Interagency Intelligence Memorandum
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE ASSANITIZED
Soviet Civil Defense
CONTENTS
Page
PRINCIPAL FINDINCS
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
DISCUSSION
I. INTRODUCTION
and
C
II. CIVIL DEFENSE IN SOVIET MilJTARY
A. Local AirMPVO
ivil Defense and the Military
theShelters vs
Evacuation
Defense in Current Soviet Military
lit. CIVIL DEFENSE OBJECTIVES AND
and Priorities
IV. ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS
A. Peacetime Structure
Civil Defense Staffs. Services. Formations, and Teams
Civil Defense at Economic
Military Civil Defense Troops
artime Structure
Military Civil Defense Manpower
Civilian Civil Defense Manpower
Quality of Civil Defense Personnel
Page
O. Command. Control, aisd Communication*
V. PROTECTION OF THE LEADERSHIP
ihc National Level
the National Level
VI PROTECTION OF ESSENTIAL PERSONNEL AND THE
GENERAL
A
Types of
Shelter* in Urban Area*
Blast Shelters
Sob-ay Shehen
Fallout Shelters
Shelter* in Rural Area*
And Evacuation
Dispersal and Evacuation Exercise*
and Equipment
Individual Protective Equipment
Other
of Essential Supplies
Raihoad*
Motor Transport
Inland Water
Air
Transport-Related Cornmumentions
VII. PROTECTION OF
A. Macrodiipcnal of Heavy Industries
Historical Perspective
Growth in Urban-lnduitrial Areas
Industrial Concentrationj
Temtorial Production Complete*
((COO1
P-ge
of Light Industrie*
of
Siting of Industries
Induur.al Reserve Opacity and
0 Hardening at Economic Installations
Hardening Techniques
Shelters at Industrial Fadlilic*
Underground Industrial Facilities
E Emergency Relocation of Industrial Facilate.
VIU. CIVIL DEFENSE TRAIN1NC AND EXERCISES
A.
i) Training of the General Population
C Cadte
D Military Civil Defense Unit*
E Tactical Military Units
F. Exercbet
C Trend*
IX. EXPENDITURES FOR CIVIL DEFENSE
A.
B
tables
Page
1 Identified Oil Defense Unit* In the
II Professional Personnel on Soviet Oil Defense Staffs
Bunkered Command Post* in the USSR
Estimated Structural Hardnen of Selected Soviet Personnel
V DIA-Eitimnted Time Required (or Evacuation ol Twelve
Selected Soviet
VI Supply and Consumption ol Cr.in in the
VII Estimated Change in Soviet Grain Slocks by Crop Year.
VIII Regional Distribution of Induitrial Production in ihe USSR
IX Number of Plant* Producing alf Output
for Selected Soviet
X Peroral of Value of Soviet Industrial Output by Urban Area
Siae
Fage
XI USSR: City and OMast Share, of Population and Selected
Light Industrial4 82
XII Regional Distribution of Selected Processed Food Production in
Ihe 83
Distribution of Selected Soft Goods Product loo
in the USSR 84
Densities of Selected Processed Food Products
In the USSR 85
XV Regional Densities of Selected Soft Goods In Ihe 86
XVI Numbei ol Yeats Soviet Production Could Continue In the
Absence ol Further Supplies ol Rasv6 87
FIGURES
Page
Priorities and Programs of Soviet Civil 19
Organization of Soviet Civil Defense 22
Soviet CMl Defense Organizations al Obiast. City, and Lower
Uvtb
Locations of Identified Soviet Civil Defense 27
Standard Pattern of Bunkered Command and Administrative
Points for Wartime Protection of Soviet Leaden at
National. Republic, and Regional 32
elocation Sites Near Moscow lot Soviet Political and Military
Leaden 33
Diagram of Soviet Dual-Purpose Shelter
Skctdi of Basement Shelter From Soviet
Station In Kharkov
Illustration ol Soviel Expedient or Hasty
IS- OverpiessutciKilotoniloton
Soviet Dispersal/Evacuation Diagram
Illustrations of Evacuation. From Soviet Civil Defense Manual
US and USSR: Comparative Area and
Soviet Cities Used as Basis for Drfense Intelligence Agency
Study of Soviet Evacuation and Dispersal
ngarsk Evacuation and Dispersal Areas Selected by DIA
Using Soviet Criteria
US Testing of Soviet-Designed Shelter
Soviet Qvtl Defense Dispersal Area
Soviet Workers In Civil Defense Eiereise
Distribution of Population in the USSR
Land Use In the USSR
Food Distribution In the USSR
Soviet Grain Storage
rain Storage Bunkers in the
nderground Storage Near
PR1NCIPAI FINDINGS
A review of the Soviet civil defense program leads us to conclude that:
program is more extensive and better developed than we had previously believed.
measures the Soviets are taking to protect theirndustry, and population couldignificant impact on
both US and Soviet perceptions of the likely outcomeuclear exchange.1
cannot, at this time,onfident estimate of the actual effectiveness of the Soviet program.
Thus, one of the most important findings of this study is that the civil defense problem demands priority altentton by the Intelligence Community. Our current understanding of the Soviet programix-month survey of the available evidence, in the first detailed review of this subjectore extensive and systematic collection and analysis effort will be required to resolve some of our uncertainties about the objectives and effectiveness of the Soviet civil defense effort.
Significant shifts in emphasis in the Soviet civil defense program occurred during thend. During that period the Soviets subordinated the entire civil defense program to military direction. They also increased their efforts to provide hardened command posts for the military and civilian leadership. At the same lime, they modifiedegree their previous policy of mass evacuation of cities by placing somewhat greater emphasis on constructing hardened shelters within urbanecision which they have attributed to concernuclear attack could occur with little prior warning. Our study of Soviet civil defense has not revealed any major changes in the Soviet program sinceor does itrash program. Rather, Ihe Soviets have been proceeding gradually but steadily to implement decisions evidently taken previously.2
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In reviewing what we know aboul llie subject for purposes of this rnenmrandum. we have acquired new appreciation of several aspects of Soviet civil defense
The subordination of the entire civil defense structure to military direction has resuHedore effective organization for carrying oul civil defense plans and operations. Civil defense training efforts concentrate on the personnel responsible for carrying oui civil defense operations, rather than on extensive training of the general population
Wc have reconfirmed our previous judgment that hardened shelters and commandre available for the top political and military leadership, and for military and civilian leadersumber of capitals and military headquarters below the national level.
Thus far. the hardened shelter program for urban areas is primarily for the protection of personnel judged by the Soviets as essential, rather than for protection of the general
The expansion of industries during the pastears into areas distant from previously existing urban centers has notreduced the vulnerability of Soviet industry lo nuclear attack. Although light industries are somewhat lessSoviet heavy industries remain for the most part in large urban areas. The vulnerability of some industry has been reduced somewhatesult of expansion of some industries into suburbs or "satellite towns."
The numbers of underground structures discoverednrlial survey of industrial facilities, and the wide range of locations and industries at which such structures have been found, indicate that preparations for industrial protection arc more extensive than we had previously realized.
We have determined that the Soviets have reserves of food supplies and fuel located outside uiban areas which could be used to support ihe urban populationucleai attack on cities, provided it could be distributed effectively. We do nol know ihe actual sire of theser how long the available supplies would last. The most difficult problem for the Soviets would probably be to assure the survival of supply personnel, equipment, and communications, and to manage the complex distribution of supplies under chaotic conditions.
Dcspite our extensive review, mnjor gaps remain in our knowledge of Soviet civil defense. From uiicln&sifled materials and intelligence sources, we know that the Soviets have an ambitious program and weood understanding of their overall civil defense planning and organization. But we lack important details about specific classified plans. While we know that the Soviets are taking some actions with respect to all aspects nf civil defense, we lack evidence on the progress they arc making in many of their preparations.
- CCOIC1"
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Organization
Beginningilitary and civilian elements responsible for civil defense were integratedingle nationwide organization, headedeputy Minuter of Defense at the national level and by commanders of military districts in the field. The leadership consists of at leasteneral officers, some of them at civil defeme staffs as low as city level. The organisation comprises, at0 full-time personnel organized into staffs, civil defense troop units, civilian services, cadres, formations, and teams* They operate at various levels extending from the Ministry of Defense through military districts, republic capitals, oblasts. and cities down to small districts (rayons) and economic installations. This organizational structure is supported by dedicated nationwide communications systems. The number of part-time participants in the civil defense organization is probably in the tens of millions.
Mission and Objectives
Civil defense is an integral part of Soviet military planning for nuclear war. In Soviet military doctrine,ne aspect of that part of military science concerned wilh "protection of thehich in nuclear war Ihe Soviets consider to be the entire nation. They regard civil defenseask vital to successful operations of the armed forces. It is partroader Soviet concept which we have characterized as "warncompassing all the military and nonmilitary measures by which the Soviets seek to ensure the survival of Soviet society and the continuity of the Soviet state.
The mission of the Soviel civil defense organization is to cany out three basic objectives through peacetime preparation and svarlime action. Soviet writings are not clear about the relative priorities of these objectives, but our evidence on actual preparations suggests that they fall in the following order:
to assure the continuity of government and control by protecting the leadership through hardened urban shelters and relocation sites with supporting communications facilities;
to provide continuity of operations of important economic facilities* by hardening and relocating these facilities, maintaining reserves of supplies and
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materials. and protecting essential personnel through sheltering In uiban meat and al dispersal sites: and
protect the nonessential pari ol the populalion through sheltering in urban and ruralvacuation of urban residents beyond the area ol initial csually produonr. effect, of nuclear itrlkei nn cities, and at least minimal training and indocrinalinn in civil defense.
Prole-clion of the leadership
Wc have identified hardened urban shelters, alternate command posts, and supporting communication! for protection of the military and civilian leadership In and near Moscow and at some capital* and military headquarters below the national level The program to build tuchar from complete, but it appear* Intended eventually to provide hardened shellen and communications for Soviet military and civilian leader* at all leveb
havecommand posts innot counting control eenteis ot*lhe Strategic Rocket Force*smaller bunkers for communication! facilities^
pattern of such facilities includes hardened bunker* adjacent to military and civilian headquarters within urban area* and hardened relocation sites in suburban or rural areas, together with lup|mrtlng communication* lyitemi. some with hardened antennas.
bunkers which have been identified lor the leadership vary somewhat in design and structure, they appear in general lo be hard enough toood chance ofuclear attack unless targeted with accurate high-yield weapons
Protection of Economic Facilities
The extent of Soviet preparations for the protection of economic facilities from the effect*uclearreater than wc previously realized- W* have not yet been able to assess the elfecr* of these meaiure* on the vulnerability of important economic facilities to nuclear attack.
Soviet civil defense planning calls for redistributing industries outside urban areas, taking advantage of industrial dispersal brought about by economic requirements The Soviets hove created new town* near sources of raw materials and have established industries In many smaller cities in Ihe course of ihelr Industrial expansion We have determined, however, that the expansion of industries during the pastear* into areas distant from previously existing urban centers ha* not significantly reduced the vulneriWrty of Soviet industry to nuclear attack Despite their growth. Soviet heavy Industries remain concentrated In large urbanlthough light induitric* are somewhat leas concentrated.
The vulnerability ol Induitry has been reduced somewhat by resiling facilities within large urban cenleri and by ihe expansion of tome industries into luburb* or
satellllc towns. Also. some reduction in vulnerability lias icsulted from producing certain Hems rsf military equipment al more than one facility.
Hasdenlng. Soviet planning also calls for hardening measures to reduce the vulnerability of economic facilities and equipment to nuclear attack. These range from underground facilities and protective engineering techniques lo eipedieni measures lor the protection of equipment. We have information on several bundled underground structure*ide range of industrial facilities in various geographic areas. From Ihe sample we have surveyed, fust ptioriiy appears to be on defense industries, but performance in the defense industries is uneven. Some underground structures were evident at other industries as well We have very tittle information on the extent to which olhci haidening techniques are helng applied Some rlesVr.se Industries arc requiied In have plans for relocation |ust prioruclear attack, bul we do not know the number or type ol plants involved in such planning
Protection of Essential Personnel It is dearhe emphasis in the Soviet urban shelter program since theas been to protect essential personnel. We believe there are large numbers of hardened shelters available for this purpose but we have no estimate of Ihe total or what percentage of the essential personnel could be accommodated. Workers would also be protected by movement to dispenal sites at predesignated locations outside urban areas which are close enough to the city to permit personnel to commute daily to their place of work Emigres have reported that advancesupplies, shelters, and otherreceive essential personnel have been made al some dispersal sites outside urban areas
Cuil Defense Units Civil defense services and formations have been established at economic facilities lo repair damage and restoreons These units practice frequently and appear to be well trained.
Reserves. The Snvlels maintain stale reserves of critical supplies ol industrial materials, equipment, fuel and food supplies, which have been reported as "large" by emigre sources We have not determined, however, the location and site of the state reserves. If Ihe normal flow of supplies In industries were halted, we believe they could continue production forew weeks without drawing on reserves. There are also reports of "strategic reserves" ofa level below which state reserves would not be drawn down during peacetime. Thus far we have Identifiedunkered grain storage sites, confirming other indications that the Soviets have dispersed and protected some such strategic reserves. The capacity of the identified bunkers, however, representsmall percentage of the capacity of the aboveground grain storage facilities located outside urban areas-Protection of the Nonessentiol Population
Since the, the Soviets have given more emphasis In their policy statements and in their wsnstruction programs lo shelters in cities. They attribute this shift in emphasisoncernuclear exchange could occur wilh little prior warning. In (heir shelter construction program lirst priority appears to be on hardened shelters for essential personnel In most cities hardened shelters could accommodatemall percentage of the nonessenlial population Fallout shelters In cities could probably provide some protection from radiation- However, within cities the primary casually.producing effects of nudear detonations would probably be blast and file, rather than radiation from fallout.
Therefore, the Soviets still rely heavily on rvacuation to protect tlie nonessential urban population. Oven a period of warning prioruclear attack. Soviet
plannine. calls lo. movement of thr noneucntial urban population lo evacuation ills up6rom likely urban target areas (farther fiom the uiban center than Ihe dispersal sites from which essential personnel would commute lo ihe city)he hash of our study ofepresentative Soviet cities, we conclude that, under most favorableovement ol the nonessential population to evacuation sites and the improvisation of shelters for them could probably be completed within lesseekecision to evacuate. In this case, as the Soviets claim, evacuation of cities could reduce prompt casualtiesew percent of the urban population We are not sure about longer-termis, the degree of protection from radioactive fallout lhal would be attained for Urge numbers of people al evacuation sites.
Although we are aware that large slocks of essentialwater, fuel, andlocated outside urban target areas, we are unable to estimate with confidence how long such slocks would satisfy the needs of the population or how soon after the attack supplies could start to move fiom producers. There Is no evidence that evacuation areas are being prestocked with essential supplies.
We have,eneral appreciation of total supplies likely lo be available (based on such things as overall geographic distribution of industry, population, and normal distributivend we have made rough calculations of normal consumption rates of some categories of supplies Such evidence as we have suggests thatuclear attack on cities which was precedederiod of warning to make final preparations, supply levers would be sufficient to satisfy the minimum subsistence needs of the population for weeks and perhaps months Distribution of upplics to the relocated urban population would probablyore serious problem lhan slock levels.
Major portions of the Soviets' transportation equipment are normally located outside cities, and would probably not be destroyed by an attack on urban areas. If an attack were precedederiod of warning, Soviet planning calls for the dispenal of transportation equipment from urban areas to predesignBted sites outside cities Nevertheless, Important fixed transportation facilities and equipment in cities, including control centers, would be damaged and power lor some segments of the electrified railroads would be disrupted The most difficult problem for the Soviets would probably be to assure the survival of supply personnel, equipment, and communications, and lo manage the complex distribution of supplies under chaotic conditions
In the past several years, the emphaiis In Soviet civil defense training, practices, and exercises has been on full-time and part-time personnel in civil defense staffs andThe Soviets are relying primarily on programs at educational institutions and other organizations lo Indoctrinate Ihe general population. This hrealistic approach to developing an effective civil defense capability, according to the findings of US civil defense experts
Effectiveness of Soviet Civil Defenses
While it seems dear that civil defense preparations in the USSR arc more extensive than we have been able to confirm, the status of preparations Implied by our evidence is consistent wilh the Soviets' own acknowledgement that the objectives of their civil defense programs have not been folly achieved. They arc concentroting. however, on those preparations which we believe aie mosl valuable lor recovery operations: an extensive well-defined organic lion al all levels of government; a
. program focused on Ihe primary Implementing argnni7*rions; detailed planning to moliillie and control military and civilian resources; measures to reduce damage to economic facilities,eadeeship lamiliar with civil defense plans and having available lo it both protection and facilities to control operation*
The effectiveness of Soviet civil defenses, including evacuation and recovery, in the event of an unrestrained US nuclear attar* on urban areas would vary widely, depending on such circumstances as the site of ihe attack, weather, lime of day. and season of year, but Ihe period of warning prior to Ihe attack wouldritical factor. Thus an evaluation of Soviet civil defense effectiveness must take into account the Following circumstances:
The most seer? te:'. for Soviet civil defense: weuldlUistfon in which the first warninguclear eschangc woutd come after strategic nuclear attacks were in progress, regardless of which side initiated the conflict
The more likely situation would be one inuclear exchangeeriod oF tension in which both sides were awareeightened risk of nuclear war. providing time for at least some final civil defense preparations.
Soviet Unionajor
We can draw only tentative conclusions about the dfectiveness ofefenses because of the large gaps in our knowledge of the program and unknowab.es about its operation under stress. It Is our tentativender optimum conditions, whicheriod ofP""unrestrained US attack during which evacuation and other prweribed prcparat
were Implemented. Soviet civil defensesssure survivalarge percentage of the leadership necessary to maintaineduce prompt casualties among the urban populationmall percentage,ive theood chance of being able to distribute atubsistence level of supplies to the
surviving population.
With minimal warning, some key leaders would probably survive, but the urban population would sulfer very high casualties and the chances would be poor that the Soviets could distribute supplies effectively to the surviving population.
Our conclusions about the effectiveness of measures to protect economic facilities, must be even more tentative Oui impression is that the protective measures we know about svould be effective in reducing collateral damage to economic facilities which were not the primary targets of attack We believe that, vrithout warning of an attack, casualties among essential personnel would be very high. Warning may be less critical to the survival of economic Facilities and equipment.
In spite of the potential contitbution of Soviet civil defenses to survival of the leadership and to reducing casualties and damage to economic facilities. Soviet planners too would have major uncertainties in predicting the effectiveness of their civil defenses. Among the most important would be uncertainties about:
ihe time available for implementing prescribed preparations prior to the nuclear strikes.
the timing and size of initial and subsequent nuclear strikes and the eatent to which urban areas would lie targeted;
iii..
the aggregate clfecti, both pinmpt and Innger trim, of bo attack involving several thousand nuclear weapons; and
the magnitude of human and material casualties and the effect of their occurrencehort period
The Soviets' overall assessment of their present civil defenses against an unrestrained US nuclear attack probably isighly optimistic one Indeed, the usually conservative Soviet planners may attribute lower capabilities to their civil delenses than we do. given the magnitude of the problems they lace and the large uncertainties about the circumstances, scale, and effects of the nuclear attacks they would have lo cope with. Even under the most lavo/aWe dicurnstances, they probably would have toreakdown of the economy, and under the worst conditions they would have to anticipate catastrophic human casualties as well.
Despite all the problems and uncertainties, however, ihe Soviets probably believe that civil defense measures contribute to giving thehance to surviveational entity and to.beetler position than the USuclear exchange. They probably would expect their present civil defenses to be able to protect some key civilian and military leaders and political and economic cadres, to reduce damage to economic facilities, to reduce casualties among the population, and lo support the conduct of military operations
More threatening interpretations of the Soviets' motives and expectations for their civil defense programs are possible, but the evidence available to us does not suggest Ihat Soviet dvil defense preparations are being carried out on any crash basis or that they are peaking toward any particular target date In any event, we have no doubt that the Soviets will continue their efforts to improve their civil defenses They have long emphasized defense of the homeland in their military policy and believe that civil defenseignificant factor in the military balance. They arc convinced that "protection of the rear" is vital to deterrence, to milltaiy success in war. and to national survival In the even! of nuclear war Whatever the nature of their specific current motivations, the Soviets would eipect their civil defense efforts to contribute to their overall strategic posture and to enhance their prospects in nuclear war.
The Bureau of Intelligence and Reteaich. Department of State, believes that the Soviet ciod defense program ii seen by the Soviet leadership primarilyrudent hedge against the possibility of attackuclear-armed adversary. Moreover, /Nfl believes that these Soviet civil defense efforts will not materially Increase Soviet willingness touclear exchange and will not undermine the deterrent value of US strategic attack forces. While fully agreeing that thts is an Important area of activity which deserves eloter attention by the US Intelligence Community, INIt believes that at the present time the scope of the civil defense program does not indicate Soviet strategic objective! beyond maintenance of rough strategicwith the US.
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, the Director of Naval Intelligence. Department of the Navy, ond the Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence. Department of the Air Force, consider that thts memorandum accurately summarizei our present Information on Soviet efforts to Improve the war survival potential inherent in the Soviet dull defense effoit. However, they fudge the impact of this war survival effort upon the US-USSR strategic balance lo be greater than that Implied by these Principal Findings and Conclusions They believe that the Soviet ctotl defense effort willefinite and increasing Impact on the US-USSR strategic balance. Moreover, ihey mess their belief that ihe Soviets are engaged in an
10
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effort loar-fighting and war-iurolval capability and dial the civil defense program is an essential element in this effort. They are convinced that Soviet civil defense efforts are intended to contribute to the USSR's strategic posture by ending US SIOP capabilities. Finally, ihey believe that the Sooiels will increasingly strive to enhance thetr international position by capltallttng on their war-survival capabilities in order lo manipulate policy decisions In the Third Wodd and NATO.
11
discussion
INTRODUCTION A. Purpose and Scope
L This memorandum describe* Soviet civil defense objectives and plana as we understand them, and assesses the progress the Soviets are making in carrying out civil defense preparations called for by their planning. As used In this memorandum, the term "civil defense" is intended to include all passive defense measures and military and civilianand equipment which contribute to preserving the Soviet Union and its society.
he possibility of nuclear war has not been ruled out by Soviet officials, who assert that preparations to fight and winar require measures to minimize losses to government and political cadres, the essential labor force, industrial and agricultural productivity, and the population base for postwar recovery. Undertakir.r. these measures isationwide civil defense organization directed by the military.
c
[The effectiveness of Soviet measures for protection oT leadership, Industry, and population could have an impact on US and Soviet expectations about the likely outcomeS nuclear attack
C 3
he intent of this memorandum is to summarize what we know and do not know about Soviet civil defense programs from all sources of intelligence, and to assess the scope, pace, and progress of the preparations called for in Soviet civil defense manuals, handbooks, and other publications. Theis more on expositionetailed analysis.
tatus teportomprehensive estimate; it !sys thefor collection activity Bud fuiiiici intelligence Investigation and production on the various facets of Soviet civil defense.
There has been no sliortage over the years of Soviet pronouncements and publications about civil defense programs and activities; our problem is verifying and quantifying the progress of these programs and finding ways to assess theirBeyond these difficulties there ate major uncertainties about thend long-term nuclear effectsehou sand -megaton attack and their implications for societal survival. Judgments among US experts differ both on nuclear effects and the degree ofivil defense program can provide. The Soviets also arc under the weight of these uncertainties In determining the likely effectiveness of their civil defense
The scope of this memorandum encompasses three aspects of Soviet civil defense: the origin and role of civil defense in Soviet military strategy; objectives, priorities, and planning for civil defense; and Soviet progress In civil defense preparations and their effectiveness. The analysis of information and the presentation in this memorandum are organized as follows:
organization and function.
protection of the leadership,
protection of essential personnel and the general population.
protection of industry,
training and exercises, and
expenditurei.
B. Analytical Approach
order of presentation of material inmemorandum corresponds to our analytical
amming fust Soviet evil defense st.aie*.y. objectives, and plans These findings are ihe basis Cor measuring Ihe progress Ihe Sovieli ait, making in carrying out their plans and. finally, where solficienl evidence is available. Ihe effectiveness ol their civil defense preparations is assessed.
C. Attribution
8 This inemorandum was requested by the National Intelligence Officer for St) ategic Programs. Its preparationoint undertaking of the Central Intelligence Agency; the Defense Intelligence Agency; the National Security Agency; Ihe Bureau of Inlclli-gence and Research, Department of State; and the offices of the Assistant Chief of Stalf for Intelligence. Department of the Army, of the Director of Naval Intelligence. Department of the Navy, and of the Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence. Department of the Air Force Material in theased on research papers prepared by the participating intelligence agencies. The working group was assisted by representors of the US Defense Civil Prepared-
ness Agency. J_
"jchalrman of Ihe working group which prepared the memorandum.
II. CIVIL DEFENSE IN SOVIET MILITARY STRATEGY
he Soviets regard civil defense as that part of mitiiary science concerned with protecting theand leadership and continuing nationalduring war.artroader Soviet concept which we have characterized as "warncompassing all the military and nonmllitaryby which the Soviets seek lo ensure the survival of Soviet society and the continuity of the Soviet state. The role of civil defense as an mlegral pari of military stialegy and planning in nuclear war was described4 by Colonel General Altunln. Chief of Civil Defense of ihe USSR and Deputy Minister of Defense, as follows.
Civil defense in the last analysis is focused on ensuring successful operations by the armed forces, for the course and outcome of armed combat will in large measure depend on the protection of the dvllian population and securing the rurvivnl of (he economy.
Passive Soviet civil defense measures for nuclearre therefore inseparably linked to Soviel nuclear weapons employment doctrine, to active air and missile defense, and to lliose offensive forces cmploved to limit damage to the USSR. Therefore, the full impact of the civil defense measures describedhis memorandum can be appreciated only in the contextverall Soviet Strategy and strategic potluie
oday's civil defense efforts are part of the Soviets' response to the "revolution in militarysed by Soviet military strategists since theo describe the development of nuclear weapons and intercontinental missiles. The present Soviet dvil defense program was shaped by Soviet strategy for nuclear war which emetged In the, but lb antecedents date from Ihe first years of the Soviet state.
A. locol Air
II The first Soviet civil defense effort began inith ihe formationvoluntary"combining the Junctions of air and chemical defense, paramilitary training, and constructionork in the dvllian economy.he Soviets established the first "offidat" agency having civil defense as its primary mission. It was an entirely dvllian organization called (he Local Air Defensend was subordinated to the Ministry of the Interior Id establishment probably reflected concern about development of long-range aircraft and about foreign concepts of strategic bombing. The Mf*VOational staff and local units in cities and factories throughout the USSR. In thes the danger of war with Germany grew, the MPVO instituted civil defense training nationwide. Despite these measures, on the eve of World War II Soviet leaden rated the dvil defense program as poor and urged greater efforts.esult. MPVO organizations multiplied, civil defense training was expanded, and an intensive program of Industrial dispenal was undertaken
uring Ihe war. the Soviet* evacuated the population and industry of entire cities Civil defense units erected defensive works, cleared obstruct sons. disarmed bombs and mines, and reconstructed Indus-
SECilrT
and other structures. These action, facilitated military operations and contributed lo expanding war production Following the war until thehe emphaili on civil defense declined, civil defense organizations were reduced, exlenxlve civil defense training was abandoned, and regulatloni went
he concept of localized air defense was altered in thehen the development of nuclear weapons and delivery systems exposed the entire OKintry 'r nuclear attack.he Soviet debate afoul nuclear strategy during this same period, most military leaders maintained that nuclear weapons would be decisive in future war and called for defensive measures against them. While the debate continued Into the, the changing Soviel views about nuclear weapons revived the lagging civil defensehelter construction in urban areas was renewedxtensive public civil defense training begannd evacuation procedures were instituted8 During the, shelters were constructed for senior party, slate, and military leaden. All these programs were aimed al "the preparation of the population to protect Itself from weapons of mass destruction and to deal with the aftermath nl such anivil defenseivilian effort under the MPVO.
B. Civil Defense ond the Military
*efense Minister Malinovsfciy mohal the onivinweoy by dVrtdnr, that Soviet doctrine would plan primanlirief conflict with manlve use of nuclear weapons, butmoil br prepared in conductrxoriadal campaign based primarily on nnnnucleai foxes mobiliied during theand nipphrd through
wartime production o assist <hls
mobiliration and lo smooth the transition lo aeconomy
The civil defense concept developed in theas the basil of Ihe Soviets" present programs. Based on the proposition that "lines betsveen the front and rear disappear in military operations involsing the employment of modernore comprehensive civil defense effort came lo be viewed by some military officers as an integral part of strategic defenses.esult, the Soviets placed increasing emphasis on the military importancevil defense and on Ihe responsibilities of regular military forces for civil defense tasks.
Soviet views about the proper relationship of civil defense lo the defense of the country were reflected in the Julyecree of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party and the Council of Ministers of the USSR. This decreeational civil defense organization to be called Civil Defense of the USSR ratherir Defense. Responsibility for this effort rested with the Council nf Ministers, which created the post of Chief of Civil Defense of the USSR.urther sign of the importance of civil defense, the Council of Ministers named Marshal V. I. Chuykov. then Deputy Minister of Defense and Chief of Ground Forces, to fill this post. The activities of the Chief of Civil Defense and Ihe staffs of civil defense under him were to be coordinated with the Ministry of Defense and with other ministries and state committees. Thestaffing, and equipping of civil defense elements were In be supported by the budget of the Ministry of Defense but within the limits determined by the Chief ol Civil Defense under the Council of Ministers. While the new decreetep forward In the developmententralized system, thisfell short of full military control over civil defense, even at the national level.
s Inventories of strategic missiles increased in, Soviet leaders showed greater concern about the destructive potentialuclear exchange and ihe prospectsuclear attack might occur with little warning. Soviet military writers, discussing nuclear strategy, civil defense concepts, and continued their repeated calls for dosei cooperation between civil deferue elements and units of the armed forces.vil Defense of the USSR became fully integrated with the Ministry of Defense. Inolonel General Altunin svaseputy Minister of Defense and Chief of Civil Defense.
C Protecting theShelters vs. EvocuaSon
s lateolonel General Beliavskiy. Chief of Staff of Civil Defense, declared
At present the most reliable protection lor persons againit all thesef mass destruction) is evacuation from large cities and industrial areas.
Soviet writers Indicated that civil defense leaders had made plans for large-scale movement of urban populaiioni and work en to shelters in rural areas during ihe "special period" (period of warning preceding nuclearhese writers claimed that, without such measures, casualties could beoimes as great.
l ili" umf lime, military and civil defense spokesmen appeared In differ over the role and importance of Soviel civil defense Mililaiy leaders idenlili'1 civil defense primarily with mililaiyAld Parly Congressinister of Defense Malinnvikiy tied civil defense In "the military-patriotic ediicalion of the Sovietheme repeated in the resolutions of the Congress He also claimed that the Soviet Air Defense Forces fPVOl could reliably destroy any aircraft and many enemyhus minimizing the protective mission nf civil defense Civil defense spokesmenifferent line They asserted, as in Chuykov* wordshat there could be "no complete guarantee that, in thef war. our cities and important industrial centers will nol suffer strikes with weapons nf masslthough Chuykov acknowledged that civil defense "alone is not capable of solving all tasks of defending the population and nationale asserted that it formed an inseparable part of Soviet defensive efforts
he stress on evacuation of cities duringppeared to be associated wilh military skepticism about the nature of civil defense in nuclear war Many Soviet spokesmen envisioned nuclear war ashort, large-scale nuclear eichange. with Soviet cities primary targets. This may accounl for Soviet stress on evacuation as the only feasible means lo protect the population. During the, however, civil defense wasubtle shift of direction. Evacuation remained the principal focus, but Soviet writers increasingly concentrated on shelters in urbanecondary but important means of protection. For example. Chuykov. writingescribed sheltering of people as one of the "moie effective" civil defense methods. Subsequently, shelters have received Increasing attention In this program, highest priority was assigned to protecting military and civilian leaden, their supportingsystems, and workers at key Industrial facilities. At the same time, civil defease spokesmen continued to call for evacuation ol the general population, claimingationwide urban shelter programvery difficult task."
ecent ttatemenli about civil defense have placed more emphasis on shelters for ihe entire population. In4 article "On the Theory o( Civilivil Delensc Chief Altunln messed that shelters constituted ihe "principal means of
immi K. Caaaaw n w
4ttinii-.ui"wrban MSarticulaily under ennditinns of thrrat of sneak attack, and called for studies aimed at "seeking more effective ways to provide the entire civilian population with shelter facilities which fully meet Ihe requiiemenli lor protection."While Ceneral Allunin alsn called for improved evacuationarticularly fnr reducing evacuation lime, Ihe *hift tn more stteo. nn shelters wa* clear. This emphasis In the civil defense program is consistent wjfh current Soviet concepts lor survival in nuclear war
D. Civil Defense in Current Soviet Military Slrolegy
oviet military and governmental leaden continue tn regard nuclear war as possihle. although thev refuse tnped lie degree of pmhaliililv to it Soviet theorists contend that nuclear war would begin with the massed use nf nuclear forces hy both sides agalmt each other's strategic and theater forces, command and communication facilities, svif-relatedilitary-economicnd centers of government. Each side would aim not only lo reduce Ihe opposingecond-Strike capability as much as possible, but also to disrupt national mnhilizallnn nf its civilian population and economy, and then In weaken it* ability lo conduct subsequent operations. Soviet switcn regard the lint large-scale nuclearas likely lo rJetermine the latei course and outcome of the war.
lot* Iherj rqval onKrOWM Iw all prlorC. lor bmh shrllm and rv.oual.on mm!
I- brfcaaWif ImlilalniuralpMectaaa acaiaM nMaalaiinamaid*mm-awm Thin.inr/am lor llVdi law ttf nuclrai allaek. and falViul il'llm fair oilier areas
oviet concepti about nuclear war have changed somewhat from those of. At (hat time, most Soviet theorists maintained that Ihe West probably wouldariety of prewar actions tn assembleuclear strike forces, mobilize theater forcesploil the result of the strikes, and safeguard their own forces and population from retaliation Because these preparations could be detected, many Soviet writen contended that the "period of direct threal" or "special period" which wouldudear conflict would be lufficient both toreemptive attack and to evacuate major cities and industries- Increased technical recon-nabtance capabilities strengthened tbb view Many Soviet military officers were concerned, however, that evacuation would give warning to the enemy and thus
l*+-
reduce tlie- effectivenessoviet preemptive strike. Al the same lime, (he procurement of large numher* ol high-yield weapons by bnlh sides made shelter protection extremely difficult in probable urban target areas. Consequently, civil defense through evacuation was closely tied lo Snvict thinking based on strategic warning and preemption.
. Soviet thinking hasand more toward the viewuclearoccur withhort period nf priorcoircKie* with ;lie deployment nlballistic missiles requiring fewfor launch. Writingthen chief of the Strategic Rncketthat high readiness of Soviet forces andof advanced reconnaissancethat Soviet missiles "will have time duringnf the missile of the aggressor tn leaveandetaliatory strike."the usual stress on preemptive attack byspokesmen, Krylnv emphasized preventingdisarming strike by launching SovietwarningS attack was underway.authoritative Soviet text Military Strategy
Soviet military strategy considers that, incircumstances,arge war mighl arise suddenly, without the traditionalperiod characteristic of ihe past.
shift in emphasis in Soviel thinkingmuch less time would be available formeasures once war appearedthe emphasis on civil defenseshifted to some degree away from evacuationsuch as dispersal o( industry andsurprise attacks.he lateMinister Crediko warned that "Ihe naturewar" would permit "ton little limeretaliatorye urged therequired decisions "prior to war."warning was consistent wilh otherwhich contend that in the final throes ofagainst Communism, Ihe West might'sneakoviet concerns about the periodprior lo nuclear war may be based onfearostile surpriseearby the absence of strong USSoviet concerns might also reflectthat the USSR itself mighl launch ansome circumstances with little advance
lthough Soviet military theorists generally maintain thai Initial nuclear strikes would decide (lie overall course and nut comeonflict, they Mill contendeneral nudear war mighl eslentlrotracted period, involving months or yean of lev. intense, largely nonnudeai fighting Because these writers eipect both side* to suffer heavy losses from masuve nuclear strikes, they note Ihe need to mohilirr forces and produce armaments during wartime In this view, civil defense hasparticular Uralegic importance" because it "makes possible theinn of armed (nrcrs during the initial period nf war
III. CIVIL DEFENSE OBJECTIVES AND PLANNING
hile we have cnnsiderahle documentars infrsrmaUnn concerning objectives nf the Soviet cisil defense program, the sources vary in their treatment of the subject The situation is similar in Ihe mailer nf Soviet civil defense planning:evealed in open literature is not always what we believe ate actual Soviet plans, which are invariably classified
A. Objectives ond Priorities
lie Snvlets" statements nf their civil defense nbjeclivr* vaiy In emphasis depending on thethe publication, and the intended audience Fnr example, an unclassifiedists object Iveshis order nf priority:
prntecting the population from "weapnm nf mass destruction."
preparing the national means of production for "economic stability" (continuity ol production) under renditions of enemy attack, and
onducting urgent rescue and restorational sites of destruction.
This listing of objectives is intended for use In civil defense courses taught in institutions ol higher learning II deliberately omits any reference In ihe place nf civil defense in the broader framework nf war survival as seen by ihe leadership and the military commanders responsible for the civil defense program
2ft The most mmprehensive statement of the objectives and task? of civil defense available tn us is in the4 article by Ceneral Altunin (see paiagraphn Chapter II of this memorandum)
'sMvilnv. tnd AUhoi OMf0
Cencriil Allunio's article was published nunc than two yeais aftercame head nf the civil defense organization and lis Incorporation into the command structure of the Mmisliy of Defense. During thai period hp had sufficient lime to fnrmulatr civil defense objectives and priorities according lo the policies of Ihe leadership It is significant lhal while Altunin refers many limes In protection of ike civilian population, he list* three basic aims ol civil defense asnf ensuring
"normal activityhe country's agencies nf leadershipar."
"successful operations by the aimednd
"effective fund inning of the economy" In .sailirnr
To thb end. thp Soviet civil defense organization has three fundamentalhile Soviet writings are not dear about the relative priorities nf theseevidence on actual civil defense prepara lion* indicates that they fall in the following order:-
protection of (he Soviet leadership: key civilian (parly and government) and milltarv personnel at the national and local levels needed In assure the operation nf government and the aimed forces during and after nuclrar win
protection of the economy and the essential work force: workers and em plovers nfservices, industrial facilities, and other economic enterprises that must continue In function in wartime, and
protection of the nonessential element of ihe population
lanning
ocumentary materials on Soviet civil defense are of several categories Writings of Soviel spokesmen contain statements of civil defense policv and descriptions of programs. These ore often propaganda articles eihorting the reader to greatet participation Ms civil defense By far the largest body nf matenah comprises bask textbooks and manual* covering all details ol dvil ddense preparations ranging from general drscriptlons of the civil defense program to detailed technical specifications for shelterThese unclassified textbooks and manuals have
ah llieie pnnriliei often licrn liiconectly referred In in publications in (he West as Soviet civil defense plans While we haw evidence ulhe civil defense plan*irion. nqviniulHio levels should contain, we do nut have copies uf any aetual eiasaified civil defense plan*
o fcilbfv prionly ocsjectivev Soviet planning call* for fianlructl facilities, together ssilh extensive supporting romniuiiieatinn* facilllics. In permit kc> gnsftnnieiil prruinnel In function during nuclear attack Planning lo pmvide for what the Soviets term the "slaliilltv olalls fin the prut return of euential pcr*onnrl through sheltering and dbprrsal. hjfdmirig ol indotlnai equipment, and ttnckpiling nf critical industrial and agricultural com modir ding topkins. both *heltering and evacsio-tina are required for the protection nf the generalpart nf the population deemed nnnessentlal In the continuity nf vital siartimc preparations arid lo rescue and restoration operations The training program emphasizes dvil defense task rirganizatinnv but still calls for training and indnctri. nation of (he ceneral pnpulalion
Soviel dwl defense planning is aimed at protecting ihe "rear areas" which in modern war "extend practicallyation's entireence Soviet civil defense planning cover* all aspects of national lllr It provides not nnlv for the protection of people. Isut alsoanpower and economic mohi lirasitem with *trategic reserves of rood and materiel tn function under enndittons nf nudear attack. It follows then that civil defense is an integral part of planning by party, government, economic, and military organizations al all levels. The national civil defense plant are prepared within the Ministry nf Defense by the staff nf the civil defense organization headed by General Altunin. At the Moscow level, civil defense planning appears to be geared to Ceneral Staff plans for the conduct of war and lo the mobilization programs nf each nf the ministries. *late committees, and governmental entitles at the level of the Council of Ministers.
Belose Ihe level of the Ministry nf Defense, the military districts ore responsible lor preparation nf civil defense plans for their areas nf jurisdiction. In each mililarv district, the deputy commander for civil defense, working with the nblast and republic civil defense head qu art res. is responsible for preparing plan* which
reflect the wartime tactical mission at Ihe military district,
figureriofiftai and Program) of Soviel*
SurvrMParty mi GorrmmoTI
r-rWKlton S( IN tCOflCJf. lYcrteYS.
and ScienrJicritfr-calPcrwnfid
PROGRAMS
or*and
M isolated rtaxaaaa slats
KaiJenircalpUnirjc-frt
Oisprrsai el new Ii'iiuWy
Sr*trtrs la essmiiai ai3 on-duty cerimntl
Olwisaldwokn.
SuKUUM rsiiiing la-CO uni!i
Pi* sonrel provides wan pr ol eel. ve equipmeni
m rsrPCOJBS3TI
u-oam
et flMrn atirban nn
Training jnj
StJ provieed BTOWciiv* eewawnt
military defense
provide for the continuing operation nf those fie menu of thehe military district whose production or services are deemed evien rial, and
provide fni conrdinalinn of ihe operation* nf civilrganizations and regular trnop units.
hile we have not had accessilitary district civil defense plan, we do have evidence of iheof subjects covered.
traffic control nf road and rail movement by civil defenseegular military units, and elements of the urban population being dn-persed or evacuated:
allocation nf alternate communication facilltie* for government lender* and for civil defense operations.
medical assistance facllilies;
transfer of independenl sources of power (mo-liile powero civil drlense engineering
nd
designation of itockpilei and reserve* under military district control which can he made available to civilomponents."
anagement nf civil defense is similar to that in many other areas ol Soviet administration. Authorities of the Individual republic* oversee the overall effort within theirul theor kray) Is the level which translate* directive* from higher echelon* into precise plans for implementation by the civiltaffi nf cities, ruralnd industrial iuMallalinm within it* territory. In lum the civil defense plans of cities and towns represent an amalgam of the plans of individual enterprise* and nf community service* *uch a* lireflghting. first aid.
rumple* -eie lake" from rlncuiWini of mmlHiiedlrlW pUnnlnrIn an .rod?. O* If Cllt.kiv in llwAp.il IIKVI Milium, rltoiijchr.
" TV USSRuirof IS separaleIdivided lata nblaiti nr krai*
enginei'c(publicnddci which ate essential In rescue and reslorallon. Mans of cities and lowni arc coordinated wilh the local military garrison commanders, militaryf Ihe militia and the Committee for State Securityocal firend Other entities. Each ofrganization* will play *ome role in peacetime civil detente preparations and wartime operation*.
t the lowest level are civil deleme unll plans and plan- of Individual economiclans of economic facilities are datsilied but would normally indude"
identification of essential and itorteisential worker*:
plan* for the movement of essential worker* at the facility, together with their families, to dispersed locations and for the evacuation of nonessential worker* and their families to location* more distant from the fadlily;
p'oviiioni for shdter and cover (from weaponor workers (and/or families residing in facility housing).
a plan for converting the farility to wartime production, according lo national defense need*.
a program lor training svorker* (and families resident In housing of the facility) to use individual means of protection;
a plan for organizing administration, warning procedures, and communications at the facility;
a schedule for executing baiic dvil defense measures for the facility;
a plan for carrying out rescue and emergency restoration work at the facility; and
measure* for protecting food supplies, forage, and water supply sources from radioactive and loik materials and biological agents.
etailed planning is essential to the conduct of civil dcfenie operations, but we are uncertain about the quality of Soviet planning. One objective in subordinating civil defense to Ihe military was to alleviate deficiencies in planning bul we cannot determine Ihe cxtenl to which its quality has proved successful. We do know, from evidence provided In Sovielhat the Soviel* are attempting In resolve planning ddiOeneies.
IV. ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS
Case histories of wartime and peacetime disasters in urban ureas all show the vital contribution of planning In saving lives sad properly. In these cases the most important element* in determining the success of rescue and restoration operation* were the nature of the rescue organization, its level of training and ihe degree lo which it was recognized by those in the disaster areas as the source of authority. In some instances, military personnel quickly Introduced into the stricken area, even without much prior disaster planning by the community, letvsd to reduce casualties and destruction. The military provided through its rank structure andisible organization and an accepted authority."
lo addition to the normal peacetimeorganization in theubliclyhighly structured. miutar>>controlled civil defense organization exists for the specific purpose of providing leadership for prcattack evacuation and dispersal and poitattack rescue operations. The existence of *uch an organization probably assure* that the Soviet public would respond a* directed during wartime Accounts of urban disaster* tuggest that any stifling of individual initiative* would be offsetreat extent by the advantages of advance preparation* and the existencelanding well-trained organization to take over in an emergency.
Most Soviet open-source literature gives an incoitect Impressionrimarily civilian civil defense structure The present Soviet civil defense organization and functions arc basically military, although there i* extensive civilian participation. In thb connection, we note Soviet effort* to obtain international recognition of the legitimacy of military participation in civil defense operations. Recently, at an international conference in Ceneva onlaw in armed conflicts, the Soviets proposed that military unit* assigned to civil defense be accorded the same protected stains as civilian civil defense pcrson-
local military commisnriar ii out oflyitem lomanpower motHhulion. and lo determine it* wartime autgmotors of aP lliose liable foi military service
Yegortiv. SMynVov. and Alabin. op. cU
Anderson.irVronyOotrVn BelorWiu Dvrtne IHimUi Optratlorti, Ohio Stale University, Disaster Research
Crater.
-eterer
The Geneva proposal was Ihe first lo inrludc (he military In what international law considers strictly civilian functions. This is an Indication of the importance ihe Soviets ascribe to the role of the military in civil defense.
he relative lack of unclassified material nn the military aspect of civil defense is consistent wilh the secrecy surrounding all things military inSR Unfortunately, much of our information is derived from unclassified documentary sources and from civilians, tending to emphasize the nonirtUltary side of civil defense, furthermore, in Ihe past we have given relatively low priority to collection of intelligence or analysis of the organizational aspects of Soviet civil defense. We are confident in our assessment of the military subordination of the Soviel civil defense organization, but we are uncertain about operational relationships between civil defense organizations and elements nf the five Soviet military services
A. Poacollme Structure
the past quarter century, as discussedII. dvil defense has been shiftedand hasumber ofchanges in response to fluctuation* inin civil defense and to shift*ocal organization withcontrol, civil defense becamethe national level under the Council of MinistersUSSR Inith Marshal Chuykov at
Under this arrangement, from the Moscow level downward, the chain of administrative andcommand over dvil defense organizations proceeded along two separate but Interconnected lines. The first proceeded from the Chief of Civil Defense, under the Council of Ministers, through the capitals of the union republics toecond chain of command proceeded from the Ministry of Defense to each military district,ivil defense department was established, headed by Ihe Deputy Commander for Civil Defense. Disagreements within and between the military and civilian elements of this structure, and difficulties in coordination of planning and operations occurred at each organizational level despite efforts by Chuykov 'o resolve problems associated wilh the quality of command relationships.
During, it was irglltd that civil defense is pari of military science and Strategy, that it is part ul the overall strategic defense of the rear, that it is essenllol for the support nf inllitaiy operations, and that It should he completely subordinate to the military establishment Accordingly.hen (he Ministry of Defense svas made directly responsible for civil defense (see Figuret "focused all matter* involving protection againsl imperialist aggressioningle organ, the USSR Ministry nf Defense."'15 statement reiterated4 declaration by Army Cenerol V. C. Kullkov. Chief of the General Staff: "In coordination with all branches of our armed forces, andingle military command, it (civil defensel ensures the vital activities nf the stale under conditions of modem
espite these statements and various references in the open literature to daily Involvement in civil defense by the General Staff, the military dislricls. and other commands, there are lew specifics in unclassified material on precisely how the Ministry of Defense exercises Its control. Open sources state that, below the MOD. direction of dvil defense is exercised, as in the past, by civilian chiefs of civil defense who are the chairmen of councils of ministers and of executive committees of Soviets (governing councils) and by the heads of ministries, departments,and Installations of the national economy. These civilian chiefs direct dvil defense through staffs and services of civil defense. Direction of these organizations by the MOD is said to be carried out byDeputy Minister of Defense Altunin through his "subordinate controlul no detail is given in these public statements concerning the nature of this apparatus.
rom Intelligence sources, it Is opparcn! that the "subordinate control apparatus" referred to byis the military district structure and that actual responsibility lor directing civil defense activities below the MOD level lies with the commanders of military districts and thdr deputies fot dvil defense, who are supported by departments of civil defense The civil defense staffs of union republics continue to play an important role, however, by ensuring that governmental and economic organizations on iheir territory implement dvil defence prog ramsby the Ministry of Defense and military district authorities (tee Figure 21
- KotloW.cvtUr. Octfhe tax and Fvrnl. Mora* Atornlrdat..
ullW.nlwo. No.tm.
'*jloblln. <ukIp. ,'i
-SfcCBEt-
The Russian Soviet Federated SodalisI Republic (RSFSR) presents special organizational problems because of its size. Untilivil defense "operational tones" served as intermediate commands betsveen the RSFSR Civil Defense Staff and the staffs of lower administrative unit* The boundaries of these zones did not always coincide with those of the military districts located within the RSFSR This arrangement did not appear consistent with the new organization placing military district commanders in the first echelon below Moscow in the civil defense structure. It appears that the zona! system in the RSFSR was undergoing certain organizational changes2 as part uf the shift to military control, but we do not know what changes weie actually made.
within each of the union republics the civil defense effort is managedivil defense staff, headed In each caseeneral officer. Below this level arc oblasf. city, and rayon civil defense staffs, the more important of which are headed by active-duty military officers (see Figureubordinate to them arc the operational services, to-mat tons, and teams directly engaged in civil defense activities. Economic installations and other places rsl work and study located within cities and rural rayons also have civil rlefense staffs. These staffs are often headed by retired or reserve military officers The chairman of the councilinisters of each republic and at Inwer levels the chairmen of the local Soviets are also responsible for compliance In their areas ofwith civil defense directives issued from higher echelons of the organizational structure
Civil Defense Starrs, Services, Formations, ond Teams
n general, civil defense staffs are charged with planning, coordinating, and implementing civilprograms Civil defense planning in the militaryased on local requirements and coordinated with military mobilization and operations plans. At (be nblast and city levels (see Figureone by (he chief nf the civil defense staff and coordinated with the military garrison commanders to ensure thatonsonant wilh the wartime missionsthe troop units located In the area. Al (he rayon level and al individual installations, (he chiefs of civil defense coordinate with military commissariats (local military mobilization organizations) In determining their personnel requirement! to man civil defensecal plans ore approved by the deputy commander for civil defense nf Ihe military district.
then coordinated with the local patty, government, and economic leaders.
dvil defense warlime operationalcarried out by the civilian services,and military dvil defense troops,as needed by regular militaryformations, and teams are organized atand dty levels and in rural areas. Theirto protect dty installations and lo performrepair work. Bdow Ihe cily level, formationscctcrprbei are itiponsible for protectingfacilities and workers. In additiondvil defense operations in tural ateasfor city evacuees, rural civil defensealso supplement utban dvllian formationspostaltaek operations.
Civil Defense ol Economic Installations
The nature of civil defense activities at economic Installations Is dependent largely on the importance of the activityvar economy. At the national levd, economic ministries cooidlnate their civil defense activities as presented in the production plans with the Civil Defense Staff and ssitht lower levels, planning is doneearly basis and coordinaled with the appropriate local dvil defense headquarters.
Altunin has stated dearly that civil defense measures should give priority to industries essentialar effort. Human sources have confirmed that varying degrees of emphasis are placed on dvil defense al places of work. Thus. Industries of vital military importance would tend loarge and wellcivil defense staff, whereas industries nf no strategic importance wouldess sizable civil defense effort. The trend In recent years, however, has been to extend the system to an even larger number of industrial installations. Current reporting describes active civil defense organizations at some plants that we would regard as having little importance in wartime.
the plant leveltaff, composed mainly ofor foremen. Among their functionsplanning for evacuation, and organizingteams for functions such asrescue, repair, ond first aid. Itfnrmations that have the task of protecting
"Cdsptin tl the Stile Plinntn* CnrnmillW.
orfinET
rigvreoviet Gnl Oefefiv* OrQon-ialiont ol Obkivi. City, ondevels
Civil Defenso Troopt
ilitary civil defense troops, cieated in the, are organized at the military district level Military civil defense units are responsible for reconnaissance in contaminated areas, for clearing debris, for reopening roads, and other civil defense activities lor which the civilian lormalions have neither the required equipment nor the experience.
ch military district has one or more military civil defense units of regimental size. These units arc usually located near important cities and major Industrial centers; their organization, equipment, and strength vary depending on their location. Some of the Identified regiments (seend Figure i) consist of two battalions with five companies each:chemical, mechanized equipment, motor transport, and construction There are also several platoons assigned tongineering and tank recoil no Issa nee. Decent evidence suggests nol only that civil defense troops have their own organic communications, but alsa that there ate independent communications units (see.
orlime Structure
SS We lack precise information on the extent to which peacetime civil defense responsibilines,and chain of authority would change during wartime Such evidence as we do have, however, on Soviet civil defense concepts, the peacetime civil defense structure, and planned civil defensesuggests that under wartime comlllions all civilian orgonlralions contributing to civil defense would be subordinate to the militaiy dislrictThese arrangements, considering the scope of dvil defense activities during wartime, would amount lo military control over practically all aspects of Soviet life Such control by the military would be
consistent with the Soviet concept that civil defense it pait of military operations inan effective civil defense system is essential to military mobilization and to successful combat operations of the armed foiccs.
o supplement civil defense troops, it Is likely that other ground force units of the military district, such as engineers, would be designated to carry out civil defense tasks. We are uncertain about the role of the other arms and services In civil defense operations, for example, it is probable that civil defense elements rdy on PVO units for warning and communications support, but there is no firm evidence on how this functions. We also believe that in wartime the local militia, the KGB, and internal security troops, supplemented by military units as necessary, would be subordinated to the military district commanders to maintain public order.
wartime organization andelements Involved In civil defensedepend on the tactical situation. Duringnatural disaster In Odessa, the taskwas composed of oblast civilian formationsunits. The activities of civil defensewere directed from an emergencyup at the oblast executive committee undercivil defense chief. Officials of theinduded the oblast and city governmentleaders. Formations operating underof the oblast and city dvil defense staffup to inform and mobilize the population andactivities among civilian and militaryorganizations and other military units.were formed on an ad hoc basis andcontrol of the emergency headquarters ofThe assistance given by military unitsextremely valuable, providingand equipment. The availability ofunits for dvil defense duties duringdepend, of course, on thdr tactical
C. Manpower
sources have provided valuabledata on the strength and location ofmilitary and civilian units. Thefor the staff organizations shown in Tableminimumor example, the figuresprofessional staff members; they do notadini nil Ira live and support personnel. Also,omits any figures for full-time civilat individual economic installations While we have extensive evidence that there are suds personnel, we have no basis for aggregating the total
that the administrative andin the civil defense staffs is at least equalnumber ofII. the total number of full-time civilcould approach0 withoutof the full-time dvil defense manpowerinstallations. We are certain, moreover,are more full-time dvil defensethanhown in the table. Ittherefore, that0 figureless than the actual number offull-time in dvil defense in the USSR.
Military Civil Defense Manpowtr
National Headquarters. Eleven general officers have been identified at the Civil Defensefor the USSR.ssumed that at least six more are heading other directorates and departments. The size of Ihe staff organizations headed by these officers is unknown,inimum oftaff memberseneral officer would be reasonable for theof the nationwide program.
Military Districts. As of the, the civil defense "department" at the military district level had someotaff personnel. It is not known whether dvil defense was upgradeddirectorate" and its staff Increased after the reorganization in the. Under Soviethangeepartmentirectorate wouldoubling of the manpower. The greater responsibilities of the military districts under the latest reorganization would also imply an increase In manpower.
Defense Academy.officers have been graduating from theAcademy at Balashikha. Nritber the sizestaff nor the number of graduates haspublicly. An estimate of the numbercan be made, however, based onof junior officers assigned to each regimentfield. An emigre who served in three dvilheard that three to four newlywere assigned to regiments annually.all graduating officers are assigned tofour-year academy should graduate atear. In addition there have beento Higher Central USSR CivilCourses, Ndthcr the size of the school norhave been determined.
IdfM'M cm MmM Unit, in ih. USSH '
RSFSR
l_ Uib*l
SFSR
Mrdinhii SlM
tan*
Mown- MX MFSR
k'.v UklUM
KolilUIm.i;
Xmm. RSFJ*
SFSR
tammm, RSfsb
SFSR
< .cI-l
Lnme
>*F. Oifcl/Anai. Aimrr.nn SSR
Tromi-iColocaud Wit* fanr-l
WlW
Kit*
Ur-nrmd
Owlr-otaA
Cr-rnovUy. Ufcwtll
lotl Dejeme Troops* An estimate nf the strength nf civil defense troops is very difficult to formulate because the evidence suggests that the strengths nf the units vary depending on the location nf the regiment and the importance of the area they protect. Most of the regiments are reportedly in cadre status, that is. containingucleus of officers and men. These cadres would be expanded to their full manpower complement during mobilization or an emergency. Some battalions may become regiments and regiments divisionsull wartime mobilization and deployment. The additional manpower would be supplied by reservists.
he strengths of cadre units as often estimated by human sources rangeen. Although there is no information as to the sizeull civil defense regiment, there have been several references lo the unitsegiment. The regiment in Chlrchik (an earthquake-prone area)
" OHiem .ltd men in (mining unlit anVInt
olfrrs the best example of what mayull unit,otal strength ofen. Since it is nnt known how many units ate at cadre nr full strength, an average of the identified regimental manpower figures was computed. On this basis, the estimated average strengthegimentfficers and men.
n addition to the regiments of civil defense troops, there are independent communications units subordinate to civil defense, manningal civil defense staffew reports have estimated the strength of the companies serving two republic civil defense headquarters to be betweenofficers and men. Assuming that companies of similar strength serve at other republics headquarters, there would be anen at this level. This is the basis for the figureommunications Iroops appearing in Table II. There are almost certainly more full-time communications personnel operating stations at lower echelon slalf
TAHt.K II
Prolntlonal Personnel on Sovid Civil Prlrur Stafli (lull-lime)
Stall OfguuiiiMoni
National
Republic
Cuiei
TotalStall
M-!Ditlrtrti
Ovit Dcleme Troop Unm
CmnmurileVMmi.
Aeademy
Total
1 indjdo reserve
850
taoo
C-vilii
SO
too
Total
4M
bul we have no direct current evidence as lo their number. One analysisotal of0 full-time civil defense communications petson-nel. This Is based largely2 Defense Intelligence Agency estimate that dedicated civil defense communications systems serve upovernmental centers, and on the assumption that an average of at least five people would be required to man each of the centershour basis. The analysis also made allowance for heavier manning at the numerous bunkered communications facilities described inf this memorandum. We do not know, however, the extent to which most of these communications facilities are currently manned.
Republic Civil Defense- Staffs. General officers serve as chiefs of staff for civil defense at the republic level. Colonels have been Identified as deputy chiefs, and majors as assistant chiefs for propaganda, political affairs, and combat training. Although there is no information on the size of the staff. It Is known that It Is composed mainly of active, reserve, and retired military personnel. Considering the dutiesepublic dvil defense staff, it is estimatedtaff ofther officers wouldinimum requirement. The figures given here do not account for the possibilityonal staff for the RSFSR or any other kind of organizational arrangement in the large republic.
Oblast Civil Defense Staffs. At tlie oblast level the chief of the civil defense staffolonel. The size of the organization and the extent of civil defense activities al thb level arc not known We havetaff of at least ten, because ol the importance of the oblast In overall administrative matter*.
tiu Civil Defense Staffs. The composition of city civil defense stalls and numbers of stafl members depend largely on Ihe size and economic activity of the city. For those with populationsillion, staffs of six officers hove been estimated. For dtles havingillion people, an average of three officers per staff has been estimated; and for dties0. one staff officer.
ayon Cloif Defense Staffs.ittle information on the composition of the civil defense staff at the rayon level While active-duty military officers may serve as chiefs of staff In some of the more important rayons, there are no Indications as to how many officers would strve in this capacity countrywide. Two offlcen. either reserve or retired military, have been estimated for the rayon
Civilian Civil Defense Manpower
n addition lo military civil defense personnel, large number* of civilians hove civil defenseIn peacetime dvlllans man the staffs, services, and formations ol administrative: centers, economic installations, and other organizationsull-time and part-time basis.
t the various governmental leveb ihediairmcn ol the respective councils of minister* or executive committees ate responilble lor civil defense.to them are civil defense chiefs and their stuffs composed of both military and civilian personnel. Full-time civilian staff member* al these levels are usually retired militaryhe proportion of civilian to military staffer* i* undear. but it can be assumed that at the lower echelons, civilianwill be proportionally higher. We estimate that three civilians, in addition to military personnel, serve full-lime in the republic dvil defenseive in iSeetwsfen one and five in the cities, and one In the rayons-
t economic Urtallattom the duector is the chief nf civil defense, but it i* the chief of staff at the Installation who plans and coordinates dvil defense activities Depending on the importance of the installation, the chief of staff will be full-time or part-timr
umber of civilians also have responsibility for civil defense programs atchools, and other organizations. Because of fragmentaryll has nol been possible to determine what proportion of these civil defense staffs is part-time.
The largest civilianade up of ihe manyeams, and individuals responsible for civil defense operations in wartime. The cadre* are considered part-time personnel and are organized atiiin. and enterprises. Their numbers and strength* vary according to the size and importance of the localities andarions. The strength* of these civil defense organization* will be dependent on the way in whkh services at the oblast and dry level make use of existing civilian and military structuies for such needs as public order, medical care, and engineering service*
Overall civilian participation in civil defense formations has been estimated by human and other sources to range betweenndercent of the work force. As reported by the Central Statbtlcal Adminbtration ol the Council of Ministers, the total labor force in the USSR wasillioninimum ofercentof the work force, the number of civilians involved in civil defense would be aboutillion.
5 Altunin Issued an order stipulating that for any economic installationeople there shouldescueor betweenndor an organizationeam oforpplying Altunln'i figure* lo the total work force, the number of civilian* participating in dvil defenseart-time basis at economic Installations would be upwards ofillion.
Quality of Civil Defense Ptitonncl
TI. The leadership of the dvil defense organization in the USSR I* composedarge number of general officers, many ol whom have impressive qualifies-tions. Colonel Generalelatively) general in the MOD leadership, appears to be fairly active in military and political drclesne ofeputy ministers (three of whom are firste has been trained at several military academies and has had combat experience Before hb appointment as Chief of Civil Defense, he wo* Chief of the Main Personnel Directorate of thend served as Commander of the North Caucasus Military. and as Commander ofh Army in the Baltic Military Districtth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, he was elected to full membership on the Central Committee.
any of the other general officer* identified a* assigned to civil defense appear to be high-quality-officcn. They have held important staff andpositions at the general staff level, in military districts, and In the group* of Soviet forces, as indicated in the listing below of the previous assignments of the moil wnlor Soviet officersas assigned to civil defense:
CUnrnlAlignments
atal Almoin Oiltf. ftnoand Directorate.
Ministry of Defense Ovnmandor. Norlk Caucatto
MjltaryGeneralDeputy Coaanuooer. Kin
Miluary DtUiScl
Chief ot SUB.ri
Coinoel Centra!Chief ol Still. Croup of
Faroes. General PobsraJ Directorate.
Ileh-uvim Military District Lieutenant Cennal Vluos- HeilCommander. Central Auanblricl UnJ Drpuly Commander. Noil ha in Croup of Foam
escue detachmentomposite of ihe principal civil lelenie units al an organliatlon or Installation.
Cuereni Civil Pelewe lv>drrt Previous AnlgnwW
LieutenantCnrtiininjn. Soviet
Tronps
Li'ulrninl Deputy CnnulMmln. Moscow
OilliKt
mong the republic chiefs nf the eivil defense staff thereormer chief of an overseas military advisory groupeputy commander of the Kiev Military District. Other general officers have been identified only at their present dosI. In most eases, an officer of the republic's nationality is assigned as Chief of the Civil Defense Staff.
e haveotal ofeneral officers assigned to civil defense at theilitary,nd oblast orevels. This total is probably only about half of the total general officer billets.
indication that senior civil defenseof high quality is that several have beenserving wiihin the civil defense structure.o* thistatement by ColonelCivil Defense Deputy Chief forindicated the status of civil defense officerslocal level:
The fact that morehiefs of Civil Defense Staffs were elected as members of local government councils5 testifies to the growth of authority and public activeness of the Communist leaders of Civil Defense.
for the quality and experience ofin general, evidence from human sourcesWhereas the younger officers traineddefense have sufficient understanding ofto provide good leadership, olderreassigned to civil defense from otherthe armed forces, according to some reports,of good leadership. We do not knowof the officer corps has receivedand we are uncertain about theof leadership, particulariy that providedolder field-grade officers.
everal reports have Indicated that recruits for civil defense regiments are not among the first to be selected for duty. Sometimes, civil defense ranks six (out of seven) in the selection process. Thus, recruits having questionable backgrounds, disciplinaryoreneral lack of skills are assigned to civil defense regiments. Nevertheless, in the Tew occasions that emergency civil defense operations have been conducted, the soldiers seem lo have performed well.
Al Ihe republic and lower administrative levels. Ihe quahly of staffmilitarybeen questioned by many source* The ci-mi lilary men are thoughl lo be filling an easy post, which does not tequire much effort and provides extra pay.
Civilian formations organized at economic and n'her installations arc supposedly formed by persnnnel excluded from military duty. There ace instances, however, in which participants arc selected at random The quality of the performance of these formation* will dependarge degree on the training these personnel receive and on the leadership provided.
n sum. the civil nianpower appears toixture ol competent staff and other* who tjhv* less ability. The quality of personnelhole is difficult to assess because of Ihe many factors about which we do notlear picture, such as the quality of leadership, training, and motivation.
D. Command, Control, ond Communications
The civil defense organization is supported by dedicated communications networks which are believed to link the CD Headquarters in Moscow with subordinate staff centers throughout the USSR. There are Indications that at least al the republic level, independent communications units of the CD troops are responsible for manning these stations.
The dvil defense troops,omponent of the Soviet military, are pariommunications network whichontrol and coordination function between the military district headquarters. CD units and other ground forces elements within the military district
It is believed that the Ministry ofprovides another network to be usedackup in emergencies. It Is possible thai this system was considered necessary to provide communication links with those areas not covered by the dedicated network. Personnel manning these stations areto be civilian
The above network* serve primarily thecommunication need* of CD. It Is believed that in wartime, other li.ed and mobile communication
-StC-flfi^
stations will also be available (of civil defense purposes.
E. Conclusions
general, regarding Che Soviet dvilwe conclude lhal ihe presentstructure is better suited than ita predecessornut Soviet objective* lor dvil defense.civil defense by Ihe military alone, rathera due! civilian and military h'n? ofadvantages both lor peacetime planningcivil defense operations Placing bothmilitary civil defense manpower andmilitary control assures an organizationtn the needs of the armed forces as called formilitary concepts. Some dvllian officialsnegatively to military direction of theirpeacetime. However, the centralization ofunder the military should facilitateplans, monitoringmaintaining stockpiles
size of the Soviet civil ddense structure.distribution within the political andIts leadership, and the facilities availablefor its command and control appearfrom an organizational standpoint, lo carrycivil defense plans and operations.
V. PROTECTION OF THE LEADERSHIP
rotection of the Soviet leadership encompasses all the measures necessary to achieve one of ihe basic aims died by General Altunin in hbo ensure "the normal activity of all the country's agendes of leadershipoviet classified and unclassified writing* ofipressed growing concern about the survivability of the civilian and military leadership of Ihe country and about command and control ol Soviet militaryhese concerns have prompted the Soviets tohundreds ol hardened lacilities in and around the capital and throughout the country to servety. government, and military leadership. Ab underway to provide such ladlittes for dvil defense headquarters at all levds. We have evidence of hardened facilities and supporting communications for civil defense leaders in the Moscow area and at other locations in the USSR, but we do not know the numbci and loratinn ol such iarifittr* countrywide.
A. At the Nationol lovel
Thealletn of the structure* built to protect the leaderahip (depicted In Figureest seen in the Moscow area Major party, government, and military headquarters (which mdudn civil defense) located in Moscow maintain emergency bunkered facilities In the city tn which top leaders and commanders would repairudear attack occurred with minimum warning. For example, the Politburo and Central Committee are believed to havereinforced concrete bunker space below (he Kremlin and sdjaceni siffices.unkers arc reportedly linked with the Moscow subway. This is said In be the case alsu with underground facilities at the cmnplei ol buildings In downtown Moscow used by the Ministry of Defense and General Staff Similar but let* diborate facilities arc believed to citst for other key party, government, and military entitles and for major civil defense headquarter*.
Outside Ihe city Ihe Soviets have constructed elaborate, alternate, bunkered command and control facilities for use by the top dvllian and military authorities (see Figurearge, rail-served, heavily bunkered (adlity near Sharapovo.iles) south ofhas been tentatively Identified as Intenuefl (or the national political leadership. Its domed bunkers are assessed topercent probability of sustainingamage at0 pounds per squarene-megatonomparable facility for the Genera!he bunkered central command post at Oiekhov,m
i) fiomlb five
bunkers It may serve as an optional location for the politico-militaryecond alternate, rail-served command post for the Ceneeal Slafl and Ihe political leadership with ten Urgeocated al7 mi) south of Moscow.
J
^Many additional bunkered command posts have (wen identified in the vicinity of Moscow, and there arc others for which suboidiriation has not been established. The latter could be idated lo civil defense Most of the
Figure-tandard Pattern of Bunkered Command and Adminiitrative Point, for Wartime Protection ot Soviet leaden ot National. Republic, ond Reglonol Uveli
o
it
O
it
i
mm and posts in the Moscow area are supported by buried antennas and bunkered communications
hird type of facility has developed ovei the last several years. These are sites located outside Moscow which combine the administrativeof key government and military components above ground with bunkered facilities capable of serving as command posts in nuclear attack. Examples of this are the headquarters of the Strategic Rocket Force* and 'he Al> Defense Forces as well as ihe First
_Chief 'Foreign Intelligence) Directorate of the KCB tlTie decisions to locate these components
'outside Moscow were most likely made for both administrative reasons (establishment of newneed for more space) and for enhanced survivability.
umber of other installations designated by US intelligence as "special dvil facilities" resemble the combined administrative headquarters andcommand posts described above, We do not know, in most cases, by whom they are currently occupied. At least one. at Voronovo. SSl) south-southwest of Moscow, has been identified in open literatureest and resort area for Moscowompletedt probably contains blast shelters built in accordance with the civil defense specifications issued by the Stale Construction(Cosstioy)9t may be that certain of these "special civil facilities" were built In conformity with the Soviet "dual purpose" concept calling for large complexes to be used for other than civil defense purposes in peacetime but to be converted to serve civil defense needs In wartime. For example,0 universlty*level dvil defense textbook, referring to civil defense aspects of urban planning, states: "The outer zone Is used for large-scale recreation of the population and for locating medical and sportshis description fits the Voronovo complex perfectly.
B. Below Ihe Notional Level
he Moscow pattern appears to have been followed al some of the capitals of republics and large centers of administrative, political, military, and economic importance. They have similar underground facilities within the urban centers which are built in or adjacent to ihe administrative headquarters of key
"likkiiititua Mojlny (monthly |ovmat ol
Moscow City Soviet EiMTitive
party, government, and military components. The most Impressive of these ate the parly-government bunker* in Kiev on which work began in thend continued through. As in Moscow, the extensive shelter syilem In Kiev, wilh its own communications fticilllfes, Is also lied in to (he local subway. Another exampleimilar in-fown underground facilitymaller yet Important dty Is the reported government bunker al Simferopol' on the Black Sea. Theuiltill located directly across from the city's civilully equipped and fumbhedarge enough to permit continuation of governmentin case of nuclear olladt
As in the Moscow pattern, republic capitals and other large centers have alternate command posts for both dvilian and military command authorities located at distances of fromo so kmoi) from the ritsrs They are large, underground, multi-storied facilities to which key leaden would repair upon warning ol Impending attack These alternate command posts ore well equipped lo ensure survivaludeat environment They have extensive communications facilities manned by dvil defense communications units and. according to human source reports, have extensive stores. Including moth-balled vehicles, lo permit operations during nuclear attack and to enable them to serve as sites from which poststrlke recovery activities would be directed. Such facilities have been reported in the vicinity of the Armenian. Belorussian. Lithuanian, and Ukranian capitals. Inest home approximatelyl) south of Kiev has been identified by human source reporting appear* todual purpose" dispersal facility. Thb spread suggests similar facilities exist In other republic capitab and dsewhere in key dties, but we have not yet identified them
Up lo the, available evidence suggested that the pattern of In-town underground bunker* and bunkered, alternate command points in the environs of capital dtles was limited to the highest level party and government organs and to principal military commands, with the latter possessing the largest number of such facilities., however, at the initiative of Soviet civil defense officials, Ihe pattern was standard!red and broadened to include many more elements of the parly, government, and national economy at the level of Ihe oblasls and cities.ecrees of Cosslroy which standardized the specifications and procedures for construct inf.
personnel blast shelters tn urban areas andlsn provided for standard bunker-type command post shelters This type of shelter contained space Intended tot communications equipment as well as offices Osmmarsd'post bunkers, whether in town nr at alternate locations out nf the city, were normally of the detached type, although some of the built-in variety may serve as emergency command posts in town
tandard pattern (as previnsoly shown la Figurefie*emergine. confirmed by intelligence, sources, to ensure the survival and continuous functioning of key party, government, and military and economic personnel down to city levels. In addition, current open literature describing exercises simulating nuclearmakes frequent reference to the role of the hunkered command posts for the key personnel o[ various organs. In general, the decree of sophistication and the redundancy of these facilities depend on the importance of the locality. The evidence shows, however, that organizations and installations with what might be considered to have only modest priorities have had constructed for them bunkered command posts of the type described above.
able III summarizes evidence from all sources on hardened facilities for Ihe military and civilian leadership It will be necessary to obtain additional information to assess the full extent to which this system of leadership protection has been implementrd throughout the country
or details on thru uitrmrnli seet Chapter VI. bcRWinlni with
VI. PROTECTION OF ESSENTIAL PERSONNEL AND THE GENERAL POPULATION
plans lor protection of essentialthe general population call for dualmcasurrs to
evacuate all nonessential population and dis-
perse at least half of the essential personnel prior to attack, to the extent that ssramlng time permits; and
e shelters for use Inf surprise attack and for essential personnel who muit remain on duly following dispersal and evacuation.
two measures are described dearly inedition of the Soviet book Quit Defense mand Present published In
"The greatest effect In protection of the populace is achieved by combining methods of shelter with dispersal and evacuation of people to safe areas of the suburban zone This is why it is ntremdy important that dispersal andas an important component In the complex of missions for protection of the populace, are opportunely planned and carried out efficiently, in compressed periods of lime, and lo previously prepared areas."
"The plans provide that workers and employees of major cities and important national economic installations who continue to work in wartime as the basic productive force are to be sheltered in relugeis which protect ihem against alleffects of nuclear weapons.*'
extensive information availableobjectives for protection of essentialthe general population Is not matched byevidence of Soviel progress In carrying outWe have reports of numerous shelter*and at industries, bul we have notsuch shdters exist at all does andnationwide. Neither do see have evidenceassessments of the physical vulnerability ofwe have identified or the total numbersafforded such protection. We have theUS testing of expedient shelters planned byfor construction In rural areas. We dohow many may already exist orand leash for their construction havein rural evacuation areas. Similarly,many details about Soviet dispersal and evacui-
KGflCr
procedures, much of which fa publicly discussed, bul wc arc uncertain about several aspects of Soviet capabilities to assemble, transport, protect, and support urban populations at evacuation siteslo civil defense plans. Similar questions of effectiveness must also trouble the Soviets.
A. Shelters
As noted previously, shelter construction In the USSR has undergone several shifts of emphasis. Urban shelters were fi.-st constructed durings part of defenses against air attack In the, this program was questioned in terms of the protection shelters could afford against nuclear strikes. By the, as the Soviets came to appreciate the nature of nuclear war, concern about the effectiveness and cost of an extensive urban shelter program, combined with the belief that adequate time* for evacuation would be available prior to an attack, ledharp cutback in urban shelter construction.
Planning for shelter construction continued, however. Soviet military-engineering designers and related civilian institutes designed and tested several kinds of "detached" shelters and shelters to be "built-in" during new construction. In the, according to human source reports, standardwere worked out between Civil Defenseand Cosstroy (the State Committee for Construction) for the Inclusion of detached, bunker-type shelters or shelters built into the designs of new construction projects. The specifications stipulated that provisions for shelters against air attack be included in plans for construction of all new housing, plants, factories, storage depots, transportationgovernment buildings, and schools. The funding for shelter construction was borne by the mganlzaHon responsible for the project, while final approval of the plans rested with the local dvil defense headquarters.1 overall coordination of shelter planning and construction design was reportedly centralized In an Institute for Civil Defense in Me
vidence from intelligence sourcesradual shift at the end ofoward greater reliance on shelters for protection of the population was consistent with prooosintemanb of dvil defense leaders. Altunin eipressed the need forystem for providing the civilian population with protective structures" taking into account the character and features of modern war and the country's economic capabilities. He has also proposed continued studies aimed at improving the reliability of protective structures.
Types of Snellen
All sheltersigh degree of protection against blast and thermal effects of nuclear weapons usually have good protection against fallout. All shelters with good protection against fallout, such as the basementesidential structure, would have some protection against blast and thermal effects, but the protection may be minimal. Categorization of shelters into "blast" andicfers to ihe primary protection intended to be afforded by the structure. The present emphasis in the Soviet civil defenseor shelters in urban-industrial areas designed to protect against both blast and fallout. US studies have shown, however, that the number of survivors In an urban area attacked with nudear weapons would increase significantly even if the population only took advantage of the protection afforded by residential and Industrial structures not built especially for civil defense purposes."
In thb memorandum we have categorized Soviet civil defense shelters as follows:
facilities built as shelters for civil defense purposes having the highest degree of protection against blast effects as well as fallout. These are structures of the type usually provided to protect the leadership and essential workers, but some are also available (or thegeneral population. "Detached shelters" are bunker-type structures physically separated from residential or industrial
Dualshdters which have functional utility In peacetime, but which were designed to be converted quickly for dvil defense use. They provide varying degrees of protection against blast and fallout. (See Figure
which afford protection against blast and fallout and which were part of the original designesidential structure or an industrial fadllty. At industrial Installations, "built-in" as well as "detached" bunker-type shelters may be "dual purpose" structures for economic as well as dvil defense use.
assssssi
S
iogrom of Soviet Djot-Pvrpot* SMi.i
Irwi designovietKoodboo. it lo. on ov.iliory ihop ot on induitriolortjm.ovld Mrve a.enoni.
f Bo lament Shelter From Soviet Publlcotion
Shown here it on example of converting on Kitting boiemenlvil defenir. shelter, using sand, dirt, timbers, ond other readily available materials.
ia
con available
created by adapting the basement areas of residential, government, and industrial structures, primarily for protection against fallout. (See)
provided by using thetunnels in major Soviet cities. The degree o( protection against blast varies within subways, but all afford good protection against fallout. (See)
Expedient orbuilt withreadily available during the periodprioruclear attack. (See Figure
hese several types of Soviet shelters offer varying degrees of protection against Wast and fallout. According to Soviet planning, the type of shelter, its location, and the protection afforded are functions of Ihe priority assigned to the survival of the protected personnel, the likelihood of direct attack or proximityarget, and the avallabilily of suitable Structures thai could be adapted as shelters.
etached, bunker-type shelters, adaptable and built-in basement shelters, and subways are available for the protection ol both essential workers and the general population. Dual-purpose shelters arc also used as underground garages, dubs, and theaters which could be converted quickly toelense use.
oviet writings and human sources have also referred tn the use of various types cf expedient, or temporary, shdters for protection from fallout. They consist of trenches lined with readily available materials and covered with earth. Ttsesc shelters, which are described in more detail In. are intended primarily for use by ihe rural population and by the urban population at dispersal and evacuation sites in rural areas. They could also be
lrustrotion of Soviel Expedient or Hasty Shelter
Diagrams such as this are provided in manuals widely distributed to the Soviet population for use in constructing hasty shelters In dispersal ond evacuation areas.
Si
used to protect personnel In small cities and at factories producing goods which are assigned low-priority.
In Urban Areat
e are not ublc to estimate the percentage of the people in urban areai that could be sheltered within cities, or the degree of protection against blast and fallout they would behe evidence suggests that the hardened shelter construction effort in urban areas is primarily to protect essential personnel. Shelter types identified at industrialand al other urban locations differ in size, structural characteristics, and depth. Human sources have reported that at industrialypical detached, bunker type shelter willeople and that built-in shelters will hold up' people. They report (hat for the general population, built-in shelters can range in capacityeople, while detached, bunker-type shelters are usually larger. These reports are consistent with specifications for such shelters contained in Soviet civil defense publications. Provision of food, water, medical supplies, power, and life-support systems reportedly varies widely, presumably reflecting the expected contributions of the shelter occupants toar effort.
Blast Shelters
he hardness values lor shelters which we have identified in urban-industrial areas and the degree of protection they would provide against nucleareffects would depend on their distance from ground and on weapon yield.
" The Soviel def inlrlon olnil Im4woc* aft ribs,
and tetlleraenti estifiihedfueti al byi at ihe IS republics Population ir.nifrmay be aj low. provtdcG
thai al leaneicvni oleudenti ate eraployre. In
noOI('ltvHunl oompallnm Under lliose rvileiU. bated on0 ceiiiui and updiladie rurirnl veal, lb* Soviel urban
populationbe about ISO million, or aboutrrcenl o( ibe total population olillion. In llili memorandum, reference is made: US attack on Soviel urban areas. |
Tine Icim "urban areas'" as toed in this ntemoiandum Includes iD citiesopulation In ewrsiotal ofillion people II includes residoilial
and industrial arcai il tvcll a< other noninJu.1rial areai nl IcHcnsi'e
acllvlly lucti ai academic
c arc not able to estimate the total number of hardened shelters in urban-Industrial ureas in the USSRr_
Considering that Industrial facilities in the USSlTrxsuntrywiac number in Ihe tens of thousands, our statistical sample is small for confirming trends, yet emphasis on shelters in indsrsitial areas as reflected in the sample is consistent with Soviet policy pronouncements. More research will be needed, however,ompleteof ihe overall shelter program and its pace and priorities.
Subwoy Shelters
1 IB The Soviets also intend to use subway systems" lo provide protection for part of the population of large urban-industrial centers. All subways have repoitedly been adapted to serve as shelters, andoscow. Leningrad. Kiev, and Baku have heavy doors at the entrances to protect against blast and initial radiation Those inad. and Kiev also reportedly have retractable steel walls for compartmenting the tunnels, and have emergency power sources, food, and medical supplies.heie were1 ml) of operating subway tunnels in urban arras that could provide good shelter fur large number* of people.
Fallout Shelters
daptable basement shelters in urban housing units represent ihe chief form of protection ol the populationradioactive falloutonstruction of basement shelters In urban areas has been widely reported by former residents, including some who were employed at design institutes or romiiuction trusts Even those basements builtiiny special civil defense features are tepurted to
MCUB-
Include an emergency exit tunnelool) long. Still weear picture of lite pace and extent of thU effort and of the effectiveness of these
shelters.
lans for basement-type shdters in newly constructed apartment buildings reportedly Indude measures designed to offer effective protection against fallout radiation, such3 ft) thick bye? of soil between ihe rein forced-concrete ceiling of the shelter and ihe first floor of the apartment building. This would protect occupants in most locations until outside radiation decays lo safe levels. Fallout intensity would vary, of course, depending on location, and prolonged occupancy of basement shelters would require preslockage of supplies.
Snellen in Rutol Areai
e have little evidence of shelter preparations foe the rural population- Because these areas are considered less likely lo be atlacked, Soviet dvil defense writers haveumber of makeshift arrangements, using locally available materials and facilities. In Ihe area of Ordzhonikidzr. RSFSR, for cample, an abandoned mine shaft has reportedly been convertedell-equipped shelter. In (he rural areas around Minsk, dvil defense personnel have recommended that underground feed-grain silos in the collective farms be used as shelters. Protection in rural areas would be provided by expedient, hastily constructed shelters, which arc discussed in the next section In more detail (seenited States studies suggest that, depending on their design, Ihe expedient shelters could provide protection against fallout and overpressures ranging fromPaosik
ur overall conclusion about Iheof the Soviet sheltei program, although admittedly our evidence it incomplete. Is that progiess in various urban-Industrial areas Is uneven. This might be expectedrogram which depends heavily on local initiatives guided by policy decisions from Moscow which probably Involve bureaucratic competition about the essentiality of Industries and availability of resources. We are unable In any caw, to extrapolate ihe Information we have to drawconclusions about the Soviet shdtcr program nationwide The evidence does indicate that Soviet priority for shelters is not to save the maximum
rban residents, bul la assure (bar essential personnel survive.
B. Dispersal ond Evacuation
Preatlack dispersal ol essential personnel ami evacuation of nonessential population are still key elements of Soviet civil defense concepts. Dispersal and evacuation are treated in detail in civil defense manuals issued in the USSR for public consumption (seeeans nf protecting urban populations by relocating them in areas sufficiently Li from cities to reduce markedly the casualties resulting from effects of nuclear detonations. The Soviets contend that such actions, if successful, could "substantially reduce civilian casualties in case of enemy employment of weapons nf mass destruction. According to one Soviet manual, evacuation could reduce casualties toew percent" of the urban population.
Under the dispersal concept, workers of urban industries and services that continue operations are to relocate to relatively safe areas outside cities. These areas should be near transportation to facilitate commuting to and from work In the cities.
Under the evacuation concept, nonessential elements of Ihe population are to be evacuated beyond dispersal areas into towns and rural areas up6 mi) from the city Evacuees would not commute, but would remain in place for the duration of the emergency
In addition to civil defense manuals, evidence about Soviet preparations for dispersal and evacuation comesariety of sources. While we arc confident in our analysis of Soviet concepts,and overall planning for dispersal andwe do notood evidential base for assessing the extent of the Soviets" preparations to carry out their plans. We have even less basis for forecasting hosv effective dispersal and evacuation would be in saving lives and providing for ihe continuity of essential production and services in the citiesuclear attack. We have, however, analyzed the Soviet civil defense organization, its command and control, and (he resources likely to be available, in order to determine ihe feasibility of carrying out dispersal and evacuation.
Evacuation
Soviets stress the importance offor evacuation by civil defense chiefsstaffs In cities, enterprises, and rural areas.
Evacuation Conunitiees. Thesecomposed nf reprcscntalis-es of the party.military commissariat, dly services,defense chiefs at enterprises, are loarrangement* for;
registering the population.
determining relocation areas and their
assuring that preparations for the evacuees arc made at the relocation sites.
making transportation arrangements.
publishing and storing relevant documents, and
determining evacuation time requirements.
City Civil Defense Chttft. The city chiefs nf civil defense responsible for establishing assembly and evacuation points within the city (SEPs) where people go tn register and prepare for departure An SEP would be staffed with abouto SO workers and is designed lovacuees. Evacuees supposedly arc notified in advance of the location of their SEPs and other details. SEPs are situated near points for embarkation to dispenal and evacuation sites. An SEP chiefisting of people for whom his SEP is responsible and has Information on evacuation routes
Warning System. According to Sovietand human sources, civil defense authorities would warn the entire urban population by national broadcast, local media, and sirens when rapid evacuation was ordered: less detectable means of notification such as courier would be used if the civil defense preparations were limited in scale orsensitive. Upon receiving the warning signal or notification, people would prepare to leave the dty. taking along only essentials designated In dvil defense literature including personal documents, protective gear, clothing, and food for two or three days.
Transportation. Soviet dvil defense doctrine calls for maximum use of all means ofroad, river, sea,relocate people. To avoid conflicts wilh the movements of the armed forces, control of all the transportation meansilitary responsibility. Rail transport is considered the principal means for evacuation. Vehicles also play an important role, with evacuation convoys organized in groups ofoehicles. Services for vehides. such as repair and fuel supply, would be provided along routes to ensure continuous movement of vehldes and
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HavreSoviet Dlsporsol/Evocuatlon Diogram
This diag.omivil defense manual illustrates .he Soviel concept
tefcert and evacuation of nonessential urban residents.
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e
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Where thereack of adequate transport, evacuation would be carried out on foot.
vacuation SiU Selection. The "outlying zone" lo which an urban population lilo be relocated ii the territory between the ouler limit of the potential rone of prompt-casualty-producing effects ofstrike on the city, and Ihe boundary of the next territorial administrative division (oblast orrossing administrative lines, however. Is authorized wherever necessary. Selection of relocation sites within this zone takes intu account distance from the city.
access lo transportation routes and availability of essential supplies and facilllies.
rrrparattonr atAreas. Reception committees made up of rural and city civil defense personnel would operate at receiving points in outlying areas to assist evacuees In reaching final destination points. According to Soviet manuals, evacuees would be housed in public buildings and home* on the optimum baus of one or two evacuees per local resident, or on the basis of two lo three square0 feet') of floor ipBce per resident
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or evacuee. In practice, weemigres haveconditions would be much more con rested. Details on equipment and lupplles lor evacuees (including food, water, medicine, and fuel) are discussed later in this chapter
ime RequttemenU foe Evacuation Soviet sources call for evacuation of Soviel cities within the "special period"eriod of warning) preceding an attack, ami Imply that the evacuation time wouldours. Soviet authorities have not published their assessment of actual time which wuuld be required for evacuation of Ihe nonessentlalpopula-tlon. Several US studies have addressed the ipeed with which the Soviets could complete their evacuation9 RAND study estimatedillion urbanould be evacuated In four days under optimumsing only half nl the
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0 transportationntelligence Agency study of the evacuation ofelected Soviet cities essnetuded that, under the most favorablehe Soviet*hysical capability to evacuate most of theities within three to four days after movement begins. The mayor assumption* used in the DIA ifudy were:
ercent of population evacuated.ercent dispersed;
two shifts working in essential industries and services;
a si*-bour alert preceding actual movements (this period of alert ha* been te*ted in Sovietnd
no other complications, such as panic, severe disruption of transport interns, or adverse weather condltlons-
ndndummarize the findings of the DIA dispersal and evacuation study
S and ussr Comparative. Area and talifudo
The USSR has more area than the US for dispersal ond evacuation purposes, but displaced personnel would encounter abrupt ond sevare woothor changes characteristic of farlatlfodo*.
delays could result fromIn carrying out the evacuation, some ofalmost certain to occur:
transportation needed for evacuation could be taken for military use during emergencies;
highways which have low traffic capacity could become congested; and
shortages of transport equipment and spare parts could occur.
optimum conditions, according toevacuation of Soviet cities within three towould be feasible- This period does nottime required for erecting expedientneeded to protect evacuees at relocationat least two days for completion ofshelters, we conclude that evacuation ofcould be completed, under optimumlesseek, assuming no effort wasconceal the operation. The actual timewould vary from city to city, dependingsuch as the sire of the city and distancerelocationwhich may be several hundred kilometers away. To speed up Ihe evacuation process and alleviate shortagea of transportation equipment, the Soviet! alio call for movement on foot of younger and stronger individuals in oolumnsersonsistance of at leasti).
t Is difficult to estimate with confidence the effectiveness of Soviet evacuation procedures In an emergency. Making these procedures effectiveorganization, preplanning, exercises by civil defense units,opulation familiar with dvil defense plans and techniques. We are not sure what percentage of the urban population would beAs the number of urban shelters for the general population Increases, and as more of the able-bodied population is assigned to active dvil defense work or essential production and services, the size and dtaracter of the evacuation program will change. Assuming the evacuees would consist of onlypersonnel, the size and complexity of the evacuation effort would bo reduced and the prospects lor its success increased.
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Suwtoal al Evacuee Relocationvacuees aree housed wUh rural Jnhabiianls and, with them, seek protection from fallout, primarily in hastily prepared shelters. In shelters they would be protected from exposure to weather and nuclear effects. For at least two or three days, according to Soviet planning, thoy should manage to survive on the food and personal supplies and equipment each person is required to bring with him. Food, water, and supplies required for longer periods would come from prestored stocks at evacuation sites or stocks already located In rural areas, from food and supplies "In ther from reserves. We have some evidence of the amount of farm and off-farm storage of food, the amount In "statehere are some indicators that there are "strategic reserves" of food and essential supplies. Presumably strategic reserves are levels below which supplies would not be drawn down during peacetime. We have no evidence, however, that food or other supplies have actually been stocked at evacuation sites for use by the urban population. Nor are we aware of Soviet plans for the distribution of essential goodsuclear attack.
xpedient Fallout Snellen, The Soviets have devoted much attention to design and construction of fallout shelters for hasty construction in areas outside cities, beyond range of the initial wualty-producing effects from nuclear attacks on cities. For2 Ministry of Defense publication entitled Antfro-dlallon Snellen tn Rural Areas emphasized expedient
types ofiving detailed instructlcns and drawings for the construction of several types:
covered trench shelter.
peak-roofed dugout.
lean-to dugout.
wood-earth shelter.
shelter roofedeinforced concrete slab.
shelter made of fascines, and
shelter of adobe brick.
These hasty fallout shelters may be built from all kinds of available materials such as timber, boards, sheet metal, bricks, and cinder Mocks.practical Instructions permit construction by unskilled labor. An example of the types of shelter appearing in Soviet publications was shown in.
Several types of expedient shelters have been built and tested by the Oak Ridge National(Figurehese teats confirmed that Soviet shelters can be constructed Inours or less by unskilled persons. The testing also proved that these shelters could provide the protection called for in Soviet plans and that, with provision for ventilar-'on, water, and light, occupants could Inhabit them through the required shelter period.
There is no evidence that materials needed for Ihe construction of expedient shelters has been stockpiled in designated dispenal or evacuation areas. Soviet writings,orlety of sources indicate that expedient fallout shelters have been built in rural areas during exercises and as part of ihe summer youth-training programs We do not know the extent of this type of training, but believe we would have evidence of any widespread program of expedient shelter construction, or peeposittoning of construction materials. The tests conducted at Oak Ridge showed that practice, even by unskilled people, was not necessary to construct the expedient shelters described in Soviet civil defense manuals. Shelter effectiveness also has been tested by the Defense Nuclear Agency and was found to be surprisingly high. In one case theoretically enabling survival of occupantshelter located only one milene-megaton nuclear explosion.
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Dispe'tal
Civil defense plans call lot each essential industrial plant or public facility such as transport to continue operations, dividing Its personnel Intohour shifts. The work shift remaining In the city would be protected by blast shelters in case of an attack. The off-duty shift would be located in dispersal areasooi) from Ihe city, bul no (tkl) away. Dispersal areas would be located to that round-trip commuting time of the workers would not exceed four to five hours. Workers commuting by train should not be farthermi)ailroad station.
Procedures (or dispenal essentially parallel those for evacuation. Detailed instructions for carrying out dispenal plans are contained In handbooks and In instructions tailored to specific Installations, which frequently are considered classified information until the dispersal plans are Implemented.
At dispersal sites, Il Is planned that workers and families would build expedient shelters, like those at evacuation sites as described In the previous section. However, according lo open literature and human sources, permanent-type dbpcrsal sites are being prepared, using facilities controlled by enterprises and Installations such as rat areas and summer youth camps. These sites contain aboveground housing for workers and their families, shelters, and bunkered command posts from which the civil defense work at the Installation In the nearby city would be directed in nuclear war. We do not know how many of these sites have been
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Accordingariety of sources, the civil defense leadership. Industrial workers and essential municipal and other Institutional personnel are trained, organized, and equipped lo carry out rapid dispersal. We have reports ol actual dispersal exercises which have included practice in preparation of relocation sites for occupancy.
Time Requttemenu. In0 dvil defense manual, there are Indications of the time envisioned by the Soviets for carrying out dispenal operations. In the section dealing with action In an industrial plant in responsethreatening situation" alertstrategic warning of nudes:he manual lists various time schedules for Implementing measures related lohour period Is specified foe dispersal of workers, office staff, and their families using available transportation facilities. The Soviets
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recognize thai tome workers may walk In dispersal areas. Total lime for dispersal should be conitdeiably shorter than that fnr evacuation, since dispersal would involve the movement of fewer people over shorter distances.
he diagram from9 civil defense manual.shown previously inllustrates how workers of plants continuing operations are relocated closer to the cily than all other relocated individuals Factory cadres during exercises may have alreadynkersrelated fadlltio ft some ol ihe dispersal areas for use as alternate commund posts, however, neither the Soviet writings nor human sources have provided precise details on this subject. It is assumed that alternate command posts for directing essential economic activities would be at dispersal points (see Chapter VI
14S. We conclude that the personnel of Soviet economic installations are better organized and prepared to carry out civil defense plans than the general population. Dispersal of essential workers would be easier than evacuating Ihe remainder of the urban population because:
Workers and their familieslose-knit community concentrated around factories.
Factories have their own transport facilities which would facilitate the movement of people
Dispersal locations are relatively close to the city, aod this would decrease the time needed to reach the site.
Exercise activity at factories is well organized and Includes practicing procedures for dispersal to relocation sites.
oviet plans and programs for relocating industry and for other measures to provide for the continuity of production are discussed in Chapter VII.
Driperiof and Evacuation
vacuation and dispersal eserciscs for the civil defense leadership and cadres arc emphasized by Soviet authorities as the means of increasing readiness for highly organized and tightly controlled movement from cities. There Is evidence that some economic installations and government services that willoperations In the event of war have conducted detailed exercises, but we do not know whether such exercises am frequent or widespread Also, we arc uncertain whether some exercises were simulations or whether then* was actual ground play. Evacuation exercises for the general population have also been conducted, but in those where there was actual ground play the public showed little enthusiasm
oviet civil defense manuals offer dcta'ltd suggestions nn how to conduct exercises They require many hours of planning, detailing all the actions required down to the lowest organizational levels Dispersal and evacuation exercises include themain elements:
evacuation and assembly points.
modes of transport.
relocation site*.
reception and quartering of evacuees,
providing for the commuting of work shifts.
maintaining shelters at places of work, and
coiulructing shelters In dispersal and evacuation areas.
nfctrmalion available oo exercises Involving actual dispersal and evacuation exercises through human sources and the Soviet press is limited. We doubt thai any actual dly-wlde evacuation exercises have been undertaken, but exercises Involving entire villages, portions of towns, or industrial planli have been reported. We do not expect the Soviets to conduct exercises involving the actual, large-scale evacuation of cities In view of the costs of such exercises, the disruption of production, and the possible misunderstanding abroad of their purpose.
actory dispersal appears to be the most frequent type of exercise, and usually Includes elements of the work shift not on duly, sinceot inclined to disrupt production. Representative industrial exercises include:
dispersal testersons at the Khai'kov Tractor Plant In Moscow;
evacuationoscow plant's dvil defense rescue units, which then simulated rescue operations at the plant;
removalersons by trucks and railroad cars In Dnepropetrovsk at the Ukrainian State Institute for Design of Metallurgical Plants:
use of vehicles to remove workers from an electric power plant In Kiev (this exercise included rerouting of convoys because portions of the assigned routes were assumed to hasx been washed out).
exercises of nonessential(he population are mentioned leu frequently,Inslunees have been reported;
At Aktyubinsk) trucks reportedly transported people to relocation sites outside the dry: however, probably lessercent of the urban inhabitants was Involved.
In Tiraspol} at least half of the housewives ignored an evacuation eierdsc alert, which was terminated in less than four hours for lack of participation.
An exercise held at Moscow University is reported to haveersons. Both railroad and motor vehicles were used to transport the evacuees, who were then quartered with local residents al their assigned relocation area
addition to exercises, according totransportation facilities are periodicallyapplication to dvil defense plans. We haveexample;
convoy travel for evacuation In Leningrad, Zaporozhye, and Sevastopol',
s tree lean for dispersal of stcdworkers and their families In Magnitogorsk,
ships on the Baltic Sea at Tallinn and on Ihe Black Sea at Sevastopol* and Feodosiya for use In evacuation, and
adaptation of riverboats to carry tick and wounded nt Omsk.
recent shift in policy to concentrateeffort In cadres and services essentia) looperations rather than Ihe generalthat the Soviets have condudod thatpublic participation in dvil defense exercisesrequired If to, these condusioru wouldwith the findingsnstitute study, "Importance ofIn Disasterce|>ared forof US Industrial firrns. On the basis ofof disaster evacuations In the Unitedconcluded that large-scale public participationdrills was not necessary for
" Mats iliraiaU of ike present Soviet dtl deienar preens correspond ctoarfr toHI tteAap Bunmee eaenBol preparUSom lorulSat beadrdaiuaoj;
heavy lis van merit In in lafrutnienin and equipment. eeleetetSon
and training of teal offkuts nod emergency penonnaL ladwding tests and auaua, enhancing In normal rlaan the nedibtUty**
iDiuirl mil low dunnc as emergency; and deamphaib of
public porUetpallim Indrills.
The Soviets apparently believe It is essential to test the dispersal capabilities of industrial plants and other essential facilities and services. Hmwever. the state of readiness of these organizations to carry out dispersal plant is uneven. This may result from differing priorities assigned lo industrial or other facilities for dispersal of Ihe essential workers.
The recent emphasis the Soviets have placed on their urban shelter program and on reducing the time for evacuation is due to concerns regarding the overall effectiveness of urban evacuation under circumstances in which nudear war started wilh iiuic prior warning. Considering the sire, structure, quality of leadership, and level of training of the civil defense organization, Ihe availability of transportationand lime required to construct expedient shelters, we believe that under optimum conditions the population of mult Soviet elites could bo evacuated In lesseek. With additional planning and training and without mass public exercises, this lime could probably be ledueed. However, considering the variety of circumstances which could affect an actual evacuation, including possible enemy responses. Soviet leaders would have major uncertainties about the prospects for success of an urban evacuation.
C. Supplies and Equipment
To meet their dvil defense ob,ectives. the Soviets require large amounts of supplies andto protect personnel and essential materiel from the effects of chemical, biological, and radiological (CBfl) weapons, and to sustain the population before, during, anduclear attack. The most critical supplies are food, water, inedldnes. and fuds. In addition to individual ptotcctlve equipment, luge quantities of equipment ure needed for flreilghtlng. decontamination, debris removal, and other measures.
We have good evidence about the types of equipment required for Soviet civil defense, and common-use Items are being produced in large quantities We cannot determine, however, the extent to which present stockpiles would satisfy theenvisioned by Soviet plans. We are also aware that large amounts of supplies and manufactured goods which would be critical to Ihe continuity of prcduction and to survival of Ihe populationa nudear attack are in (he normal distribution pipdine. Similorly. while we know lhat Ihe Soviets maintain reserves of food, medical supplies, fuels, and industrial raw materials and equipment, our evidence
ihe size ol these reserves and the amounts in Ihe pipeline isulled. In some cases we have been ablestimate pipeline and reserve storagesuch as the amount ol on-farm and off-farm storage of grain. We are unable to determine precisely what percentage of critical supplies in reserve and in the pipeline are located outside urban areas.
eeneral appreciation, however, of the stock levels of essential supplies normally located outside urban centers, and we have made rough calculations of present consumption by the urban population. These calculations suggest thatuclear attack on cltlm which was precedederiod of warning to make final preparations, supply levels would be sufficient to satisfy the minimum subsistence needs of the population lot weeks and perhaps months. Distribution of supplies to the relocated urban population would probablyore serious problem than stock levels.
Individual Protective Equipment
hree principalmasks fat use by the civilian populationthendor adults and theor children. For children too small to wear even the smallest gai marks, an Infant protective chamber Is produced. The sdf-coMalaed gai maskesigned lor use lo rescue work la flooded sheiten and cellars. In citlngubhlngnd restoring tn utilities la underground installuhira.
" Production of masts and clothing mrulrra little investment In labor and capital equipment, and could be accomplishnl bj> any rubber goods manufacturing plant.
he basic items of Individual protective equipment are masks, respirators, and protective clothing. For years, gas masks of various types have been produced andnd the general population has been instructed in their use.4 the Soviets announced distribution to dvil defense unitsew mask whichosed system which purifies and recycles exhaled air.ittle evidence to indicate that the number of masks available would satisfy total Sovietasks are not retained by (he general population, but are stored at work or in housing areas for training and for emergencies. Some former residents have reported that masks were on hand for essential personnel at the fadllties where they had been employed. Detailed instructions In civil defense manuals on how to fashion .expedient masks suggests an inadequate supply of gas masks for rural inhabitants and nonessential urban residents. The most readilyapparatus for protecting the respiratory systemimple inexpensive respirator, which is used on farms in peacetime while fertilizing crops,vailable in large quantities
pecial protectivehead and hand covering, goggles, andnormally available only to civil defense personnel responsible lor monitoring, decontamination, rescue and repair, and similar field functions (sec. While human sources have reported that proteellve dothing was on hand al industrial fadllllcs for civil defense units, we do not know the quantities of such dothing produced or whether all dvil defense units arc so equipped Civil defense training of the general population has included instructions on individual protection by covering the skin with layers of regular clothing, hats, scarves, gloves, and boots or galoshes.
Olhei Equipment
Civil defease manuals describe the protective equipment required for civil defense operations, induding equipment for construction and debris removal, hrefighling, decontamination, waterand detection of radioactivity and of chemical and bacteriological agents" Our knowledge of production, storage, and distribution varies according to type of equipment and its assignment to civilian or militaryn genera! seeettes understanding of military equlptnent than we do of that for civilians.
Most of the equipment required for civil defense operations li In peacetime use. For example, military units as well as dviltan organizations have numerous hand tools of various types and mechanized equipment such as bulldown. tractors, Bucks, and fire
"The Soviet! hove prodoead arrant dcrten tor detecting and meaiurtngre liveadaoacthity indicator lor detecting tantaralMrkan of an area; the DPS roentgenometer, lor measuring rauVaUon levebontaminated tbe DP-ll beia-gamana ndiomeiar. far determining (he degree of radaooctrv* eanlaralaanon cw taarfaca of various oh|eets: and Ikeoentgen aaaatar radiia vaarecnal UaJruaseet la. detecting aadthe leeal alradtaataa. Abotypes of tSonmeteei ha v. bcra pmoWaal la aiaari general radiation Levels and So tfamaalat ihe total dose recereed byBath civilian and awLtaiy ladaalogical inraiiionag team use thj equipment.
Tom hai been ccmildeemlila iMelUgeata activity directed toward depoti containing mflllary nsatratrt, but little attentfcm hai been given to either ilongelor dvil defense equipment andor the leciuilquea to. maintenance and iuuannr.any eMInula concerning lhaaa rupncU an eitiemely sketchy.
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Wilh proper planning, much of thiscan be removed from target areas, given (he time to do so. for ihclter building and other tasks In dispersal and evacuullon areas and luliscqucrrt relurn for rescue, repair. And restoration work In urban areas Soviet writings stress civil defense requiieinenis for equipment and vehicles from civilianbu( we do not know the relative priorities of civil defense and the needs of Irctical military units.**
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Soviet writers have Identifiedi nit lion of civil defense and mililaryfor civilian equipmenterious problem.know that many motor vehldra assigned toarc organized Into military reserveaolokotonas, whose mission is toof military forces. Soviet civilhaso the use of these units foroperations. In addition to vehiclesmany Industrial plants have heavyequipment, and their civil defense cadresas probably the best organized andof all civilian civil defense units.
Equipment for civil defense work is available not only in civilian organizations and industries and in civilian and military dvil defense units but also in tactical military forces, military commissariats, rear services military logistic bases, Internal security forces, construction troops, and paramilitary units. At) of the latter have individual protective equipment, vehicles, and communications equipment, together wilhexperienced in their use ond servicing. Construction troops and military units, for example, possess live heavy equipment needed for rescue, repair, and reconstruction.
We believe much ol the equipment assigned to organizations other than regular military units would be available for civil defense operations, asIn Soviet planning. The availability ofin rear services military depots and In military combat units would depend on the tactical situation. Military writings suggest, however, that some regular military units, and presumably their equipment, would be Involved In civil defense activities under the overall direction of military district commanders. Our knowledge of production of various types ofb fragmentary,diable information on storage and distribution
We conclude that regardless ofudear attack, sufficient equipment of all types would probably be available for Ihe leadership and to support militarye are less confident about the availability of specialized individual and unit civil defenseprotective clothing, decon lamina Hon equipment lo protect key personnel and essential Industries. We arc very uncertain about how mudi Individual civil defense equipment would lie available to the generalGeneral-purpose equipment in peacetimebulldozers, tools,probably be sulficient to support dvil defense operations provided adequate warning were available to make final preparations. An attack without warning,would severely degrade Soviet capability to provide such support for the general population
Supplies
ome appreciation for the magnitude of the supply problemarge-scale nudeai attack on the Soviet Union is conveyed by distribution of population and land use in the USSR, as illustrated in Figuresii? didsncesn population centers would aggravate the problem of distribution of consumption supplies between regions of the USSR. Moreover, ihe Soviet road and rail networks are not as highly developed as in Western Europe or the United States, and would be vulnerable to tome disruptionesultudear attack. There b.egree of regional setf-suKicicncy in consumption goods In the USSR, which would ease somewhat the problem of long-haul transport and distribution of supplies.
Assessments of the adequacy of Sovietfor supplies and thdr distribution are very sensitive to assumption! about the period of warning prioruclear attack. They are also sensitive to the overall effects of on snack mvoKsng several thousand nudear weapons on Soviet cities, industries,systems, and the population Even among US experts there Is disagreement about nuclearn view of these uncertainties, neither we nor Soviet planners, can do more than calculate the theoretical capacity of the USSR to furnbh supplies to the leadership, thend Ihe populotion inpost-nudear-attack situation.ifficult even with complete Information on the locations and amount of essential supplies in the pipeline and In reserve, and our information is far from complete. The information we do have suggests that Ihe Soviets have made detailed plans and serious preparations to provide for most critical supplies.
In thli section of the memorandum wc have limited our dbcusslon to the categories of supplies most critical to survival of thewater, medical iuppli.es.
Food1 At with other aspects of the USSR't civil defense program, accurate and specific Information about Soviet plant concerning food supplies and theiracking. In the Soviet Union tueh
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i"formation lulls itilo ihe category of itale secrets However, given the centralized nature of the country'* economy and society,ighly probable that the Soviets' civil defense planning for food distributionuclear attack sailsontinuation of the present procurement and marketing system, modified by the civil defense organisation to cope with the post-nudearatlackood supply system under central supervision, readily adaptable to cmcrjeoey conditions, is already in place in the USSR. OfTsetting thb advantage are several dclidencies which would be exacerbated, perhaps in the extreme, depending on the time of year, duration, severity, and scopeuclear conflict.
most Important ingredienti forof the adequacy of food supplies forpopulationarge-scaleare:
the vulnerability of the food production and distribution system to disruption and the time required for its recortstitution;
the amount of food available to supply the population during the period of dbruption of the production and distribution system; and
the location of food In the pipeline and In storage relative lo areas likely to be subjected lo nuclear attack (the survivability of the food supply)
The Soviet Union has long sfrived and failed to produce abundant and reliable supplies of food; basic food requirements are met but there are frequent crop shortfalls Theurther complicated by the cumbersome Soviet purchasing and distributionwhich makes these operations awkward and Inefficient In the best of times and circumstances, although It would have some advantagesree market system in the aftermathuclear exchange. Inasmuch us providing for reserve stocks constitutes an added strain on the system, the Soviet authorities presumably hold these reserve food supplies to levels deemed consbtent with minimum requirements forcrop failures or war.
The Soviet population, whicher capita bails) about three times the minimal dally caloric intake required for subsistence, could adapt to reduced food availabilities with little direct negative Impact on the country's militaryalthoulh the subsistence levd could not be maintained Indefinitely without severe consequences to health and labor productivity. Al World War II demonstrated, the Sovietble to withstand widespread deprivation ol many vital products, indudlng foodstuffs, and still function dfectivdy. Awareness of these factors could prompt Soviet leaders to limit their investment in errvergency food Storage facilities and other contingency measures For food supplies and distribution as part of (he dvil defense program.
Molt agricultural products In the USSR reach the consumer "'a the state procurementProcurement Ministry and the Central Union ol Consumer Corporations (seehere alsoively and extensive market in "surplus" produce which reaches the consumer throughfarm markets. State purchasing organs have fixed delivety quotas for each product established by Caspian. Substantiol premiums are paid for above-plan production.ercent of someas raw col ton. flax fiber, sugar beets, tobacco, lea leaves, andpurchased by the state; substantial portions of others, such as grain andare needed for seed. feed, and personalconsumed within the agricultural sector.
The USSR Minbtry of Procurement organizes the acquisition by the government of all types of agricultural materials, supervises the fulfillment of procurement plans,argely responsible for food inspection II coordinates the work of other ministries and departments which purchase agriculturaland defines the zones or areas in which they may operate.irectly responsible for the purchase, storage, and proper utilization ol state gtatn resources. It maintains centralized grain drying and storage fodlities (on-farm grainanaged by the farm) and operates processing plants such as mixed feed mills and flour mills. Other purchasingare the Mlnbtrles of the Food Industry. Meat and Dairy Industry. Ugh! Industry, and Trade and the Central Union of Consumer Cooperativeshich buys not only from farms but also from individuals who have surplus output from their personal plots. State and collective forms may market surplus products through markets in cities and nearly every town and village, and are thus an important source offoe urban residents who frequently cannot purchase good quality fruit,and meat In the state retail trade network.
production in the USSR hassince irftO. but the overall (tend in output b
ood Distribution in the USSR
The Soviet rood distribution system is structuredumber of Qovornmont ministries, with most domestic produclton channeled through the Procurement Ministry ond the Central Union of Consumer Cooperatives.
From the source to the consumer
rivals pint products
by large yeaMo-yeai changes. For example,5 crop was aboutercent leu than production4 and less than two-thirds of the3 crop (see Tablehe USSR has reacted to recent crop shortfalls by Importingamounts of grain.
ISO. Growth in demand for grain has outpaced production growth In recent years primarily becauseharp expansion of Its use as livestock feed. Average annual productionas IS percent greater than. while domestic consumption Increased byercent.
he USSR produces ample grain to feed Its population. Even in yean of harvest failure suchood use requires less than one-half of total production. Industrial requirements daim one to two percent, while seed requirements range fromoercent. In contrast to other uses, quantities of grain fed to livestock have been accelerating. About one-third of the total grain crop was fed to livestock In the, but livestock herdsesidual claimant; In yean of shortfall, their needs were first to be cut.he livestock program has received higher priority. We estimate half or more of the total grain crop has been for feed during the.
ovallability and variety of food inore greater than In the past, and themode significant gains. There has also beenshift awayelianceor example, more thanercentcollective farm families' food was purchasedretail stores and farm markets.
the Soviet diet Is stillwith starchy foods, It hasrowth In consumption offoods, such as livestock products,eduction in the number ofby gnsin and potatoes.
Soviet distribution and marketingbeen Improved, with large dries still favoredoverall distribution. Although processing,and storage of food are not yet near UShave been expanded. Thus,orto seasonal fluctuations than before and mote
TABLE VI
Supply anil Consumptionin Inhe USSR
Domestic
Consumption
Seed
Food
Industry
Exporti
Llvoloc*
Supply
Domestic Production
Imports
Consumption
Seed
Food
Industry
Livestock Feed
6
1
G
1
1
1
1
8
:
6
2
:
1
7
Because, of rounding, totals may not add to ike values
goods arc available. Largely because of government control and bureaucratic Inertia, Soviet food production and distribution are Insufficient by US standards, but In an emergency involving serious disruption of the system and food shortages,control would be an advantage,
Followingarge-scale nuclear attack on Soviet urban-Industrial and military targets, food production In many areas would probably continue. However, the road-rail transportation system for food distribution would almost certainly be disrupted. The impact of these disruptions on food distribution, would depend on how efficient civil defense units were In managing distribution, in repairing damaged railroads and their equipment and In eliminating bottlenecks on the road networks.
Food Storage: Food processingiverse operation in the USSR, with facilities smaller and less concentrated than In the US. Inood storage and food processing are activities performed outside utban areas of greater0 population. While we have some Information on other foods, we have concentrated our analysis on the availability of grain, because it Is the staple of the Soviet diet. At leastercent of Soviet grain is stored on the farms, and most of the remtiinder is probably kept In rural areas.
e do not know exactly how much grain the USSR has In storage. The size of Soviet grain stocksarefully guarded state secret Our estimates of changes in stock levels can only be illustrative, primarily because of uncertainties about estimates of livestock consumption and about the difference between official claimed and actual usable grain output. We lack benchmark data to useasis for an annual accounting of output, consumption, and reserves. Despite these uncertainties, we haveadditions and withdrawals from stocks for each crop year (endingune) during the. The net change In stocks for eachhown In Table VII. Summing these estimates of additions and
TABLE Vlt
Eitlruted Change in Soviet Cralm Stock) by Croplo osPtloa me trie torn)
rear
t
3
9
6
5
6
7
-fircftct-
withdrawals does not result in an estirnati of current stock levels because we do nol know ihe level of slocks0 or any oilier year.
IBS. We eilimale lhat the Soviel -rain storage opacity isillion metric0 million on-farmillion off-farm) According to Soviet sources, the total on-farm capacity of grain and oilseed storage facilities, which vary from open-air platforms and pits to well-ventilated, coveredwasillion metric tonsff-faim storageas reported to beinion metric tons. Ofr-iarm facilities ateovered, frequently ventilated, and are able to hold grain in good condition for several yean (see Figure
"Ofi.larrn. or oonlarm. itorarrnan not intended tor farm vsr. but Itot ivourtymous with urbanndWd. the maior portion ol nonfVmi probably loralrd In ruralonvenknl lo grain producers
enerally. Ihese facilitiesfilled as the grain and oilseed crops arc harvested and then emptied as ihe raw materials are usedhe USSn has added aboutillion Ions to ofl-laim capacity, and there arc Urge numbers ol grain elevators being bulll Assuming anercent retirement rate In facilities, off-farm capacity would currently be aroundillion Ions. We do not know how much has been added to on-farm capacity
he Soviets have large "stale reserves" of food and other materials which they would call upon for usen emergency. We alsohat the Soviels have "strategic reserves" ol foods (as well as other supplies and industrial materials) for use during wartime Presumably strategic reserves areelow which supplies would not be drawn down during peacetime. We do not know whether some part ol Ihe grain storage capacity discussed above constl-
oviet Oroln Storage Facility
This locality.Kaiokhttan. contains port of rhaoff-form groin storage copocify estimated lot the USSR.
strategic reserve" or whether this reserve is in addition toillion metric tons.
sources have reported(or food storage including grain.of dispersed and protected stocks of grainspecifically called for by1 decreeihe civil defense organization of the USSR- Aswe had identifiedndergroundbunkers having similarhe bunkers vary inith themeters long andeters0bunker storageratioetriccubic meters orlthough these bunkers vary In sizethey have several eomrnonMost are colocated with conventional grainlong, low storage buildings and are rail servedAll but three of the bunkers have afacility and alt but one have one ortransfer facilities used to offload the groinwhich extend intostorage facility area near Kiev Ishe total storage capacity of thetostimated toillionof wheat. Combining the colocatedthe total storage capacity atillion metric tons,
The storage sites areool) from the nearest urban center. According to human sources, the underground bunkersentilation control system and are constructed of reinforced concrete with an earth cover which would enhance the bunker's survival against nuclear weapon effects. Correlations between the distribution of bunkers and concentratloni of civilian population or military installations arc as yet inconclusive. Evidencethe typo of grain stored in the bunkers and Its Intended use remains unconfirmed. The source whose reports permitted the initial identification of the bunkers staled that the bunker-stored graintrategic reserve for use In wartime. The limited capacity and the physical characteristics of the bunkers suggest that they were designed topecialized and limited postattack requirement, that U, an assured grain supplyimited number of people.
Preliminary research on constructionIndicates that this bunker program began in the. Al least one and possibly two bunkers may have been initiatedhile nine were Hill under construction in ihe. Construction time varies appreciably, from two lo ten years. We believe we have located most of the bunkers of thb particular type, but what may be food storage bunkers of different type now have also been observed. Our analysis of food storageontinuing.
lIlion-metric-ton capacity of theuch less significant for purposes of sustaining the populationuclear attack than the amount of grain likely to be available from on-farm and off-farm storage facilities.illion metric tons of bunkered grain would representercent of the food grains consumed annually by the Soviet population. On the otherillion metric tons is less than one percent ofillion-metric-ton capacity of other grain storage facilities. The bunkers are therefore not as significantactor in Soviet post-nuctear-atrack recovery as they are as an Indicator of national policy, confirming that the USSR does maintain strategic reserves.
Our estimates of Soviet annual supply and consumption of grains0 were shown in Table VI. Soviet grain imports inave variedittle over one percent of domestic output0 to more thanercenthen the harvest was ihe lowest inecade.
5 about1 million) of the Soviet5 million) lived In dties0 or more residents. Urban per capitaof grain and grain producb averages two-thirds that of rural residents, primarily because urban residentsarger variety of foods to eat Thus the population resident in dries of0 consumes aboutercent of the grain required for food. This was aboutillion tonse estimate that consumption of grain for food requiredercent of the total estimated grain supplyndercent
We do not know, of course, what portions of Soviet grain storage facilities contain grain. Certainly the amounb in storage vary according lo the harvest. Although Soviet sources Indicateigh levd of reserves Is maintained at all times,ikely that storage fadlities were not full following5 harvest failure. Even if off-farm storage facilities were only half full, they would contain adequate grain for the dty populationear as well as for seeding the subsequent crop. The availability of this grainudear attack would depend on the vulnerability of the storage facilities. We do not know
GCCRCF *
AVAILABLE
how much off-farm storage is located in uiban areas, but we believe much of it is in the countryside, in elevators located along railroads."
ow long the grain supply would satisfy the requirements of the city populationuclear attack would depend on how soon alter the attack the flow of (ond from farm areas was resumed and in what volume.ubstantial flow of food were resumedatter ofew months, food stocks in general would probably be sufficient to sustain the citv population for that period, possibly longer if the conflict began In the fall of the year.uclear attack, distribution of foods and otherroblem for the Soviets even In peacetime, mightore limiting factor than food stocks
ater. Civil defense must ensure the supply and availability of waterostattaek environment for personnel and industrial needs, and for conducting civil defense operations such as decontamination and firefightlng. Thus, planning calls for storage of water supplies In shelters, construction of water reservoirs, enclosing wells, and the rapid repair of ruptured wmler mains.
In attempting to determine the extent to which the Soviets have diversified their sourceswater supply, data from nine selected urban centers of economic activity was collected. Research ol thb data failed lo show any effort in the construction of water reservoirs in the last decade However the availability of water In urban-industrial centers and their environs for postattaek operations has not been subject to detailed analysis.
vidence, however, of preparations for svatcr storage, although the extent of suchb unknownvidence of bunkered water storage facilities at some relocation sites and Industrial installations Open sources cite actionarge Industrial plant in Moscow to improve its water supply. Five artesian wells svere dug and connected to the plant's water system and five underground reserviors were constructed. As for water supply In dispenal and evacuation areas. Soviet manualsthat water be drasvn from wells which are to be sealed hermetically. Other sources have reported that the RSFSR civil defense staff had undertaken an extensive program through the republic to drill and seal wellsethod of ensuring an uncon laminated water supply.
" III-and ImtSon ol otl-tarm amax'iiibtrvti ol an Intellineneeunderway.
url VV> have Informallon on Soviet peace-lime production and consumption of energy. The actual amounts available In the Soviets after an attack would depend not only on the targets struck by the US, bul abo on the period of preparation prior to the attack during which the Soviets could Increase their reserve stocks at ellconsumers to fuel producers- As in the case of other supplies critical to survival of Ihe population and post-nuclear-attack recovery, distribution mayore serious problem than the stock levels available
ydroelectric power accountsoot one percent of the Soviets* -total energy needs; nuclear power sourcesegligible part of the total. Soviet planners probably eipectarge percent of the hydroelectric power would be disrupted. Thus,fuels would be the most important energy sources for the post-nuclear-attack period.
oviet production and consumption of fuels by type5 were as followi-
Prodartlop Connunpnoii
Nataral
iydn^wa.
uritiodl
We5 fuel positions as follows-01
tWo Resent*Mb* bamrh fbhl)
mmm Mb/day
Ubon
Mf)
rnattoa bob/day
Bihon tons)
Natural Ca>
Fiona Rewrvn trillion cubic meters
billion (tabic
melm/yeat
Hilton cubic
metars/year
Coal
Eiploied ireovniable
billion metric tons
mlllioo metric
ton/year
million metric
ton/year
These figures understate the Soviet potential energy resourcesudear attack. Should fuel
ritical shortage in the recovery, iSoviets would olmuvt certainly attempt lo acquire fuel fromon Ihe periphery of Ihe USSR, inctudinr. (he Middle East. Their success in making such acquiti-tiom would depend on the political and military situation and on world energy supply levels.
e have no precise estimates for the total amounts of organic fuels in the Soviet pipeline from producers lo consumers, for strategic reserves, for seasonal variations in pipeline, or for reserve furl stock levels. DIA calculations of the storage capacity for reiincd oil products are as follows (in barreli);
ays'
Level.
and Tank
mpply)
products in storage and transit (excluding those being escorted) currently totalillion barreli, enough to satisfy peacetime oil consumption by civilian, industrial, and military users for aboutays.uclear attack, we believe the military would have first priority on oil products, critical Industries and services would have second priority, and the general public last.
ost storage sites and distribution facilities for natural gas are located in urban-industrial areas likely to be subjected to nuclear attack. Thus, dkstributson in urban areas of gas.ercent of which Is used by the general population, would almost certainly beAvailability of natural gas to the population at evacuation and dispersal sites would depend on the location of the site relative to natural gas pipelines. Assuming that some gas-producing facilitieslo operate, gas pipelines to some Industrial or power facilities might continue to function or be restored to operational statushort period.
oal continues to account for aboutercent of the energy consumed annually In the USSRS Soviet coal production totaledillion metric tons, and coal reserves in the USSR arc estimated to be in eacessillion tons. Of the total annual Soviet coal production, however, onlyillion tons aic hard coal. The bulk of Soviel coal Is composed of 1st own and soft bituminous coaU with high moisture content. These coals weather and disintegrate rapidly, ignite spontaneously, and cannot be stored satisfactorily for long periods of time. Although actual stockpiles ol coal can varybecause of such factors as seasonal variations or preparations taken during the warning period, aboutillion metric tons of coal could be available from stocks on hand prior to the initiation of hostililles.quivalent to aboutays' supply al prextrike production rates.
Soviet industry utilised aboutercent of the coal consumed ir, she USSR Inousing and communal services accounted forercent and the remainingercent was consumed inagriculture, and transportation. Coal accounted for aboutercent of the electric power produced in the Soviet Unionoviet dependence upon coal as an energy resource for electric powerand personal consumption Is likely to Increaseecovery periodrtxfear exchange The distribution of coal would be critical in the postttiike period. Coal is produced In five major basins in the USSR, ond aboutercent is shipped by rail. Coal transport accounts for aboutercent of the total transport volume of the Soviet state railroad. Major disruptions in this transportation system will Impact heavily on the availability of coal for industrial and personal consumption.
Soviet civil defense planning calli forfuel to principal consumersuclear attack, namely critics) industries and the general population as well as the military. Since Soviet planners cannot predict the pattern of surviving fuel reserves, the locations of supplies may not correlate with the needs of high-priority users. We have little infoimallon on Soviet preparations to overcome such problems In meeting fuel requirements. Soviet plans for continuity of critics! industrial production specify fuel stockpiling and preparing for the use of alternate sources of fuel. Oil storage exists in some evacuation and dispersal areas near cities, but additional analysis is needed tu determine ihe capacity of such sites to serve the relocated urban population. Given the higher priority of the military and certain Industrial ministries for oil and oil products, it ts more likely that Soviet plans envision that coal wouldrincipal source of fuel for the general population. Distribution oF coal to the population has an advantage In that it can be transported in almost any kind of carrier, but. as noted. Sovietifficult to store in large quantities lor long periods because of rrtoistufe absorption and spontaneous combustion.
with other critical supplies, wcstocks of fuel would be available topopulation in Ihe immediateOver the short term, because of its bulk,probably present the most difficultlot the Soviets. (It should be noted,the Soviet population demonstrated inII the ability to survive and to workof severe shortages of fuel forOver the longer term following an attack,and distribution would likelyr industrial recovery of the USSR.
Medical Supplies. The USSR is self-sufficient in production of most common drugs, antibiotics, and biologicals. Certain highly sophisticated drugs are imported from the West in small amounts. Poor planning and coordination within the pharmaceutical industry often result In shortages of raw materials and chemical intermediates that delay production of medicines. The quality of most Soviet-produced drugs Is adequate, but problems in quality control tend to produce variations in potency. Another significant shortcoming, despite recent efforts at remedy, is substandard packaging of finishedshortcoming that restricts long-term storage capability. Distribution problems alio arise occasion-ally.
Laboratory and surgical equipment isdomestically or imported from Eastern Europe, and generally is of acceptable quality. Medical equipment is available in sufficient amounts, but few items of equipment arc disposable. The Soviets' more sophisticated electronic medicalIs generally obsolete by Western standards, but performs adequately. The greatest shortcoming in Soviet medical equipment is lack of standardization and chronic shortages of spare parts due to poor planning of production schedules.
The USSR is believed to have extensive reserve stockpiles of medical material, maintained by an agency of the Council of Ministers. These stockpiles contain drugs, antibiotics, vaccines, serums. Mood plasma, plasma expanders, bones for transplants, surgical dressings, medical and surgical instruments, hospital and laboratory equipment,ayAccording to Soviet sources, strategic reserves must be maintained al all times, regardless of shortages in the civilian seclor, and are constantly replaced. It is believed that Soviet aid to undcrdevel? oped areas probably includes drugs drawn from strategic reserves thai an- ncaring their expiration dales. Many of the spcciflci of Ihe strategic medical stockpile are not known, including locations.by item, and number ol days ofarticular deficiency Is believed to eiist in the Soviet whole blood preservation program for nationalThe Soviets cannot Store whole blood for more than aboutays.
he medical supplies availableuclear attack would not be limited to strategic reserve stockpiles. The Ministry ol Health maintains civilian medical depots and operates the medical sections in military general supply depots. Reserves of medical materials are located at large hospitals and other medical facilities, and the civilian system of pharmacies maintains warehouses of drugs atpoints throughout the country. As is the case with designated strategic stockpiles, the normal peacetime reserves of medical supplies controlled by the Ministry of Health are continually replenished, with the older materials being dispensed first.
2U. Stockpiles of medical supplies available for civil defense appear lo be adequate. J
"jVe do not know, however, the localion ol most of tTie strategic reserve sites, their sire, or the adequacy of their management.
effectiveness of some drugs may wellby substandard quality control,packaging, prooleons of timely distribution,of overstocking of some itemsare indications that storage conditions varyto location, thus placing some storedIn Jeopardy. Because ol their lesser bulk,would present lessistributionthan other critical supplies. We agreejudgment of Soviet sources that the USSRstocks of acceptable drugs andsupplies for use In event of nuclear war.
D. Distribution of Essential Supplies
Providing for the distribution of essential goods to critical industries andisplaced and injured populationamaged transportation system would be one of the most difficult problems lor Soviel civil defense planners in recovery operations
The ability of the Soviet transport system to handle military movements, evacuation of thefrom uiban areas, and Ihe movement of
essential foodsosl-nucJear-attack environment depends on circumstances which the Soviets cannot predict with confidence Soviet planners late into account Ihe worstsuiprise attack on SovietIhey probably regard II as highly unlikely. Such an attack would probably destroy much of the transportation facilities in uiban areas and al critical points, but Soviet planning appears to be based on the assumptionarge portion of transportation equipment and facilities outside urban target areas would survive. Probably more Important than the amount ol facilities and equipment likely to survive would be the availability of electric power, key management personnel, communications, and other transportation support facilities.
uclear attack against citieswarning, we assume lhat much ofequipment nationwide still would beExcept for structures within urbanof transportation systems are difficulteven using nuclear weapons to attackare not very vulnerable to collateralOO-kt, weapon would cause onlydamage to most transportationmiles or more away from ground remat any given time much rail equipmenttrucks are moving between urban areas,be largely undamaged by strikes directed
Railroads
railroads would be affected most byol electrical power. If allwere out, aboutercent of Sovietbe affected These would Involve most ofIn the western USSR (includinghe Trans-Siberian line as forChita, and the toute between KhabarovskCurrently about half the freightterms of Ion-kilometers) is carried byand (he other half by dicscla estimated that the Soviets have0ocomotives Sinceof electric power can be expected,dicsel locomotives would be taieda larger percentage of the traffic onUse of dtesel locomotives would dependavailability of dlesc! fuel and
bviously the current level of rail transport could nut be maintained, but the amount of equipment available would probably be sufficient to keep vital supplies moving at satisfactory levels. Il seems eitrensely unlikely thai all segments ofrailroads would be inoperable. Many of the electric power sources for the railroads are outside key target areas, and would be untouched by an urban attack or relatively easy to restore to service.
lack of electricity wouldof transport-related computer centersprocesses that depend on electricityMany al these functions could be operaledpower sources or could bewith much less efliciency.
Motor Transport
theillion (rucks inillion are used In agriculturehundred thousand are assigned lo theof the remainder are In urban areas, but aof these would probably remaina city attack especially if sufficientavailable so cany out Soviet plans lofrom likely target ateai. Human sourcesin recent years the Soviets have endeavoredmore vehicle parks In areas outside city centers.
Inland Water Transport
amageuclear attack to inland water transport equipment is likely to be light, except in areas close to weapon ground zeros. The Soviets would probably be able to move supplies along rivers and canals in the period immediatelyuclear attack. Traffic volume over water routes could be easily Increased over peacetime levels by use of expedient carriers.
Air Transport
ll types of transport aircraft would be vital assets for recovery operations, especially in the period immedlalply following an attack. Unprotectedmost of which are usually located near major target areas will probably be put out of commissionurprise nuclear attack on cities. Aeroflot. the Soviet national airline, hasransports and the military hasr so. In its day-to-day operations the Soviet transport fleet is vulnerable, but evenhort period ofarge percentare of these aircraft could be dispersed to some of the hundreds of airfields outside urban target areas.
Transport-Related Communications
communications wouldtn (be distribution ol supplies in andiscussed previously, the Soviets areto increase the survivability ol civilcommunication facilities. Manyfacilities arc not highly vulnerable. Forthe Nevada testing siteamageequipment causedlasta pressure77 psi) "was ol suchcharacter thai it need not be considered heredisruption ol critical power sources forfacilities can be expected. However,sources of power are available, socommunications at military andorganizations could probably bewith the damage to communicationsIn urban areas, surviving facilitiesbe sufficient to permit (he Sovietsfrom the standpoint of communications,of critical supplies.
Personnel"
Whether qualified personnel to operate and manage transportation and distribution of critical supplies would be availableuclear attackajor uncertainty for Soviet planners, but the protection of essential personnelivil defense task of highest priority. There are. for example, active civil defense staffs and units at various echelons of (he transportation system, whose organization andresemble those at other economic installations. Also Soviel plans call for control over allmeans to be exercised by the armed forces, using military command and control channels, to satisfy both military and civil defense requirements.the priority that civil defense would command for transportation assets would depend on the situation.
The Soviets can probably be confident that sufficient transportation facilities and equipment would survive an attack precedederiod of warning to permit distribution of essential food and other supplies to the population. However, in this matter, as In other aspects of civil defense planning, (he Soviets cannot be certain about the overall effects of an attack involving several thousand nudear weapons or thdr ability to manage effectively the distribution of critical resources to the population while carrying out military operations. The Soviet reaction to these uncertainties is found in theirpproach to civilconcentrate onthe dvil defense organizational ilruclure and Its coordination wilh the armed forces, to provide for the production and distribution of supplies, to improve the effectiveness ol civil defense units and supporting services, and to expand their means of communication for control over civil defense operations
VII. PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIES
nsuring ihe continued operation of facilities ot national ecnrsrmie significance inrr-ost important task. According lo the Soviets,odern war with the use of weapons of mass destruction, "victory will be gamed by the country having an economy which, despite losses and damages suffered in the course of the war. maintains the capability of supplying its armed force* with everything they require, and of supplying Ihe country's populace with the foodstuffs and basic
Soviet measures In provide for the continuity of production ol induitriesudear attack, depending on the extent and success of such measures, could affect US plans for nuclear weaponwhich call for the destruction of the USSR's capabilities to reconstitute itselfajor power. Protective measures aimed at the continuedof goods essential to the conduct of military operations could, if successful, impact on tactical operations over the short termudear exchange.
In this section we report what we know about dispersal and hardening of Soviet industries, reserve production capacity, stockpiling of supplies and materials, and protection of key industrial workers. We have made no effort to estimate Soviet longer term capabilities to reconstitute Industriesarge-scale nuclear attack aimed at destroying them. Neither have we been able to correlate the industries at which some protective measures are In evidence with those which would contribute most to Immediate post-nuclear-at tack military operations.
From the available evidence, we havelo confirm explicit policies and objectives for the protection of Induitries as derived from the Soviets' own writings, and have attempted to assess the progress tlsey are making
"Mayor General M. Miiradyaa.rmenian Republic Civil Defense Stall "Raising ibe Readiness of CivilomimmUliled In JPRS Irani, on USSP Mtttimy Affoln.i.
""fiC^-ftCT"1
oviel coiicepls for reducing Hie vulnerability of industry in nuclear wur callombination of meiiiuiei. each of which will be dbcussed In thisier
The macrodupetsal of Induitnet:ong-term program ofi bull rig induitrialihrooghoiil the country, involving the creation of new (owns and agglomerations of Industries by region.**
The microdiipertat of industry: Thb Involves establishing more than one industrial fat.'lilycritical products, siting of production facilities within an urban area soingle weapon would not destroy the entire potential of the areaiven type of production, andystem of reserves of critical supplies and materials.
Hardening of Industrial janlitteintended to protect vital equipment or entire facilities and. through shelters, to protect key
workers.
of industrial facilities: In the period Immediately preceding or during hostilities, certainmaterials, andmove outside the urbanarea to sites which had been prepared in advance
A. Macrodispcrsol of Heavy Industries
art of militaryeliberate program for macrodlspcrsal of industries would involve spreading industryarge geographic area so that devastation of any one region or urban area would not completelyiven product. The ideal outcome would be to make each region of the country self-sufficient In critical products. Soviet writings on civil defense describe thb concept ru follows
Measures may be taken nationally to limit the concentration of industry in certainational and dbpersed location of industries in the territories of ourf great national economic importance, primarily from Iheof an accelerated economic development, but also from the standpoint of organizing
hile Soviet publications regularly point out the ad.sntagei for dvil defense of this lype of dtsperut. they oho acknov-tedgt that the primary iiwlivaltom are economic and social rather than purely military protection from weapons of massniformly dispersed dUtribution of plants may be accomplished gradually by developing Industry in underdeveloped regions and limiting the (onstiuction of new plants in highlyregions 10
23d. Although Soviet civil defense authorities urge macrodispr riion of industry, there is no indication that Sovieteing dbpersed specifically for civil defense purposes.arginal decline in overall industrial concentration has taken place over the lailoears,lmost completely explained by economic factors. Some of the Important industries ore becoming even more concentrated over lime.
ndustrial ministries generally resist theto remote areas because of high construction costs and the need to develop an infrastructure of roads, housing, stores, etc Thus, Soviet managers find It easier lo expand existing plants in already developed areas than to build new ones from scratch In relatively remote underdeveloped areas On the other hand, plant locations are often dictated by tlie availability and cost of tronsportation, requiring that they be located either near the source of raw materials or near their customers The Kama River Track Plant and its associated new town (Naberezhnyye Chelny) for example, air being constructed far from large cities (seehe Soviets believe that large plants such as the Kama River plant are more efficient and that Ihey receive economies of scale. Thb predbposi-tion toward largo plants Is further Illustrated by the fact that the average annual outputoviet cement plant doubled0
Historical Perspective
he Soviet policy of Intensive Industrial development shifted the industrial geography of the USSR. When the Communists assumed power, almost all of Soviet industry was concentrated in four majorew local local pattern evolved from Soviet efforts to establish industries near the source of raw materials and to make each union republic or economic region as self-sufficient as possible. Industry also was to be developed near the consumers and specialization was lo be encouraged.esult, new Industrial regions were developed in the eastern section of iherocess which was acccler-
" Yegoior. Shlyakuv, and Alabln, op. til.
SECBCT-
during World War ii wilh (he Germanol the wcslcrri part ol the countiy.
ollowing the war. the industrial regions in ihe west rapidly regained the position they held prior to thf niithreak ol hostilities. Since then the territorial distribution ol* gross industrial production has been remarkably stable.
uring (he, the locational pattern of industrial development was publicly debated. The issue was whether lo concentrate on industrial uC-'clopmen' inr tcisiiii& industrial capacity in the wesl. The decision was in favor ol expanded western industries; thus, industrial development inhowed no appreciable regional shilt in manufacturing capacity. Western centers in many cases grew more rapidly than the less developed areas (sec Tablehile industries for extraction of raw materials were developed in the east, the chief processing industries were slill localed In the traditional manufacturing centers of the western
ussn.
Growth in Urban-lndmlrial Areat
ince the, some Soviet planners have voiced concern about unbridled growth ol large metropolitan areas, warning ol additional social costs and urban blight. They advocate more industrial development (particularly labor-intensive industries) In relatively small and medium-size cities and towns (populationsrstensibly to make use of labor resources made available by theof agriculture. These suggestions are applicable primarily to western republics, such as the Ukraine, where transportation and communications arewell developed. Indeed, Industrial development probably was increased in many of these small and medium-size western cities. However, labor statbtles suggest that little excess labor Is readily available to support many additional industrial development projects. Moreover, there is little evidence to suggest thai diseconomies from urban-Industrialare halting, or even slowing appreciably.development in the largest metropolitan areas of the USSH. In fact. urban-Industrial concentration is becoming more Intense In many of the largest Soviet cities."
"upported by various lUtullcal moaiurti For0 Indwlrial concentrationiund by the
growth ot Induftrlalapllaerocat In
Moscow and by ISO percent In Leningrad.
tadd: vi ii
Regional DittiilraUoa ol lodultifal Production in the USSH (pcrccntl1
RSFSR:
Nr-ih-eii*
Ceniial
Vyatka
Central
Voba
North
Ural
Wesl
Far East
Ukralnlaa
Uihu.nl>.
Latvian
Estonian
CcvgUn
Armenian SSR
Uibck
Kirgli
Tadlhik SSR
Turkmea
Kaulh
rSrtnriisnan
Moldavia* SSR
1 Because ot founding components may nol addhr regional breakdown on which thb percentagelluslraled in Figurehe firstreas named arc economic region) within Ihe Russian Sorit! Fadoaled Socialist Republic There other republics ol the USSR.
* Includes Kaliningrad, administrativelyn RSFSR but included la the Baltic Economic Region Wih the Lithuanian. Latvian, and Estonian republics.
Industrial
j
he trend In the distribution of Soviet Industries is also suggested by an analysis^
to compare the number of plants required to accountiven percent of total output6 (Tablend
to del ermine the percent of the estimated val of output of all industrial facilities^ accounted for by urban areasdifferen population size (Table X)
nats ix
al HaMi rW*rta<raj MOatp* Ue SclcOfJ
rVovirv**
Motor
Aluminum
U-d
Ztac
Tixtan
Tenia
T
Alrnift let Enxlnt
Electric
SO* n*
TS* vilpul
IT
i:
ts
n
t 4
t
3 3
1
It .
%
1 S
i
1 i
1
|
*Mt*
3 6
i
1 t
t*
6 II
ii
|
* t%
6
1
+ $%
4i iro
M
TABLE X
Pcrwnl at Vili*ulpvl bylt* Sit*
ooroicoooo
xkr. '
i".ln" olArm
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Table IX shows ForM Importantnumber of plants
required to account for at leastercent andof the total output (or capacity) of allfor each selected Industry. The tablein spite of large increases In the output of mostindustries and with the exception ofihe number of facilities required to accountrelatively small ond has
Increased very littler oveiThe past IS years. In the steel industry, lor eumple. the number of plantsforercent of total steel prodocTion capacity hai actually declined from
hows ihe percent of the estimated value of Soviet industrial productionl""
Represented by the output from six classes of urban areas. The six classes ol uiban areas are ordered by population sire and the number of urban areas in eachhown in the table
The condustaru drawn from theconsistent with other measures of industrial concentrations, namely, that
- Mosth,Sh
degree of concenTrahon of produciinn
The output of most of the representative sample of industries selected for analysis more than doubled0ul there wasmall increase In the number of plants required lo account forercent|^
As in other industrial nations. Soviet industrial production Is concentratedimited number of large population centers.
Territorial Production Complexes
of industry could resulttrends toward establishing territorialcomplexes. This program is to locate industriesto the source of the raw materials ondepend. The Soviets expect that (his initialhelp to stimulate furtherconsumer goods, and serviceThe planning end coordination phase ofnow underwayassiveas pointed outecent article by thePlanning Commiltee.
For the rapid and harmonious development of territorial complexes, the organization oftechnical and economic studies Is especially important. As yet, experience has beenonly In the drafting of preliminary plans for Ihe long-range development of individualHowever, the amount of work is so great that It Is necessary to include in il an entire system of design organizations capable ofthe general designing nol only of basic production units but also of the entire production and social infrastructure. The regional layouts for territorial complexes (hat are being drafted in the system of Ihe USSR Slate Constructionshould enter into the practical activity of each complex's general designer.
B. Macrodispersal of light Industries
in most countries, light industry isthan heavy Industry in the USSR.of the shares of the USSR'sof food and soft goods with shares ofof selected cities and surroundingthai shares of processed-food productionmore closely with population than do sharesimportant factor inplanning (sec Tablehis is notthe perishability of food products leadsreater proportion of localin the immediale area. In all areas the shares of processed-food products arc lower than population, probably because of the availability of fresh farm produce not processed by industry, particularly in the rural areas (sec Tables XII andhe bulk of the production of processed foods and soft goods occurs in the major centers ofattern which changed liltle5
of potenlial product surplusin processed foods and soft goods forcan be accomplished by computingfor eachThese densitiesIn Tables XIV andxcept forChernozem Region, North Caucasus,Oblast, the RSFSR it generallycapacity to feed its population solely fromindustry. Likewise, theCentral Asia generally arc not self-sufficient.that the bulk of the country would haveon the Central Chernozem Region, thethe Baltic republics for industriallyThis picture changes only slightly for theindustry. Generally, the relationships lend tobalanced,regions haveproducts and some deficit products.
results, when contrasted wilhfor industryhole, show virtuallybetween total industrial density andof the consumer nondurables industries.that the locatlonal pattern of theis atypical of industry in general
C. Mkrodispersol of Industries
Siting of
iting production facilities within urban areas to reduce their vulnerabilityingle weapon Is most practical in newly developing areas of the USSR. In already developedassive relocation of Industry would be necessary toubstantial Impact on reducing the area's vulnerability. In many urban areas whereoncentrated, new industrial plants have been built In the outskirb.
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Because or rounding, ouinponanti may not addn- Hjm Si
Noffckfertse aspects of city planning probably would
ir.similar
he Soviet civil defense literature has died at least six ways toicrodiipenal of industry:
reducing or limiting building density byentry ol new Industry In concentrated locales;
constructing wide roads so that rubble will not impede transportation;
creating green areas (forest belts) to separate industry from other activity;
creating reservoirs (apart from the needs for human consumption,ecessary input for many industries).
creating an outer tone to which workers may be
jafely dispersed and where their physicalmay be latiilied. and
building circumferential highways to help maintain the transportation network.
ome surveys Indkale that in some instances, the construction of new industrial facilities, including whole new towns, is being carried out in accordance with these guidelines..There are Indications that civil defense considerations play some role In microdbper-sal of Industries. In Bratsk, for example, the aluminum and lumber combines were reportedly placed in sites where floods caused by on attack on the Bratsk dam would nol affect them. Also, special attention was paid to creating wide roadways in the town of Nabereihnyye Chelnyinimum width of8 leetl. Nevertheless, the guidelines are generally common to any well-plannedeacetime as wellivil defense function, and Ihe survey noted above suggests they are not always followed. Figureepicts the microdii-persal of Industrial potential In selected large urban areas
miim*iiia:*
t8l
TABLE XIV
Heiional Denaitlea at Selected Froeeiwd Food Product! in the USSR
The Soviet Union has acquired considerable redundancy of facilities to produce, some military items. For example, there are possibly four tank plants and three plants for tank engines. Armored personnel carriers are produced in five locations, usually by large plants with large product mixes. However, these plants are not known to be hardened or to have underground production facilities,
The redundancy in tank facilities was not entirely planned. Production was Initiated in heavy equipment plants that could handle tank production processes and was relocated because of the exigencies of World War II. Soviet tank production still takes place in Nlzhniy-Tagil and Omsk, sites to which the production teams and facilities of the Leningrad "Kirov" and the Kharkov tank plants were relocated in Worldfter the war the Kharkov facility was restored and has resumed the production of tanks. Moreover, with the exception of the Kurgan Armored
+
Vehicle Plant, which is located In the Urals between Omsk and Sverdlovsk, all the plants producing armored personnel carriers arc located in heavily industrialized areas of the European USSR. In plants that were making military goods before World War II.
Industrial Reserve Capacity and Stockpiles
he reserve capacity of Soviet industry has received little research attention both because of Ihe paucity of data and because of the nebulous character o( the concepl ofhe tendency has been to assume that the capital-starved and production-maximiiing Soviel economy does not willinglybelow-capacity production. While the reluct ancc of the Soviets lo retire outdated industrial capacity from the current production stream appears to support this view, some evidence that unused industrial
" Thin in. the major iMelkgrnoe eHoit In thliIs contained in EH. Tne LoeaHoa of SoaUl Manufacturing Capacity; An App/oW.
tAWJ XV
nafttnSatnled Wi Cod.tlx USSR
Gallon
Hr/.kei
RSKSR.
Northwest
Central
VcJei-Vyalki
irtinKni .
V-tt-
North Caitoaiui
Ural
Won Siberia
iberia
Tn Laat
Ubtllniaa SSR
Lithuanian SSR
Latvia* SSR
KUonlao SSR
Georgian SSR
Aierbaydihan SSR
Armenian SSR
UM SSR
KlriU SSR
Tadri.tk SSR
TUrttnen SSR
Kaiakh SSR
KcloruaMan.
SW Flew* 32
capacity doe* exist appean aperiod really In human source reports. **
ne such report indicates that industrial plant managers frequently overstate the amount ofcapacity being utilized In order to avoid future demands for Increasing the utilization of machinery and equipment and touffer against Increases In production plans. This suggests that some unused capacity exists which probably could and would be used under emergency conditions
lie enlenl lo which industrial enterprises can continue producing in the event that their supply of raw materials inputs is interdicted alsoorm of reserve capacity. This, inunction of raw material Inventories, stockpiles, and thebetween inputs and outputs.cant
-T.eniWrlaloaeaoeedaasaiaetof lew lha- aw. covldarJfs-rlinWa* and
ml
evidence coocerning the magnitude of ratv material stockpiles because such data generally fall within the realm of state secrets. Some rough estimates of Ihe amount of time production could continue by drawing down inventories, based6 input-output model of the Soviet economy using Soviet data, are shown for selected Industries In Table XVI.
25G. As indicated inf the table, none ol these industries could continue moreew weeks without access to additional taw materials. It is difficult to extrapolate these results, which are basedo the present time. Evidence suggests that Inventories are erratic, especially in those sectors heavily dependent on agriculture. On Ihe other hand, the Soviets placed greater emphasis on preparations for the continuity of industrial production beginning in the.
nother source of supply for both raw materials and final goods is the Soviet state reserve
iai1:XVI
Length ol lime output inventories -ouW last (columnlus length
levels.
system, on which there Is Utile current rel/able information There >te three categories of Soviet state reserves. The first is designed lo maintain continuity of planned production in the eventerious interruption of normal supplies. The second is designed to permit the rapid conversion of the economyartime basis, under mobilization plans Both Ihese categories of commodities are stored at plants and warehouses of the economic ministries. The third consists of stocks held at state teservc bases, for use in extreme emergencies when all other stocks have been eihausted.
2SS. Soviet state reserves are thus very much broader in character and purpose than the "strategic stoclrpiles' of Western countries. Moreover, state reserve operations penetrate the economy to such an extent that they necessarilyarge pipelineonsiderable portion of current Soviet consumption of some commodities is regularlyby planned releases from stale reserves.
l is upon these large, flexible, all-inclusive State reserves that the USSR must depend to meet any large-scale or long-term emergency. In lime of war they would furnish the material means for converting the economy to war production. In accordance with economic mobilization plans, for maintaininglife in areas isolated by military action, and for limited, direct iiipport of military forces. In peacetime they are called upon to lessen the eflects of breakdowns In production and distribution and to ol time the most cointralalng Input would last at current, product Ion
give theertain degree of regional self-sufficiency. While there Is no precise measure of the size of Soviet state reserves, the state reserves bases distributed in each area probably would furnish the food and materials necessary to sustain the given areaeriod of at least several months.
As noted in Chapter VI, maintenance of and protected stocks of grain reserves Is specifically called for by1 decree establishing the civil defense organisation of the USSR. The quantity and distribution of Soviet grain reserves are particularly critical factors in determining the abilityegion to supply its population with food during an emergency. Grain reserves and bunkered grain storage facilities are discussed in that chapter in connection with food supplies for theuclear attack.
D. Hardening of Economic. Hardening ol economic installations refers to the full range of engineering measures taken to improve the "operational stability'* of Individual installation: in wartime. By stability the Soviets mean the capability of installations to produce according to plan and "presumes the rapid restoration ofwhich has been disturbedesult of the enemy's use of mass destruction* There arc degrees of hardening ranging from constructionnf
v. OgloMin- indp. eft
l. T. *
underground facilities and protective engineering techniques to expedient measure* fot the protection of equipment. While we are beginning to have some idea of the scope of underground construction, we lack evidence on the degree to which other hardening techniques and measures are being applied. The goals of the program for hardening Industrial facilities were described0 Soviet publication as secondaryeconomic consideralions:
Increasing the survivability of buildings and structure may be acluevo! rhen plsnning new construction as well as when rebuildingHowever, these measures are taken only if they are economically feasible."
Undoubtedly many industrial ministries have been loath to spend their limited investment rubles on civil defense measures which in no way will help the ministry achieve production targets. On the other hand, more recent Soviet statements, and classified sourcesrowing trend to mandatory Inclusion of civil defense related engineering and technical meaiures In plans for new industrial construction.
Hardening Techniques
Chuykov wrote0 thatin the damage to industry fromeffects could be achieved at low cost:
There are tested techniques and measures to be used in Industrial construction that can lessen destruction and reduce the likelihood ofexplosions and fires. Preliminary calculations show that they can lessen the effectsuclear attack by approilmatdyoercent without great monetary and material expenditures."
a recent publication, the Sovietsand technical measures thatsurvivability of economic facilities.published inuarter of auses as an example the measures taken atFirst State Hall-Bearing Plant to Increaseol that plant.ome of the taskswere
removing wooden and flammable material In floors and roofs, replacing these with concrete and noncombuitiblehtrakov, and Alabliv. Of. tttCivil Daltnse In Our Commonromer, and KreclsrtiuW Oaf IV/Ow ofIodWnol IVoarer. Moscow: Aimidaa. IVTSu pan Ui JlttS
r.t'
burying utility lines;
shelters to protect workers;
igging artesian wells to ensure an adequate water supply; and
heltered substation for plant compressors
lthough the Soviets describe these measures in terms of civil defense, some of these procedures In the US would constitute programs of moderniiatkm completely devoid of did! defers- content. Other cMI defense measures described In Soviel writings Include "inereasing equipment stability" by replacingmachinery, reducing the number of different model types, buildingeserve of spare parts, and developing fully automated machinery. These actions, in line with Soviet policy, would be justified on grounds that they would enhance peacetimeand at the same time reduce the plants vulnerability to nuclear attack.
cases where hardening would neither oddproduction nor lead to sorts? costIndustrial ministries would resist such measures.succeeds in incorporating standardfeatures into building designsonstruction cost savings may
addition to the more costly formsmeasures, Soviet open-sourceas the Civil Defense Handbook describemeasures for protecting IndustrialAmong the most basic measures to be takenrequiring the orderly shutdown of anExpedient hardening measures include:
reinforcing buildings and structures with cables and supports;
removal of combustible materials and other Fire prevention measurea; and
covering equipment, structures, and buildings with earth and sandbags.
A study ol expedient hardening techniques for possible application in US industries indicates that such measures could markedly reduce damage to industrial equipment from nuclear weapons under some circumstances.
ccording to Soviet writings, the engineering and technical hardening measures described above are being applied generally in industrial instaMotions,
feeGREf-
BEST COpy AVMLMLE
whilc expedient hardi'mng techniques would be undertaken as necessary. Hie re is, however, little intelligence information lo confirm the extent to which any ol these measures and techniques are being carried out. Features such as shelter construction have been noted by human sources, but most of them have not been Interrogated in detail about other industrial hardening techniques, nor have they had thebackground to report on them. Thus, our understanding of the eitent to which Soviet dvil defense directives on Industrial hardening are being followed remains irunlequatr.
are unable lo |udge ihe effectiveness ofmeasures discussed above but studieslo assess them. Our impression is thatmeasures we know about wouldin reducing collateral damage towhich were mil Ihe primary targets of attack.
Shelters at Industrial Facilities
provision of shelters at industrialabo an integral element of the hardening processthe Soviets rely to ensure stability ofinstallations of the national economy. Asthe section of Chapter VI covering trends inon shelter construction, emphasis onbegan arain In theof the report describingn shelter construction, severalpositions In industry gave them access tohave stated that this mandatory program isin new Industrialource who worked on planning ofconstruction for the Ministry of Ihestated lhal as ol8 all plantto include civil defense-approved,shelters The shelten for Industrial use.and detached, aie to be used not onlybut for materiel as well Thus, byareas for storage of sensitive equipmentadd another dimension to their
developmentroad networkfor workers and materiel atwith the dispersal system describedVI, whereby in wartime one shiftto operate production lines whileof the work force would be housed outdangerprobably continue forto be (he Soviets' principal response tovulnerabilityuclcai attack. Thisappears toong term effort which should provide significant protection to those elements of the work force remaining al llicir production pasts and also needed to perform repair work In the event the installationrn age.
Underground Industrial. Soviet familiarity with, and interest in, construction of underground industrial enterprises dates at least from World War II. After their occupation of Eastern Europe Ihe Soviets were able to inspect at lint hand, and leara from, the considerable German efforts in underground operations In his frequently died book Mthtory Strategy, the late Chief of the Soviet General Staff. Marshal Sokolovskiy. described the importance of underground industrial enterprises as follows:
Ensuring the viability of Industry, espedally heavy and militaryost important aspect of the preparation of Industry forhe most important industrialshould preferably be located underground in premises prepared beforehand for this purpose.
Construction of underground complexes may have been underway al various locations within the USSR itself from the fate lWOs lo ihe, according to plaintext messages which identified organizations specializing in undergroundmost of which had been associated wilhubway constructionhe intercepted trafficnl these organizations weir at woffc Dfj projectsumber of locations in the Caucasus, Cenlral Asia. Siberia, and the Far East. In no case did the area of reported activity correspond with any location of confirmed or likely subway construction.
Since then there have been several reports from human sources concerning underground production fadlities in various parts of the USSR. In some cases the plants were wholly below the surface and were reported to be engaged tn current production from the underground fadlities In others, the underground element wis repotted to be producing military items while that element of the complex located above-ground produced for the dvllian economy. One such plant in the Urals turned out trucks ond bulldozers at the aboveground plant, while the underground fadlities produced aimoicdecond such complex has been refilled toear Kretnenchug in the Ukraine. Its aboveground production Is railway rolling stock; the underground fadlities allegedly produce amphibious tanks.
+
ther reporting states that some defense industries in major centers such as Moscow have standby underground facilities "which can be used to duplicate destroyed enterprises, production shops, and scientifichile most reports onfacilities have related them to defense industry production, one source reported an eilensivefacilityhoe factory and photographic paper factory in Leningrad.
o date we have not been able to confirm the underground production facilities reported above. There is firm evidence, however, of cn undergroundDodonovo near Krasnoyarsk. Thisdefense industryelieved toajor nuclear-related facility. In addition, there is recent evidence of anotherower plant, in Sevastopol. This underground production facility was reported by an individual^*
pic described a
large ferro-concrete structure, the entrance to which beganunnel, about4 ft) long, leadingliff face. One of the shops in this installation was reported to be aboutongyt).
E. Emergency Relocation of Industrial Facilities
ccording to Sokolovskly. "The evacuation of industries Is usually provided for in the plans for mobilizing the national economy and is closely related to the mobilization plan of Ihe Armedelocation of industry during or subsequent to hostilities was an Important ingredient In Soviet strategy during World War II, as noted in the discussion of macrodlspersal. In the nuclear age. however, thisess viable alternative as the period of warning diminishes. For this reason, emphasis has been placed on the various hardening measures described above to permit continuedof defense-related equipment provided for in economic mobilization planning. There has. however, been some reporting from human sources suggesting Soviet plans to relocate certain defense plants to previously selected sites in remote areas as soon as warning of Impendingeceived. The evidence available on Soviet preparations to carry out these plans is limited, and information on them Is difficult to obtain. The plans are classified and known Only lo theop management.
One source stated that Ihe operations of lib design bureau in Odessa would be shiftedi) awayillage where underground shelter and working facilities had beenource from eastern Siberiaelocation site ISOi) from Irkutsk for his institute but noted that no effort had been made to stockpile material Ihere or otherwbe prepare the sile for continuing operations. In some cases il is difficult to dbiingubh in emigre reporting between relocation sites for actualand facilities to which plan! personnel would be dispersed in accordanry- with procedures described in
One source has provided details on proceduresefense' electronics plant would move its production linesreviously surveyed yetsite as soon as the alert order was received. The source, whoanagement-level position and had access to the planning, stated that the relocation site was ehosen with these criteria in mind:
away from potential military targels; and
located near railways, power lines, water supply and gas pipelines.
To avoid pinpointing ihe location of the site to hostile aerial observation in advance of hostilities, no preparatory work was done prior lo the move, such as clearing trees or laying foundations. The source contended that within two days after the move began, the site would be ready to receive machinery which would be installed In large army tents and specially designed inflatable buildings. Movement of equlp-menl and the stockpiled parts for continuedwould be accomplished by transport and working vehicles organic lo the plant. The source estimated that approximately two weeks would be required to complete the move and resume production To date only this one source has reported on :his form of emergency relocation to an unimproved rite.ot known lo what citent this approach has been followed by other installations.
VIII. CIVIL DEFENSE TRAINING AND EXERCISES
Soviet civil defense trainingthe education of allthe means of protection against effectsdestruction weapons, lectures and literaturebasic means of education, withbeing placed on practical oerefses requiring active participation by
trainees. Greater siren it being placed on (lie preparation oi active cadres than on muss
In theory. Ihe whole concept of training, is lo ensure ihe survival of the individual so that he can personally and collectively contribute to Iheand rest oral ion of the Soviet state; training of both civilian and military personnel stresses the Interface between them, since "the soldiers and the workers stand together, aso ensure his survival, the individual must know how lo reactar alert, shield himself from nuclear effects, and survive the postattaek era. with or wllhoul special equipment or supplies. Training slresies self-sufficiency and Initiative on the part of the Individual buto-it-alone altitude, since he must band logcthcr with others lo serve the collective purposes ol Soviet society and the state in wartime actions and postwar recovery. In training, as In other aspects of the dvil defense program, those facilities andlo which the regime has accorded high priority in war survival appear to have the most intensive, regularly conducted training activities.
Theie is much evidence on the ciistence of training and exercises and compaialively little on the specific results needed to permit reliable |udgments on effectiveness nnd value. Handbooks and otherabound with instructions on what is to be taught and how lo teach it. They also cover the need for practical eserdses and bow to conduct them. When discussing results, authors of artides in open literature are characteristically complimentary wilhignored, played down, or generalised to the point where they cannot be evaluated. Writings with restricted distribution arc more critical.
Recent reporting by human sources on their experience in training programs confirms these trends, but continue lo reflect general lack ol public enthusiasm At the same lime, when asked specifically if the system would function in an emergency, most of these sources respond positively, adding thai In the Soviet Union the population will follow orders when giventhan and military authoritiesar judgment that public enthusiasm and widespread public participation in drills are not necessary to carry out rescue and restoration operations in an emergency Public understanding in advance about what to do and how In domportant. In their training program the Soviets are concentrating on those capabilities critical to successful operations In an emergency; thb includes a eliable means of command and control, and well-trained and equipped task units which are exercbed frequently by responsible and knowledgeable leaden.
he Soviet concept for training the generalo bring instruction to people where they live and work, so as to make dvilart of theii daily lives, rathet thanerson goes away to do occasionally and ihen igaastm Ti.is principle applies to all segments ofdwellers, rural residents, fadory workers, and the military. The Soviets dalm to have an infrastructure capable ofthis type of training, and evidence tends to support this dalm. particularly In the industrial and military lectors. In addition to training the Soviets require practice In ihe form of demonstrations and exercises of varying size and scope Evidence is dear that demonstrations and exercises take place, but their extent and degree of success have not .been fully and reliably measured. More important in Soviet planning than the level of training and dvil defense skills of the general population are the readiness and preparations of the dvil defenseat ions, cad ret, and services
of the Gfnerol Population
he largest task in training the general population involves urban residents, because of thdr number and their location in likely target areas.vil defense training for the general population became compulsory, requiring an annual minimum ofours per person, mostly classroom instruction. Training focuses on weapon effects end how to use equipment The Individual actions and skills stressed included use of masks, decontamination techniques, knowledge of alert signals, of assembly points, and of personal supplies and equipment needed, and how to build and live in expedient shdters in relocation zones.
raining of urban dwellers not partidpating activdy ki civil defense services or lormatiorts at thelr pbee ofccomplished primarily through the schooli and neighborhood organizations Someillion toillion students receive mandatory training at schools beginning in the second grade, espedally during militarization training and Incamps (see. The schools also serve as assembly points arid training sites lor local residents in
best copy available
evening. Apartment complexes have selected residents who help disseminate civil defenseand assist in training exercises and who would marshal residents in case of evacuation. Similar individuals serve in areas of single-family dwellings. The Communist Party cell apparatuseans for disseminating information, and patty functionaries periodically attend training (unctions lo demonstrate government interest in civil defense and concern over protection of the people.
he quality of training for many urban dwellers is difficult to assessationwide scale. Human source reporting Is nearly unanimous on the poor quality and irregularity of much of the training conducted for urban residents not associated with essential institutions and installations. SinceIs requited on the individual's own time, training is often not well received, but through sheer repetition the training probablyositive learning value to the trainee. The best results appear to be among the children, because of their youth and consequent receptivity, and among the older people who experienced World War ii.
n rural areas, civil defense training stresses:
protecting people, livestock, and agricultural products from chemical, biological and(CBR) effects; and
receiving and hosting evacuees from urban areas.
Because of the small size and close-knit stntcturc of villages and state and collective farms, training there appears more practical and better received titan among the mote cosmopolitan residents of cities. Soviet publications report better results among rural groups than among groups in dtles, and more confidence that rural trainees know and canthe training they have received. For rural residents not living in villages and state and collective farms, training is less structured and more sketchy, essentially being confined to literature, broadcasts, and occasional visits by traveling Instructors. It is not possible, however, to confirm Soviet writings about the state of training in rural areas through emigri sources, since few of Ihe emigres have lived or worked In agriculture or the rural economy.
C. Cadre Training
he Soviet, appear to be convinced that the success of civil defense operations will depend on the State of training and preparation of full-time civil defensearticulady cadres for industiy and for communal services in cities.
o the Soviets, their long-term ltrugglc toodern industrial base warrants special attention to training for industrial workers. In industries there ore workers organized in formations arid trained in services such as first aid provision of masks and protective dothing, and flrefighting. Special recognition is given to such cadres, and members appear in some cases to take much pride in their units They practice their skills at special sites and participate in civil defense drills at their Industries. Including operation of industrial command posts and relocation to dispersal areas. In addition to instruction In survival, industrial workers are trained in measures necessary to assure continuity ofinvolving protection of equipment, supplies, power and fuel, and finished products. High-priority industries are believed to have the best trained, most capable cadres, although training and eaerdses are not always conductedatisfactory manner.5 article. General Altunin chided factory managers who use civil defense exercises for repair work on their buddings while neglecting other aspects of the training such as firefighting or practice dbpersal
Soviets also have cadres needed toof public utilities and services suchand medical care These cadresnf urban technicians andresponsible for ihese services, and theyinstruct and supervise others assigned to assistactivities during emergencies. Institutes,and similar facilities also train cadres.
between Individuals andbeen cited in Soviet publicationseansinterest and participation by thoseIn exercises. Several human source reportsluvorably on ihe way in whichbetween civil defense formations hasforontest betweenformations conductedepublico intrigued the participatingthat they neglected to answer local
o add irahsm to training, special sitesalnjne. vlllai-ci reportedly have been constructed In many pa itsihe country. These sites contain mockuris and models which afford realistic conditions for practice of flrefighting. decontamination, and other civil defense skills (see.
ilitary Civil Defense Units
he work and training of military units assigned to dvil defense have been reported on in detail by Individuals who have served In these units, which have the primary wartime mission. of targets of rsridors destruction. Theyange of tasks from decontamination to road repair. The units arc capable of rapid augmentation and expansion. Training is frequent and stresses three themes:
updating the unit's knowledge in Its subject speciality.
instruction in its civil defense role, and
Interrelationship between dvilian dvil defense components and non-dvil-defense military
This last theme ties the unit's training lo that of dvilian units, including the augmenting of urban communal services, should conditions strain the capability of civilian units
he Soviets provideed training for officers assigned to both the military dvil defense units and to the dvil defense staffs. Junior officers for dvil defense (races are graduated from the Civil Defense Academy and receive advanced training at the Higher Central Officers School of Civil Defense in Moscow.
E. Toclical Mililaiy Units
Instruction of regular military units Inagainst CDIt weapons ranks high among training goals, and would be of value should tactical forces be tasked lo augment dvilian and military dvil defense units Having skills such as engineering or medicine, tactical units could quickly contribute to the dvil defense effort with little or no training. If tactical commitments permit.
Individual dvil defense training ol internal security Iroops. construction troops, military reservists, and members of paramilitary organizations Is largely limited to instruction In personal defense against COR weapons Units of these organizations could perform
raining Exercitt ot Sovid Gvil Defenta Village
tasks In support of civil defense operations in iheli area of assignment
sum. military training has aspectsclosely to civil defense functions,personnel to assist in peacetime aslecturers and to augment civil defense forcesif not committed to combatthe emphasis on the supporting ruleunits are to play In civil defense nsSoviet open literature and classifiedhave little evidence from other sources, suchofficers and soldiers of such units,regular military units plan and conductcivil defense operations. While both openand human sources base described theof military units in actual dvil defensea natural disaster, these sources are notwhether the units were dvil defensercgulai military units.
P. Estorcrioi
Soviets claim to place greatest of plans andilitary spokesman:
It is only with practical exercises that we can convince any individual of and demonsirate the vital necessity for the particular measure* di-lected toward improving dvil defense against
modern weapons.
authorities stress that exercisesacross the board, from theto neighborhood teams at theRecently there have been calls by the ChiefDefense to undertake more ambitious"complex" exercises whereby commandinvolve all units under their commandoperations for nuclear war. Fornuclear strikes on factories or farms, ilthat all or most dvil defense unitsns would nearby families of woikcis
literature contains references toInvolving ground play, as distinctp-niome have beenMUMIMT Most have beena certainingle industrialty district, with the primary purposecivil defense units and cadres rather thanpopulation. Some recent ones have beenbilious, perhaps reflecting Altunln's demandcity and rural civil defense exercises. One exeicise of this type occurredS atown0 people near Moscowrobable relocation site for Muscovites. According lo Soviet publications, thousands uf people participated,and reconnaissance operations wereand shelters were occupied by local workers.5 exercise, in Tul'skaya Oblast. involved the dty of Klmovsk in Klmovskly Rayon: thb was known as an "integrated rayonal exercise" There may have been other such eieicises of which we are not
aware. Trsentegrated rayonal exercise may appear with increasing frequency in dvil defense
contexts if Altunln's policies on exercise* are carried
out.
Staff exercises have been frequent in the past, and there are Indications that sevetal have taken place during the past year Procedures appear to conform to those described in open literature and other reporting.
Practical experience In dvil defense operations has been affordederies of natural disasters which have struck the Soviets In recent years. The forest and peat ftres around Moscow in the summer2 involved civilian and military dvil defense units, and finally regular military units in coordinated efforts to curb and extinguish these widespread conflagrations, whose smoke and odor were evident in downtown Moscow. We are not certain of the -organizational and command arrangements employed during this emergency. For the5 hurricane at Odessa, all elements of dvil defense, plus regular military units, functionedingle military command. The series of earthquakes in Soviet Central Asia in the spring6 also triggered the civil defense apparatus, requiring medical aid,housing, and other assistance. Again, in thb case, civilian and military dvil defense units as well as regular military dements operated under military command
Several inidHgence sources have provided information on the actual ground play in Soviet exercises. Tests have been made of evacuation by various means, Including ships and river boats as well as trucks and railroads. Industrial cadres have gone to dispersal areas, worked on shelters and fadlities, and practiced comrnunieallom links with their factory. According to open literature, shelters In evacuation areas have been built by young people during summer patriotic training, and Industrial wurkers haveIhe stockpiling and use of materials needed to
s--iru.Ui.ig machinery and lo provide protectivefor equipment. Practice warning drills arc frequent in factories, institutes, and schools and for the general public. In drills for the general public, the normal procedure Is for people to report to the neighborhood school, where they are registered, lectured, provided practical demonstrations, and then excused.
G. Trends
SOI.o accord Sigh
priority to themilitary andof civil defense.
The principal emphasis In civil defense training is on the primary task elements, especially the cadres assigned to communal services and formations at industries and institutions.
Orientation of the general public, heavily emphasized in, remains part of the program despite continued lack of enthusiasm for it among most of the population.
Increased attention to civil defense Haloing In the educational system suggests that ihe Soviets intend to rely primarily on this means for instruction of the public.
As the number of civil defense regiments ond related troop units ha* grown, according to reports, their training programs have expanded.
To increase Interest In all forms of training, civil defense officials have instituted the use of competition among units, cadres, and
Although Soviet authorities haveivil defense role to tegular units of the armed forces, there it little evidence that they arc engaged in civil defense training.
There has been an increase in the number and scope of practical exercises at various levels, ranging from staffs and formations at industrial enterprises to major civil defense headquarters and all the units under Its control. Accounts of such exercises in Soviet open literature have in many cases been confirmed by intelligence sources.
e arc unable to evaluate the success of the civil defense training program in improving the effectiveness of civil defense preparations andThe Soviets themselves are piobably unable to evaluate how well iheir training program improves combat readiness For better Indications ofwe need more hard evidence on the competence of instructors, level of participation, frequency of exercises, and exercise scenarios. Critiques by the Soviets themselves arc no substitute for this kind of Insight. The evidence we have points to improvements in the training of those civil defense organizations on which greatest reliance would be placed in astaff structure, civil defease troops and the civilian cadres and formal Ions responsible for essential services. A' more informed estimate of the training program for these elements and Its effectiveness will have to await additional evidence.
IX. EXPENDITURES FOR CIVIL DEFENSE A. Estimates
The US Intelligence Community does not have reliable estimates of the costs of Soviet civil defense. The USSR regards annual civil defense expenditures as classified information within its national or military budgetesult, civil defense expenditures do not appear as an Identified item In published Soviet budgetary data. Some financial information Isbut it is extremely fragmentary and provides an inadequate basis for estimating total expenditures.
The available data Indicate that funding and provision of resources for civil defense are not centralized.1 Central Committee decree on civil defense provided for the financing of civil defense activities from union, republic, or local budgets and from administrative and operating funds of self-supporting enterprises and organizations. The Ministry of Defense pays for military personnel, their civil defense equipment, and for materials Involved in construction ol some special projects.
ragmentary Hems about the financing of Soviet civil defense activities have become available from time to time which reflect the dispersal of authority for civil defense funding noted In1 decree.
n the absence of Soviet budget data, one way to estimate costs would be to inventory theparts of the actual program, apply cost factors to these components, and sum the results. This approachore complete and consistent body of detailed Information than we have had Up to now on
items inch as manpower, (he number and types of shelters and bunkers, mt|oi equipment, and cost factors. We are just beginning lo gel tome of the information needed to attempt thb kind of analysis, and even now data are unevenly distributed in these item categories.**
he principal cost-generating elemenls In the dvil defense program seem to be manpower, shelter and bunker construction, and, possibly,These are the elemenls on which any future costing work probably should concentrate,
B. Trends
In order to establish the trend of costs over time. II would first be necessary to establish consistent and reliable estimates of aggregate costs for several years As noted above, at present we do not have such an estimateingle year.
In the absenceeries of annual cost estimates, il Is (empting alter surveying Soviet civil-dcfense-related activities to conclude (hat II some .phase of thexpanding, then total costs must be growing. Expenditures for someconstruct km. for examprobably have been increasing in recent years. Even in the areas of expansion, however, it should be noted that additional expenditure over lime does not necessarily equatereater degree ol effective protection. The following paragraphsumber of points that one should keep in mind if exaggerated estimates of the cost of Soviet civil defense programs ate to be avoided.
If one (rics lo estimate (he likely trend of expenditures from (he limited data available, care
"Ilbe enphursed that this aaerhed darrctpioridripmfitaml akaeab ol Ihe program are specified
must be taken to distinguish new programs from old programs whose exbtence may have been undetectederiod of yean. Also one must dbtingulsh cost-generating activity from those measures and programs which, even though (hey loom large In Soviel statements, use few resources lo which cost can be attached.
here seem to be many activities In the program which, because of their nature or the way the Soviets carry them out. entail little or no budgetary cost, for example:
Some training depends on contributions of personal time by (hose receiving training.
The expedient field shelterot an ex pensive activity.
Evacuation plans ate not costly if (hey have not been tested by major exercises.
Most of the equipment requirements areby dvil defense application of equipment used in peacetime activities.
The program lacks high-cost Items of the kind found in military programs where costs are driven by weapon systems embodying expensive and technologically advanced hardware.
elated problem in assessing trends in expenditures is that of distinguishing. In any given activity, costs attributable lo dvil defense among the costs lhal should be assigned lo other motivations, such as economic development. This problem is present in many of the activities described elsewhere In thb memorandum. Including construction of new towns and fartories and dbpcrsal of Industry.lo dvil defense all the cost for any of these activities would be an overstatement of (he costs of Soviet dvil defense programs.
Original document.
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