CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE OFFICE OF POLITICAL RESEARCH
6
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE AS SANITIZED
SOVIET POLICY AND EUROPEAN COMMUNISM
by
Note: The author is grateful (or the many comments and suggestions which were received from other CIA offices during the preparation of this study. Comments and questions will b&
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SYNOPSIS
This Synopsis presents
the state of relations oetweenoviets and the most significant West European CommunistCommunist Parties of Italy, Franco, Spain, and Portugal, uf these, the Italian Communists have just registered new gains in national elections, and havereater voice in the national government. In France, the ujimnunists hope tolear legislative majority in conjunction with their Socialist allies in the national elections now scheduled The Portuguese Communists, having failed in their bid for power, retain considerable organizational strength and are biding their time in hopesetter day. And the Party in Spain, though still officially illegal, hopes to take advantage of the transition from Franeoism toolid base for the future.*
SECRET
The growth in the prominence and political potential of these Parties rbviously holds the promise for the Soviets of increased influence in an area of major interest. But these developments occurime when Moscow's relationship with West European Communism istate of transition. elationship marked by considerable tension, and, in general, by declining Soviet authority. Andt in the near term, at least, the principal objective of the West Europeanacquisition of politicalnot fully mesh with Moscow's interest inattern of political detente andcooperation with the West.
The paper is concerned with what these underlyingmean and may come to mtan for Kjbcow. Do the Soviets still have ways to induce or compel the Western Communists to act in accordance with their desires? Are they right in thinking that, despite the existing divergencies and frictions, the rising stature of West European Communism will be beneficial to then in che longer run? And, if not, how important are the doctrinal and political problems wnich West European Communism might come to pose for the Soviets?
CONFLICTING INTERESTS
The Western Communists can generally be counted on to staunchly support the main pillars of Soviet foreign"peace" and disarmament proposals, "national liberation" in Third World areas such as Southern Africa, and the like. They will even accept Soviet policies which they find quitesuch as Moscow's heavy-handed domination of Easternrovided these do not harm their own interests. Despitecritical allusions to the occupation of Czechoslovakia, both the Spanish and Italian Communists have accommodated themselves to the Soviet occupation.
However, the major Western Parties are no longer willing to sacrifice their own inriediatetheir hopes for the acquisition of political power or athare ofthe soke of furthering Soviet policy objectives.
This is true both of tlie ostentatiously "independent" Portaa the Italian Communist Partyhich haspolitical strategy independently ot the Soviets for comeof ostensibly "loyal" Parties puch as theindicate that the decision of tne
ufWer rarcy co push dWlll-out bid for power5 was taken against the advice of the Soviets, who had few hopes for theof the venture and feared the resultsestern backlash.
The unwillingness of these Parties totl"*ir interests to Soviet policyotential danger to sone important short-term Soviet policy objectives. The Western Communists are preoccupied by the pursuit of power on the national level, but Moscow presently gives priority toa pattern of economic and political cooperation with the Weatern oowers. The Soviets have been sensitive to the possibilityole in government for any of the Western Parties would cause deep anxiety in the West and mighteaction against the Soviet Union, threatening Moscow's access to Western technology and undermining its diplomatic initiatives.
The Soviets have demonstrated by their actions that they believe that their -mmcdiate interests will not be furthered by aggressive action on the part of the Western Communists.
apparent efforts to dissuade the Portuguese Communistsrom their effort to seize power on their own Urve already been mentioned.
4 presidential elections in France,
they sided indirectly with Valery Ciscard d'Cstaing, sending their ambassadorell-publicized meeting with the conservative candidate justthe election, and publicly treating him in favorable terms.
unsuccessfully opposed the PCI's decision to challenge the power of thp Church and the Christian
Democrats4 on the grouna* that iteckless gamble. Similarly, they have been cool to PCI entry into the government at thene,
--Moscow's cultivation of the Spanish government against the opposition of the Spanish Party has been one of the principal sources of discord between tho Soviet and Spanish Communists.
DECLINE IN SOVIET AUTHORITY
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At the same time that the immediate interests of the Soviets and the major Western Parties are becoming increasingly divergent, Moscow's ability to impose its will on them has declined. The causes of the decline in Soviet authority are manifold, but two fundamental reasons can be cited.
moral authority within the movement has been eroded by the successive traumas of de-Staliniration, Hungary, the Sino-Soviet quarrel, the occupation of Czechoslovakia, and persistent suspicions of Moscow's interest inspheres of interest" deal with Washington which would leave Western Europe in the American zone.
prospect of political power has both given the major Western Parties, the incentive to put their own interests over those of the Soviets and increased their ability to do so, as their domestic political and economic resources hove increased.
Moscow has traditionally reliedombination oi financial levers, political agents, and ideological bonds to reinforce its dominance over the international movement. All three factors are now declining in importance.
Moscow subsidises all four of the Parties with which this paper is concerned, but the importance of Soviet subsidies varies according to the individual circumstances of the recipient Party. The Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) is dependent on Soviet assistance for the overwhelming bulk of ita financial resources. At the other extreme, the PCI has_etermined effort to reduce its dependence on Moscowhen the Soviets retaliated against the PCI for its criticism of the invasion of Czechoslovakia by reducing its subsidies. Still, Soviet subsidies reportedly amount touarter of the PCl's total budget. The French Communist Party (PCF) has had neither the financial resources of the PCIrecently, in anypolitical will to reduce its dependence on Soviet assistance, and reportedly receives considerable financial assistance from the Bloc. However, the amounts involved and the Party's reliance on them have not been enough to deter it from striking out on its own course.
Until recently, the approval of the Soviet Union has been an important prerequisite for advancement within the leadershipommunist Party. The weight which Soviet opinion carried va ied from Party ti Party, but in no case was it ignored. esult the leadership of every Party was liberally salted with Soviet place-men.
However, many pro-Soviet leaders have been culled out and Moscow can no longer count on its ability to manipulate policy within these Parties through its agents of influence. The Soviets are probably worst off in the Spanish Communist Partyhere their most important allies were expelled from the Partyfter the failure of an effort to challenge the independent policies pushed through by the Party's General Secretary, Santiago Carillo. The leadership of the Italian Party under Enrico Berlinguer has also made a
determined effort to shunt aside leaders closelythe Soviet Union, although they have not been purgedsome
There has been no comparable reshuffling of the leadership of the PCF,far atleadership haa regained united behind Ceorges Harcheis in; the stance of ostentatious independence he belatedly adopted} inespitewith this position at lower levels of the Party. Only in the Portuguese Party can the Soviets feel confident that their friends, led by the Party's First! Secretary, Alvaro Cunhal, are dominant..
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The Sovieta have more support among the rank-and-filo then emong the leaders of these Partiea. Even in the PCI, whichong history of relativet is generally estimated thatuarter of the Party's members harbor strong pro-Soviet feelings and are correspondingly dubious abihe "revisionist" course of the Party'a leaders. Theis at least comparable in the Frencn Party, where8 the Soviets aucceeded in appealing to the rank-and-file members of the Party toetreat from the leadership's criticism of the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Only in the Spanish Party, where Moscow has failed abysmally: in an effort toecalcitrant leadership, has pro-Soviet sentiment thus far proven insignificant. However, the rank and file normally have little voice in the determination of Party policy.
The ideological bond which unites the Soviets with the Western Communists, while the least tangible instrument ofis arguably the most important of them. Even the most nationally-minded of the Western Communist leaders sees himseliember of an ideological community in which Moscow is the most senior and powerful member, andorresponding ?ulf between himself and tne roost lnftist of socialists. The power of this sentiment is best demonstrated, even thoughomewhat different context, by Yugoslavia's Tito, whounninr, quarrel of almost three decades' duration, has been unable to separate himself from Moscow once and for all.
THE PORTUGUESE CASE
If Soviet policymakers were influenced solely byof immediate diplomatic and economic benefit they could be expected to disassociate themselves from the ambitions of Western Communist Parties. In fact, many other elements contribute to Soviet policies, among them strategic objectives, the dictates of ideology, and domestic political constraints.
The effect these factors can have on Soviet policy was demonstrated in Portugal. Here the Soviets initially reacted to the coup of4 by lending covert support to the Portuguese Communists, while doing their best toow public profile, and, as noted, advisingrcnature bid for power. This cautious stance was more than justified on the groundsational calculation of advantage and disadvantage.
USSR had little political and economic interest in Portugal.
gains which they could score tnere through aggressive action promised to be more than outweighed by the damage done to Sovietin Washington and Western Europe.
Portuguese Party was viewed with distaste
by the PCI, PCE, and many other Western Communists because its obvious authoritarianism threatened to compromise their own efforts to portrayas responsible democrats. Soviet support for the PCP therefore complicated relations with these Parties.
Yet despite all the factors which argued in favor ofa cautious distance from the Portuguese Communists, the Soviets publicly weighed in on the side of the PCP after it had overreached itself andunderfrom its enemies in the summer
attacked Western "interference" in Portugal and organized demonstrations of international support for the PCP.
attempted to pressure'the West European Socialists to end their support for their fellow Socialists in Portugal.
ublic stand in favor ofosition of the Portuguese Communists, although they must have been aware that this would force some of the Western Communists to takeiexception to their views.
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In fact, the damage done to Soviet interests within the international movement was serious. It drove Moscow's off-and-on again polemics with the PCI and PCE to new heights. Even More seriously, Soviet polemics against the Communist critics of the PCPeaction in the French Party, as Marchais seized the opportunity to give hisdemocratic" and "independent" cast. For the first time, the Soviets are now facedituation in which the two major Western Parties are frequently aligned against them,erious deterioration in their ability to dominate West European Communism.
Soviet actions in Portugal demonstrate the strength of the fundamental sources of Soviet conduct. Whether Soviet actions arose from ideological conviction or Aether theyesult of the internal factors working on the Sovietthe need to demonstrate that their policies werenot as important as the fact that these actions were takenof considerations of immediate diplomatic advantage.
Strategic folicy Objectives. There is no evidence That the Soviets havo altered the main objectives of their post-war European policy: the displacement or diminution of US influence and the prevention of the establishmentival power center in Western Europe. Similarly, there is no indication that they nave altered their conviction that the accession to power of any of tho Western Parties will facilitate refutation of thsae objectives. All of the Western Parties, even the Italians who have u'.savoved any plans to bringnilateralfrom NATO, support "the dissolution of military blocs" in Europe. This is also an objective which the Soviets support and originally formulated, since it would mean the end of NATO, while permitting Moscow to rely on !the network of bilateral military agreements it has built in Eastern Europe.
There is also no sign that the multiplication of points of friction between the Soviets and the Western Communists has altered the perception of Sovietat the advance of the left in Europeevelopment which, however troublesome the problems it poses at the moment, is something which is in the long-term interests of the Soviet Union. (Some Soviet commentators at lower levels of the hierarchy, however, have questioned this assumption in oblique terms.) Moscow continues Lo extend support to Western Communism Doth inpropagandaand insubsidies.
Ideological Impulses. Ihe stubbornness with which Soviot Leaders have clung to their assumptions cannot be fullywithout taking into account (the ideological underpinnings of their perceptions of thehey function not only as national leaders and practical politicians, but as convinced Communists. Clearly, the fervor with whirh these convictions arc held may vary from leader to leader. Some party ideologues-Mikhail Suslov,elatively high priority to the advancement of the Communist csuse abroad, both for emotional reasons and becauseong-standing bureaucratic involvement in the affairs of the Col nun ist movement. roader or more mundane orientation, may accordelatively lower prioricy. Horn, however, can ignore it.
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Domestic Political Comitraints. To do ao would be toine their own political base and claim to leadership oi the Soviet Patty and the international movement. No Soviet political leader can lightly riak leaving himself open to the charge that he has been indifferent on matters of ideologicalarticularly not in tho environment of political balance which prevails within the Soviet leadership. The ia(portance of this factor has been demonstrated repeatedly, most reveal-ingly in the care with which Brezhnev and others have taken to justify dettntc as an aid to the cause of revolution abroad.
argument is that detente by easing East-West tensions makes it more difficult for the bourgeois rulers to rouse public hostility to the Communists, and by committing them to the maintenance of good relations with the USSR, makes it more difficult for them to forcibly keep the Communists from power.
IMPLICATIONS FOR SOVIET POLICY
The same blend ofhich were at work in the Portuguese situation are likely to continue to shape Soviet policy. Moscow can therefore be expected to lend consistent but cautious support to the Western Communists. It probably will continue to:
covert financial supportow-key public support to the general cause and ultimate goals of the European Communists, but trying to avoidintcrvei.tion on their side.
take full advantage of the organizational, ideological, and financial levels ct itsto try to curb the tendency toward doctrinal and tactical independence among the European Coranunista.
At the sarao time, Soviet policy will be sensitive to the apocific features of the political situation as it evolves in Italy, France, Spain, or Portugal. One of the most important constraints on Soviet support for any particular Party is Moscow's interest in avoiding serious damage to its political and economic relations with Washington and the other major capitals of the West. ajor consideration from the Soviet point of view iaarty's approach to power is pursued cautiously and with an eye to minimising the risk of domestic or international upheaval, or whether it proceeds recklessly and in disregard of the potential international consequences.
"This inhibiting factor can have the ironic result of putting the Soviets at cross purposes with "orthodox" Parties whose doctrinal positions are close to their own, and aligning them in support of the tactics pursued by the "revisionist" Parties with whom they have the most philosophical disagreements. The Portuguese case is illustrative of the first situation, and the Italian of the second. There are indications that Moscow approves of the PCI's careful hendling of its recent electoral gains, and of its apparent willingness to content itself for the moment with an informal role in government.
The official reaction in Washington and the other major Western capitals may directly influence Moscow's responseeveloping situation. As it did in Portugal, Moscow will weigh the likely coat to its positionhole against the benefits to be drawneeper commitmentarticular Party.
A final factor will be the state of their relations with the Party in question. Where these are bad, the Soviets will be disposed to limit their cupport. This factor may becomein France, where the Soviets have reacted bitterly to the French Party's effort to compensate for the belatedness of its show of independence with attacks on the internal policies of the Soviet Party, something from which the more committedly "revisionist" Italian Party has shied away.
he central question for tlie West is tho'extont to which Communist participation in the governmentestern country would threaten the bases of that countty's constitutional system and alliance commitments, the central question for Moscow is essentially the opposite. To what degree has Coraucist involvementonstitutional system weakenc* the commitment to forcechanges in domestic and foreign political alignments, and would this commitment be further weakened by participation in Would, inommunist Party strengthened byin government servehannel for the intrusion of "subversive" Western ideas into the Communist movement or into the Soviet Uniou itself?
SOVIET PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY
Moscow's conviction that its long-term interests are served by the advance of Communism in Western Europe is reinforced by its judgment that its differences with the Western European Communists are manageable. The Soviets are encouraged tothat these differences do not affect the basic affinity of purpose and inspiration which they share with the Western Communists and their common viewsroad range of world issues. These include opposition to US "imperialism" and support for "national liberation" movements in the Third World and for leftist political causes in general-.
Moreover, although they are becoming increasingly more difficult to deal with, the Western Communists are reluctant to become totally estranged from the Soviet Union. The inter-party negotiations which paved the wayonference of European Communist Parties in late Juneood measure of the present state of relations between the Soviets and the Western Parties. According to the available evidence, the talks were difficult but both sides made compromises in the interests of maintaining at le.nst the appearance of solidarity. As long as the Western Communists are reluctant to go into schism within the international movement, the Soviets can entertain the hope that they can be brought back into line.
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This is not to say that the Soviets are correct in their perceptions of the situation. To theersuasive argument can be made that the differences between the Soviets and the Western Communists will become more serious, rather than less, with the passage of time.
accretion in the power of the Western Communists will add to the incentives for them to put their own interests ahead of those of the Soviets, as well as adding to their ability to resist Soviet pressure.
theyole in governnu it in any country, the Western Communists will perforce be driven by considerations of electoral expediency, which in many cases will lead them to put national interests over Soviet interests.
their historical and cultural affinities, tne feelingegional community of interests quite alien to those of the Soviet Union is likely to grow among the Western European Communists.
lessons of the Soviet experience in China, Yugoslavia,fact, in almost all Communist countries freeoviet troopthat Moscow has been unable to maintain its authority in the absenceilitary occupation.
The post-war history of Eastern Europe has demonstrated the past vulnerability of these countries to Western idees, and they might prove equally susceptible to the more "democratic" versifo of Communism advocated by the Western Parties. If so, the Soviets mightituation in which their position in Eastern Europe is threatened by ideological erosion.
uccessful and independent Western variant of Communism could aggravate the problem of dissidencc in tho Soviet Union. Some Soviet reformers and dissidents already lean heavily on the experiences of Western Communism for the legitimization and inspiration of their ideas.
In fact, the most likely source of an open schism between Moscow and tha Western Communists wouldhreat to Soviet authority in Eastern Europe or the spread of dissidcnce within tho Soviet Union. In this event, the most likely Soviet action would be to act decisively to cut off every source ofhia would certainly affect Soviet relations with the Western Communists, and might well spill over to affect Soviet relations with the Weat in general, if Moscow perceived the threat as serious.
Other factors wnich could contributeeterioration of relations between the Soviets and the West European Parties wouldituation in which the Soviets were compelled to use force to maintain their position in Eastern Europeoviet effort to intervene in Yugoslav affaira after the death of Tito. Either development would inevitably bring Hoscow's relations with the Western Coamunistsew pitch of tension, and both are quite conceivable. Similarly, the behavior of these Parties inthey should become tooart of thewould add new strains to their relationship with Moscow, asundamental alteration of their presently hostile relations with Waahington.
However, any fundamental restructuring of this relationship will have toew point ofas those suggesteda change in the Soviet leadership. ew lesdership, whatever its composition and priorities, would be certain to bring changes in style, and possibly in tactics, which might affect Moscow's relations with West European Communism.
even Iran claim to leadership within the international movement than the present Soviet leaders, thus opening the way to further self-assertiveness on the part of the Western Parties.
A change-over in Moscow, as well as some of the other potential turning points cited above, can be expected to take place within the next five years. In particular, the ability of the major Parties to convert their stance of "moderation" and "independence" into political gains will be tested, in France by thelegislative el vions, and in Italy by the ability or inability of the PCI to continueits influence in the faceeak and demoralized opposition. Em success or failure of the PCI and PCF will affect theirto persist in their present course. This period, th-refore, is likely to be crucial to the changing relationship between Moscow and the European memberse Communist movement.
Original document.
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