Interagency Intelligence Memorandum
Prospects for Soviet Naval Access to Mediterranean Shore Facilities
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PROSPECTS FOR SOVIET NAVAL ACCESS TO MEDITERRANEAN SHORE FACILITIES'
KEY JUDGMENTS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR US POLICY
Soviets strongly desire to compensate for their loss earlier this year In Egypt of their only adequate Mediterranean facilities for major naval repairs and replenishment. However, with current limited shore access (he Soviets will be able to maintain essentially the same level of naval surface operations and presence La the Mediterranean that they had supported in recent years. This will apply duringriods as well as foe their normal low tempo of operations. Without further access to shore facilities, it will be more expensive, more difficult to manage, and harder on the crews, but it can be done.
submarines on deployment to the Soviet Mediterranean Eskadra come from the Northern Fleet, and have much more need of shore access than do Soviet surface ships with their freedom to use closer Black Sea home port facilities. Without suitable new shore
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access, either submarine on-station time in the Mediterraneanhave lo bo reduced or the number of supportEither or both would present significantbut we Judge the Soviets can manage it if they have to.the Soviets will probably seek to maintain theirof submarine
the near term, we believe that Soviet prospects for the Idnd of/ controlled access to Mediterranean shore facilities that they desire for substantial repairs and. sustained replenishment are dim except in Yogoslavia, where Moscow's prospects-are marginally better butroblematical. Syria may be the next best bet. but. like Yugoslavia, Syria continues to insist on restricting Soviet use of and access to its limited port facililitics. Moreover. Syrian-Soviet relations continue to deteriorate over Lebanon.
the longer term, major political variables in countries all around the littoral could dramatically affect Soviet prospects. Albania Egypt itself. Libya, Malta, Syria, and Yugoslavia are all examples.
the meantime (he Soviets are likely to plug away at insinuating themselves and their Mediterranean ships into more modal port arrangements with the more promising potential hosts.
Algeria and Libya, the Soviets are likely to engage ineffort to erode these countries' resistence to granting thenaoal access to include major repair facilities. Theya somewhat stronger effort of the same sort in Tunisia thancountries. Their current prospects, however, are not good In anvthe
Soviets are liiely to expend their highest level of effort over near term on Syria and Yugoslavia, where current Soviet port use,ell as some Soviet pohtical and military leverage with each of those^ countries;asis to press for the Hod of major, lessccess now denied the USSR la these countries. '
Mediterranean countries might well cope with Soviet pressure for naval facilities byrwdifled version of thepproach. Inviting Western as well as Soviet use under carefully specified conditions. And if Yugoslavia Itself feels constrained to yield to Soviet pressure for less restricted port use. it is likely to hedge any concessions by heightened solicitation of use by the US and other Western powers.
DISCUSSION
SOVIET NEEDS
I. The Soviet naval pretence haiermanent feature of the Mediterraneanervingounter to Western naval forcei, these ships haveole In most of the Mediterranean area crises of recent years. Further, their very presence has served notice that the Soviet Unionuperpower possessing important Interests in the region. This Fifth Eskadra' hastrategic defensive msslonb Western ballistic missile submarines and carriers,ider role In the support of Soviet clients and the symbolic and actual promotion of Soviet slate Interests. The Soviets are anxious to continue to maintain the Fifth Eslcadra'i capabilities to perform Us roles and to solve problems connected with its support.'
We expect that the Soviet navy's presence In the Mediterranean will be maintained, probably at roughly the tame levels as have existed over the past few years. Although the Sovietelf -sufficient in its peace-time logistics practices, operating ships at sea for extended periods without shorexpensive in Icrmi of operational efficiency. For ihb reason, as well as for the potential use of any shore access to enhance their political presence and influence In the area, the Soviets perceive naval access to shore facilities as highly desirable'
The degree of Soviet dependence on access to Mediterranean shore faculties varies for different kinds nf forces; surface ships can operate almost completely independently of local support; diesel submarine
.nperarlons are significantly complicated If access to localnavailable: and deployment of land-based naval aircraft would require almost continual use of local airfields. Tbe Soviets have been able to maintain their naval forces In the Mediterranean with access toew shore facilities. They have done this by ullLring afloat support either In port or Inhis effort hasontinuous presence of lenders, repair ships, small food and stores shins, naval oilers, merchant tankers under contract to the navy,ost of other support auxiliaries.
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nasmuchey role of the Fifth Eskadra haseaction to Middle Eastern crises.oteworthy that the1 buildup which- occurred during the October War3 was not affected by limited logistics support nor was there any need to increase their utilization of then available Egyptian facilities. However, that lime the Soviet were also lucky, in that scheduled relief <Ucsc) submarines were already enroute from the Northern Fleet. Both these and the diesel submarines they were scheduled to relieve stayed on station In the Mediterranean for the duration of the crisb. (Deployment from the Northern Fleet requires two and one-half weeks for diesel submarines aad about ten days for nuclearil was supplied by merchant tankers and by naval oilers operating out of Soviet Black Sea ports Further, the evidence indicates that many merchant tankers whkh had previous experience in supporting fleet units were available and could hove been pressed Into service bad the Soviets chosen to disrupt their own civilian operations. We can expect that the Soviet naw'i roleuture shorl-lerm Mediterranean crisb will not be affected by logistics consideratiom so long as they have unimpeded access to ond from their Black Sea homefor any necessary submarine-
ince Fifth Eskadra surface, t
e.combatants.spend eas much ashelr time at anchor or In port visits fs&crtfaap underwayn cserdses, their logistics and ^pporlrequirement are somewhat leu than would otherwise beertain level ol replenishment, maintenance, and minor repairs to combatants can be accomplished In. anchorage rather than Infrequent Soviet, practice less used by other navies The primary anchorages used by the Soviets, even when access to Egyptian facilities was available, are located In Ihe Alboran Basin, the Gulf of Hammamet. near Klthera bland, east of Crete, and north of Solium, Egypt (seehese anchorages are situated near the principal operating areas of ihe Fifth Eskadra.
n fact, the Soviets have teen some compensating advantages in Soviets making do with logistically awkward arrangements of this sort. Even during ihe jean when they had continuous and reliable access to Egyptian ports the Soviets carefully avoided becoming too dependent on foreign facilities Soviet naval
Mediterranean Ports arid Major
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ofliocn may have orclctred to have the means availible lo nipport their own fotces from their own resources rather than come to rely on other sources which might be deniedrucial moment. Indicative of the Soviets' naval logistics philosophy and practice has been (heir complicated effort to avoid dependence on foreign sources of fuel oil. In the Mediterranean some five lo seven Soviet POL ships are normally present to provide fuel from their own Internal sources to combatants and auxiliaries. In general theor the merchant tankers to refuel naval oilers which In turn go from ship to ship topping them off. The Soviets have held tenaciously to thb arrangement in (he Mediterranean and any change wouldajor policy decision- On (he political level, the Soviets have to reconcile their naval involvement in foreign countriesheir contradictory desire to mlnunire (he appearance of an international policy driven by naval expnmionism.
expanded deployments of the Sovietthe, however, have in factby some mod idea Son of pastthat time the Soviets have begun to seek(by Western standards) access to shoreonly In the Mediterranean but also in theand elsewhere. Some of the port servicesnow used by the Soviet navy in Useroutine replenishment, minor andand crew rest. Moreover. Soviet standardsover their military support have led themagreements with littoral countries fa severalallowing them to establish facilities foruse.
Post Ups and Downs
Soviets have, however, had mixed resultsefforts to obtain access ashore. Beginning Inbased someubmarines In the Alrjaruan portHowever, they had to pull out these unitswith (he break In Soviet-Albanian relations.following years the Soviets made ato gain access to Egyptian facilities, butImportuning they were admitted only Inof the Six Day Wat7 when thewas in no position to resist thelo Soviet offers of assistance. Asthese facilities In Egypt were ofto the Sovleti. When Egyptadvisers Inowever. Sovietactivities were curtailed, Hy6 the Soviets had been completely excluded from Egyptian port facilities following Sadat's abrogation of1 Soviet-Fgypt lan Friendship Treaty.
Naval Air
he most significant loss to the Soviet navy from2 ouster was the removal of their naval aviation unit based In Egypt at three airfields. This air organization consisted of ASW, reconnaissance, and missile strike aircraft. The ASW and reconnaissance aircraft conducted mlssiom in the Mediterranean against US and other units, and there Is some evidence lhat the strike aircraft were being prepared for operations over the Mediterranean when Soviet use of Egyptian airfields was terminated. Soviel ocean surveillance In the Mediterranean Is currently accompluhed primarily by Soviet ship shadowing of major Western ships, through high-frequency direction finding (HFDF) and by satellite reconnaissance;editerranean airfield did add valuable flexibility and redundancy and regaining access toacility probably remain) an important Soviet goal Some agencies would also note thatrisis, with Syrian concurrence, the Soviets could also use the three electronic warfare aircraft they have maintained In Syria2 to assist their reconnaissance operations Should tho Soviets .choose to rotate the Kiev-class ASW carrier? In future regular Medllerrancanhey would havea continual alioal naval air capability, but they would also want at least emergency airfield access ashore. Soviet use of airfields of Mediterranean littoral states for reconnaissance. ASW, aod striken even more politically sensitive Issue than access to ship repair faculties. Thus the Soviets are likely lo seek naval air access, however desirable, only after any improved ship access they might manage, for all Mediterranean countries would be far leu likely to grant naval air access than ship iadlities.
Other Egyptian Conveniences
he Al Cebbari shipyard at Alexandria provided major replenishment end repair servicesboth routine andthe Fifth Eskadra. particularly to its dicsel submarines, in con|unction with Soviel support ships stationed In the harborloating base. The Soviets- lud constructed this yard where-
oviet personnel worked on Soviet ships under rhe control ofSoviet admiral.2 the SovieU had managerial control ol the shipyard; after that they apparently lost control of and even access to facilitiesfor the graving Jocks and perhaps the workshops. These they continued to use. withloating base, until (heir final expulsion this year. Priorhe Soviets had been developing additional and more secure facilities for (heir own use further west along the Egyptian coastline at Mersa Mntruh. but the Egyptian government also quashed these Soviet plans.
lexandria was also convenient in connection with the important operating requirement for fresh water. The presence of at least one water tender In the Mediterranean suggests that Soviet navalth* oldera restricted capacity to distill their own water in adequate quantities. Fresh water is also (ranifcrtedoviet combatants by oilers and by merchant (ankers under naval charter. When the Soviet navy had access toater tender frequently operated from (hit porl and rcsupplied naval units In .he eastern Mediterranean. To date the Soviets have apparently not found an acceptable shore substitute and so have had to deploy water tenders from the Black Sea,
The Diesel Submarine
ogistical support is muchroblem for Soviet diescl submatinet in the Mediterranean than for surface shlpi. Since tho surface ships primarily deploy tram Use Black Sea Fleet, malar repair facilities inome waters are more readily available.rews of surface ships do not have to face the same habUebility problems as found on submarines. Soviet submarines which routinely deploy to the Mediterranean, however, come from the Northern rather (ban Black Sea Fleet- In part Use Soviets seem to have chosen this arrangement because of provisions of tho Mootteux Convention. Articletates that submarines belonging to Black Sea powers may exit Use Turkish Straits only for overhaul outside the Black Sea. that notice must be given to the Turkish government, and that the submarines must transit oa the surface. No provision allows passage of submarines based elsewhere into the Black Sea. Transit through the carefully monitored Straits inhibits flexibility and compromise* security. For these reasons the Soviets have chosen to deploy Northern Fleet sulHruuineslte
Mediterranean since they began nearlydeploy-men Is therebeen Black Sea FleetMediterranean patrols beforeoverhauls in (he
AW-nans lurssequentlcset submarines for major repair and overhaul wusignificant ei|unsion of Soviet usefacilities Of the averageiead attack submarines deployed, about three used this port at any onetime. Molt work was performed onfloat In the harbor, but the yard's graving docks were abo utilized tor more extensive repairs lasting for several months. Further, submarine crews could get away from the confined and uncomfortable quarters found on these dlesd boats. Now Soviet submarines
can only make limited use of repair facilities in Syrian
aod Yugoslav ports,.
aving been expelled from Alexandria, the Soviets must mike alternate arrangements to maintain the previous level ol submarine operations and presence in (he Mediterranean.
a minimum (be Soviets will probably seek to maintain (heir previous level of diescl attack. submarine operations. They can do this byncreasing (lie frequency of turnover of trteir subrnarines or by increasing the' number of submarines lenders and repair ships deployed to the Mediterranean. Either more frequentround timer or increased numbers ofhips would be expensive and difficult to manage, but the Soviets could probably accomplish thuajor reduction in their Modi subnuuine operations. Since their finalrom Egypt earlier this year the Soviets have lafact had fewer diesel submarines ioediterranean than earliernsteadowever, they formerly kept more Inports or anchorages than in the last few months, netting outssentially the same number operationally uriderway. The result, although at the tame letxl of operationalotoet Mediterranean diesel submarine pretence.
Soviets could also maintain tlielr former average Mediterranean diesel submarine presence by further straining their logistics support.
mosl preferable alternative for the Soviets would be success in one or nunc of their efforts to acquire additional shore facilities, as major repair of diesel submarines at sea is impossible, and even lesser support it far from easy.
Current Soviet Port Access
IS. Current access by Soviet naval units to shore-based facilities (other than as part of official port visits} ii essentially limited to Syria and, for repair facilitiesgotlaoki Syrian pott facilities in both Tartus and Latalda. despite Improvements, are limited. Neither of these two crowded harbors can be used on the same scale as Aleiandria since they lack giaving docks and other requisite facilities. There has been,ear continuous presenceupport ship in one or the other Syrian ports since3 war. providing services to visiting Soviet diesel submarines and minesweepers In addition, most of the Soviet support ships which were until recently stationed in Alexandria are now stationed in Tartus.of water androbably available to the Soviets calling in Syria; however, there arc currently no Indications that Soviet naval units obtain fuel oil In Syrian ports. There It evidence that the Soviets have been pressuring the Syrians, thus far unsuccessfully, for some additional access.
he Soviets have long been interested In Yugottaota'i facilities on the Adriatic, but Tito's government has so far strictly limited Soviet access. Nevertheless, by3 the Soviets were granted limited access and began to send unarmed naval auxiliaries to Yugoslav shipyards for overhaul. In4 Yugoslav maritime law was revised to permit the repair of foreign combatants and auxiliariesugoslav ports. Tbe prnvbioos of the law an strict, however, limiting the number of ships to two of the tamo nation under repair at any one time in any one port. Foreign combatants can be repaired onlyugoslav military thlpyard; currently,he only Yugoslav port so designated. Furthermore, work must be done exclusively by Yugoslav personnel, using Yugoslav material and repairs and must be completed wlihin six months. Munitions and armaments must be unloaded and placed in the care of Yugoslav military authorities, and only one third of tbe foreignllowed to stay on board. The law alto ipcciiically prohibits foreign Installationi or fuel depots on Yugoslav territory.ize limitation
tons for warships0 tons for auxiliaries Is imposed. The Soviets apparently have accepted all these restrictions. Theyton floating drydock to Tivathereby inemd-its capabilities, and4 several Soviet diesel submarines have undergone overhauls. Soviet access toi ill far less than the facilities and ccmdlticnsof use they enjoyed at Alexandria, however. -
Soviets are not known to have otherarrangements in Mediterranean countries.western Mediterranean merchantnaval operations through replenishmentwater, ond limited provUlons. rnakc frequentto purchase water and provisions. Port visitsunlb are accomplished without the prior
clearances and formalities required of naval vessels.
and such vbits are relatively frequent to Tunis.
Tunisia; Calabria. Cagiiari. and Palermo, Italy;
Algeclras. Spain; Gibraltar; and Algiers and Annaba,
Algeria,
II. LIKELY PfiOSf, COUNtatt BY COUNTRY
general desire to improve itsto shore facilities In the Mediterraneanspecific possibilities in the light of two setsThe pht/rtcal aspect involves thelocation of existing facilities and/orto improvement There arealong the littoral where water,or even POL might bo obtained andto Soviet combatantsumber of ports suluble for the typerepairs formerly made at Alexandria. In orderthe seaward approaches to the Black Sea anda presence close to several importanttbe Soviets have focused the Fifthoperations in the eastern Mediterranean.them to continue thb practice In the nearthus Soviet naval planners would logicallyseek shore access reasonably dose to theseMediterranean operating areas, but wouldaccept It elsewhere. Facilities for fairlyon submarines In sites also suitable for crewhigher In Soviet priorities than repair facilitiesships. And, their past use oftbe Soviets would prefer asite to enhance their shins' security.the advantages ol an established bad>or. of Soviet Interest In Mersa Matruh suggest
would prefer Io ovoid enl repot.
ore problematical Is the political aspect of (he Soviets'likelihood of various littoral countries allowing Soviet shore access, and what kind under what conditions. For the near term, we believe that Soviet prospeeti for Increased access to Mediterranean shore facilities for substantial repairsnd tegular replenishment arc dim. except in (he case of Yugoslavia, where they are marginally better but still problematical. Over the longer term, major political variables In countries all around the littoral could dramatically affect Soviet prospects In the meantime the Soviets are likely to plug away at Insinuating themselves and their Mediterranean ships Into more modest port arrangements wilh the more promising potential hosts
Unlikely Prospects
n otherwise disparate collection of Mediterranean countries is unlikely in the near term to be actively wooed by the Soviets for their shore facilities. Port calls by Soviet combatants to France und Italy, for example, appear to be motivated more by broader political objectives-the USSR's demonstration of its legitimacyediterranean power, weakening NATO, and improving state-to-iteteby any reasonable expectation of securing access to naval facilities In those countries. Increased Communist Party influence, or even formal participation, In the government of Italy ii unlikely for the foreseeable future to change thb situation. The party would presumably want to avoid the sort of rsolltical-military favor to the USSR that would validate NATO governments' concerns and stimulatesharply negative reactioa.
rercr or Turkey present equally unlikely short -tcrm possibilities for Soviet naval access. Any Soviet effort to acquire facilities in one would greatly complicate relations with the other, of course. Moreover, the Soviets appear to be pUying for much higher stakes than naval facilities In both theseenUdng them out of the Western camp into al least the notialigned Third World. Any piemature attempt to obtain naval access to facilities In Creece or Turkey, and the unwanted attention It would surely draw, might very well be counter productive to this larger objective. In the case of
Turkey, other Soviet military priorities freerthrough the Turkish Straits and military-relatedthrough Turkish airBoth Greece and Turkey contain considerablebase sentiment In general. Moreover,expressed coooern in NATO forums aboutpresence in thendicatingwould probably be reluctant to permitthan periodic Soviet naval visits such as thoseand
here are three portsnd Famagusta; only the lasteep water port. The Island has no graving docks or other major shipyard facilities. This unpromising physical base, plus the continuing uncertainty over the political future of Cyprus, make it unlikely that (be USSR sees any hope for significant naval facilities there. Moreover, the USSR would be reluctant lo set in motion naval access gambits which might risk direct Soviet Involvement in the event of renewed conflict. Additionally. Creece and Turkey would probably be no morr willing to accept Soviet access to Cypriot ports than to their own. and even Makarios would be unwilling to contemplate such action.
23 In three other MediterraneanAlbania, and naval access by combatant shipsemote possibility for theforeseeable future. In order to transform any of tbese/JV-coontries into viable and high priorityrastic domestic and regional political shifts wouldequired.
ith Egypt, however bleak the presentear-term prospects, the Soviets probably nurture somehope that Cairo will eventually come again within pull' of Soviet influence and allow at least some renewed. Iv-access to the kind of extensive fadllries there that they previously enjoyed. It would be premature, however, to rulenilateral move on Egypt's part allowing for some resumptlan of Soviet naval
"Jit would certainly be conceivable for Egypt to adopt something like the Yugoslav legal formulaL
^that would allow both US and Soviet warships to use Egyptian shipyards.^
Soviet Effort
orocco'* location In the !ji western Meditetninean probably reduces its attraction, at least lot use by the Mediterranean Exkadra as presently deployed, to Soviet naval planners. The two major ports on Morocco's Mediterranean cxmstllne, Ceuta and Melllla, arc endaves under Spanbh control. Casablanca on (lie Atlantic has better facilitiesraving dock of tome ISO0abat may have agreed5 to allow the Soviets more freedom in using its ports in exchange for expanded military assistance. But. even before tlte USSR's support for Algeria over Morocco lo the Spanish Sahara disputeall over Soviet-Moroccan relations. Morocco tended to regard Western naval visits more favorably than Soviet port calls. And since the Sahara crisis Morocco's attitude toward the US navy has become even more favorable. While this favor could certainly deteriorate. Moroccan caution in dealing with the Soviets will probably be more lasting. And. in the near term, the Soslets will probably uol press for naval access (her*.
alta offers an excellent location for centra! Mediterranean naval operations, and Valelta's extensive facilities include five2 feet)well trained, eiperienced personnel. Prime Minister Mintoffs willingness to discomfit Westernlso celebrated, but Malta's overall political relations with the USSR have been too poor to offer much present hope for Soviet naval access there Indeed, Malta now has better relations with the PRC than the USSR. Any future attempts by Mlntoff to eiplolt fears In the West of Soviet naval access to Malta would complicate his desire to figure prominently In the nooaligned movement and would alienate Libya. Malta's entry into the nonallgned group3 was apparently conditionedromise that no foreign military presence would be allowed after the Britbh lease expired9 expiration of the base agreement awkwardly (for Mintoff) coincidesriennial meeting of the noruligned conference. Any continued foreign military presence (Western or Soviet) in his country would also discredit Mintoffs attempt to set himself up as the spokesman for the Mediterranean world in any expanded follow-on European security conference. Nevertheless, the Soviets will presumably be alert to any signs of further shifts in Mintoffs foreign priorities that they might eiploit for even conditional naval access. Meanwhile they may play ononaligned pretensions to argue for greater equably of treatmentis British and other Western ships. The economic consequence of British withdrawal, particularly If sufficient Libyan '* financialot forthcoming, may also" Moscow someoviet promise ofockyard revenues, perhaps initially associated with ervice for noncombatanrx. could proveas Western ships will probably continue to use the facilities, allowing Mintoff to argue the case of impartiality. Malta Is one of several Mediterranean countries that might In some circurrrstanees ersoose to develop the Yugoslav model of port accesstrictly regulated but available to both Soviet and Western ships.
Some Active Effort
ather well endowed with |iort and related facilities:
some eight wellmajor commercial ports, seven (Annaba. Anew. Bejaia. Cburaouet, Mostagnem. Skikda. and Oran) have fairly extensive anchorages and berthing facilities but lack shipyards for major repair work. Algien has one ol the largest ports on the African continent with two shipyards, tlte larger having two graving docks and extensive related equipment
rench naval baseeep and well protectedit now possesses noeblr, in comblnatioo withcommercial facilities at nearbytiie potentialajor western .
M-Although the Algerian government has for many yean permitted periodic port calls by Soviet ships at Algiers and Annaba for sbowlog the flag and replenishment, it has steadfastly rebuffed all Soviet attempu to obtain any access to Mers-el-Keblr and to repair faculties at Algiers. There have been no indications of any shift In Algeria's position Still, the physical attractiveness of Algerian facilities, combined wilh the USSR's large political investment In that country, will probably motivate ihe Soviets to some level of continued effort Should the Soviets al some future time move toward expanded naval activity in Iho western Mediterranean, the attraction of Algeria's
v. vtjffii
highly probable that Moscow, using its varicesassistancehe wedge, will keep on trying gradually to gain access to Libyan facilities. Although'!this process is likely to be painfully slowreturns minimal It couldouiidaHoa for contingencyavorable change ih presentttitudes or leadership. Moscow would also beood position to try to exploit any increasedhould Qadhafi's Libya come under pressure. hostile neighbors.
ProboWe High Soviet Effort
Syria is one of the USSR's current principal clients in the Arab world, and the Soviet navy hasear continuous presence tn Syrian watersevertheless the Soviet navy's access to Syrian ports remains uncertain. Moreover, tbe Soviet-Syrian polirical relationship appears currently to be deteriorating over Lebanon Existing port facilities ire crowded and were Inadequate for Soviet needs, especially submarine maintenance, even before the Soviets lost facilities in Egypt Syria has no graving docks or trained shipyard workers. Further, piominent Syrian offidab have expressed the
j] that
Egypt went too far In extendingort facilities to the Soviet navy. They have argued that Syria has, by contrast, agreed onlyoviethose nature was dearly in its own national interest;'And Syria continues to reject Soviet requests foraccess.
he Soviet navy's present use of Syrianto be partuid pro quo for political 'and economic and military assistance! ssuminf, iliut their present relationship continues,will probably try to take advantage of Syria'smilitary and economic debt to themfor expanded access. Syria's prodmity toEskadra's principal deploymentthe USSR's heavy military investmentguarantee continued Soviet pursuitport access. The Syrians would surelythe Soviets build the new facilities necessary
accommodate much additional naval access there. And. under no foreseeable circumstances are the Syrians likely to grant unrestricted access to any naval facilities In their country. Moreover. Soviet lack of Influence over recent Syrian military Involvement in Lebanon does not augur well for other Soviet efforts to parlay aid Into increased Influence.
-i'CCSfV-
Tunisia has four principalarge commercial poet with extensive anchorage space, butmall shipyard.
an unproved natural harbor and the major homeport of the Tunisian navy. Someiles) to thehe Socomena Shipyard with four diyeiockx, the largest being 2S0eet long.
and Susan, with small shipyards suitable only for minor repairs.
oviet warship port rails began4 and increased In frequencyheir Initial successes apparently led the Soviets toard-sell approach. But repeated badgering by Soviet diplomatsore liberal port call policy has cumulatively served to antagonize Tunisian officials, including President Bourguiba. Recent evidence indicates that the government has revised its initially sympathetic attitude toward Soviet naval visits. There is no sign, however, that the Soviets hove toned down their approach now thst they have iseen espelled from Egypt.ll the more attractive to them. moscow might additionally proffer economic aid orupplies. Tunisia has long sought Io revitalize ihe port facilities at Tunis,oviet offer to assbtroject might be well received. In general, the Soviets probably hope tooothold in Tunisia before Bourguiba dies, in hopes of improving their position during the urscertain succession period (hat will probably follow.
unisian bureaucratic Inefficiency in cootdi-natlng Soviet requests for vrxiU haselpful element in Moscow's effort to keep its program of port vblts alive. However, 'we expect (he Tunisian government to review Soviet requests for naval visits more closely and when they occur, to control (hem more rightly than In the past. Moreover, recent heightened tension with Libyaq
jb likely to affect Tunuia's willingness to accept more frequent Soviet naval visits
eyond trying to expand their present limited access to Yugoslav repair facilities at llokaencompassesSoviets are reportedly maneuvering for naval access to other suitable facilities, including:
with its two graving docks, marine railways, building ways, etc;
with two Urge shipyards capable of major repairs.
There are also various naval yard facilities at Split, but th* Yugoslavs ore least likelyllow any Soviet presence adjacent to (heir own main naval headquarten. Yugoslav ports have (lie additional attraction for the Soviets of potential overland resupply. albeit easier lo Pula and Rijeka than over the treacherous Monlenegran (errain lo Boka Kotorska; on the other hand, they are all located In the Adriatic,usceptible lo closure In crisis situations (see Hgure
hese excellent Yugoslav shipyards appear to be the only viable Mediterranean shore access alternative to Egypt for the Sovtett in the near term. Moscow will probably use whatevereconomic, or militaryhas lo try to secure the greater access it seeks in Yugoslavia.ome reason to think that the Yugoslav government mightillingness to open an additional shipyaid lo foreign, including Soviet, use under the strict legal Provisions outlined inbove. The Yugoslavs have abo recently indicated to us officials thai they have no intention ofreater Soviet naval pretence ashore, and have specifically invited us navy use ol Yugoslav shipyards.
or Ihe present, although Soviet hopes of increasing their use of Yugoslav ports may not be very high, Moscow obviously intends to keep tryingncrease its access under the current law and. If possible, to open new ports lo Soviet use.
j]dun*ng I
_ final Yugoslav-Soviet negotiations over the European Coherence of Communist Parties (ECPCl Tito ptorrxbed that he would Issue instructionsllow greater Soviet use of Yugoslavia naval repair facilities, although Yugoslavia restrictive laws would remain unchanged. Whether th* Yugoslavs will follow through on thb carrot, now lhat ihe ECPC has come and gone with Ihe Soviel "coricessioni" desired by theroblematical Other Soviet incentives might include offers of assistance and economic credits or increased Soviet work orders for Yugoslav shirryurds. Yugoslav present dependence on Soviet supplies of Ihe more sophisticated types of military equipment may provide some leverage. In the longer term. Tito's departure could pir/vide Moscow with increased
opportunities. While the eventuality of severe strains in Yugosla* cohesion would lave* possible augmented Soviet kverage, (hb might not pertain on the naval access issue. The Croatian Republic contains most of the attractive port real estate, and Croatlans might be more rather than leas resistant lo Soviet port access In any deterioration ol the Yugoslav federation,elgrade deal with the Soviets at Croatian CxrsertscJ An orderly transfer of power and strict adherence to TiroV policies of nonalignment would
Moscow no belter off in naval arxetx terms jhan present.
Yugoslav Naval Repair Facilities and nail Links
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