CONTRIBUTION TO BRIEFING FOR SECRETAY RICHARDSON

Created: 10/8/1976

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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Deputy Director of Current Intelligence

: Contribution to Briefing for Secretary Richardson

US-USSR Bilateral Political Relations

1. US-Soviet political relations haveeries of shocks since iatohich, while not completely destroying the structure ofave left it shaky. From the Soviets' perspective the most serious disappointments have been:

--US refusal to liberalize tariff and credit

*

legislation.

continued momentum of US military spending and

weapons programs.loss of influence in the Middle East, for which they blame the US. The US presidential campaign has raised further doubts in Moscow about the firmnosa of Washington's corrunitrnant to improved bilateral relations.

Soviet reaction has taken tho form of strenous efforts to undercut the US in areas of competition such as southern Afirca, to press its own military programs, and to increase and sharpen its anti-American propaganda. Regarding the latter, Moscow has become much loss reluctant in recent months to criticize harshly the President and Secretary of State. President Ford was attacked in the Soviet media last month, for example, for allegedly reneging on his commitments at5 European Security Conference.

The Soviets, despite their frustrations, continue to adhere publicly and privately to tho general "detento" lino they have pursued throughout. On the one hand Moscow remains spurred by the concerns it faced when itr "peace program" was initially formulated:

need to avoid nuclear confrontation with the

of China and of arapprochement; and

limitations imposed by an inflexible, inefficient economy.

the other hand, detente has paid off forin several other, more positive ways. Thewon increasing recognition as tho military and

political equal of the US. he expansion of East-West trade has eased Moscow's prosent economic difficulties while offering the prospect of helping to modernize Soviet industry.

Soviets evidently hope that bilateralimprove onco again after the US elections. that the fundamentals of thetoward tho USSR will 'continue regardless of who

the next presidrnt may be.

Meanwhile, the Soviets are making no predictions about what they obviously regardlose race. Publicly they have not- taken sides, finding merit and fault in the positions of both candidates, but the Soviets, given their penchant for stability and predictability, traditionally prefer that an incumbent remain in office.

For themselves, tho-Sovlcts show few signs that thoy are prepared to modify their own policies in response to US complaints. Thoy may in the future assess more broadly tho costsenture such as Angola, but they continue to make plain their intention to act in support of "progressive" forces, seeing no contradiction with

thjir concept of "detente."

Soviet_Political Assessment An Old Guard

Soviet domestic political scene iscontinuity to the point of stagnation. TheGeneral Secretary of tho Communist Party Brozhnov

at its head, continues to be dominated by those ofolleagues who combined to oust him

scheduled gathering in Moscow on October 27

if

of the USSR Supremerubber-stampand the more important meeting of tho party's Contra! Committee that will precede it, will provide opportunities to make changej in the top leadership. The Soviet leaders, however, have" long been ignoring such opportunities, despite their age and sporadic bouts with ill-health which have tended toura oF ovurdue change.

five senior leaders who form acore in the Politburol close to or

the youngest, will ben December;

he now appears reasonably well, but has suffered

from periodic ailments that sapped his strength.the titular head of state,the Premier and in charge of tho economic

apparatus,e is now reportedly recovering

eart attack.

the party's top ideologue, is the oldest74.

Brezhnev's unofficial deputy in the party and likely interim successor, has just

Beyond the roles of Brezhnev and the seniors, key portfolios at the top of the party are usually managed by more than one leader. Generally, however, Kirilenko probabxy supervises heavy industry;olitburo member and party secretary, probably coordinates the troublesome agricultural front with Brezhnev himself alsoersonal input; party secretaries Katushev and Ponomarev handle international communist relations and are responsible respectively.for ruling and non-ruling parties, both working under Brezhnev's and Suslov's supervision.

In the government, and especially to support his detente program, Brezhnev has looked to three men whom he promoted to full Politburo membership3 and who head key institutions:

Foreign Ministerhead of the KGB for nine years.Defense Minister who died in April.

ssfJT:

CONFIDENTIAL

replace Grechko, tho leadership passedqualified military officers and chose oneyear old Politburo member Ustinov, whosupervised the defense industry from tho Though he now holds the rank of marshalSoviet Union, Ustinov is the first civilian into hold this sensitive portfolio.

Style of

reason for the barely glacial movementpolitics is the Brezhnev regime'sof Khrushchev's highly personal andstressing instead collective decisionmakingsecurity. This tends to be true throughout theand turnover is thus slow.

criteria for success in Soviet politics

are competence, hard work,n managing patron-client relationships and keeping one's nose clean. The system is well protected against outsiders, youth and anyone who does not follow the unwritten rules. remium on avoiding risk, it tends to stifle personal initiative and to encourage bureaucratic sclerosis. While some of tho younger officials in tho party and government apparatus perceive the need for improvement if not reform, they aro not questioning the system.

character and outlook of moat of thoare conducive to thia stylo of rule. Thoytho most part preoccupied with their materialcrave personal security and socialover the generally tough policies onrights, religion and emigration that agitatestrata of aooiety do not generate an echo

Outlook

Kosygin's roported ill-health could result In some changes In the top hierarchy. Nevertheless, public scheduling of the Supreme Soviet session suggests that Kosygin, who should speak on and present for approvalive year economic plan, is expected to be well enough to undertake this task.

Any planned changes could be signalled by party shifts at the Central Committee meeting in advance of the Supreme Soviet seaaion. One might be the promotion to the Politburo of N. Tikhonov, who waa recently appointed first deputy premier, possibly to lighten Kosygin*s Another could bo the unfinished business of formally dropping Ustinov from thoove normally requiredinisterial Appointment.

CaNF^rDENTIAL

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the longer term of the next few Important changes In the top leadership are all but

Inevitable. They are more likely to comeesult Of dentV or inform!ty, however, than because young politicians are plotting against their elders.

in the USSR is always a Ztare event in Sovietinstances sinceno set rules exist for

j' turnover at the top, oither In party rules or inprovisions. This time around, however, wo i; expect another drawn out process as the top leaders seek to hang on together as long as they oan. The longer this taxes, however, the more likely it is that long' elements of instability caused by lack of room at the top will come into play.

Original document.

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