PRC, severalhave already refused to sell arms to Taiwan, bat others have continued toillingness to sell weapons and military hardware to the ROC.
Taiwan reportedly considers itsolfime-bind and believes that it must hurry if It Is to get the moclern weapons and techno logy that it seeks. The ROC appears to he concerned that additional sources of tmhtary hardware wtO dry up as other countries follow the US lead and move to improve that ties with the PRC.
Of lira countries from which Taiwan bas sought arms, only Israel is likely to remaine> Kable source well into the future, f"
he ROC has sought to obtain ai3itional weapons, equipment, and technology from these and other countries, but no deals have beenso far. Taiwan is particularly interested in
2ft France, Italy, West Germany, and the UK are receptive to selling weapons, equipment, and technology to the ROC, but all of them probably would put restrictions on the types of hardware that they would provide. Both the UK and France have sold aircraft and technology to the PRC, and they are unlikely to risk losing this market by selling advanced aircraft to the ROCT
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rrrs approval ana encouragesnetrt ote, by third ecu: tries mightOOBan ride these and other weapons and tec boo logy to Taiwan.
Research and Development
addition to tbe weapons that it isor obtaining from foreign sources,is conducting research and developmenta variety of weapons and equipment Theprogramigh priority; Taiwan ts alsowork on aircraft, tanks, artillery, munitions,warfare.
Nii.or.ihsi Chinese are developingon theirtrainers and aThe turboprop trainer prototype,flew inas progressed slowly.of thai trainer binges largely on therights to cop rod vice the US-made gasengine; the US has recently agreed toof the engines. Tht transport Is scheduledflight testing in two years,etIs planned for construction byarge pool of experiencedtechnicians, but they have bad relativelyand reaearcb training For this reason,will be hard pressed to produce anwithout massive technical assistanceUS or other countries
he Natlonabsts committed thermelvos to tbe( advanced weapons at early5 when they established the Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology The institute consists of four researchnuclear,and electronics.
Missile Program
This program is still In its infancy, but isslow but gradual progress. The ROC efforts appear to be directed primarily towardshort range surface-to-surface aiitislup missile that can bemnvcly as well as
The ROC has built and is expanding facilities in support ol Its missile program. Tbey include test larillUcs at theissile tost range on die southeasternolid propellant production plant, and scveial missile component production plants that are In varying stages of construction
he ROC apparently obtained sufficientdata anddevelopversion of the Gabriel Mark ii unoshipit calls the Drone Bee. Betweenhe ROC test flew this missilebut muro than half of them werelost three test flights in late April tailed.is developing tht Drone Bee as anto counter PRC naval craft equippedStyx missile as well as for defense againstforces. The Drone Bee is suitable for useor from shore installations. Taiwan hopestesting on the Drone Bee by the endwhencheduled to beginplans to producef tlte missiles.
he Drone Bee is also serving the important function of providing the Nationalists experience in the development of missiles. The ROC alio has plans to build other Surface-to-surface mtailv* and one of tbem wiO be capable of hitting targets on the mainland from launch sites on Taiwan.
aiwan reportedlym rangemissile, called the Green Bee, to the planning stage. This missile is earpeeted to carrym payload. The Green Bee cannot reach the mainland from Taiwan, but there are reports that it will eventually be deployed on the offshoreThe ROC considers theee as an intermediate step towards the developmenturface-to-surface missile that willange ofilometers Krom Taiwan, that missile would be capable of hitting targets more than sev-eral hundred kilometers deep in the PRC.
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HOC tcientisb have also workederies of artillery-type rockets called Working Decs which carry high explosive and chernicaJ warheads as far asilometers In addition, tbe HOC has done research oaoe-guided antitank mis sue based on the Sovietagger, which itfrom South Vietnamprovided an analysis o( theystem and perhaps some components. This program has temporarily been shelved.
Missile Technicians
he scientists and technicians assigned to the various nussile projects appear to be very capable aad in the majority of cases, well trained, mostly in US institutions. These people, however, are largely theoretically oriented and lark technical training and experience. The ROC has recogniaed this problem and is trying to correct It by training programs.
he ROC scientists started out with nodesign or development experience, and thiswill have to be acquired on the fob. Within the nest two to three years, they wH]be able to work out most of their problems, while they acquire the necessary experir-nce. It seems likely dial development of the moremissiles, even with outside lielp, will require longer times than allowed by present schedules.
Foreign Technology
As ROC scientists try to develop larger locket motors, they will have to refy more onassistance Specific areas include ablativecase bonding and insulation techniques, high strength materials, and precision controlAll of these types of technology are, however, availableumber of other countries,
So far, the ROC has been quite successful in acquiring the necessary equipment to carry on the development of their small missiles. Taiwan also seems to have acquired (be minimumnecessary to develop an inertial jriudanrelor the Green Bee missile, and possibly foem missile as weQ. The Nationalists do not, however, have sufficient solid-prnpellant rsroduc-tion capability to produce grains form missile. They may abo have trouble producing the grain for the Green Bee if they do not obtain extra mixing cnuifjment, and tbe ROC may have trouble acquiring such equipment if the US denies it an export license for tbe larger equipment.
Nuclear Program
The ROC has been conductins thestudies and experimentation in nuclearand high explosive technology that orefor It touclear device. The leader of the research team conducting these studies believes, however, that Premier Chiang Chiog-koo would not cedes the fabricationuclear device7 at the earliest, and then only if the ROC felt it wai necessary forurvival, ll ii not hiely that the ROC will actually beosition to take that step until later this decade. In any event,of nuclear materials to fabrication ol andevice would entail violation er abrogation of IAEA safeguards. Detection ofiolation could lead to sanctions by nuclear suppliers These sanctions would probably take the form of Inter-roptJon of deliveries of nuclear mater tab aodthis could serxmsly interfere with Taiwan's civil nuclear program, which depends on foreign sources for tnrlched uranium. Sanctions would not materially effect the weapons program, because the ROC already has enough fuel for the researchfor many years.
A first device could be delivered only bymeans orarge transport aircraft suchrude nuclear eLnic*oit would take tbe ROC at least twoyears touclearcapon small enough to be carried externallyacticalNuclear warheads suitable for use with the surface- to- surf ace missiles now in the planning stage or under development would require many more years to develop.
The Nationalist Chinese have steadilytheir facilities at the Institute of Nuclear Energy Research while attempting to obtainones sucheavy water production plantomplete nuclear fud cyde. The main facility at the Institute is the Taiwan research reactor which ii fueled xith natural uraniumt.-ilh
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water. When operating onder averagetha reactor produces aboutilogramsgrade" plutonium per year. Theobtainedwith fuel for more
(ban two full COreloacUhgs and heavy water The ROC also purchased IBS tons of uranium metal from South Africa, this metal is fabricated at theInto fuel elements for the reactor.
order to use the plutonium producedreactor touclear device, theChinese must separate tbe plutoniumspent fuel-3 tbe US pressuredontractilot scale fuelfacility that it had signed with
Icotnrauvk The ROC is currently rsegotjat-ing with a[ pmspaoy for the procuremeot of tho components and technical designilot reprocessing plant. Acquisition ofacility would provide Taiwan with the capability to obtain sufficient plutoniumignificant nuclearprogram.
very small reprocessing laboratory hasbeen completed at the Institute, It willscientists useful training and practicalbut it Is not capable of separatingof plutonium. Meanwhile, theresporadic reports and some physicalsmall amounts of fuel from the reactor arereprocessed at other hot laboratories tobut the amounts recovered wouldsmall.
Nuclear Weapons
he ROC will not be able to develop aweapons capability until sispufieant quantities of plutonium are available. The ROC may beto acquire the capability to develop and pro duceew rest devices rather than weapons Tbe work at tbe Insntute appears to be directed at tho basic theoretical design and research required for such devices.
4roup of ROCscientists reportedly used computer facilities at the Chung-Shan Institute of Science andto conduct extensive theoreticalirst generation nuclear device. Es peri meats were carried out presumably in the areas of high explosives, Shockwaves, andsystem* Probsecns were erscountered In thebut these were solvnd and the program wasuccess Inhe success of this design work probably led to thestatement to the press last fall that the ROC now bad the capability to manufacture nuclear weapons.
Nuclear Scientists
The ROC has sufficient trained manpower to build and operate all of the existing researchfor the nuclear fuel cycle, but may encounter difficulties if they build additional or larger faclli tics louclear weapons program. The only problem area tbat has been specificallyso farack of trained reactor operators for future nuclear power plants. By the time these plants ot any other nuclear facilities are completed, however, the ROC should bc able to train enough operators and tcchniciaDs
Most top nuclear scientist* in the ROCtheir formal education and training in US schools. Many have since returned to tbe US,France, and Israel for specialized training in vaiious aspects of nuclear science ens^neerlng.
Nuclear courses now being taught on Taiwan at the Tung-Hua University have alreadythe ROC nuclear program.8or example,cientists received advanced degrees in nuclear physics, nuclearand nuclear engineering. These students formed the uucleus of the ROC nuclear research program. The Institute of Nuclear Energy Research is the only mayor orgaaiiation in the ROC that does work In the nuclear field. It employseople. They are relatively well qualified and have excellent facilities to work witfa-
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Electronics
The only electronic* equipment that the ROC currcotly produces la quantity for the armed force* are ANield radios, which are coproducedS ticeose. Thereodern electTOrrics industry on Taiwan; however, relatively little of its technology is suitable for manufacturing the sopliisb'cated equipment needed by the military.
The ROC is encouraging commercial firms to produce military electroDics systems andBefore the companies can do so. however, they will have to invest large amounts of capital
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build and equip modem plants. Tbe commercial firms lack experience in manufacturing equipment for tbe military and probably will be slow tocapital to such enterprises.
OC research and development work onis just beginning. The Nan'onahsts willheavily on foreign sources for technical data
and assistance to develop and build sophisticated military equipment such as radars, avionics, and missile guidance systems. Even with advanced foreign technology and participation byfirms on Taiwan, the ROC will probably not be able to meet the requirements of the armed forces for atecade.
Original document.
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