Soviet Approaches to Defense Against Ballistic Missile Submarines and Prospects for Success
riA historical review program
RELEASE AS SANITIZED
Top Secret
SOVIET APPROACHES TO DEFENCE AGAINST BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES AND PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESS
CONTENTS
PREFACE
SUMMARY
I. INTRODUCTION Anli-SSBN Warfare
Coordinated Strike
Campaign of Attrition
THE PRESENT SOVIET APPROACH AND CAPABILITIES FOR
COUNTERING SSBN*
Soviet Perceptions of the SSBN Problem
Sire of ihe Enemy Force
Location and Extent of Operational Areas
Required Timeliness of
Strategy
Tactici for Obtaining Initial Detection
Base Surveillance Operatiom
Choke Point Operations. >
Pairol Area Search
Tactics for Maintaining Contact
Trailing
Surface and Air Tracking
Target Classification and Attack
Capabilities for
Capabilities for-
regc
Ine Rok of Mine
Availability of Forces for Anii-SSBN
lhe Role of Fiacd
III. FUTURE SOVIET CAPABILITIES TO COUNTER US
Acoustic
Nonacouitic
Overt
Wide-Area Surveillance
ANNEX; SOVIET ASW TECHNOLOGY
-L
PREFACE
'Ibis Interagency Intelligence Memorandum was prepared at theof thc National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs and is intended to convey to policymakers in nontechnical language theSoviet approaches to destroying ballistic missile submarines at seaeans of defending against the threat of submarine-launched ballistic missiles. It was prepared by the Defense Intelligence Agency in collaboration with the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, the Office of thc Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, the Director of Naval Intelligence,of the Navy, and thc Assistant Chier of Staff, Intelligence,of the Air Force.
The report covers current and future Soviet strategy and capabilities to degrade the effectiveness of the Western ballistic missile submarine force at sea now and over the next ten years. An annex discusses the iipplication of technological developments to future antisubmarinesystems. It updates and expands on the4 Interagency Intelligence Report "Prospects for Success in Improving Detection of Submarines in Open Ocean Areas."
This Interagency Intelligence Memorandum was prepared as backup for. "Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Conflict Through thehile the memorandum was not in finished form, its general findings were available at the timeas completed. 'Die conclusions ineflect the conclusions of this memorandum. Thc cut-off date for information in this report
SUMMARY
Out principal conclusions aboul Sooiel defense! againsi Western baUitlic missile submarineshich have varying degrees of uncertainly, are as follows:
antisubmarine warfare forces do not nowerious threat lo Western SSBNs al sea. Soviet forces have major deficiencies in Iheir ability lo delect and track SSBNs.
is probable lhal future improvements in Soviet defenses will platt Western SSBNs in greater risk of detection and destruction in restricted waters and possibly in some of Iheir current operating areas.
ts unlikely lhat during the nexl ten years the research and development programs which the Soviets have underway will result in operationalwatfore (ASW) forces capable of threatening the prelaunchof Ihe US ballistic missile submarine force programed lobe at sea at any lime.
The only practical counter to SSBNs is to destroy them at sea before they launch their missiles, particularly in thc absence of anti-ballistic missile defenses. To do so would require some combination of aircraft, ships and submarines, sensor systems and weapons capable ofand localizationery short period, and near-simultaneous destruction of all ballistic missile submarines at sea. Of the threetasks in antisubmarinelocalization andis the contingent element in current and future Soviet defenses against SSBNs. Detection of all SSBNs at sea would requireroad ocean area submarine surveillance systemapability to track SSBNs for extended periods, possibly by covert trail.
We are confident that the Soviets do not now have the capability to determine thc location of Western SSBNs at sea with thc precision necessary to attack them, or thc capability to track them for extended periods. The extent to which these deficiencies are removed in thc future depends on thc success of their various research programs aimed at development of improved sensors for submarine detection and tracking.
'I"he Soviets have research and development programs to supportoperational ASW requirements:
oceanography, including oceanic microstructure, turbulence, and short-term variability of the ocean medium;
the technologies known in the West to have potentialto ASW sensors, including hydroacoustics, extremely low(ELF) electromagnetics, optical technology, infrared (IR) imagery, and magnelomctry; and
signal processing theory and techniques for ASW application, although the Soviets probably lack the capability to produceof sophisticated high-quality integrated circuita for operational signal processing hardware.
Our assessment of prospects for Soviet development of improved systems for submarine detection and tracking is based mainly on assessments of thc Soviet research and development programs in the following technologies:
sensors including advanced arrays,detection,
of ELK emissions from submarines,
c, ?
research with ASW potential, andquieting.
From our understanding of the technologies involved and of research and development programs in the US and the USSR, we conclude that thc Soviets have little potential for achieving effective operational systems for wide-area ocean surveillance or long-term covert trail of ballistic missile submarines in the next ten years. Moreover,in US SSBNs and expansion of their operating areas will compound thc Soviet problem of finding and irackine, them. These judgments are qualified by gaps in our knowledge ofP
Jpossiblc tuture Soviel
developments.
Although it is our present judgment that in thc next ten years Soviet ASW capabilities will fall short of being able to prevent most US sub-jnarincs on staiion from launching their missiles, thc extensive Soviet ASW research and development activities merit close observation in (he years ahead.
I. INTRODUCTION
I. The US ballistic miuilc submarine was developed to increase ihe survivability of US intercori-lincnial attack forces Tor ihe Soviets to limit damage io ihe USSRS nuclear strike, they moilapability to destroy US SSBNs, bombers and ICBMi. To do so ihey mustapid and near-certain means for finding and destroying submarine-launched ballisticn general, there are ihree approachesefense against SLBMs ihat Soviet military planners have explored:
of ihe submarine command and con irol network so ihai SLBM launch orders cannot be received;
ton of SLBMs or iheir reentry vehartes in flight with antiballistic missilesnd
of the SSBNs before ihey can launch their missiles.
2 Approaches ihai involve disruption of theand control network and ABM defenses arc outside the scope of this study. Temporary disrupt inn ol Ihe command network is atelaying measure because the submarine remains fully operational and the missileshreat. An effective SLBM defense based on missile intercept is foreclosed as long as ihe ABM Treaty remains effective. Thus, the basic Soviet problem is toeliable means of detecting and destroying ihe SSBN force prior to ihr launch of its missiles. If the Soviets were to atiack without warning, aboul half of the SSBNs wouldbe al shore facilities and would be vulnerable, but such an attack would not eliminate the threat posed by thc SSBNs already at sea. Therefore, lhe key to
Mkr Akuuwrogram *id
i*ji*lnli<A. are.tcn lot ImnomiiArniit ti.ti/Jnn^'Jiro.ijIi ihe Ml&lfWh" ll Norember |Wj.
an effective defense against SLBMs lies in the desiruction of ballistic rnrssue submarines at tea
Anli-SSBN Warfare
) Antisubmarine warfare conducted against ballistic missile submarines involves consideraiions ihai are fundamentally different from thosein ASW againsi attack submarines. Inattackome loss of friendly forces and lhe survival of some enemy submarines is tolerable and expected. The effecitveness of ami-SSBN warfare, on the other hand, is much more critical because of the destructive capability of just one surviving SSBN. Moreover, there are stringent time constraints on ami.SSBNo minimize damage to the USSRoviet preemptive attack, the Soviets would havecprdtitaitd marly simultaieauiaint! all SSH.'i'i within missile range of the Soviet Union in conjunction with strikes againsi ICBMs and bomber*
Coordinated Strike
onceptually there are three requirement*oordinated strike. The first and most formidableis to know the location of those SSBNs at sea at the time of the strike. There appear to be two general way* ihat this Tint requirement might be satisfied
road-area ocean surveillance syiiem, fiied or mobile, which could providereal-time information on thelocaiion of all SSUNi; or
--deploymentultiplicity of recoruuiisance systems which could locate,eriod of lime, all SSBNs and trick ihem continuously until ihc lime of attack.
Therequirementoordinated slnke i* toapability for localiiaiion of all SSBNs in order
io deliveragainst them (Detection may alio provide lecalrraiion of the SSBN. depending on thehc detection system) The third re-quircment. near-simultaneous deitruction of SSBNs ai tea, would necessitate having weapons, sensors, tactics, and command and control systems capable of supporting such an effort Thc absence of capabilities for detection, localiration, and destruction of all SSBNs at seaoordinated strike need notimited form of coordinated strike on those SSBNs ihai had been detecied and localized.
Compote" ol Alt'Irion S. Alternatively, an ASW force might be usedampaign of attrition against SSBNs. Cradual destruction of ihc SSDN force, however, would allow the other sideespond before the force had been ncuiralired. On the othertrategy of attrition is the only one that could be supported by current and likely future Soviet ASW forces. Moreover, desiruclion of submarines one by one might be regarded as less likelyoordinated strike toassive nuclear exchange.
II. THE PRESENT SOVIET APPROACH AND CAPABIUTIES FOR COUNTERING SSBNs
Perceptions of the SSBN Problem
io SovietrimarySoviet ASW is io thwart an attack byIn case this objective seemsaction is required, the Sovietshe maximum extent possible an attack bySoviet writings also provide insights intoperceptions of the anti-SSUN problem.
Sire oly Force
calculating ihe size of lhc Westernthe Soviets do noi discriminate among SSBNsUS, ihe UK. and France, whootalissile launchers Underconditions, the Soviets expect aboul Wof the force lo be at sea at any one. indicated thatrisis theaboul a0 percent to be at sea. Inforcc^tjueture ihe Soviets might have toboth SSIlNs and nuclear-powereddqtcnding on how they assess theirin diffc'ciuuKC In'twecn Ihe two types.
location ond litem ol Operational Arras
N The Sonets probably base their estimates of the extern and local ion of Western SSBN patrol areasariety of information including weapons characteristics, targets, geographic considerations, environmental conditioni. and operational doctrine. Various source! indicate ihe Soviets have concluded thai all Weaiern SSBNs can launch missiles from any point in the ocean that is within missile range of the target, and ihai Western SSBNs art not currently operating in thc Indian or Arctic Oceans. Hence, ihey conclude ihai Western SSBNs normally operate in the Norwegian Sea. northeastern Atlantic.Sea, and western Pacific.
Required Timeliness of ActionSoviet doctrine and force posture indicate the Soviets assumeeriod of teruion woulduclear attack on the USSK.f_
"(Soviet planners believetncy woulderiod of aoout ten days before ihe beginning of hominies to increase their preparedness and to locate enemy SSUNs. The Soviets have concludedestern SSBN requires aboutinutes to complete missile launch following the receipt of the launch message. This is based on the estimate that about IS minutes would he required for the final preparations to Tire and that once launching begins, all missiles would be launched within IS minutes
Strategy
he Soviets' perceptions of the SSBN problem and thc limited elTcaivcncss of their ASW forces are among the key determinants of their present strategy for defense against ballistic missile submarines. We believe the Soviets desire, but do not expect toa successful coordinated strike against all SSBNs. Prior tu the outbreak of hostilities they would almost certainly attempt io track as many SSBNs as possible from their bases, from choke points, and from encounters in ihc open ocean. The ASW lorces would attempt to maintain contact nnd withhold attack until ordered to strike We believe Soviet strategy for the destruciiun ot SSBNi at teaimult.incuus attack against those submarines lhat have liccn localised followedampaign of acintHHi
IIonflict at which the Soviets would auiuipt to destroy SSBNs would depend on lhe
situation Soviet military doctrine cmphaiires attacks against enemy nuclear forces including SSUNs in lhc opening stages ofa major war. Inar. ibis would include atlacks against enemy SSBNs ai sea and strikes against SSBN bases.heater "War. confined to Europe and lhe surrounding oceans, tlic Soviets would, by their definition, refrain fromsubmarine bases in the US- There arehowever, lhat Sovicl ihcater war doctrine oils for attacks against SSBNs al sea at the onset of hostilities, whether conventional or nuclear. However, if lhe Soviets thought they could restrict the conflict ro conventional warfare; they might refrain fromSSBNs in order to reduce thc possibilityore limited war. the Soviets almosi certainly would not attack enemy SSBNs, although ihey mighi increase their attempts to track them
I* In peacetime, surveillance of Westernbases,inimum, provides opportunities io colleci some technical and operational data on SSBNs and lo accumulate more realistic operational experience by operaiing against potential targets. It is common for Soviel naval intelligence collectors (AG Is) to be stationed ofTSSBN bases to monitorarrivals, departures, and local operations. In receni yean attack submarines, primarily of theclass, have opera led for short periods off US SSBN overseas bases in con; una ion with an AGI. We believe these activities are being conducted not only to collect intelligence, but as some Soviet sources have suggested io form the bash for initialing trail on SSBNs. It is relatively easy for ihe AGI to detect thc surfaced SSBN visually or by the use of tensors.etection is made, the AGI can direct an attackto the vicinity of the SSBN. The Soviets might then attempt to intercept and trait* the SSBN. but there is no evidence that they have so far tueceeded inS SSBN.
IVrisis or when hostilities appear imminent, the surveillance AGI would be subject to harassment and blocking so thai in all probability Soviet attack submarines would be forced to operate without assistance Because of thc limitt of sensors aboard
ai used inaper connotes knowing ihe locaiion uilubnwrieiewar-ceeiunuoui hint by any plaiform. ten to*.
at-TeeAeaj- nipcnal terramtunaeim liritowi ihe targei
he Soviet Navy engages in operations andwhich include those tactics appropriate to the implementation of thc Soviet anii-SSBN strategy. These activities vary from many small exercises in local watersew Navy-wide operations in broad ocean areas in which large numbers of ASW units participate. Some of these operations almost certainly involve simulated and actual attempts to detect Western SSUNs. The experience derived from ihese operations and exercises is applicable to operations against either SSBNs or nuclear-powered atlack tub-marinei.
hc Soviets emphasize in their ASW operations* and exercises those tactics which ihey believe offer the
delusion, ilmrfwiioa.
laielxaiior. mi) anaek
Iltnlum loniiuiennit) lhe perienceie submarine
I letrtiponrudently opeia ted submarine in ike Open man
. ii eVTn vU et best,heoctearby tutu.
Only ihc US. teM id Sound Sooeitiinee Syttrm (SOSUS).
Iia> a tem wtliefe is capable of calrcmet' Inrw-eangr
anedlen of rsich Motor Snct targtu Outer ceeawin erly lieimaeilf en patrol aircraft. tvKace ferret anduablithes ih< coniact aa iwbmaeine ee ww^wnw. Snendly er beuik. end prrtupin.nnr CumCcxion may be acliirveit by comparing tnieiecp'rdnh wiih discrete fecqueneiet known io
be aimiiieda pankwlv tlili ef submaeine
it ihc proemin with sufTiCtrnt acruracy lor weapon delieerv.in ibe (mil aeu. ASW lone* localize tbc
ii rhe phase io which the weapon is prrpaeerl and
launched n ihe larger. Thu phase begins onieew ace- ini
current .Soviet submarines, unassisted initiation of imil nl aiicv;uivc ballistic missile submarine is anmethod on which to base antrategy
Choka Point Operations
he Soviets frequently patrol in itraits and other narrow passages in attempts to detect rub-marines inDunns exercises the Soviets may deploy substantial numbers of forces to these areas. Areas where such tactics have been used include the Strait* of Gibraltar and Sicily, the water* south ofand the Grecnlanddceland-UK gap. The Soviets have used various pUtforms in co intituling theserom the Moskva antisubmarine helicopter carrier to escort ships and, on occasion, auxiliaries. Aircraft used have included both fixed-wing and shipborne helicopters.
ofoverage of lhe wider paisages (such asm gap between Iceland and iheowever, would require much larger forces and would pose much more difficult, problems. In evaluating; lbc potential effectrvenest of barrier operationsefense against ballistic missilethe Soviets would have to lake into icccount:
change* in SSBN patrol areas that would avoid barrier passage,
commitment* of Wesiern air and/or naval forces to oppose Soviel barrier units, and
use of counterrneafures by transiting SSBNs.
We believe thai Soviet employment of barrier tactics, even under the most favorable conditions, would not result in detection of moreew SSBNseans of initiating continuous iracking.
Soviet barrier operations have involved both nuclear and diesel submarines. The laiter, whose limitations in speed and endurance make ihemfor trailing operations, could be used in barrier* io initially detect and destroyNY In barrier applications, both surface ship* and fued-wing aircraft could alto be used, bui iheir efTeciivcness would dependajor degree on the lactkxl situationontrol of the* for fixed-wing aircraft, they could be employed either alone or in conjunction wiih other force* to detect and localize targets, assist in reacquiiiiion if contact is lost, or to conduit attacks. While barrier force unit* wouldbcticream, most have ihc ability lo carry out euth phase ofinitial detection io
n addition io their potential use io detect and destroy SSHNs, barrier operations could be used to obtain thr initial detection of transiting SSBNs proceeding to or from patrol for lhe purpose ofl The effectiveness of operations for this purpose would defienel on many factors, including the number of pUiformt employed, capabilities of the variousand environmentalIhc Soviets could Ihcomically cover the en-liic pant;iw in narrow ehoke points Such as lhe Sirails
PoHol Area Srorch
Soviet surface ships and submarines operate regularly and Soviet ASW aircraft operatein some of the US SSBN operating areas. In recent years such Soviet operations have increased and tome of ihem have been searches for SSBNs. usually characterized by intensive activity in relatively small areas of open ocean. In conducting theie operations, the Soviets seem iooordinated effort by all three types of platforms, but individualaircraft and attackoperate independently.
e believe ihai the Soviets do noteiec-imxi system which could give ihem even lbc general location of SSBNs on patrol.^
he basil of
systemuch as SLBM range, the Soviets could reduce somewhat the potential search area* (teendhese areas are. however, greater lhan those which Soviet forces could currently searcheasonable probability of detection within the lime available to do so. Wc arc uncertain of the means by wtuth ihe Soviet* select smaller areas for intensive ASW Mliviiy.
Tactics for AAomtainingailing
ikc an SSBNdefied, ihc Soviets might iry lo irncli llic submarine with surface ship! andbut wc believe ihai trailing would be iheir |rrclerrcd tateriod of crisis, ihc Soviets would probably aticmpl lo establish (rail on Western SSBNs partly through lhe use of attach submarine* assisted by surface ships in ihe vicinity of base* In boih choke point and open oceanurface or air units would direct ihe trailing submarinehc target.
railing may be overt or coven. In covert irailmg, (he target submarine, being unaware of the trailer's presence, is less likelymploy countcnac-lies; the tactical initiative remains wiih the trailer 'lhe most effective sensor for such trails currently is passive sonar The high radiated noise levels of Soviet submarines and iheir poor passive sonar capability (compared lo lhal of US SSBNs) makes ii likely that the US submarine would detcci the trailing Soviet tub-marine. Thus coven trail using passive sonar would be enrcmcly difficult for the Soviets.
nstead of passive sonar capability andquieting, the Soviets have emphasised active sonar and attack submarines designed for speed.nuclear-powered attack submarinesignificant speed advantage over Western SSBNs and arc finedariety of active acouiiichort-range high-resolution sonar. These characteristics suggest that one consideration in Soviet lubmarine designapability for overt trait. The Soviets use the overt mode of trail in exercisesa variety of circumstances, including after loss of passive (covert) trail. Several potential counter measure* against oven nail are available, however, L
he Soviets thus do not currentlyignifi. cam trail capability, coven or oven. Their coven trail capability in particular is limited by the acousticheld by US
Surface ond Air Tracking
eriod prior to the outbreak of hustiliiaes. surface ships and aircraft probably would also attempt lo detect and then track SSBNs covertly nr ovenly until ordered to attack, lhe Soviets have stressed coordinated surface and air ASW operations, and have developed lhe lacfics and communicalions syiicms io support such efforts. Recent Soviet ASW combatant construction and operations have emphasized ihipborne ASW helicopters (seeetection wereombination of Soviet air and surface platforms might be able lo track an SSBNimited period. The success of such operations would depend, however, on factors which include lhe type and number of platforms and senior employed, environmental conditions, and counter measures available to the SSBN.
Target Classification and Attack CopoUoiei lot Oouifieonea
2fi. For effective use of ASW assets, the Soviets must discriminate among submarine typesariety of sensors and techniques. We believe the Soviets are capable of differentiating betweenand non-submarine contacts, and between Soviet and non-Soviet submarines. Wiiamai laws if tht Swa-tiffrrrMiair SSBJVi fromypriWriUmibmarimi.
Copobiliries lor Attack
Uncertainties
he preceding sections have described in general term* the present Sonet approach and capabilities lo counter Western SSBNs There are several areas of uncertainty, however, in ourof the Soviets' ami-SSBN capability
Ihe Role of Mine Worfore
he Soviel Union hasumber of antisubmarine mines]"
3
In addition to traditional mine applications (luch high-density mine fields off SSBN bases) die Soviets might attempt to restrict or deny SSBN transit routes as well as portions of operating areas by theof mines. We arc uncertain of the degree to which the Soviets intend to use such tactics or how effective ihey would be.
AvoilobSty ot Forcer forpwofcoos
e an?uncertain about the number of Soviet lorces lhal would be assigned to conduct ami-SSBN warfare Various other mtroom have competing
claims for the assets available to the Soviet Navy. Nearly all ships in the Soviet Navy have some ASW capabilityhows first- and second-line ASW forces capable of operations beyond local waters In time oi crisis, it is estimated thai moat of the available first-line forces and some of the second-line forces would be allocated to ASW operations, although not all of these forces would be assigned an anti-SSBN mission However, even if they used all of their forcei with an ASW capability, they would haveimited ability for anti-SSBN operations.
The Role of Fixed Sensors
n We have no evidence of deployment of fined acoustic submarine detection systems in US SSBN operating areas. We know that such systems are deployed in the Barents Sea.ystem may be deployed in the northern Norwegian Sea. The fulland purpose of these deployments, however, as well as the analytical techniques used in ihe process-irw, of collecicd data, are uncertain.
Assessment
ver ihe past decade ihe Sovieu have made steady improvements in their ASW capabilities
Table I
econd-line ASW Fortes
TtiUl
IIS
Deaign.uon Weilern Pecllic
Kir.
KrOtU II
Kreiu I
Kanln
Kuhia
Mod Hash!"
KiivaJi
1
November
Echo
Foiled
Tatijo
BPK BPK BPK BPK BPK BPK BPK
PLA (alomk tabmirinc)
PL*
PLA
PL (oabaurlB*)
PL
CHC
Kynoa
SAM-KMlln
Koilin
Mirka
Petva
Rit*
Grisha
Echo II
Zulu
Romeo
Whi.te/
ASW Kereu* RKR uptidMl eunk trWaar) CC
KM
SKH
M PK (small ASW
PLA (atomicM
n he less, serious dericiencies remain Because of deficiencies in broad area ocean surveillance, ihe Soviets arc unable to position their localization and auaik forces with sufficient speed or accuracy toajor portion of US SSBNs at sea. Moreover, we believe the Soviets lack the capabilily to track or trail US SSBNs for extendedcapabilily which, in ihc absenceroad-area ocean surveillance capabilily. are criticaloordinated strike strategy. We further conclude that under current Soviet strategy for destruction of SSBNs at tea, whichimultaneous attack against ihejeriobmariries thai had been localiied followedampaign of aunt .on, theould not destroy moreew SSBNs even underfavorable to Soviet ASW forces
UTURE SOVIET CAPABILITIES TO COUNTER US SSBNs
he Soviets are working hard to improve their ASW capability. The extensive Soviet ASW research programsesire to overcome their present deficiencies in countering the Western SSBN force and would apply io both coordinated strike andstrategies. To be able tooordinated strike again it Western SSBNs, the Soviets mustapability for long-term tracking or effective broad-area ocean surveillance of SSBN operatingenhe Soviets fall short in both of these capabilitiesoordinated strike, we expect them io improve iheir capabilily io deal wiih SSBNs overended period, that Iff, by attrition
IS Wc believe ihai lhe Sovieu will continue loeavily in research, development, and deploy-mcni ol systems which show promise of improved ASWome existing shtpi will probablynudcrnif cd and new classes oTsurfaer ships, wiih newor improved ASW hardware, will enter lhe operational inventory. New classes of nuclear attach submarines with better sensors and quieting probably will be introduced, and we expect new types of ASW .mi raft will enter the Soviet inventory later in the decade.
hc Soviets may use for ASW advancednow under development having characteristics of high speed and performance maneuverability, long range, and endurance Follow-on ASW weapons, such as improved versions of misiile-defivercd torpedoes and depth charges, probably are also under development Improved mines and torpedoes are also expected to appear. New tactics will be developed to exploit the capabilities of these platforms, tensors, and wcajions.
Acowitir Troll
>v. Using acuuttk techniques for trailing, the Sovieu would have to make major strides in both radiated submarine none reduction and acoustic ten' tor development before ihey couldapabilitv_ to irail USs'covertly for extended periods t
^Xll hough lhe Soviets have ihe technologyroduce quieter nuclear submarines, we have identified no Soviet programontrol radiated noiseeduce cuunterdeteciion US submarines also
ubstantial advantage in passive sonar perforrn-
anec as
Troil
The Soviets are experimenting wiih several techniques for inciting SSBNt at tea using acoustic and nonacousite sensors on surface thips. aircraft, and submarines. They appearelieve that the use of submarines for trailingromising means forWestern SSBNs. Also, of the several postible (cchniquet for tracking SSBNt. trailing is ibe only one availablehe Soviets which has any proipects foe being carried oul covertly,iscussion of thc limitation! of wide-area surveillance systems for Soviet application to SSBN tracking, tee
M In orderirable portion of the Western SSBN force to be threatened, thc Soviets would have to trad some submarines for periods as long as several weeks Trailingighly complex operation in which skill and experience can be at important as the
tensors and quietness of lhe trailing platform. During the nexl decade we believe, however, that
technological develop menu will be the key limiting
element in Soviet acquisition of capabilities to trail
pottibfe dCtctofMnecHk in Soviet
Wetiern SSBNs.
'Sn-or diKuiu'on Of'Jinoto^y
he Soviets will, nevertheless, almost certainly make irnprovemenu in acoustic performance over the MM ten years by designing new sonars (possibly in-eluding towed arrays) wiih better signal processing. They will probably also achieve tome reduction in radiated submarine noise. Thus the Soviets couldubmarine during the next ten years ihat could be on an acoustic par with today's USThey probably could not achieve theadvantage, however, even in the absence of further USadiated noise. Wetherefore, thai succeitful acoustic passive trail over long periods will be beyond Soviet capabilities through the msd-lvBOs.
he Soviets could attempt to maintain trail of SSBNs wiih active sonars ai long ranges and itill achieve covertness by disguising ihe structure of their sonar signals While ihere remain several unknowns about thrt technique, il rs judged unlikely that in lhe neat ten years the Soviets coulduccessful
system of ihis type for coven trailing over Ion; periods.
justic Troil
There is evidence thai ihe Soviets have employed, periodically over lhe part ihreeimited number of rsoriacousiic sensors systems in opcraiiont againsi iheir own submarines possiblyrial or experimental basisT
luur knowledge oT Soviet proHrnms In this
nreafj
J limited. Therefore we cannorwith confidence the potential effectiveness of these systems.
1
^[Our judgment, which is is that.
prcienlcd in the Annex, is lhat anelFective system for lung-range nomtcouslic trail will noi be fullyrr.u during ihe next ten years.
J
Expected improvements in sensors,and numbers of ASW-capable unitsan improved capabilily for oven trail. In view of ihe counrcractions available to the USorce.
overt trail would probably noi afford ineeliable capabilily for continuous (failing. Moreover, ihe initiation of oven trailing would alert the US to Soviel intentions longirablc number ofat sea would be threatened.
Wide-Area Surveillance Systems
n effective wide-area surveillance system would not only have io search wide areas of the open ocean, but also need ioigh probability
detection and low probability of false alarm. For use inysiem. airborne platforms offer potential for high search rain because of their high speed. The Soviets, however, would have to develop the required sensors. They are eiperimeniing with radar and IR dnectioo of submarine surface wakes for use inAn IK detection system would be particularly sensitive to weather conditions, as well as submarine depth andadar Ins so We estimate that the Soviets could possibly deploy an IK system within ihe
nexl ten yen is. Ihi( there ii much uncertainty on thc iiroluliilityof valid detection thai might be achieved with *uth at iyilem We are uncertain about the feasibility uf airt>orne radars for submarine detection. In any cane, wc believe il unlikely that an effective system OKI be developed and deployed in the nexl ten years
lectromagnetic fixed detection system could be deployed but. because of the short deieaion range, ii i* not expected to enhance appreciably Soviet capabilities to detect -SSHNi P
eoukl have an "iomiotnlbated on ihis advanced technology during iheten years. Development of an
effective operational system would requite lhal the Soviets make substantial improvements in present sonar
signal protesting and in the means for roordi nation
among the various search platforms.
inally, wc do noi eapeci the deployment of any spaccbnrnr nr fixed submarine detection systems capable of fulfilling the wide-area surveillanceduring the next ten years
"Jl.imiiations of geography and the Soviet lechnutogy in underwater cable systems, as well as the quirincsxubmarines, rule out deployment of an effective fixed long-range surveillance system such
ns NOSUS.
3 ELF
systems are probably limited lo ranges of letsun.
he Sovietsesearch and development, program in magnetometers for magnetic anomaly detectionnd are experimentasers Ihat could have an application to ASW.^
^jThese programs are not expected toignificant impact on wide-area search in lhe next ten years, because of the short detection ranges of magnetometers and the major advances whirl) would be needed in laser technology to achieve boih high search rales and adequate penetration wiih the sea.
Tthr
Soviets could develop high-performance hull-mounied or (owed acoustic arrays. Such systems based on current technology would increase somcwha( (he Soviel general ASW capability, bui they would likely prcienr only modest improvements in lhe Soviets' ability io delect SSHNi in thc open ocean Recentnified US research and development in acoustic arrays and sijnat processing indicates the possibility of relatively long-range acoustic detection by both fixed and lowed arrays While the Soviets could exploit such research ands unlikely ihat they
17
Assessment
SI Soviet AMV research and development over the next ten yean will almost certainly include continued efforts io achieve the capability io successfullya coordinated iirike. The cumulative cfleci ofacroii lhe broad from of Soviet ASW-rclaied retcitrch and development will improve Soviet capabilities. Wc expect ihe Soviets to eoneeniraie on trying lo overcome present shortcomings in broad area ocean surveillance and in long-term trailur assessment of lhe prospects for .Soviet success in iheie areas depends heavily on our evaluations of Soviet sensor developments and data handling systems We have limited knowledge of Soviet progress in ccnain technical areas in which an eflernvc sensor syriem might be developed^
asicnmeni of Soviet prospects ised by gaps in our knowledge of Soviet progreisn.'in basic technologic? applicable io ASWdevelopment
rom what we do underiiand about Soviet research and development programs, and about the inhrsufugical difficulties and operational problemstheir deficiencies, we conclude thai Soviet cilortc have little prospect for achieving anapability Inoordinated strike agm'nvi ihc entire Western KSilN force during the neat
ANNEX SOVIET ASW TECHNOLOGY
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