Research Study
Tbe Soviet Foreign Policy Apparatus
TROM una4
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE OFFICE OF POLITICAL RESEARCH
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THE SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY APPARATUS
by
NOTE: Other CIA office* were consulted during the preparation of this paper. The author is grateful for the many useful suggestions which were received, although the responsibility for the Further coarants will be welcomed by the author
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. THE POLITBURO AND SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY
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II. THE ROLE OF PARTY ORGANIZATIONS IN SOREICNCENTRAL COMMITTEE SECRETARIAT ANDDEPARTMENTS 10
III. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS 17
IV. COMMITTEE OF STATE SECURITY (KGB) 22
V. ACADEMY OF SCIENCES' FOREIGN AFFAIRS RESEARCH
VI. THE FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY-MAKING.
HOTS
g of the political and organitattonal context of Soviet fore ign pol icy^aking,*
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Significant changes in the rule, scope, and structure of the foreign policy apparatus under the Brezhnev regime have been stimulated by the expansion of Soviet external relations, che growing interdependence of foreign and domestic policy, and the increased concern for improving the effectiveness of policy-making machinery. Prior to theore activist phase in Soviet diplomacy was initiated under the rubric of the* "peaceoreign policyelatively secondary and dependent place in the overall policy-making process* Since then it hasoaition of fundamental importance with the reault that the foreign policy-making process haa becone relatively more instiCu-tionslized and less ad hoc than in the past.
This study does not deal in depth with tho role ol thr Sovicj
Uitarv in foreign policy-making
PRINCIPAL JUDGMENTS
A distinct trend toward greater rationaliration and professional!-cation has marked the Soviet foreign policy process over the past decade. The resulture formally defined policy-making system in which lines of authority are clearer and procedures more regularized* In particular, coordination mechanisms have been strengthened, the role of specialized staffs and foreign affairs experts has increaeeu, conventional sources of information have been improved while new analytical capabilities have been developed, and short- and long-range policy planning has been upgraded. Theseogical result of the current regime's commitmentusiness-like approach to policy-making, also reflect the So/ietecognition that foreign policy nowajor part of its activity, even affectingonsiderable extent the domestic policies and priorities with which it has long been oncerned.
The key element in the clarification of the lines ofauthority has been Brezhnev's ascendancy in foreign affairs.1 he has assumed considerable authority for routine as well as crisis-situation decisions. All the major foreign affairshave been put under his command as Oenerai Secretary, "head" of che Politburo, and Chairman of the USSR Defense Council. Brezhnev's personal staffentral role in coordinating activities of various lower-level organizations involved in policy formulation andand in filtering incoming information required wy Brezhnev.
The Politburohole, and Brezhnev's senior colleagues in particular, nonetheless, are informed, consulted, and ultimately must approve decisions on major foreign policy questions. Ami despite the partial centralization of power under Brezhnev, various important foreign policy tasks remain the province of numerous Party, government, and non-official inst itut ions, Indeed. increased part ic ipation in policy-makingider circle of institutions and individuals allmark of tho Brezhnev era.
The elevation of Foreign Minister Crooyko to the Politburothat the relationship between Party and government institutions
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at the apex of the decision-making process io approximately equal. However, at lower levels the Central Committee's International and Bloc Department* appear toore decisive role than the Ministry of Foreign Affairsven though foreign policy isovernmentaloreover, these Partyexercise general oversight over implementation of leadership decislona by the HFA and other non-Party institutions.
Changes in the role and structure of the Soviet foreign policy apparatua represent internal adaptation of the political system to the USSR's growing role in world affairs and the increased complexity of its foreign relations* The particular form that such changes have taken, however, is unique to the present regime and may disappear or be altered when Brezhnev leaves the scene. AnyParty leader may, after consolidating his personal authority, reshape the decision-making process to fit his own style and While such specific changes cannot be predicted, the trend toward increased institutionalization in Soviet foreigntranscending individual personalities and leadership changes, seems likely to be maintained over the long-term.
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I. THE POLITBURO AMD SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING
tslitburo Dcciaion-Haking. The Politburo of thoCentral Committee (CO makes final decisions on allmany aecondary foreign policy and diplomatic issues. of collective leadership as the normal pattern ofin the post-Stalin era has been reinforced byand procedures adopted by the present regime. Thewith the death of Marshal Crechko, comprised ofullcandidate members) plusC Secretaries who arc notregularly, usually weekly, to conaider the moatiaaucs on the basis of careful preparation andmaterials and policy recommendations at lower levels ofgovernment. Meetings sre also called on an ad hoc basiswith critical diplomatic developments^^
final agreements
during are"ihncv's3 visit Co the United State* and at the Brethnev-Ford talks in Vladivoatok in4 were submitted to the reat of the leadership for rstificstion shortly after these meetings were concluded.
The principle of collectivity is also carefully upheld in procedures for coordinating Politburo members' vinws and votes weekl
Politburo and Foreign Affairs. Traditionally an institution mainly concerned with domestic policy, duringhehaa becoms more actively and deeply involved in foreign affairs. According to snverol top Party leaders, it devote* as much aa hall its time to questions of foreign policy and diplomacy with which i' i* aometimes concernedaily basis.
In theory, all voting membersqual rights and responsibilities for determining policy decisions regardlesa of whether their collateral
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assignments in the Party or government involve foreign affairs. In practice, chenlarged focus on external relations and the demands of efficiency in decisionmaking haveivision of power and responsibility within the top leadership. The predominant influence over both routine, day-to-day decision-making and crisis management is wielded by Brezhnev personally, several other senior political figures, and the bureaucratic chieftain* who manage the key government national security hierarchies. The role of this "Inner cabinet" for foreign affairs is institutionalizedolitburo sub-committee for political-military affairs, the Defense Council.
Brezhnev's Since1 Brezhnev haa steadily and substantially enlarged his prerogatives both in fonmilating policy and conducting diplomacy, making himself in effect the USSR's primary foreign affairs official. Ath CPSU Congress, Brezhnev announced the "peace program" which sat out the general line of Soviet policy aimed at normalizing relations with the West. Shortly thereafter Western leaders were informed that the General Secretary had assumed personal command over Soviet relations with the United States and West Germany andolicy in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). Through his conduct of personal diplomacy at the summit level with foreign leaders, Brezhnev has actede facto state leader. 2 he has further legitimated his role as the USSR's lending statesman by signing inter-governmental treaties on the authority of his Party title.
The division of foreign policy activity among Brezhnev, Premier Kosygin, and President Podgorny, which was maintained51 as an expression of ^unuinc collectivity in foreign affairs, has been substantially affected by the reduction of the role of the latter two- Kosygin's position and by extension that of thein relation to the Party generally have declinedosygin had been the chief spokesman on relations and the main executor of diplomacyia the West. His roleA trendgreater involvement by non-Psrtyrend that was dramatically reversed by Brezhnev's assertion of his own and the Party's authority.
Brezhnev has aecurcd orgs.iirational support for hia foreign policy course by gaining control over the key components of the Party and government bureaucracies.
The Party's executive arm for managing foreign relations, the CC Secretariat and the foreign policy departments of the central Party apparatus, work in direct support of the General Secretary's office. The two CC Secretaries who manage these departments, Ponomarev and Katushcv, and their principal subordinates, report directly to Brezhnev.
Foreign Minister Gromyko and the Ministry of Foreignunder Brezhnev's guidance. This^mAmjipnfirraed bynd the close Brezhnev-Cromyko
working relationship dotes back to at
With the cooptation to full membership on the Politburo in3 of Foreign Minister G: -yfco, Defense Minister Grechko, and KGB headunctional unity between deciaion-making and policy implementation was achieved. These nominally government executives have been directly subordinate to Brezhnev, who has privatelyhem as "my ministers."
*AndTopovandidate member.
**Brezhnev haaull-time foreign policy advisor, A. M. Alckaandrov-Agentov, on hiB staffhe others hove been ajded
Brezhnev's Private Secretariat. For the dual purpose of managing the overall policy process and conducting diplomacy, Brezhnev hasighly qualified group of foreign policy advisora within his own private secretariat.** These advisors serveeneral substantive staff that not only provides the Ceneral Secretsry with information and counsel, but also appears to have wide-ranging authority for coordinating policy and negotiations. This auxiliary apparatus has undoubtedly enabled Brezhnev to reduce his dependence upon the regular
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Party and government foreign aifaira departments while simultaneously increasing his control over the latter.
As brethnev established his preeminent position in the ruling oligarchy, he accorded his advisors increasingly greater public recognition and political status. X. V, Rusakov, A- H. Aleksandrov-Agentov, and A. I. Biatov are identified in the press and official communiques by the title "assistant to the General Secretary of the CPSU." ourth aide, Ye. M. Samoteykin, holds the lesser rank of "consultant." The three assistants have relatively high positions In Party nnd state bodies.* All three also retain the high diplomatic ranks they acquired while serving in the Foreign Ministry.
In terms of prior organizational affiliation and substantive knowledge, the profiles of Brezhnev's aides complement one another andide range of experience in areas which au of centralin current Soviet foreign relations. Rusakov, who has served in both the Foreign Ministry and the CC department for Bloc relations, is Brezhnev's top expert on Eastern Europe and China. areer foreign service officer before he joined Brezhnev's staff, Aleksandrov-Agentov handles general East-West relations, American affairs, and perhaps arm* control issues as well. In addition, heole in German affairs. Blstov, like Rusakov, has worked in both the diplomatic corps and in the CC; he is regarded as an authority on Germany (Ent and Wesi) and France and continues to cover both Bloc and non-Bloc affairs- also csrae out of the Foreign Ministry where he concentrated on Finland and the Scandinavian countries- Since joining Brezhnev's secretariat, he has expanded his portfolio to include Kiddle Eastern and South Asian countries.
ull member of the Central Cosaittce, and Aleksandrov-Agentovandidate member. Both were elected to the USSR Supreme Soviet BUtov was elected to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet } and to the Party's Central Auditingon
The General Secretaryship and foreign Affairs. The post of General Secretary endows its incumbent with certain prerogatives not shared by other Party leaders, but It is not inegitimate
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basis for exercising control over foreign policy. Logically, the Chairman of the Council of Ministersetter claim on the job of foreignder, aa Kosgyin demonstrated3ut Brezhnev cannot simultaneously occupy both the top Party ano government executive positions becausean on doing so agreed to by the post-Khrushchev oligarchy. Hence, Brezhnev has tried to institutionalize the role of primary foreign affairs official by surrounding it with symbolic repreaentationa of legitimacy. During the period betweenh Party Congress1 and the springe sought the support of the rest of the leadership bydemonstrating first the promise and then the concrete success of the "peacehat is to say, Brezhnev's personal power and prestige wereunction of his foreign policy achievements.
A major sugmentation of Brezhnev's role occurred at the Plenum of the Central Committee inhen the entire Politburo including the senior members of the leadership joined in effusive encomiums ofand singled out Brezhnev's great personal contribution to it. Following the Plenum, Brezhnev's hand was perceptibly strengthened, and he showed considerably greater aclf-confidence and authority in the course of his subsequent visits to Bonn, Washington, and Paris where he waa received with all the honoraead of state.
ustained effort was begun to enhance Brezhnev' prestigeorld statesman and to embellish his image as anpeacemaker. His collected speeches on foreign policy were published in3econd, supplementaryeleased inignifying his role as the leadership's key spokesman, theoretician, and practitioner in this area. Other symbolic gestures, such as the awarding of the Lenin Peace Prise on May3 and the World Peaceold Medal inere part of this image-building process. This has continued more or less unabated in the press and other media.
The Politburo Seniors. Below Brezhnev thereore group of senior Politburo leaders who constitute an informal "inner group" and who carry more weight than their junior colleaguesroad
spectrum of policy issues, induing foreign affairs. Thia group includes Podgorny, Kosv?in, Suslov, and Kirilenko* Only the latter, who aerves as Brezhnev's second-in-command, can be considered anBrezhnev supporter. Despite his preeminent position within the leadership, Brezhnev doea not entirely dominate the policylargely because these senior leadera retain significantand collective power which actsimiting factor upon Brezhnev1 freedom In deciaion-making. Any major foreign policywould probably require the approval, or at least the acquiesence, of one or more members of this group in order to be adopted and implemented.
Toe Ministers. The promotions of Cromyko, Grechko, and Andropov to Che Politburo in3 should not be viewed as institutional representation of th^ir respective bureaucracies per sc so mucheflectioneir personal standing and Brezhnev's own political references. Allen had been working closely withJflrer.hnev in addition to regularly participating in itburo meetings for several years prior
At the asme time, this was the first major restructuring of the Politburo in many years, sad its broader organizational implications are not insignificant. The Politburo's foreign policy-makingwere certainly enhanced by the promotion of men with consider able technical ability and bureaucratic experience from advisory to decision-making roles. (Politburo membership has always been heavily weighted with Party politicians and administrators with little or no substantive experience in foreign affairs.) hishas allowed for more effective top-level coordination and integration of the various aspects of national security policy as well as of domestic and foreign policy.
*The Defense Council was recently and apparently for the first time openly identified in the Soviet military press- See Krasn^ya
Defense Council. Primary responsibility for national security policy-making ib lodged in the Defense Council.* Its members include
Brezhnev, who sets as chairman, rpdcernv. Kosygin, Ustinov,*.
e
g his death. Grech':o.
Chief of the General Kulikov any beermanent or ex officio member, and the General Staff reportedly acrvea aa the secretariat to the Defense Council.
The Defense Council's main purpose is to coordinate the various political, military, economic, and technical considerationsSoviet defense decision-making, and it frames policy positions which are usually submitted to the entire Politburo for final deliberation. In recent ycora it has assumed a larger role in foreign policy-making as well, especially as it relates to defense issues. Soviet SALT policy hasajor concern of the Defense Council, which also appears to be the USSR's key crisis-oanaSement> body and national command authoritv.
Middle Eaat Crisis,1
has been the CC S- tary responsible for overseeing the all-important defenae industrial aector of the Sovietong-time candidate oenber ti the Politburo, he was elevated lo voting Status ath CPSU Congreae. and aubsequcntly upon the death of Ha,.iiUi Crcchko, nancd Himaier ol Deicose.
<
rezhnev was clearly in charge throughout the events ot
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II. THE ROLE OF PARTY ORGANIZATIONS IN FOREIGN POLICY: THE
CENTRAL COMMITTEE SECRETARIAT ANO FOREIGN AFFAIRS DEPARTMENTS
The Secretariat. The permanent stafff the CC Secretariat is organized into functional departments which arc deeply involved in the formulation of policy and are responsible to members of the Secretariat for supervising every aapect of Soviet policy execution. All government ministries and other agencies are oubject to tho control of the Secretariat exercised through one or more of the Central Committee departments. The relevant foreign affairs departments arc the International Department, the Department for Liaiaon with Conszuniat and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries (or Bloc Department), and the Department for Cadres Abroad.
The Secretariat's role in the foreign policy process is pervaaivc It functions aaenerator of policy andupervisor of its implementation. On the bnaia of materialn prepared and coordinated
by the CC departments, the Secretaries formulate the agenda for the Politburo's weekly meetings. They also review inputs of information and/or recommendations from the Council of Ministers and otherorganizations and channel them into the decision-making process. Secondary issues which arise between regular Politburo sessions are coordinated among th* top leaders by the Secretary or Secretaries assigned specific competenceiven policy area. Once thehaaecision, the Secretariat ia responsible forand executingter, and later assessing how well it was carried out.
At least five of the current eleven CC Secretaries have either general or specific foreign affairs responsibilities:* Brezhnev, overall responsibilities; Suslov, general foreign relations with emphasis on ideology and international Communist affairs; Ponomarev, relations with non-ruling Communist Parties and relations with the West and Third World; Katuahev, Bloc relations and Asian Communist Party-states; and Ustinov, defense and defense industry questions. Politburo and Secretariat membership overlaps to form an interlocking directorate with respect to foreign policy-making. Three secretariesSuslov,irect voice in Politburo decision-making, Ponomarevandidate member, Katushsv does noteat on the Politburo, but he regularly attends its meetings.
*The specific responsibilities of the two secretaries added at the time ofh Congress in March-April have not been revealed. However, one of the two, in particular, K, V. Zimyanin has ain ideological-propaganda work and ia thus likely to have some foreign affaire role.
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THp Internet iona1 and Bloc Departments. The USSR maintains three types of relations with the outside world: tate" foreignelations with foreign Communistarty" foreignnd relations with socialiat parties, radical movements, and front organizations. Each type of foreign policy is conductedifferent level by ifferent means, but the individual strands of all three are ultimately joined together under the general supervision of the CC International
and Bloc Departments, These two departments are organized mainly along geographical linca. Together theii various sub-divisions coverentire Communist and non-Communist world, and theyarge foreign office in their organizational structure,
"Party" Foreign Policy: Relations with Foreign Communist Parties, Thereeneral division of labor between the two departments in which one, the Bloc Department, is primarilyfor relations with ruling Communist Parties (CPs) in Europe and Asia and the other, the International Department, for relations with non-ruling CPs in the West and Third World. But when relations with the international Communist movementholeuling and non-ruling CPs) are involved, departmental lines are blurred and the two function as one unit. Policy materials prepared in one department arc coordinated with the other, or they are jointly prepared by inter-departmental task forces. The two departments cooperate, for example, in the publicationlassifiedbulletin" dealing with current international affairs andorld Communist movement which is circulated within higher Party circles.
the term "foreign policy" refers exclusively to state relations,
"State" Foreign Policy. It was once believed on the basis of their overt activities that these two CC departments wpre responsible solely for inter-Party ties. In fact, analysis of their internal bureaucratic functions shows that they pUy an exceedingly important part in the formulation and implementation of "state" foreign policy* decisions. They serve in effect as the Party's "general staff" by formulating policy positions, devising overall strategy and Lactics, planning policy programs, and coordinating policy operations. In doing so, the two departments have clear precedence over theovernment executive body, the Council of Ministers, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
On the state level, the Bloc Department is charged withSoviet policy toward the East European and Asian Cot*muniat Party-states, including China, Albania, and Yugoslavia. Inter-governmental relations supervised by the Department fall into three baaic One of its key objectives is to coordinate Soviet and East European foreign policies to the maximum extent possible through the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Comnittee mechanism. While the purely military aspects of the Warsaw Pact alliance lie withia the USSR Defense Ministry's, when military and political issues Intersect the Bloc Department has the guiding role. Bilateral and multilateral economic relations within the Bloc, which are conducted through the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance, are managedpecial sector within the Department.
ime. More recent-
The lnternacepartment andoreign Pol Under the present CPSU leadership the CC International Department has functioned with clearer lines of responsibility than heretofore with regard to relations with the West and Japan, and it has contributed toeneral regularitation ol foreign policy dec
>aFl in policy formulation has been known for some ly, the Department and some of its leading officials hAve also begun toore overt role in the conduct of Soviet diplomacy.
ring the fifties and into the sixties this kepnrtment put much of its emphasis on policy toward the developing countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America because they were considered vitallyto overall revolutionary struggle against the Western industrial nat ioun,
Policy Formulation- One of the Department's key tasks is to provide the Politburo with advice, information, and estimates on foreign policy matters. Data for these purposes are drawn from the intelligence gathering and diplomatic reporting agencies as well as the Department's own resources. Its own funcionariea areassigned to Soviet embassies they alflo travel abroad on TOY.
In addition to country and area experts assigned to various geographic sectors, the Department relics on its own in-house "brain trust" organizedeparate consultants' sector. This sector also employs the services of outside consultants and experts who have regular staff positions in Soviet academic institutions and the Academy of Sciences' foreign policy "think
Preparation of intelligence analyses and estimatesonspart of the Soviet policy-formulation
q _ithe ^owMaterials from the CC apparatus to the Secretariat andPolitburo contains an indistinguishable combinationboth intelligence and policy recommendations. That is, the intelligence and policy-making functions are combined rather than separated as in most Western foreign-policy bureaucracies.
Policy Planning and Coordination. In addition to advisingon foreign policy, the CC staff performsfunctions with respect to the planning andpolicy in which it commands the full cooperation of Planning includes broad, long-term analysis ofconfronting the leadership, as opposed to the dailyduties of line officials. Coordination involvesline agencies and officials aimed at assuringin pursuit of established priorities and purposes.
C
s clear alsos known of the responsibilities of the organizations in Eastern Europe which are the counterparts of the Sovietand Bloc Departments. In one such case, the organization in question is charged with serving as the executive arm of the Politburo and CC Secretatriat in overseeing the preparation of policy programs with respect to all foreign countries and for obtaining the cooperation of other agencies in the implementation process.
ith the Foreign Ministry. The most direct form of Party control over policy implementation ie exercised through auperviaion of the Foreign Ministry by the CC Secretariat and its two foreign affairs departments, ouch in the same manner, for example, in which the CC Agriculture Department overseen theof Agriculture. Theae Party organa cannot, of course,the detailed technical work of the MFA, but the evidence indicates that there is continuous coordination between Party and government organizations and personnel. Such coordination ueually involves lateral contact between deputy chiefs, or in some cases heads of sectors, in the International and Bloc Departments, and deputy foreign miniaters. When major policy iasuea arc involved, the line of communications runs between the appropriate CC(Ponomarev or Katushcv) and Foreign Minister Gromyko.
However, Cromyko's elevation to the Politburo, which putsrank above Ponomarev and two ranks above Katuahev, and hisrelationship with Brezhnev raises the possibility that heand his Ministryhole have become somewhat moreof cloac CC supervision in the name way in which they havefrom day-to-day oversight by Kosygin and the Council of There is some evidence to show that, while the Ministry isautonomousis the Party apparatus, regularhas gradually shifted from the CC to Brezhnev'sat least on major policy questions. A
recently stated, however, that although Gromyko can make ^ noent decisions on some issues, such decisions must still be cleared through the Secretariat and the CC before final deliberation by the Politburo.
There is reason to believe that the CC foreign departments may also have responsibility for approving the Foreign Ministry's yearly work program for its headquarters' operations and embassies and consulates, for reviewing the discussions of its governing body, the Collegium, and for coordinating policy statements msde publicly or through diplomatic channels. This ia the case, at least, in several Eaat European countries.
Support for Brezhnev and Detente, The International Department has begun toore important role in Soviet state relations in
. Several non-Communirt countries maintain contact with CC functionaries through their embassies in Moscow. More important. Pono-raarev's diplomatic activities have expanded substantially in recent years. The pattern of his contactsndicatestime spent with foroign ministers, premiers, vice presidents, and presidents of both Western and Third World countries. Wearing his hat as Chairman of the Foreigu Affairs Commission of the Supreme Soviet Council of Nationalities, Ponomarev.led the first Soviet parliamentary delegation to the United9o sound out Congrco-sional attitudes toward detente. ear later he was host to Senate and House delegations during their return visits to the USSR.
Both Ponomarev and his deputies have been observed workingsupport of Brezhnev, The deputy chiefs of thearc very important figures in the Soviet foreignbecause theyore direct channel to thereater share in shaping policy than do theircounterparts, the deputy foreign ministers. Thechief, V. V. Zagladin,ase in point.3 heBrezhnev abroad on several state visits /indservedadvisor to the General Secretary during meetings with foreignin the USSR. fcj
Intcrnotionn1 Department As An Internalionnl Actor. The Interneelonal Department does not, of course, maintain officialrelations with foreign governments; that is the Foreignusiness. Nevertheless, it has at its disposalariety of mechanisms through which it can exert its influence abroad and support Soviet oreign policy bv non-diplomatic and covert meant. Hem ion hasbeen made ol ties to pro-Moscow CPs in non-Coawmtst countries, which the Department trains, funds, and gives guidance to, and of the practice of stationing functionaries in Soviet embassies.
An entire sector in the Department is involved in directing the activities of international front groups and organiiathich are aimed ot attracting both Communist andupport fotr
As detente hns gathered momentum, the Department has attempted to revive the "united front from above" tactic of forging relations with the leaderships of the major European aocialiat and social democratic parties. Host notable have been Ponomarev's and Zagladin efforts since3 to eatablish an ongoing party-to-party dialogue between the CPSU and the German Social Democratic Party to include discussion of diplomatic questions.
Det>artment for Cadres Abroad. In addition to it* directof policy and administration, the CC Secretariatariety of controla over Soviet foreign service personnel. pecia CC Department for Cadrea Abroad clears personnel appointments and promotions, conducta Party political and organizational worn,career training, and evaluates both the profeaaional and psycho" logical qualities of these personnel* For these purposes, the Department maintains its own representatives in the Foreign Ministry* headquarters and in some, if not all, missions abroad. It hasincreased in staff sice and responsibility in recent yearswith the expansion of Soviet foreign relations.
Ill, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is not in charge of foreign poli but only diplomacy. The role of diplomacy in Soviet relations with the outside world has alwaysariable,onstant, and
subject to fluctuations over time. Today, however, the business oftreaties, other legal agreements,conferences andconsidered serious business. esult, the Ministry's expertise and organizational mission have become more relevant to the implementation of foreign policy, and it professional role has been enhanced considerably. This isevident in Gromyko's rise in status and in internal changes in the Ministry's staffing and structure.
Gromyko. The Soviet Foreign Minister's role is largely aof his personal relationshipthe top Party leader, who is also usually the chief architect of foreign policy. Whentook charge ox* Soviet foreign policy, he bypassed the Ministry completely and in doing so he frequently went out of his way to belittle Gromyko personally. Brezhnev, on the other hand, has assignedrominent place in the overall process nf fornu-jir inir And implementing foreign policy.
Under Brezhnev the increased concentration of foreign policy powers in the hands of the top Party leader has been accompanied by an increase inForeign Minister's authority. , Tor example, Brezhnev made Gromyko his personal representative in charge of the preliminary talks with Bonn's ambassador to Moscow and the subsequent protracted negotiations with Chancellor Brandt's foreign policy advisor that led up to the Soviet-German treaty of Since that time, Gromyko has actedimilar capacityumber of important occasions. He apparently has some degree of authority, albeit limited, to conduct negotiations and make initial decisions on his own.
Gromyko's elevation to the Politburo3nique event which recorded his increasingly important role in Soviet foreign policy. The productureaucratic career, he is the first
foreign minister to be coopted into the Politburo on the strength of his professional accomplishments rather thanolitical figure.
Party Efforts to Improve the Foreign Ministry's Operations. By the late sixties it was clear to the Soviet leadership that the Foreign Ministry, until then one of the most enervated of Soviet institutions, had to be infused with new content and purpoae. On orders from the7 CC plenum, the Department for Cadres Abroadajor study on the Ministry's urganizaticn, staffing, and operations. The study when completed the following year noted the increasing scope and complexity of Soviet foreign policy activity and said that this required more stress on the political and profeasional training of Soviet diplomatic officials.umber of apecific educational, organizational, and administrative measures were laid down which aimed at raising the effectiveness of MFA personnel
Gromyko reportedly waa ordered to improve the work performance of ail sectors and level* of the Ministry's headquartersentralnd its fcraign representations. Additional staff was to be recruited where appropriate from the ranks of Party andcadres with administrative experience and frcmoreign affairs specialists in the central Party apparatus and academic institutions. In some cases, higher salaries for MFA executives were approved.
Special emphasis was put on securing more international legal and economic specialists for the diplomatic corps. The course of study in the Ministry's Institute of International Relations was reduced from six to five years, in order to graduate more young diplomatsearer rate, and its program in international law was reinstituted after having been abolished years before. The Ministry's information collection and reporting function was to be improved. For this purpose diplomats were permitted to expand ties and contacts withof political, business, and civic circles, ties and contacts which theretofore were largely assigned to the intelligence services.
The Drputy roreign Ministers* Kcxt to Gromyko in the Ministry's cha in-of-command arc one first deputy and eight deputy ministers. Overall supervisory responsibilities, both administrative andare divided among them, with the firat deputy acting at Gromyko's right-ha.id man. In running the Ministry, the deputv ministers are quite important, since intra-organizatioral decision-raking is extremely concentrated at the Lop, By andhey arc not key actors in the foreign policy decision-making process, though this is subject to specific issues and circumstances. The deputy ministers, all of whoa are experienced diplomats, do on occasion become involved in policy implerauntation when they act as troublc-shootera in diplomatic hot spots or servo as heads ox Sovietto international conferences and negotiations,
whot is of significance in regard to the deputy ministers is the turnover in their ranks in recent years, the rate and scope of whicheliberate policy of bringing new talent into the Ministry's top management level. Only the first deputy and two of the deputy ministers have been in their present positions since the mid-fiftiec. Two were promoted to their current ranks in theixties and the rest during the,
More important, with one exception, these men were promoted from within the career foreign service, and owe their advancement to experience and ability rather than Party position. This pattern contrastr with the past practice of assigning career diplomats, on the one hand, and Party careeriats and government officials, on the other, in approximately equal numbers to executive positions. Over the long run this may ensure greater professional autonomy for the Ministryhole*
An even more extensive turnover hat been carried out in the ranks of the chiefs of the geographic departments who, in addition to the foreign minister, his deputies,ew heads of functional bureaus, sit on the Ministry's coordinating board, or Collegium. All seven departmental heads/Collegium members received their0
Administration for Planning Foreign Pol icy Measures and Departments. Two important organizational innovations that were implemented in direct response to6 CC decree and attest to high-level concern for enhancing the Ministry's capabilities for executing foreign policy tasks were the revamping of the policy planningand creationew information processing and dissemination mechanism.
The Administration for Planning Foreign Policy Measures (UPVM, after its Cyrillic abbreviation) was createdut did not achieve importance until three years later when the CC becamein its operations. Both its current and long-range planning functions were improved and expanded, and for this purpose the Party ordered that highly qualified personnel from within the Ministry and from academic institutions be recruited for its staff,
UPVM's staff currently consistsiplomatic officers, many of whom are in the higher diplomatic ranks and have advanced degrees. Staff members arc paidighcr-than-average diplomatic salary scale, and in general UPVM is considered an elite organization withinMinistry. Its chief divisions are organized geographically, and they include American, European, Asian, and African bureaus. There iascientific work section" that is responsible for liaison with foreign affairs research institutes in Che Academy ot Sciences and other academic institutions.
As the word "measures" in its title indicates, UPVM's mandate is limited to translating higher-level policy directives intoplans and programs. It does not determine policy goals nor does it coordinate policy positions with the other Party and govern--ment institutions. Its primary purpose is to elaborate long-term trend projections in international affairs for the benefit of the foreign minister's office and the Collegium- In recent years, however, UPVM has succeeded in expanding its functions and becoming directly involved in current operations. Its preparations for high-level meetings and backstopping of key negotiations in particular have wonolid reputation in the Soviet foreign policy establishment. The American division, for example, drafted seven of the ten basic position papers lor the2 Soviet-American summit and the important
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Principles of Mutual Relations" document signed by the two countries. UPVM and some of Its senior staff members have played an important role both in the negotiations and in backstopping at the SALT, HBFR, and CSCE talks.
The Informationelatively new HFA division, was set upnd the staff now numbers, Its primary function is to transmit policy guidance to Soviet embassies, and this was in response to the CC's call for more regular and morecommunication of important Party and government decisions to ambassadors and other diplomatic officials. Theretofore this task was assigned primarily to the MFA's geographic bureauc.
The Department's secondary function is to survey and analyze foreign press materials. For this purpose thereress attache in each Soviet embassy, ostensiblyto the Press Section but actually reporting to the Information Department in Moscow. ulletins released to embassies to keep them informed on current events are prepared in the Department on the basis of materials it collects from abroad. The Department also responds to requests for policy guidance from Soviet radio and television officials.
IV, COMMITTEETATE SECURITY (KGB?
In the Soviet view espionage andrather than mutually exclusivethe overallSoviet foreign policy, and this istheirin Soviet missions abroad.
The KGB: Organization and Functions. Twor ions of the Soviet Committee of State Security (KGB) function in direct support of the foreign policyFirst Chief (Foreign) Directorate and the Second Chief (Internal Counterintelligence) Directorate.
Except for espionage missions assigned to the Soviet military intelligence servicend political intrigues managed directly by the Central Committee, the First Chief Directorate has exclusive competence for all clandestine activities abroad. The activities include conducting intelligence, counterintelligence, andction operations; maintaining security among Soviet citizens abroad; and training and monitoring the activities of Soviet Blocservices.
From the perspective of foreign policy decision-making, the Directorate's key role is that of collector and disseminator of positive political, economic, scientific, and some military Intelligence collection is centered in eleven regular departments which conduct operations in designated geographic or linguistic areas. These departments supervise, maintain, and staff the KGB's "legal residencies" (field stations) located in Soviet missions abroad, providing them with operational support andas well as intelligence requirements.
A separate organization within the Directorate, the Information Service or Service Numbers primarily responsible for thennd dissemination of intelligence reports. It processes almost all the classified information (except scientific-technicalbtained from the operational departments and from Bloc intelligence services.
*Generally speaking, thereivision of labor between the civilian and military intelligence services in that the KGB's colleo-tion units are oriented toward acquisition of political information" and those of the GRU toward military data* In practice, however, there is some overlap which tends to blur this functional distinction The GRU's chief organizational mission is to collect strategic intell gence which includes political, economic, sociological, scientific and technical as well as purely military information. Conversely, the KGB may be called upon to obtain data which is predominantly military in nature.
pecial sub-directorate for scientific and technics,handles operations in this area.
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Disseminated information is normally sent directly to KGB Chief Andropov by the head of the First Chief Directorate. The most urgent reports, which usually arrive by cable, are sent directly to the highest Party and government officials.
The First Serviceeekly intelligence bulletin which is circulated to Politburo members, CC Secretaries, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, the General Staff, and other recipients as appropriate. Special analytical reports and intelligence estimates, *ot normally included in the weekly bulletins, are sent only to consumerspecial interest in the material or at the request of the CC or head of the First Chief Directorate. The First Service also provides rapid reference service for the Soviet leadership and conducts oral and written briefings for the Politburo.
Normally the First Service does not levy collection requirements. Such requirements come directly from the CC, which also serves as the coordinator of requirements from other Party and government agencies.
The Second Chief Directorate does not conduct foreign operations. But, in addition to surveillance of the Soviet population, it is charged with the twofold task of spying on and subverting foreign diplomats, on the one hand, and denying them access to information and unapproved contacts with Soviet citizens, on the other. It places particular emphasis on human and technical penetration of foreign embassies and consulates as well as recruitment of diplomats who later will return to their home offices as "agents of influence." This Directorate alao conducts operations within the USSR against foreign tourists, students, and journalists.
The KGB Abroad: Kspionage and Dipl^nacy. US intelligence experts estimate that, on anercent of all Soviet officials posted to foreign countries are staff officera assigned to either the KGB or GRU. KGB officers generally outnumber their military counterparts two-to-one. In some countries, particularly in the Third World, the complement of intelligence officers (from both services) in Sovietay run as high asercent of the staff, umber of intelligence officers stationed in a
particular country depends upon the total size ot the Soviet mission and Soviet intelligence objectives.
All levels and components of Soviet embassies and consulates, except the posts of Ambassador and CC representative, the number one and two positions, have been used at one time or another to provide diplomatic cover for intelligence officers. KGB officers, moreover, are both numerous and influentially positioned in higher diplomatic slots. The KGB "resident" (station chief) is almost always assigned to the embassy with the rank of Counselor or First Secretary. KGB officers also occupy other high-ranking slots ranging from First Secretary through Attache in numbers that are often equal to those of bona fide diplomats.
Intelligence officers who are assigned integrated cover in the foreign service combine the duties of spy and diplomat. The allocation of functions and personnel assignments between the KGB and the Foreign Ministryatter for high-level Party decision. Under Staliii the secret police controlled all personnel assignments and placed its own functionaries in leading positions in MFA headquarters and thecorps. At present the KGB-MFA relationship isorking partnership on fairly equal terms in which the latter provides the overt framework of diplomatic contacts and stations abroad which the former uses for its own purposed of espionage and subversion.
The KGB and Foreign PoUcy-Makinp. THe KGB's major source of influence over foreign policy is derived from the importance andof its functionalandforeign intelligence, on the one hand, and recommending and conducting covert political actions, on the other.
Like any large bureaucratic organization, however, the KGBsome political weight and can make its views known. At present, the KGB has access to Party policy-making through its Chairman, Andto-pov, in his roleull member of the Politburo and, probably,ember of the Defense Council. While Andropov servesirect link between the top leadership and the bureaucracy he heads, in the final analysis heareer Party official who owes his primary loyalty to the CPSU and his current status to Brezhnev personally.
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V. ACADEMY OF SCIENCES' FOREIGN AFFAIRS RESEARCH INSTITUTES
Knowledge and comprehension of Che outside world comeumber of sources, including regularand intelligence gathering- Theae sources have beenaugmented over the past decade by research andcentered in academic institutes formally under thethe USSR Academy of Sciences. It ia impossible to determineto which the Kremlin relies on these institutes in orderthe hazards of making decisions on the basis ofor inaccurate information. are public commentinstitutes' role, however, Brezhnev recently acknowledgedcontribution to the formulation of Soviet detente policy. of the present balance of forces in the worldean address to the Academy, "made it possible to elaborate apolicyeace
IMEMO and IUSAC. The two principal institutes charged withSoviet foreign policy officials informed on the internal and external iffairs of the major Western countries are the Institute of the World Economy and International Relations (IHEMO) and the Institute of the Jnited States and Canada (IUSAC). IMEKO, the prototype Soviet foreign affairs institute, focuses heavily on 'Western Europe and Japan, although it alao conducta research on Third World countries and areas as well. IUSAC, the newest institute, reflects the increasingly specialized area/country orientation adopted in the formation of institutes during the sixties. Its primary concerns are US foreign policy (with special emphasis on Soviet-Americanolitico-military affairs, ond internal developments in the political, economic,, social, end cultural areas of American life. (Research on Canadian affairs consists largely of studying Canadian-American economic relations.)
The Soviets have not followed the American practice of setting up civilian "think tanks" to examine their own country's military doctrine, strategy, and defensesubjects are theprovince of theablishment. The military affairs scctionn of the two institutes are primarily responsible for keeping
abreast of the latest developoents inan-miIitsry relations, defense decision-making, strategic doctrine, and arms control policy in NATO countries, especially the United States. Staffed largely by retired military officersew civilian experts, these sections focus on the political and politico-military rather than the purely military and technical aspects of strategy and defense posture. IHEMO, however,pecial "closed" military-tcchnical-economic section that does classified research for the Soviet general staff.
Both institutes have substantial resources, material as well as human, at their disposal. otal work force, IKEMOrofessional staiff whom have advanced degrees. Given its much more restricted geographic focus, lUSAC's staff size is impressively large. Ofotal employees, half arc professionals, andave advanced degrees.
Because of their academic status, these institutes are in a. unique position among other Soviet organizations to gain accesside range of foreigners and foreign institutions. Over half of IUSAG's professional staff members, for example, have visited the United States at least once, and several have spent considerable time in this country either on extended academic exchanges or as members of the Soviet Mission to the United Nations and the Soviet Embassy in Washington. During the eighteen-month period alone endingUSAG hosted moremerican officials,scholars,n Moscow.
Tne Institutes and the Foreign Policy Process. Apart from their purely academic endeavors, the institutes serve as reservoirs of factual knowledge and analytical support for Soviet policy-makers. In the case of IMEMO and IUSAC, the primary consumers of institute-prepared materials are the CC International Department andsonsl staff. The institutes also on occasion carry out special projectsontract basis for government ministries and state committees, but this type of work is less frequent and less important than that done for higher Party organs and officials.
It should be emphasized that the institutes do notormal, institutionalized role in the policy-making proceas. But by meana of
their accumulation of facta, analyaia, and estimative judgmentsargely non-regularized interaction process with Sovietthe experts may on occasion provide input into theprocess. What they do not do is mak* recommendations or suggeationa regarding Soviet policy.
At the same tiue, however, underpresent regime thehave come to be more routinely calledo prepare policy-relevant submissions for the use of Soviet policy-makers. Some of the major documents and resolutions presented atdh CPSU Congresses were written by academic specialists. In preparation forh Congress, IMEMO ia reported to haveajor stud) comparing the relative balance of power between East ond West in terms of scientific-technological capabilities.
another way in which the experts get drawn into theprocess is through the writing of background studies andpapers for Soviet leader*. Analysts at both IMEMO and IUSAC, for example, contributed written reports on SALT and MBFR to Brc brief infrbook for the second Soviet-American summit3
While the institutes do not directly participate inthey do have at their disposal the mcana for regularly disseminating their ideas and views within the upper echelon of the Soviet Party and government hierarchies. EMO and IUSAC publish their own monthly in-houee journals as well as occasional monographs and books. ublications are notable in the Soviet context for their more reasonable and less doctrinaire content as compared to the sloganeering and propaganda stereotypes found in the mass circulation press. The potential that such publications have for influencing policy-makers should not be overestimated, but according to several sources they are widely rend by the Soviet "attentive elite."
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1KEH0 and IUSAC arc also reported to publish limited circulation
opies) "information bulletins" for dissemination within the
top levels of the Party and government hierarchies. Theae bulletins
contain both straightforward reporting of factual material drawn from
the world press and original analyses written by institute experts.
Thisotentially significant development, since heretofore the
preparation of similar publications was entrusted solely to the CC foreign affairs departments.
Special Role of the Two Directors. The respective directors of IMEMO and IUSAC, N. H. Inozemtaev and G. A. Arbatov, are both much more influential in their own right than their official titles indicate. Each man has served in responsible positions in the Party apparatus, and they both occupy high-level positions in Party and government political bodies. While these status indicators are not significant per se, they signify that Inozemtaev and Arbatov are important personages in the Soviet foreign policy establishment.
Both men are known to have direct access to the inner circles of Soviet deci*,on-making. Arbatov is one of three or four key advisors' on whom Brezhnev relies for interpretation of developments in the US and in Soviet-American relations. One measure of his importance, as his colleagues at IUSAC point out with considerable pride, is the fact that he accompanied Brezhnev to the USnozerotsev is also reputed to have ties to Brezhnev, and appears to associate closely with Suslov and Ponomarev as well. Arbatov and Inozemtsev both occasionally write important articles, which usually appear in Pravda, Izvestia, *nd ^raQunist and reflect top level views and thinking on foreign policy. Such articles generally correlate highly with what is known about decisions reached for example at CC plenums.
VI, THE FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY-MAKING APPARATUS
B^csude of the considerable effort being made to increase the flow of trado, technology, and investment capital from major Western industrial nations, foreign economic policy issues at presententral place in the overall achnme of Soviet foreign affairs decision-making. Aa Brezhnev pointed out in his speech toh Party Congress, "Politics and economics, diplomacy and commerce, industrial production and trade are interwoven in our foreign economic relations,"
Economic Policyking. As is the caseaspects of Soviet international policy, the Politburo isdecision-making body with respect to foreign economicTrade Minister
regularly attends Politburo meetinjfkT^ot just sesaione of tneMinisters, because the latter simply doe6 not have thedecide key policy questions. During recent Soviet-Americanover grain and oil sales, Patolichev / worked out Jy^ government's positions nTSSvancc inBrezhnevto the General Secretaryaily
basis.
Next to Brezhnev, Premier Kosygin, long regarded as the mostpromoter of East-West economic cooperationeans of sustaining internal growth and modernization, ia probably the most influential figure in foreign economic affaire. His first deputy in the Council of Ministers, Mazurov, is another Politburo member whopecialized interest in economic policy.
The Presidium of the Council of Ministersuch larger part to play in both formulating and implementing foreign economic
policy-making than in political and military aspects of foreign policy* It work* out many of the plant and proposals which eventually reach the Politburo for decision and coordinates the activities ofgovernment agencies concerned with foreign economic relations. The Presidium's broader scope in the foreign economic sphereorollary of its internal role in economic policy-making and It ia in fact organized along the lines of an economic affairs cabinet; five of its ten deputy chairmen have specificrcsponaibilities that involve foreign trade, economic, and scientific-technical relations. The key deputy chairmen concerned with East-West relations are V. N. Novikov, head of the special Commission for Foreign Economic Questions attached to the Presidium and responsible for coordinating subordinate government ministries and state committees involved in economic relations with non-Communist countries, V. A. Kirillin, Chairman of the powerful State Committee for Science and Technologynd I. V. Arkhipov. Arkhipov's responsibilities appear to overlap with Novikov's, or more likely, there has been workedivision of labor in which the former handles economic relations with the Western industrial nations and the latter with Third World countries* Arkhipov's appointment to the Presidium in4 was regarded as an effort to strengthen the hand of the foreign trade bureaucracy in governmental decision-making. Arkhipov is notong-tinv foreign trade official, buteported Brezhnev protege.
Cosplan. Because foreign economic activity isonstituent part of the national economic planning process, the State Planning Commission (Cosplan) ajor role in working outpatterns and levels of trade and other forms of international economic cooperation. Two of its branches, the Foreign Trade Section and the Section for Foreign Economic Cooperation with Capitalist Countries, work with subordinate agenciess the Ministry of Foreign Trade (MFT) and the SCST in formulating plans. Cosplanpriorities for foreign purchases and approves hard-currency allocations for them. It revicwa all import/export plans submitted by tho MFT and SCST before such plans are sent to the Council of According to the Deputy Chairman of Goaplan responsible for foreign trade, his organizationarticularly ictive and direct role in policy-making where large-scale, multi-facetedents, such as "compensatory" or barter arrangements, are involved.
Ministry of Foreign Trade. The state monopoly of Soviet foreign trade meana that the government is the intermediary for all commercial tranaactions with foreign firms and companies. The MFT ia theagency for the administration and regulation of foreign trade and other forms of economic agreements. The MFT draws up drafts of trade treaties and in appropriate caaea signs them and formulates both long* and short-term export and import plans. Actual negotiations are conducted by more than fifty All-Union Foreign TradeTOa) which are aupervised by the Ministry. These organizations are juridically and budgetarily independent corporations chartered by the Soviet government and have monopoly righta for the export-import of of specific commodities. There is chronic criticism in some circles in the foreign trade bureaucracy of the fact that these FTOs rather than the ultimate user/producer in the industrial ministries orenterprises negotiate trade and commercial agreements. The practice of including representatives from industrial ministries in negotiations has increased in recent years, but the latter do not exercise any decision-making authority, merely acting aa technical consultants.
State Committee for Science and Technology. The SCST iswiththe introduction of new technology and technical processesSoviet economy. In the foreign sphere, it directs theto acquire Che latest in science and,technology fromrealization that the USSR must abandon its traditionalif it ia to derive benefits from thethrough external relations has led to an important androle for SCST. It engages in direct negotiations withand signs virtually ail scientific-technical cooperation Deputy Chairman Dzherman M. Cvishiani is in charge ofoperations. An outfpoken advocate of East-Westfrequent visitor to Europe and America, Gvishiani is alsoson-in-law.
Thereong record of bureaucratic rivalry between SCST and MFT. Because many of the most important Soviet deals with the capitalist countries involve both commercial and scientific-technological aspects, each organization can claim responsibility
Cot conducting negotiations and signing agreements* This rivalry has been fueled in the last few years as economic interaction with the West has increased. It is not uncommon for SCST officials to snipe openly at the MFT's bureaucratic inefficiency in the presence of Western businessmen and officials.
The two major foreign area research institutes, IMEMO and IUSAC, and their respective directors, Inozemtsev and Arbatov, have been at the forefrontampaign to provide theoretical and practical rationalesrogram of national modernization in cooperation with the industrially developed capitalist countries. IMEMO'sis on forecasts ranging from one to ten years which enable Soviet planncra to factor foreign economic relations with the West into their calculations. IUSAC concentrates on more practical studies, sometimes on contract for Gosplan, the MFT, and SCST, which outline problems and prospects for implementing foreign economic agreements. Inozemtsev and Arbatov serve as policy consultants and have participated in trade talks on behalf of the Soviet government.
Another research organization whose staff members areforeign economic issues is the Institute of the Economy ofSocialist System UEWSS). Like IMEMO and IUSAC, itroader, more expansive conception of theexternal ties in Soviet economic planning. ovietinformed US officials that on orders froma meeting scheduled for early6 would includewell as IMEMO, Gosplan, and MFT who
would discuss measures forcentralizing control over and improving management of the foreign economic policy machinery.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
To what extent do current trends point to fundamental changes in the structure and functioning of the foreign policy apparatus? To what extent do they repreacnt highly peraonalistic andhoc adaptations which will not outlast the present Leadership? For example, it is obvious that several important developments strongly
reflect brezhnev's personal style andnd that when he departs from the politburo certain changes will occur. ilia successor will not immediately enjoy either the power orwhich it took brethnev some six yeara to acquire. the next party head may not concentrate so heavily on foreign affairs, he may not decide (or be permitted) totrong personal for* eign affairs staff* and he may notenchant for summit diplomacy. there nay wellore fluid situationof the,
ume cle
considering the vital part foreign affairs now plays in the overall decision-making process, however, it can be estimated that*
in Soviet decision-making. The needtrong personalityource of dynamis- and coherence in policy formulation may stem as much Erom objective requirements of the Soviet political system as from the personal ambitionsotential leader.
Other broader influences which have resulted in the reshaping of the foreign policy-making process will remain at work in the foreseeable future. The most important of these has been the USSR's expanded role in world affairs and the enlarged scope and complexity of its foreign relations. Thet and rcuiotic approach of the present leadership have also had an effect on the policy process, and this style of leadership will probably be carried over and become even more pronounced in the next generation. Thewill continue to be the central arena for strategic-level decision-making, and, based on the last few years experience, its reorganisationore effective and efficient foreign policy decision-making body is likely toermanent feature of the Soviet aystem. Past experience and present practice suggest that overall planning, coordination, and supervision of policywill continue to be lodged in the Party apparatus1 foreign affairs sections. Steady progress in the development of research in the foreign affairs institutes and an increasing legitimization of the role of academic experts also promise to become fixed patterns. And as long as emphasis continues to be placed on the conduct of
Soviet relations with the Wcat on the state level, the Hinistry of Foreign Affairs will provide increasing diplomatic support andexpertise in support of Soviet foreign policy. Its role in policy formulation, though enlarged is still limited, and its subordinate statusis the Party's ruling bodies is not likely to be fundamentally altered.
Original document.
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