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Tabic of Contents
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Composition of Output: An
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Key Subsectors: Tractor
Spare Parts and
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Uses 17
industry
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Goals for the Seventies
General
Figure
Figure 1: Major World Producers of
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Introduction
The Soviet tractor industry is an industry in transition. he theme has been tractor The old historic (since World War II) emphasis upon growth in output with insufficient regard for the needs of agricultural and industrial users has been suspended, if only temporarily, to permit greater emphasis on quality and performance. Still, old habits die hard and goals forimprovements are proving more difficult to achieve than nonotonic increases in output.
The purpose of this study is to put the new trend into context. The paper discusses production, technology, and uses of Soviet tractors, and the technical goals and achievements of the modernization program. Itetailed comparison of Soviet.and TJS tractors in terms of output, parks, horsepower, and use; assesses the general quality and maintainability of Soviet and OS tractors; and evaluates the importance of Western technology and foreign trade to the Soviet tractor industry.
Production
USSR is the world's largest producerhe USSR producedhousand tractors,double that of the United States (see However,
mmm
the average Soviet tractor is less powerful than its US counterpart. Thus, measured in total horsepoweroviet output exceeded that of the US by only aboutercent. Soviet tractor output5 was aboutercent larger than the combined output of the United States, United Kingdom, and West Germany, three of the leading producers in the non-Communist world (see
Soviet tractors are highly standardized, andthose in the United States, are seldom built to the user's custom specifications. Production is characterized by long runselatively few models produced in mass volumeelatively few huge plants. Nine major plants account for more than four-fifths of all tractors produced annually in the USSR. 2/
By standardizing models, and keeping models inlong after designs of new and improved models had become available, the Soviets have been able to achieve high and steady growth in output. , for example, output climbed steadily at an average annual rate of about
8 percent.
1/ Unless otherwise indicated, horsepower in this paper refers to engine horsepower at the rated revolutions per minute of the engine.
2/ In the ascending order of size (by unit output) withof total output given in parenthesis,avlodar, Dnepropetrovsk,insk
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as production grew, tractorand technology were neglected, making majorsooner or later inevitable if other goals, suchin the average life of the tractor park,to be sacrificed. , the Soviets triedit both wayssustain the previous high growthupgrading tractor qualitybut failed; thefell offercentercent
nd output fell shortr-of plan by aboutercent.
lan period the Sovietsproduction sights andajor effort tothe quality and technical capabilities ofoutput5 was setnits,annual growth rate ofercent, the lowest ofwar plan period. This slowing in the rate of growthtoetooling and reequippingthe production of several new and improved tractornew models were to make up one-third tototal tractor output. However, none of the goals ofwere fully achieved: actual output fell shortby0 units orercent; and newfor only about one-sixth of production. Majorthat were introduced into production5 areTable 2. Models currently in production are shown3.
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8. Newer tractor models have greater horsepower ratings than older models and improved performance characteristics generally, but they also cost more. Moreover, new prices are high relative to claimed tractor productivity. For example, the current price of theracklaying tractorercent greater than that of4 model it is replacing, but its productivity in power consuming operations is onlyercent toercent higher. Composition of Output: An Unsettled Controversy
9. For many years the USSR favored the production and use of tracklaying, rather than wheeled, tractors. Although tracklaying types are more expensive to produce and operate and lack the speed and mobility of wheeled types, they have better traction in most soils, compact the soil less,less fuel per hectare, and are more easily adapted to non-agriculturalonstruction) applications. During thend, however, influenced by expansion in sown acreage of row crops in the USSR {which favors the use of wheels rather than tracks)ersonal directive by Premier Khrushchev to copy US practice (in which wheeled tractorshe production of wheeled tractors waspectacular boost. Output of wheeled tractors increased fromercent of tractor output3eak ofercent
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decision to push output ofgenerated an intense, and sometimes bitter,over -product mix that continues to be reflectedebb and flow of relative output shares. Duringshare of tracklaying types creeped steadily upward to
aigh ofercent The economicfor the shift away from the wheeled versionradual decline in acreage of row crops, and the promise of powerful new engines for tracklaying types capable ofthe speed advantages of wheeled tractors. owever, the share of tracklaying tractors has again declined, as the output of heavy-duty wheeled types, especiallyKeries, has rapidly accelerated. Apparently, the Soviets are now persuaded that wheeled tractors arc superior to tracklaying types in many agricultural For example, wheeled tractors are especially useful in Soviet agriculture for trailer-transport of farm products and other materials. In the US, trucks are normally used for this purpose.
the USSR produces aboutercentthan tracklaying0 wheeled. Larger and heaviernd greater, primarily are of tracklayingand lighter tractors, less thanorsepower, In the intermediate horsepower rangesowheeled tractors outweigh tracklayingargin
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. In the United States,ercent toercent of all tractors produced annually are wheeled andore even representation of light, medium, and heavy types,
output is heavily biased toward lighttypes of less thanorsepower. "Onlyof production4 consisted of large,types and about two-thirds of these werepowered (no moreorsepower). orsepower and up) are produced inquantities0nd nearly alltractors for use, primarily, in agriculture;tractors for industrial applications are insupply.
plug the gap in heavy-duty tractors,arge new plant at Cheboksary for theof special-purpose industrial-type tractors0 hp models. Although originally planned, ground was not broken endhe Soviets had managed to assemble atractors in one major building already completed. most of the components for these two tractorsfrom the Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant where designsand prototypes made. The first stage ofCheboksaryseveral thousand units per yearis still
a long way off and may not be achieved0 at the
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earliest. Clearly, it will be many years0 before this plant will be able to meet growing Soviet needs for heavy tracklaying tractors for construction. Kcy_Subsectors: Tractor Engines . . .
Production of diesel engines for' paradoxically, has helped both to advance and to retardin the tractor industry. On the one hand, increasing specialization of engine production for moreecade has freed production capacity at tractor plants, helping to sustain secular growth in tractor output. Whereasractor plants were, themselves, the major producers and suppliers of tractor engines,even major specialized producers provided roughlyercent of the engines used for new tractor production. 4/ Only three tractor plantsBryansk, Chelyabinsk, and Vladimircontinue to produce engines. Bryansk and Chelyabinsk produce engines for their own tractors, for road and construction machinery, and for other industrial uses. The Vladimir plant, which produces far more engines than tractors, supplies engines to producers of wheeled tractors.
On the other hand, lags in the development of planned "families' of improved tractor engines have delayed introduction
3/ All tractor engines produced7 have been diesel and virtually all tractors now in use are diesel powered.
hese specialized plants are located in Barnaul, Khar'kov Ttwoinsk, Rybinsk, Yaroslavl, and Volgograd.
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of new tractor models. In some cases for ten years or more. For example, the first prototypes of the MTZ-80 (which is to replace theere testedut production didn't begin until the latter half The firstof (which is to replaceM) were tested as far backut the tractor still was not in full-scale production by the end Reasons for lags in engine development are not clear; almost certainly they include: bureaucratic resistance to change, difficulties in getting engine plants retooled, and lacklose working
relationship between developers and producers.
16. Production of diesel engines in the USSR isby*an inadequate level of specialization andin the production of major engine components and parts. There are complaints that components and parts areelatively large number of enterprises with wide variations in output levels (and costs). For example, in the, crankshafts for tractor engines were produced by ten plants with annual levels of output ranging from0nits; pistons were produced in ten plants with outputs rangingnitsillion units. The quality of workmanship and the quality of metal inputs in component parts very often have varied from producer to producer.
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of engines often meansof bore and stroke. Suchthe use of similar piston sizes but notof parts. For example, the Sovietthatorsepower engines produced byplants have the same number of cylinders, andcylinder diameters, but otherwise different Thus, many other ports and accessories are One factor retarding progress inhas been poor coordination among tho sevendiesels'for all purposes, and among thethe same ministry.
. .nd Spare Parts and Repair
production of spare parts forto that of the United States, is huge, as mayfrom the following example: he USSRparts valued2 billion rubles, representingof the value of output of new tractors. 5/ United States, production of spare parts amounted toover one-fourth of the value of new tractor output.
On balance, the ratio of spare parts to output ought to be somewhat higher in the USSR, than in the US, because of the greater use of tracklaying tractors in agriculture. 6/ Even
V Estimatedillion rubles.
6/ More spare parts are required to maintain tracklaying tractors than wheeled. For example, in tho Unites States the value of spare parts shipped for tracklaying tractors amounted toercent of the value of complete units in the, compared withercent for wheeled tractors.
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taking this factor into account, however, under comparable US standards spare parts production in the USSR probably would notf the value of output of new tractors.
19. In effect, Soviet spare parts production4 was roughly equivalentew tractors, whereas US spare parts production, for the same year, was the equivalent of0 tractors. 7/ This comparison is especially striking in view of the fact that the US park of tractors in agriculture isillion* units larger than the Soviet
park, and the average age of the US park is about double that of the USSR.
Despite the exceptionally large volume of spare parts production, Soviet output still is not able to meet domestic needs. To take one example: utput amounted toillion rubles, but this was onlyercentillion rubles worth of new parts that Soviet officials estimated were needed for that year. Moreover, nearlyercent of tho parts classified as "especially important" were produced in below-plan quantities. An official of the USSR Ministry of Tractor and Agricultural Machine Building expressed the dilemma of spareravdas follows:
ased on the estimated unit value of the tractors produced In each country
;. "The more spare parts we turn out/
the greater the need for them becomes* Expenditures of metal on spare parts now comeood one-half of the metal earmarked for the manufacture of new machines. But we are still told that there aren't enough spare parts."
21. To offset persistent shortfalls in new partsrepair enterprises have accelerated the recondition-ing of worn parts. econditioned tractor parts were valuedillion rubles, orercent of the value of new parts production* Reconditioned parts are said to beercent toercent cheaper than new parts, and service life is said to be good.
22* The exceptionally large need for spare parts, which uniquely dramatizes the technological lag of the Sovietindustry, stems from both engineering and managerial deficiencies. Engineering deficiencies include: mediocre construction quality, mediocre quality of many parts anddurabilityignificant share of production. deficiencies include: overproduction of easily made parts and under-production of the more complex ones; faulty distribution which results in receipts of unwanted parts;
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poor field maintenance; the tendency of farms and tractor repair organizations to overstock parts to be on the safe side; and, finally, over-repair or the tendency to replace unworn parts along with those that are worn. The tendency to replace unworn parts apparently has increased in recent years with the developmentarge number of assembly-line type facilities for major overhaul work. Since every tractor that enters one of these shops is totally disassembled, technicians are tempted to replace internal parts thatare hard to get to just to be on the 3afe side. Technology
Soviet tractors have laggedof the United States in design, durability andthey have been less versatile and reliable. new models of Soviet tractors have greatly narrowedin one or more of these aspects during the pastit remains generally true that US tractors, oncan do more work, perform more efficiently, andthan their Soviet counterparts.
Design
tractor design has tended toubstantial timelag, changes in Western Native innovations have been few. Most of thefeatures of Western tractor technology such aspower steering, and turbocharging are incorporated
into certain of the current Soviet models, but they are founduch smaller share of total output than is the case in the US. One additional feature that has been copied and very widely applied is the four-wheel drive; the USSR produces more tractors with this feature than the.United States or any other Western country. Recently, the Soviets have modified four-wheel drive to provide for automatic engagementredetermined level of slippage. Automatic engagement is in use on some type of motor vehicles in the United States but has not yet been applied to tractors, apparently to keep down the price.
For many years the Soviets have not copied US models outright,umber of new Soviet wheeled tractorslose resemblance to US counterparts. Some tracklaying models still in production, such as thendM, are only slightly modified versions of models developed in the United States more thanears ago.
The quasidependence of the Soviet tractor industry on the United States for design technology has its historical roots in the extensive assistance that US firms provided in the, in designing and equipping the first Soviet tractor plants in Chelyabinsk, Khar'kov, and Volgograd (then Stalingrad). ajor shift away from reliance on US design technology appears imminent; industrial tractors to be built at the new Cheboksary plant have an innovative Soviet
design of cab at the front of the tractor, and bear noto OS tracklaying models. Durability
27. Soviet tractors, though rugged, tend to break down more frequently than their US counterpart. For example, the average period of use before first major overhaul isours comparedours in the US. 8/ Soviet tractors are not built to the precise tolerances of USgenerally do not incorporate high strength metal alloys to the same degree, are not serviced with comparable high-quality lubricants and oils, and are not assembled with the same degree of craftsmanship that characterizes US practice. In past years, thousands of newly built tractors have been rejected by agricultural equipmentefore leaving plant shipping areas and have had
8/ Planned average operating norms for Soviet tractors used in agriculture before first major overhaul are: tractorours; engines and undercarriages of wheeledours; undercarriages of tracklayingours. These averages apply only ifoperating and maintenance producers are strictly followed.
9/ Officials of Soyuzsel'khoztekhnika (All-Union Agricultural Equipmentn organization that acts asbetween the producer and agriculture for tractors and agricultural machinery, as well as for fuel, mineral fertilizers, and other items. Soyuzsel'khoztekhnika also controls the major repair facilities not owned by collective and state farms.
to be set right by the producers; thousands more have become quickly inoperative shortly after delivery.
Power
Soviet tractors, on the average, are less powerful than US tractors (see ractors produced in the USSR averaged aboutorsepower, compared withorsepower in the United States. The disparity was even greater for tracklaying tractorsaboutorsepower in the USSR compared withorsepower in the United
In general, Soviet tractors are underpowered relative to weight. However, .weight to power ratios are vastly improved over those common in, and the newest tractors have weight to power ratios that are as good as many US models. The average wheeled tractor produced in the USSR4 (weighted by output) weighed an estimatedilograms per horsepower, compared with an estimatedilograms per horsepower for US wheeled tractors. For more powerful tractors used inweight to power ratios tend to be higher in both countries. For example, the most powerful tracklaying tractor currently in production in the USSRorsepower)
10/ Data on tracklaying tractors are
11/ Those data are not entirely ccrrparable. Because weight-to-horsepower ratios for tractors produced in the US4 are not available, the above figure is based on rxwer take-off (PTO) dataample ofiesel wheeled tractors tested at the university of Nebraska test center. PTO horsepower in the tests was estimated to beercent of engine horsepower. Since Soviet data are given in terms of engine horsc-pc**sr. PTO in the US was dividedo get engine horsepower.
weighs aboutilograms per horsepower, based on service weight, compared with aboutilograms per horsepower for the most powerful US4 horsepower). In someapplications, high weight is advantageous.
tractors weigh relatively more than USand, by comparison, are underpowered, mainlymetal is used in the fabrication of engines,parts than is the case in the United States. is used to compensate for its relatively poorused in Soviet tractors lacks the highof US -alloys. Soviet tractors also tend tobecause engines arc adjusted to run atto reduce wear and extend operating life. Soviet tractors are being operatedof many US tractors of the, engineow are quite common in thejUnited States.
tractors also lose more horsepower than do
US tractors between the engine and the drawbar whore the power counts; that is, relatively more of the power of the average Soviet tractor goes into moving the tractor itself. The average US tractor is able toreater share of engine horsepower into usable power at the drawbar, because it
12/ For example, the new Sovietractor tested at Nebraska weighs more in relation to its powerimilar US model tested earlier with tho same maximum PTO and drawbar horsepower. Theeighed (without ballast)5 kilograms per maximum PTO horsepower compared9 kilograms for the US model.
has less weight relative to engine horsepower, and better gear ratios. However, the margin of US superiority in this respect seems to be diminishing. ew years ago, the drawbar horsepower of the averaqe Soviet diesel wheeledwas aboutercent of engine horsepower compared with nearlyercent for US models. Current Soviet models, according to tests apparently carried outoviet track in much the same way as tests at the University of Nebraska test center, are claimed to have approximately the samehorsepower in relation to engine horsepower as similar US tractors. Uses
Agriculture
32. Agriculture absorbs by far the greater share of production of tractors in the USSR, as in the United States,
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and currently accounts forillion tractors, or about two-thirds of the total tractor park, compared withi million in US agriculture, or about three-fourths of the total. However, because tractor attrition rates are high, the number of tractors in use in agriculture in the USSR falls far short of what is optimally desired. Also, shortages of spare parts frequently keep tractors out of service for extended periods, further reducing the number
harvested
HIVLi: Oil . Mil _
ilo the estimated value of Soviet net fa
of the United ,StaU:s.mhere were about
13/ Theof the USSR^ wasor about Sfl^pcrcent more than that of the Unit wh'
about four-fi fths,
xmtUS.
hectares of per tractor in the USSR compared with about"J* hectares in the United States. So
available for use. As an illustration of the seriousness of this problem, in the,ercent toercent of the entire tractor park wastanddown condition from time to time awaiting parts.
ecent Soviet estimate, abouttractors are needed in the USSR for optimal That quantity of tractors in use wouldreached by1 if the rate of tractorthe park had been kept atercent to 5the past twoate that has characterized
US practice for many years.
fact, more thanercent of the existingtractors, in Soviet agriculture has been retiredthe pastharp rise over the 9oferiod (see In recentnumber of tractors retired has been equal to aboutof the number of new tractors being delivered toresulting in only relatively small additions tostock. For example,, about 2tractors were delivered, andillion unitsresultingelatively modest increase in theof tractorsix-year period ofcomparison,in the United States, tho annual retirementsince theas been considerably in excess
of the nubmer of new tractors delivered, in some years by as much asercent toercent. Such retirements have been
possible because the US park has long been near the satura-tion point, and new tractors have been purchased primarily for replacement. Also, the sharp increase in the use of higher horsepower tractors has permitted fewer tractors to do the same or an even greater amount of work. The US park reached the current Soviet level
The relatively high rate of retirement of Soviet tractorseflection of deficiencies in machine quality and durability, and, perhaps,esser extent, to poor maintenance and high usage rates. In addition, the fact that output norms are set the same for both old and new tractorsower class encourages collective and state farm managers to. replace older and less productive tractors as soon as they can justify retirement to higher authorities. Since there is no used-tractor market in the USSR, tractors that are retired, in effect, arc scrapped.
The number of tractors in use in agriculture in the USSR will not reach optimum levels even0 ifetirement rate of the past decade continues, as seems likely. illion new tractors are scheduled for delivery to .agriculture, and anillion units will boet increase In the park ofractors. By the endoviet agriculture is scheduled toark7 million tractors, orhort
of the optimum. Rising allocations of tractors to non-agricultural consumers, especially construction snd roadbuilding, has prevented
Soviet planners fromarger share of production to agriculture. Agriculture is to get aboutercent of new output, the same eharc as.
in use in Soviet agriculture, particularly
the higher powered new models, are often grossly underutilized
because of low inventories of complementary farm machinery.
For example, thousands of theAK
heavy-duty wheeled tractors in agriculture cannot be fully
utilized becauseerious shortage of farm trailers, plows,
harrows, and other machinery. Soviet exports estimate thatof new agricultural machinery other than tractors should
amount toubles per ruble expended on new tractors.
That desired ratio, which is met byew leading farms,
compares with an actual coefficient0 ofubles
throughout agriculture. Although this coefficient probably
rose duringlan period, the imbalance between the
number of tractors in use and available agricultural
probably will persist for some time.
upgrading the quality and durability oftractor and engine designs to increase engineand overall pulling power, and increasing the volumeparts, Soviet planners hope to reduce attrition rates
14/ The value of output of agricultural machinery increased byercent50 (compared0 percent increase in unit output of tractors.
BTOSSTO
(increasing indirectly the park of tractors) and improve the utilization and efficiency of tractors in use. Industry
39. The USSR has made slow progress in satisfying the highly specialized needs of industrial users. Although aboutercent of all tractors produced annually in theire allocated to industrial consumers, most are tractors that have been designed primarily for use in agriculture. he USSR produced only0 tractors specially designed for industrial applications,0 of these were logging tractors. Special-purpose tractors and tractorsfor use under differing climatic and geographic conditions are urgently needed. For example, one of the basic bulldozers in use in construction and roadbuildingeneral-purpose tracklaying tractor designed for agriculturelade mounted on the front. Only about one-fourth of the tractors in industrial use are said to be adapted especially forunder which they are operated. Tractors in use in northern climates frequently are not built for sustained operations under conditions of extremendith inadequately ventilated cabs that aro used in permafrost regions are sent to desert regions in the south as well.
15/ An average.
16/ f the tractors allocated in the non-agricultural sector, construction and roadbuilding received an estimateercent, forestryercent, and mimnq and miscellaneouserceni
17/ Insufficient use is made of special low-alloy metals, special rubber, and special lubricants designed for cold climates.
Beginning4ir-conditioning was installed
for the first time on some tractors going to hotter climates. Kxport
40. The USSRelatively small shareercentercent for the pastearsbecausearge domestic need. Nevertheless, the USSR has become one of the world's largest exporters of tractors. exports totaled0 units, aboutercent that of the Unitednd about one-third that of the Unitedhe world leader. Aboutf ail Soviet tractor exports go to Communist
countries have been dependent on the USSR for tracklaying models, since only Bulgaria, Poland, and Romania produce tracklaying types and, until recently, only in models of up to aboutorsepower. However, Poland now produces more powerful tracklaying tractors inorsepower range through an agreementS company, and Romania is producing models of domestic design Thus, historic East European dependence on Soviet models is diminishing.
xports from the United States averaged0 units annually in the,eak0 units
19/ Data for the United Kingdom are Exports for theellery narrow range around the annual averagenits.
For many years the pSSIt shipped to non-Communist countriesWcth of all the tractors that were exported. , an overwhelming proportion of theseaboutercentwere shipped to the developing nations; in turn, about one-half of these went to India alone. During this period, relatively few tractors went to industrializedr less annuallyand most of these to France. 3owever, sales to industrialized countries were more than double2 level, owing to sudden large purchases by the UK, Canada, and the US. Soviet officials are hoping for future sales in the US alonenits annually.
To attract Western buyers, the USSR has made some minor modifications in tractor design in an effort to meet tho special requirements of foreign customers and has sot up some modern servicing facilities and spare parts depots in the West. Export tractors aro beginning to match up fairly well with the performance standards of US and other Western-built tractors. More importantly, the USSR has priced tractors belowWestern models. For example, according to industry sources, Soviet four-wheel drive tractors are being offered in the
United Kingdom at about two-thirds of the price of UK-manufactured
he largest are located in France, Canada and the United States (New Orleans and Milwaukee).
models; tractors are being offered in tho US at roughly four-fifths the price of comparable US To carry out sales in Canadian and US markets, the USSR hasanadian-Soviet joint-stock company.
These Soviet initiatives have helped to overcome the traditional reluctance of fanners in the West, and especially in the United States, to purchase Soviet tractors. Moreover, they comeineeavy domestic demand in the United States was delaying deliveries for certain US models and were aided alsohanged political climate which seems to have lessened the stigma of purchasing Soviet products. Although some US customers seem actually to prefer Soviet tractors because of their greater simplicity and lack of frills, it is still too early to judge whether Soviet tractors will prove to be sufficiently sturdy, reliable, and efficient to gain widespread acceptance in the United States.
The USSR has shown little interest in large purchases of Western-made tractors for use on Soviet farms (buying only small quantities for testing purposes) but hasrowing interest in procuring large, high-powered, specialized models for industrial applications. The USSR has already purchased
elling prices of Soviet tractors in the United States Bear no relation to the dollar prices obtained by converting domestic Soviet ruble prices at the official exchange rate. For example, the converted price of theone of five models being offered in the US) would be0r about one-third the priceomparable US tractor.
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between four and five thousand large (uporsepower) tracklaying tractors from the United States and Japan. Those in the upper horsepower range are used in laying gas pipelines and ripping ground in mining operations in the permafrost regions. Included in the purchases from Japan are tracklaying models for use in forest-clearing and mining projects in the Soviet Far East. Goals for the
, the Soviets planned for majoracross-the-boardin engines, components, tractor design, and spare parts. Major technical goals includedengine rpm's, improved fuel consumption, widerof turbocharging, increased average horsepower, and better weight to horsepower ratios. Though reasonable, and technically feasible, these goals were realized only partially, or not at all.
The Soviets had planned to increase the engine speed of the average Soviet tractor byoercent by raising average rpm'spm's0pm's In fact, nearly all tractor engines in production
5 had the same rpm rating as Planned speeds were achieved in only three of the new models: racklaying0K0nd theheeled0 rpm).
Fuel consumption on some Soviet tractors is as good or bettor than on some US tractors, but the plan to have typical consumption rates oframs perhour5 was not realized. Indeed, only fourin production5 had consumption rates within this range (theA wheeled andMonsumptionrams per horsepower hour seemed to be typical.
Currently, engines of theA wheeled and theracklaying tractors are turbo-charged for increased pow^r. The Soviets had planned to add turbocharging to three or four more engines for tractors in mass production, but this does not appear to have happened.
The power of the average Soviet tractor (weighted
by output) was to have increased toorsepower
that is, by Af percent above the averagehe actual average5 was onlyorsepower or ltf percent higher
A
significant reduction inwas planneddown tooilograms perfor wheeled tractors (similar to the USndtoilograms per horsepower for tracklayingbetter than the US ratio). The Soviets made
22/ It is not clear whether these Soviet weight-to-horsepower ratios have been calculated on tlie basis of the designed weight of the tractor or the service weight (fueled and ready tout probably it is the former. The difference can be significant. For example, the average weight per horsepower of all Soviet wheeled tractors producedeighted by estimated output, wasilograms based on designed weight andilograts based on service weight. For tracklaying tractors, the figures werendilograms, respectively. ^
mm
substantial progress toward these goals- All four of the major new models of wheeled tractors that were in massby the end5 (thoK,) had weight-to-horsepower ratios within the planned range, based on designed weight. Theracklaying tractor alsoow weight-to-horsepower ratioased on designed weight, but it had not gone into mass production by the end All other major models of Soviet tracklaying tractors weigh considerably in excess ofilograms per horsepower, with the exception of theA andwhich average aboutilograms per horsepower).
SI. Finally, an unprecedented feature of tho Ninth
Five-Year Plan was an objectivo to satisfy completely all requirements for spare parts This was to be accomplished, in part, through increased consolidation of enterprises producing spare parts. Consolidation was expected also to reduce wide differences in production costs through increased economies of scale in production programs. For the five yearshole, the Soviets had planned to increase outputrts and components for tractors and farm machinery in specialized enterprisesillion rubles;utput of spares was scheduled to amount to one-fourth of the gross value of output of tractors and agricultural machinery combined. The Soviet press has since been silent about these
goals or their implementation. However, there is evidence that the spare parts supply problem persists, and that the existing patterns of spare parts distribution and consumption that contribute so importantly to the problem have remained fundamentally
In the current Five-Year Plan period, the Soviets will try again to reach many of the same technical objectives that they failed to reach. If, as seems likely, most of0 technical goals are met, the Soviets will haveajor step toward upgrading their tractors to world standards. However, they probably will not achievewith the US. The thrust in the US tractor industry for improvements in tractor performance-seemsven more intense than in the USSR.
One area that may prove difficult is raising average tractor horsepower toorsepower0 as planned. arge extent, that goal will depend upon successful full-scale production of new tractor models at Chelyabinsk and Pavlodar. Additional capacity is under construction at Chelyabinsk but is moving slowly. Pavlodar plans to put into productionheeled tractor but has had experience producinghorsepower tracklaying model. General Conclusions
In general, Soviet tractors5 were better made and more powerful than those producedlthough, on
the average, not as well-made or as powerful as those produced in the United States; the average Soviet tractor still cannot be said to be the technological equivalent of the average US counterpart. During the past five years, the technology gap with the United States has been narrowed sufficiently in Soviet export models to make them acceptable to at least some US farmers, but acceptability in the US market isure indicator of technical equivalence as long as the Soviet price is substantially lower than the US counterpart. Moreover, export models are manufactured with special care and cannot be said to be characteristic of Soviet production, generally.
The Soviet drive to raise average tractor horsepower im well directed and should help to improve productivity ln agriculture, and perhaps also to reduce agricultural manpower requirements. Even so, new, higher horsepower models are likely to be underutilized for many years because of shortages of complementary farm machinery. In addition, shortages of spare parts will continue to keep many tractors out of service for extended periods.
A critical shortage of special-purpose heavy-duty industrial-type tractors, including pipelayers and tractors for construction work as bulldozers, is likely to persist throughout the remainder of. This shortage, coupled with an anticipated growth in demand generated by projects such as the Baikal-Amur Railroadakes it likelythat the USSR will continue purchase of large tractors in- the United
States and other Western countries. The USSR may also acquire US production technologyecently signed scientific and technical cooperation agreementarge US company.
Table 2
OSSR: Major New Tractor Models Introduced
Percentage
in
Being Horsepower Horsepower of
Replaced Models
Wheeled
Tracklaying
I '1 3
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Original document.
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