MEMORANDUM
SUBJECTi Terrorism in South America
Terrorism flourishes on the bonee of politics. It ie the delusion of those who 'iaoe lost the oapaotty to dietinguieh between hope and death,
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Irving Howe "The Ultimate Prioe of Random Terror"
Modern terrorism invites repression. Theis intent on provoking hisacts of counter-terrorism so widespread and so brutal that the general public bocomesfrom the government and sympathetic to thecause. The immediate goal, according to Carlos Marighela, the slain Brazilian apostle of urban guerrilla warfare, is that "the political situation of the country willilitary situation, and the acta of violence, the mistakes and various calamities that fall upon the people will be put down to 'errors* by the government bodyguards."
As violence begets violence, according tothe fabric of society is torn apart,institutions give way to authoritarianarmed repression supplants political:
The aim of terrorism is to make life unbearable for (lii ordinary people, in the hopa that they will
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bocome enbittorcd and exasperated with their government and clamor for change. ituation, Marighola argued, could load to tho aoiiure of power by the, in what he described aslimate ofmployed against colonial regimes, such tactics have proven successful, as In British-mandated Palestine and in Cyprus. This hope has not boon fulfilled, however, in any Latin American nation. Yet, it is precisely in those countries where political violence has become the major policyandterrorism has been the strongest slnglo catalytic force in recent military coups d'etat.
olitical weapon modern terrorism dates from the French Revolution where it was employed by thegovernment to instill fear and respect for new authority in the general populace. Then, aa now, terror consisted of symbolic acts designed topolitical behavior by extraordinary means,the use or threat of violence. For example, in Guatemala, Uruguay, and Argentina, leftist guerrillas placed heavy emphasis on tho symbolic nature cf their violentand killing military officere and police chiefs, foreign diplomats, end wealthydomestic rnd foreign.
The concopt of terror may be old, but its effects are magnified by nodorn technology. The modemarsenal includee ii cendlery devices, sophisticatedd hand-held missiles. Modern psychological studies have provided new technlquea of interrogation and intimidation. More importent, the conditions of contemporary living and space-age communications systems have facilitated the growth and the impact of urban political violence. Today terroriats feed on thegenerated by crowded living conditionsby and dependent on technology, and thrivo ondramatic communication of their acts by tho electronic media.
Television and,osser extont, radio have given now meaning toh Century anarchist view of terrorism as propaganda by daed. Now guerrilla groups can attract national or oven world attention to their cause. The term "guerrilla theater" is an aptsince terrorism is often drama consisting ofi
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Carefully staged kldnapings, as In the abduction of tho Born brothers, two wealthy Argentinewhose seizure by Kontoneroconsisted of an elaborate maneuver designed to divart tholr automobile from most of their bodyguards, in which the terrorists masqueraded as street construction workers and policemen.
Ritual trials and executions, such as the now famous killing of US AID official Daniel Mitrione
j by the Tupamaros in Uruguay, or the "capital pun-I) ishment" of U5 honorary consul John Egan, after Argentine authorities failed to meet terrorist demands to show several captured guerrillas "alive and well" on television.
Newspapers have also been exploited by Latin American guerrillas. One of the conditions for the release of the Bom brothers was the publicationontoneroin prominent newspapers all over the world. Roberto Sontucho, tho recently slain leader of thePeoples Revolutionary Army, invitedto guarrllla press conferences. Ono spectacular operation3 saw guerrillas seize the editorrominent Buonos Aires newspaper, and insist that the paper print terrorist!direct violationecently enacted ban on news of guerrilla activities. Tho newspaper complied with the demands to secure thc safe return of its editor, and in retaliation right-wingterrorists sabotaged the printing presses. Farther afiold, tho terrorist attack at tho Munich Olympic Games gained ita perpetrators the aorvicos of satellite-relayed international television.
1 Such evonts dramatically illustrate the fact that terrorist tactics are aimed primarily at the people watching and only Incidentally at theofton are innocent bystanders. The random quality of thoheightens the terror and often exaggerates the actual threat posed by the guerrilla. In reality,groups in South America have ncvorirect challenge to any govornment. Most of tho groups have boon too small and woak to engage socurlty forces directly, and in the battles that havo occurred, as in Argontinu, tho guerrillas have taken most of the blows. As one scholar has observed, "torror may be the weapon of lonely fanaticsuddle of conspirators intent upon forcing history through thoir own solf-saerifice and otherblood, but rarely is it tho weapon of mass movements
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The two most prominent examples of South American nations where terrorism currentlyandthis viewpoint. Terrorism instill has many of tho characteristics of banditry. Four leftist groups, most of then based in rural areas, commit robborice, armed assaults on police outposts and small.army patrols, andof wealthy Colombians or foreigners who are held for ransom orhe guerrilla bands do noterious subversive threat, but theyontinuing source of irritation and concern for security officials.
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In Argentina, the Peoples Revolutionary Army (ERP) has lost it? imago of invincibility after moreear of harassment by military forces. Hundreds of guerrillas have beenthe leader, Robertoeven more are In prison. Thetreasury, once estimated in millions of dollars, is said to have dwindled ton addition, the ERP has lost hideouts, weapons,and documents containing'valuable operational It is doubtful that the ERP will ever regain its former prominence.
Trie other major Argentine group, the Hontoneros, has suffered as well. More than seven months have elapsed since Montonero chieftain Roberto Quieto waa captured by security forces. During that period the guerrillas havo made no known attempt to free him or to secure his
recent violent activity suggestsguerrillas are on the "
The serious reverses suffered by tho ERP may force tho remnants of the group to try to link up with the Hontoneros, who have longroad-basedLiberation Front." Efforts to form such an alli-onco in tho past failed. Tha hontoneros, in fact, now may be reluctant to affiliato with the survivors becauso thoy fear the ERP has been penetrated by the police. Another possibility that is being taken seriously by South American security forces is that several guerrilla groups are forging oporativo alllancos to cngogo Inor international terrorist activities.
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Offiaial concern haa boon fueled by recentof the existence of an organization known as tho Revolutionary Coordinating Junta, consisting of guerrilla representatives from Bolivia, Uruguay, Chilo, Argentina, and possibly Paraguay. Tha'Coordinating Junta wasorganized under the leadership of tho PeoplesArmy, however, and despito reports of repro-Bjmtaiiyea based in soveral European countrlos. BBp
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gontTnaTnatha^pBa^oz its funds, and probably itscome from tho ERP. If it isreature of Argentine terrorists, it has probably suffered with tho decline in tholr activity and strength. On the other hand the fact that the Junta has not taken credit for any terroristIs the customary practice of individual guerrilla'noc mean that it has been inactive. It would appear from captured guerrilla documents that the organization takes itsfunction seriously and exists for that purpose and to provide logistical support to member groups.
Zt is tho fear that Individual guerrilla groups throughout South America will unite that has motivated the recent intensification in cooperation among security officials in the[Southern Cone
Despite tho!fact that guerrillas seem to be losing tlie bsttle in Argentina and aroinor threat elsewhere in South America, it is unlikoly that terrorism will disappear. Few torrorlst groups anywherehloved any of their long range objectives, but the use of terrorist tactics always attracts publicity andwins concessions.
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Zn South America, therofore, political extremists will probably continue to establish links, and formif only for the sake of convenience in particular operations. The development and deployment ofsmall arms and precision-guided munitions and tholr likely acquisition by terroristserious new throat. On the other hand, tho fear that terrorists will obtain and oxplodo nuclear weapons seems to bo cxaggorated. Tho survival of any guorrllla movement is contingont on some tacit public support. Mass murder would be Nevertheless, the possibility that guerrillas will threaton to uno nuclear weapons in ordar to tako
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advantageass hostage situation cannot be ruled out.
Until now loftist guerrillas in South America havo not been completely indiscriminate in their uso oftactics, but have restricted their targets to identified political enemies. In contrast, counterter-rorists and in some cases government forces haveor murdered prominent liberal members of society not linked in any known way to tha guerrillas. This is of course tho rosponse that the guerrillas seek. Tret some repressive measures aro officially justified and acceptedrightened population on tha grounds that they reduce the effectiveness and attractiveness of Greater government controls over the news media wit'i regard to reporting torrorlst incidents wouldtha publicity that terrorists apparentlyougher official stance on granting political asylum is already evident in Argentina and Uruguay, and South American countries in general have taken an increasingly tougher stance on yielding to terrorist demands.
Terrorismontinuing throat to human lib-orties and to human lifo. Lastmore peoplo diod in Argentinaesult of political violence than have been killed in Northern Ireland in the past five years. In all strategies of torror, there is an inherentto go beyond the limits previously accepted, formally or informally, by both rulers and ruled. It is just this "one step further" that makes terror momentarilyand, to some people, exciting. Except, perhaps, in tho most disciplined kinds of actions against precisely selected individual targets, the strategy of terror can succeed onlyteady abandonment of moral Regardless of the intentions tho terrorists bring to their act, it tends, out of desperation and through repetition, to become increasingly unselective. Indeed it is precisely the incraasing unsclcctivity that makes terrorism so frightening.
There are, however, political limits to the ef-foctlvoncsB of terrorism. Ovor forty years ago, one scholar, J. D. Hardman, dofined thoso limitai
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omplete revolutionary tactic terrorism has nover attained real success. Governments, whetheror revolutionary, are not inclined to retreat before acts of torror directed against key parsons. Tho will to power is!not weakened by the exercise of power,
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roportion of th. popui.tion and by concerted mass operations.
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