CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE AS SANITIZED
MICRO ONLY
6
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Com.-nor.ts on Foreign Policy Article, "Soviet Strength nnd US Purpose"
The latent issue of Foreign Po3 icy conies an exchange of comments on tlw"'topic'oviet Strength ond US Purpose," The exchange feature! comrannts by Amos A. Jordan and R. W. Komer on an earlier Foreign Policy article by Congressman Les Aspin, entitled, "How to Look at the Soviet-Americanndebuttal to their comments. Much of the commentary focuses on CIA's military-economic analysis. This memorandum provides comments on the main points made by Jordan, Komnr and Aspin-on that analysis and on other intelligence issues.
Milltory-Economic Issues
Jordan accuses Aspin of devoting too much attention to the "red herring of conceptual problems'" in the CIA's dollar costing methodology. He argues that it is "the best comparatlvo method available". Jordan and Konar dispute Aspin's contentionomparison of defense costs in rubles would show the US to be outspending the USSR. Jordan quotes former DCI Colby to the effectough ruble comparison still shows the Soviet program to bo larger than ours. Aspin cites the former DDI, Dr. Proctor, as stating that the uncertainties in this comparison are so great that this conclusion cannot be supported. Further, he asserts that the ruble figures in the CIA study are derivedartial listS Soviet machine tool prices andhe cost of a
r/ita memorandum waa prepared in tho Office of
Research. nd queries may be directed to
ONLY.
i
ank is extrapolated from theear old cent figuresathe." Finally, he argues that because some US veapons aro beyond Soviot technological capabilities their ruble costs would be infinite,
Comment; Tht CIA did in footough estimate of theruble coots of US program*. At tha recent Joint Boonomic Committee hearings wt noteduble comparison would chow tha cottt of Soviot defense programs5 exceeding those of US programt by about SO percent,to aboutercent measured in dollar terms. Aspin'r remarks on the oonocptual problome of these comparisons in genttal and of coating taahnologiaally advanced VS woapone systems in rublcB epeoifioally aro germane, and iltuotrateeooity to make rather arbitraryassumptions in this type of analyeie. Daepitt the difficultiee of ettimating rublt coete for VS weapont, and the inherent difficultitt of international economic oomparisone, wt oontinut to btlieve that tht overall Soviet military program it ourrently significantly larger than that of the US. Aspin is inoorreot in stating that ruble cost estimates art battd6 machine tool prices. In fact, our ruble-dollar ratios art drawnarge body of price data, much of which it quitt rectnt.
Komer agreos with Aspin that "gross ostimatos of Soviet versus US military spending can be misleading by themselves" and further statos that "they aro necessarily based on esoteric ruble/dollar conversion ratios". Ke also claims that the CIA hasspecial correction" in its dollar estimates to account for lower Sovietcosts. Aspin denies thatorrection vis made and correctly quotes Mr. Colby as stating that USrates are used in the CIA calculations.
Comment: Komtr is wrong on two points. Dollar cost comparisons art based for tht most part on dirtot dollar eotting of Sovitt weapont and programt; Atpin't rtply that US pay rates art applitd to Soviet manpower in dollar eottt tttimatee it oorreat.
Komor nlso takes Aspin to task for focuning on growth in upending rather than absolute levels nnd ftr assorting thai "only about half of tho Soviet growth in military spendingonrho US". He charges that Aopin's analysis of tho allocation of thin growth to various minolon categories is unsupported and that it must have boon donc"on tho back of an cnvolopo*. Aspin's reuponte io that his basic Information come from the CIA. He also states that Soviei dofense spending is "driven in part by China's military expansion which hasoor recently."
CogfWHt: While Aspin probably did baee hie oalcvla-tione mid-ally on CIA'a dollar coat data, wo did not eupplyreakdown of growth by mioaion. We do not know what baaio sources or methodology he uaed. (Copies of tho information we have supplied to Aopin are in Aepin ie correct in ttating that acme Soviet dofenoo programe are directed againnt China, but hie eetimatc of aneroont annual growth in Chineoeit not eupportod by our analyaia. Our estimates auggeet that the dollar ooeta of Chineee dofense programe have been relatively etable2 and eomawhat below the peak level
Other Issues
Jordan charges that Aspin errs in stating that ono-third of the Soviet ground forces are deployed In the Far East. Ho states that the figure is in fact one-fourth. Aspin counters by stating that his figure came5 testimony by the former OIA Director, General Graham, before tho Joint Economic Committee.
Comment^ Our estimate aupportt Jordan. We do not know how General Graham derived hie figurea. Our estimate of the paroantago of Soviet ground foroa divisions deploys in various areaa ia given in the following table:
Peroont of Soviot Divisions Deployed
Inoluding Airborne Dtvioior.c
Excluding Aivboynn Divisiono
7
S?S
also questions Aspin's stoticti.es on mianilo throw weight and bomber payload. Aspin stated in his earlier article that tho OS has on advantage ofillion toillion pounds. Jordan says that the US figure is overstatedactor of three. Aspin's rebuttal is that Jordan is correct if one ossumose carry0 pound payload rathor than00 pound payloads which ho says that some models can carry.
estimate would be oarr
Comment: Our eetimatee are closer to Jordan's than to Ae'pin 'e. (See table below.) Tn our cotimatee we oount only on-line (operational) bombers and misoile launahare. This approaoh is more realietio than estimating groso throw weight totals. Also in ths interest of realism we do not use maximum payloads for either US or Soviet bombers. Instead, we aeribe to them nominal payloads whioh we
On-Lino Hieeile Throw Weight and Dombor Paifloado (llillion Pounds)
2
-4-
A.N'nt'.ai'UHI'OSK
In hit ciu'elt. "Howoh atntMMijMt* thr view, put lueweedJunxt SckUaWttt and tOmW
mwAsri of tin tttinbttwrinn, thai ibe Soviet Union uW then* oaltpvnJing the United Statei foe defente. IH% article, end the public wi/wi'nn which Ay'n wfiv quality hunched, eitnxtnf eontideeabltand prvtMtottinW disagree mtlH. Inlhmre which (vtkWt, the Ailing A'tiuniti v / Jcudcn enilfiaf otuUbnt to I'tctidrnt Jolimon. diywle A'pin't four ft os ivtll Pi hit concluucnt. In addition.conimentt on Earl C. Ha^rnal't article. "AfiecSchlcu'ngrr: Something Hat toliith alio appeared in iht lav.f eerdirt ol both Aipin ond Haiwol follow, in one of the mott interne debaitt ivr hatt gel published. Alihcvgh the reader inag ttdl find no tingle, timple aniierr. lliere ran be no queuion of the imporianee vf this drbeii. which hat now become eei integral part o> the flectionEdiiort.
Amos A. Joiflnm
The ankles br Let Aipin ind Earlin ihe6'd.ICY ire importantthe orwgain. off-again Gicatihe signifkanceet kinin tn: world. Allhough it ilto discuss both adequately in iit may nevertheless be usefultheir central thcfti and pointof their inadequacies. lest theywisdom in. ircles.
The ovrall thrust ol tlxlear: the itatiitki whichm beenbout ihe ulitiveof. mJ Swirl Meut- rHJiu tie beiuf, uVtoiledlv CvMAgpui|HiKti HVfcWnTi eventidf.iii love Kene nml net worryor only hih* ofur pomd hcreawt can be viewed a* "ihtcAieu-iai"ht United Si lies
Alilmurh lfieorce .Aipinnd Soviet defense pioyrjniu>nitedpoint of ilk,-spends lluhii essay deprecating iIk li^nifieaiiccTlief iIk a'tkle itto tlie red Ik-dingof conceptualin ilk*elltod of cumcaiin.'lire of the Soviethut. heilau
ll*OWitl| lhn. (ot iIk- better
in minitower, forcequipmeni,ariomtea<urri.iliiaiy itreiiRih Iu* been incrcaiini* whileeen deelining. imiiad he fcvmei on whal should lurehat ilk- Soviet pio-jrarn would com il il vttt pioeuied in iIk United Statei, with tlie lame inanp>'wer and ilk- i- mi- quantities and quality ofoverstates Soviet rrsoutie inpitis. it is the best comparative method available. In any caw. it is clear Out any distortionin the method could no: vitiate ilk* conclusion that the Soviet Union's ovnalt defense progiam is vciy much tlie larger of the two.
Further, clcipkc Aspin'sobasing the comparative coitinjpioducessameince data for rouble-based comparisons are as reliable as those for dollar-based anal- (the intelligence community now hasajor effort to improve them). meaningful rouble companion isas former CIA DirectorColby publicly. "aroublc-baied comparison Indicates the Sovkt piogram is! signif cant- larger than
SS.
Ill klttll. Alpilt't llh-Mi lintvniliiir, MOf( OA
Iepen.'i onto the llfU.M noo-Soviet Malf-at* CM aneitaiiil iW SjtMfllfcyuality ofKiiivd (tndl to (tmfirm lliii judgment. Oney quctlioit of relative trends. Aspin attempti li<llirof tin' Jt'wilesiltllllVf .ill*iii ilw fst.lw<j| ex-planationi foe Soviet ineteases wIimIi utileess lataclrsmic lhan the iVuia^on'i explanation llm lhc Sovirl Union ii striving fot military supremacy: fust, tint maK hurf|;rt j- ill may bo merelyiction of |'ir Strategic Arm* Limit-iiinii Talks (SALT) attitudes hy Soviet leadersnd. that iiunction of "internal. burcJv.ciatk/po-iiiieal factor! in thent. if the Soviets were budgeting for four new intercontinental ballistic missilesne new intermediate tange ballis* lie minilr ne newaJHstk miuilfnd one new bomber,ihe samefor arms controls with ihe Unitedan question wltrtIter iteaicrs for stability whkh impelled the Soviets to corriplrte all these expensiveto promptly begin tbe next generation ofnew iCbMs and SLBMs wjiieh are now under development (the latter systemsconceived after the signing of2 SALT agreement).
Turning to Aipin'a second,olitkal" explanation foe rising Soviet defense budgets,ifficult to lake rom-fort fiom the proposition thai major Soviet program and force increases mean littlethey have oceurredonsequence of Breihntv'i "trying toajorityrnte in the poIltburo" and nil) maintain hii support in the armed forces. If thearmed forces with their preoccopatioa with military might are so influential, eon* tern about the milicaty balance would secrn doubly wjmnted.
liiid. and., rrwci.il.o hii atgamntt for uVUuisto tin-f living Soviet miltl iiyo MfMi-firanduition catCRcairt inwith cj,-prising |seVkbaVaak In ibct* rouble data.ienllr Ik' Ita* uvJctllai: he icoim talievilli far me-ie pie.Vn-'i ligidiiy than wjuantid. 'jhi. IcjWfl at* us obviously out of line with what wc clearly Vrow tlut hitaw can be called into question. TIhm. in hii discussion of throw* weiplu trivili./v, hj ul'i.tves that ilk* United Stileslieillion pounds toun:ftoviet figurero'.tj'lily COtltbl hul.'h missile throwh: and 1'jiuKt. fi^um aieatedacior of rouglily three. In fa:i. in terms ofhe Sovietnot only nowhtow-weiglubut will likely iacte-tir its lent rw! the next few yearj. lis advanupcoeutjil In the mott danf/tous aspect of lli; equation, namely, mhule ibiow-welfjit. wliieh holds the potrntiat for counterfoiee or 'm!se whkh bomber payload does not.
"Wc will continue lo licoil lhc ra* imlilllly to witteli, Iklon, nntlrhn|in even In.
Aspin't siairmrnt ihat roughly one-third of Soviet ground fours are deployed in lite Fat Iijii and another one-third againu NATO Is also crrontoui. An analyst could onlyat these figures by tor'uiing the data so that Soviet divisions opposite Turkeyre really anti-NATO) and Iran and intal Russia become "Far Eastern" divisions-In fact, only about one-fourth of the Sov-t; ground forces are in the Far Eait. and one-half are facingvery important difference for defense planners. (Of overall Soviet forces, fai leu lhaner rent art committed againstii related ob*
HivJlioui hastem deploy* tucfiit de. not. InlcteM* (or, indeed.resumably Uciweot only ii'iicues the ircu-rityand hoop depl'tynicnis of the Unitedi in NiKilhr.nl Asia, hut altoan unwarranted Soviet force iti-
fli'xiiiiiit)-.
Indeed, arcrt fiom data inadequacies, tlwf Sin ill forces ami Use variability of Soviet marginal lesouiee -illkvaiioii* over lintc are tiuei.il weak pxints in hii ease. In ilk* past ievei.it yean, for itiM-'nee. tliehave not put increaseduiM-up against China or in other areas Aspin delineates asut os-crwliclminglyiensiveandleseareli aniln objective observer can only echo thesentiment that the overallbuild-up should be placed inperspective.
Ravenal's critique of the Americanposture is not at all concerned with it eh mattery as analyzing the Soviet budget. He ia disdainful of tlic games ciities such as Aspin play.uess. Iwould find Aspin guilty of five of the sevenand rhetorical ployi" Ikiven if inch critics are successful. Ravenil asserts, "tliey will simply distort our defeiseor spread it toonstead, he callsmore Iwnestasedoreign policy which narrows national ic-iurity down to seeing "that our soil is never invaded and occupiedoreign power; that our internal processes are neverby the threat of another nation (ot nonnatlonalnd that American lives and property are not spent except in the obvious and necessary defease of thoseccordingly, "we should draw backineend can holdefemivr perimetertrategic fotee concept that can be maintained over ihe longhe reason for iueh areversal is twofold: tlic world is too
IUll4,ljlilv Ivl Ilk.
it a* il didr cent my afletII: mititaiy wiilnliawjl ii tlv.It-sensible courseheie no longero piy ilvan ilk' risks -if beingnajoiPOM'er.
While admiring iliifjnAPposl-lionmenM in wh>.'h rXlrituJ om< maims ami domesticnrt preei*-ty tlte same end. na-rnly.it withdiav.'al. one is tempted tofmjhei about both ritks andlk-te m.inrant risk that withdrawing our ovencas militaiy pusenee and ea<biriing otir aliijiife*-will lead lu citciimstT-nrcs in which oarproeeiies tan imtecd be di.tttxl bfAie we so lelf-snflicient in annterdependent world that w< canil. inhaped, or at leal Is-arilr in flu.-need.nations whose purposes are inimical tu our own? Could we remain ficr to puisue god. compatible with our values, by oui own processes, in an itK-caiinf-ly chaotic oe bos-tile world? RaWfuTl citing of tbcsol uionistiiidly helpful. si:.ee we no longer have the British fUei and tlie nurojk-an balance of power to protect us-
Turning io Ravtnat'i treatment of costs and bis assumption that Amerkans are not willing to pay the prke of continuinginvolvement, it would have beenhad he focused some attention on ilie torn of noninvolvement: What, fot rxam-pie. might be tequired over the long ttrni lu defend an isolated, beleaguered America or to deal with the likely loises of vital taw material import! and markets?
Ravmal'i peisimlsm regarding thewillingneii to bear defense eotts items In part from his exaggeration of thr size of the bill. He gaspsillion defense budget" yet any compound interest table will show that if inflation rates of the last few7 per centassumed for tlte next0 billion budget5 would be nc
jr.
n (oiMUnt or "leal" dollars lhan today's h'.ldj'el ,llld wouldr fof tire1 j'rosi national pi-nlnct. IK* ills'* admitniteds nowess, both in lelaliv* ami aluohite (ems, fot its military forces dun in ilie. (hide.J. ihe dill i* now actually smaller than ai any liiwe since (he Korean* has convinced din-self that "defense is irrn by Americans as an increasingly Intolerable diversion of the nationale isimmune lo (lie evidence of recent congressional voivi and nation a!Gal' fup's March Ipoll shows that well over half (Ik people. defense xjvncliiic* is "too little" or "abouleof ill? legislature's response to this public av.-jiencii by observing that Oengicis "abjectly concedes the.substance of iIk ad-nii nisi rat Ion's budgetary
I'-oa-cding. ncvectltcleva, from the view lliai Ik knows llsc risks andare loo onerous. Ravenal showa |ww deep cuts can be made in the defense budget. Hit starting point is adoptionolicy ofin both Asia and Europe (including the Mediterranean and the Middlellhough he suggests that It would takeecade ininwithdrawal. He ignores the fact thai Europeans. Asians, and othcts would quickly move to discount the future, once oui direction and goal were known, so that we would almost immediately have io start paying the political and securityofnrioni.Hr then proceeds to slash force structure, eliminating all tlie units brought home from Europe and Asia and cutting down total forces lo something like two-thirds tlie preient levels,illion0 billion in the process.
The logical inconsistencies ofntended rigorous analysis are staggering. If he intends no commitments, no alliances, and no troops in Europe and Asia, if be reallyoninterventionist policy and force program,alfway bouse, why
ItUllllaill Im" swiiiI I al I
(WW foieesri-wed* isall' Hy Ins OWN ibeoriented" five and one ibitdandirand (is caiiiei uikini on-ln simply |uleaving only mjie.'ic -wive* ilie!
little is wuue than none at all, lemptiny. u. lo intetvenr in di-.pfr.-re easel withuale forces, even including (Ik- leservii. Ind.vd. it i* ur.elejf IrOW rcsefvei can be ra-lionali/ed under (lie Ravenal policy:more sensible eotnv wouldy io sirur*esidual foiee designed for. teiiiiotyorce which would ttB<ery difereri froia iIk*sidual strategic restive-.aftviirtually all else overboard.
In addition to these fundamental prob-lems with tin- Ravenalhere are seii* ous shot (comings in bis budget mctliudotogy and calculations. Allooiingntire tie-feme budget to either generalorce* or straiegrc forces, as lied absurduui of the useful idea of "minion budgetIhe kind of strain on common icnie which Iht Ravenal mrtlvod onjils is indicated by hii allocating the retired pay potiion of tlie defrnse budgetitherforcei or genual purpose forces, a* though it had anything to do with eilliei of them. Some of (he other allocations are not much better; for inxancr. wlse-reicpen* dituiciariety of minions, as does much of tlie spending on intelligence and communications* Reducing time and ihe training bast, for example, in proportion io cuts in European and Aiiant difficultustify. W't will continue to need tbe capability io warch. limn, and talk, perhaps even to mobilite some manpower, particularly if Ravenal ii terious! keep* ing forces "loosely oriented" toeal.
Returning to the central Ravenal
iifiUullti-iHy. ih.it vtc slx-tld pay.MieniK'tiimtw whole it.'iiuii ol miliMiys.ilMice llui'l'iii' of (he budget debate "simplyspu-ad it tooAipiny ifapJIt It)ier l't>i>li.il "nuiu.-ii.jl eompai it,.'ruiili the Sovi.is] IH iinitoitam" ami HMM ofafttJM inending "is certainlylerting."
W't are indebtedoihotdefining some ofilv Gteil
IX'hait:helpingimpSf
theofut alliances and ofn on ouiseltvt- tofor lliOH'ttfi ihe riiki entailed inricslie Soviet mililary build-up: andoth for ini-Minf*otv careful, Pirnd-ian-tlng analyst* of whai we are doing or attempting. But both ciuyiitf might usefully examine whit Uie American people item to have been laying on lime mattcnnamrly. tliat despite all ihe clialT thai hai been blown in their faces,velhat wt liveangetoui. turbulent world which requires ut continuoudy to lend to our mililary strength, and iliatih* constant temptation to shiftresources from defense to socralii. "tlie moil important social serviceovernment can do for its people it to Vtcp ihem alive and free."
RAY, Komcrt
l-rt Aspin often makes good aense in eril-kfiing our defense. But his attack on comparison! of Soviet. defenseIn the last Uiue of FOREIGN POLICY Ii not one of his better effom. While accusing the Defense Department of making meaninglcn comparisons, he in turn tebuti them by uiing largely mraningleii comparisoni of hit own. In effect he playi the MMfr .. it.-;
LVfense IX-jtitnvm with>:
Ihai gion vttiinan
ivestaiiiy based on'^'oI'miiovhryl.tory.wlnlo tell u* ii alto quite'iv, lie wis thati!*Tin*ollar let mi lend: tovJeipower coin.ate mn.lt loivyi ilyr. oui i. But the HA wai not quite s> il.irib as i" overlooko wlnt Aspin claims, iror lower Soviet r>
Nor ii Aipin tight itwo budgets areJ ia* iciblet tnvtrad of de-liars, "lb.s the bifgrrlie or.ly. estimate done un tliiim bv the CJA, makes tleir ih. on iheSoviet spendi-ig still greatlylhat cl the United States.
Of count. Aspin ii quite right that to any case "the crucial issue is wltai ihe So vieli art spending their extrand not just the total sire of their budget. Itity that be then undermir-es his own argument by itich dubious allocation ofmilitary budgeto various missionaNJi poiird by any knownm familiaror unclassified. He BUS have done it on the back of an tnvelope.
I doubt thit any qualified expert agree with him lhai "only about hvlf of the Soviet growih in military trendingerear is threatening to America" or NATO. Sinee hii ariful chart enInly the distribution of ckanfftSoviet defense spending, it alio nicelycati the total allocatlom involved.bv using tbe entire decadeai ahe highlights the build-up on the Clrinc-border while obicuiing the more recentrowih of Soviet sircngrh oppetite Europe. Tun. iht Soviet Union budgets foe lorr.r
i:.sf directly thirattii (lie
UnitedIWl ilic Uniud Stales also buys force* lli-il do noi llinvli'novietool SI SOinci'mcnlallw Vict-toni wai, vltii h, byJy did not djutllr threatenhile ihis was going down tin" drain, compatable Soviet outlay* were cot:iiibuiiii;'. directly to litein Soviet mengih. When-pin's argument?
I'crhapt A'i-lii" best point, madeater press release, il that NATO versus War-siwPaeludget companions are inoie meaningful lhan llioic between tlie- United Slater and Soviet Uniongree that lotal NATO spending exci-cd* that of the Wp. Hut forave in an earlier FOREIGN POLICYliit too it grnidy misleading. Ilete Aspin disicganl* his own admonition to look not only al totals hut at wlierc the money goes.
In strong contrast to tliewp fences, equipped and org-ni/xd on tlic Soviet model, NATO iiisparate national militaryTbe resultingverlap, and duplication in NATO-country spendingany comparison, Fot example, T. A. Ollaghan conservatively estimates that NATO wanesear by (ailing to consolidate research and development,and supportnd theimpact on military capability through la'fc of common training or doctrine. lack of standardization or even interoperability of equipment and procedures, is even more worrisome. In ihott, NATO's whole is ac* tualty Icsi than the sum of its parti, which mafces gross NATO-wp budget comparisons no more valid an index tlian those between the United State* and the Soviet Union alone.
V, Knnnr. "Tricfftw NATO'i Sttt-Mktid
wttiiGN
roivon-itob in Mitiuir indTnhnotocrotor,x-im Ttth,+
42,
Finally, we need Inidl)(I'liij'-iiis.-'iit lo dwun'-mt theSoviet militaiyill iwfrkc. In MM tXfgtxiei.Vim-it not only peallybut has far mote aeliveilillery. and the likewin vemvisti'iit with aTrue, ijualiiyl! asI- laVcnuM.tillm.MTy Ley ie*>Helli
Bul Aspin aehnovInSjan that iupe;io: nm beta air nM irrelevant eiihet. And Ivagrees ii 'i Ibe liend is what ii mo'ttuibing. So while *haiing liis vieweed< appiait d. not jusigiel that he inventedfn if countei llial of it* IVtVafJM.
I*et me iitXteu ibc criticisms of Amen A. Jot-dan and IC W. Konur in tlse conievi of my oiiginal ankle.
MVs A.Tn'l"
ttw other gWnYte* '
Tlic ankle's fust point se.is that the ley to rletrrmint'ng whkhspent* more on defrnic iscurrency uwcl in the companion. Putting both budgets in dollar terms Jj.iwi (lir Sovkis trendingand wc all agree on ilui. Hutias against the Unitedoidan dismisie* the seveicofar comiuiisor.ere "methodologicalish see coatd. But since Ihe Pentagon relies heavily en th: dollar companion in its appeal Ice mOtt
Swiil leivljtn-n
mMrvwf coin
Willhrii f. Co-'ovr' Ojr J
v^i.v
imtttt ok ftwifiVi ill, in
f. DC:iallmt OtU:i. I. p. il.
49,
i is iieveisaiy to elevate this lianiblr
d Ulltf.lseure llh-in'i inert l.
Ifput'l'.nw kiel.yis in ivuhK-Icii*m,ilrd Slllfi wouldiitijviiktnii: Itustii. Komci iontmiaying tlii' only detailed rouhlr eoniparit'inSoviet spendingtly execcd* lhalih? United I'uirt"i' indeedtudy, lllir NoYi.1t. outtp,tbe I'riicilyibcal footii'itc in tliii study ICVCjItJIfiin of CllOf il JO IjlpfO per cent lead ii meaningless. Al-though Komer doesn't mention it. iheivi in tlu* study are derivedir-tial lirt5 Soviet inaehi.i' tool pikes. In oilier words.vit2 taul. is extrapolated fromyear-oldathe. The CIA itself now puts no faith in the study, noting it has "significant technical and theotctkal problems (wIncM trnd to understate tlie rouble eost. programs."
Komer and Jordan ignore the statement in my aiticle that many sophisticated Anteii-can defense items simply eannn, be made by thr Soviet, and thai the touble prke of iueh itemssm-fore tlieoretieally infinite. Jf realistk rouble prke tags were attached lo theie weapons, tliere Ii no doubt that acomparison would show the United State* ai the bigger ipendcr.*
Tlie second point made In my ankle was thai Sovkt defense spending haterear over the pastby. the ttcmrndoui amounts
*hiiIHV Runiltlli.mptt, i'..- tfpil
khaiwimht Itouw Ai'hJ Sriinrn cWo ci't thml Wt4 utth hrqvnl fltnrkm.
Prof/or.A tuttf tar iniiHi-
(ini tn ii'n Ih* Satiniop.
ttvnl-j-. iht CtA
It tnovJJ tn oofmf th*i( 'inutile
pUkcp.fi Itt* toU re maat a
J lA*
CIA rorAwoint.
H.
clain.eJ by umii hi.I
f the gioe-tliileMrthd toiOiiitev border,in! -il1-area* thai aie not tliietM>nited Matet. Korier ?rdispute then* hippy Uibinie sveonj,
Konnri say* lie hou'i ven
to s'lpj-oil my ione:ii-.io:i% eniieyr.iiMUhfatenlngwhiehave beer" thecluallyointi fiomA.*
Jordan sugg.-ils thai ihe figuirs anipulated and sayi thai only bytlie data" could: loughlyheoices face China.tshMU chitftenanii.'h.Ti. then director nf (tie Defen-eAgenty, wlio teslifi.tl. "Youhiid of [Soviet ground foreeij facinggainithiid ofIkhird of ihcm opposite China.*'1 But the issue Iietenetndvis. WhctlKr the CIA ot Komer is light, whelhei Orabain or Jordan ii rtghi. is notIk point Is that ofe cent in-cteatc in the Soviei dcfcnieig-nincani part bas gone to nonibrraiening areas.
Tlie third point ia list original aiiiele noted that the Soviet! aie indeedoi of unit, iln'pi. andhi; Komer appropriatelybean count."
' Komit'io tiit% thrntnamS.thit nti'5.
pill ti rli.
i . by titinf ipuJmf "if t"
ievirli |lMMhi rAWr anil'..'i*Kiln/VoaslfM ir*mt4n HHBt o' uwain. 'Altoutioa ol R'i- ht Sotiti Urivk i
hutniul i. tint many of lln-ir Kan*
Iv.-u sci't to tltC J
i ourrc gcnriallyigher quality linn ilulis.*
Takes onery have im-tc. They giind out Jofvus of small ships, hutniied State*huili more tons ofthanoviet* ewiy year >jhc WwWhe United Siha totuen-lutesewiIk'iiefs. im.I.ote fnepawer lhan ;he eor.ihir.il mi^lu of cvrty Soviet ship ofgreaterons. If ihe low nun.-bets of ships in. fleetIk fault lies not with the sire of ilie de-ftnse budget but with tlte way ihe Navy wtsissM lis ship*-
Komcr note* that it is produclion irrnds ratliei than whole numbers that Irrends ate importaul. but the Pentagon's figum oneatlyintump in Soviet productionrough in American production. In severaleapons areas. Soviet output dropped lastear while ourst Komcr said, it'srends thai mailer.
lanning, of coune. ii bated on tomrihlng more sophisticated than bean counts. In recent years we liave ceasedio fight twoalf wan limulia-rev.iind have shiftrd our formalf war ilratcgy. At the tame time, the Russians have confronted China and are presumably shiftingne-warwo-war strategy. Tlie tlow bar iicady in> ', nine io Sovmi dcftnK spending i* drivenact by China's military txpantion which
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nine iiii.Ji ll.. I'mledhould Sp'n'l nn defriiv.
Tlte Ku<'i.tiis aretvSf Je<Vnw budgvrer cent pel >eai.sonw pntrsttajte whkh i* nXo Ilie Uhlt.dWl.ithfropoinr' To .vpprovt ilv:'i poJ I" Ig.l. whicher cent in overall defeii'e *jv*iJ>:ig andent in ibe weapon* aeccittnUiK" an owcreatlion.
! civ* oninr;Hetnilvr* ga.v, llMlook at some hiuoiy vbril vi uiK -of iuun1<ei*
Hack inAllenf the f'.iA. argued ihtiviets had ie-ccntly caught up lo the Unitedn de fenie spending and IvUto continue.*'"
Tc-day the Peutagon argues lhat thehave only recently exceeded thein defense sj'vnding andwarns ilot "the momtr.tcn oftign of
I expect tlut in another IS years tome adminiMiaiion figure will step foiward to announce solemnly to the nation that theave juit overtakenin defente
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lv itKUIKMlUU Pi* llifii lf-(iiil buildup wilt continue willful six*.*
Where'i thenid
Karl C. Ktmvnnll
i ihink wcriticswld k* fi.iir-i fill forrticulate rebuttal wc hate received fromi rhef Anns Jordan. Hi* comments wilhnee io my own ariiclc fall inio four parts: I. He attempt!rianurlarby piltint nw oyrinti Let Aipin. My approach drxt difer frombulil entirelypplaud Al-piu'l approach fot in insistence ran (a) cool and precise intelligence about llw adversary, aml (b) ilTicienriei. where wei them.
nut, as for thvw efficiencies, timeimit togood" cuts. Of eouite. there are Kill lurh expensive targets asomber, the Trident lulimatinc, andnuclear escort vessels. But fot itally impressive ind long-laiting cuts in tliebadger,ll bare ro face theof cutting missions. Wc can't do the same job for significantly lest.
ovietecline to play tlie game of "whcllicr they gel more rubble fot tliefot no other reason than tlie fact tliateat tlie Russians may wrll fulfill ihis year's exaggerated Pentagon estimates.
But why the Soviet! are doing ihit is not at cleat ai Jordan thinki itappen to think that, from tlicir own point of view, it ii (a) domcitically stupid andhat ihe Soviet Union it quit* at capable ai ofl-cr nattoni of mlndleu and Irrelevant forte expansion. In any case, their gairts arc not our losses: An incicmcot in the Soviet forcr docs not automatically multccrtaic in ourand is certainly not an incontestable argumentolicy of aims competition. The case foe "matching the
49, .
rontonhe often admi-able analysislast lereialWuiesloppy anilThelint is ih'l you can'tileiinnls'ii abmiir miuileand the li'.e. Yen mustome pjrlty wildhrathat, ycu >rs lhat iheatel..ymore tlun
arty advantage we had, In many cat-fv* is (he Os'eritdlug fact al-ou; ukutlcai balance, and.arge extent. |hf global armi competition In general. Itto swings in numbeii in any inrlev.
Tht reasons for cutting bft-aj fierirc that (a* we don'ilirrbj timugh Is iiu-ngh: out ic.pw
menu aic fnilf. Iht relative orandortttary CO Jordan'sicpce. Sll> billion ncxi ytatot of money,0 bill ian within eie.ii: year* will stillot of money. (Also, toilk- impression Jordan rives, thefor some reason is asking fotineiea-ci. not justhile, in rompiiison with some of our allies, wc areIns developedn many -ciptttf. The finalii is time io be blunthef any. will tendI en our alliet andofesi our allies and friends than ihey were JO yean ago. and some of wlmm already Co-jVi lhat we will defendand indeedgood reason for iheird ate making other provisions or actonmodstiont*.
ordan object! to my cost accounting, particularly my assigning off dfftnse Mtf-hraddtnlifiable missions. He ildtrisivr of my allocating e'en reent pay to general purpose ororces, "as though il had anythingith either of'll nickvere allocationi. They are not quitereduriio ad ibturduni" that Jordanhat would lie hare ui do with it!"
49.
Mil ill ll tlie'gllU tlllO
thereforef Wheicdid lli.-'f COHl arise, anyhe Comnurec'any ycaii ago. inearned lhatl-vgins with the atirihuiion of all coin to ipe'ifie product lineiiofuhat is, someof output. No residual cop-outIt'1 about lime the Dcfeme Depatl-ment began to work the same way.
otdan complaint of the "tiaggtring" "logiratf scaling down global minion* and will retaining,o. half our force ttruciorc. Actually. i'm glad Jordan thinks theetp are Hillizablehink they are.ccasionally have to apologize to my iad-ieal frirndi on thit tame point that Jordan li making. My prudent initinctt tell me that wc would still iccond-chanct"odest hedge against "unknownorce commemoratf wiih our continuing importance in lite wottd. Quite the opposite of most critics, I'd rather have too many forcctore modest schedule of minions than too few forces toontinuing global appetite.
y far the most important part of Jordan's rebuttal deals with the concept of strategic disengagement. Jordan it worried that my philosophy might becomehai kind of tubllcwill get him nowhere:ew words are in order on thit ultimate point offoreign policies.
Jordan ovcniates my posit"turning in oaturning our backsifficulthink America willmajor international power" for theears at least, even if despite iitclf, at before the Spanish-American war.m saying is thai we would be best adrhed to keep our "powrr" latent. In thatdmit to Jordan'sm "ttadycrap the whole, notionhink hit crittrion of "keeping four ritliens] alive and free" is ititc. butimula KjJheoretically infini'tbill or an opci:-tndtd competition wiih somt designated advmary.
Someone. I'm afraid, will haveind belles words to describe ourave refcricd to iheof iht tvohing internationalcon-itraintt of costt and limits, wlui ii goingapptr, cnyivay because three-qua tiers of our environment it beyond our control. It'satter ofertainlyeliberatenov myt not congenial, and thus itice target for rhetorical labbit pundits. Bi't whatere to sayanted lb? same good things lhat Jordan wants to lop. pent' Whatuld lliat make* Foreign policy isatter of comttuct-Ing preference lists and trying to hrctor thr country and its legislators and intellectuals into supporting them wiih donations ofblood, and trust. We have io lake into account the cost side of the tquation. Or rather, whether we like it or not. history will do our accounting fot us.
What about ihis "increasinglyworld" that wt art Itettircd on. it teems, every other dayf By this time,oot would deny the many types of inter-dcpendrncirihich we are subject. Most ai< unwished for. and representthat we should certainly hedge against. But how? By creating military forcct for invasions of the Persianhink our government would be protecting our ttcuriiy far better by eliminating vulnerabilities than by creatingTbe realil whether our internal procrmt are more prejudiced by moving expensively to meets wt have been doing forcart and as Jordan suggests wt continue to do, oe bv husbanding and trallocating ourto self-in diligences, but to investments in economic competitive nest and socialtcquisiiea foe rtmrning thit country to an cihie of national achievement.
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nternational system. 1'ui ilut
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jIhhii piops-sing in.vsii.vi'/iiirifij our own nation tootld ihai fcurr*l ccntiJ-lt-'ion in tbii. We run solve out problemij. IhiiuI uvkiy. poltiv. and rctsnomy. iK.iu.li'1 solve eveiyou* tlf'u Uci we ejn solve tl-eni only if WW nop suitsing and building Mil ownnvitingind only if our fotcign rlitcs *i- j'i:ic llir resoorcci amirust ofplc.
Thai hnngi nicinal point.suppe-tt. True, a* JoidanArieiicanaMy sumlusvlhal ihvy don't warn lo Rhy tlie kuMtais. and ibf?unish toncicisioiialif ilrryet<
wise. Hut llu'i season's votes may be an ephemeral thing. Wc also have amplelecrnt and historical, to ilie eomiaiy. Vbm will public sup-sort he when :lie real billsan our executive branch and our military confidently deliverbelter lhan meny involvcnvnis and indefinitee*lame themol being able to do better. In Ihb case. Ilie faujl ri in lhcis. tlieconstellation of lhc internationalin ouriets'cs.
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ladecd we have an opportunity to MHbLtiiKtu'efnd lwo longrnsiona]ide concern over sensational accounts ft CIA tlerdj and misdeeds,eties oflitutional confrontations between theand legislativeannot appear into our history he>*Atclunfts in Amcikan inlclUgencc.
TIk nut and easiest .vtion wouldit tinker with lite organisationalf intelligence. When in doubt, or under pre:-mte. reorganise; this ii anrcarcMitc ploy. It iiempting panacea forproblems. With due lrepeal for lb: n'eas suggested byntonba" Allison, but without agreementfelkve this oppoilunity sbocM be seiaed In moie impottant fields.
The fundamental lesson of the year of investigation il that American intelligence ispan of and muit operate under th*conititutional system. This perlvaps ot-vious fact for Ameiicanstunnin;in ihe long history of intelligence. It is ai startling an idea to many developedai it is incongruous io totalitarian! It does not reverse any early American
M W
TOR: Deputy Legislative Counsel, OLC
Responses to Representative Aspin's
Questions on Estimated Costs of Soviet Programs
femorandora io our response .toposed byin at our The answers be tow were drawn frora ourof the dollar costs of Soviet defensewas reported to the Congress in our publication
ollar Comparison of Soviet and OS Defencedated6 and its supporting,.
data as you know reflect ourhow much it would coot in dollars to reproduceSoviet military programs in the US. They doactual Soviet defenso expenditures oron tho Soviet economy. Noithor can theanalysis alone bo used to draw inferencesrelative military effectiveness or capabilities
of US and Soviet forces.
f General Purpose "aval Ships
estimated dollar costs of Sovietprocurement of general purpose naval5 total about tenigure reflects total shipis,of the basic ship, armament and It docs not include costs for such items
es fuel, munitions, food, and medical supplies.construction programs comprico about one third of the total. Construction programs for major surface
combatants and minor surface combatants (including amphibious warfare ships) each account 'or about one quarter of the total dollar costs.* Naval auxiliary ship programs account for tho remainder.
Cogts_of__Sovict Torccs Mono tho Sino-Soviot Bord2r
4. Ko ere unable toeliablef tho coats for Soviet forces cepH/ed in rosoonro tr, the threat from China. Our dat* teso is not currrotiv structured to provide such data easily, and an extensive research effort would be required to calculate it. In addition, it is difficult to define those- forces which the Soviets might have earmarked fcr operations chainsc China. Many of tho Soviot forcos and weapon systems--like comparable US forbo redeployed toarious contingencies. Consequently, it is at least as difficult to estimate tlie costs of Soviot forces designated for operations against China as it is to determine tho costs of US forces earmarked foroperations. Our <mprorst*on is that the costs of Soviet forces for operations against China probablv comprise on the order of one fifth of tho total dollar costs of Soviet defense programs. It should behowever, that wo have not actually dona the work that would permit us to, stand behind this
Tank Coots
5. The estimated procurement cost in tho US2 Soviot tankhin estimate does not include thef fuel,or spare parts. The latest cost estimate for tho0 tank could better be supplied by DoD. Information available to us indicates that tho cost of0 tank4
Minor surfaoe oombatante ara those with full load dieplaoemants0 tone or leas.
estimatedipnttlio nocand end aecunits of their.s Jollers. cants actoolnted with tho lood nhip of aestlootedo retire tho cont for thoto4 dollarn.
Cost of? Inf.nntry Corbnt VohJCilc
estimated dollar coot for thoprocured in0
/ictino -Director Strategic Research
CENTRAL INTCLLIGKNCI? AGENCY.
5
The HonorebJe Los Aspin House of Representatives
Dear Mr. Arpini
This responds to your request ofor information on the costs of Soviet defense progrcms. We ore providing most of the data that you have re-guested.
ote of caution, it must be emphasized that the most recent estimates at the level of aotail you specified vero made at tho beginning4 and reflect the Intelligence Community's estimates and projections of Soviet military forces and-activities as of that time. Since then there havetbeen revisions in estimates of Soviet military manpower* new information on the production .levels and unit costs of Soviet-veapons, and new budgotary information on Soviot defense spending. We are in the process of analyzing the cost implications of this information and plan to have new detailed estimates completed by late spring.
We have made preliminary estimates of totalcoats which incorporate some of tho newbut theso estimates cannot bo broken down to the level of detail that you requosted. Please note that these preliminary estimates are expressed in4 dollars and they compare with US spending for counterpart programs as followsi
4 Dollars
Total Defense Activities'
Soviot programs
US Expenditures
Sovietorocnt of US
Excluding Tensions
Soviot Programs
US Expenditures
Sovietovatnt of VS
He regard these estimates as tentative, and theywill chenge somewhat when we finish our complete upu: in tho spring.
The estimatos below are expressed in3 dollars. 'T*hcy were tho basis for tho testimony of tho Director of Central Intelligenceubcommittee of tho Joint Economic Committee this past Juno. Asabove, thoy ore now out of date in the light of moro recent information with which wc oro still working. Tho estimates for strategic defense, strategic attack and peripheral attack forcos oro exclusive of costs for RDTtS or command and support. Counterpart US expenditures arc shown for comparative purposes. (Estimates3 oro not available.)
to
3 Dollars
6 7 8 1 IS 72 3 <
Total
5 8 3 9 0
3.7
2.2
4.6
4.0
Peripheral Attack Forces Soviet
The estimates above include the costs of KGB border guards and MVD security troops. The annual dollar costs for-those forces are catimatod to beillion dollars for the. As you know, the US defense outlays do notounterpart for these forces.
Wo cannot provide you with estimates of tho costs of Soviet forces in Czechoslovakia or in tho Far East. Our CBfil accounts aro not structured to produce expenditures Qfi 'this kind of geographic basis.
5
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUHJKCT: Transmittal of information to Conyrcssnsan Anpi
provided the following information toof Congressman Aspin's Staff in answer tothat he presented to tho Director of OSR Tho questions weror
the throe to five percent increase in Soviet hardwaro spending expected 'o continue?
the increase in tho number ofin the NATO guidelinesesult merelyeorganization of the forces that were alroady there or docs it mean that there has been on increase in the forces?
Defense Spending
informed Mr. Kleimann that the three torate of growth that the Secretary ofbeen using relates to total military spondingmilitary hardware. ointed out that
tf
three percent refers to the long-terra trend in spending,
trendlightly cyclical pattern resulting from the deployment of succeeding generations of ICBMs,
spending is now in thephase of the presentcycle.
The five percent refers to tho
present rate of growth, ami
expansionary phase is expected to end67 with the completion of the current ICHM deployment programs, nt which time Soviet spending will level offew plateau.
then pointed out that spending "for hardware
is. also cyclical but varies much more widely. Forthe rate of growth ranged from minus seven porccnt1 to plus ton percent Weapons Acquisition coatslus PDT&E) variesminus threw percent and plus eightexnnj.di turos run generally counter-cyclical to investment
Manpower in tho NATO Guidelines Area
told Kleimann that Soviot ground forcesNGA increased fromhousand men intohousand at present and thatof Soviet divisions increased0 at the
time of tho Czechoslovakian invasion but has not increased since. xplained that about half of tho laanpover increase since thes resulted from tho divisions introduced
Original document.
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