NIE 13-76 - PRC DEFENSE POLICY AND ARMED FORCES

Created: 11/11/1976

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

NATIONAL

INTELLIGENCE

ESTIMATE

PRC Defense Policy and Armed Forces

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PRC DEFENSE POLO AND ARMED FORCES

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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTElliGENCE BOARD CONCURS, EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT, AS FOLLOWS:

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contents

Page

NOTE

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

THE ESTIMATE

POLITICO-MILITARY

A. POcton Afloctlni Sirategy

National latere*!)

Ton-art. Dangen. aod

Economic and Technical Coeatraintj

Tke PLA and

h Overview ot Chine* Strategy

National Strategy

Military Strategy

Deterrenca

VVarflgbttng Strategy

ARMED FORCES

III. THE POSSIBILITY OF

IV DEPENSE POLICIES IN THE EARLY

ANNEX APRC Economy and

ANNEX BThe PLA and Pofcki

ANNEX CPRC Armed Forcei and

ANNEX DPLA Warflgiiilng Capability

ivil

PRC DEFENSE POLICY AND ARMED FORCES '

SCOPE

This paper examines Chinese defense policy, strategy, and armed forces innd makes some broad predictions for the. Separate Annexes provide details on the economy and technology. PLA involvement In politics and the succession, trends In the armed forces, the conventional and nuclear warfighting capabilities of the military, and civil defense.

NIE0 Julxi im tad SIR lUI-Tt.nnr IBU.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

considers the United States ra be lessirectthan the Soviet Union. Tbe Chinese abo view the US aspower, gradually withdrawing from Asia, butof great strategic strengthong-term ideological8).

main danger, from the Chinese vantage point, is that the US. lacking the political will to pnnue its national Intererb vigorously and allowing itself to be putosition of Inferiority In conventional and strategic arms, will compromise with the USSR on disadvantageous terms, leaving China to face Soviet power alone

Chinese will continue to see It In their best interests notthe use of nuclear weapons, either at the strategic orThe Chinese aim clearly must be to confine the conflict tolevel, where they feel they can make maximum useIn manpower, knowledge of terrain,.

The Chinese probably hope thut their extensive dispersal and passive defense measures will help them ridetrategic nuclear attack preserving enough force to deter or eventuallyollow-on invasion

At the theater level, the Chinese would not Initiate, but apparently envision retaliatory, employment of theater nuclear forces against an Invnding force

to the laste do not believe thatwould relyluring deep" strategy for defenseInvasion, or exclusivelygainstIn coastal areas.

Judging from force developments and dispositions, we now believeombination of tactics would be used, with much depending upon the nature and location of the attacks at well as upon the kind of Invading forces.

Current levels of manpowereapons and equipment, and training suggest the forces arc now generallyigh state of readiness (Annex D,

swam

Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) is not organized,trained to conduct operations successfullyuclear(Annex D..

China's minimal capability for strategic and theater nuclear war does, however,odest deterrent lo nuclear attack (Annex D,.

If deterrence fails, China's nuclear warfightfng capability would be no match for that of the USSR and could notoviet invasion (Annex D..

the PLA is best organized, equipped, and traineda nonnuclear defensive war against the Soviet Union, itan even chance ofoviet conventionalit reached Peking and the North China Plain. Any attemptlarge areas of China would be unfeasible (Annex D.

could not conduct major offensive militarybeyond its Soviet border.

Consequently it is highly unlikely that Peking would initiate such operations (Annex D,

Against Taiwan, the PLA probably would not have the capability touccessful nonnuclear Invasion much beforeithout unacceptable losses (Annex D,.

If the Chinese were to intervene in Korea, they could apply sufficient strengthonnuclear situation to overwhelm the forces presently there (Annex D..

Against India, the PLA force inuited to denial operations and for punitive expeditions against Indian(Annex D..

The PRC probably could seize and occupy the Spratly Islands even against such opposition as Vietnam, the Philippines, or the Republic of China could mount at this time (Annex D..

C. The PLA remains at once an Instrument of party policyhaper of that policy (Annex B,

overall military posture has not been weakened by the preoccupation of some political generals with the succession (Annex B,

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material support for insurgency Is modest,confinedandful of groups, primarily In Southeast Asia,pressure points andeans of precluding SovietVietnamese involvement with Insurgency in the area (ParaAnnex B.)

foreign military assistance will probably remain smalllimited In variety, and unsophisticated In nature.

j. Economic and technical considerations appear to preclude any dramatic improvement in conventional and nuclear warfighling capabilities over the next five years

Development of the PLAighting force compuroblc in sophistication to that of the USSR ot the US today will take at Itaaoore yean and would require the acqubitkm of more expensive and advanced technology than China now has (Annex C, Para 31

The Chinese will continue to be highly selective In weapons choice, and they are unlikely to come up with technological "surprises" in mililary weaponry

K. The modernization of Ihe armed forces will continue to be uneven and slow.

The armyhi far better shape lhan ii has ever been and will remain ihe backbone of ihe defense of the nationnd Annex C.

The navy will remain principally an effective coastal defense force. It will, however, operate at greater distances from Ihe coasl over the next five years (Parand Annex C.1

The air force willimited air defense force with some ground attack capability, but its overall capabilities will

improve over the next five yean {Parand Annex C. Paras IM1}

L There has been lihie change in the massive paramilitary program (Parand Annex C.

M. The Chinesemall nuclear force of missiles and bombers (Annex C.

A limited-range ICBM. possibly capableof reaching Moscow.ow operational.

More advanced missiles, such as an SLBM system and the first ICBM capable of reaching the United States, are now under development but will not be available for several years (Annex C.)

N. If, as wemoderate" leadership Is ernefrom the overall succession process, these new Chinese leaden wouirj continue tn strengthen their military posture against the Soviets, even though there coulde some attempts to reduce the abrasiveness of the Sino-Sovlct relationship. They would push ahead with the creation of their intercontinental nuclear forces

O. Certain ongoing trends and defense policies have an enduring quality and will consequently survive the post-Mao transition period into the

The Soviets will remain the main threat.

The Chinese will not align themselves with other powers but pursue an Independent stance.

Peking will prefer to use political and diplomatic means rather than military pressures to gain its ends.

The PLA will continueuge militarybut one more operationally competent than now. It will remain Involvedreat variety of political and economic duties.

Though the PRC will probably begin tomall force of ICBMs and SLBMs In the, It could not successfullyuperpoweruclear exchange.

The large discrepancy between strategic nudear weapons available io the Chinese compared to those of the US and Ihe USSR will continue to seriously constrain the development of any flexible Chinese strategy for responding to an enemy first strike.

China poses no direct military threat to the United States. Itotential threat to US forces and allies in Asia.

P. In sum, wearge conventional force being

modernized, supportedassive paramilitaryunder the covermall nuclear force which is developing an intercontinental capability.

Peoples Republic ofi

"SeWE!

THE ESTIMATE

CHINA'S POUIrCO-MIUTARY STRATEGY

A. Factors Affecting Strategy

The People* Republic oF China haiigh priority toajor power with the Fundamental purpose of putting China among the foremost nations ef the world. More specifically, this effort has been Influenced by China's national Interests, perceived threats, economic andlimitations, and the Interaction of the Peoplet Liberation Army In domestic politic* These factors hare abo shaped the PRC notional strategy and the development af supporting military forces.

China's stated aspirations are to transform the countryowerful socialist state, protect (he nation from social-imperialist* (USSR)nd Improve the material and cultural well-being of the mattes, using Marxbrri-LeninisnvMao Tse-tung Thoughtheoretical basis for guiding ihe behavior oF the nation. The wording out of these aspirations In practice has often been difficult and Frequently led to arguments over methods and priorities.

Notional Inrrfwft.

To real ire its national purposes, China has several broad national Interests and concerns.the Chinese Icarfcrshlp vrishes primarily to ensure the security and territorial Integrity ofChina and, oF lesser priority, to recover Taiwan and other territories claimed by China. The leaders also desire to maintain their Maoist ideological purity. Simultaneously, they hope to catch up with the Industrial powers in science and technology andodem economy.

lo Foreign relations, they want to assert China's rolereat power on the world stage. Peking hopes eventually to replace the influence of the United States and other Western countries In Asia and counter the expansion of Soviet. ]apuiiesc,and Indian Influence in the area, while gaining greater influence in Southeast Asia, ideally, the leaders also desire to extend China's major power status by selectivelyignificant voice In communist movements and by strengthening Chinese Influence everywhere, especially In the Thud World

S OF these two considerations, the Internal is the more import not. protection oF the Chinese state, deterrence of possible aggression against it, and failing that, the ability to successfully defend against aa attacking force have been Peking's highest priorities since Ihe regime come to power. Yet interest In adiicvlng full status and recognitionreat power has also been high.raditional sense of China as the "centralhich automatically deserves homage from Its neighbors, has beenodem nationalism. This nationalism Is Intensified by twoense of grievanceesult of the exploitation of China by Western nations and Japan beginning In (he late nineteenth century,essianic sense that the Chinese revolution end Peking's subsequent elforls at ntoderntxatlon provide the proper model for develop* r; nations throughout the world.

all of these perceptions of their senseand In their provisions for acceptingchange, the Chinese Insist uponFundamental beliefs ond Ideals. In theirthe virtues nf Indepersdcnee,and hard workreat deal; aboveChinese wish to avoid losing their culturalcoming to terms with the West and modemiiallon.

Thttati. Dovtaars, ond Opportun.'fiii

perceptions of threats to theare various and of different magnitudes.important by far ore seen as flowing fromall from the Sovietdifferences, conflicting nationalanimosity, and Soviet coercive diplomacycontinuing tension between Peking and

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The USSR'* mililary buildup along China's northern brirdcr. ib Atian ailtccllvo security proposal, Its efforts Ia affect Japanese diplomacy, and Ils Influence nliraily apparent In Mongolia. Vietnam, und Indlo lutvc convinced ihr Chinese leader* tluit Cliliia It being "surrounded" by the Soviets. Though they claim that Mmcow's ryn arc Used on Lairopc ruil the Middle East, they fror tire Soviets will eventually attack tbrm

& Peking consider* the United States to be Imirect military threat lhan the Soviet Union The Chinese aho vie-fter) Stairseakened power, gradually withdrawing from eoereitrnckd positions In Asia, but none! brimpawn of great strategic strengthorn term ideologicalAssessing the United Stales to be on Ihenternational attainult of Soviet probes, the Chineae belhrve thai YVii thing ton must concrtitrate on Wx primary oopnncnl, tha USSR. To thb utent. ChinanmrnmulHy of Interest with Ihc Unllod Stalestrugglr, with MbmQW. The main danger, from the Chinese vantage point. Is [hut Ihc United Stales, lacking live political will lo punuc Hi national Intcresti vlgnrauily and allowing Itself to be putosition of Inferiority In conventional mill itrfl logic or mi. will compromise with ihe USSR on diiodvantageoui lerms. leaving Chirm In face Soviet power alone. Peking, therefore, attempts to cxooerbalr tcntifa between Ihe two superpowers.

llhoiigh Ml attention Ii focused primarily onChina sensei some danger inJapan, the only other Asian major power, brival nf China Two bitter wars withthe paatBS yean have given Peking rotson toJapanese rearmament, especiallyweaponry. Te lessen Ihai prospect Chinaro increase (he correlation of Chineseinterests through political andIn doing in Ihe Chinese are alsoJapanese economic and techr.lcal ilnrngth.

ifferent kind ofIn order to protect their northeastChinese cunnot afford to Ignorehowever, wishes laituationdraw China Into confrontation with themajor nrou powcrs-^he USSH. Japan, andsn Is wary of any Northtempi to unify Ibe peninsula forcibly. South Korean acquisitionticrenr capability

vould further complicate China's policy 'ihc oreo.

Taiwan Is Ihe PRCs iinfinlsnerl civil war. Reunification of Taiwan with tbe mainland remains an Important objective, hut it Is of leu immediate concern than International acceptance of China's dalm of sovereignty over the Iiumu Although lately the Chinese have spoken mote about the possibility of eventually taking Taiwan by force, such talk seems primarily intended to lend credibility to Peking's bargaining pnslllon In any future talks. It also revealsncreased pestlmlsrn about Ihe potential for reunification through negotiations. In ony case, evidence that Taipei wai close loruderaw Peking toward military action ana serveotential flashpoint in Sino-US relntioni.

Elsewhere in Asia. Sovici Influence aggravates Chinese concern over minor threats from peripheral nations. Indiaore immediate danger than Japan,esser potential danger. The Chinese arc particularly concerneduclear stute allied wild the USSR on their southern (lank. The Sino-Indian lsnrdcr rcmnlns In quiet dispute, and despite New Delhi's recent coneiliolory move lo raise dlplo-malic relations to an ambassadorial level. Poking doubts tint Indian coolness will appreciably abate soon. Soviet ncnrtratlnn of Ihc Indian Ocean area, moreover, hasetrategic entree In portions of the Indian Ocean littoral. As aPeking foresees further Soviet navalof the PRC

The Chinese perceive Vietnam as Ihe most powerful und stable stole In Southeast Asiaotentially oponsionet one, whichexing security Issue for them. Hanoi Is an olstacte tospirations for iincliollengcd influence In theproblem exacerbated by long-standing Slno-Vlctnamese ethnic friction* and by rival claims to the itJtuuls in the South China Sea. These frictions would exist even without Hanoi's currently warm feelings Inward Moscow, but such relations magnify ihcm. Any Soviet acquisition of naval base rights InunlikelyId significantly heigh ten Peking's fear of Soviet encirclement.

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the potcutial dangers facing II undof permanent allien. Peking naturally aconcernedossible outbreak of aand its Impact on China's nationalmore pessimistic than most cationsa war is Inevitable, the lop Chinesecertainly are exaggerating the likelihood ofIn the relatively near futiue. EvenChinese claim that the greatest danger is athe superpowers, they really fear amilitary assault on China. To decreasethai China would have Id absorb thisas well ns lo improve Its currentttempting lo involveIn Chinese security. The Chinese seemlhalonflict between the Unitedthe USSR would eventually involvefears, however, that given the nuclearthe superpowers,ar might befirst by conventional means which Itecided advantage over the US.

Eionomic ond Titbnleol ContliaktH *

a developing nation, China continues toeconomic problems. The limitedta force difficult economic trade-offs onmakers. The scarcity of high-qualitytechnological resources requires continuedof national resources ta aorortunodaleand priorities,

thoa concentrate on quick risesmodernuatson, Chinese policy appearsUse developmentiable economy overrun In order to support moreater date. We believe Ihat thebarring extensive agricultural failures orpolitical upheaval, will permit theof the military establishment.however, will necessarily dependrate of Industrial growth aad can thereforeto proceedeasured pace. Asthe Chinese will continue to beIn weapons choice.

Chinese obviously have not become asand self-reliant as they had hoped.most of the technology gained inrom the Soviets, they haveto the West for more acqiiUtsons ofboost their economy and military production base. So long as the Chinese continue to concentrate on applied rather than bask research, they will lie unlikely to come up withsurprises" In military weapons.

nd PoKtia *

IS. The political role of tlse military Is currently In flux.1 there hasradual but marked disengagement of lbc military from tho political arena ond rcaascrtion of the party's political primacy. Yet the voice of the military hi policymaking remains strong.

he dlvisivenen among China's civilianmakes it unlikely that the military wilt he pushed further out of political life In ihe aftermath of Moo's demise. Despite the preoccupation of some political generals with the succession, China's overall military posture is not likely to suffer greatly. Should disorder approaching the scale of the Cultural Revolution occtu, ihc PLA. as the final guarantor of security, would almost certainly intervene.onsequence, the combat availability of some units would be affected temporarily.

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extent to which PLA leadership views will InTKicnc* Chinese foreign policy over the next five years Is unknown. Some military leaden; apparently continue to believe that the United Statesseful counterweight ta the USSRource of needed tcchtiolojy. while others may fed that China's best Interests would be servedoreign policy that was less abrasively hostile toward tlte USSR.

Peking's rnatcrial support of Imurgcney is modest and confined loo handful of groups, primarily In Southeast Asia. China will probably continue this nssbtance us potential pressure points andeans of precluding Soviet ond limiting Vietnamesewith insurgency in the oreo.

Compared to that of the superpowers. Chinese foreign military assistance will probubly remain smaS In amount, limited In variety, and lexxstiphirticatcd In nature. Wc sec no major shifts In character, direction, or scale tn Chinese military old over the next five years. The Chinese will notajor supplier

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to Third World countriei, lei alone be able to challenge superpower dominance in arms supply. China, however, provides the Third World nations wiih an niter native and coniideri its foreign assistance as enhancing Its prestige and influence at minimum financial and military risk.

verview of Chinese Strafany NaflortolS'raNgy

Chinese national strategy deals largely wiih preserving China's security ond maintaining lis way of life. In post and present Interaction between China and the three major powers oo Us periphery, at different times each one nfin theo (hefc, Ihc United States from Ihen the, and the USSR from theposed the main threat loasic security and survivalational entity. Duringodd years, the central task has been lo deter or combat (hai threatening external enemy whileosition of great military Inferiority. The esicnce of the present PRC national security problem Is how best lo protect tho Chinese stateilitarily superior USSR, both now and In the future.

ational strategy, the Chinese ate building up thclt own power position by whatever means possible, while allemptrng lo reduce lhal of their main enemy. The ultimate aim of thiso ntlcnaote Soviet power so that the USSR no longerhreat to the maintenance of Chinese security and well-being

urrent national strategy,ne of limited aim, simply because of limited resources. Thus, the Chinese hava sought loational defense posture which would nol only dotcr attack hut oho woold allow for balanced economic development, la order lo reduce rbk-toking, the strategy will likely continue to be militarily defensive In outlook while politically and psychologically offensive in nature.

To attain thb aim. the Chinese arcange of policies that seeks:

To improve polilical relations with those nations and orgunhnllnns (eg, the US, Japan, NATO. Eastern Europe) which have Ihe potential to counteramsonism and In help soften the aggressive unll-Chino policies and outlook of the Soviets. In this eoooecllon, the Third World Is abo loale In resisting Soviet influence. (Some Chinese continuing objective!is specific countries and regions are shown on the accompanying pulknit map, Figurehich, while nol depicting any order of priorities, docs Illustrate some nolitkn-mlrliary and economic aspects of Peking's global

To mask Internal divisions so as to limit the opportunities available lo external mbchlef-maken.

To develop economic arrangements to Increase PRC Industrial strength, tcdmologieol growth, and military capability.

Toililary establbltmeot wfrich con deal more effectively with conventional and nuclear war.

n turn, the Chinese urc now attempting lo maximize Iheir strategic poalian by closely integrating their political, economic, and military policies so lhal they con moverosition of "relative weakness" lo one of "rciailvctrategy furnishes the Chines* with their best hope ofilitary conflict In the present, while buying lime to prepare ways of dealing mom effectively wiih Ihc superpowers In Iho future.

n tupport of national strategy. Chinese military irrarrcv (Irenes both deterrence and warflghtlog capahiUy-

Hrlrrtniee tn make an attack on China tn notlyikely enemy thai war ii avoided.

Watflghllng capability lo defend as much Chineae territory as possible. If deterrence folk

Tn achieve these strategic militaryhereeneral conscruus among the leadership of the continuing validity nf Maoht military concepts. Ihe Importance nf mililary power, aad the oreeadly of mndernrnug the Pl-A. Nevertheless, there rkwfy have been and ore disagreement* on srxdfk baac* related to their defeme policy and Strategy.

I

ost contentious issues. These Indude:

Assessment nf (he threat posed by potential enemiei and the type of defense required for each one;

The value and (lie of the component ports of ihe PLA;

The siic ond type of nuclear force for deterrence and China's ability touclear war;

Tho role of paramilitary forces versusforcesodern war;

Tho pace of programs and priorities of resources for PLA modernization, including allocation among tho various components; and

Tho extent of PLA Involvement In political and economic activities.

the death of Mao, these issuesmore Important and contentious. Itto Imagine that any current Chinesebe able to consolidate his position withoutthe support of key members of Ihe PLA.might require major concessions andshift of direction In the PLA'sNevertheless, we fed confident of detectingchange In the presently acceptedmelding of competing viewpoints

Defaneaet

The Chinese currently view deterrence as an Integral portrooder process of influencing the main enemy without direct confrontation Their approach is both direct and Indirect: at the military level, they are developing more armed strength In order to Increase the punishment to be meted out to en aggressor for resorting to war; at Ihe indirect level, they arc using political and mychological means to contribute to military deterrence.

A balance of the two ways Is essentia] for the PRC. Tho direct military approach Is necessary but very costly. The less vbible and more subUe, indirect approach fe attractive because It creates on added measure of deterrenceheap price and with much less danger of military provocation, even though It docs notreat assurance of success.

Overall. China's mllitory deterrent Isbut Its effectiveness differs sharply according to the nature of ihc war. For example,round Invasion, China hasigh level of deterrence because of its huge conventional force (well prepared ond disposed for defense Inast geographicalassive and highly organized population,obilization capacityrotracted war.onventional ground attack against China wouldormidable undertaking evenurxrpower. The modernisation of the genera) purpose forces, rrrorcover. continues tosteadily this sizable deterrent.

Chinaodest nuclear capability which complements Its convcnttooal capability. The aim is lo prevent nuclear blackmail and toucleer strike against, or on Invasion of, China. In addition, the nnclear forceimited nuclear umbrella. The Chinese may fed that this nuclear force might make either superpower reluctant to Intervene in local crisis situations for fcur nfround confronto-lion wilh Ihc Chinese or an escalationuclear level.

China's nuclear forcearticular concerts for lire Soviet Union, os well os for US forces and US Asian allies within range. Although this force will remain vastly Inferior to that of the United Stoles and the USSRong time to come, ib deterrent value will markedly increase, particulody in US eyes, when China's full-range ICBMs and SLBMs become opcrutitmal, probably in the earlyhis added capability will require greater caution in handling situations that could resultilitary dash with China.

The Chinese have enhanced the deterrent value of their IRBMs and MRBMs by means of conceal. meal nnd held site deployment. Such measures hove not only increased the likelihood of pott -strike survival but also have decreased the potential attacker's confiilcnce that lie has detected and targeted the entire force.

The Chinese have also achieved some added deterrence through political ond psychological means.

"sFCittt.

Peking'i motl noteworthy nccomplUlurient hu been the tmptoveimnt of relation* with ihe United States, that railing the perccivvd ccat oral rtakoviet military attack upon China. Other political initiaSvts oa defease marten hava not been a*iciil. bul the deterrent payoff wouM bt significant should Chinese palitca!-military calculations ba leaJzed

esarapla. In the fvrld of arms controlthe Olnaso hope to eoastrainand use of force by the United StatesUSSR through various proposal*hese Include:

Propaganda attempt* to undermine MBFR and SALThich they fear would provide ihe USSR with greater miliaryagalral China.

Proposal* foi adoption by Ihe superpower!u>|jnt-uw pledge as China hai done,of nuclear arms from overseas bases, support of various nuetcar-frte-iooa proposals,participationorldwide nuclear disarmseeirCrenet.

Advocating adoptionmtle territorial water claim by all countries and control of Ihewithin the Jurisdiction; supportitg ibe claim of Malaysia. Singapore, and Indonesia for controniog the Strait of MaUcoa. Thesewould serve lo limit the free movement of the US and Soviel navies.

The main focnt of Chineseb to deal with an Invasion of ihe mainland,attack, or tome combination of both.to Chine official Moiements and issuancesNanooal Party Coetgrrawi, Ihe topwar it dlffarerrt IntHUltira and rakingIl could ba large or small, nuclearand with or without surpriseIraorn even anllripaK that an enemylo cheirocni and biological warfare In orderfamine, civil disorder, and pout seal collapse.

We believe lhat themilitary strategy basically calls for;

all-around defense of China,ajor effort devoted tooviet ground attackecondary effort pointed toward icocoait drfensg;

The availabilityentral itnervtt and forces from other arret a* reinforcement or lor Iruer-tionhreatened atra, and of ihc militiaeplacement pool:

The maintenanceihility byombination of main, regional, and guerrilla fortes, and

Tht tseottllonariety of tactics, both offensive and defemise including mobile,and gisreritla warfare a* the situation demand*.

II. More apeelrVallr. in tbe north the ir.itial defense consbts of lightly armed and widely scattered border defeme troop* They would provide carry warning and Intelligence concerning the major asc* of advance* la the eventround Invasion. Further back. In the first de'cnitJle tcrruln. defensiveunlike coastal defenseboon eomtiucteri anil are manned hy artillery-heavy local defeme force nnlti. MooUa inaln-ldroo ground units are located behind their romplcios to blockand maneuver to tho motl lluonleiied areas. The airased la provide support for bolh the defensive complexes and Ihe maneuver forces. In addition, the North Seawllioned to block the approocbci Into north China through the Pohal Culf

military Nroltgy alsoto counter threats all along ihc coastline ofba navy, parttcukuiybacked up near rhe coast byand air ck-ecaac lighten. Crounddefense unit* man artillery coastal defensestrong point* along the coast. Main-farcepositioned behind Ihe coastal sites to serveelements and lo repd an Invader beforecan be secured

lo the latl NIEc dothat the Chinese would rely on astrategy for detenteossibleor exclusivelypotlllonalan attack In (ho coastal areas Rather,of force dcvoloitmonti und positioningon Ihe ground. In the air, and al sea leads usnowombination of tactics would be

uwd. with modi depending upon tht nature and location of Ihe attoclt ai well ai upon the kind of Invading force*.

Nuclear. Wa believe the Chines* will continue to wc It in their best Interests no* to inlttatt the usa of nucleer weapons, drher at the strategic or tactical level. TW Chino* aim cteaity must be to confine tbe conflict to the conterrtranal level, wbtre they reel tbey can mak* madmum use of advantages in manpower, knowledge of terrain, and defensive complexes

At lite strategic level, China's nuclear wurlltht-ing strategy is severely limited. Foroviet strategic attack would lease the Chinese few options beyond limited retaliatory strikes on enemy urban arras. The Chinese probably hope that their extensive dispersal ond passive defense measures will help them rideira regie nuclear attack preserving enough force lo deter or eventuallyollow-on Invasion Indeed. China's salutary strategy remains largely predicated upon meeting an invader within Chinese territory

t the theater level, Ihe Chinese would not Initiate employment of theater nuclear forces against an invading force, bul apporcnily do envision possible retaliatory use of these forces?

because the missile systemsand cumbmome, they would providecrude force with relatively limited value againstIn contrast, while the Chineseprovide greater accuracy than the missiles,would be reducedophisiicateden vi raiment Nevertheless, tbe Chineseuse of rr.TiOlrt ond bom ben la thk fashionsomeof theresponding to an enemy's use ofsystems.

ommon clement to bothond nudcar strategies Is civilid cs enhancing civilian morale, the extensive

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construction of ibelten and underground tunneling serves two purposes. Tbey are seen as providing some protection of personnel during bombing and as locations from which to fight an Invader In the ground defenseity.

sum. wearge conventional forcemodernized and supported by massiverjrganiaalion, all under the cover of aforce which It developing anThe large discrepancy between thenuclear weapons available to the Chineseof the United States and (lie USSR willserlousfy constrain the development of anystrategy for responding to oa enemyChina poses no direct military threat toStates. Itotential threat to US forcesin Ado.

II. CHINA'S ARMED FORCES A. Military Forces'

Given the external threat and economic and technological constraints, the Chinese havethe bulk of their regular forces at levels adequate tn deter an enemy,ery sizable paramilitary force available, and simultaneouslymall nuclear force. The modernization of the armed forces will continue to be uneven and slow; it appears tnomentam of Its own, despite political and economic changes (see

At the conventional end of the force spectrum, the Chinese army remains the bacMronc of the defense of the nation.boutillion men strong and nrcdriminantly an infonlry force. Appmximatdyercent are local forces fsco Figureuch forces Indude several large and west-armed garrison divisions but for tbe most part Ihey ore lightly equipped ond organized for defense of their own military region Main force units generally are more heavily equipped and are available for operations anywhere In the country. They arc gradually Increasing their firepower and mobility, but large-scale mechanizationtill In tlte future.

The navy and air force arc both smaller, havingerson noi rcspoctively. The navy remains principally an effective coastal defense force (sec Figurever the next five years,

or dctalk nfronlpmcal. dqthwrnna. (ralaaaa, uict andrmlution

however. It vritl operate it greater dbtinces from Ihe crawl.hese citcnded operation! could become routine tn thr early ICWa. The air force has not developed much lseyond llie Hugo ofimited olr defense force with someattack capability (iceul It* overall capabilities will Improve aver the nut five years

n rsddltloneat forces. Chinaotential paramilitary base nfillion penonnel. moat of whom are aaagrsed to'tia Of tfus lotaLatfJloa Bakllv-aimed troops from the militia arid tha Production and Coralructior. Corps coost Itie facto reserve and initial troop moliiliration Ixise.

t the odvanenl end of the force spectrum (see Figurehe Chinese huvesmall midear force of mini lei and hum hen. Thit forceodest deteircnl against attack und permits the employmentountervaluc Hratcgy agulrot several USSR dtlcs ind Allan nations, induding several US allies It can abo he usedsnnsfrairglc auclear fone There ii oTMrmrantUl evidence that Chi no leeks toattkal rroclear !m> as I

A limited-range ICIsM. pmalbty eapaKc of rrwefcimow rartrratlnoal. Mou advanced mtssilei.ntem and an ICBM capable of rea>-hing ihe continental United Stales, am now under development buf wilt not be available for several yean

B. VVorfio.ht.-ng CopobilKkil'

hina's capaliillly In defend the mainland from conventional attackuprrpower it substantial, and the PLA is fullyof defending against altada by lesser pawen

* Sirnr Un iblm'i

A conventlnaial ground irnaalna by rSher superpower eventual? could be staternated Inoyrction of Chineae military power abroad, however. cratllnurs to br limited by deficiencies In rVepowrr. rmyhinly. and logblic support

China could mnhlllj* large continienls of lightly armed gucnillai. Beeetise of limited uvallahHlty of mojnf comhul weapora and equipment, low If any new. heavily armed conventional until could be activated after hostilities begin

The navyignificant coastal defense capability, but It could not successfully oppose eitherpen-ocean conflict ll eouy effectively pursue military denial and Idockadc orwrnlirmi agaimt irooller nearby notions, unless they were assisted hy the USSR or the United States.

The air force could defend China from air attack and provide air support for ground and naval operations ago Inst Asian opponents.ustained effort by ihc USSR or lite United Stales, air operations would be lest luceeaful.

hina'* strategic nuclear capability Is obviously no match for either that of the USSR or the United Stales.A. moreover, hasudimentarynuclear capabilityot organized, equipped, ur (rained la conductndcar war environment.

verall, during ihc next five years, economic and technical eoroldc rations appear In preclude any <trimnllc Improvement In (be PIonventional or nuclear warfrgbtlng capability. Operational (kplm/-men! of an ICBM or an SLBM capable of reachingcontlnenlul United Stales, ltitwcvcr, wouldadditional deterrence ugalml US or Soviet nuclear striker. Compared to possible AsianChina's mililary capabilities will becomemore powerful. The ever-present Soviet threatimited amplubiom lift copnhlllly, however, combineajor constraint and limit Peking's options to project force.

III. THE POSSIBILITY OF CHANGE

hina is In imndllon to Ihe post-Mon era. Kvcnb liolh beftue and oflcr Moo's death have rcirrfiirccd mtr Judgmentcadcr-sJllp. pursuing pragmatic policies tn the Inlcrcit of Krtial stability and dcvrfopmcnl of eonnumlc strength, will finally emerge from Ihe overall succession rsrocess. Initially,Ionic grouping of civilian and military leodcti seems lo he at the helm. Some cooitniloosness will undoubtedly comlnuc to cilst, and Ihc posslliility for further conflict remains. Periods of disorder dumaging central authority have been endemic in Chinese history, bul ihe recent purge of ihe "left" suggests only minor und controllable turbulence, If at all over the near (crm. No matter what the polillcol

*KafJ

PRC Ground Force

I I

80 07 88 BB TO 71 73 73 74 75 7ft 77 79 79 60 SI

lumi outo ol first, wc cspccl over (he long run ihc emergencengle leader who bet lea authorily (Hon Moo ol the height of hb ascendancy but who will follow policies that balance off the Interests of the party, state, and the military hierarchies.

roadly pragmatic leadenhip consolidate control, we would espect the Chinese to continue to see the Soviet Union as the most serious potential threat facing them. There could well he, however, some attempts to reduce the abrasive nets of the Sno-Sovict relationship,hat case, the Implication for defense policy Is that, even if tensions were somewhat lowered, the Chinese would continue to strengthen their military post'iT* against the Soviets. The new Chinese leaders would not dom lo let down their guard, but teep the rxepunderanee of their ground ibeces oriented toward the north and push ahead with the creation of their Intercontinental rtucker fonts-Tbey would net, however, be constrained a* much by the Soviet laiiitary threat at now. ond China might be rnore free to use military force clae where toew rrmlinttncy

e do not. however,ragmaile regime to pursue eipamionlit policies (other than Irredentistl would focus on developmenttable

PRC Naval Force Trends

ft

Missilo Attack Boats

79

Subrtuifincs Principal Surface Combatants

81

titjm-

for healthy ecooomie growth. For example, Chinese prsgmatrtts would be willing to sacrifice tome Ideological values In order to promote production through more orthodox economicMich as grtoter uso of material incentives.echnical-managerial team operating theirmer economic underpinning for the development of tho defease eHoblblunenl would be created.

t would be fecldesa to judge that the dfrecUon of Chinas future defense policy will be largely determined by the Ideological difference* within the leadership- We believe that the defense policy of any new Chinese leadership will be more sensitive to an interact kin among national interests, availability of technology, economic growth, the creation of military power, and relations with the outside worid. In this context, pragrruillsm and tbe force and inlcns'U' of

Chinesethanmake motivating factors for change.

IV. DEFENSE POLICIES IN THE

e believe that certain ongoing trends and defense policies have an enduring quality and conscqecntly will survive the pnsl-Mao transition period.

National security will continue to be the major Chinese preoccupation. Tbe Soviets will remain the main threat. The PRC. however, will not align Itself with other powers hut will pursue on independent stance,

The PLA will continueuge militaryone more operationally competent and modern bed than now. It will continue to

PRC Air Force Trends'

involvedreet variety of polilical and economic duties.

China's military power will continue to be circumscribed by thai of the uiprrpmen Ahhougb the PRC will pmUbty begin In force of ICBMs aad SUM. in atCoaJdei lanodear

to raise the risks and cosb of

a convenllonol attack, thereby reducing the prmpeel "fan attempt.

imall Asian nattoen, the PRC willecided military advantage Nevertheless, Peking will prefer to use political andmeans rathe than military pressures to gain its end* Ithowever, hr prepared to resort to force to hack up ib tectorial csairns.

PRC ECONOMY AND

PRC ECONOMY AND TECHNOLOGY

DEVELOPING ECONOMY

economic strategy Iiby Its resource limitations. Il(a) develop the country'stechnkol base, (b) maintain and improveliving slandnrdontinuallyIon alreadyillion, and tc)the military forces. These competingdalira for scarce resources must be meteconomyNP rather Impreciselybe the equivalent of0 billion. OverFive yean, the Chi nor have been ablesubstantial overall economicpercentwhile rnodesily improvingforces. Food production haa kept slightlypopulationemarkable achievementIndustrial production, upon which thehas expanded at aboutercent annually.

the Chinese hove the advantageself-sufficient In most raw materials,But It will br some years Isefnrc they will beexploit all of these resources. They still needsubstantial quantities of nonferrouscopper,ariety of special steeband strength alloys for

EconomlaJ

fwt estimate

fjt pO'tloa of IM aniAcH Industrial sector is devoted to defense The Chinese have chosen an investment pattern thai favors agricultural and industrial development in rive Dear term but would stillradual bet steady expansion of military forces aod weapons systems Overall. Chinese policy appears to favor the development of ao economic bese over the long run In order to support the creel be of more effective military frreensater date- Thus, Ihey are sacrificing rapid military mrsderruialioo in the short term.

The heavy costs of maintaining the FLA are portly offset by extensive use of the military in building roads, railroads, cans is. and waterprojects ns well as In producing food and some light industrial goods. Nevertheless, defensewiH continue toeavy burden on the advanced industrial sector of Ihe Chinese economy. Further compounding the problem, the Chinese defense budget can be expected to edge upward, certainly In the nest five years and then on Into the future, because of programs to deploy longer-range land-based missiles, the first submarine-launched ballistic missile system, and new aircraft. Nonetheless, barring extensive agricultural failuresrolonged political upheaval, we believe that the Chinese economy will permit the gradual modirntwilson of the military establishment. Even so, the Chinese cannot afford the wide range of weapons options open to the icprrpmvcr* and must be selective in how they develop their defense Industrics.

China's military accomplishments, whilehave been hamperedcarcity of high-quality human and material resources. The most Important resource constrainthronic and growing lack of skilled technicians and engineers. This deficiency Is compounded by the apparent Inability lo provide quality replacements for their small but aging corps of senior scientists. Another basic constraint affecting force modernization stems from competing resources demands on the limited economy. China simply does not have sufficient resources to provide simultaneously for rapid military development as well as for expanded agricultural and industrialBecause of the competing demands between the military ond civil sectors ond wfthln the military between the services, we expect toontinued Juggling of resources asfraught with politicalmade ta accommodate competing national requirements.

eJf-Rellance and Technology. The Issue of self-reliance ond foreign technology in modetniang

Chinese Industry In general, und military technology In particular, hit Isren contested within China'i niHng hierarchy since the IBOOi. The debate hoi focused primarily on the ritcnl.nd pace which foreign technology should beather than oa whether or not to purchase abroad. In actual practice,ee ba* meant avoiding deortsdertrwingle nippller. not*Hf-*urr)cifney.

7 Acquisition of foreignermhiible in Ihe inert term In order la reduce Ibe nerd for future Import* and a* long as China I* not tsatottrd by foreigner* or "contaminated" by foreign influence. Accordingly, recent Chineae purchases Includeplants und industrial complete* thai embrace entire industries Their technological acquhltinoi cover rnachlnery, tqulpment. scientific instrumentsmetal* from Ihe Wail.

8 Several factors have caused Ihe Chinese lo move toward purchase! of advanced military technology. Primarily, the usefulness of copying Soviet design technology of theearlng lb end. Tbr Chinese are experiencing technical difficulties in developing some follnu-un uropon* systems, nichophisticated high per forma nee fighter. In addition, creation of an entirely new family of Indlgrnoin weaponseynnd tbeir eiittlng design and engineering cafabditba,

RC Intarrat In acquisitions of militarv related technology from Ihcemain high. Since China's opening hi the Writestern techoology generally ho* become more available. COCOMwhich formerly barred PRC access to much sought-ofter technology andhave lieen progressively cased or circumvented More significantly, competing Wcitcrn nations arc eyeing ihe potential of Chinese trade and will attempt toide range nf strategic good* In Ihe fulurc.

he extent of future PRC purrfvases, however,indeterminable for several reasons. The Chinese toaden themselves may he uncertain as to how far they can go politically to rvku Ibeir icff-nrHance precepts, bow successful iheir own weapon*program* will be, and how fast China can absorb new technology Meets, of course, will depend upon the availability of foreignand tbe etitlenceavorable International atmeoplere permitting additional mililary leehootogy transfer* to the PRC.

II. Corueqirrnon. Economic and technological constraints have dictated Ihe crealirrn of armed force* thai rely primarily upon manpower and easily manufactured, low.technology weaponry. Thb runpoorilitary (trategyefensive posture,arge com'er tiooal Forceami real itiategic force Given the state of China'* economy and lb trchrintngical assets, these same factor* wii continue lo shape.rrdomlrjrt way. China's strategy and forces for ihe foreseeable future.

he present general ordering of mililary venta civil priorities will proltsbly persist ihrmigli thb decade, rcgardles* nf Ihe outcome of iho succession,xessuso Iho mosl Important bases of thbcost and difficultyore ambitious defense effort, the urgency of modernization, and expansion of agriculture andremain rsrenttany uriehanged at least

ia Military growth and rae>dersaralion will likely depend on and be paced by lod.atrialudden diversion ol some civil resources to defense, however, con not be ruled out, especially if Chinese policymaker* were loubstantially greater external threai. China'* military-Industrial facilities, moreover, provide an existing potentialreater defense production effort when needed.

THE PLA AND POLITICS

THE PLAOMESTIC POUTICAl FORCE

A. PLA Porrtkol Posture

he voice of Ihe military In partyhas beentrong becaiue of frequent hislcrie Intertwining of etvll and milrtary functions. Ta theare! ancestor, ihe Red Army, ami hadingf .Hals wen? either comrnarrderi or commissars of rank* army units; In the period Immediately fallowing iho founding of tbe PRC9 the stllitary.bortfinate arm of the party, directly govemtd Ineal rrporaew years;fter the breatmown of the party aad government organiza:ion during ihe Cu'liral Revolution, (he militaryajor votfc In civil affalri andime was the country* dominant administrative fryer. Ai aof this unique and changing role, military prirUcipannn in the Chirwae peaVticsl process became ealargrd. both at the center and at provincial levels.

Theolilical power reached Its apogee In the. The then Minister of Nationallan, was Mao's detlgnaled heir, the military onminated ihe reemi! ifuird adreinbtratire and party organs; nnd the Ninth Pari/Congress9 resultedentral committee packed with military men and In the elevationonsiderable number of senior offlccn to the Politburo This risehe military's political fortuneslear threat lo the power of both old-line petty functionaries and the dvtlOn "aeweomen' who rose lo prominence during the Cultural Itrvolution.

1 there he*radual hut marked darnjajrmeot of the military from tbe pull ml arenarwuerhDn of theolitical primacy. The PLA't presence in policymaking organs and. above all. In Ihc administrative apparatus hot boon reduced sharply wilh some abatement of lensloni between the military and the reconstituted civilian hleiarehy. Oviliare have steadily replaced military appointees at influential party and government posts In Peking and In the prnvlnces. At the highest policymaking levoh andew provinces, however. Individual military ftgures rssofanuc to eserecre tubal anower

4 The PLA's representation on oiviban pollcyfnak-ing bodies Is itlll greater than II was before the Cultural Revolution. The relative declineowever, has rilrmat certainly uukI some leading twflttary fig-ores who now occupy lesser pMtasns of authority than In ihe immediate para-Culturalyears. On the other hand, the residual strength nf the military powerhrtlden leaves many civilian party readers deeply suspicious of PLA political lutitiicaaaeat. and there have been efforts to teovee furthrr the civilian-military bolanee to liteovor. Itowcvcr, both tides In the struggle which Ijmkc out into the open In6 with the political deaah* at* termer Vice Prrtnler Teeg Htiao-plag aeon to have been vying for influence wtth the mlrltary-Sueh competition could again leadarger military soy In party affairs, as may have happened (luting recent political maneuvering! fallowing Mao'i death.

j The PLA it by mo means whetry hornoesneous or monolithic, and the military establishment obviously docs not speak with one voice. Since the mld-IOBOs, the lame of emphaili on military experience versus poStical training has been coettntioes- Eve* during the Cubans! Revolution heyday of military Mfhiencc. many mdltary cornmands were deeply dividedsupporters of various Red Guard factions. Differences probably still crist among military loaders over Ihe oeiare and pace ef force nstaScsiaaatioa. All of ihese drviomo, In fact, have political and economic ramifications which affect rontroversses among the civilian party factions as well as those belween tho civilian and miliary hnrcatxrals

here are. nevertheless, some issues of great political Importance oo which the PLA as un Institution wrruld achieve consensus. It is likely thai many offlccn wndd agree thot the PLAarger slice of ike Urdgetary pie. and aneat would uneYiutitcdty resist major nitbacks in the defeme budget. Also, the officer corps would strongly resent nnd might root any civilian and party attempts to

denigrate the PLA as an irrslltulion and lu curb Ut Influence Oa the ttrur of law and order, meat of the sriArarr would prefer to avoid ttrrnes and (train* apearvjrdrlrtg (he scab of the Cultural Revolution and would throw their weigh! In fame of resatlverr coruervallva political forer*

n lum, the polilical role ol the military it currently Innd the PLA remain*e on instrument of parly policyhaper of that policy.

S. Tht PU and Stxceaston

& The rsreblerra of tucccttion have pravirJedor greater PLA polilical tsivolvrsnent The divblvenei* among China* leadrrship tineo Moo'i demise rnakei It unlikely that the military will be puihed further out of political life. Tho itruggle among tho eon lending factloni. which has been broughtead, hat thrust lop PLA kadenartisan mlr In successioneveral key prjsHiorn arc important, iododlng the Minister of National Defense, rhe PLA Chief of General Staff, aod the commanders of ike Peking Military Region and Ihe Peking garrison- All have hem Influential posit lorn In ihetrife of (he pat) decode, and Ihey are likely to remain crucial n* tha succession period proceeds. In addition, leading military figures In ibeum. while ambus to preserve PLA influence, will he tempted lo advance tbeir political forturses

3 Despite the pcersccvparion of some political geocroh with the tgeccsvon. China's overall military pojlure hai not been weakened. Tha military chain of command remotni Intnci. no mnfnr foctionnlum has neonate manlftal within the PLA Itself, and major military unit* have been playing ateripheral rose in the succession process.

he PLA Itself, as the final guaraaror of internal security, would be likely to iBtrrrvcne If any residual factional struggles spill out inio the streets, schools, aod factor lei, oncale a* to threaten Cultural Revolution-style chaos. In Ihe unlikely evenl of military Intervention, requiring administration of the countryarge scale, however, the combat availability nf some units, including main force drrtssorn, would be affected temporarily In addition, inch an Involvement could pave the way for long-term military domlnotion of Ihe party ond govcrn-menl.

II. THE PIA AS AN EXTERNAL POLITICAL FORCE

A The PLA and Foreign Policy

II

continue to play an active mlc in pmvidlng mililary aid, assisting certain insurgency movements, undrowing Clilotc diplomaticabroad.

12|

rni points wcrn tn cinergf in-lt in (siriiinanrsn wrriis rvieicrKehat the PLA. al least since Ike Koran War. ha* bom pulnf idly cneisaou* nf the rebttve weakness of Chinai armed forces compared to ihote of lis putative enemies. Thehal in iho pott at least some of China's leading (miliary figures appear lo have taken tke view that Chinai best in remit -rxild br servedoreign policy thai was lea* shroavcty hostile Inward the Soviet Union.

hese two points are Intcrrclat

n the late

hai because China's military muido was so weak il would 1st necessaryumber of years to

rely on the USSR tor military aid, both In tho form of direct nrmi purchase and ihe development nfmt-product Ion capacity. Al that time,the United Stale* >ai considered the primary threat In China. Tbe posllinr, nf Peng'* toccetaor. Lin Hao, k* has easy to ratablhh enndoBvely. but he opfieun tu have argued lhat It would ha unwise Inolicy of rapprochement with ihe US, pcrltan* because thli course risked provoking Moscow Inio an attack on China. Un may abo have argued

thai China could not afford lo Irritate deliberately the USSR. sinceourseoviet riposte that the PLA omitd nut cminler effectively.

hehether or nor such views are currenily held by arty ImportanteeaSna.

[ logic

mmwm nn1 puwiiuia iukhi uydefense ministers were not whollyunrepresentative of the importantthe PLA.galnal an attitude ofis suSrl tora* almurve policy tnwaulsuggesting that this altitude out! within

an hate of some importance In the succession struggle. Moreover. If pertinent military leaders gain an Increased voice in Mcy making. Peking couhl become more receptive Iti the idea of moderating somcwhol its unyielding opposition to the USSR.

itaa (start. monTtniei! the development of the Susc- US connection It is prohaMe that seat* military leaders,road view of Chinese strategic policy, believe that the United Stolesseful CHiiitrrwcitht tn the Soviet Union and that Mmcow has been feared ta take Inio conooerarioa pnaiblc USto Soviet pnllcy toward China. Smnr others probably tteheve Ihat the present Slno-US rolrsllonshlp is Inconclusive, has provhled few direct benefits to China, and has heea largely discounted by Moscow and may even havr rawed greater risk for China.

IB In any event, while Mao lived themilitary men who mightowering of Sinn-Smiet tcnskro did notajor, erect Impact on the conduct of Chinese fnrciga policy. Indeed, their Itleni pmbably did not even receive much of an airing within parly eouncih. In tho wake of Moo's death, however, any such views could become quiteilnee It is likely that there willoviet overture which could prrviuil-fleiiard intra-party debate on colic toward the USSR. Ifebate gets underway while liar Chinese leadership bIs certaintyIt moy beeiirrie inrnnrhim-rrcmrnii nieadership accept Moo's pnlscy of strengthening ties with tbe Wet! and thr Uaitcd Stale.articular In cadet to obtain Idhniilogico] imports which feed Chlua'si-i. iir.fll camples. Al least some military leaders have |ireued for lacerated technological imparlsssist in Ihe creationore modernree quickly

he PIA os on Extemol Instrument

he Chinese have been much less braille than their isnnsagandra and militaristicmuresL They lamw.nik. iirrcnnfinriralfcn prim for thr mat part rspeetally against the superpowers. They have concentrated onilitary

th the Unites! States ihrmiglmitnd with the Snvict Union since the

Above all, tbey are eajisrmety careful not to be Involvedrmraet which might eseahttc to the ast of nucicai weapon*

tvtnhdcss, the Chineae have not hesltatod to use fore* They have done tn when they hove been reacting to what they have seen as threats In Chinese territoryorea and tht border conflicts wtth India arid ibe USSR) and when reasserting control over claimed terrtnnes (the Pamcebl la these instances. China actedalculated and controlled manner In order lu achieve limited objective*

C. The PLA ond Inwrgency

lthough promotion of revolutionaryhai root* ta Chinese ideology,ood reason to heheve that pragmatic national interest* are the dominant factor In determining the nature and level of Chinese assistance tn insurgencies.eking hai might better it ate-to-state relalHinihlp*developing cminlrioi and has disossacialed itself from to-called Mooiat group* In most parti of the world Thus, tke PRC bos been tciecive aad restrictive in its aid to mmgeociev The Chinese do, however, continue to offer propaganda support torvohillonary action."

D. Security Aivl'cnc*

a addition to aiding Iniuigcncy, the FLA provides fatalities, Instructors, and support foi the training of penonivtl senl to China under the vnrtous foreign assistance program* a* well a* military cadre (or PRC military aid programs abroad.

hort of direct military action. Peking wiH continue tof military rewnircw to supplement It* bilateralhinese national security rsbjccl'vc I* lo foster the dovehi|Mitcril nf politically stabse, friendly nation* arounderiphery. Pekingrecogtitrn* the value of military oBOlancc in leacrirng Soviet and US mflucnoc In the Third World Toward these ends, the PRCtmount! uf mililary aid to North Korea and North Vietnam In addition, theave supplied arm* lother govern men Is over theears, olrvioualyeans of reinforcing Its influence in the recipient nations

IS. Chinai security assistance program differs radically from that of tke West. Becauseaucityesources, Peking can only nffer aid which I* small In amount, limited in vatlcty, and lesssophisticated in cbnrocter. Hut her than mnisrtary asslitanco orloans, aid is providedrail* or Interest-free jbaab. The Chinese have tkunncd using mililary assistance programseans of obtaining Foreign haws and acres* In mililary supper: facilities, creating hlualmnl mililary olkancri, and establishing mulrilat-eral security arrangeinDnhi.

hr scale of Chouse militaryinlscule compared io thai of ihever the pad five yean Chiaa ha* erporlcd an estimatedhtlilon worth of mililary criuipment, withalf going to North Korea and North VlearasiriJ

statu

PRC ARMED FORCES AND TRENDS

CONVENTIONAL FORCES A. Gorvarol

ince tho Sino-Soviet border conlllciur estimate of China's general purpose and air defense forces has grown by approximatelyercenteacetime levelillion men. This increase in the estimate, largely In combat fceces rather than In tervice support fceces, bat resulted from an expansion of the military presence In the four northern military

The arms and equipment changes, moreover, lead us to conclude that China has maxim lied most of tho Soviet technology obtained during. Tho present mix of weapon systems, compared to that of tbe, reflects the growth end transition of the PLAorce that can conduct manyoperations.

Development of the PLAighting force comparable In soph is ilea lion to that of the USSR or US today will take at Uatioore years and would require tbe acquisition of more expensive and advanced technology than China now has, We judge that Chinese forces are beginning this difficult and costly transition, but increasing PLA capabilities willong end arduous process.

B. Ground Force

The Chinese ground force, the largest In the world, hasillion personnel. Its primaryo deter an attack oo China by meanstrong land defense and. falling that, to defeat an Invading foroe.

Ground forceargely determined by. and reflected In. Chinese perceptions of the threat. About half of China's combat and combat-support divisions are In the four northern military regions oriented against the primary threat Anothersizea third of theorroyed along the coast to defend Ihe secondary potential threut ores. Significantly smaller fortes ore oriented toward China's other frontiers, and the remainder is located in China's heartlandentral reserve and for reinforcement of threatened areas.

Chinese ground force levelsfrom an appreciation of the terrain andforcesS andhealso calculate that when war comes,not have time ot the heavy equipmentform new units. Success or failure will dependready and available active farces (see FigureIt)).

Chinese continue to alter theforce levels of their combat divisions to obtaineffective mix. Por example,9 theyout their cavalry divisions, farmed five orarmored divisions, and upgraded thefirepower of most of their main force units.increased the number af tanks in someand in each division. Tbe numberin artillery units of all types and alhas aho Increased.

fc Responal forces have also born stnwgtbcncd. These full-time forces now totalivisions, and some of these have more artillery fire supporttandard Infantry division. Tht best equipped of these divisions man elaborately prepared defensive areas located on many mator avenues of approach Into north end northeast China. There are anndependent local force regiments located throughout China.

array continues to Improve Its exorcisepractices.eing given toJoint service, aad antiaircraft artilleryjudge there Is on Improved ability toexercises throughout China.combined arms training, however, will continuelevel ond below.

orge assortment ofarge output ofartillery pieces, ammunition, andequipment has been sufficient to equip the

ftsttl^

oTSRtt.

force with relatively modern rniteriel, to arm portion* of the paramilitary force, and to meet exportlto, tbe Inventory of tank* and armored personnel carrier* continues to trie moteoderate rate, but we tea no trend towardof force*.

II. We raped development programs on such weaponsediumight-weight machine Run. and self-propel ted and towed artillery to

nvi ue Jinpiiwj si >ne Bniwniciwt ui new ground force weapons which, although not projected In our estimate, are within their capabilities and would he usefulodem, well-equipped foe. These could IncludeCs. lankntitank guided rrarsltes, new tactical rockets, self-propelled air detente guns, and thoulder-launcHed surface-to-slr missilesew weapons,will be Introduced gradually and their quality probably will not match those of the superpowers,

n ihc chemical warfare environment, ll appears Ibe Chinese have only marginally improved- The PLA recognises the utility of chemical and biological <CB) agentsilitary rolo, but greater emphasis I* placed on iho protective defensive aspect* in training. Thishse range of protective mask* and clothing, dejection devices, and decontamination by for the largest in Aiia andubmarine force that ranks third In the world in sheeresources allocated to naval shipbuilding suggest that China doc* not espect lo challenge the Soviet or UStn the near future. For the present, they are determined toavy that con conduct an estended defense of the China coast, lo include domination of the China Seas, white slmulianccudyolid foundation for Ihe establishment of an open-ocean fleet (see figure.

he navyubslantlol capability lo respond qulekly lo an attacking surface force, with submarines as the first line of defense. The dleset-altack submarine force, combtlng ofodd W-hus submarines,eing incrcotcd by eight to ten units each year. Theosses have adequate antlshlp but very limited antisubmarine warfare capabilities Theloss submarines oil! reach block obsolescence in five yean. The Ming doss, two of which srerc butll In the, wa* probably intendedeplacement forit has not entered series production. Weew dksrl attack submarine will appear in Ihe next five year*ollow-on forhtst.

hina also intends Id establish alarcc of nuclearingle nwdoor attackthe Han, Is now operatlonall

NovcJ Force

ia Theow aa eitrernefy effect) ve coastal defense force, but rhe Chinese are attempt'rg toore modern and bakncrrl navy They have Improved their naval wtepent and altered the composition of the fleet to th* pointhe navy is

acking up the submarine*econd line of nivalil of principal surface combatants and oratstal patrolotal ofestroyer* aod frigate* ore available for ritrssded coastal defesac, divided about evenly befreo tbe two types. The Cordyy desfroyen and rhe Riga and newsgaies am fitted with theaval onibhiputa tlestrnyers mayodified semen of theith aa Increaied range. The two

Klangtung frigates appear te be configuredhipboardtem which is slili being developed

estroyer* ore concentrated at strategicwithin each of the three fleet proas along with torpedo attack submarines. The number ofxpected to grow slightly over the next five sears, fcmphasis will likely be on the gulded-mlsstle frigates rather than on the larger destroyerhe new Kiunghu and Klnngtung classes offer the best hope for Improving tbe limited ASW capabilities of the fleet ass lor correcting the lacknedem shipboard olr defense capability, which currently restrictssurface operations to within range of land-based air cover.

he smaller surface combatants are strung along ihe China coast ot regular Intervals for dose-la defense. Although most of these units are not as sophisticated as their counterparts In Western navies,shortcomings ore compensated In part by their availability In largetheir excellent material condition. Of these,ulded-iulssilc boats of both Soviet and Chinese design employnmissile, with the prospectollow-on, Improved missile Ijeeomlng operational on these boats. We estimate that the missile attack boats, as tbe mainstay of combat power for tbe surface combatant fleet, wlQ continue to Increase In numbers over the next five years.

units of the coastal defensenaval aviationupporting rote loand surface forces. Should thebe passed, especially In the YeDow Sea,of eroding an enemy assault farce wouldcn the numerous nniiil ricfrnir artillery sitesthe land-basedndruise missiles.

naval air force hoiircraft,which ant Interceptors. Although the Chinesesome ISO medium ond intermediate/ rangeandantan ftghre^brgnbers thatthe naval coastal defense force, thecapabilities of the naval air forceAlio, airborne ASW capability Isa prototype aircraft, ibeayASW rote If It Is produced. Otherwise, thepurchase an ASW amphibian aircraftnavy has also begun to recede the Frenchhelicopter, capableultiplicity of roles.

China's aerial maritime reconnaissance wlD remain poor until the navy obtains long-range maritime patrol aircraft.

ha Chinese ore expending crxtsldcrablethe envelopment and expansion of navalthese

facilities are completed. China wlB have support and protection capacities In all three fleet areas.

hina has an active naval researchprogram under

he vulnerabilities of the navy continue to be various and

bave nut chosenevelopeapaBlllty lo project major military power ashore. Nevetthekss, Ihe navy prsuexscs luffidenS amphibious ships and craft to fift about three infantry divisions In medlam-baul om-prubknn openttiaaa. However, thai small ruree is used primarily for sheet-haul loglslM lupporl aloag the Chinese ctwit

bcaftnning te asseader, more pnrfeaairanel pearure. Srartacr units have began peri-cdlealfy to cprratr ICO to ISO rwuHeal raster, too. the coast. AiraN. are beginning lo participate in faint navalnd submarines have begun to undertake atended patrols Principal Chinese nival units now transit, and imaller units openste in tbe Taiwan Strait close to the mainland. The recent deployment uf rxeonrtgraphie research ships loto the Soulh Pacillem from the China coast

markeddepoiltira from normal naval operation* and ma. be on early Hep inward deploying lubmorinct inio Ibt Pacific. Training aerobes continue lo emphasis* ceaital defeme, aad tbey have now become significantly bugar. taoreIcj ond modi longer In duration.

D. Ab rote*

ha air force, iht third largest InId. It Mvaroly llmlttd by rhe lack of mprntticattd aireraft and poor Since Iho Soviel withdrawalhinese air copabllltlet have Improved, with few ercrotioni, onlyith Ilia producHon of aircraft bated on Soviet Korean War vintage lech-iiotngy. Tht primary minion of the air force ha* been ihe defenie of mainland China, and developrnenlt9 hava bat* crerrbeent with thi. mlretaa)ate nohowever, that tht air forrt would bt una) to carry tht war to tht enemy, aaeh oa by dtnroyiBg health tactical air and nuclearrough long range IrUerdktlon.

irrovidedix of aircraft. SAMi. and aaa weapon supported by radars, command and control systems, and paMtve meaiurei ruch ai camouflage, hardened stielteri. and dlipcilon Tactlca] air uppotl ailbough secondary to air del cue. haa bran strengthened once IBM, most notably with the UitrcoVction oflkcotstHSatlgntd fgjhtes^bornbor based oa ihe Sovset MIC-IB PanMr.

he overall aircraft strength in eottottonal units0 ha* increased by0 aircraft,otal of overver the neat five yean wr flipect tolow but continued expansion and Improvement of tha alt force (setnds the Chinese attempt to correct doflrttmcM In their air dtfensc and ground attack program.

W large Interceptor force now numbersircraft2 rha air def en- fore* hoi been quantitatively il-engrSened by addingIC-IB Farmers and by ooubuAg tha MIC-S1 Flshbtd Inventory tohisonsiderable upgrading over ihe old MIC-I7 Frtacocs which have been In Inventory since tho early IBSCs.orce mi* con provide an effective defenie igalnit srnoB-scole, eftar-alr mail atlack by subsonic poootrotoTi at low-to-modlum altitude In daylight. The Cluiits* alsohat roliBnce upon quantityubstitute far quality can al best beemporary measure Tlie force combination ofB/Sli li far Inferior hssaylosd. avionics, and CCM capabilitieslbs soprusti-eated aireraft at Ibe superpowers.

n their searchew or Improved Interceptor, tht Chinese ore trying various alterSI not tho mld.loefx they have bean devrJoplng oadellowing, twin jet Macfa II fighter, deslgnalrd the llsiisn A,rirdlunr-to-blgh altitude Inlrrotpt sole. The long RftD period suggests development al potilcm which may ftt beIf icehnlosl peobiera art raof-rd soon, thenterceptor could be ioaor nt an The Chinese art abo riper!og with tbt Nanmai jet aircrafl first noted last

Chinese haw recently purchased IhoIot engine and manufacturingBritain. They will no doubt attempt to designfighter for this engine, but such un aircraftbe availobie in quantities until after IBB).Chinese have ihown iraermt In the|tt fighter, the French Mirage |et fighter,bVUMhTOL fighter.

rhrhinese weapom ptamsret as awill likely decide to produce Hiien ai aiwhile tlcMgnlng andewhidgtpcy ooginc aircraft willin Important port of the futuredefense force after thonihe Chinese will retain olderimmedUilely phait them oul

Thui. otte the neai five years, we wal likelyhinese interceptor force that ta more rtsorJcra than at praaral. wiih greater night and eTl-waolher rjpjt-liiy as well ai wak improved armament Tho would Include an air-to-air missile (AAM) IO replace rha rudimentary Soviettoll. Although wt know the Chinere pnssen some of the lattert tt not dear how many. If any. are avru'lahle In operntional fighlcr null.

Other aerospace defense, forces, luch oi radars. SAMs, and antiaircraft artilleryill likely be

SKtW.

toil

China's expanded air defeme surveillance system now Include about BOO radon atites, with coverage particularly dense around military complete* and Industrial centers and along tbe coast. The Chinese will oonHoue to upgrade native and forclga-deotgned radars to overcome apparentand to provldt Improved low-altitude detection, longer surveillance ranje. end tome KCCM capoblll-ties. High-speed data transmission systems suitable for air defense are not likely to be integratedationwide systemesult, even at that time China's air defense communication! system could be easily saturated and overwhelmed byarge number of hostile aircraft or those employing sophisticated penetration techniques. Alrborrur radars are undergoing experimentation,udimentary airborne radar surveillance system might be available by theo supplement ground-based radars.

hina is relyingombination ofnd AAA fot air defense protection In addition to aircraft. The mix Is AAA-beavy. as the Chinese now have0 AAA guns, an Increase ofhh trand to extend and thicken AAA defentes will likely level off over tho next five years. In the meantime, the Chinese wlD probably makeIn weaponry and In associated fire-control systems. Self-propelled AAA may be eventually Introduced Into armor units and possibly inio the air force and army antiaircraft dtvislonsJ

J Ugtil atia'meaTuir/TJv^ toignificant threat to aircraft attacking military basts, lines of communications, key cities, and Industrial complexes. They could also be used in an alternate role against ground forces,

he Chinese SAM forceeak link In ait defense operations. It Is deployed at ot.lyites, predominantly In tb* four northern military regions and rather heavily around Peking. Neady oil of these SAhts are the oldopy of the Soviet SA-2first ment the aaa growth Even so. China wlU be only marginally protected, because the force levels of the new SAM* will be low. Wo Judge from th* slow pace of SAM deployment and the sustained Emphasis on aaa that the Chinese have decided to roly upon guns, supportedmall number of rrtlsiiies, as the cheapest, If not the best, sir defense mode.

to tho Interceptor force, theclement has received less emphasis, lbreflects Chinese ursderstandlrigeed forstrike force buteluctance toin Its rnodernixurlon. It now numbersaircraft, aboutercent of the totalforce. Ofeaglejet bombers. The Beagles rune stabilisedlevels (see Figureageohas been identified.

onton As,fighter-bomber with increasedradius, have replaced most of the agedos the principal ground attack fighter,Improved close air support to groundtheir location in north and northeasta limited capability ta execute thalluwhostile tactical air through sudden attacksprior deployment, and assbb in thoof air superiority in high-value combatlockactical ainto-sarface missilelimits the usefulness ofbreak-through opera ,oos; buta TASMavailable in the. If the Chinesenow.

issueollow-on ground attack fighterclear. The purchase of the Spey engine raisesthat It might be used to powerattack aircraft We beaeve thai thecapabley air environment, theof PLA ground divisions requiring tacticaland block nlaolesccnc* of the Beaglemonse'itum for further expansion ofStrike lorces. Weoderate growthover the next five years, and the developmentground attack fighter armedaSM In

ig Iho pressing requirements for better combat aircraft, military traiupoet aviation lorces will

ooWlnu* to haverelatively low priority Oftted-wiog trssnspcrts. S3 parent art the order, ohrxt-range. proratlierdrtven aircraft obtained freesRecent limited import of mora modern light aad medium tratnports front the br.tlihand the Sovietiurl andowever, hai upgraded Chinai tram port capability, which will Incremt only moderatelyonsequence,eel China's airlift and airborne capacity to remain poor, (hough augmentation by Civil transport, couldign if leant increase In capacity

W hdkopter force will Improve onlypa.-ed to iht transports. Almost alldkoptrrr ore the older. Soviet-designedound Purchase of imall numben of medium bracootrrt will rlnsfy continue, and wtlh Chi neat production of on upgraded MM, tbe hellcoplar force *rl probably Incrnue lubslantiolly

here hai been tome Improvementproficiency of the air force to fight aTraining hai strewed over-water flights byerabiltry of fighter and bomber units,of listtreaetortround attach role,turning of SAM units. Abo, aa annualhai been Initialedetching of rhe air defease fceces beganNevertheless, aircrew flying houn. whkh artto those of iha United Stales, amto Increase, thai requiring aircrews toconsiderable amount of rime to basic flightthan to advanced skills

it.forces

a. Central

principal paramdittry force lo China aMllllla. The militia and othtrIn Iht PRC Irodirtorsally ware anof Mao'i thinking on warfare and In the

ol bottlllttaa couUignificant

a wartime, paramilitary elements would be vaed to baraai the enemy wttb guerrilla-typeassist In tht defense of urban canters, gather intelligence, help maintain production levels, and providt manpower reserves for the regular fetors ellher as individuals or ai moderately trained units. Tbo peacetime-paramlKtory forcn It Inarge-scale, low-cost pod of reserve manpower. II assott tbe regular forces In recurlty operations, facilitates as^rscul-tural and Industrial organ tut too. helps maintain law and order, aad knots party propaganda effcrti

iS-io

militiaort-timeconization found throughout China atpolitical subdivision of various economicfrom factories lo communes Althoughatillion persons, only aboutare actually armed Tht militia is by farof ihe PRC paramilitary org tn (sailorsChina's dt facto reserve and

eaajoftty of the militia receives soTbe armed miflrta receives several daysa year and perhape an tittisdrd period oftwo weeks in key anas along iht borders. Mostam trained In tht ust of uneH arms, botare familiar with machine guns,artillery, and AAA weapons. Some militiaperiodically train with regularnit*.

tcemphaiti of the militiahen tome independentwen formed These regiments,metabtn of tbe arated tnihiia fromarc coerlreJed directly bybat may ba cfigtok for service outsideoreos al well

of the urban militia may be therecent accomplishment Inaper organlialiun beforemllltla units now actively participatetraining and security patrolling inThe newly created urban militialocal civilian party committees acoordinating agency. They couldfor coordinating local arctsrily and civilduring poriodt of disorder-

C. The Production and Conduction Corps ond Other Pwomlkiory Oroonizotior,!

change In status of most ProductionCorps (PCC) units from military to cMl

adminlitration began tolace In2 The aimed clement* of demobilized PCC unit* hove become mill tie met Some PCCowever, have continued to cxitt under tbe aegis of the rnilitaty, Irul these oppeor te be units In the most remote areai, where total icorganteathKi hot not been fullyThe missions of these units continue to be economic development and border defeme and surveillance.

ther elements,0 million strong, Include such diverse organizations as civil railroad construction units and transport agencies as well as various public security and civil defense-oriented groups.

III. NUCIEAS FORCES A. General

y Western standards. China'* strategicprogram has been movingow pacentercontinental nuctear weapon systemslargely in the developmental and experimental

ol tho currently deployed MH/iHBM tore* is not expected. There nuclear forces have not grown appreciably In strength (see figureagenor im proved in terms of range and accuracy.

There are several possible reasons behind the apparent slow pace of China's nuclear delivery system. One reason Is that the creaitoa of the PRC force over the past fe" years hasimited deterrent against nirloar attach or blackmail, and larger numbers of existing systems would onlylBtmal addRsena! deterrence.

Other reasons for the slowness inuclear force may be lechnical, economic, end political lo nature. The Chinese are encountering technical difficulties In devehsping their strategicEconomic difficulties springing from tho limited technological resource base and exacerbated by the disrupt loos of the Cultural Revolution may also haveontributing factor. In addition, the Chinese apparently now view the threat Itself as loss urgent- The United Stales for tbe most port has with drown militarily from Ihe Asian mainland, primarily from China't southeastern doorstep. The Soviet* ore no longer engaged In threatening nuchas rhetoric, although they continue to Improve their Military forces along the border

wceeok Nudeor Forces Cwreeil Sio-ui

China has developed three strategic weapon systems and I* In the midsteseorch, development, ami testing program lor two more (see Figure*nd UL Two of Ihe three deployed weapons systems, theHBM and theRBM. were developed from Soviet-suppliedand becarrne operational01 leasee! hery.

The third deployed system, ihe CSShich became opera lion al Inepresents China's flnt step In developing an ICBM and ranh satellite vehicle (CSV) hornier. Unlike Ihend the CSS*howo-stage, sllo-linsed mkslle which hot the capability of being deployed again! Moscow.

A larger, more advanced ICBM. theas been undo- develorsment tirnultsnrouify with thehe rtor-nt Si-eeesrful ESV hsanrhos rasing thea the basin suggest that early uVeleastistn ta) prnhlr-nu with ihe manic have been snfved Hriwever, prior to dcpWtssrnt additional tests of theaniatie mode and silo consttudlon wrsuld be expected. Theould be the only Innd-bnird missile capable af reaching both the United Stales and all of the Se-viet Union

VI. The current higher Chinese priratty Inr theehicle may bepace rather thanissile role Theas been usedpace boasterthe las* arvaa of the tec attenrpttd ksuadsos af this ivsteen.5 tMs bcicrster was uvdcct-tsf jliy ismil two prototype Hint and roc prototype photo-rrennnnltsance satellites.

hina's other pnlentlal global strategic linear, the sihm, haa boon under de-idopericnf since athexpected to be China's flnt attempt atcfid-propel la nlsietn. whleh could oho be usedand-basedndbaicd flight lesrjag of rfao rrarsstlt cruld begin at any time

SB China dees notedicated strategic horeber lorce such as thai of the Vnhed States and tbe

Chin*'* SLBM system will no; be operational until the.

We tee no irritationollow-on to any of the systems discussed above becoming operational within (he neat five yean. We Judge tlsere wlD be only subsystem modification! to Improvo performance.

he ChlneM alao have flitlle materialelects of whalto need for iritir ariaiegieprogrtmt. and indeiign and production of tacticalb not corutrained From our tnalysisnuclear eapabllltlei. wt would notif the following devasopcnenti eitherway or becornt apparent over the oeit

-tatal tactieal rtomba aad warheads:

neehawamatd cruise mbile.

nirctear depth charge aad

demolition munitions

n Ihe other hand, we nilr owl rcveral tactical warltcad applications for the neat future. We lodge, bated on our knowietlge of warhead design, that tho Chinese are unlikely to develop certain wen port, suchimlrar artillery round,r mod AAMs for flghtm. and possibly torpedoes for submarines

TRENDS

C. Non si ro logic Nut (tor Forces

he Chinese have notactical nuclear force per it. Instead, ihty ore attempting to make do with what they havt to serve ihearer nuclear force purposes. For exatnpk. the MRBMs and IRBMt could be usedheatre rear. Thend the. however, are raora likely than the MRBM/1RBM force to be employed in other an offensive or defensive tactical nuclear situation. ATI of these forceseaningful taction) mi dear capability against tbo USSR and US Asian allies.

TO- From the above developments, wc conclude that Iheow in far better shape than II has ever been, especiallyo meet foreseeable warttmt coeds We also believe that the Irends under-was- will crastlruie tn sharpen China's combat csrpaba-rrses over Ike steal five yean:

wWteady effort to develop tke FLAighting force, while continuing its political work and economic duties

dtveiopmenllobal nuclear iletorrcnt will continuetow but steady puce.

general disposition of conventional forces will point toward an Increased Joml-wrviot, in-dep'h defense of China, csprcsaly In tbo critical northeast and coastal areas.

-lo Mac. the FLA wii remain al abort thelevel wtlh cmplnsb on qualitative upgrading of forcoi

will be further strengthening of command and control arrangements, especially In military

APPENDIX TOARTY/ARMY COMMAND RELATIONSHIP

continue to vnmajor organ of tha Communis: Fatty with Internal (toority. polltkai. and production tola* In addition to tBau of providuf, for therultary defense The key org* relational link be ft en ihe civilian parly

apparatin aod iho military fe ptoetdad by the Military Committee of tho patty Central Committee. Thtt organ,ierarchy of partystending throughout tht armed foreea, lervei aa the hlgbert louree of military policy and dccttMcvmeldng.

t The de facto rtalmin of the Military Commit, teeinister of National Defense and thai it the aanlorntat!ve of tha PLA within the party. Although tho Military Committee policy directives will normally be given to the General Staff and/or the Can-nilcnl Department* fortha Cornrrraittee haa dearxerHralcd the capability of directly intervening at lower echrJcru. Serving ai the principal national lovel point of contact bctuoen party and military organisations, thii Cotn-raUtte*ajor rote In the frwmadation and overnight of party prrlicits as applied lo the PLA.

3 Within the PLA organisation Itself, the Ceneroi Staff Departrnenl of tbe Ministry of National Defense lervei a* the unified ramior cnminacd authority for all ground, naval, and air lorces.he Ceoe-al Staff Department maintains control river major ground force element* ihrough II Military Region Commaiub and through separate national Navy and Air Force Hera-Squattm Other leparate headnuartrn cca-nr-oncnts prov-d* ruKional rroatrol over vertoaa rnisatlc. armor, artillery, rear service, and construction until

National Command Structure

RQiiro IS

Poceles Coogreai I

!

Stale Council PTomiae

I

Communist Party CCP

Commander" Paopresy PLA

ational Dc tenseal aalii/Managcr-wit rWUMTO .

CCPCertrali^mmiBaa:

rtutaryCemra^'

Heodquartefs

Poittteal Deportment PoaoCal Work Si^trvltUon

General Slaft" Department

Operational Command Authority

General Rear Services Department

r

Headquarleri

Strateolc Rochet Forco HeadQuarlera

Other HeadquartersEngineerEngineer

Air Force Heaoguarters

Una

CorisUutor* Authortt,

IB

stoat!

PLA WARFIGHTING CAPABILITY

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

hina's worfightlng capability lies prifflsrlly In It* ability to defend ago!rat externalut thr PLA doesimited ability to project IU military power outside China'she PRC hopes ihat any war can be confined to conventional weapons and has repeatedly stated Its Intention never to be the first to use nuclear weapons. Its nudear capablBty will remain vastly interior to either that of tbe Soviet Union or the US. If eithertrategic midcar attack, the ability of the PLA to functionohesive military force would be thrcotened. The Chinese, moreover, arc Ill-prepared or equipped to fightuclear benlcfield.

I We believe, however, that Chinese fighting forces have good morale, are responshe to central authority, and ant highly motivated to defend their homeland.

1 It Is not possible to estimate prrxisety howould take the PLA to be fully ready for combat, but current levels of manpower, weapons and equipment, and training suggest the forces are now generallyigh state of readiness.

-I. Chinas population ofillion people constitutes an enormous manpower pool for wartime mobilisation The mobilization potential of the population Is limited, however, because China does notonventional reserve, has few facilities to produce heavy weapons, and has accumulated few stockpiles of heavy equipment. Peking must rely primarilyarge paramilitary7 million armedb only partially trained ond for the most part hghtly armed.

S, The weaflghtlng capability of this force, however, should not be minimised. In areas overrun, an attacker would have to contenduerrilla force more numerous than the regular force) encountered.

(neither adventitial or nuclear war the majority of these guerrilla forces would survive and continue to resist, therebyong-term occupation of China prohibitively ripcaatva.

C. Lc^stk Considerations

ft Thenjpstic and support system at primarily designed to support defease of the brane-sartd Stockpiles of supplies, ammunition, and POL are positioned throughout China apparently as partystem of central, regional, local, and unit reserves. Kfforts lo improve the flow of materiel through the various echdons nf tho logistic system arc continuing. Outside China's borders, however, theogistic system would be hard pressed tnufficient flow of supplies over long lines of communication.

major conflict would severely lest thesystem Roll and truth transport wouldto shoulder the major burden ofstriken on principal depots and linesworld hamper rrsuoply efforts.of supply, however, could still be movedlogistic chain by mllllia ekrsaenn andThe PLA. particularly in aprobably would espenrnce severeof critical Items such as POL and ordnance,China's ability to engage ihe enemyuisrc-tcalo warfare for prolongedend mull mill activities nf course wouldaffected by any disruptions of supplies.

II. WARFIGHTING CAPABILITY BY THREAT AREA

A- Nurthein Area

o^-w* CocWar

ot equipped, structured,supported to eonduot majoroperations much Iwyrmd theighly unlikely that Pekingsuch operollons.

9 Conversely, Ihocil organised, equipped and (rained toen nuclear defensive war ngalmt ihe Soviet Union. We bellow lhat the Chinese would have un even chance ofoviel conventional ofrersive before It reached Peking ond the North China Plain (rceeography ond deployment of PLA farces In Ibe border regions sugectt that Ihe Chinese are ready to malic on all-out effort tn hold territory from tho Koreanhe Shenyang Military Region to tbe Konsu corridor in Ihc Lanchou Military Region.

A Si-viol attack on China would most likely focus mi tlie Shenyang Mililary Region. Neady two thirds; of the Soviet force olorni the border are lieplnyed in thb region (icehe irsttial objectiveoviet campaign there probably would be tn overran Heilungkieng and Klrin Provirrces.

In response to such an attack, illff resistance could bo eipecicd from tho Chinese olr defense Fighters, and unHs occupying tbe defensive complosrs. If the Soviets were able to break through lo the Monchiirian Plain, ihe poor defensive terrain and lack of air superiority would soon force ihc small number of Chinese main-force elements in this areaclnylng action. As Soviet forces advanced further wuth, they would bt confronted with ihc bulk af Chinai relnfnrced air and ground fntccs in the regions. Mewnwliilr, the Chinese would bo capable of denyingalar part or beachhead to the Soviet Paeiflc Pftel during thb period.

IS. Slmullaneouily with an attack in Shenyang. Ihe Soviet) probably would abo launch on operation into Northwest Cblno. Chinese defense of iho Stnklong andalary Regions would be aimed al protecting mod and roll networks and denying the Soviets wrecssentral and cast China,

Soviet operations In Shenyangwere unrJcrwoy. supplementary attacksPeking Military Region from Mongolia mightattempted. Poor lines of communion Hon,and lubilantiol numbers of Chineseagainst thh being Ihe Initial primary atis

outgunned, partlculady In theand looking the mobility of Sovietground troops would have ihc advantagerjrxdtlrm Tho vr.ttr.css of Ihcmililary regions and tbeir underdevelopedcnrnmunicatlorn would heavily tax Soviet logistic capabilities. By sheer niunlicsi alone, ihe conventional and puramllilary forces would have tome capability for aiirititig Soviet units even before they confronted Ihe bulk of Chinese forces.

Most of China's combat alrfiekh are moreile* from Ibe Soviet and Mongolian borders, thus providing some security from surprise attack. Thb also Increases tho time available for PRC fighter aircraft to react. In addition, China's large Inventory of aircraft and numerous hardened storage facilities would enable PLA air force units tn survive even sustained attacks by the USSR.

Eventually, hrraewr, ihc Soviets should be able lo gain local olr nipcrlorlty. Obtrilesceot dtlnescock of air-to-air missiles,low and Inefficient commattd-and-control system for combat opcmlioos would gradually degrade tbe Chinese air capability. Thin SAM defenses and. little SAM capability ugalntt supersonic and low-flying alma ft nbo uould weaken China'i olr defeme effort. Even after tbe USSR achieved olr tupcriority. Isriwcver, the Chine* probably would be able lo provide limited air cover and ground tupport over the battlefield

-iincSonef Nvdror ar Cwseraf War

l& The PIot organized, equipped, or trained to conduct operationsuclear war environment. China's minimal capability fot strategic end theater nuclear war docs,odest deterrent to nudcai attack. If deterrence fails,uclear warfighllng capability would lie no match fee tha! of the USSR and could notoviet Invasion.

n the ground, thx. Soviet plannod rale of advance doublesuclear attack. China's lack of tactical friability and consequent Inability to quickly shift, mess, and disperse forces on Ihc hart IcfleU coukl prove costly. If dispersed, PLA formations would be slow In reacting to Soviet bicaklhrought; If moated, tbey would become Ideal nuclear targets. China's prepared defensive completes alio would be eitremely

Military Regionsir Districtsnd Reel Areasu

Soviet/Chinese Border Forces

Opposing Ground Forces

In the Military Districts/Regions

Adjacent Io theo -Soviet Border

'nlncfBhlr.inor ot chemical ultack, ami the PLA would quickly late IU Important terrain advantage.

tay-behind and guerrilla unit* would be leu affected. These forces could Inflict only slightdamage to the Soviets, but any anempt to permanendy occupy Chines* territory clearly would be costly to any invader

h aad naval fcece* would suffer from inlUr dtsad van rages. Neither could mnnnue io fightorce fee nvoerhort time. The dlsprrsed and hardened air faeUkka could only temporarily prolong the Isle of those forces Irsdrvidual naval units could rooonar te resist, hot tke Chinese would find it almost imrrcrastbie to mount alarge-scale operation

ortion of China'* nuclear force rarobabty would survivereemptive Soviet nuclear stnke and would be lessbytactical nuclear attack. In any event. Ihe PLA's nuolear warfighiing capability Is extremely limited, and there wrndd be little tho PLA could do tooviet Invasion under these conditions. This would probably also applyiological and chemical warfare environment.

Supporterlri Konton Aitorlr on South

MM

PWri capability loorthnn South Korea has vastly improved sincewhen Pekingvolunlrer army"terrene there. Were ihe Chinese tn do so again,apply siiiTlcienl strength In atn overwhelm the force* ssnw there.military requirements along livea* well a* th* wide range of possibleto Chinese military Intervention knthe PftCs frr-rdom of action If consulted byIheptrhably would attemptPyongyang (me*ajorihe South. China would at best providethan token military supportayorby the North, bat would providela the event military action byforces threatened the sun)vol of theregime

B. Eastern and Southtm Areo

Sea-coos' Pa'nnia

the PLAormidabledefense capuhllily. Naval, air, andarc strategically deployed along the coast andefense In depth against an attach from the sea. The navy to eminently suited for. and fuly capable of. tn effective coastal drfnoe against any hostile naval force except the superpowers. The contir.er.tal shelfsialic*enSanees the navy's ability to conduct anu-suhrnarine warfare and lay defensive mtnefields.

RC combat aircraft art available within the eastern region to provide air defense and to support ground and navalnherentaircraft, deficiencies Inand control, and tha lack of air-to-airseriously degrade China's air forceontest with largo numbers ol opposing sophlsli-catod aircraft NovortbeUst, the air force couldignificant toll of enemy aircraft before conceding local air superiority.

Overillion (round tiO'ps rue positioned in successive lines nf defense In the couatal regions. Garrison units man artillery coastal defense sites, and itroogpirtnts along Ihe coast ant capable of stiff resistance in all areas suitable tor mayor ampeat-ioui iandir.gs Male force units are positioned behind tbe coastal stts and probably rauld contain in loader

Given these rampnartlorr*.Judge that it would be costly for the United States to conduct major amphibious oprraneni against the PRC and virtuallyhe USSRurwperwc* ccnsld eventually achieve naval and air supmmacy over Chineseny attempt to occupy large areas of China would still be isn feasible.

(air and Sowiri CMito Sao*

PRC it unlikely to Initiate anyconfrontation In these area* (seeuring th* near krm. NorurthelesB, the PRCexpanding Its activities In the waters ofStrait and South Chine Sea, and Isltod military objectives.

significantly, the PLAapable of nling Ih. offshwe blondst surface entry to an unamsln" Taiwan.

-tewatna <fonUmlW. caaalasMs. unrl muBmy fnten tr d* Ml wciaHllxaK*

darn "FUC MHIiaryn ihr lae and Smith ChinsTS.

Taiwan, tha PLA probably weald col have the capobillty touccessful nonnudear Invniion much beforeithout unacceptable losses.

the Penghut (PescadorcsX the Chinese could conduct an imujAlbtoui assault against tbeunlikelythe Untied Stales Intervened.

Chinese probably could seize aod occupy Ihe Pratai Reef al any time.

PRC could seize and occupy the Spratiy Islands even against such opposition as Vha> nam. the Philippines, or the Republic of China could mount at this time.

the Senkekm, the PRC could assert Us sovereignty by occasional naval patrob to show tho flag near tho area.

PLA could occupy the Hong Kong and Macao enclaves

MoWond Sou-twos' Alio

urrent force leveli In southern China are sufficient toajor conventional offensive against mainland Southeast Ana. except Vietnam China can peofect Its prjwtr deep into Vietnam bul only with substantial reinforcements from other parts of the PRC Tbe PRCs interceptor force would be able lo obtain air superiority. China's navy, vastly superior to lit Vlttnamatt counterpart, would he able to control Ihe Gulf of Tonkin.

C. South Asio

LA capabilities have imprmed only slightly Inpost decade In the Slno-Indian border area. Although the tremendous Chinese logistics problems In the Himalayas art being somtwhal alleviated by the constructionOL pipeline across the Tibetan plateau, such an upgrading has not overcome all of Ihc problems Inherent In difficult, remote terrain and severe weather. Additionally, tbe Indian forces are now bolter trained, cnulpped, and positioned farther forward than ihey weree judge ihe PLA Could succeed In minor Incursions across the border, bul It could not sustainimited-objretIve offensive to capture and hold the Himalayan foothills leading into India, foi the moment, the PLA force In Tibet Is suited to denial operation! and for punitive eipedlttons against Indian Incunions.

flfl *WftB

ML

CIVIL DEFENSE

STRATEGY AND CIVIL DEFENSE

I. Tht Chinese have taken ion" Initial Kept to provld* protection against the immediate effect)arge-scale nucloor attack. They appiiently fool that their civil defense hsi enhanced civilian morale ai well an their ability to torvtve in air or missile attach

t In rontrast to Ih* Weit'i. China's ervlt defemehavi tokenew and lartar strategic dtmenskwi The extensive ccewructioei of iheileri andmneting serves hen purprwea Theyrotection of ptrsoranel darts*;

aa Invade, in the ground oefeo-ity IL ACTIVITIES AND PROGRAMS A. MIIHory Roto

pla

4 The PLA. nf coono.t. constructso build such peafact. atlnS ruhwoy complex, which wouldivil detente roleartime rmergency Theoieovw, continue) to participate In the various civil defensey providing tecwlty and olhet police fiinctloni during air raid drill) and by aulitlng In the iinplenvrintatlon of the defeme plantrogram,'

ooW attack oo China, tha

whole would employ all available resource* not requited Fur defensive and offensive operations to assist In. and perhaps even control, post-attack

rehabilitation,

b. Industrial Diipo.sol

Chinese place heavy emphasis onof the economy and Industry. Despiteat dispersal since, much ofindustry remains ceocentraled lo traditional

vearatraU* to attack tha aew arroepneernovfJy RAD) have beana remoteway from the Sonet border and hern major POputatloo centers. Although new plant, prorhseing corrvenrtiooal small arms and ammunitionear popuktled areas, they are built In rugjed totoirt and are spread throughout Iho country, la contrast, many new dvtl Irtdustrlul lomphues,ihc lorge imported lortlllsor and not roe hem leal Itianli arc being built In Dal, open, ond easily accessible oreos where they are more vulnerable ta military allack.

and Tunnels

6onsequence of the Chinese rtewrunoel wstrW" and tbe ioeviulaMrtyround invasion tanWaageorncnUosxal bornbiag or*trtha. rbe roal of protecting Use urtaa wAaton protmbl, ia piae* rather than on rriooillonational* forrogram items from several reasons Th* Chinese reooamxe that those cities containing the brains of the govern-meat and party and (he industrial narve* of Chirm mast hrat highpart of the overall prcporcdncst policy. They have likelymoreover,ock of warning or other Circumstance* would preclude timely relocation, even though some tunnels would afford the crwortunlty to oslt the city. The CUrstse probably ealouble lhal even if evacuees were to be rolocotcd. thor* wouldeed for fallout raoteetVan at temporary sitesequirementllaWtty and ulihaailon of

SKfifJ

populace for aa active defense at well ai rehabilitation of (he ctlna In general. In lieu of an om (loll Uric mlkille dr lease syslrn end winimited a* defense capability, the Chineae find thai (he roost attractive and practicala remain lo pUce and to dig deeply lato trte receaari of the earth.

better aad tunnel program ts one of the meat ei'msive ta iha world, though lo cffeetivrejrss remain* antcstedhe iiwaatu effort to build more and better protect too has resetted In the co rat ructionan of ihelttrs and tunneb under most if not all. large and medium-ilred clttesj

Judge thaftne"

Tiaiurc una quality oriwie unoTtground Installation! vary from city lo dry. wllh someistory as far bock as ihe Korean War, when Ihe Chinese feared US use of nuclear weapons north of the Yolu River.

D. Complementary rVogromi

he speed wllh which mililary and dwllan rescue and relief fnrors were marshaled after Ihe Tangshan earthquake dismler of lost July Indicates lhat the Chinese om al Irwil eapohle of coping with Individual large-scale dbeulrrv

Tbe Chlsseae should roceive some tactical warningnnecsstioaal or rsueh-ai bombing attack through ihaW air deform radar network Tbey would, ho-ever, receive Utile, o* any. seaminguclear atrrnle strike.

From the me nl siren, and pobhc ackhea lysstesra In aaaHapohian areas, we prerutne the eiisaenos of emergency opcittloos centers In hlgh-rttk areas. Wc Judge, however, that cr.il aurharitlesery limited capability to monitor radiation or measure chemical and htologlcal contaminationan attack, although the Pl-A'i intichemical units would bo available for ostulnncc.

he Chineae will continue lo rwheve that dvll defease Is an orssotulefy resent ud part of Ihe strategic defesitc of China and that without it, any future war effort would beerihehaa, we eipcet tbe cmrshtsh an civst dofense to was aad wanehinese narsnaoJ arerirtles of ihe military threai. Far the moose ru. China's civil defense pug rem has momentum aad ii i> adequately based aad lufficienlly broad to Xovomorssste further eiperako We believe there will lie aa Improvement inprograms. Mich a* warning,nd readiness (ruining, and (specially In ihe io-place helteeing program.

. OUTLOOK

DISSEMINATION NOTICE

rrit. dooim.nt wm dotarnlneMd bynfrol lnf*lllo*nee Agancy. Th* copy Wormollon out mm ti ih* roclp-mt ond of perions under he |urbdktlon enddrUoooldbwaktotlon m. b* otlhorliod by tb* ielfow-Inej oHklab within the* taapecihe

ofof Ma DfM of UiIojpcio* ih* Office of tb*ad mm erniiliati ai theh ef Staffmmm ChW ef Star! tor aaelhsance.of mm May. lor **

DtpcrtMM ei rSereeSor o( Nerrol IntaOaatnce. (or th* Daoo'W-nl of rhe NenrysmSoU Chief of Stofl, Mmmamrtm, lee ih* DaporWol of IS* Air Fores I. Depvty AsiOJar* Adminlttraior for NarlonaJ Security, for the Energy Rauarth

and DovolopmaiM AofeuaislrcMonnaronl Director. W, foral Bureau of Irrraitioorooecio, of USA, for H. rfarionol Why AtjMcy

L Special AuhloM lo Nil Sttrelory for Nohoool Security, for the Dapormunt of the Treasury

L Tht DCI'i Deputy for Na-lonolor ooy other Department or Agency

document moyoln*d. or danroyad by burning inespaeobleiwauijjyr returned to th* Central InteBganca Ap*ncyuty for No'W IntolKgartc*.

At ih* and oferiod, lae forward^ tsoancy, oro

1 Whan tho dooam.nltorlod net la

Mth*

lACfMSVi,1

A. The atfoocuawr*e*om tha Mat mini rnifT'

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Original document.

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