AFTER MAO: FACTORS AND CONTINGENCIES IN THE SUCCESSION

Created: 8/1/1976

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

CONTENTS

Pagr

INTItODlCTORV I

PRINCIPAL 3

'NIK DISCUSSION

Mihi'i IVIrrlinuU.ni

Aconi anil

Thrrcie

An Mlrrc.ptcd

R'viill cfjirxial

A Sovlrt Miliiary

hilurr DMrtlxilinfi nf

Nt. Otmmandrnir,n

A Prmllik Uqiillalik-

Tliirr Irtpvapublr

Tht Rrla.fc.nUHp lo Mao'i "Tho.iRhl"

"hVhanllllillnn" or

Th*oviet-AnwHcun Trlnndc

11cm

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

Tlie reason for writing ihls paper ii that Man Tsc-lung. who has dominated (lie Chinese Communist Party (CCP) for more tlmiiears, may soon hr totally incapacitated or dead, und (lint his degree of flnmiimirice hus licrri Mich lliut his departure will profoundly affect the Chinese scene, regardless of whether violence Is avoided.

The enormous power und authority of ihe Chairman must somehow beiigtecmenl ih llirougliu number of successors. This paper allrmpls to identify the key figures und contending dictions.

This paper is organic! sequentially, considering factors and contingencies in three peiiods: prior to Man's death, around the time of death, and after deathewn the first period, the question of access to and influence on Mao arises. In the second period, there urr nt least three dramatic possibilities: an attempted coup In Peking. Intervention hy Military Region leuders outside Peking,oviet utlack. In the third period, poweristrihuled. and there veem Io In- ut least three inescapable policy-questions for those who share in it: their relationship to Moo'sheir altitude toward the "rehabilitation" of leaders brought down in ihe Cultural Revolution, and their management of the Chinese position In the Sinn-Soviet-American triangle. (II is recognized that oilierconlroveruul issues migiiliuken up on their merits cr fur factional advantage.)

Throughout this paper, the wordsnd Itlglitlsl(s) nre used to indicate points on the Chinese jNilitieal spcctrii.n.e words do not imply fixed and predictable positions on every possible Issue. ImiI refrr In apparent predilections. These designations are assigned In Individuals and factions primarily in terms of apparent allegiiince to and fervor for Mao's fundamental revolutionary vision.

This revolutionary vision (put summarily) calls for the creation, through continuing "classompletely politicized und selfless, ideologically-motivated man. and of an egalitarian and largely self-sufficient China, in which differences between mental and manual Injur, industry and agriculture, the city and the countryside have been abolished. It also culls for the creation of Maoist-type Communist

a

parties, responsive lo ihr CCP, lo lake power in other countries; but this objective ha Increasingly conflicted with, ami been lubordlnatrd to. Mao's Intense nationalism aod the nrrd as he has seen It to protect China's national security against Soviet "social-Imperialism."

It Is hoped thai this presentation of selected factors and contingencies will be of some value to Ihe reader In the months ahead, even though much of the paper isijcctural.

i

tunes-

principal judgments

Maoppears to be deteriorating rapidly, and China Is probably already under some degree of "collective" leadership.

Those with the greatest access to Mao, and in lhc best position to iniluence whatever decisions he is able to make In his last months, appear to be the Centrist llua Kuo-feng, Mao'i latest and current favorite, and the police figure Wong Tung-hslng. the hend of Mao's personal bodyguard. Hua will probably bear the mark of Mao's favor into the post-Mao struggle, although this will not ussure Hua's primacy In the successor leadership.

DRAMATIC, BUT UNLIKELY, POSSIBILITIES

There is abe takena coup at the time of Mao's death. The passed-over and unpopular Leftists, feaiful about their futures, or Rightist military leaders, fearful of the Leftists, might conspire with the most Important figures of the physical securityleaders of the Peking Military Region (MR) ond of the smaller Inner-core forces. However, the key security figures seem unlikely to cooperate in any coup. Moreover, any hypothetical group of conspirators would have to have the cooperation or assent of the main-forrc armies of the Peking MR (not Just the MRtherwiseup could be quicklyoup wouldigh risk of splitting the military forces of the MR. leading to armed clashes umung them, in turn risking the spread of armed conflict throughout China.ll of the post-Mao leaden would probably wish to avoid this.

Intervention in the succession process by leaders of theRs outside Peking seems most unlikely unless Peking itself istate of chaos ond the conflict has spread further. While th? Russianstale of civilto provide substantial material supportroup of MR leaders whom ihey believed to be pro-Soviet, rm such lenders can now be Identified, and the central leaders are unlikely to allow the situation to deteriorate to the point that either the outlying MR leaders or the Russians would attempt to intervene.

-we* pi

A Soviet attack on China at the time of Moo's death seems the least likely of the dramatic possibilities. There are too many obstacleseaningful military ot political victory for Ihe Russians. Beyond this, with Mao's death there willualitatively new political situation for Moscow to try to exploit. The sensible course for the Russians, with Iheir most Implacable enemy departed, will be to talk, not fight.

A TENSE "COLLECTIVE"

Mao's successors, even If they have been working reasonably well together during Mao's deterioration, and even if they avoid violence ot lhc time of Moo's death, will stillifficult problem in distributing power among themselves In the Immediate post-Mao period. This will be cspcr hilly Inie If the leaders decide tn retire the post of Chairman, winch would place Hua Kuo-fengollision course with the Leftist Chang Chun-chlao for the post of Secretary-General of the Party, then the Party's topmost position.howdown in the Politburo. Hua would seem likely to attract more votes and toetter claim to the support of military and securityhe preferable course would seem to he to retain the Chairmanship, dividing power between Hua {continuingime as First Vice-Chairman) and Chang (continuing as Secretary-Central).

No one person, whatever his title, will be able to dominate Ihe Porty as Mao had. Nor. probably, can any singleCentrist, Rightist. Leftist, or other. The group that dominates will probably prove to be some comltination of the strongest figures from all points of the political spectrum.

In addition lo the difficulty of calculating the perceptions of various leaders as to one another's strengths (especially, military/security support) too little is known of the personal character of the conjectured key figures toonfident judgment as to whether all or most of them would prove able to subordinate their serious differences wilh others, and their personal ambitions, to the common good. On balance, however, it seems likely thai moil of the key figures, actingense of national Interest, will he able to agree upon some form of "collective"which, at leastime, will conceal the extent of their differences.

A POSSIBLE EQUITABLE ARRANGEMENT

Thereossible distribution of power among themportant figures which would seem equitable to outside observers. The center-line

in such ii "collective" would run through the Center of the Chinese politicalIn Chinese terms, ullhough slid more "revolutionary" than. say. the leadership of the Communist Party of Ihe Soviet Union. The constellation would be:

Centrist Hua Kuo-feng.s the Party's principal officer;

leftist Chang Chun-chlao,s next-ranking officer or Premier;

Rightist old Marshal Yehnd the "wild card" Chenemaining respectively Minister of Defense and Commander of the Pelting MR. the principal figures of the Military Affain Committee which controls and directs Ihe armed forces;"

Centrist Chi Tcng-kucl. in hb. remaining the Party's supervisor nf organizational work and the other key figure (first political officer) of the Peking MR. and becoming the back-upr Chang In the Party or governmental structure;

"wildangontinuing In the role of director of the Party's political security apparatus (secret police);

of the above, plus one of the lessernow second-ranking Vice-Chairman, young Wong Hung-wen,r Madamer the propagandist Yao Wen-yuan, aboutcomposing the bulk of the Politburo Standing Committee, the core of Party power; and

Rightist Chiaohe very able protege of Chou Kn-lui, continuing as Foreign Minister.

CENTRIST POLICIES

A centrist leadership nf this kind would be expected to take Centrist positions on three Inescapable policy-questions: the group's relationship to Moo'she concept ofnd the Sino-Sovlet-American triangle.

Mno's successors will almost certainly affirm their fidelity to hisn the Interest of continuity ond because they have Ijccii so

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Intimately associated with hh policies. Some of ibe disruptive manifestations ofowever, can and very probably will be modified, but quietly, employing other aspects of the "thought" to Just.fy this.

Mao's policy ofthousands of Partv cadres, government functionaries, and military leaders brought down In the Cultural Revolution, many of whom ire again in importantprobably be reaffirmed, although many will remain purged. Any attempt by Leftist leaders to reverse this policy would probably lead to their own downfall.

Mao's successors may move to reduce the tension in the Slno-Soviet relationship, even in the Immediate post-Mao period. For example, thereood dance that the Chinese will quietly modify their demands In the border dispute. This might be seen as having the additional advantage of inducing the US to move more rapidly toward "normalization" of relations with Peking.

It Is not expected, however, thut the Chinese willolicy of equidistance from the USSR and the US. The probability seems strong that the USSR will remain the "mainnd that Mao's successors will persist in lhe policy of attempting to use the UStrategic counterweight to the USSR. If for no other reason than that Peking's exploration of the potential of the US connection ha* not yet been completed,ny constellation of post-Mao leaden could be expected to continue the process of exploration, even while complaining that the pace of "normalization" of relations is too slow.

the discussion

DETERIORATION

Moo Tar-tung.rcemlier. ho< appeared lo I* oXnliMRlfrut taptilly since Matchyear. He Iicoted lo the point that he no longet inukri even brief appewanm. and he may Isecome totally Incaparllatrd. ot dir. within thr nesl Ir. months. (See phnlocniph.)

As olao Impressed perceptive fntfljtn vhltnn ai Kill clearly (hr diiminant figure In China, and ll was Just al lhat time Ihal Mao personally set In motion ihe process (hat was to culminate- In the purge ol Teng Hsiao-pingao was Mill lucid In Dccrmhet and JanuaryJ

|Un gJ February, he md lot oboul on ooui andinutes with fofiner Hiesldent NUon.

Mao did not appcor again untilarch, al which lime heong Impression of dtmlnlihed rigor.

Mun appeared Iwlee In April (or brief conons. In Ihe ircond uf llte*e. lieew fogllsh'tatigiinge Interpctfr.orvanl-edunilrtt Chi Cltaocbu. suggesting n( leust the ptmlhltll)retl forlrk-wllled enough to 'cover' for Man on occasion, concealing ptmlble gaps In Mao'i comprehension and supplying plausible amwen when Moo could noi.

Again In May Mno nppeated twice briefly, lo Ung vetv enfieliled. Ills head lolled, he was clearly partially paralyzed on his right side, snd may have lieen partially naralynd on hb left.

8 decblon to give up the post of state cholnrnuX ot even lo have aequietccd In It. raittd

*ll may rravmalil) br*hy, ll'l.l. CmlcHt,rtimrd thr Onliht Him Kwitinrant

vrq andiun.hlan) *hnhlrtafrhlfalhI"

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rfctvt hi Man'. Krai. Thr apntn-nthal Maonlldmrr Intilltly lo mntlnK China'.In thran tnr. In II- ahrad. ami Ihal hr thmr Una a. Ihr third admlnho.tn. In.ml thin. Ini.nnt an Idrnbif nrallotirttiafna. anda. thrnnr otl|ial lir.it.nant. id ihrIStnhavrIn kWt (aim until Kw draih. (Sm pW"c'aph nn twiranor fntird nn Man by nlKrt Wadrrv hart In ihr irnw Ihal lliaa -a. la. Man .a*aan HVr Minn.rmild I*

hr lsltl-.lt -hllr ran aliar-liMi* rimwi a. a

RllhthlMan .hiiprd dxrl nl fi-raall. dnlcnatlm linn

hllIhr nay lhat thr MintIn i'.n. hail hm

dnlinaint

CHANG CHUN-CHIAO

In ihr degree tn which Moo could still (Itiminnir ihr Parly lendrnh.p. and ai la thr degree |oc Lira ml phi already be under"aaAnaW* Iradeohtp

of mkl-Augwl ihrtrmm reason lo believe thatill makinghr shiftardet line (by various Chinrte tpnkconcn. in talks with Americans)on (he problem of Taiwan than premier llua Kuo-feng had brrncounterproductiveprobably hnsr hrm ImpmrH only !jy wmrone with *rcutrr utilhi-Hy lhan llua. which narrows ihr lirld lo onr man. Mnn hlmsell, who it known to havempatience aboul ihh louril"ir ol Mao's total iorapacitation. it mini hr peCMimrd lhat Mao rs Mill ahlr lo imrorne effectivelyhmnrs to do an.

flrri Influence: Various nbwrvrri havrthat Man will no! won dlr,conliwiln* to .tVtrrinrMr until hr notitdnminatr ihr Tarlv Intl cannot even lair

part in ihr dcrisiim-making nrocr*s. to iholimply drin* iiirrf by others actin* in hi< name.

THrrr wouldIn br alIwo ilacn In Hichdrctlnr. Onr would I* that InrtcritKutrJ bill till) outhoiltallvr Man Is Increasingly JuscrpIlM* lo Ihrncr nf the lew other leaders who havr acees* la him (perhaps ibe Mage thai wrinnd thr olhrr would hr that in which hr would bregetable.ntn In hh laM months. allow-In*hird possible Mage In which thr onr condlllnn" into thr olhrr.

In recent nsonlhs. (hose who havr visibly hadMao arr ot course those who havr apprarrdIn hit mretlt.gs with foreign visitors- Firstand Premier llua Kuo-lm*.Chlao Kuan-hua. and Mao'i Interpreter*In his mote peivalr llfr. in whfciiarr made, there arr probably at trailMadame Mao.lmay Mill br Tne mmrtri

secretariat (managing hh mall and running hism* Won* Tung-lnlng, the hrrtd nf his jiroonalhere arr probably others who havr access occasionally, Including some or all ol Ihr other lhm active members <be*kfe> Mao and llua) of Ihr Polilburo Standing Committee; thr Leftisti Chan*iao and (po-iibly) Wan*(wo trader* pu"rd over when Hua waslhe Righlnl old Manhal Teh Chlen-ylng.

Thus leadinr figures of ihr Center. ItK and Hlght all Uill havr

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Chanto* many yeon theforemeit economic ipecloliit, tel oiid* Innd cit-fiied crvriog tht Cuhvrol Rarolutionj Mil altv* but inodive.

liv Shoo-cM, Moo'i tint 6evtc >ont Irom thet whitf.h* -oi AWidttigrtoredtghetl-ronaing victim of lha Cultural Stvolt/hor, andprime jymbot ol of OOpOWHOn lo Moo'i policiti; hot mod* no'ler motlthough may Hi* br olive.

g.omuiant figure forhanrot

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oport Iron In rHok- Ot thr ou-fcorify tor- policy, cmW b. jvdged.

Tmg Ht-oo-ping. Srcretory-Grnrrol of thrfej Snoo-cbi'l principol deputy in ihrurged with li*rihoblfctoted- by Moo, ond returned to po-er3 (with Chou'i illneti) wot wielding po-rr lecond only to Moo'i,-under ottodcopitalitifoadrr" tincreploredot thottime oi Attingremoved Ironn

(ina mililary leader, tucterded Liu Shoo-thi at Moo'i lilt

lieutenantnd9 wot designatedthr Port,t Moo't WHiiieu (lothrdMaooup ogoimt Mooot Medotfi io MongofcoWringmrM purge.

I

Of Ihrte figures, lluaIs Ihr nearcsla dcstgnsted successor, named ai Seniortlie man In whom Mao In rrcrnlIhe greatest

at been "observed loime and warm personal relationship wilh Mao. and hat one ati vanillic none of the other* hot: he speaks Mao'i language. Moo's native Hunonese* Wans Tiinj;-lulng hat lorn ihe leader physically closest tn Man sinceumlonl companion, even accompanying Moo on his Iravrh (which Madame Mao donhile Wong cannot maintain In his mm person an unbroken vigil overhe securily forces -Mlnit, believed lo be directly responsible lo Wang, con ond probably do Wang teems to be completely identified tilth Moo. to want what Mao wants, although Vt'org may (um out toind of hitind already busy making calculations os lo what fjcllohal group In the leadership It would he mosl advantageous to hlmtcll lo support, ihe presumption has lo be thai Wang I*upporter of Man'smarked fovorlle. Hua

In sum. ot all stages nf Mao's hypothetical deterioration, ll seems likely thai Hua Kuo-feng. telnftitsvd by Wangng. will have ihe greotesl access lo Moo and Ihe greatest influence wlih him. ond will he In the besl position of any leader totry tnMoo'l mi-r

Neverthdrss. so long as Mao retains (he loyalty of ihe physical ond political security apparatuses, he can probaMv continue lo make whatever changes he likes in the Pally leadership, and some of ihose with access In him may be attempting lo manipulate him Into making vrnie

Il It not hard to Imagine Iht pusird-ovrr and demotes! leftists endeavoring lo persuade Man lhat Ihr reall/ollon of hit revolutionary obfecllvet con be accomplished only If then iheir

t hard In imagine ihe Centrist and Rightist leaden with access to Mao Irving tn bring Mm In believe thai ibc leftists still have loo much potential for disruption, and should he deprived of

j Shaml tn Wh China. hnl arrvrd In.

,i those Importantl'atosts which ihey Mill have.

urther prnublc tbat Hua Kuo-feng. now in line to succeed Moo. tecognlrJng the importance oflindly loyal teesirily chief snd having doubts si lo whether Wsng Tung-hung would give to him snythlng like Ihe loyalty that Wang has given Moo. will ultrmjrt in transfer more and more of lite overall securily senium Inln his own (Hun's) liur-ib before Mao's death. Hua may regard some one of hb own Ileuterants os having predseh/ (he qualities he requiresecurity chief

The prmibtlillei for eiercblngMso ore of course many, too many to enumerate On balance. om concludes thst Hu. will be able lo survive ss the mosl importonl figure after Mao himself, and thst he will have Wong's support as Mao would wbh, although xie cannot count un ll.*

THREE DRAMATIC POSSIBILITIES

There ore some dramatic and highly disruptive conlingendes lhat could occur on Mao'ie most Important of theseoup employing military and wornd form of the Peking MR. military intervention by tome of thef theRs outside Peking,oviet attack on China An attempted couperious possibility; Ihe other two seem most unlikely except in the eventoup.

AnCoup: The possibilityoup has to he taken seriously, because of the sharp differences among vaiious leaders and because Ihere are forces in Peking which could probably bringoup, ol least initially The psssed-over snd unpopular Leftists, fearfulen futures, ot Rightist military leaders, fearful of ihe Isflbls. might conspire wlih the most important figures of the physical securilyleaders of the Peking MR and ol themiilirrheir opponents and even Ihc Centrist figures like Hua Kuo-feng who have kept the hulance. The three key physical securily figures, adlng (usl hy themselves, could probably carry

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iiultuivettlul roup. The qur*tlon of whrll-rr (hrir will bran altrmptrdhr lime of Man'* death (no realeenthai time)put In the form of Who will b> the first lo leotn of Mint death? Who. that b, mlghl have privale kirf/wlrdgr nf the death cm for an hout or Iwo, and might iherrliy I*etition to !ttne ordeo in Mao's name which would be nccepled ai pin.eedlng from Mao and would be acted on?

Thrrr teem only llmlled gains In be made by being lhe 'finl In know' oflh. if Indeedny 'finl' Thetrrsimtiancr* of Mao's lavt days may lie inch that olhrr keyperatlrg In learnt, will Itriiblr lo keepund lhe rforV at ftiald to have Irren then the death of Stalin, In order lo keep any onr nf (hem from having private knowledge. Even on Ihr attumpllom lhat thl* t* not done and thaiTung-htlng himtelf I* nol on lhe icene. (he hndyguard lone* protecting Mao (at lhe Soviet police were protecting Stalin) could br expected to report at once lo Wang

ThereiliIIIt) that Wang, acting on hitr in concert with some principal to whom he had secretly pledged allegiance, couM moveonly lhe forcet irspontlve loellcct the orrrst nf crrtaln other Party leadersthe remaining leaders were even awake. Bui thb wmarta koks implausiblerctiriiy forces would have lo br perfrcthjr rrsponsive lo him that is. eadi ol hfs deputies ordered lo arresi one ol Ihe top leaders ol Ihe Parly land, necestnrily. hit entire family, and Imutehold staff, in order to keep the fact from being modr known to other top (Iguies) *ould have to hr willing to take tuch etlreme action without attempting In vert'y lhat lhe order did in fad come Irom Mao. and all of thr block* ol arretit would have lo br prrlectly coordinated, carried out al ihr tame moment at several different point* In Peking,rder In prrtcrvr secrecy and prevent the nmhllliaflon of stronger military force* by other leaden *

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One venion of |hh scenario Is lhal Wang and Madame Mao might act logether (with Madame Mao informing Wang if tbe weee the llrsl lon behalf ofhanghaiwhich sheilmed. Thii presumes thai Madame Mao ha* persuaded Wang, contrary lo the vblblrhat tl was Moo's will io have these true "revolutionary luccetson" In fad luccred him.

A tomewhol more plausible form of aplauilble lhan simultaneous oritilt throughoutbe one In which all of Ihr lopummoned lo Ihe deathbed ofdying or (unbeknownslem) already dead Mao. al which timection i> arrested by Wang's imall sccurily force on the icrtie. on behalf ofot her taction. But it seerm likrly lhal those summoned would have alerted others, to that ibis could not lie carried cut In secret.

In anyhr entireon of the morning after Even If Wang and lib pelndpab were prepared to arrest andumber of the other top leaden (an art Ion whkh might tet loose all of the powerful form In China making lor instability andhey would have lo hove lhe cooperation or astern of other military forces in Ihe Peking area, especially the main-force armlet of the Peking MR: olhrrwhe, Ihe coup could be quickly reverted. And even il Ihey did have Ihe mllilory'i cooperation or aurnt, ihe military would beosition to dominate the leadership emerging from lhet Is hard to helirve lhat any of lhe civilianoewillingly arrange what would be Inilitary dictatorship

ranilftrralUHi* havr been 'UmKml nrrfirllv In"Mlbtuy fnem Inand lhe Srrurfly <d

leaden"

Those in the best position to carryoup would term to be ihe three most Important figures oi the physical *ccuilly opparaluss|ng at thr Inner core and Chro lltl-llen and Chi Trng'kurl, respectively Commander and 1st Political Of (leer nf ihe Peking MR, lo whom the main-force armlet of the MR would probably be rrtponslvr. at least Initially. (Seehese ihree. each of them perhaps acting in Ihr belief that he would not otherwltr hold high position In the pott-Mao leadership (or even in lhe bellel lhal he would

otherwise tif purgedon errothery octlng together could probably eatlly dispose ot* the four principal leftists, who do not com no nd Ml her regular or securily form Wang, Chen, and Chi could probably prevail against Hua kuo-feng loo. orany other group

However, ibh hypothetical troika would also have lo face the problem of the morning after. Jinllfying tltrir aciions lo ihe miliiary forces they had employed In the coup and to military forces throughout China. They might be sufficiently persuasive touccessful armed rebellion against themselves (another way In whichmilitary dictatorship could come toIs ihe reason foroup as morearginal possibility.oup even by these three key figures would seem toigh risk of splitting the military forces nf the Peking MR leading to armed clashes among elements of them. In turn risking the spread of aimed conflict throughout Chinatale of anarchy or dvil war. This situation would carry the greatest risk of Soviet Intervention, In Ihe form of support of selectrd elements of Ihe armed forces or of an outright Soviet attack Those who are In Ihe best position lo carryoup each of whom Is on record as hard-linewould probably be unwilling lo accept suds risks

Rrtolt of thrdrn Thrrr has long been speculation thai the MRcalled ihe powtvful MRfordhly Intervene In ihe succession pmcest. Such speculation has perhaps been strengthened byns k)on ihal, ot tbe several MR commanders who teemed lopossibly tosome degree of polilical foible as of5 (at least one or two of whom seemed likely act to survive Ibeir prolonged nominations) not one has yetIf Mao and other leaders were afraid to move again; any o* them or were beingy central miliiary leaders (See map. facing )

ll still seerm to be lb* cose, howevtr. thai the MR leaden are not very powerful outside of their military regions (and can be bypassed even wiihtnhe purge of several of ihrm In the Lin Plao offolr. the most transfer of MR commandersite replacement of several career military men by career Party cadres In polilical officer posls. Ihe removal of MR commanders from th-lr most Important polilical posls (apart from Iwo Instances In which the MR commanders are known to be ihc first secretaries of the Party committees of their headquartrn; there may bebe additional Indoctrination glsm them In the anti-Un ond onli-Cnnfudut campaign and the "Water Margin" campaign. Ihe continuing rcorganidation of regional ond provincial command*

(and pruhahlt nf ma In-(race armlet, although these changes arr rn*land othri actfcmt have cearnbtnedeturn tne MR leaden lo whal at-orat lo la* die tulionllnatr limit Innt which the* had accepted without scrlmi* challenge In lhc yron More lhc Ctillurnl Involution and continued In accept tlurlnfitural Revnhillon.

drn outildc Peking Mill do not appear tonified, purpmlvr gnwp. No nn<Ir MR outside Prklng could pmtlhly conduct aoffensivel thr capital with It* own resource* It would hr very difficult (althourh not imprmlblc) for Ihe leaden iiff Mil* Insonsplrr Urcvrvtfully. iipultylo Ihrl* all alone Ihrhem to bring their force*i.o

ill the marginal possibility of the atr of bombers ot missiles located In the various MRt bringeking. Bui tlie probability remains tlutt Ilie commarvd-anj-control tyMem It secure, and il it hard to ice how tuch wcapunt could br rmploycd effectively In any case.

Three aho remaint Ihe posMhlhiy of Soviet material supportey MRhenyang)roup of MRt, giving those forces (hr capability for tuslalned oprrationt which they do nol now have, but ihis doet nolc-)ous possibility unless armed conflict in Pelilng Itself spreads throughout Chinallualion approaching inal of civil war, and some etVmcntt of Ihe contend int. forces make known to Moscow lhal Iheyeconciliation with the USSR.

Ftirlbri. having comr through Ihr public demonstrations thai surrounded (lie moss mourning fnr Cboii Kn-lol and Ihr changes In lhe leadership (al which time every MR lined up lo proclaim ill tupport nf Ihe changes) lhc central leadership is not Lkrly lo let any pnlilksslhe continuing ontl-Tengin nut ol control as lo moke II necessaryeturn Ihr mililary to political power Ihrmighnii! China. NHlher It Prklng likely lo alarmR leadrrs iiyarge-scale purge of Ibem

II Millue lhal only lhe leaders of the Peking MR (dlwwstrd abovr In connectionoup) hare suhunntial capability In affect the thapr of thr tuti-rsslnn. rllhrr by making Iheir weightactualthe tidesmtender or grw. af contenders or by tending (bell forces Inln action To do lhe latter would,rd above. Incur .uhMuntial risk.

Thut II Milt teems Inie. as II did In rnrlyluil tlieiisr fur lhe regional leaden In Ihr period In which Ihreing thnprd. and thr tourse which mosl If not all of Ihem are likely lo follow, li lo be pasdve. accepting whatever arran^mentt oreil InM as the, did tn April) Il ihey do refrain Irom attempting lo iBterfrre (simply voting or counselling at Indh-ldualt when invited lo dohey are likely lo conllnue lo be iubrii.nl lolly rrprrtrnted In lhc new PtJllburo, to hove greater Innitencr In the Politburo titan lltey havr thus 'rr hod. and. In nvntl eases, to retain iheir present pod* andbetter situation. In manyhan lo I* caught up In Ihe hazardous infighting in Peking

A ImM Mililaryome otacrvert ha re long believedovlrl attack on China al the lime of Moo'itrongossibility presumably enhanced by lhe Soviet observation in recent moo iht lhat lhe leodenhlp has failed lo maintain lit "unit; andnd by ihe aound conclusion lhal II will not magically become unified by Mao'i death. There Is evidence that the Chinese Ihcmtclvrt genuinely fear the possibilityoviet attack at lhal tune.

A caj- can be made for It: essentially, lhat lhe Russians have believed for yean that ibe largest rrsrrvott of pro-Soviet tcntimrnl (or perhaps more prrebely. of Ihr least strong anti-Sovieto br found In lhe Chinese military; that some Chinese mllllory leaden muy Intervene In lhe tuccestlon process In order In prevmi the accession Iu power of the LrftrM (and moM anti-Soviet)nd thai those leader, would be willing to undertake foinl Cipcratinns with Soviet forces In thbnsslUy disalfected military leader. LI Tr-sheng. removed Irom hb pottice-chairman of the Party In5 and severely criticized before and after. It till) the Commander of lhe Shenyang MR. (he NoctheaM area throughoviet ground attack would presumably come (as It didgalnM Jartanrsrith ot withoutr-thmgolitburond would proUliI)

ooailriril Inrn InChlna'i

Regnal awlleadrn tU>ln In ihr lahlm,'

not rare iu rxdionge hisosition foe permanent statusraitor, another Uno doubt that Soviet force* could drive deep Into the Northeait and force the Chinese hack, into ihrir last recourse ofvar."

hen the level of Chinese provocationSino-Soviet border was high, Ihe Russiansencouragf.PIbc

view lhat they might attack China!uciear strike nr conventional meant or both, and the Chinese were clearly alarmed by this. Moreover. In the years since. Soviet sptnVesmcn have occoslonally Indicated lhat present Soviet policy toward China is the "soflest" possible, that there are forces In the Soviet leadership whichuch harsher policy, forces held In check by Breihnev'ssober coalition. But9 the Chinese generally have refrained from military provocation, and the Russians have repeatedly disclaimed, again both publldy and privately, any Intention lo strike Ihe Chinese In the absence of such provocation. It seems virtually certain that, at ihe lime of the succession, ihe Chinese (who showed Iheir alertness In the problem during the leadershlpchanges In April) will take core not to offer any military provocation to Ihe USSR, any cose foe the "hawks" in the Soviet, leadershipobably really rJo exist, and who probably do figure In Chinese calculations).

The Soviet disclaimers con probably be accepted. There ate sound military and political reasons for not allocking China at anyhe probability of bogging down huge forces for yearsand action, the stigma of first use of nuclear weapons and the Inability of such wMpom to distinguish between friends ond enemies, the Chinese capabilitylimited) nuclear counter-strike, the Impossibility of successful occupation of Chinarolonged period, (he Importance of not "freezing" Chinese hostility for decades or centuries lo come, end so on

There are additional reasons for not intervening at the time nf the succession: the possibilityoviet attack, far from Increuslng whatever disunity existed in the Chinese leadership, would draw the Chinese leaders together lo act against what Ihey would see as Ihe won! of all situations, subordination to the USSR; the', own ignorance of Ihe Chinese leadership, their Inck nf evidence as lo whichan "patriots" Ihey hove spokenmight effectively Intervene on Isrhalf of (tbey seem genuinely not In know which of the current leaders, If elevated to supreme power by Soviet arms, might turn out to be reliablythe qualified sense thai, say. Peng Te-huolnd the lock of assurance, even if they see some combination of central and regional military leaders rising up against the civilian leaders at (he lime nf Ihe succer^ Ion. that the group would be able to survive or If in power would be pro-Soviet.*

As previouslytale of civil war In China might seriously tempt the USSR to extend support Io (he most p'omhlng contenders, and this argument holds for the possibilityoviet attack asoviet attack seems mostIs, leastmiliiary as well as political power is frngmenled throughout China, so lhat Soviet military Intervention would not appear so nakedly to be undertaken againstne good reason for regarding Ihe possibilityoviet attack as marginal Is that there seemsarginal possibility Ihal the Chinesedisunited andallow ihe situation to deteriorateondition of civil war.

Beyond this, the strongest reason for refraining from military intervention is that, wilh Mao's death, Ihe Russians willualitatively new situation to exploit, without Incurring any stigma or risk. Their most Implacable enemy will have departed, and the successor group Is bound lo feel Insecure, more vulnerable to Soviet polilical Initiatives. There are surely advantages to the Russians In reducing Chinese hostility if possible The sensible course for the Russians, and the one that they arc expected to follow, before, during, and at leastime after the succession, will be lo talk, not fight.

FUTURE DISTRIBUTION OF POWER

No Commanding Figure or Faction: Assuming, then, that the three key figures of thr physical securily apparatus do notoup In the hours surrounding Mao's death, that there Is no revolt by thr MR leaders, and that there Is no Soviet attack. MansIf ihey have been working reasonably wellcollective" during the period of Mao's

atrial eumlnanMi in .Jilmv Intlm In tram nf

Ihrl TSan.Sn.trl Drb-iwr? The

t IhM'i leailm"

PRESENT CONCENTRATION OF POWER

(active and central. In order of rank)

Standing Committee:

Mm Twituit, Chunin

Hua Kuv-lmf.Vke-Ch.

Wan,

Veh

CtUuii ChuctUao

FuO Member*

Oung (Madam* Mao)

Yao Wcovaan

vrUro

Chen !t.

Chi Teng-kuet

Wang Tuni-hnng

WuTe

SECRETARIAT (conjectured)

Agrlculiurr. Security

CramLit

SrWiry-Crorcal (aV^cW)

Culture (Mao'i ptnonal icerelartil?)

ISot-raod.

Economic Affain

Partv and Man

rollflcal Security, n,ffice

IH Secretary.

MILITARY AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

Chaman

Standini Ctle

Vlor-ChalnriM

Senior Vlce-Ch.

Standing Cite Dir. Cen Pol. Drpt

Standing Cite Standing Ctle Standing Cite*

STATE COUNCIL (known)

(no bead of Kate) Premier

Minuter of Detenteat tillII tMIn

2nd Vice-Premier

Jed NVe-rVouer. Commander, Peking MR

4thrmker.PoMXf. Peking MR

1ft PoiOff. Peking Cannon

sllllrrlusrs problem In distributing power mining themselves in the Immediate pint'Man period.

First, will iherc be any single commanding figure' That it.here any one of the umvsvors lo whom the .Hheni would* eipectriJ to lurn lot leadership3

If Cltou En-kl were still alive and well. Chou would proUUy be that man. lor rr-nj id the leadership (all Inil Ihe hardnd. if he had lasted. Ten* lltiao-ping might ciaoccivalily have been In Chou'* partition. In tlieir alweiiee. no one teem* lo Hand nut. as hatingational-level IrunVr lor mon> yean,csmimandlng greatit demonstrated othlevemenli over the rangeeader's concern, and atut Ihetime vigorous and vital, prnfecting Ibc Image o( (lie new China.

YIH CMKN-YING

Of tlsete lour pulatlveYeh. Chang, and Chen. In order of currentassume the Chairmanship tmnv dlately upon or very soon after Mao's death, assuming lhat Parly leadeneed for another Chairman so soon. Hua Kuo-feng would teem lo have ihe best chance Thb com vision missdgmenl that mosl of Mao's succettorv In the Immrdietr pns|-Mao period, would find ll easier lo group temporarily around Mao's own choice as his principal mcct-tuu lhan tbey would around anyone ebe. lhatietter-spjalified lhan Yeh. and that thereess objection lo ihe smooth, pleasant Hal Ihon loang or Chen."

iii- Iilm nr4ist Vke-(hj'imn" ib ahlih ilhli rnuItarlMenIM tactred tn Ihr f'tbUrniamJiifi antniauAtially ll tprofir. liwirad thai

pVaur. owalaa ntiml trlrrl ihr Chairman analPartytuao hy ihr "Onl >alaa hr aaadr wiy rapUli rlafinru wn

afpaWoarol anion aaaalnal rhr tvnanm ajoajog rVwanaUr

ihr aaallr. BOOaTJ rraarr a* Ihr Prwthaaa la an

nfilm aaadda taaal aaa miIhe ia laBaaroJim.

mtakalr iiaalfc la aiaaar. IJthrul.i* (lialimanUUp In th" anUrti rrrml ihal

tdd I* plaird hy ihrrwdll.tr ihrrai nlliurnratkm nay mUilnry and wvu.lly li.m iidllrlrm "urtn" ml|Sil Intlmn In any rvriu. Ihr

latmrtStMr dlUillmllnn id pnariUrh/ In *rprnd hra.dvpmeplinn tA Ihrutirmlrnhljh pmlilnn

si

m

m

Actually thereall pmtlliillty lhal thr Tartyretire ihe piit of Chairman Mao Sat made cvrn lhc noil to awrsoenr.ororn hlmtrll al thr national levrl,ay Iw retired mil of rripcet lot him. If to, prrtun -lily all uf ihfould disappear al iht* urne lime, leaving Muailh only ihe Prrmicti pot| ami pulling himollMon courte wllh (Slang Chun-chlao for lhc SeCTrlary-Grneroli pint, whkh would then he lhc Party'* motl Important pmllWn

Therelrongre pmulrlllly lhal lhe Partyime,rolonged period,hairman, because, for Ihe above reatoni im Putty leader would feel comfortable In the pott; hut lhal Ihe pott lltelf will nol helua could pretiimrfbly remain Flrtl Vice-chairman under tuchnd lhe de /acta leader of lhe Party, much at Ihe Military Alfalrt Committee (MAC) for year* hat been run by lit tence-Chain rai ThereeemfJ for some .at, Iradrr In lie recognized at the trnior figure,man lo convene lhe meeting*olitburo Standingecessary lo tonvene other Parly mertlngt (full Politburo, ripandrd Politburo, Central

Comniiltee) In lurn necessary lo wink out Ihr distribution of power and to put ihr Onlraleal of apfMoval on H, even II that mannothe coulddominate tuch meeting* Tn recognlre lhe designated first Vlce-Cholrman. llua. at lhal man would *rrm llir leotlr coiirtr.

Il would term lo make (hr Itetl trmr Inew Chairman,ollable period nf rr.nuinlng In whkh llua Ii recogniml a* ihr de faeto Chairman. Thr Chairman'tould then britey-Oneral'i pott, prrmllllng both llua and Chang to occupy key Party potlt and thutem Iu divide lhe power. Whalrvrr thr arrangement, noChang, orlie ahlr lo domlnalr Ihe Party at Mao had.

Ifo tingle commanding figure, neither don there teem lo Ite lhe pimped of any onr commanding faction

o nol appearave Ihe organ!ratMmal strength Chung Chun-chlun It lhc ttnmgctt figure in lhal group, but In recent years Ihrott hat not teemede anything likenwerfiil at II onre was (under Teng Huao-rnng)rs not teem Inirm grip onr-nl Political Departmentrip mainlalrted through hit own protege* which would

ensure ih obedience lo himartyang Hung wen mayice-Chairman of the MAC (in writ as of theui nn act only wilh ihf consent of olbrr MACa.li.me Mao has no power apari from Mao, and is simplyname lo bc explolled. Yao Wen-yuan tun only umse part of the propaganda apparatus, the equivalent of Ihe old Propaganda Department. (Seen sum. the only way In which llirs gimp could lake power would be In an alliance wlih opportunistic military leaden, who. flnt. woo Id seem In have no good reason to ally wilh them, and, second, would dominate any stsch alliance (Jusl as llsey wouldt would mil Ire surprising to see someflls) group eiHiKleil from ibe leadership after Mao's death."

The st'englh nf the Rightists Is probably concentrated In the miliiaryIn Yeh Ohlen.yiog. who .lihoogh old and ailing will

Ofrindr "Th-lrfHk.1

IhruHn-rni, Hin thei cwerm nitwit

Ihr) In (Iliumey figure In ihe Immediate post-Manmuchlie was used to rally the military Inn Piao affair; and |ust possibly in Chen Hslhen. whose background and associallons would seen lo place him with Ibe Rightists Ihi'. who pruhnMy has to lie regi-rded aswild card" who might play himself In support of another leader at utmost any point in the spectrum. The good will of ihe milllury will Ik- extremely important lo theiliiary leaders, some of whom nvy be able to play miliiary cards, but Ihey will probably seek to avoidIhe military Inln mllltP- action (the cardslayed simply liy being shown In rolllburn voting, or perluips even by bluffing, hyredible claim of support by military and security elements not directly represented b. the Politburohile an effort by Ihe military Itself toilitaryf course conceivable,ilitary Intervention seems more likely lo be on behalf of whatever group of leaden whom tbeihal portion of Ihe militaryosition toto be best-dbposed toward themselves. On Ihe record, thb group would certainly seemome combination of the Center iiml the Right, noift.'

The strength of thepread throughout the Party apparatus, the government machinery, and ibe security forces. But the group does not Include military leaden In ihe sense of career military men.he "wild card" Chen Hsi-hcn has already pledged lib allegiance to II. This group nppean lothe same positionh the military as the mllil.re toward It: that Is. iheyo need each other, neitherroup has Imih ihe miliiary strength and the managerial skills to enable II Io dominate ami govern by Itself.

The Iwv Unclassified nr "wild card" leaden,lrng Tung-hslng. constignificant group wilh (ml the Iwo of Ihem. by virtue of Iheir conlrol of miliiary and security forces which can lake swlfi uctlim In crises. Rut theynuttrong enough pair to dominate, hy ihemselves. the

on- Ihn ihr Mint* ronlml ihr ml HiIf It nwlillm

poM-Mao situation; they loohove lo *x( In comlslriulion wilh key figure* ol irlliftih Chen and Want; ore truly "wlWcting psirpuslvely tngrthrr they wouldotmldab't tombl nation,or any group of contender, of their choice; andworking for different contending groups, they mlghl plunge ihe leadenlilp Into chaos. Unfortunately,o solid Informollon on ibe Male nl Iheir nliillorwhlp* wilh each nlher or with any other Party leadereicepl Manhlmtelf."

There-seem, only one sense In which the Immediate post-Mao leadership can br regarded as likely lo be dominatedmall group. Thii would be some rtmblnallm of ihe Hmnjieil figures of theft. ftlgnt, and Unclassified: namely, llua Kuo-fenghi Tenx-kuel ofnter; Chang Chun-chlau offt: Yeh Chlen-ylng of the flight; and Chen Hsi-tien and Wang Tung-luing of the "wildint observers wouldevenlh figure. Wane llung-wen nfft. and tome would lubstllulc or add another. Ibe Pl-V* Chlef-of-Staff when one Itrobable Rl/hll't (like the prevenl acting chief).

Further. Illlle Ii known nf ihe personal choraeler of these conjectured key figures. The distribution of power would seem to depend heavily upon ihls factor ft well as upon perceptions jf one another's :trrnglht specifically, whether all or most of them would prove able tn subordinate their serious differences uith others, and their personal ambitions, to Ihe general good. Ihe appearance of stability and of national purpose. Perhaps ihey will pmvr unable lo do so, even temporarily. On balance, however.eems likely ihal moil of the key figures, actingense of notional Inlerrsi. will be able to agree upon some form of "collective" leadership, one which, at leastime, will conceal Ihe eslent of their differences ondegree of tension among them.

A Poullile Equitable Distribution: There arc serious observers of ihe Chineseho contend that any

alwSWWtt iry *prttalard.

ra-rnaanrnltsIn Ikel In be-USn* hdtanrr.

"Than- hawm In hritrt*ien haiith hiKh Una KtHt-'raa; ami limn ChuiMtilan,ie na.li pruiSfnl I all lh.ee.haienllrrlv

specsiuitltin as lo Ihe diape of the post-Man leadership Isaste of lime, as loo llltle con he 'et forth with sufficient confidence to be of vulue lo Ihe reader. Nevertheless, the effort mus| be made, If only because untie cont Ions seem more likely lhan others.

It has alrejdy been cimcrdrd Ihal ilierr are several serious wmtlngrncirs In any assessment of tlie post-Mano) that Man will change his mind ngaln and will once more upset Ihe arr-ngemenls for the stKvesilnn which he has made (till* was alw-ays the principal contingency in culculolinR Teng llslao-ping's status, and. In tlse event, was the mainb) lhat there willuccessful coup, perhaps led by key figures of Ihe physical Hcurity apparatus; (c) thai any suchll be ivcriurned by some combination of military forces In the Pckhp area, resultinge facia military dictatorship or _rmrd conflict; (d) thai main-force armies In other military regions will revolt against the national leadership (or lack of il)end plunge China Inln somethingvil woni' ui tlse USTTt will Inlervene. ellher In Ibe foim of supporting certain Chinese military force* ut In the form of an altnck on China by Soviet forces; ond (f) Ihal Chinese leaders ore so divided and hostile Ihal they will not care about ae appearance of stability and will Immediately engage In an all-out struggle foriri Mao's death.

If each of those sis contingencies Is arbitrarily assigned some substantial chance of coming to pass (the first three the highest, the other three thehen the odds might already be almost even that some one of Ihem will occur (even If the particular one cannot hend the odds may themore nni be much belterhai anything very useful can he said about the .hope of Ihe post-Moo leadership In terms of particular leaders. If other, more remote contingencies are addedhe assassination of Maoember of hi* personal staff or medical team, ihe sudden death of one or more of the principal actor* In Ihcoviet attackino-Snvlet reconcillalion before Moo's departure, ihc revolt of ihe massrs throughmtlhen the odds might foil In /ess than even Sn It seems lies! lorief conjecture, to emphasize thai this conjecture is highly confceliiral. and lo warn enmeslly against betting hcnsily on IIrobable outcome.

The mostr-seem Ing distribution of power In Ihe most Important posit, on present rvlilenee, looks

Standing Committee

Mm KuO-lrtlf. dr fmrr or dr hmo Chairman

Chang i - .1

s/kr-Chairman

hkrn ring. Vke-Chairman

Wang(i-un '

I Ii' Mil ll-il

,

Secretariat

Of SrcretafT-Ossrral

Senary Cervrral' Ccncralkl

K>fial Work Political Security

Military Affain Committee

Standing Cite Standing CO*?

Chairman or aV /otto Chairman

Standing Cller

mrmsn'

Standing Ctte> Standing Ol*'

Slate Courvd]

PVrmlrt (lino, port)

rVrirtt-f'

Miniitr.lrn-r

Premier; "Commandrr. Prklng MR

Premier or Vice-Premier, lit MM; Ming MR

uncthing like the foUnwing (althougho Wmernmi) not Ion*

rrjunijlilr tnunm tlvTTrsrH'esJV

Una koo-frnga* Party Chairman, and pethim .iv Commander-in-Chief ol (he armed forces concurrently (as (he Party Comlilutinn now prnvhlril. although ihereood chance (hat the CnmlHullnn will he changed In onler In astildoncent rat Ion of power in one man'srei .Dillon In avoid "anotherr tn be Srcrrlars-Onrril if lhe pent of Chairmanretirrd,

Ik-

un-chiaothe (conlinnmg) aVfarm(nrwly-pnarlaimed) dr jurecral nf Ihe Parts (ifn Imhe Party post

Soh.|Mhra|n.

In importance to that ofh Ihr tirnUUhly thai Wang Mung-wen will he retained in the Iradrnhip as Chang's deputy, although wilh much less power.

Chien-ting and Chen Hsi-llcn as Ihe dr facta heads ol the MAC. cither with Hua as lhe dr Jure Chairman il Ihe Constitution Is unchanged ot with nori iwo (probably Yeh. first) innving up In Chairman If lhe Constitution Is changed, with Vrh remaining Minister nf Defense and with Chen retaining the critically important post of commander of the Peking MR

llua Kuo-feng lo continue ai PremierIf he dors not ncsups thr prril of MAC Chairman concurrrnlly wilh thai of Parly Chairman, or if lhe pmt of Ports CS.lrmnn Is relirrd; nrChun ihlm to lie Premier romsirrrnlU with hKoctal* if

mm

bcvooSi both Party Chairman antl MAC Chairman (thu* ranking Chang tn ihr two mosl Important hierarchies).

Teng-kucl a* Prrmlcr if Hua I* bothalrman and MAC Chairman and withes toha* enough lupport to! Huang Chun-chlao from being hoth Premier andfn |he absencehalrmantblp Chang low* Iht* conlrnllon for Ihr Secretary-General's pint and I* not offend thrf Premlrr; and Chi In any caw lo hove the responsibility for supervising the Party's orRunlzuMnoal work, probably remaining First Political Officer of the Peking MR a* well

Tung-hslng to coniinuc at Ihe director of Ihe Party'* central political security department and of the Central Committee's General Office, Inter alia continuing to supervise the security forces lhat protest ihe Party leaders.

Kuan-hua. Ihe Chou En-lai protege who I* cleady ihe best-qualified man for tbe (oh. lo continue as Foreign Minister.

Some such arrangements would provide the smoothest possible transition from Ihe cuTenlly-existing situation and. on the assumption thai lfua and Chang are not forced to compete for the Secretory-Ceneral's post, would reduce the possibility that any one of the seriously disruptive scenarios will In fad occur. Secondary arrangement* might reasonably Include:

naming of most of the ahme-cited primary leaden below Hub's level as Vice-Chairmen of the Party and as the core of the Politburo's Standing Committee and the naming of at least one of the threefttsti (Wang Hung-wm. Madame Mao. Van Wen-yuan) tn the Standing Committee at well;

Ihe confirmation (re-election) of most members nlthe current Politburo, moving up one or two of Ihe alternate* who symbol! re Important group* (women, minorities,ew key figure* from Ihe many lo choose among In ihe struclures of power and the governmental machineryewew Minister nf Public Securily, the head of the Slale Planning Commission. Iwo or three promising provincial-Irvrl figures such as hulf of ihe aliovr-namrri leaden ihcmsclvr* were until

The contingencies which probably deserve emphasis, In offering one nf these configuration*oderately credible one fnr tbe Immediate pint-Man period, seem lo Ite Ihe following:

Mao before he dies will choose to do and will prove able to do what be pointedly did not do In naming Hua Kuo-feng Flnt Vice-Chairman andn strengthen the heft organizationally at Ihe eipeuse of Ihe Center and Right, in which cose we might see Cluing Chun-chlaoosition to be Installed as Party Chairman (or as Secretary-General in the absencelialrmav) wilh the support of leftist or opportunist miliiary leaden, with W'ang Hung-wcn moved up lo become Ihe Party's Setietary-General and with both Madame Mao andWen-yuan added to thetanding Oimmillee, and Hua Kuo-feng being only ihe Premier (If that);

Chen Hsl-llen will be perceived by other leaders, either before or after Mao's death, as potentially too powerful and ambitious, and that arrangements will be made to ease him out. In favor of some other military leader who would nottrong personal following In (be Peking MR and would be perceived as more dodle;

Wong Tung-hslng will similarly be regarded by other leaders as potentially loo dangerous to all of them, with hi* control of the mosl sensitive personnel ret mj- 'including records nl positions token at Party meetings) and his control of Ihe bodyguard forces which constitute ihe Innermost ring of security, thai some part of the security apparatus will be successfully used against Wang In somewhat iSc same way lhat Berlya was taken, and lhathoever) will be able to place his own man (at Mao has done for so long) In the critically Important post of director of the political securily apparatus; and

Wong Hung-wen (who has probably made himself an adversary of Ibe military) will he seen by other leaden a* thinking of himself as "anotbeind that they will act together against him. eicludlnf. him entirely from the leadership-

Bui wmr of Ihrsr po**ihllllle* trrm* ttrimg mmigh Iu shake Ihr |ix!(inrnt lhal one of Ihr configuratltmi outlinedhr bestv Im thr general thaprhr lmnvdl.trder*hip

If lhal It alewplrlurr, lhm. ihltcolledlve" domlnalrd In fadoalition of career Parly eodrn ond career mllllory men. In which Ihr strongest Ungle figure uould br Ihr Onlrttt lluallhouth hr could not thtrnlnatr ihr Paly In anything llVr ihr way lhal Mao had donr Nnf In Importance wotiM probably Kr the mm-estecme Is-fllU Chang Chtin-cblun. and aflrr lhal Ihr military Iroden Yrh and Chen,ightist,wild conl" hacking ihr Center. Al the nrit Irvrl of power wmildlhe Crnlritl Chi Teng-kurl and the "wild card' Wang Tung-hung. Ihr lailrriketi-Uen. backing the Center Thr cmlrr line in Ihk cnnttellatlon. which would drown, te ihr Pi Willi Mantling Cnmmitlrr and would probably he replicated (wilh tnmr rearrangement) In lhe MAC, would run In luct directly through ihr Onler of iSe Chinese political ipcclrum ai new"moderate" In Chinese terms, allhough tlill more "rrsohrtlrtnaty" lhan. say. ihr Irodrrship of thr (ommunht Party of the Sovid Union But onr mutt rrllrratr ami in rocrot here while tome such arrangement might hold for the Immediate pott-Mao period. Il tecmilo personal1.n policy, and the unpredldablllly nf Ihr "wildII would prove nmlaNr over lhe longer run.

THREE INESCAPABLE WIO QUESTIONS

radenhlp of thlt kind would be rxpeded tn lake Crnlritl pmilinm on three Inescapable policy-quesllnm; the group'* relollomhlp lo Man'shr concept ofnd lhe SlitreStitlel-Amerkaii triangle

The RehilumJtlp let Moot 'Thoughl" Mao* urcs-eston mini Immediately define In tome lad.Ion thdr rrlaltonthlp withplu* years of Man'* leadership nl thr Party, lhe dominance of hit person und hit "lltmighl."

Thr tursY>wnri have Ihe option, ol course, of il'iuuiiK-Ing and disowning Mao. In rmighly the term* ofI doetimenl attributed to Un iWs group nf (onsiilralnr*

L

o. purring hlmsrlflhe Parly, for egomania, for refusal lo share power and for blaming other* for his own mistakes, for falsiMng history lo potted himself, for Irrndiery lo fnll'ifulag the dodrlnalrr ptirsiill of illusory goalt al Immense human cost, for indillerrnce to II* wrlfare of tbe

But mosl rnrmhew nf the Inner drcie of Ihe utcretsnn will rewe their rise lo high potillon lo Mao's campaign* of lhe past decode, and mod In fad lo Moo'i persoijil srlecllonem lor preferment, and Ihry cannot drgrodr him or his "ihoughl" In the Immediate post-Mno period without undrrminlng thrmsrlve* while thry ue dilltp,lc thdr own mi*ednd lhe temptation lo riploil lhe negative feeling, about Moo thai are now probably wldesprrad in lhe Party and even In the "mnstrt" that havrhbcontllliietvcy (Un Pinoood cose, und there haiarked Increase In Ihe willingness of Chinese, both 0flV1.l1 and common men, to eipress anti-Mao irnllroenl In lhe part year, most strikingly In the Tlenanmrntlikrly lhal mosl of ihrould agree that continuity roust br maintained. The leftists would certainly so contend, as otherwise ihey would hove no legllimacy al all. Tlie Centrists and RlghtlMs mlghl re|nice In lhe downfall nf the leftists, but ihey alreadylmngcr organl/atinnal position than do the IsflNt (an advantage given them by Mao hlm*rlf. a* rverynne tsnd ihey do not need lo discredit Mao in order lo keep ihls advantage and if necessary in use

On Ihe other hand, il seems rnosl Improlwhle lhat any Individual or ony ilnglc group of Mao'i tocccston will Ite allowed Io present himself or herself or tbrmtrlve* as the guardian or guardians of Moo'smong the current leatlrn. onlyung-wen and Madame Mao *rrm rnrirdvahfy lo he Inrsperirn. rd or simple-minded rnotigh to Iry lo don rflnrt which II undrrtakrn would turrly fall, whether In Party rounclll or In an appro! In liternhnbly neither will do to, bulleaden mav neverlhelest choose lo gel rid of(asove) lhal Wang dors Irtdrrd think of himselfn-ther Mao" and lhal lhe

onpupolar Madame Mao Ii nol nrmury for ibe nrrvrvaluin nf continuity.

Mint posthumous Immunity may nM ntrode ofocialist nr*hrstudy ofninlim-Mao TooIn which ihr Parly and populace havr hrrit laturatrd forhe Iriec'ln-one comlilnallon In which old. middle-uyed and young people are given thcoretleolly equal rrprrtrnlal km inorgans, (he assignment of milliom of cadm to "Maychooh for productive laboreindoclilnatlon, lhe creation and popularisationadame Mao'i) "rrvolulionary" plays. Ihe "open door" management of unlvmltlefdmission only afire al least Iwo yean of labor, continued Inhor while Undying, direction by worker-peasanl-vildler propagflndand Ihe diipatch of the great majority of educatedlhanillion tolhe countryside lo fileThese policies are all controversial, and souse still probably hr modified, but II would term that this could be doneeliberatethoul attacking cither the "Ibought" embodied in Ihe policies or Ihe man hlmtell.

In turn.f course vulnerable, and lorne degrading of him In his Stalinist role will probably lake place toortethree-year period ctirrespnndlng lo that between Stalin's death and Khrushehrv'i "tectrt'" speech. But this will prnhably not occur In the Immediate pent-Mao period,

"RrheMilaHon" orotentially highly disruptive Issue, for (he luccesvus. It that of |bean accnmplithrd fact, but one whkh could hethousand* nf Party rudrrt. governmrnl functionaries, and military leaden brought down In the Cultural Revolution, hundreds of whom are probably now In important positlorti again (including nor member of the Politbum) Although thisen Mao's own policyhe year after lhe great purges began, an attempt to reverse It could be linkedefense of lhe Cultural Revolution itself

The link hat In fact already been made, in thr anll-Teng campaign, with Mao leading the way Teng has been charged more or lessIrving lo

return In lhe Cond Old Days hrfnee ihr Cultural llrvntnfiofi. wilh denigrating thr Ciillurnl Revolution

("the iwcsrnt Is nnl at good at lheith attempting tn revrte verdlctt (Inter alia, on thosend with retiming In office dlicredlted old cadres Thrrr Is no doubt lhat Teng wai primarily orarge number of old cadres, Including many of hit oldnd proteges from his yearst Ihe Party's Secret nryCenerai

Any attempt in repurge the"rehabllltees" rtt maue would almostrom thr Leftbts, who played leading roles in the purges, who rose at Ihe ctpenie nf (hose purgtd. who fell threatened themselves by lhe return of such figures at Teng. and who would like lo open up all Ihose Jobs for the young people who constitute their putative following

1 Bui Chang Chun-chlao. the most it rongly .hated ard apparently Icatl rtt re me Leftist, has hlmsell been associated with lhe policy ot rrhahllilallon. and even if lhe Leftist, were lo actroup Ihey would on ibis Issue at on others be outgunned, llua Kuo-feng. CM Trng-kucl. and Wang Ttmg-htlng have all strongly associated Ihemtelvet wilh the rehabilitation policy, and also, owing lo their organizational positions, hove probably played large roles In effecting Ihe rehabilitations. Thelmost certainly also true of the leading mililary men likr Teh Chien-ylng and Chenn.vr helped to restore their eld comrades (eictudlngconspirators nf lhe Lin Plan affair) throughout the military eslabllthmrnt and might be etjpected (Yeh certainly. Chen probably) to resit! any attempt to change the current professionalism and conservative cast of ihr upper Irvcti of (he armed form.*

he outside ponlbilily lhal thetorre ofatiem.pt to bypass the rest of thr Party hradership and appeal dires'ly lo ihr mattes, much at Mao did In the Cultural Revolution. Thb wouldall lo complete the Cultural Revolution,arry out another Cultural Revolution (Manb- authority for Ihe dictum that furthci Cultural Revolutions will be necetsarynd thh lime In sweep out all of the hidden lupporten nf Teng llUao-plng. meaning in eftcrt lhe great majority of thr rrhahilitrrs.

athe rbawirr mlitmhip

m T* irrnvi rn :ti liwrtAj. -yhe

unrv Onlral Mllllan*'

ven concclvohle that'thts will contend lhat the diape of the successionthe abvnce of Mao'i ilrfinttlvrlyeiprctwdshould be determined by the masse* Thatonlender for high position who regard* hh pros peril ai other-He poor coukl argue wlih some Justification Ihal the concept ol ihe Culturalhe rise nee or culnilnoll'- nf Mao's "thought" (the highest form ofnd that the masses ihould therefore be given Ihe opportunity to select those who will protect and preserve hisThe likeliest canlen of this particular virulence look to be Wang Hung-wen and Tan Wen-yuan, who owe iheir rise wholly to ihe Cultural Revolution and who might believe Ihal Iheytrong base ot* support in the young.)

But Ibe problem for any sucheither Ihe Isiuc nf "rehabilitation" or the Issue of ihe entire configuration nf tbeobvious: that ihe Impetus fnr another Cultural Revolution could rnmc onlyeader who was already In possession of something like Mao's power (otherwise, ihe Party already fallhfully represents theho could use Ihe maneseapon against those unresponsive to himself personally as the embodiment of truth, and who among other things could completely control the propaganda apparatus employed to muse the masses. There Is no Lrftbt on the current scene who has anything like Mao's charrsma. who could send the masses out Int" tbe streets on hla or her behalf. Although two prominent Leftists. Chang and Yao. do seem lo have Ihe largest roles In directing the propaganda apparatus for Mao now. Ihere is no waycan eipect to keep these positions against the whhet of other Party leaders after Mao's deathlless ihey also control the military establishment, and there seems virtually no prospect of thatD does nnt control the armed forces, II works for those who control them: sshile the CPDital organ, and Chang might be able lo me the CPD lo support his own or another's candidacy for high position (redirecting the PLA's loyally from Mao lo someone else, evenn Itself it seems clearly In he an disulfide nl vehicle fornd Chang himself needs the good will of ihe senlni militaryo apt-ear In dominate Ihe MAC nfhtrh tbe CPD is |he Inslniment

In sum. ihe prospect o' annther Cultural Revolution, another mass campaign outsldr the control of the Partyn internal threat Ihal almost all members of the Innerprolsably determined in elimtnale.l

In male

iteral would peoUbfy lead to thr downfall of those who had made U.

Thr Slno-Seviei-Amrrican Triangle:nescapable Issue for Mao's successors In the Immediate posI'MaoInescapable as that of defining their relationship to Maolhat of Ihe Chinese position In the Slno*Soviet-Americanrue not only because Peking's policy toward theconsequently Its policy toward thebeen so closely td-ntified wilh Mao's personal Intransigence toward the Soviets and his personal advocacy of ihe opening lo the US, soualll otivdy new situation will arise wilh hb death, but because Moscow will not allow the successon to escape tbe bsue That Is. with tbe menacing presence ofillion Soviei troops on ihe Isordcr as an Incentive to Peking to negotiate, iheill almoil certainly renew overtures tn the Chinese for an Improvement In relations, beginningorder 'elllement.

Almost all of (hose eipeeled to be key figures In (he succession have put themselves repeatedly on record as hard-line anil-Soviet, and In recenl months, following the changes In the leadership. Chinese leaden have been al pains lo reaffirm that their fundamental foreignthosehen the USSR officially became the "main enemy" and ihc US began In emergeotential tadl ally against thenot change. But these leaden have had no choice, because Moo has continued to dominate (he Party and has shown himself lo be willing and able to continue lo purge It. and any signesoluilon less firm than Moo's would hove served to remove the offender from leadership (That was not. however, the re*or Teng Hsiao-ping's purge )

ll hasrnriori, thai every memberroup as Jorge as the Chinese learlrnhlp ssoiild feel the same deg-ee of hostility lo lite USSR lhat Mao has felt;n lhat every member of the

topmost gnwp nfInner circleozen orfrel m. Moreover, ii hat long teamed likely. In lhe nature ol lhe caw. even if every Keyf lheacre fully at hostile lo lhe USSRMao hat been, lhal cunt Herat km* ol naiional Intrrrttead lo tome tenllmenl among Mao's iiKcrsiort foe an eating of lhe lent Ion. Further, II hat long icerned pmsihlr lhal tome group ia lhe tocrrstor leadership would try lo espWl the Si-KvSovtrt-Amerlcan huir for factional advantage, perhapt Irmpectlve ol lit genuine vlewt; }uttn Plan oppoted an Improvement In rrlallorrt wilh the US In pari because hh main rival for Influence wilh Mao. Chou Kn-1al. favored tuch an Improvement (and viceo ibe Lrflltti and PJghlittt Is China after Mao'i death, although no longer competing for Influence with Man, might manipulate Ihe foue against each other. The Inlrlllgencr problemt here have hern to Identify ihe'soft" figures (leatt hot! lie to Ihe USSR) In lhe leaderthlp. lo calculate their weight In Ibe succession, lo drlermine how (ar they (or other leaden for other rratont) would be willing lo go In order to eaie lemlorn. and to anew Ihe value of Ihe Slno-Sovirt-Amrrlcan Issueounter In factional politic*

There terms virtually no chanceadical change In Chinese policy toward rllher lhe USSR or Ihe US In Ihr months following Mao'i death. Jusl as Ihey cannot repudiate Mao personally and lhe concept of hh thought" In general In the immediate post-Mao period withoutem vol vet. to they cannot rodlfall" alter these particular polkses without repudiatinghe anli-Sovlel policy ha* been al Ihe center of almosl all of Mao'iIhe poliete* of the Party as afor moreecade, even prior to lhe Cultural Revolution, and In recent yean thr (sharply qualified) pen-American pnllcy has. thai policy; lo repudiate lhal policy would Ihus bring Inln questlonlne enllre fabric of Chinese polky. This would be truef whsthcr the Immediate port-MaotiKcrsslon were lo he dominated by the Left, ihr Crnlce. nr ihr Right

Nnwrvrr. there li some roomery limited rasing of lhe tendon wilh Ihe Soslrli In lhe Immediate nmt-Mao prrtod. without giving ihr appearance of repudiating Mao hlmsrlf. And the incentive will be greater lhan II hat been;hoseop* along the border will br worth tomethlnglohe lime of lhe succession, at Chinese leanttack al lhal lime will (al lhe Chlnne lrtemse|.e*ave Incieatrd Although lhe Chinese cannot be etpected lo lale the Initiative lorlrgallon lo Moscow toon after Mao'i deathepudiation ofumiliation (ort Is cimcHvable lhal ihey would agree lo ameeting In Peking, and In any case lheot In facto lhe overall struggle agalntl Soviethe Chinese could recognlre Ihlt by quietly withdrawing their demondithdrawal of Soviet troops from the borderrecondition for beginning arrtosw talks (hot at Ihe Rusilant could quietly withdraw tome part of thr troop*esture of goodhile the prospects for an early setllement of Ihr border Issue are small (Ihe Chlnne would have to agree to compensation for. rather than gain possessionbpulrd riverodes' compromise on Ihe mallet of troop withdrawal would help lo insure Ihe Chinese agalntl (he possibility lhat these troop* would actually be used.*

Over (hr longer run. lhe situation looks more complicated Imnkally. lhe group likely lo be tbe most uncwpeomblngly antt-Sovict. theikely also lo be the most firmly antl-American, while the group* likely lo Ite leasl anil-American, the Ccntibti and Ibe Rightists, arc likely also lo be lhe leart harshly antl-Sovlet (although nil, dearly anll-Scrvfartl

The Russiani themselves have regarded lhe Left hit-specifying Madame Mao and the three "Shanghai radicals Chang Ohun-chlao, Wang llung-wen and Yaolhe hard core of Inlranslgrnt hostility lo the USSR In Ihe anticipated toccetsor leadership, because llw memben of ihh group have seemed genuinely to share Mao'i view of lhe need lo penbt In Ihe struggle agalnit "revhionlim" on all Ironlt. On thr other hand, although astoclatlng ihrmtelve* nominally wilh the opening lo Ihe US white Mao lives. In tome of their pri ale ttelrmenlt all but Chang have termed Iolind kleoliigtral adherence tn orthndni. fundamrntalltt, "revolution-ary" alllludrs winch call for at great hostility toward Ihe US as toward Ihea policy of

rites*t*, ta Lave ihr addtnrwal aoVraiaffr af iiwhi*i| ihr

IM, lhm hsoWtaf Ihr I'* la rarwr tnrer mptnlrmiUm nl rrlilHm *Hh rVllog

equidistance from Iwo absolute rnemlci (Ihrfavraml hy the "ultra-leftist" Un I'ijo, regardless of thr strategic situation and considerations of national Interest

Thr Russians cntrrta'ncd no hope* nf Teng lltlait-pini; (who hodi Intronsigrntty anll-.Snvict for many yean at Mao could pmtjhjy haveut they ttere quick to eipres* tome hope for Muo Kun-leng, nt tvhote record nf antl-Sovhrt peortouncemrnlt they appeared to be unaware, (ll It possible, although the Russians hove not uld to. lhat Hua studied In the USS.lank before the age nfwat pro-Soviet at ihal lime, at thr OOP llself war) Presumably Una's public' rrrnnrk* In recent months have reduced

IT not

eitlnjculshed those hopes, and ihe Russians have no ground for more than minimalrom others of the conjectured Cenlrltt group. Bui, as earlier suggested, the Russians hate had hope for yean from elements of Ihe Right, and In particular from Chinese miliiary leaders, even though tbey have seemed genuinely unabfc lopro-Soviet or the least anll-Sotiet individuals In the military The hope wot stimulated by ibe Peng Te-hsial affair of IBM. In which Defense Minister Peng frankly advocated an Improvement In relations with the USSR, was fed by ihe Un Plao affair1 (which implied that there were other "elosel" antl-Maoiiii In Ibe Chinese miliiarynd has been watered in recent years by certain features of the ontl-Confudon campaignhe "Water Margin" campaignnd Ihe ontl-Teng campaign ofIn all of which the regime's propaganda has reflected Man's continuing fear lhat he has nnl managed to estlngubb pro-Soviet feeling (or onll-onli Soviet feeling) in China, especially among the milil. ry. The Rutttars are probably right in believing lhat for whalrvir combination offeeling, fear of ihe USSR,ions of national or professional nr factional arc Important elements of the pn>fettlonol milltory who doubtlonllal Improvement In relations with the USSR (evrn though we (on are unable to identify Individuals as more than rwtitf'fuit way )

II follows, (hen. lhat the happiest outcome for (he Rutslnns would probably he domination nf the iiiccessor leadershiplrghflirn which the miliiary wouldlmnghis outcome is unlikely, hut (heies) outcome, for Moscow,on Id seem to be ihe acirtuoo lo dominanceoalition of career Party cadre* and career military men.entrist holance. in which Ibe military wnuld p'ornng voice. Inasmuch as Ihe coreerrcs would depend for their survival upon retaining tlse military'* good will And litis seem* the mosl likely outcome, (he arrangement wilh the Ircsl ehaeiee of coming tnven though ll leem* llltle more than an even-money bet.

One variation of the 'military dictatorship' scenario would he very awkward for the Russians to deal wilh That would he an alliance between the Leftists and oppo'tunlslie military leaden, If Ihe latter were In Include (Then Hsi-llen and his personal following in Ibe strategy Peking MR, That improbable union would coalesce (hose believed lo be mosl anti-Soviet no one band and leas) anti-Soviet on ihe other. The mllitory would be eipectrd to dominate ihe alliance, hut ihe dvilians might he formulating and carrying out its foreign policy. Perhaps fortunately for almost everyone, that scenario seems lo have small chance of coming lo pass.

There does not seem lo be any possible comtrllalkm of svcttitms io Mao which wnuld wish to rrttoer Ihe Smo.Soviet alliance, returning the US lo lis place as ihe main enemy of both. The wont that the US bos lo fearhinese policy ofhethe prospect of dther leftist domlnolloneftist-miliiary alliance hthat ihe USSR will remain the "malend that Man's successors willo eiplore the pmtihllity of rffedlvely employing the UStrategic counterweight to ihe

The Sino-Soviet-American triangle can of course become an btue In factional politics, between those who genuinely favor (or would pretend toolicy of equidistance, and those who genuinely favor

ynrefrrrnernltkii hotnmet far (hr USSR, atiM heIn Irnpmr rrlatlna* wlih (he USAB

n.anmat- In Si.mi* UrrrraV

-wtcrfpt -

IKMT

would pretend eo favor) the greatest degree of Improvement In relation* with Ihr USSR Although thr former group would he eipected lo argue mainly on kleotoglcal ground*ithdrawal from ihr US ninnrctlnn (Ihr equal threat* lo thr True Doctrine from "Imperialism"hr two groups could employ similar pragmatic argument* In Justify thrlr opposed positgu men ti which have surfaced from lime to time In various pronouncements and commentaries directed to different audiences. These would be:

for many years, the determination of the US to resist Soviet advance* has been dcdinlng;

-thai partly became of this, there has been aIf! In the military baltince of power In favor of thehlfl which further erode* the US will to resist;

In conseipsence. lite US Is belling heavllv on Ihe success of "detente" with Iheetente which will prove lo be an "inudnn" for Ihc L'S as tlse USSR will go on behaving a* it always has. under cover of detrnlr. hit which will prove tollsasler for Chb a, as China will have no leverage on either;

American relations wlih the USSR are far more important to the US than relations with China cm possibly he. as China Is no great military threat to ihe US. I* of little value Inoviet attack on the US. and would not be nf great value as an ally In war;

It it not Ibe US which Is now deterring an attacklna. and that Ihe US would do nothing for China in the evenloviet attack on China;

ractical matter. Ihe principal US interest inn Ihe border issueeeping II unsellledl. which 'forces' the USSR to Invest heavily In Ihe China front and reduce* Ihe threat on the Kuropcan front where Ihr US strategic Interest really lies;

Ihe US Is determined lo prrvenl Peking from Inking over Taiwan;

In sum. that Ihe US hat simply been using China toeller deal from Moscow.

For nor group. Ihese urgumenti would add upolicy of abandoning efforts to "normalise" relations Willi the US; for Ihe oilier,olicy of following tlie same course as llie US and reducing tensions with ihe USSR as much a* possible, beginning by accepting Soviet termsorder settlement.

While elements of Ihe argument might be accepted hy almost all of tin- key figure, nf the post-Man leadership (the USSR I*ore Important country at this lime lhan Is China,egional power;enuine concern about the military balance and Ihe current state of US resolve seems to come through Chinese statements io all audiencesj. and while the two portions may be pul forward over the longer term, Ihe argument as an argument does not seem worth much lo either of ihe two possible groups at Ihecitreme* of Ihe foreign polky rangeontest for pntlllon at the lime of Ihe succession. In other words, most of the key figures haveifferent argument, so lhat. If one or the other of these two hypnthctkal groups has not already won the struggle for prmer but has to try to persuade other leader* to adopt Its foreigneither of themhle to do It.

by Chinese leaders.

both In recent years and recentave seemed to make clear lhat those concerned wIlli foreign policy. Including motl of Ihote eipected to be the key figures of Ihe prnl-Mao leadership,icture of the Slno-Soviet-American triangle something like thh;

China mustounterweight to Ihc USSR under any circumstance* (even If then?ubstantial Improvement In Sino-Soviet relations, andimitedmi there Is simply no alternative lo the US;

thetill militarily powerful (almost as strong as thend means to remain so;

IlKl

-that the US does in fact help bolh to deteroviet attack on China and to resist Soviei efforts lo eslablbh "hegemony" In the Fur Knit, and h. declared lis Inlrntinn lo continue to doresident Ford's remarks on this themelsll to Peking lntt December);

the Soviet-Americanimited and precarious;

Ihr US doc* Indeed pncttx*ll. Iiiml mass and hugeol valuealue ihal run only increase wilh Ibe immiir nf (Jklnrse militan pot*".

nnrmali-allr.il of rotations with Ihr US (full diplomatic rolalionsl ot cmine will require uime lime, and ranrtol lie expected In (he nest few month*.

thec. while veiatMan. is much lev* Imporlanl than ihelna can afford los regards the annexation of Taiwan.

thai, in sum. Sinn-American relations, while Impetfrcl. are roore-or-less satisfactory.

In othero pot ihrinimal Irrrm. the Chinese are far from having ciwnplrted iheirf ihe pos.il lihlictHofitahlr relationship with the US, ami it would lie on Ihr face of il absurdlow offpossibilities, p* topnllian-iih llie USSR, without alompleting ihe process of exploration.

Karlatinos as lolhrdislrihulion nf power in the Immediate post-Mao period (lasting at hast for some months) were ihal the "collective" would prohahly be headed by the Ontrist Hua Kuo-feng. who would probably re*aM Foreign Minister Chiao kuan-hua (Seeoth Hua and Chiao hate associated themselves with Ihe above-summarlrrd positionTedible fashiont seems tn lie what_lhry genuinely believe, independentfnd most of the othrn etpected lo he ley figures In tbe post-Mao leadership areI to some degreerarlership completely dominated by thr doctrinaire lyliiM' might choose to rime off the opening tnlhe L'S

CHIAO KUAN-MUA

In the immediate pent Mao period, there seems little chance of such dominance Any other constellation of post-Moo leaden,ilitary dictatonhip. couldnpeeled In continue the process of exploration, even while continuing to complain (as are the current leaden) that the pace of "iiormaliration" of Si no-American relations Is loo slow."

The Ihtre Uanrfard ifamand. far "nnrmalirallnn"preuinaalih mnlinni- (tn iKo prrtnrll Hi hr ihr irsmner rS I'S rlfahwiallch Ta*prl. ihrl nl USaaannl farm.

al-an. aad Ihr ali-rallm nl thri1.iul

Trraly nl

Original document.

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